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Technical and Safety Analysis Report

Technical and Safety Analysis Report

HIGH SPEED RAIL ASSESSMENT, PHASE II

Norwegian National Rail Administration Technical and Safety Analysis Report

JBV 900017 February 2011

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Preparation- and review documentation:

Review documentation:

Rev. Prepared by Checked by Approved by Status 1.0 DEF/18.02.2011 RFL, KJ GI Final

List of versions:

Revision Rev. Description revision Author chapters Nr. Date Version 1 18.02.2011 1.0 Delivery final version DEF, RFL 2 3 4

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Table of contents

List of tables ...... 8

List of figures...... 11

List of abbreviations ...... 16

1 Subject – Technical solutions...... 18

1.0 Introduction ...... 18 1.0.1 Brief description of scenarios...... 19 1.0.2 World high speed rail (HSR) overview...... 20 1.0.2.1 ...... 20 1.0.2.2 Traffic...... 22 1.0.2.3 HSR and the Environment ...... 23 1.0.2.4 Important HSR countries ...... 24 1.1 Standards for high-speed railways ...... 32 1.1.1 Summary ...... 32 1.1.1.1 Technical Specifications for the Interoperability (TSI) ...... 32 1.1.1.2 Norwegian Regulations “Teknisk Regelverk JDxxx“...... 36 1.1.1.3 Scenario related summary...... 41 1.1.1.4 Previous studies carried out in Norway ...... 42 1.1.2 Differences or Gaps between Norwegian norms and European standards for High Speed Railways ...... 43 1.1.2.1 Standards for HSR Infrastructure ...... 43 1.1.2.2 Standards for Technical Equipment...... 46 1.1.2.3 Standards for ...... 48 1.1.3 Recommendations for Solutions and Strategies to close the identified gaps ...... 48 1.1.3.1 Extension of the existing standards according TSI specifications ...... 48 1.1.3.2 Proposed Solutions for identified gaps ...... 49 1.2 Climatic conditions – meteorological data ...... 51 1.2.1 Summary ...... 51 1.2.2 The climate in Norway ...... 51 1.2.3 Future climate change ...... 52 1.2.4 Topographic issues and mass wasting...... 55 1.2.4.1 Mass wasting in Norway ...... 55 1.2.4.2 Bedrock...... 56 1.2.5 Climate change and extreme precipitation ...... 56 1.2.6 More about different types of mass wasting ...... 57

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1.2.7 Hazard mapping rockfall ...... 61 1.2.8 Climatic influence on the construction phase ...... 61 1.2.8.1 Introduction ...... 61 1.2.8.2 Important issues due to calendar and winter conditions in mountain areas ...... 62 1.2.8.3 Main disturbances in the construction phase due to climatic conditions...... 62 1.2.9 Climatic influence on the rolling stock...... 63 1.2.9.1 Introduction ...... 63 1.2.9.2 Main findings and problem areas...... 63 1.2.9.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures ...... 64 1.2.10 Climatic influence on the operation of the rail system...... 66 1.2.10.1 Introduction ...... 66 1.2.10.2 Main disturbances of the operation of the line ...... 66 1.2.10.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures...... 67 1.2.11 Early warning systems – EWS...... 70 1.2.11.1 Early warning systems ...... 70 1.2.11.2 List of existing monitoring methods...... 70 1.3 Technical solutions...... 72 1.3.1 Summary ...... 72 1.3.2 Description track construction types ...... 74 1.3.2.1 Ballast sleeper tracks...... 74 1.3.2.2 Slab tracks ...... 78 1.3.2.3 Summary of described track systems...... 91 1.3.3 Description of parameters influencing the track system ...... 91 1.3.3.1 Operational parameters ...... 92 1.3.3.2 Functional parameters ...... 97 1.3.3.3 Geotechnical parameters...... 104 1.3.3.4 Environmental parameters...... 109 1.3.3.5 Service parameters...... 111 1.3.3.6 Cost parameters ...... 112 1.3.4 Analysis matrix...... 116 1.3.4.1 Methodology of the analysis ...... 116 1.3.4.2 Results of track assessment...... 117 1.3.4.3 Explanation of the results ...... 118 1.3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis...... 119 1.3.5 Recommendations of track system according to scenarios...... 120 1.4 Infrastructure concepts...... 123 1.4.1 Summary ...... 123

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1.4.2 Infrastructure concepts – Alignment parameters ...... 124 1.4.2.1 Definition of variants ...... 124 1.4.2.2 Alignment parameters...... 124 1.4.2.3 Analysis matrix...... 131 1.4.2.4 Effects of alignment parameters on structures, safety and control equipment ...... 134 1.4.2.5 Recommendations regarding the appropriate alignment parameters in relation to scenarios and conventional / tilting operation ...... 134 1.4.3 Infrastructure Concepts - Case Studies ...... 137 1.4.3.1 Scope and objective of the survey...... 137 1.4.3.2 Tilting train concepts...... 138 1.4.3.3 Tilting train information and experience by country ...... 142 1.4.3.4 Manufacturers...... 155 1.4.3.5 Conclusions ...... 156 1.5 Rolling stock...... 158 1.5.1 Summary ...... 158 1.5.2 Objectives of rolling stock assessment...... 158 1.5.3 Definition of concepts ...... 158 1.5.3.1 Dedicated High Speed ...... 158 1.5.3.2 Tilting trains ...... 159 1.5.3.3 Other trains using high speed railways...... 159 1.5.3.4 Mixed traffic ...... 159 1.5.4 Assumptions ...... 160 1.5.4.1 Scenarios given from JBV ...... 160 1.5.4.2 Proven design solutions...... 160 1.5.4.3 Compliance to TSI’s...... 160 1.5.4.4 Particulars for Norway ...... 161 1.5.5 Evaluation model, description...... 161 1.5.5.1 Train concepts ...... 163 1.5.5.2 Train parameters ...... 163 1.5.6 Critical parameters for train concepts ...... 164 1.5.6.1 Climate and environment...... 164 1.5.6.2 Route alignment...... 166 1.5.6.3 Pressure pulses ...... 166 1.5.6.4 Collisions with animals...... 167 1.5.6.5 Fire and evacuation - Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed?...... 168 1.5.6.6 External noise ...... 168 1.5.6.7 Length of train...... 169 1.5.6.8 Signalling - ERTMS ...... 169

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1.5.6.9 Track impact ...... 169 1.5.6.10 Energy consumption ...... 169 1.5.7 Information of existing & future trains ...... 170 1.5.7.1 Bombardier Transportation ...... 170 1.5.7.2 ...... 170 1.5.7.3 AnsaldoBreda ...... 171 1.5.7.4 ...... 171 1.5.7.5 Stadler ...... 172 1.5.7.6 Hyundai Rotem ...... 172 1.5.7.7 Kawasaki ...... 172 1.5.7.8 South & Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (CSR)...... 173 1.5.7.9 Hitachi...... 173 1.5.7.10 Mitsubishi ...... 173 1.5.8 Absolute requirements for Rolling Stock...... 174 1.5.9 Remember list when buying trains...... 174 2 Subject – Risk Assessment ...... 176

2.0 Introduction ...... 176 2.1 Summary...... 176 2.2 Definitions ...... 179 2.3 Purpose of the HSR-risk assessment ...... 179 2.4 Scope of the HSR-risk assessment...... 179 2.4.1 System-variant 1...... 180 2.4.2 System-variant 2...... 180 2.5 Risk assessment, general approach ...... 181 2.5.1 Risk acceptance criteria, general introduction ...... 182 2.5.1.1 Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS) ...... 182 2.5.1.2 Explicit risk estimation and harmonized risk acceptance criteria...... 183 2.5.2 Risk assessment, bottom-up-approach for RAC-TS...... 184 2.5.2.1 Hazard identification ...... 184 2.5.2.2 Qualitative consequence (severity) estimation ...... 185 2.5.2.3 Evaluation if RAC-TS is applicable for specific hazard...... 187 2.5.2.4 Estimation / quantification of safety barriers and THR-allocation ...... 187 2.5.2.5 Hazard List with THRs ...... 188 2.5.3 Risk Assessment, Top-Down-Approach ...... 188 2.5.3.1 Definition of Top-Events ...... 189 2.5.3.2 Quantification of Top-Events ...... 190

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2.5.3.3 Top-Event, evaluation of rail statistics ...... 190 2.5.3.4 Evaluation of accident rate ...... 194 2.5.3.5 Consequence analysis for every Top-Event ...... 195 2.5.3.6 Estimation / calculation of the collective risk...... 195 2.5.3.7 Residual collective risk for every system-variant ...... 196 2.5.3.8 Individual risk for every Top-Event ...... 196 2.5.3.9 Residual individual risk ...... 197 2.5.3.10 Top-Event-specific risk assessment...... 198 2.6 Sensitivity analysis ...... 224 2.7 Perspective ...... 226 3 Subject – HSR Contribution to transport safety and security...... 228

3.0 Introduction ...... 228 3.0.1 Objectives & Scope ...... 228 3.0.2 Limitations...... 228 3.0.3 Definitions ...... 229 3.1 Summary...... 229 3.2 Availability of input data ...... 229 3.3 Transports...... 230 3.3.1 Types of data and evaluation approach...... 230 3.3.2 Railway transport ...... 231 3.3.2.1 High speed railway ...... 232 3.3.3 Road transport ...... 232 3.3.3.1 Car transport...... 232 3.3.3.2 Bus transport ...... 233 3.3.3.3 Truck transport...... 235 3.3.4 Air transport ...... 235 3.3.5 Ferry transport ...... 236 3.4 Safety...... 237 3.4.1 Types of data and evaluation approach...... 237 3.4.2 Railway transport ...... 237 3.4.2.1 Conventional rail ...... 238 3.4.2.2 High speed railway ...... 239 3.4.3 Road transport ...... 240 3.4.3.1 Car ...... 241 3.4.3.2 Bus ...... 243 3.4.3.3 Truck...... 244

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3.4.3.4 Dependencies...... 245 3.4.4 Air transport ...... 246 3.4.5 Ferry transport ...... 247 3.5 Model description...... 247 3.5.1 Model structure ...... 247 3.5.2 Uncertainty analysis...... 248 3.6 Estimation of the future distributions between types of transport means ...... 249 3.6.1 Scenario 0...... 250 3.6.2 Scenario 1...... 250 3.6.3 Scenario 2...... 251 3.7 Results ...... 252 3.7.1 Estimation of the current transport safety level and development ...... 252 3.7.2 Estimation of changes in safety and the consequences of the changes ...... 253 3.7.3 Uncertainty analysis...... 255 3.8 Conclusions...... 261 3.9 Security of HSR Systems regarding sabotage and terrorism ...... 262 Table of references...... 264

Annexes...... 270

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List of tables

Table 1: Main technical parameters of existing HS – lines; in ( ) exceptional values...... 21 Table 2: HSR Traffic 2009...... 22 Table 3: Overview HSL in ...... 24 Table 4: Overview HSL under construction in France...... 24 Table 5: Overview HSL in Germany...... 25 Table 6: Overview HSL under construction in Germany ...... 26 Table 7: Overview HSL in ...... 26 Table 8: Overview HSL under construction in Spain...... 27 Table 9: Overview HSL in ...... 28 Table 10: Overview HSL in ...... 28 Table 11: Overview HSL under construction in Japan ...... 29 Table 12: Overview HSL in China ...... 30 Table 13: Overview HSL under construction in China...... 30 Table 14: Overview technical specifications for Interoperability...... 35 Table 15: Parameter requirements of the TSI SRT...... 38 Table 16: Parameter requirements of the TSI PRM ...... 38 Table 17: Parameter requirements of the TSI CCS ...... 39 Table 18: Parameter requirements of the TSI INF ...... 40 Table 19: Parameter requirements of the TSI ENE...... 41 Table 20: Limit value analysis ...... 44 Table 21: Precipitation intensity in Norway ...... 52 Table 22: Problem / measure matrix for climatic influence on rolling stock...... 64 Table 23: Problem/measure matrix of climatic influence for rail system operation ...... 67 Table 24: Summary of track types...... 91 Table 25: Components of the ...... 97 Table 26 Construction height of track systems ...... 98 Table 27: Requirements on super- and substructure of ballasted tracks ...... 107 Table 28: Requirements on super- and substructure of slab tracks...... 107 Table 29 Mass-spring-systems ...... 110 Table 30: Scoring values of track solutions according to scenario A - D ...... 117 Table 31: Results sensitivity analysis...... 120 Table 32: Parameter comparison of different standards ...... 126 Table 33: Lower limit values (ENV / ÖBB / JBV)...... 126 Table 34: TSI limit value...... 126 Table 35: Comparison of the maximum permissible route gradients ...... 127 Table 36: excess depending on speed ...... 127

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Table 37: Possible speeds in curves R = 1’000 m ...... 130 Table 38: Illustration of different characteristics for curves at 200 km/h ...... 134 Table 39: Finnish tilting trains...... 143 Table 40: Tilted regional trains in Germany ...... 144 Table 41: High speed tilting trains in Germany ...... 144 Table 42: Tilting trains currently in use in Great Britain...... 146 Table 43: Tilting trains currently in use in Italy ...... 147 Table 44: Tilting trains in Norway ...... 149 Table 45: Tilting trains in ...... 150 Table 46: Cant and maximum lateral accelerations in Spain ...... 150 Table 47: Tilting trains in Spain ...... 151 Table 48: Tilting trains in ...... 152 Table 49: Tilting trains in ...... 153 Table 50: Tilting trains in the USA...... 154 Table 51: Residual risk related to Top-Events, overview ...... 176 Table 52: Residual collective risk, overview...... 177 Table 53: Residual collective risk, point estimate overview ...... 177 Table 54: Residual collective risk of personal. overview ...... 178 Table 55: Residual individual risk of passengers and 3rd persons. overview ...... 178 Table 56: Definitions...... 179 Table 57: HSR-System, interfaces...... 185 Table 58: Hazard severity level, according to Table 3 in EN 50126-1 ...... 186 Table 59: Accident statistics UIC...... 193 Table 60: Accident statistics Norway ERADIS ...... 193 Table 61: Distribution of fatalities to person groups, UIC ...... 193 Table 62: Collective Risk parameters Norway ...... 194 Table 63: Comparison of risk parameters ...... 194 Table 64: Operating figures...... 197 Table 65: Top-Event 1, statistical data ...... 198 Table 66: Risk estimation, Top-Event 1 ...... 201 Table 67: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 1 ...... 201 Table 68: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 1 ...... 201 Table 69: Top-Event 2, statistical data [83] ...... 202 Table 70: Risk estimation, Top-Event 2 ...... 205 Table 71: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 2 ...... 206 Table 72: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 2 ...... 206 Table 73: Top-Event 3, statistical data [84] ...... 206

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Table 74: Risk estimation, Top-Event 3 ...... 208 Table 75: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 3 ...... 208 Table 76: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 3 ...... 209 Table 77: Top-Event 4, statistical data ...... 209 Table 78: Risk estimation, Top-Event 4 ...... 211 Table 79: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 4 ...... 211 Table 80: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 4 ...... 212 Table 81: Top-Event 5, statistical data ...... 212 Table 82: Risk estimation, Top-Event 5 ...... 214 Table 83: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 5 ...... 214 Table 84: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 5 ...... 215 Table 85: Top-Event 5, statistical data ...... 215 Table 86: Risk estimation, Top-Event 6 ...... 216 Table 87: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 6 ...... 217 Table 88: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 6 ...... 217 Table 89: Top-Event 7, statistical data ...... 218 Table 90: Risk estimation, Top-Event 7 ...... 220 Table 91: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 7 ...... 220 Table 92: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 7 ...... 220 Table 93: Top-Event 8, statistical data ...... 221 Table 94: Risk estimation, Top-Event 8 ...... 223 Table 95: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 8 ...... 223 Table 96: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 8 ...... 223 Table 97: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter of the collective risk model (system variant 1) ...... 224 Table 98: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter of the collective risk model (system variant 2) ...... 224 Table 99: Estimated changes when HSR combined with conventional rail is implemented billion passenger and vehicle kilometres ...... 251 Table 100: Estimated changes when a separate HSR is implemented ...... 252 Table 101: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in Norway and the annual safety development...... 252 Table 102: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios presented as total number of fatalities during 25 years...... 254

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List of figures

Figure 1: CO2 Emissions by passenger kilometres and transport mode 23 Figure 2: 3-layers regulatory structure 33 Figure 3: Interoperability - Sub-systems 34 Figure 4: Structure of the Teknisk Regelverk 37 Figure 5: Principle of ETCS level 2 47 Figure 6: Expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation from normal period 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. 53 Figure 7: Expected change in annual temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100. 53 Figure 8: Expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. 54 Figure 9: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. 54 Figure 10: The topography in Norway 55 Figure 11: Mass wasting records from the National Road Administration, various types 55 Figure 12: Excerpt of bedrock map of southern Norway 56 Figure 13: Soil/sediment slide 57 Figure 14: Rissa was the scene of the largest quick clay landslide in Norway last century, 29 April 1978 58 Figure 15: Large rockfall at Mundheim in Hardanger in 2006 59 Figure 16: Trigger areas for avalanches in Jotunheimen 59 Figure 18: Comparison of slab, loose snow and slush flows 60 Figure 19: Example hazard maps from Hardanger 61 Figure 20: TGV track with Twinblock sleeper B450 (formerly U41 VAX) 75 Figure 21: Ballasted track with B 70 sleepers 75 Figure 22: B 70 pre-stressed 76 Figure 23: B 90 pre-stressed concrete sleeper 76 Figure 24: Ballasted track with Y-steel sleepers 77 Figure 25: Wide Sleeper system 78 Figure 26: New high-speed line -Rhine/Main, Hallerbachtalbruecke, Germany 80 Figure 27: Cross section RHEDA 2000® 80 Figure 28: Cross section RHEDA 2000 (Turnout area) 80 Figure 29: New ICE high-speed line Nürnberg-Ingolstadt with System BÖGL 81 Figure 30: System Bögl detail and description 81 Figure 31: Cross-section on earth structure with system BÖGL 81 Figure 32: Finished system NFF Thyssen 83 Figure 33: Constructional principal of NFF structure 83

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Figure 34: System overview PORR ÖBB 84 Figure 35: System PORR ÖBB on embankment 84 Figure 36: J-SLAB System on open track 85 Figure 37: J-SLAB System overview 85 Figure 38: J-SLAB (Taiwan HSL) with ballasted protection aside 85 Figure 39: System LVT-Track 86 Figure 40: System overview LVT-Track 86 Figure 41: System overview GETRAC (on asphalt support layer) 87 Figure 42: System overview of EDILON system 88 Figure 43: Top View EBS system 89 Figure 44: Cross section EBS-system 89 Figure 45: EBS system pictures from construction site 90 Figure 46: Details of the EBS-block 90 Figure 47: Impacts on earth structures 105 Figure 48: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 1.25 % gradient over a distance of 10 km 128 Figure 49: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 2.5 % gradient over a distance of 10 km 128 Figure 50: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 3.5 % gradient over a distance of 6 km 129 Figure 51: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 1.25 % gradient in the start zone 129 Figure 52: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 1 132 Figure 53: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 2 132 Figure 54: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 3 133 Figure 55: Radii to a scale of 1:5’000 from the table for change of direction of 20, 30 and 40 degrees 135 Figure 56: Recommendation of alignment parameters for conventional (non tilting) trains 136 Figure 57: Recommendation of alignment parameters for tilting trains 136 Figure 58: Active tilting system type 140 Figure 59: Passive tilting system type 140 Figure 60: Wako tilting system/ 141 Figure 61: Icy bogie due to winter conditions 142 Figure 62: Part of the evaluation model as example 162 Figure 63: Number of animal collisions 167 Figure 64: Animal collisions 2009 according to type of animal 168 Figure 65: Zefiro train 170 Figure 66: Velaro train 171

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Figure 67: 171 Figure 68: AGV train 172 Figure 69: Flirt to NSB 172 Figure 70: UK 395 173 Figure 71: train 174 Figure 72: Hazard identification 185 Figure 73: Risk matrix with RAC-TS reference value 186 Figure 74: Example for calibration of risk matrix 187 Figure 75: Risk matrix applied for hazard with lower severity but credible immediate potential 188 Figure 76: Top-Events, overview 189 Figure 77: Fire, causes 194 Figure 78: Fire, consequence analysis 195 Figure 79: Derivation of the collective risk 196 Figure 80: Example of derivation of the residual collective risk 196 Figure 81: Example of derivation of the individual risk 197 Figure 82: Example of derivation of the residual individual risk 198 Figure 83: Top-Event 1 „Derailment“, system-variant 1 199 Figure 84: Top-Event 1 „Derailment“, system-variant 2 200 Figure 85: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, wrong switch position 203 Figure 86: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, stop signal passed 203 Figure 87: FTA / ETA system-variant 2, wrong switch position 204 Figure 88: FTA / ETA system-variant 2, stop signal passed 205 Figure 89: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, object on track 207 Figure 90: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire in rolling stock 210 Figure 91: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire at track 210 Figure 92: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform while entry /exit 213 Figure 93: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform by passing train 213 Figure 94: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, person(s) traverse 216 Figure 95: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, level crossing unsecured 216 Figure 96: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person crosses track 218 Figure 97: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, objects / parts loosened / raised 219 Figure 98: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, electrocution accidents 221 Figure 99: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, dangerous goods accidents 222 Figure 100: Range of collective risks 225 Figure 101: Results of the sensitivity analysis for each Top-Event (system variant 1) 225 Figure 102: Results of the sensitivity analysis for each Top-Event (system variant 2) 226 Figure 103: Billion railway passenger kilometres in Norway. 231

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Figure 104: Billion railway vehicle kilometres in Norway. 232 Figure 105: Billion passenger kilometres (driver and passenger) in cars on Norwegian roads. 233 Figure 106: Billion vehicle kilometres in cars on Norwegian roads. 233 Figure 107: Billion passenger kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads. 234 Figure 108: Billion vehicle kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads. 234 Figure 109: Billion vehicle kilometres in trucks on Norwegian roads. 235 Figure 110: Billion passenger kilometres with airplanes in Norway. 1970-2009. 236 Figure 111: Billion passenger kilometres with ferry . 2005-2008. 236 Figure 112: Number of fatalities on Norwegian railways during 1996-2003. 238 Figure 113: Passenger fatality per billion conventional rail passenger kilometres. 239 Figure 114: Fatality for others per billion conventional rail vehicle kilometres. 239 Figure 115: The number of persons killed in road traffic accidents in Norway during 1970-2009. 241 Figure 116: Passenger and driver fatality for car traffic per billion passenger kilometres 242 Figure 117: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion car vehicle kilometres (“cars involved in killing others”) excluding passenger and drivers in Norway during 2005-2009. 243 Figure 118: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion bus vehicle kilometres (“bus involved in killing others”) after accidents with cars; buses and single bus accidents are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009. 244 Figure 119: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion truck vehicle kilometres (“trucks involved in killing others”) after accidents with cars are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009. 245 Figure 120: The estimated number of international air plane passenger fatalities per billion air plane passenger kilometres according to the ICAO 246 Figure 121: Fatalities on ferries in Norway during 2000-2009. 247 Figure 122: Schematic description of the approach for uncertainty analysis. 249 Figure 123: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in Norway expressed as the expected number of fatalities for each means of transport. 253 Figure 124: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios presented as total number of fatalities for four different time horizons. 254 Figure 125 Change in predicted societal transport safety S1 and S2 compared to S0 in Norway for four different time horizons. 255 Figure 126: The economic consequences of transport safety level changes with the implementation of HSR systems in Norway for different time periods. 255 Figure 127: The uncertainties of total societal safety level forecasts of transports, presented as total number of fatalities during 25 years in Norway, for the studied scenarios. 256 Figure 128: The uncertainties of economic consequences of safety changes for Scenarios 1 and Scenario 2. 256

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Figure 129: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years. 257 Figure 130: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years. 257 Figure 131: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 1 during 25 years 258 Figure 132: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 1 during 25 years 258 Figure 133: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 2 during 25 years 259 Figure 134: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 3 during 25 years 259 Figure 135: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25 years 259 Figure 136: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25 years 260 Figure 137: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25 years 260 Figure 138: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25 years 260

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List of abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads, US ATC ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies in the AVE Alta Velocidad Español, Spanish HS train concept CER Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies CSM Common Safety Methods CST Common Safety Targets CSI Common Safety Indicator DMU Diesel EIM European Rail Infrastructure Managers EMU EN Euronorm ERA European Railway Agency EqFa Equivalent Fatalities (means a measurement of the consequences of significant accidents combining fatalities and injuries, where one fatality is considered statistically 10 major or 100 minor injuries). ERADIS European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety ETCS European Train Control System EU European Community FLIRT Fast Light Innovative Regional Train, EMU produced by AG FRA Federal Railroad Administration, US HS High Speed HSL High Speed Line HSR High Speed Rail HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning IC InterCity ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICE , German HS train concept IRMA Structured outline of all train systems splitted in 14 sections; 1= Carbody, 2= bogie and running gear, 3=brakes, etc. JBV Jernbaneverket, Norwegian Rail Infrastructure Operator KIT Karlsruhe Institute of Technology km Kilometres min Minute Mio. Million MTBF Mean Time Between Failure NRV National Reference Value NNR Notified National Rules NSA National Safety Authority NSB Norwegian Rail Traffic Operator Pkm Passenger kilometres OHL Q Probability

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RA Railway Authority RAC-TS Risk Acceptance Criterion for technical systems RSSB Railway Safety Standards and Boards, UK SCB Swedish Statistisk Centralbyrå SI Safety Integrity SIL Safety Integrity Level SJT Statens Jernbanetilsyn (Norwegian Railway Inspectorate) SRA Safety Regulatory Authority SSB Statistisk sentralbyrå TGV Train à grande vitesse, French HS train concept THR Tolerable Hazard Rate TSI Technical Specifications for Interoperability UIC Union Internationale des Chemins de fer, International Union of Railways UK United Kingdom UNIFE Union des Industries Ferroviaires Européennes, Association of the European Rail Industry

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1 Subject – Technical solutions

1.0 Introduction On the 19th of February 2010 Jernbaneverket got the mandate of assessing the issue of high- speed railway lines in Norway. The study is being organised as an independent project organisation within Jernbaneverket´s “HighSpeed Rail Assessment Project 2010-12”. The assessment shall include recommendations about which long term strategies shall form the basis of the development of long distance passenger train transport in the southern part of Norway. The project is due for completion in February 2012, in order to inform for the 2014-23 National Transport Plan. The study work has been divided into three phases. The first phase began with the collation and assessment of earlier studies by COWI. The report in hand is part of the second phase to establish overall principles for high speed development, whilst the evaluation of specific routes will form the final phase. An important target in phase 2 is to identify which high-speed concepts are adaptable to Norwegian conditions. The main assessment shall explain and analyse common problems and prerequisites, followed by analyses of the different corridors in Phase 3. Phase 2 was divided into six assignments which have been worked out in parallel under the coordination of Jernbaneverket: 1. Market analysis: Atkins Group, with Ernst&Young, Temple, Rand Europe and ITS Leeds from the UK. 2. Rail-specific planning and development analysis: WSP Samhällsbyggnad of Sweden, with Transrail Sweden AB and Multiconsult AS of Norway. 3. Financial and economic analysis: the Atkins Group consortium plus Faithful+Gould of the UK. 4. Commercial and contract strategies: PricewaterhouseCoopers of Norway and the UK. 5. Technical and safety analysis: Pöyry Infra of Germany, with Interfleet Technology, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and Sweco Norge AS. 6. Environmental analysis: Asplan Viak of Norway, with MISA, VWI of Germany and Brekke og Strand Akustikk AS. These different issues of the six assignments constitute a basis for corridor analysis. It was hereby important that the premises may be used flexibly in the corridor analyses. Work package 5 “Technical and safety analysis” has been worked out by a team of Pöyry, Interfleet, Sweco and KIT. The report contains assessment of: World overview of high-speed rail, 1. Technical tasks, namely: • Standards and norms that are needed for high-speed rail, • Aspects of Norway’s different weather and climatic conditions with regard to possible high-speed rail construction, • Different technical track solutions, • Infrastructure concepts comprising a alignment parameter analysis and a case study of tilting train operation in 10 different countries, • Rolling stock.

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2. Risk assessment with regard to high-speed rail operation, 3. Safety analyses linked to different speeds and types of mixed traffic. To provide a comprehensive report of the assignment all tasks were compiled in the document in hand. However, every main tasks forms a self-contained chapter with an own summary to facilitate reading.

1.0.1 Brief description of scenarios Based on the mandate the assignment had to consider four different scenarios to assess which action alternatives are best suited in order to obtain the goals for the transport politics in the different corridors, namely: A The reference alternative: based on the existing railway lines. B A more offensive further development of the existing railway infrastructure, also outside the IC area. C High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and IC strategy. D Mainly separate high-speed lines. Following assignments and interpretations for the assessment have been made:

► Assignment of the scenarios A. The reference alternative: based on the existing railway politics: • no new tracks built compared to the projects already started as of November 2010, • normal maintenance work of the tracks will continue as today, e.g. replacement of worn tracks etc to keep the standard as the same level as today, • not relevant to the TSI for the trans-European high speed rail system, • speed < 160 km/h. B. More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the InterCity area: • in accordance with TSI-Category III: specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h • e.g. removal of level crossings, increasing curve radius’s, increased cant etc., • speed: 160 – 200 km/h. C. High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity strategy: • high-speed concepts which partly incorporate the existing network. Some new parts of the line which is built according to high speed concept without any level crossings. The new lines will not necessarily be built in same alignment as the existing track. • in accordance with TSI-Category II / III specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case. • speed: 200 – 250 km/h.

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D. Mainly separate high-speed lines • High-speed lines largely separate from the existing network. As scenario C but to be built for the complete corridor from start to end station. • In accordance with TSI-Category I: Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or higher than 250 km/h. • speed: 250 – 350 km/h.

1.0.2 World high speed rail (HSR) overview

1.0.2.1 Infrastructure In December 2010 a total of 6’637 km of new high speed lines (HSL) are in Europe in commercial service; 2’527 km of HSL are under construction and another 8’605 km of HSL are planned. The four countries France, Germany, Spain and Italy are operating 6’160 km HSL, which means 93 % of the European total. Therefore this chapter will concentrate on these four countries adding Japan, where HSR started already in 1964. Today Japanese railways are operating 2’534 km HSL; 508 km of HSL are under construction. China has actually 4’079 km of HSL in service and 6’154 km HSL are under construction. The development of the European HSL has been done over a period of more than forty years. During this period the design criteria have been modified as experience has been gained with the different aspects of high speed running. In particular, the geometric parameters chosen for a certain design speed of a new HSL permitted higher maximum speeds than those specified when the line was opened. Experience shows that it is worth to keep a certain « reserve of speed » for the future. Several European HSL are designed for 350 km/h, actually the maximum speed is 320 km/h. Parallel to the construction of HSL new HS trains were developed. The success of HSR is due to the fact that HSL, HS train as well as HS services (station, ticketing) were handled together. As far as traffic is concerned the HSL can be divided into three types: Type 1: Exclusively high speed traffic (dedicated HSL). This is the case in France and Japan as well as in Germany (Köln – ) and new high speed lines in Spain. Type 2: High speed passenger traffic, with conventional passenger trains at lower speeds. In this group is Spain. Type 3: Mixed traffic with high speed and conventional passenger and freight. This is the case in Italy and Germany, as well as in France for the by-pass Nimes-Montpellier and the future line to Italy Lyon – Torino. In 2001 UIC has published the report "Mixed traffic operations on high speed lines: experience and trends", relating experience with mixed traffic operations, trends in terms of design and construction criteria and the technical aspects to be considered. In this report Prof. A. Lopez Pita came to the recommendation: “Before selecting the geometrical parameters and in particular the maximum gradient and length of gradient, where operating freight trains is envisaged, proceed with an analysis of the actual impact of these parameters on the following variables at least: investment into infrastructure, operating costs and hauled load of freight trains.” In each individual case a decision-making process will be necessary. The table below gives an overview of the main technical parameters of HSL:

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Table 1: Main technical parameters of existing HS – lines; in ( ) exceptional values

Country Operation Design Speed Gradient Radius Cant [km/h] [%] [mm] [mm] [mm]

France dedicated (SE) 300 3.5 4’000 (3’200) 180 85

dedicated 350 2.5 7’100 (5’500) 180 65

Germany mixed traffic (HW) 250 1.25 7’000 (5’100) 90 80

dedicated (KF) 300 4 3’425 160 (170 slab) 150

Spain dedicated (MS) 300 1.25 4’000 150 60 (65)

dedicated (MB) 350 2.5 7’250 (6’615) 140 (160) 60 (165)

Italy mixed traffic (FR) 250 0.75 3’700 n.a. n.a

mixed traffic 300 1.8 5’450 105 n.a.

EU TSI dedicated 250 - 300 3.5 3’793 * 180 100 (130)

dedicated 350 3.5 5’596* 180 80

Japan dedicated (T) 270 2 2’500 200 90

dedicated (S) 300 1.25 4’000 180 90

Norway mixed traffic 250 1.25 4’000 (2’900) 90 (125) 100 (130)

* TSI contains no explicit value for the radius. This value is calculated with the other parameters in the table.

20 December 2007 the published the technical specification for interoperability (TSI) relating to the ‘infrastructure’ sub-system of the trans-European HSR - system. This TSI shall be applicable to all new infrastructure of the trans-European HSR system. The values are valid up to a maximum speed of 350 km/h. For the maximum gradient exists a very large margin of variation, between 1.2 % (mixed) and 4.0 % (dedicated), which clearly shows that it is difficult to fix a recommended value, because traffic and topography of the region that a new line passes through play a major role in the decisions taken. The TSI specifies a maximum gradient of 3.5 % over a continuous length not exceeding 6 km; to which the condition is added that the average gradient should not exceed 2.5 % on 10 km. The parameters essential to determine the other geometric characteristics, especially the radius are cant and cant deficiency. There is a tendency to reduce the value of the cant deficiency as the speed increases. However, it seems possible to design tilting trains in the future for speeds above 300 km/h which could operate on the HSL with larger cant deficiencies than are allowed for conventional HS trains. Taken into account the cant and cant deficiency the regular radius for design speeds of 300 km/h to 350 km/h is between 3’500 m and 7’000 m. The TSI specifies a minimum figure of 4.50 m for the distance between track centre lines (for speed limits higher than 300 km/h). This value is used in France and Germany; in Italy 5.00 m are realized. The economic implications can be considerable if the transverse section is increased. Studies carried out for the international section Figueres - Perpignan of the Barcelona - Perpignan HSL showed that a variation of the distance between track centres from 4.5 m to 4.8 m would involve an increase in cost of the whole civil engineering work of 1 %. Some railways (DB, FS, SNCF, JR) have developed HS ballastless (slab) track. In particular, in Germany the HSL Köln – Frankfurt is equipped with ballastless track, except for the zones where the trains must travel at speeds of less than 200 km/h (stations, etc.). The cost for building these tracks is up to 100 % higher than that for ballasted track, but experience shows that, especially in tunnels, the maintenance costs are less than the costs of ballasted track (of the order of 1/5th), due to the slower degradation of the geometrical parameters of these tracks. According to Spanish estimates, the cost of slab track would be double and the maintenance

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 22 of (270) cost would be half. These estimates assume a life of 60 years for slab track against 30 years for ballasted track. It is, however, premature to conclude that the overall life cycle cost of ballastless track would be considerably less than that for conventional track. New HSL are relatively expensive, with costs in Europe ranging from 10 to 40 million €/km. The cost depends on whether the new lines are built for mixed traffic operations or for passenger services alone, but also and particularly on the terrain they cross. Some country specific values of HSL costs are mentioned in the following chapters.

1.0.2.2 Traffic The HSL built to date have generally brought journey time reductions of 50 %. The phenomenal success of HSR is borne out by traffic growth expressed as passenger-kilometres (Pkm). The figure of 104.4 billion Pkm achieved in Europe in 2009 was doubled in only ten years. The 76 billion Pkm figures recorded in Japan (for a population of 127 million) demonstrate the massive untapped potential for HSR in Europe (EU has a population of 500 million) and indeed across the world. The Japanese use their HS trains six times as often as the Europeans. The last column of the table below demonstrates the success of HSR. In these five countries HS trains are responsible for 23 to 59 % of the whole railway’s passenger km (including short distance traffic).

Table 2: HSR Traffic 20091

Country Total trainset stock Kilometres travelled High Kilometres travelled train High Speed [%] Speed >230 km/h Speed [Billion Pkm] total country [Billion Pkm]

France 440 51.9 87.7 59.2

Germany 233 22.6 76.8 29.4

Spain 127 11.5 23 50

Italy 83 10.7 45.6 23.5

Japan 275 76 244.2 31.1

Short-haul journeys by air as well as car use are especially well-suited to a transfer to rail. Some examples show the substantial shift in market share that followed the commissioning of HSR. Shortly after its launch in 1994, HS trains secured 60 % of the rail-air market on the to route; today Eurostar holds 71 % of the market. Conventional trains had only 12 % market share on the Madrid – Barcelona route, actually HSR’s share is higher than 50 % in relation to the air. The Madrid – Seville HSL has won over substantial market shares from the airlines, buses and cars. Actually HSR secures 84 % of the rail-air market. Madrid – Seville is the very best European HSR, enjoying a load factor of 75 % and a second-to-none punctuality record of 99.8 %. In other European HS countries exists similar experience about the transfer from air and road to the HSR. In France, Germany and Italy HS trains also run on the conventional lines (at the normal maximum speed for those lines) up to 200 or 220 km/h. By connecting with existing lines HS trains can serve many more destinations and can access city centre stations. Therefore the time savings of the HSL are brought to regions without HSL. In Spain the HS trains AVE (AltaVelocidad Espagnol) are running only on the HSL, but there are trains from Talgo equipped with an automatic gauge-switching system which allows using HSL and conventional lines. The Japanese HS trains can only use the HSL.

1 Cp. [1].

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Since the opening of the French Mediterranean HSL (2001) TGV passengers can cover the 750 km between Paris and Marseilles in a mere 3 hours. After completion of the whole Paris – Strasbourg HSL French TGV and German ICE will link Paris to Strasbourg in 1h 50 min. Today the first Spanish HSL Madrid – Seville is the very best European HSR service, enjoying a load factor of 75 % and a second-to-none punctuality record of 99.8 %. This excellent performance is due to the fact that Madrid – Seville line is a dedicated HSL. Non-stop AVE trains take 2 hours 15 minutes to cover the 471 km, at an average speed of 209 km/h. The timetable therefore incorporates sufficient slack time to absorb most delays.

1.0.2.3 HSR and the Environment HS trains running at 250 – 350 km/h are not without consequences for the environment. The first point to mention is the energy consumption. With their high load factors and the regeneration of electrical energy during braking (ICE), these trains have a low specific energy consumption. That of the German ICE, for example, is no more than about 2.4 litres of petrol (roughly 1.6 litres for the French TGV) per 100 Pkm that means less than one-third that of a car on a long-distance trip. HSR is energy efficient and produces a minimum of greenhouse gases and thanks to electric traction can easily switch to renewable energies. The emissions generated by trains depend on the power generation mix. ADEME (French environment agency) published in 2008 a comparison of the energy efficiency of different modes in France as well as the emission of the greenhouse gases, transferred in CO2 values. The picture demonstrates the good record of HSR (TGV) compared to conventional trains (grandes lignes), private car (vehicule particulier) and air (avions), unit: gCO2/Pkm..

2 Figure 1: CO2 Emissions by passenger kilometres and transport mode

In transport is responsible for 25 % of all CO2 emissions; the part of rail is small. A shift of traffic from the roads and airways to rail will support a sustainable mobility. The construction of HSR always means encroaching on nature (land take, separation effects). Environmental considerations have an important role to play in the planning of HSL. The aim of the work is to avoid damage where possible and at least bring it down to a justifiable level. To

2 Cp.[2].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 24 of (270) minimize the level of intrusion into nature and the use of land, attempts are also made to combine HSL with existing rights of way. In France, the Paris- HSL runs parallel to the motorway over 135 km, the Paris-Lyons line for 60 km and the Paris-Atlantic line for 35 km. The German Köln -Frankfurt HSL is extensively twinned with the motorway. The specific land take of HSL is 3.2 ha/km (two German HSL), which is only one-third that of a motorway (9.3 ha/km for German motorways). Since on electrified lines the air along the route is not polluted, some two- thirds of the surface areas needed for a HSL remain intact as biologically-valuable habitat. The aspect of the environment most affected by the increase in speed is the subject of noise. Above 250/300 km/h the predominant noise is that of the and the aerodynamic noise. Railways have been successful in cutting the noise produced by their trains. At 200 km/h, the noise generated by the ICE is some 7 dB (A) lower than that of an IC trains at equivalent speed. There are research programmes seeking to bring about further reductions in noise at source. Where HSL generate excessive noise for line side residents, noise abatement screens or walls are built. Other, generally more minor environmental effects can also occur; such as vibrations, electro- smog and the use of herbicides (though not on slab track).

1.0.2.4 Important HSR countries

1.0.2.4.1 France

Table 3: Overview HSL in France

HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Paris – Lyon (Sud Est) 300 1981/1983 419

Atlantique 300 1989/1990 291

By-pass Lyon 300 1992/1994 121

Nord – Europe 300 1994/1996 346

By-pass Paris (Interconnexion IDF) 300 1994/1996 104

Méditerranée 320 2001 259

Est (Paris – Strasbourg, 1. Section) 320 2007 332

Total km 1’872

Table 4: Overview HSL under construction in France

HSL under construction: max km/h Opening Length km

Spanish border – Perpignan 300 2011 24

By-pass Nimes – Montpellier 220/320 2016 70

Dijon – Mulhouse (Rhin – Rhone) 320 2011 140

Est (2. Section) 320 2016 100

Total km 334

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Actually the French network comprises 1’872 km of HSL managed by RFF (Réseau Ferré de France), the French state owned infrastructure manager. Some 334 km HSL are under construction and 2’516 km of HSL are planned until 2020/2025. With the opening of the Paris – Lyons line in 1981/83 HSR began in Europe. With a gradient up to 3.5 % the construction of tunnels could be avoided in a difficult terrain. This HSL as well as the following HSL are dedicated, that means only used by the French HS train TGV. Due to a less problematic terrain the maximum gradient of the HSL Atlantique and Nord could be reduced to 2.5 %. These first three French HSL were realized with costs of less than 10 million €/km (prices of the 70th and 80th). The first section of the Eastern HSL (TGV Est) Paris - Strasbourg until Baudrecourt (south of Metz) is 300 km long with costs of 3.1 billion €. At around 10 million €/km, this line is in the cheaper cost bracket for HSL construction. The terrain is admittedly unproblematic, with no tunnels required and only a few long bridges, and the sparse population also makes matters easier. Work for the second section of this HSL to Strasbourg (Vendenheim) started in November 2010. The costs will be almost twice: 19 million €/km (total 2.01 billion €, 100 km), due to a 3’900 m long tunnel through the mountain Vosges and a higher population density. End of 2011 140 km of the 190 km Dijon – Mulhouse HSL (TGV Rhin – Rhone, Est) will be opened, the costs are 2.312 billion €, that means 16.5 million €/km, this HSL has two tunnels (1’870 m and 170 m length), only a few long bridges and a sparse population. The by-pass Nimes – Montpellier will cost 1.62 billion €, that means 23 million €/km and this HSL will be operated in mixed traffic. In 2016 HS – trains will run with 220 km/h (later on 320 km/h) and freight trains with 100 or 120 km/h. This line is realized in public private partnership. Mixed traffic is also foreseen for the French – Italian HSL Lyon – Torino, passing through the Alps.

1.0.2.4.2 Germany

Table 5: Overview HSL in Germany

HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Fulda – Würzburg 280 1988 90

Hannover – Fulda 280 1991/1994 248

Mannheim – 280 1985/1991 109

Hannover (Wolfsburg) – 250 1998 189

Köln – Frankfurt (dedicated) 300 2002/2004 180

Köln – Düren 250 2003 42

(Karlsruhe –) Rastatt – Offenburg 250 2004 44

Leipzig – Gröbers (– Erfurt) 250 2004 24

Hamburg – Berlin 230 2004 253

Nürnberg – Ingolstadt 300 2006 89

Total km 1’285

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Table 6: Overview HSL under construction in Germany

HSL under construction: max km/h Opening Length km

München – Augsburg 230 2011 62

(/Halle –) Gröbers – Erfurt 300 2015 98

Nürnberg – Erfurt 250 2017 218

Total km 378

Actually the German network comprises 1’285 km of HSL managed by Netz, the German infrastructure manager. About 378 km of HSL are under construction and 6 HSL with a total length of 670 km are planned. In Germany, HSR services began in 1991 with the launch of the "InterCityExpress" (ICE) on the Hannover - Würzburg and Mannheim - Stuttgart HSL. Initially the reference speed was 250 km/h for HS trains and 80 km/h for freight trains. These speeds have been increased to 280 km/h and 120 km/h respectively in the last few years. These lines are also used by conventional trains (Eurocity, Intercity) running with a maximum speed of 200 km/h. In Germany all HSL are built for mixed traffic, with the exemption of the Köln – Frankfurt HSL. The necessary parameters (gradient 1.25 %, radius 7’000 m, minimum 5’100 m) and the difficult terrain caused 61 tunnels with a total length of 121 km, which means 37 % of the whole HSL Hannover – Würzburg. For the Mannheim – Stuttgart HSL 15 tunnels with a total length of 31 km were built; 31 % of the whole HSL. The high percentage of tunnels and many bridges caused average costs of about 19 million €/km (prices of the 80th). Since August 2002, the most important German HSL between Cologne and the Rhine/Main area has taken roughly an hour off Frankfurt-Cologne journey times (previously 2 hours 15 minutes). This is the first German dedicated HSL and equipped with slab track. Despite the maximal gradient of 4.0 %, 30 tunnels with a total length of 47 km were necessary (26 % of the HSL). The cost were about 6 billion €, that means 34 million €/km (prices of the 90th). This HSL also links Köln/Bonn and Frankfurt Main’s airports. The Nürnberg – Ingolstadt HSL was opened in 2006 for mixed traffic, which means with a gradient of only 1.25 %. 9 Tunnels with a length of 27 km (30 % of the HSL) were built. The cost were 3.5 billion €, that means 39 million €/km. This HSL featured the first German Regional Express services running at up to 200 km/h.

1.0.2.4.3 Spain

Table 7: Overview HSL in Spain

HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Madrid – Seville 270 1992 471

Madrid – Lleida 300 2003 519

Zaragoza – Huesca 200 2003 79

(Madrid –) La Sagra – Toledo 250 2005 21

Córdoba – Antequera 300 2006 100

Lleida – Camp de Tarragona 300 2006 82

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HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Madrid – Segovia – Valladolid 300 2007 184

Antequera – Málaga 300 2007 55

Camp de Tarragona – Barcelona 300 2008 88

By-pass Madrid 200 2009 5

Madrid-Valencia / Albacete 300 2010 432

Total km 2’036

Table 8: Overview HSL under construction in Spain

HSL under construction: max km/h Opening Length km

Figueres – Frontera (– Perpignan) 300 2011 20

Barcelona – Figueres 300 2011/2012 132

(Madrid –) Alicante / Murcia / Castellón 300 2012 470

Vitoria – Bilbao – San Sebastián 250 2012 175

Variante de Pajares 250 2012 50

Ourense – Santiago 300 2012 88

Bobadilla – Granada 250 2012 109

La Coruña – Vigo 250 2012 158

Navalmoral – Cáceres – Badajoz – Fr. Port. 300 278

Sevilla – Cádiz 250 152

Hellín – Cieza (Variante de Camarillas) 250 27

Sevilla – Antequera 300 128

Total km 1’787

Actually the Spanish network comprises 2’036 km of HSL managed by Adif, the Administrator of Railway , which is a state-owned company. 1’787 km HSL are under construction and 10 HSL with a length of 1’702 km are planned. After the opening of the Madrid – Valencia HSL in December 2010, Spain has the longest HSL network in Europe (2’036 km). In Spain there is the political goal to link all major cities with HSL and to have 90 % of the population within 50 km of a HS station. All Spanish HSL are constructed at standard gauge (1’435 mm) to facilitate movement between countries. In order to enable through-running into the existing Iberian Gauge (1’668 mm) network variable gauge rolling stock Talgo trains has been developed.

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The first Spanish HSL Madrid – Seville entered in service 1992. Today it is the very best European HSR service, enjoying a load factor of 75 % and a second-to-none punctuality record of 99.8 %. Building on the huge success of this HSL, the Madrid – Barcelona HSL entered in service in three stages from 2003 to 2008.To enable the train to compete effectively with the airlines, for the first time a design speed of 350 km/h was chosen (actual commercial speed is 300 km/h), slashing journey times between the two cities (620 km) from 6 hours and 30 minutes to 2 hours and 30 minutes. The cost of each kilometer HSL is about 20 million €.

1.0.2.4.4 Italy

Table 9: Overview HSL in Italy

HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Rome – (First section) 250 1981 150

Rome – Florence (Second section) 250 1984 74

Rome – Florence (Third section) 250 1992 24

Rome – 300 2006 220

Turin – Novara 300 2006 94

Milan – 300 2008 182

Novara – 300 2009 55

Florence – Bologna 300 2009 77

Naples – 250 2009 47

Total km 923

Actually the Italian network comprises 923 km of HSL managed by Treno Alta Velocitô SpA (TAV), two more HSL with 395 km length are planned. Italy was together with France and Germany a European pioneer in HSR. The HSR era began with the 248 km Rome-Florence (Direttissima) HSL, opened between 1981 and 1992. During the construction of this HSL a long- term plan for a HSR network "alta velocita" was born, based on two main routes forming a "T". While the vertical part of the “T” is finished, the horizontal part from Torino via Milano to Venezia is still in planning. Work on the 210-km Rome - Naples HSL began in 1994, followed by Bologna – Florence in 1996. This line runs through the Apennine mountain chain with extensive tunnel sections, which constitute over 73.3 km of the total line length of 78.5 km. After completion of these two lines journey times from Milan to Rome stand at 2 hours 50 min and a Rome – Naples trip takes a mere 1 hour 5 min.

1.0.2.4.5 Japan

Table 10: Overview HSL in Japan

HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Tokyo – Osaka (Tokaido) 270 1964 515

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HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Osaka – Okayama (San-yo) 270 1972 161

Okayama – Hakata (San-yo) 300 1975 393

Omiya – Morioka (Tohoku) 275 1982 465

Omiya – Niigata (Joetsu) 240 1982 270

Takasaki – Nagano (Hokuriku) 260 1997 117

Morioka – Hachinohe (Tohoku) 260 2002 97

Yatsuhiro – Kagoshima (Kyushu) 260 2004 127

Hachinohe – Shin Aomori (Tohoku) 2010 82

Total km 2’227

Table 11: Overview HSL under construction in Japan

HSL under construction: max km/h Opening Length km

Hakata – Shin Yatsuhiro (Kyushu) 230 2011 130

Nagano – Kanazawa (Hokuriku) 300 2015 229

Shin Aomori – Shin Hakodate (Hokkaido) 250 2016 149

Total km 508

Actually the Japanese network comprises 2’227 km of HSL, another 508 km of HSL are under construction and 583 km of HSL are planned. Worldwide Japan was the first nation to construct a HSR network. The Tokaido from Tokyo to Osaka opened in 1964 for the Tokyo Olympic Games. It was an immediate success, carrying 10 million passengers within 3 years and the network has been progressively extended. All Japanese HSL are constructed with European standard gauge track (1’435 mm) instead of the „Cape Gauge” (1’067 mm) of classic lines. From a first operating speed of 210 km/h, the HS train has steadily increased in speed. For Tokyo-Osaka passengers, this has led to a reduction of travel time from 4 hours (1964) to 2 hours 30 minutes In Japan the highest operating speed is actually 300 km/h on the Sanyo HSL. JR East railways announced for the Tohoku HSL a commercial speed of 320 km/h in 2011. Throughout the day, traffic on the Japanese HSL is extremely dense, and punctuality (between 0.4 and 0.6 minutes delay per train) extraordinarily high. Some areas in Japan have strong winter conditions. For the Tokaido Shinkansen there is a heavy snow spot between Maibara and Kyoto, called "Sekigahara". The measures by JR Central to avoid problems with the snow are as follows: • Sprinklers have been equipped along this snow spot. When it is snowing, water is spread to melt snow. • The ballast has been treated by resin, so that there is a kind of film on the surface of the ballast.

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• At some stations behind the heavy snow spot (for example: ) station staff puts away snow blocks. The Joetsu Shinkansen line is also operated in heavy snow areas. During the planning of this HSL JR East took into account the snow experiences of the Tokaido Shinkansen. The countermeasures for snow are: • For the rolling stock the so-called "body-mount" shape was adopted, which includes all the devices inside of the train. Therefore the devices are not exposed to snow or ice. • Sprinklers were equipped from the beginning of the operation in 1982. • All the line is slab track.

1.0.2.4.6 China

Table 12: Overview HSL in China

HSL in operation: max km/h Opening Length km

Beijing – Tianjing 350 2008 120

Jinan – Qingdao 200 2008 362

Nanjing – Hefei 250 2008 166

Hefei – Wuhan 200 2008 356

Shijiazhuang – Taiyuan 200 2009 190

Wuhan – Guangzhou 350 2009 968

Ningbo – Wenzhou– Fuzhou 250 2009 562

Zhengzhou – Xi’an 350 2010 458

Fuzhou – Xiamen 250 2010 275

Chengdu – Dujiangyan 250 2010 72

Shanghai – Nanjing 300 2010 300

Nanchang – Jiujiang 200 2010 92

Shanghai – Hangzhou 300 2010 158

Total km 4’079

Table 13: Overview HSL under construction in China

HSL under construction: max km/h Opening Length km

Guangzhou – ShenZhen (Xianggang) 350 2010 104

Changchun – Jilin 200 2010 96

Guangzhou – Zhuhai 200 2010/2012 142

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HSL under construction: max km/h Opening Length km

Hainan east circle 200 2010 308

Wuhan – Yichang 300 2011 293

Beijing – Shanghai 350 2011 1’318

Tianjin – Qinhuangdao 350 2011 261

Nanjing – Hangzhou 350 2011 249

Hangzhou – Ningbo 300 2011 150

Hefei – Bengbu 300 2011 131

Mianyang – Chengdu– Leshan 250 2012 316

Xiamen – Shenzhen 200 2012 502

Beijing – Wuhan 350 2012 1’122

Haerbin – Dalian 350 2012 904

Nanjing – An’qing 200 2012 258

Total km 6’154

From 2008 to 2010 that means within only three years 4’079 km HSL were opened for the commercial service with design speeds between 200 km/h and 350 km/h. China has the longest HSR - network worldwide. Actually 6’154 km of HSL are under construction with the objective to start commercial service within two years. 2’901 km of further HSL are planned. In the near future Chinese railways will operate a HS network of 13’134 km. It must be remembered that the era of high speed started in China by the , in the year 2004. This was - and still is - the world's first commercially- operated high speed maglev. With speeds of more than 400 km/h Transrapid makes the 31 km in less than 8 minutes. In 2006 the State Council ended the debate: conventional track HSR technology versus maglev. Today China is undergoing a building boom of dedicated conventional HSR lines. The HSL from Wuhan to Guangzhou was opened in December 2009, thanks to a maximum speed of 350 km/h the travel time is only 3 hours and 30 minutes. Actually this is the longest HSL in China (968 km). Due to a difficult topography the line has many bridges with a length of 470 km and tunnels with a length of 165 km. The construction of this HSL took only four years with costs of about 12 billion EUR. The HSL from Wuhan to Guangzhou is part of the corridor Beijing – Honkong. The 1’122 km long section Beijing – Wuhan is under construction and will be opened 2012. The 458 km long HSL Zhengzhou – Xi’an has also a design speed of 350 km/h and was opened in February 2010. The travel time is reduced from about six hours to less than two hours. 77 % of the line is on bridges or in tunnels with costs of almost 4 billion EUR.

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1.1 Standards for high-speed railways The task of the assessment has been carried out for mapping standards and technical regulations that exist and which are relevant for development of high-speed railways. It is necessarily based on the basic boundary conditions fixed in the “Technical Specifications for the Interoperability” (TSI) of European High-Speed-Rail-Systems but extended to related or extra standard complexes. All areas where standards or technical regulations do not cover the relevant requirements for development and operation of high-speed railways in Norway are listed and described. The need for new or modified Norwegian regulations for high-speed railways are studied and evaluated.

1.1.1 Summary 1. Comparison in the main regulations and main parameters, not in all subsidiary standards, norms, etc. 2. Main difference: the „new“ Regelverk from 01.07.2010 is valid for speeds up to 250 km/h, in some cases we found references to 300 km/h (JD 530, 525) 3. Similar to other European countries the TSI seems to be the basis for the Regelverk, we found some minor differences, but not in the main parameters 4. Conclusion: • Extend the existing Teknisk Regelverk for Category I high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h regarding to TSI (limit 350 km/h) and change or adapt all speed related parameters. • This applies in particular to the Infrastructure section, but also to all speed-related subsystems such as Energy, Safety in Tunnel, etc. • The subsystem Control and Signalling is currently revised regarding ERMTS respect. ETCS, it is recommended to include the above mentioned speed range in the process. • The final and effective norm or at least a binding preliminary version should be available before the start of the final, detailed planning. • TSI conformity checks should be done during the planning and the construction phase. • Minor differences could be discussed with the responsible within JBV organisation.

1.1.1.1 Technical Specifications for the Interoperability (TSI) The European Community contributes to the development and expansion of Trans-European networks in the area of transport infrastructure. To achieve these objectives, the European Community takes all necessary actions to ensure the interoperability of networks, particularly in the field of harmonisation of technical standards. For the railway sector, the European Council took a first measure with the adoption of Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the Trans-European high speed rail system (HGV) on the 23rd July 1996. With the on the19th March 2001 adopted Directive 2001/16/EC on the interoperability of the conventional railway system as well as with the introduced Directive 96/48/EC community procedures for the preparation and adoption of technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) and common rules for assessing conformity were introduced. The two interoperability Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC have been amended several times, today the directive 2008/57/EC of the 17th June 2008 is in effect. To achieve the objectives of the interoperability directives for high speed railway systems the European Association worked with the AEIF - Association Européenne pour l'Interopérabilité

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Ferroviaire (European Association for Railway Interoperability), a body representing the infrastructure managers, railway companies and the rail industry, to develop, implement and revise the TSI for HSR traffic. Since the implementation of Directive 2004/50/EC, the competent authority for the development of the TSI is the European Railway Agency (ERA). It has been established to provide the EU Member States and the EU Commission with technical assistance in the fields of railway safety and interoperability. This involves the development and implementation of Technical Specifications for Interoperability and a common approach to questions concerning railway safety. The Agency's main task is to manage the preparation of these measures. The development of technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) has shown the need to clarify the relationship between the essential requirements and the TSIs on the one hand, and the European standards and other documents of a normative nature on the other. In particular, a clear distinction should be drawn between the standards or parts of standards which must be made mandatory in order to achieve the objectives of this Directive, and the ‘harmonised’ standards that have been developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical harmonisation and standardisation. As a rule, European specifications are developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical harmonisation and standardisation. They enable a presumption to be made of conformity with certain essential requirements of this Directive, particularly in the case of interoperability constituents and interfaces. These European specifications, or the applicable parts thereof, are not mandatory and no explicit reference to these specifications may be made in the TSIs. References to these European specifications are published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and Member States publish the references to the national standards transposing the European standards.

Figure 2: 3-layers regulatory structure3 Technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) mean the specifications by which each subsystem or part of subsystem is covered in order to meet the essential requirements and to ensure the interoperability of the trans-European high speed and conventional rail systems. Today the Agency works on drafting the third group of Conventional Rail Technical Specifications for Interoperability concerning Infrastructure, Energy, and Passenger rolling stock, and Telematics applications for passenger services. The Agency is also carrying out the revision of TSIs related to Freight wagons, Operation and traffic

3 Cp. [3].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 34 of (270) management, and Noise. Further activities will include revision of earlier adopted TSIs with the aim of extending their scope to the entire European railway network.

Figure 3: Interoperability - Sub-systems4 The development of technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) has shown the need to clarify the relationship between the essential requirements and the TSIs on the one hand, and the European standards and other documents of a normative nature on the other. In particular, a clear distinction should be drawn between the standards or parts of standards which must be made mandatory in order to achieve the objectives of this Directive, and the ‘harmonised’ standards that have been developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical harmonisation and standardisation. As a rule, European specifications are developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical harmonisation and standardisation. They enable a presumption to be made of conformity with certain essential requirements of this Directive, particularly in the case of interoperability constituents and interfaces. These European specifications, or the applicable parts thereof, are not mandatory and no explicit reference to these specifications may be made in the TSIs. References to these European specifications are published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and Member States publish the references to the national standards transposing the European standards. They are also published on the ERA website.5 For the HSR subsystems the applicable standards and UIC leaflets can be found in Annex 1. The list below shows the Technical Specifications for Interoperability in force and in development:

4 Cp. [4]. 5 Cp. [4].

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Table 14: Overview technical specifications for Interoperability

TSI - Technical Specifications Published in OJEU Published documents Date in force for Interoperability Decision Date number High Speed TSI HS In force 2010/79/EC 10/02/2010 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex A 01/04/2010 2006/860/EC 07/12/2006 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 07/11/2006 06/03/2007 for 2007/153/EC 07/03/2007 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex A TSI CCS HS - Control Command and revised Annex A Signalling 01/06/2008 for 2008/386/EC 24/05/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision modifying Annex A revised Annex A European Railw ay Agency - legal references for ERTMS (approved documents and specifications) TSI ENE HS - Energy 2008/284/EC 14/04/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/10/2008 TSI INF HS - Infrastructure 2008/217/EC 19/03/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/07/2008 TSI RST HS - Rolling Stock 2008/232/EC 26/03/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/09/2008

2008/231/EC 26/03/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/09/2008 TSI OPE HS - Operation and Traffic Official Journal - EC Decision amending Decisions 25/10/2010 w ith Management 2010/640/EU 26/10/2010 2006/920/EC and 2008/231/EC specified TSI MAI HS - Maintenance 2002/730/EC 30/05/2002 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/12/2002 Conventional Rail TSI CR In force 2010/79/EC 10/02/2010 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex A 01/04/2010 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Sections 7,1, 2009/561/EC 25/07/2009 01/09/2009 7,2 and 7,3 of the CR CCS TSI 2006/679/EC 2008/386/EC 23/04/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex A 01/06/2008 TSI CCS CR - Control Command and 06/03/2007 for 2007/153/EC 07/03/2007 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex A Signalling revised Annex A 2006/860/EC 07/12/2006 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 07/11/2006 2006/679/EC 16/10/2006 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 28/09/2006 European Railw ay Agency - legal references for ERTMS (approved documents and specifications) Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) TSI WAG CR - Rolling Stock Freight 2006/861/EC 08/12/2006 31/01/2007 including all annexes to the TSI Wagons 2009/107/EC 14/02/2009 Official Journal - EC Decision inserting Article 1a 01/07/2009 TSI NOI CR - Rolling Stock Noise 2006/66/EC 08/02/2006 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 23/06/2006 2006/920/EC 18/12/2006 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 11/02/2007 TSI OPE CR - Traffic Operation and 2009/107/EC 14/02/2009 Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex P.5 01/07/2009 Management Official Journal - EC Decision amending Decisions 25/10/2010 w ith 2010/640/EU 26/10/2010 2006/920/EC and 2008/231/EC specified

TSI TAF CR - Telematic Applications 62/2006/EC 18/01/2006 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 23/06/2006 for Freight EC transport w ebsite - six technical annexes to the

Under development Anticipated to be TSI ENE CR - Ener gy 2010 Anticipated to be TSI INF CR - Inf ras truc ture 2010 TSR LOK CR - Rolling Stoc k Anticipated late (Locomotives and Traction Units) 2010 TSI RZW CR - Rolling Stoc k Anticipated late (Passenger Carriages) 2010 TSI TAP CR - Telematic Applications Anticipated to be for Passengers 2010 Transverse TSI HS + CR In force TSI PRM - Persons w ith Reduced 2008/164/EC 07/03/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/07/2008 Mobility TSI SRT - Safety in Railw ay Tunnels 2008/163/EC 07/03/2008 Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex) 01/07/2008 TSI Conformity Assessement Modules In force TSI Conformity Assessement Modules 2010/713/EU 04/12/2010 Official Journal - EC Decision 01/01/2010

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This study is relevant for the development of high speed railways. In the present TSI for the trans-European high-speed rail system the lines have been classified as category I, category II and category III respectively. The requirements to be met by the elements, subsystems, etc. characterising the infrastructure domain shall match at least the performance levels specified for each of the following line categories of the trans-European high-speed rail system, as relevant. Category I: specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h. Category II: specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h. Category III: upgraded lines for higher speeds from 160 km/h to 200 km/h All categories of lines shall allow the passage of trains with a length of 400 metres and a maximum weight of 1’000 tonnes. The performance levels are characterised by the maximum permissible speed of the line section allowed for high-speed trains complying with the High- Speed Rolling Stock TSI. The values of parameters specified are only valid up to a maximum speed of 350 km/h.

1.1.1.2 Norwegian Regulations “Teknisk Regelverk JDxxx“ Jernbaneverket’s technical regulations (Teknisk Regelverk JD5xx) include requirements for design, construction and maintenance of infrastructure facilities on the public railway network in Norway. The latest version of the technical regulations is in force since 01/07/2010. The next release of the technical regulations will probably be published 01/03/2011. The regulations will be set up in a new format. The 2010 version of the technical regulations contains design rules for speeds up to 250 km/h for all subsystems except for the control- and signalling-system (JD 550-553). The old version for the old systems is still valid. In anticipation of the design rules for ERTMS systems changes to JD 550 will be made that makes it possible to project existing or new systems for speeds up to and including 250 km/h. As part of the technical regulations are also JD590 Infrastructure document properties. This document provides comprehensive information on infrastructure adapted to the needs of those who will design, build and maintain rolling stock. Similar to the TSI the technical regulations contain dated and undated references to normative documents. It is referred to the documents in appropriate places and publications are listed in separate appendices to Chapter 4 for each subject. For dated references, or publications marked with revision number applies to issue that are described. For references that are not dated or labelled terms of the latest edition of the publication referred to. The structure of the Teknisk Regelverk is shown in the following picture:

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Figure 4: Structure of the Teknisk Regelverk6 The Technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) is implemented in Norway concerning to the implementation Directive. The different TSIs specify minimum requirements that must be met to ensure interoperability. By design, construction and maintenance of technical regulations will satisfy the relevant TSI requirements. In some cases, the requirements of the Teknisk Regelverk could be stricter than the TSI requirements without limiting the interoperability. In the following tables various relevant TSI parameter requirements are compared and addressed to the Norwegian Teknisk Regelverk:7

6 Cp. [5]. 7 Cp. [5].

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Table 15: Parameter requirements of the TSI SRT

Krav nr (TSI) Parameter JD 5xx Kap. nr Avsn. TSI krav Merk oppfyllt (a) 3. Grunnleggende krav 520 Ja (b) 3.1. Grunnleggende krav som fastsatt I direktiv 2001/16/EF 520 Ja (c) 3.2. Detaljerte grunnlegende krav knyttet til tunnelsikkerhet 520 10 Ja (d) 4.2.2.1. Installering av sporveksler og skinnekryss Ja (e) 4.2.2.2. Hindring av ikke autorisert tilgang til nødutganger og utstyrsrom 520 4 3 Ja (f) 4.2.2.3. Brannbeskyttelse av konstruksjonen 520 10 2.11 Ja (g) 4.2.2.4. Brannsikkerhetskrav for byggematerialer 520 10 2.11 Ja (h) 4.2.2.5. Branndeteksjon 520 10 2.4 Ja (i) 4.2.2.6. Utstyr for selvredning, evakuering og rending I tilfelle av en hendelse 520 10 2.3 Ja 2.2 (j) 4.2.2.6.1. Definisjon av sikkert område 520 10 2.3 Ja 3.3 (k) 4.2.2.6.2. Generelt 520 10 2.2 Ja 3 (l) 4.2.2.6.3. Lateral og/eller vertikale nødutganger til overflaten 520 10 2.2 Ja

tunnels (m) 4.2.2.6.4. Tverrpassasjer mellom nabotunneler 520 Ja (n) 4.2.2.6.5 Alternative tekniske løsinger Ja (o) 4.2.2.7. Gangbaner for rømming 520 10 2.2 Ja 23 (p) 4.2.2.8. Nødbelysning for rømmingsveier 520 10 2.6 Ja

TSI SRT - Safety in Railway Tunnels (q) 4.2.2.9. Merkning av rømmingsvei 520 10 2.7 Ja (r) 4.2.2.10. Nødkommunikasjon 520 10 2.8 Ja (s) 4.2.2.11. Tilgang for redningstjenster 520 10 2,2 Ja (t) 4.2.2.12. Redningsområder utenfor tunneler 520 10 3.3 Ja 23 (u) 4.3.2.1. Gangbaner for rømming 520 10 2.5 Ja (v) 4.3.2.2. Inspeksjon av tunnelforhold 522 Ja (w ) 4.3.5.1. Beredskapsplaner og øvelser for jernbanetunneler 520 10 3.5 Ja Vedlegg 2.m - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI safety in railway in railway safety and TSI regulations technical between Correspondence - 2.m Vedlegg (x) 4.4.3. Beredskapsplaner og øvelser for jernbanetunneler 520 10 3.5 Ja

Table 16: Parameter requirements of the TSI PRM

Krav nr (TSI) Parameter JD 5xx Kap. nr Avsn. TSI krav Merk oppfyllt 4.1.2.2 Parkeringsplasser Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.3 Hinderfri adkomst Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.4 Dører og innganger/utganger Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.5 Gulvoverflater Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.6 Gjennomsiktige hindringer Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.7 Toalett- og stellerom Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.8 Møbler og frittstående gjenstander Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.9 Billettsalg, informasjons- og assistansepunkter Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 2.1 4.1.2.10 Belysning 543 2 2.2 Ja 2.5 4.1.2.11 Visuell informasjon (toganviseranlegg) 560 10 Ja 4.1.2.12 Taleinformasjon (høyttaleranlegg) 560 10 7.2 Ja 4.1.2.13 Nødutganger og alarmer Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.14 Gangveier (overganger og underganger) Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet reduced mobility mobility reduced 4.1.2.15 Trapper Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.16 Rekkverk Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet 4.1.2.17 Ramper, rulletrapper og heiser Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet

TSI PRM - People with Reduced Mobility 4.1.2.18.1 Plattformhøyde 530 14 2.1 Ja 4.1.2.18.2 Horisontal avst. Plattformkant-spormidt 530 14 2.1 Ja 4.1.2.18.3 Sporgeometri langs plattform 530 14 2.3 Ja 4.1.2.19 Plattformbredde 530 14 2.5 Ja 4.1.2.20 Plattformende 530 14 2.6.1 Ja 4.1.2.21 Innretning for ombordstigning av rullestoler Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet Vedlegg 2.n - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI people with people with and TSI regulations technical between Correspondence - 2.n Vedlegg 4.1.2.22 Personoverganger på stasjoner 530 12 3 Ja

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Table 17: Parameter requirements of the TSI CCS Krav nr (TSI) Parameter JD Kap. Avsn. TSI krav Merk 5xx nr oppfyllt 4.2.1 Sikkerhet 550 RAMS.1 (Ja) 1,2,3 4.2.2 Funksjonalitet ETCS ombordutrustning 2,3 4.2.3 Funksjonalitet ETCS infrastruktur 2,3 4.2.4 EIRENE funksjoner 560 9 2 4.2.5 EIRENE og ETCS luftgapspesifikasjoner 2 4.2.6.1 Grensesnitt mellom ETCS og STM 2 4.2.6.2 Grensesnitt mellom GSM-R og ETCS 2,3 4.2.6.3 Odometri 3 4.2.7.1 Funksjonsgrensesnitt mellom radioblokksentraler 2 4.2.7.2 Teknisk grensesnitt mellom radioblokksentraler 3 4.2.7.3 Grensesnitt GSM-R – radioblokksentral 2,3 4.2.7.4 Grensesnitt - LEU 2 4.2.7.5 Grensesnitt Euroloop – LEU 2 4.2.7.6 Forberedelse for installasjon av ERTMS infrastruktur 3 4.2.8 Krypteringsnøkler, håndtering av 2,3 4.2.9 ETCS-identiteter, håndtering av 3 4.2.10 Lagervarmgangsdetektor (HABD) 2,4 4.2.11 Kompatibilitet med togdeteksjon 550 7 3 Ja 4.2.12.1 EMC mellom systemer og delsystemer 510 4 2.1 Ja 4.2.12.2 EMC-kompatibiltiet mellom rullende materiell og infrastruktur 590 Vedlegg 5a Ja 4.2.13 ETCS DMI 3

TSI CC Control Command and Signalling 4.2.14 EIRENE DMI 2,3 4.2.15 Dataregistrering (Black Box) 2,3 4.2.16 Synbarhet av ETCS/signalinstallasjoner 3 Notes : There is no consistency betw een EN and TSI in the security requirements. The requirements of technical regulations are based on 1 EN.

2 Requirements w ill be incorporated in rules for design, construction and maintenance of ETCS and ERTMS equipment.

Requirements are not prepared in this edition of TSI and w ill be incorporated in rules for design, construction and maintenance of 3 ETCS and ERTMS equipment w hen they are available. Vedlegg 2.o - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI management, control and signaling control management, and TSI regulations technical between Correspondence - 2.o Vedlegg 4 Until further addressed in Jernbaneverkets detection strategy

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Table 18: Parameter requirements of the TSI INF

Krav nr (TSI) Parameter JD 5xx Kap. nr Avsn. TSI krav oppfyllt Merk 4.2.2 Nominell sporvidde 530 6 2.1 Ja 1 4.2.3 Minste tverrsnitt 520 5 2.1 Ja 4.2.4 Sporavstand 530 5 5.1 Ja 4.2.5 Maks stigning/fall 530 5 3.3.1 Ja 2 4.2.6 Min. horisontal kurveradius 530 5 3.2.1 Ja 4.2.7 Maks. overhøyde 530 5 3.2.1 Ja 4.2.8.1 Manglende overhøyde fri linje 530 5 3.2.1 Ja 4.2.8.2 Manglende overhøyde i avvik i sporveksler 530 5 3.2.7 Ja 3 4.2.9.2 Ekvivalent konisitet designkrav 530 6 2.1 Ja 4 4.2.9.3 Ekvivalent konisitet driftskrav 532 13 3.1.2 Ja 5 4.2.10.4.1 Vindskjevhet maks verdi 532 13 3.2.2 Ja/Nei 6 4.2.10.4.2 Sporvidde toleranser 532 13 3.1.2 Ja 7 4.2.11 Skinnehelning 530 6 2.1 Ja 8 4.2.12.2 Låsing og detektering i sporveksler 550 8 2.1 Ja 4.2.12.3 Bruk av bevegelig krysspiss 530 7 Ingen krav 9 4.2.12.13 Geometriske krav i sporveksler 530 7 Ja 10 2.2.1 4.2.12.13 Geometriske krav i sporveksler 532 11 Ja 11 2.4 4.2.13 Sporets motstand mot vertikale laster 530 4 2 Ja 6 2.1 4.2.13 Sporets motstand mot langsgående krefter 530 Ja 12 10 2 6 2.1 4.2.13 Sporets motstand mot laterale krefter 530 Ja 13 10 2 4 5 4.2.14 Trafikklaster på nye bruer 525 5 6 Ja 7 8 4.2.15 Sporets stivhet Åpent punkt 4.2.16 Maks. trykkvariasjoner i tunneler 520 12 8.1.3 Ja 4.2.17 Sidevind Åpent punkt/nasjonale regler 4.2.18 Sporets elektriske isolasjon 530 6 2.1 Ja 14 4.2.19 Støy og vibrasjoner Åpent punkt/nasjonale regler 4.2.20.1 Maks hastighet av pass. tog langs plattform 530 14 2.5.1 Ja 4.2.20.2 Plattformlengde 530 14 2.2 Ja 4.2.20.3 Plattformbredde 530 14 2.5 Ja 4.2.20.4 Plattformhøyde 530 14 2.1 Ja 4.2.20.5 Horisontal avstand spormidt - plattformkant 530 14 2.1 Nei 15 4.2.20.6 Sporgeometri langs plattform 530 14 2.3 Ja 4.2.20.7 Beskyttelse mot elektrisk støt på plattform Se vedlegg 2.q

TSI INF Infrastructure 4.2.20.8 Forhold til personer med redusert mobilitet Se vedlegg 2.n 4.2.21 Krav i forhold til sikkerhet i tunneler Se vedlegg 2.m 4.2.22 Planoverganger 530 12 2 Ja 4.2.23.1 Plass for evakuering - konstruksjoner 525 4 3.5 Ja 4.2.23.2 Plass for evakuering - tunneler Se vedlegg 2.m 4.2.24 Km. merker 530 5 2.3.1 Ja 4.2.25.1 Lengde av hensettingsspor Ingen krav 16 3.2 4.2.25.2 Kurveradius hensettingsspor 530 5 Ja 3.3 4.2.26.1 Toalett tømme fasiliteter Ikke relevant for JBV

Vedlegg 2p - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI infrastructure TSI and regulations technical between Correspondence - 2p Vedlegg 4.2.26.2 Vaskemaskiner for tog Ikke relevant for JBV 4.2.26.3 Vannpåfyllingsanlegg Ikke relevant for JBV 4.2.26.4 Sandpåfyllingsanlegg Ikke relevant for JBV 4.2.26.5 Drivstoffpåfyllingsanlegg Ikke relevant for JBV 4.2.27 Ballastopptak (”Flyvende ballast”) Åpent punkt Notes 1 Track structures indicated in the JD530 offers nominal gauge according to TSI requirements 2 TSI requirements fulfilled assuming "normal requirements" 3 Requirements are met for all types of track sw itch JD530, kap.7 4 Track construction w ith 60E1 skinner/NSB95 sleepers set in JD530 satisfy TSI requirements 5 Maintenance limit point value of the gauge is w ithin the requirements for my average over 100 yards JD532 allow s higher "immediate" threshold w ind bias (up to 7 mm / m) than HS INF TSI (max mm/m) for speed> 200km / h. Claims JD532, how ever, w ithin 6 the requirements of CR INF TSI for speeds up to 250 km/h 7 JD532 allow s higher "immediate" limit gauge than HS INF TSI for speed > 160 km/h. Measures in JD532 requirements are for speeds> 160 km / h, 8 Track structures indicated in the JD530 offers a nominal skin inclination according to TSI requirements 9 Relevant only for v > 280 km/h 10 Our track sw itch design satisfy TSI requirements regarding groove w idth, ridge height and ledeskinnens height above rail top. 11 Max lead flat value ("free w heel passage") is derived from JD532 to my requirements. distance fraliggende tongue and stick the rail and the gauge 12 Track Structures specified in JD530 w ith requirements for ballast profile satisfies the creep resistance given in TSI 13 Track Structures specified in JD530 w ith requirements for ballast profile satisfies Lateral resistance provided in the TSI 14 Track Structures specified in JD530, Chapter 6 w ith concrete sleepers have insulation in fixing and thus satisfy TSI requirements 15 JD5xx have different requirements to reach the platform edge - center of the track in relation to HS INF TSI. Norw ay, how ever, granted a special case 16 TSI requirements, "length must be sufficient to accommodate high-speed rail" is not explicitly expressed in the technical regulations

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Table 19: Parameter requirements of the TSI ENE

Krav nr (TSI) Parameter JD 5xx Kap. nr Avsn. TSI krav oppfyllt Merk

(A) 4.2.1 Generelle krav 546 2 2.2 Ja (B) 4.2.2 Spenning og frekvens 546 5 Ja (C) 4.2.3 Parametere knyttet til forsyningssystemets ytelse 546 11 11.2 Ja (D) 4.2.4 Regenerativ bremsing 546 8 Ja (E) 4.2.5 Harmoniske utslipp mot energiforsyning Ikke relevant for JBV (F) 4.2.6 Ekstern elektromagnetisk kompatibilitet 546 17 17.4 Ja (G) 4.2.7 Kontinuitet for strømforsyningen ved feilsituasjon 546 3 3.1 Ja (H) 4.2.8 Miljøvern Åpent punkt i TSI Energi (I) 4.2.9.1 Generell utforming 540 4, 5 Ja 4 (J) 4.2.9.2 Geometri for kontaktledningsanlegget 540 5 Ja/Nei 5 (K) 4.2.10 Samsvar mellom kontaktledningsanlegget og frittromsprofil 540 5 4.1 Ja/Nei 2 (L) 4.2.11 Kontakttråd materiale 540 4.a Ja (M) 4.2.12 Kontakttrådens bølgeutbredelses hastighet 540 5.c Ja (N) 4.2.14 Statisk kontakt kraft 542 5.d Ja/Nei (O) 4.2.15 Gjennomsnittlig kontakt kraft 542 5.d Nei 3 (P) 4.2.16 Dynamisk oppførsel og kvalitet på strøm opptak 542 5 2.3 Ja (Q) 4.2.17 Vertikal bevegelse til kontaktpunkt 540 5.c Nei (R) 4.2.18 Strøm kapasiteten til kontaktledningssystemet 546 2 Ja (S) 4.2.19 Strømavtageravstand benyttet for utforming av kontaktledningsanlegget 540 5 3 Ja (T) 4.2.20 Strøm kapasitet, DC systemer, stillestående tog 546 2 Ja (U) 4.2.21 Nøytralseksjoner Ikke relevant for JBV (V) 4.2.22 Død seksjoner 540 6 2.4.2 Ja (W) 4.2.23 Elektrisk beskyttelses samordnings arrangementer 546 6 4 Ja (X) 4.2.24 Effekter av DC på AC systemer 540 6 2.4.2 Ja (Y) 4.2.25 Harmoniske og dynamiske effekter 546 2 Ja (Z) 4.4.1 Forvaltning av omformerstasjoner i tilfelle fare 546 2 5.3 Ja (aa) 4.4.2 Utførelse av arbeider Ja 1 542 (ab) 4.5 Vedlikehold av omformerstasjoner og kontaktlednigsanlegg Ja 548

TSI ENE Energy TSI 542 (ac) 4.6 Profesjonell kompetanse Ja 548 510 6 (ad) 4.7.1 Beskyttelses tiltak i omformerstasjoner og seksjonerings steder Ja 546 12 2 (ae) 4.7.2 Beskyttelses tiltak i kontaktledningsanlegget 510 6 Ja 3 (af) 4.7.3 Beskyttelses tiltak i returledningskretsen 540 12 3 Ja 540 (ag) 4.7.4 Andre generelle krav 541 4 Ja 542 4 (ah) 5.4.1.1 Generell utforming 540 Ja Vedlegg 2q - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI energy and TSI regulations technical between Correspondence 2qVedlegg - 5 5 (ai) 5.4.1.2 Geometri 540 Ja 5.c (aj) 5.4.1.3 Strøm kapasitet 546 2 Ja (ak) 5.4.1.4 Kontakttråd materiale 540 4.a Ja (al) 5.4.1.5 Strøm kapasitet, DC systemer, stillestående tog 546 2 Ja (am) 5.4.1.6 Bølgeutbredelses hastighet 540 5.c Ja (an) 5.4.1.7 Avstand mellom strømatagere 540 5 3 Ja (ao) 5.4.1.8 Gjennomsnittlig kontakt kraft 542 5.d Nei 3 (ap) 5.4.1.9 Dynamisk oppførsel og kvalitet på strøm opptak 542 5 2.3 Ja (aq) 5.4.1.10 Vertikal bevegelse til kontakt punkt 540 5.c Nei (ar) 5.4.1.11 Rom for heving 542 5 2.3 Ja Notes 1 Separate document management system - Qualification of personnel 2 Are also specified in the "Netw ork Statement" under NO1 3 Norw ay has set different requirements acc. normal contact force of 55 N The „new“ Teknisk Regelverk from 01.07.2010 applies in large parts the TSI and is in principal valid for speeds up to 250 km/h, in some cases references to 300 km/h (JD 530, chapter 4 “axleload”, chapter 5 “Routing Table”, JD 525, chapter 4 “Bredde”) could be found. The Regelverk for Signalling and Control Systems is in revision for the ERTMS at the moment, the differences are described above.

1.1.1.3 Scenario related summary The scenarios for the four corridors to be examined in more detail in the following phase 3 are described in chapter 1.0.1. In this case the high speed concepts are included in scenarios C and D:

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C High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and IC strategy: • High-speed concepts which partly incorporate the existing network. Some new parts of the line which is built according to high speed concept without any level crossings. The new lines will not necessarily be built in same alignment as the existing track. • in accordance with TSI-Category II / III specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case. • speed: 200 – 250 km/h. D High speed concept with mainly separate high-speed lines: • High-speed lines mainly separate from the existing network. As scenario C but to be built for the complete corridor from start to end station. • In accordance with TSI-Category I: Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or higher than 250 km/h • Speed: 250 – 350 km/h This concept will be applied in all four corridors. In the following phase 3 it will be determined which scenario will be the most suitable solution for the respective corridor. Concerning the technical regulations it must be ensured that at the time of planning but not later than the tender and award of construction and implementation works, the appropriate version of regulations is in force. At the moment the TSI covers the high speed railway lines for speeds up to 350 km/h (scenario C and D), while the Norwegian Regulation at the moment cover speeds up to 250 km/h (scenario D) and partially up to 300 km/h.

1.1.1.4 Previous studies carried out in Norway The studies formerly carried out have been scrutinized to check if there are comments, conflicts or gaps are stated regarding the technical regulations. These are the relevant studies we checked: • VWI - Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway • Funkwerk and Railconsult: High Speed Operations • Oppsummering av JBV (Summary report from JBV) • COWI report “Status of knowledge on high-speed rail lines in Norway” The VWI study uses design parameters as a basis that would give a speed level of 200 to 300 km/h on new stretches of track, this refers to infrastructure regulations and requirements, which are covered by the TSI but they are not in accordance with the present technical rules in Norway. The VWI reports are more or less a pre-feasibility at an early stage and at a time where Norwegian regulations were probably less developed than today. The COWI study summarises these problems with regard to the new regulations in Norway for speeds up to 250 km/h and describes the main changes compared with the old version. It is mentioned that with effect from 01.07.2010 the Norwegian technical regulations also include a routing table for 300 km/h. Also in Sweden, Svenske Trafikvärket, has decided that their high- speed will be 320 km/h. It is furthermore mentioned, that Høyhastighetsringen in its report "Den nye Bergensbanen" described some design parameters like speed up to 300 km/h and curve radius of 3’400 m and less due to the terrain.

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Concerning requirements and regulations the COWI study [6] comes at least to the main summary: “The reports that have been prepared are not in accordance with the present technical rules for speeds over 250 km/h. Most lines must be upgraded so that they are in line with the rules. The stretches of line that lie in very meandering valleys will mainly have a higher proportion of tunnel than stretches in wider valleys that have the possibility of increasing curve radius, while at the same time having sufficient straight lines between the transitional curves.” All comments in the reports are regarding to infrastructure requirements. None of the reports refer to regulations, requirements or standards for Technical Equipment or Rolling Stock which might cause problems, conflicts or where gaps exist. Hence there is nothing in the report to comment on this subject to under this headline.

1.1.2 Differences or Gaps between Norwegian norms and European standards for High Speed Railways

1.1.2.1 Standards for HSR Infrastructure The most significant difference we observed between the TSI and the Norwegian regulations is in the allowed speed parameters for high-speed operation. The Teknisk Regelverk has been set up for a speed of up to 250 km/h (Intercity traffic). In some few cases we could find references to 300 km/h (JD 530, 525). The TSI, in contrast, holds the frame parameters for high-speed operation up to 350 km/h. In this chapter, we have compared the TSI Infrastructure (INF), Safety in Tunnel (SRT) and People with Reduced Mobility (PRM) with the corresponding Norwegian standards. In the following table we have compiled the fundamental speed-related parameters derived from the TSI Infrastructure 4.2.1 General Provisions and set up in contrast to the effective Teknisk Regelverk. Jernbaneverket has addressed the requirements with the transfer and implementation of the TSI into the regulations in JD 501, chapter 2, addendum 2j – 2q in the Teknisk Regelverk and checked if the TSI requirements are fulfilled. We have checked cases, in which no analogy could be made with the TSI, randomly regarding their plausibility and attached in the following table. Furthermore, we have listed topics that have caught our attention during the perusal of the regulations. This, of course, does not ultimately rule out further differences or complements.

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Table 20: Limit value analysis = 350 km/h V ) ) 6 8 286 m 307 m = 300 km/h V JD ) 6) 8) 2 3) 1) )) 9 4) 248 m 262 m er traffic er = 250 km/h g < 20 mm < 20 V h + 20 mm + 160 mm ( ≤ 2.000 m

400 m assen q ≥ 100 mm p 12,5 ‰ 1680 mm 6) 8) T ≤ R ≤ 550 mmmm550 760 / 12,5 ‰ mixed traffic / traffic mixed ‰ 12,5 130 mm 1435 mm +/- 2 mm -10 -10 20 ‰/ mixed traffic ‰/ / 20 50 m 50 m 62,5 -20 mmT -20 < 25‰ 20 ‰ passenger traffic ≤ 4,50 m 4,70m 4,40 m4,56 m4,60 m 4,40m 4,56m 4,60m ≤ ≤ ≤ 214 m 208 m 105 mm 90 mm 85 mm = 200 km/h V 5) 7) 500 m 70 m 70 = 350 km/h V 630 / 473 m/ 473 630 m/ 263 350 5) 7) 500 m R ≥ 60 m 60 = 300 km/h < 0 mm V 540 / 405 m/ 405 540 m/ 225 300 h 50 mm 50 ≤

q TSI 5) 7) 2,5 2,5 ‰ 400 m 400 ≤ ≥ T 1650 mm 1650 or speeds> 160 km / h, however, with very good margins from the TSI requirement, so that this practice ensures ensures practice this that so requirement, TSI the from margins good very with however, km / 160 h, speeds> or > r, granted a special case ("specific cases") for this parameter in relation to the TSI PRM 0 ≤ 550 mmmm550 760 / 500 m R ≥ -30 mm < T mm < -30 50 m 50 the rise / fall does not exceed 2 ‰. exceed not does fall / rise the 35 ‰ / length max 35 ‰ m / length 6.000 = 250 km/h 25 ‰ / length max 10.000 m max 10.000 / length ‰ 25 ≤ ≤ V 450 / 338 m/ 338 450 m/ 188 250 5) 7) 500 m R ≥ no further categorie for distance between track centres between for distance categorie further no 40 m 40 80 m 100 m 120 m 140 m 100 m 125 m ≥ 4,00 m4,00 m 4,00 m 4,20 m 4,50 3,30 m3,30 m 3,80 m 3,80 m 3,80 m 3,30 m 3,50 m 3,50 3,30 m3,30 m 3,80 m 3,80 m 3,80 m 4,00 m 4,40 180 kN 180 kN 170 kN 160 kN 200 kN 180 kN 170 kN 1.500 m1.500 m 2.700 m 3.800 m 5.600 m 1.800 m 2.900 m 4.300 2.000 m 3.700 m 5.400 m 8.100 m 2.400 m 4.000 m 6.000 m 165 mm165 mm 150 mm 130 mm 80 700 mm 760 mm 760 mm 760 mm 750 mm 800 mm 140 mm 100 mm 100 mm 80 mm 180 mm 180 mm 180 mm 180 mm 135 mm 125 mm 120 mm 10.000m 15.700 m 22.500 m 30.000 m 15.400 m 24.000 m 30.000 m 30.000 m 30.000 m 30.000 m 1435 mm1435 mm 1435 mm 1435 mm 1435 R = 200 km/h 3,30 - 3,70 m 3,70 - 3,30 m- 4,20 3,80 m- 4,20 3,80 m - 4,20 3,80 V 360 / 270 m 270 / 360 200 / 150 m/ 150 200 ) ) ) on cant / cant radius on g to TSI-value ( production limit balast ( normal normal normal normal normal normal normal normal normal minimum minimum minimum maximum minimum maximum maximum R > 5.000 m 4.000 m - 5.000 m m5.000 - 4.000 m m4.000 - 1.000 dependin ( REMARK e straight line/ R > 10.000 m 1430 mm 1432/1433 mm 1434 mm 1434 mm maximum maximum g ran 25 ‰ passenger traffic 25 ‰ passenger ≤ y) g the platforms g e CATEGORY g ht lines and circular curves circular and ht lines au g y g ht ement alon g g th of strai of th endent on cant deficienc cant on endent ular track 20 ‰/ length 3.000 max m mixed traffic / g p g de Limit valuesin accordances Technical to Regulations Distance between track centres tunnel section tunnel centres track between Distance Re Length of section with medium gradient medium with section of Length radius Vertical Gradient Track resistance – vertical loads vertical – resistance Track Distance between trackcentres open section tolerance (Th) of the platform height platform of the (Th) tolerance arran Track Railings and noise screenings on bridges screenings and noise Railings Horizontal radius ( cant) and radius on (dependent Len Ballast Thickness Ballast length platform and platform track between Distance tolerance (Tq) for thedistance between track and platform hei platform Lenght of transition curve transition of Lenght Gradient at platforms Gradient Nominal track Nominal Distance tonoise screenin Track cant Track Cant deficienc Cant 4) Gradient at platforms should not have greater rise / fall than 12.5 ‰. If there is any change of coaches at the platform, the at coaches of change is any there ‰. If 12.5 than / fall rise greater have not should platforms at Gradient 4) mm (minimal) = 180 cant track with is calculated / bloss, clotoide curve transition of Lenght 5) 5.1 Tabell 3.2, chapter 530 JD to concerning ramp of Lenght 6) mm (normal) = 100 cant track with is calculated / bloss, clotoide curve transition of Lenght 7) 5.1 Tabell 3.2, chapter 530 JD to concerning ramp of Lenght 8) stock rolling modern with lines on existing deficiency cant maximum 9) 1) JD532 allows higher "immediate" limit gauge than HS INF TSI for speed> 160km / h. Measures in JD532 requirements are f are requirements JD532 in / h. Measures 160km speed> for TSI INF HS than gauge limit "immediate" higher allows JD532 1) ≤ 2) howeve Norway, TSI. INF HS to in relation track the of center - edge platform the reach to requirements different have JD5xx 3) that the gauge will never exceed the TSI requirement in track at such high speeds. high such at track in requirement TSI the exceed never will gauge the that

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In addition to above shown table differences have been found: • JD 520: Chapter 5, Task 4. “Normalsporprofiler”, figure 5.13 und figure 5.14 The minimum cross-section according TSI Infrastructure is maintained. Both cross-sections show sidewise cable ducts constructed on the formation. The standard cable duct width is 60 cm. The cross-section design is conflicting with the sideway. According TSI INF, category I, there has to be a sideway along the operated tracks. The sideway ensures the deboarding of the passengers to the nearest opposite track. The clearance of the sideway on main track is not specified further in the TSI INF. On the basis of the TSI safety in railway tunnels, task 4.2.2.7, a sidewalk width of 0.75 m with a clear height of 2.25 m is proposed. The height of the sidewalk is allowed to be under rail foot bottom edge at formation height. Therefore it is recommended to integrate the cable duct into the formation. • JD 530: Chapter 6, Task 2.1 rail inclination Within the TSI infrastructure, category I-III, a span of rail inclination from 1:20 to 1:40 is defined. JD 530 is referring to UiC60E1. Definitions for rail inclination are missing. For an inclination of 1:40 rail profile UiC60E2 has to be used. According TSI INF also switches and crossings should have a rail inclination. This is especially needed for speed limits v > 250 km/h. • JD 530: Cross Wind Crosswinds are influencing high speed operations. However TSI Infrastructure, task 4.2.17, is not giving standards within this context. As in Norway wind effects will have an impact on HSR operation a national standard has to regulate this complex. • JD 530: Noise and vibration TSI Infrastructure, task 4.2.19 is referring to the different national regulations. The TSI Noise for conventional rails can be mentioned as reference but is not worked out for high speed rail systems. State of knowledge is the use of the Nordic rail prediction method in Norway. Also additional rail traffic noise regulations are in place which most likely will also be used for HSR projects. • JD 530: Ballast pick-up TSI Infrastructure, task 4.2.27, is an open point and not defining any regulations at the moment. Here national standards have to be applied but have to be extended to high speed rail systems. • JD 532: Chapter 13, task 3.1.2 track gauge – single error Definitions for allowed track gauge deviation are today only in place for quality class K 0, v > 145 km/h. The allowed deviations for speed limits v > 230 km/h have to be added (5 mm/m instead of 7 mm/m). • JD 532: Chapter 13, task 3.2.2 lateral displacement Definitions for allowed track lateral displacement are today only in place for quality class K 0, v > 145 km/h. The allowable track lateral displacement for speed limits v ≤ 200 km/h is according TSI HS in JD 532 defined. For speed limits v > 200 km/h those have to be added. Some of the references in JD 501, Chapter 2, Annex 2, could not be reproduced.

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1.1.2.2 Standards for Technical Equipment

1.1.2.2.1 Signalling and ATC The evaluation of the standards for signalling and ATC gives following main results: • The Regelverk for Signalling and Control Systems is in revision for the ETCS/ERTMS at the moment, it couldn’t be checked. • Comprehensively the Norwegian Rail Standard (JD) includes no signalling regulations and principles for speed limits v > 160 km/h. Thus the entire standard for signalling should be revised for a development of state-of-the art high-speed railway operation. • Sub-systems of the ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System), here the GSM-R are already in operation but are not further specified for high speed lines. Document GSM-R Prosjektet (Doc.No. 3A-GSM-036) describes sufficiently the physical composition of the Norwegian GSM_R network, statements regarding voice and data parameters, however, are not being made here. • A uniform applicable ATP-system for HSL is not covered by the current standards. Furthermore the following additional tasks for a high speed railway development have to be adjusted in the Norwegian Rail Standards (JD): • JD 590: Chapter 2, section 2 et seqq. JD standard defines only the railroad control system EBICAB 700 with the specifications DATC and FATC as punctiform control system in allowed speed limits from 130 km/h up to 210 km/h. High speed lines need in principle continuous railroad control systems. For high speed operation an appropriate standard should be aimed for. So far the Norwegian standards are not describing the European standard for the coordination of the rail traffic ERTMS (ETCS) railroad control system with its equipment levels 1 to 3. • JD 550: Chapter 5, section 2.1 et seqq. The standard is describing protective sections at signals. Resulting distances and breaking times are based on the EBICAB specifications according FATC and DATC. For HSR operation the standard needs adopted specifications. • JD 550: Chapter 10, section 2 et seqq. This chapter and following are related to the positioning of location transponders for the national ATC (EBICAB). As the system is not qualified for HSR lines the standards have to be extended and adopted accordingly. The current JD set of regulations JD 5XX for technical equipment adequately describes the design and realisation parameters in terms of conventional equipment for signalling technology, track release signalling systems and train control and is for the most part not in conflict with the future requirements and recommendations of the European Commission for Interoperability in the Trans-European rail network. For the technical equipment and in particular with regard to a standardised European train control system, which also complies to the requirements of high- speed operation, the European Train Control system (ETCS) was developed, which meets the demands of the diverse speed levels of the rail systems with its applications (Level 0-3, STM). While the applications Level STM for the migration phase from national system to a standardised full ETCS system, level 1, are predominantly used for speeds up to 160 km/h in conventional traffic, ETCS level 2 will be more and more put into service on diverse high-speed railway lines in Europe. With regard to long braking distances and the visibility and recognition of the signal aspects, trackside signalling is dispensable in level 2. Movement commands and speed standards are transmitted to the driver via the MMI (Man Machine Interface) of the onboard unit. Interface to the electronic signal box is the RBC, which issues the movement authorities for the train.

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Figure 5: Principle of ETCS level 2 Hence it is recommended to extend the JD regulations by the chapter ERTMS with main categories ETCS and GSM-R and adapt it to the interoperability criteria. Interoperability criteria are mainly defined in the sections – on board- and – track-. -On board- assembly groups in terms of interoperability are e.g. the on-board safety platform, data recorder, odometry and GSM-R, assembly groups track-side are e.g. RBC (Radio Bloc Centre); Euro-, Euro-Loop, LEU (Lineside Electronic Unit) and track-side safety platform. Another aspect in terms of interoperability is the respective national train running regulations and standards for railway operation. In the scope of harmonisation these should be studied and revised, in addition to the criteria already mentioned above. However, this study is not subject of this chapter.

1.1.2.2.2 Overhead contact lines and power supply

► Voltage and Frequency Primarily, a nominal voltage of 25 kV with a nominal frequency of 50 Hz should be used for lines of TSI category I. In member states, whose network is electrified with AC 15 kV and 16.7 Hz, it is permissible for this system to be used for new category I lines. The requirements are as specified in EN 50163.

► Performance characteristics and installed power for the Energy subsystem The system shall be designed to meet the following in EN 50388 specified requirements: • line speed, • mean useful voltage, • maximum train current.

► Regenerative braking AC system should be selected with regard to possible regenerative braking Stationary facilities and their protective equipment have to be designed with the possibility for regenerative braking.

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► Continuity of power supply in case of disturbances The power supply and the overhead contact line shall be designed to enable continuity of operation in case of disturbances. Individual supply sections, switching, redundant supply equipment in substations.

► Geometry of the overhead contact line For lines of category I a nominal contact wire height of 5’080 mm to 5’300 mm shall be planned.

► Static contact force For AC, 70 N needs to be observed.

► Mean contact force For the mean contact force, no data are provided in the TSI for speeds exceeding 320 km/h. National regulations are valid, as far as they exist. For speeds up to 320 km/h the specifications of the TSI are binding (figure 4.2.1.5.1)

► Contact wire material The contact wire shall comply with the requirements of EN 50149.

► Quality of current collection The quality of current collection has a fundamental impact on the life of the contact wire and shall comply with the specified parameters. Conformity with the requirements on dynamic behaviour shall be verified in accordance with EN 50367.

1.1.2.3 Standards for Rolling Stock A very thorough scrutiny of the latest standards and regulations used for Rolling Stock projects in different European countries (including Norway) for tilting as well as high speed railways has been conducted. The full list is given in the Annex 1. We have included in our considerations the existing TSI as well as the two new TSI expected to come into force this year. These two are nevertheless not applicable for this study as they cover a) the updated requirements for freight wagons which shall not be considered (even that mixed traffic has been part of the overall study, regarding standards only HSR is new for Norway and hence looked at) and b) locomotives, which are as well not considered. We are assuming that only trainsets (EMUs) will be considered in future Norwegian HSR. Furthermore 57 UIC leaflets, 178 Euronorms (ENs), 1 preliminary EN, 31 IEC standards, 6 Norwegian standards and 21 other international / country-specific standards or regulations have been analysed, compared with the matching Norwegian standards and all in all no conflicts and only one significant gap has been identified: cross winds. The strategy to overcome this gap is described in the respective later chapter below. One UIC leaflet (UIC 812-1) that is commonly referred to in Rolling Stock new build projects we deem as not applicable for safety reasons as tyred wheels are not recommendable for very high speeds. As well one commonly in Norway referred to Norwegian standard (NS3919 “Brannteknisk klassifisering av materialer, byggningsdeler, kledninger og overflater”) we deem obsolete in our case as the respective Euronorm will cover all aspects of this national norm.

1.1.3 Recommendations for Solutions and Strategies to close the identified gaps

1.1.3.1 Extension of the existing standards according TSI specifications For the realisation of a HSR network or individual lines with a speed of 250 – 350 km/h within the projected scenarios in Norway, it is imperative to extend the existing Teknisk Regelverk by

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 49 of (270) the above mentioned speed range, although there are some details are included for 300 km/h, but it must be totally completed to enable a future high speed design. This applies in particular to the Infrastructure section, but also to all speed-related subsystems such as Energy, Safety in Tunnel, etc. The subsystem Control and Signalling is currently revised regarding ERMTS respect. ETCS, it is recommended to include the above mentioned speed range in the process. As it is expected that the revision and implementation of the existing regulations will require a certain period of time, it is recommended to base the upcoming feasibility studies on the parameters specified in the TSI. The most important design parameters may be taken from the above table resp. the table in chapter 1.4.2. This is unobjectionable, as usually national regulations hold stricter design parameters than the TSI. However, the final and effective norm or at least a binding preliminary version should be available before the start of the final, detailed planning. It is recommended to conduct, for example, a first TSI conformity check in the planning phase prior to the issuance of a construction permit, to detect and clear possible discrepancies in detail as early as possible. A further TSI conformity check should be carried out prior to respectively upon approval of the implementation planning.

1.1.3.2 Proposed Solutions for identified gaps Some of the above mentioned gaps may be ascribed to the speed range > 250 km/h currently missing in Norwegian regulations or to the revision of the control and signalling specifications. Other topics suggest further discussion, as they seem to differ from the TSI. In addition, there are open points, which currently are not addressed in the TSI. To exemplify, we have selected one topic to show a possible approach:

► TSI Infrastructure, section 4.2.17, Effect of crosswinds (Sidevind) As we have seen there is a gap for the cross wind issue because it is not solved in the TSI at the moment and we have found no Norwegian standard or regulation referring to this. Looking for samples in other countries we have had a development in Germany where in the mid of the nineties cross wind safety of high speed railway operation gained more importance for German Railways due to the introduction of modern high-speed trains with light weighted endcars. Crosswind is an issue concerning both infrastructure and rolling stock. In parallel intense cross wind studies were started and resulted in 2001 in a first “Handbook for the Safety Proof under Cross Wind”. Additionally, so called wind protection walls were implemented on the HSR Cologne - Frankfurt in certain sections before starting operation in 2002. German Railways issued in 2006 a comprehensive guideline to assure cross wind safety of passenger railway operation. This Guideline RiL 80704 (formerly known as RiL 401 03/01) was declared by railway authority EBA as German state of the art for cross wind assessment. Most of the methodological parts of the guideline had been transferred into the new European draft standard on cross wind (prEN 14067-6). Cross wind is actually the only gap that has been identified within the area of Rolling Stock. We see the need to define a regulation for Norway that could be based for example on the above mentioned German regulation as long as no mandatory Euronorm is in force. Other countries faced the same problem and developed their own regulation. Irish Rail for example developed a regulation that is less rigid than the German DB RiL but still practical for their country specific conditions. Swiss railways is currently considering their own regulation as they recently have been facing cross wind problems during operation for the first time. They as well are tempted to develop a less rigorous regulation than the German version.

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Nevertheless anticipating the rather harsh wind conditions combined with exposed infrastructure we recommend the following:8 • as long as the EN 14067-6 is not in force or cancelled due to disagreements within the standardisation process the DB RiL 80704 shall be used for Norwegian HSR, • when EN 14067-6 is in force Rolling Stock requirements shall be based on that norm.

► TSI Infrastructure, section 4.2.15, Global track stiffness – open point (Sporets stivhet) The stiffness of the track structure is a key input for the development of designs and maintenance plans to achieve optimum whole life performance. Simplified, the track stiffness defines the impact of the trackway on the vehicle. This applies in particular to high-speed and heavy goods traffic. It has to be pointed out that usually not the specific stiffness is the determining factor, but variations in stiffness. Furthermore, the stiffness varies according to the climate. A track stiffness that is too high or too low leads to increased dynamic impact and therefore is an important cost factor. In previous years studies have been carried out by the industry, organisations and scientific institutions. The studies found that there were differing interpretations and opinions on the relevance, importance and understanding of track stiffness. Measurement and evaluation methods have been developed to better understand track stiffness and its impacts and to optimise its distribution. Also, for the first time, the stiffness in turnouts has been compared on an international basis. The result shows clearly that there is considerable potential for the reduction of dynamic forces. First computer-based as well as empirical procedures have been developed and evaluated. Some of the studies have been proposed for use by the ERA drafting group for Rail Infrastructure TSI, in connection with closing out the open point on track stiffness requirements. National railway infrastructure companies have now the opportunity to use the available studies and documents to complement their own national regulations, as long as the topic is not been handled in full by the TSI.

8 Cp. [7] and [8].

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1.2 Climatic conditions – meteorological data In South and Central Europe adverse weather and extreme climatic conditions are handled through temporary speed restrictions when needed. The number of days with such weather, climate or special winter conditions is high in Norway. The ambition is therefore that the technical solutions chosen for high-speed railways will enable normal operation under most climate variations likely to occur here. In the following chapter different issues are treated more complementary. First we will give an overview of the Norwegian geographic conditions. It contains theme as Climatic conditions and meteorological data, topographic issues and landslides. The following chapters will then outline problems and solutions which must be regarded for planning of new high speed railway lines. This part contains issues like climatic impact on the construction phase, rolling stock, operation of railway systems and an overview of early warning systems (EWS). For a summary of different problems, causes and possible measures it is refered to the matrices in chapter 1.2.9.3 and 1.2.10.3.

1.2.1 Summary Train operation in winter can be difficult as experienced in northern Europe in the winter 2009/2010. A study that examine the correlation between train delays and winter conditions in Norway have been performed by SINTEF for the years 2005 - 2010 [9] as well as a study by the Swedish Trafikverket to sum up their experience from the winter 2009/2010 [10]. The current solutions for operating trains in winter climate have been well covered in earlier studies [44] [45]. This report acknowledges this work and has found some few “new” additions, especially regarding high speed in exposed mountain environment. In the mountains it is important to design the line to accommodate deep snow, wind in combination with snow and plan how the line can be kept clear. Rolling stock that is designed using current guidelines will technically be able to operate at full speed in most conditions as long as the lines can be kept clear. In the winter it is however necessary to allow sufficient slack in the schedule to allow proper maintenance and de-icing between the runs. The current design of switches is vulnerable to snow and ice. High speed switches even more so due to longer length. The moving tongue can easily be blocked by hard packed snow, ice lumps from passing trains, ballast stones etc. Since a jammed switch has severe consequences for the traffic, investing in research for a switch design which is less sensitive to foreign objects can eventually benefit the whole industry. A revolving or sliding action to operate the switch in stead of the sideways squeezing movement can be part of a solution. A very important task will always be the necessary planning and organizing before the winter season. Through traditional measures most problems can be solved before they cause delays in the operation [10].

1.2.2 The climate in Norway Norway's climate shows great variations. From its southernmost point Lindesnes, to its northernmost North Cape, there is a span of 13 degrees of latitude, or the same as from Lindesnes to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore we have great variations in the level of received solar energy during the year. The largest differences are found in Northern Norway where there is midnight sun in the summer months and no sunshine at all during winter. The rugged topography of Norway is one of the main reasons for large local differences over short distances. Under follows a few extremes which are measured throughout the country [27][28]. Maximum temperature in Norway was recorded in Nesbyen, Buskerud 20.6.1970 at 35.6 ºC. Minimum temperature in Norway was recorded as far back as 1886 and is still standing after 120 years. The record was observed in Karasjok, Finnmark, on 1th January 1886 at -51.4 ºC.

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The precipitation record in Norway is from Indre Matre in Hordaland County on the western coast of Norway. After several wet days, it was measured, from 08:00 on the 25 until 08:00 on the 26 November 1940, 229.6 mm of rain. It has however fallen more because the measuring cup was filled up and some spilled out. The next few days was also very wet and during this 5 day period of rain a total of 495.4 mm was measured [24]. The following table shows the intensity in shorter periods of extreme precipitation. As the table shows, the extremes mostly happen during summertime.

Table 21: Precipitation intensity in Norway

Duration in Precipitation sum Time of Place County Date minutes in mm start

1 4.3 Gardermoen 9 Akershus 08.jul.73 09:32 2 8.1 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 11.aug.86 17:11 3 11.9 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 01.aug.86 17:11 5 16.2 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 01.aug.86 17:11 10 25.6 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 01.aug.86 17:10 15 27.3 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 23:04

20 34.4 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 23:01 30 42.0 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:59 45 49.1 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:40 60 54.9 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:35 90 56.7 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:35 120 59.3 Gjettum Akershus 17.jul.73 05:25 180 60.8 Grimstad Aust-Agder 11.jul.78 01:29 360 87.8 Sømskleiva i Vest-Agder 06.okt.87 00:15

In the winter season, precipitation is in the form of snow in all parts of the country. Generally 1mm of rain gives up to 10 mm of snow. However, a warm cloud with rain normally contains a lot more precipitation than a cold cloud with snow. There exist large geographical snow variations and variation of snow covered periods. In the southern and western coastal areas snow is normally infrequent and the snow covered periods are normally not continuous throughout the winter season. Nonetheless it can come to quite a lot of snow in a short time frame, and sometimes 0.5-1.0 m of snow can be built up during a 24 hour period. Inland areas, where temperatures are low, there are normally moderate snow; while the snow covered period is long. Generally the highest wind speeds occur in open areas near the sea and on the high mountain routes. A maximum mean wind speed between 30-35 m/s is quite usual, even 45 m/s in some cases. For extreme situations, gusts of wind can pass 60 m/s. For a new line, places where heavy wind occurs should be avoided. This has to be evaluated for each line separately, giving special attention to high bridges and embankments across vallies.

1.2.3 Future climate change Systematic variation in the atmospheric circulation pattern over the North-Atlantic, The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), is an important reason for the large natural year to year variation we experience in wind, temperature and precipitation in mainland Norway. These natural variations in air and ocean circulation give significant climate variation in Norway for periods up to a few decades. For time periods up to 10-20 year these natural variations are

9 Tangert av Nøisomhed i Molde 1. august 1986.

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 53 of (270) of the same size or greater than the expected future human induced climate change. Therefore a climate change assessment has to go beyond 2030 [24]. In general, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, concludes within its regional climate projections for northern Europe that the annual mean temperatures in Europe are likely to increase more than the global mean. The warming in northern Europe is also likely to be largest in winter and the lowest winter temperatures are likely to increase more than average winter temperature. Annual precipitation is very likely to increase together with extreme levels of daily precipitation in most of northern Europe. Confidence in the forecast of future changes in wind scales is relatively low. It is however more likely than not, that there will not be any increase in the average or extreme wind speeds in northern Europe. The duration of the snowy season is very likely to get shorter in all of Europe, and snow depth is likely to decrease in at least most of Europe [22]. The annual mean temperature for mainland Norway has increased 0.8 ºC during the last 100 years. This is consistent with global mean change in the same period. Annual precipitation has increased by around 20 % since 1900 with most of the increase in the period after 1980 [24].

Figure 6: Expected percentage change in normal Figure 7: Expected change in annual temperature from annual precipitation from normal period 1961-1990 to normal period 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100. 2071-2100. In Figure 6 [27] the map shows expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation from normal period 1961-1990 to the normal period 2071-2100.The presented results are based on the global climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German “Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie”, the regional climate model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere and the hydrological model HBV. [27] In Figure 7 [27] the map shows change in annual temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100. The results are based on the global climate model HadAM3H, following SRES emission scenario A2. The results are downscaled using met.no's HIRAM model; ~55km2 spatial resolution and 19 vertical levels. Finally the results are empirically adjusted to local conditions to 1 km spatial resolution. [23]

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In Figure 8 [27] the expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100 are shown. The presented results are based on the global climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German “Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie”, the regional climate model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere and the hydrological model HBV. The changes during the winter months seem to be much greater than for the other seasons. The season’s spring, summer and autumn are shown in Figure 9.

Figure 8: Expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.

Figure 9: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071- 2100.10 For the amount of storms in our ocean and coastal areas there seems to be no clear trend since 1880. The climate models show little or no change in mean wind conditions in Norway in the period towards 2100. Some results however indicate that high wind episodes might happen more frequently [24].

10 [27].

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1.2.4 Topographic issues and mass wasting

1.2.4.1 Mass wasting in Norway Mass wasting or mass movement is rock and soil which is moved naturally by gravity, often triggered by weather conditions. This process is often called landslide, which however has no specific definition in geology. In this section we will also include ice and snow movements. The geological composition, topography and climate vary widely throughout Norway, from deep fjords and high mountains to the more plain areas. Figure 10 [35] gives a rough overview of the topographical situation, with mountains over 2’000 m along the central mountain range in southern Norway and plain, lower lying areas in south and central Norway. Large temperature differences, locally heavy rain, steep topography and unstable areas with marine deposits make the country vulnerable to various types of mass wasting that may occur, even in the flatter parts of the country.

Much of the landslide activity is associated with the fjord Figure 10: The topography in Norway landscapes in Western and Northern Norway, but also the East and the North are prone to mass wasting. In this area though, it is often found to be a different type of land wasting. In this chapter the most rapid types of mass movement has been shown greatest attention. Mass movement also includes slow movements, which of course will be hazardous for the operation of a high speed line if the track should be involved. The assessment of this is however, a standard part of the construction phase, and appropriate measures will be taken to prevent this. The table and pie chart in Figure 11 shows the recorded mass wasting on Norwegian national and county roads from 2000 to 2009. The data is derived from mass wasting Registry of NPRA, where all the debris on the road is registered. The graphs give an indication of the occurrence of different types of landslides in the country and will most likely also be able to represent mass wasting pattern on the railroads in the country. It may be worth noting that the rockfalls and icefalls of many places are under reported, since much of these are smaller blocks being cleared away by the first car passing by.

Figure 11: Mass wasting records from the National Road Administration, various types11

11 [36].

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The mass wasting activities vary according to seasonal changes. Statistically, the mass wasting activities are lowest in the summer. The danger of rock and earth slides increase during rainy periods in the autumn. However, the statistics show that landslide activities are greatest during snow melting periods in the spring. The snow melting period is characterized by continuous water flooding during the day combined with frost expansion during the night.

1.2.4.2 Bedrock The bedrock in Norway varies widely both locally and regionally. Bedrock map of southern Norway (Figure 12) illustrates some of the variation in the bedrock. The Caledonian mountain zone covers almost 2/3 of Norway's bedrock, the remaining 1/3 consists partly of older, Precambrian rocks (Precambrian = prehistoric time). There are also two younger bedrock areas: the Region with its Permian eruptive rock and field with its Devonian sandstones and conglomerates. Basement rocks are in some places more than 2’800 million years old. In general the rocks formed in the late Precambrian time consist mainly of gneiss. Local is intrusive (magma that has solidified below the earth) of granite or gabbro. In addition, there are also areas with quartzite, amphibolite and marble [37]. The bedrock in Norway is generally classified as good in terms of stability although there are local exceptions. Mass wasting is generally much more dependent on local topography and fracturing. Deep glacial valleys combined with the fractured bedrock in many places are a typical source for rock falls.

Figure 12: Excerpt of bedrock map of southern Norway12 The bedrock of the country is varied, but mostly consists of good rocks in terms of stability. Landslide activity therefore usually depends more on local topography and fracturing than on various rock type.

1.2.5 Climate change and extreme precipitation We have in recent years seen an increased frequency of cases of extreme precipitation in Norway. The consequences of potential climate change with rising temperatures and more precipitation will probably be an increase in flood and landslide frequency. Areas previously

12 [38].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 57 of (270) considered stable can become unstable. In total, extreme precipitation is likely to increase the risk for most types of avalanches in Norway over the next 50 years. This applies particularly to periods of extreme rainfall. More frequent occurrence of strong low pressure (precipitation and wind) from the Atlantic could provide increased avalanche activity in vulnerable areas that are cold enough. In some locations the type of avalanche will change, new locations will see avalanches and some places are going to see a stop in avalanches where they have tended to be earlier (e.g. in lower areas). Heavy rain and winds will lead to increased erosion and water pressure in rock cracks. Increased pressure on relieving blocks and flakes will preach increase the frequency of rock falls, especially along the coast where the climate is most humid. Intense precipitation periods also increase water saturations in soils and sediments and we can therefore expect more soil and flood slides throughout the country. Flooding is a risk factor for clay slides. With any climate change and rising temperatures, the annual spring floods in the lowlands is generally expected to come earlier in the following years. It is also common with autumn and winter floods and the risk of flooding and increased pore pressure in clay will cause the frequency of clay slides could increase. The consequences of a rock avalanche can be very serious. In Norway, there have been many examples of slides that have gone in the sea or water and have generated huge tsunamis and wiped out entire villages. Examples of this are Loen in 1905 and 1936 (respectively 74 and 61 people were killed) and in Tafjord in 1934 (where 41 people died). Tafjord, Molde (island of Otrøya) and Stranda/Hellesylt (Åkneset) are examples of places that are vulnerable to tsunamis caused by avalanches.

1.2.6 More about different types of mass wasting

► Soil/sediment slides Soil/sediment slides: Figure 13 shows a large sediment slides that have taken some houses. Two or three streams in the slide path may indicate that the slide was triggered in a period with intense rain. The slides consist of masses of stone, gravel, sand and soil with varying water content. Soil slide is normally triggered by heavy showers over a short period of time, or in combination with rapid snow melting. Slides are trigged by normal soil on slopes with a gradient of 30° but in areas without forests landslides can occur on slopes that are down to 25°. Normally, there is no danger of slides if the slope of the terrain is less than about 27°.

Figure 13: Soil/sediment slide13

13 [39].

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► Quick clay slides Figure 14 shows the quick clay landslide in Rissa in Trøndelag 1978. The landslide swept along 8-9 farms. Quick clay is very sensitive. This means that it can be quite solid as long as it is undisturbed, but loose its strength and become fluid when stirred. In contrast to landslides, which require a certain slope angle to be triggered, quick clay landslides can be trigged in nearly flat terrain. Quick clay is formed by clay particles deposited in salt water during the last ice age. The salt binds clay particles together so that the clay particles are stacked like a house of cards. Because of the geological rising large areas consisting of marine clay has risen above sea level. As the salt washed out, only an open and unstable structure like a house of cards is left behind. Quick clay landslide usually occurs sudden, with little or no warning, and can develop very quickly over a large area. Triggering mechanism is often a disturbance somewhere in the clay package, for example that a riverbank along a stream in quick area falls out during a flood period or by construction activity or stress of the sloping terrain so that some of the camp falls. Slopes partly consisting of more stable materials than clay will during a landslide retain much of its strength. One can often get warning signs like cracks in the ground. The development of the slides like this will often be slower than in sensitive clays [40] [41].

Figure 14: Rissa was the scene of the largest quick clay landslide in Norway last century, 29 April 197814

► Rockfall A rock is considered "smaller" blocks and block parties under 100 m³ [42]. Rock falls are triggered by cracking processes such as congelifraction, water erosion etc. Most often individual blocks of varying size breaks free, but sometimes more rocks loosen aggregate. Water pressure and frost action is the most common triggering factor. Therefore, rock falls occur most often in rainy periods or in the melting period in spring and autumn. There are also rock falls during the summer, when the cracks are completely dry.

14 [38].

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Figure 15: Large rockfall at Mundheim in Hardanger in 2006

► Rock Slides If a greater batch of rock loosens at the same time, it is called a rock slide. Water pressure and frost cracking are the most common triggering factors. Therefore rockslides, just as rock falls, often happen during periods with heavy precipitation, especially if combined with snow melting. Rock slides differs little from the rock falls, but the amount of stone is larger, from about 100 m³ up to 10’000 m³ [42].

► Rock avalanche The rock avalanche is defined as large rock masses exceeding 10’000 m³ [42]. The largest rock avalanches may include several million m3. Rock avalanches have a very rapid movement and are moving farther out than regular slides. With a similar movement pattern as a snow avalanche (with a large dust cloud in front) they can sometimes go across the valleys.

► Avalanche

Figure 16: Trigger areas for avalanches in Jotunheimen15

15 Source Sørstø Roger Anderson.

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A distinction is generally made between three forms of avalanches: loose snow avalanche, slab avalanche and slush avalanches. The first two can be either dry or wet while the slush landslides have very high water content. In particular, the dry snow avalanches can be accompanied with severe detrimental winds. Loose snow avalanche: starts at or near the surface of the snow that has very little bonding between individual grains. These landslides involve usually only surface snow or snow near the surface. Loose snow avalanche starts in a single area or point and spreads outward in a fan shape as it moves down the slope. Loose snow avalanche can be triggered in both dry and wet snow, but the failure mechanism is the same. Avalanches triggered in wet snow can be much more massive than if the snow is dry. Required slope gradient for release of loose snow avalanches will depend on the water content of snow. For dry snow, which usually slopes over 35°, but this angle will be instantly reduced with increasing water content. Slab Avalanche: When a larger portion of snow, a slab, releases simultaneously along a moving plan (the collapse of a weak layer of snow), it is called a slab avalanche. At the very top of the avalanche it leaves a long edge with height that can vary between 0.2 and 4.0 meters. Closest to the ground the particles are moving in close contact with each other, and the snow has a relatively high density. This is the element that determines the avalanche speed and which has the maximum destructive impact. Slab avalanche is considered to be the most dangerous

type of avalanche. Slab avalanches are mostly triggered in Figure 17: Example loose snow slopes between 25° and 55°. Winds arising in front of this type avalanche of landslides can be of great speed and damage buildings and vehicles far ahead/ outside its path. Slush flows: Slush flows are a mixture of water and water-saturated snow and usually triggered by heavy rain, by snow or during springtime by strong solar heating and snow melting. Slush flows can break out at slopes with just a few degrees and can be very destructive.

Figure 18: Comparison of slab, loose snow and slush flows16

16 [39].

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1.2.7 Hazard mapping rockfall Hazard mapping for rockfall is the first map in a series produced by the national geological hazard mapping program, which also includes avalanches and landslides. The hazard mapping project started at NGU in 2007 with the development of the methodology underlying the maps. The purpose of the hazard maps is to get an overview of potential avalanche-prone areas (risk sites) at the national level. [43] Hazard maps show potential source areas and discharge areas for rockfall. The maps are drawn using a computer model that recognizes the potential source areas of rockfall in the slope of the mountain and geological information. From each source area calculated discharge area for rock falls automatically. It is not done field work in preparing the maps.

Figure 19: Example hazard maps from Hardanger17

1.2.8 Climatic influence on the construction phase

1.2.8.1 Introduction Norwegian topography and climate poses great challenges for not only for railway operations but also for the construction work. This section looks into some of the most important aspects. Some of the corridors for the possible HSR railway lines are exposed to varied climatic conditions, since they go from regions of typical coastal climate through narrow valleys towards high mountain areas and further through valleys ending in regions of more or less coastal climate. It will be a challenge to maintain construction works during the winter in the mountain area, in a landscape with low temperatures, deep snow and strong winds. The winter season (length, amount of snow and temperature) varies from year to year. Due to common practice with normal construction operations in the winter season this has to be considered and taken care of in the planning of the implementation. For construction sites (corridors) located in specific areas in the mountain, as well as close to nature protection areas, building temporary local roads can be a challenge. This may affect the distance between construction sites, temporary storage areas and rigging areas due to evacuation of people and machines in extreme weather situations.

17 [43].

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Construction work in tunnels can be carried out independent of outside weather conditions, but is still depending on the logistics outside in relation to road access and the continuous running of machines and other equipment in spite of ice, snow and heavy winds. After a period with heavy snow it can be difficult to restart the construction work. Equipment for thawing snow/ice from machines and equipment for removal snow from the roads/line is strongly recommended as part of the rig. At last it will be an economic question related to progress at site and required precautions (weather conditions) to ensure safety for the staff and machines and to ensure correct (acceptable) quality to the constructions as being carried out.

1.2.8.2 Important issues due to calendar and winter conditions in mountain areas • Rig location: o Distance from infrastructure and distance to site, o Communication lines (data, phone), o Evacuation plans, o People and machines, o Plans for people and machines when evacuation from site is impossible due to bad weather conditions, o Access to temporary roads, open during bad weather, o Open access to temporary storages in bad weather. • Safety due to environmental conditions: o People, o Machines, o Plans for bad weather conditions, o Plans for excepted weather conditions due to accepted construction quality, o Plans for when evacuate from site, close down for the winter. • Quality: o Define acceptable amount of water, ice and snow mixed into the construction (track formation). • Financial reviews: o Working in low temperature, frost issues, o Working in extreme snow/snow depth, mixing ice, snow and other frozen items into the construction materials.

1.2.8.3 Main disturbances in the construction phase due to climatic conditions

1.2.8.3.1 Frozen soil In winter there will be problems regarding the use of frozen soil in levelling and embankments. The workers will not be able to compact the soil satisfactorily. The best solution for this is to plan the building phases in a proper phase plan, making use of the soil in summertime when it is not frozen.

1.2.8.3.2 Wet soil The track foundation must always be exchanged with drained, frost free masses. However, for embankments existing soil can most often be used. After heavy rainfalls and flooding, the soil

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 63 of (270) can get so wet that it is not usable for the construction work. Therefore other soil nearby has to be used instead. This minor problem may cause some disturbance on the schedule. Increased pore pressure in the soil will increase the risk of land slides, and should therefore be paid special attention where this is likely to occur.

1.2.8.3.3 Snow and coldness/General winter problems During the winter the projects generally will need to calculate with more time to get the work done. Proper equipment for snow clearing and heating must be considered. This is a part of the scheduling and phase planning. In some areas trouble with snow clearing can require so much effort that it will be better to close down the construction area for a limited time. This will primarily apply in the mountains, where the wind rapidly will cover construction site and roads with snow. Tunnelling is an example of work which can be done in the winter, with only small problems caused by winter conditions.

1.2.9 Climatic influence on the rolling stock

1.2.9.1 Introduction This section looks at the problems and possible solutions related to the rolling stock. Other European high speed operations already have experience with high winds and heavy rain, so the new challenge will be to combat the low temperatures, snow and ice that come with the Norwegian winter. Interviews with other operations across the continent (see chapter 1.4.3) the winter measures common in Europe are found to be the use of snow ploughs, high positioned ventilation, de-icing facilities using steam or glycol. These measures are well known and in use in both conventional trains as well as high speed and tilting train services. An interesting observation is that operation of tilting trains is not differing much from regular trains with regards to adverse weather. There is a risk for snow packing between the carbody and bogie with tilting trains. This risk has to be minimized in the design phase. If problems occur due to adverse weather (Norwegian winter conditions), the general measure in Europe is to reduce speed or even cancel trains and wait for the weather to improve. The ambition for the Norwegian operation must be to operate normally in all normal winter conditions, and this is achievable using current design guidelines.

1.2.9.2 Main findings and problem areas Conversations with Norwegian personnel gave invaluable input on current practice, successful measures, planned improvements and tests regarding winter operation. The Nordic report “Winter durability of rolling stock” (1994) [44] and the Swedish study “High-speed operation in winter climate” (2006) [45] has made good compilations of the winter challenges facing a train operator in Norway. The Swedish report also gives a good presentation of the state of the art of winterization of rolling stock and infrastructure. • Packing of snow and ice on carbody and The problem is often caused by snow in the air clinging to damp components of the train. The snow can either be precipitation or snow smoke whirled up by wind or the train itself. The packed snow which will turn into ice causes problems with moving parts particularly in the bogies and can also contribute significantly to the load on the vehicle. • Packing of snow in air ducts. Snow that is sucked in through ventilation can cause trouble. Placement of ventilation gaps high on the vehicle sides and the use of filters can avoid the problem. • Humidity and risk of ice in air supply system

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The air supply compressor for the brakes and other auxiliary equipment will deliver air with moisture. This moisture will freeze in pipes, hoses, low points and brake components, if allowed into the pneumatic system. Filters and dryers will keep the moisture out and the functioning of this can be monitored by dew point measurement. • Extreme temperature, -40 °C The train must be designed to operate and be parked without power in temperatures as low as - 40 °C. This means that materials and components must be selected which have acceptable properties at low temperatures. Strategies for heating non safety related components if they have narrower operating temperature ranges may be allowed, but nevertheless low temperatures must not damage the components. • Brake system components The brake system components must be designed for Nordic applications. Some components, like friction materials, have unexpected poor performance under some weather conditions often experienced in Norway. • Current collection, pantograph issues The pantograph faces several challenges due to winter conditions. Rime on the over head line (OHL) will generate arching with resulting wear and heat. The pantograph can hit ice on the OHL, especially in tunnels, and this will probably destroy or severely damage a pantograph at high speeds. Snow and ice on the pantograph will affect its function, including pressure on the OHL, it’s up and down movement and tilting function if applicable. Our studies have not found particular winter problems with the OHL in Europe, but further investigations on how the OHL system will perform in high speed in very low temperatures should be considered. • De-icing and maintenance Experience shows that more maintenance is needed during winter time and that de-icing is a critical activity that takes time to accomplish successfully. The most successful technique seems to be glycol based de-icing facilities. Winter schedules must allow sufficient time for proper de- icing between runs. • High-speed issues (problems that can be expected to increase as speed increases) The Swedish winter report from 2006 [45] points out the following rolling stock issues that probably will increase severity with higher speed. Ballast pick-up, disc brakes not functioning well under all circumstances, poor running dynamics due to snow packing etc, pantograph issues due to ice and rime, and platform track issues.

1.2.9.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures In the following different problems that can occur due to adverse weather conditions are organised in a matrix. A short explanation of the problem and some possible measures are described.

Table 22: Problem / measure matrix for climatic influence on rolling stock

Cause Problem Possible measures

Whirling, dry snow around Packing of snow and ice on carbody Train design: the train (snow smoke) and bogies. Hampered movement of Design the moving parts to crush the ice if packet or cover parts including suspension, brakes, them with repellent surfaces. couplers and tilting mechanisms. Cover parts with bellows Pipes and cables can be damaged. Design the underframe of the train as a closed box reducing the surfaces and crannies that can gather snow and ice. Proof and pressurize compartments to avoid snow from entering. Track maintenance: - Water spraying on powder snow along the lines to bind snow that otherwise would whirl up around the train. This can be effective when the wind is not strong enough to cover the area

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Cause Problem Possible measures

with new powder snow. Thus primarily in low land and not mountain sections. Maintenance: - De-icing facilities and sufficient fleet size to allow trains to be taken out and properly de-iced before reentering traffic [17].

High snow levels around Weights for catenary system are Weights where snow levels can be high can be protected by a OHL masts blocked by snow. Tension of the lines case. is lost.

Wheels or brake disks After standstill the wheel is blocked This is handled by braking procedures. Brakes to be released freeze to brake blocks or as the brakes do not release. This at standstill immediately after stopping if possible. Frozen pads will cause wheel flats that can have wheels are difficult to detect, but can be jerked loose by a more serious consequences. combination of operating the brakes and reversing the train.

Water in the compressed The water will freeze in the system Air dryers, filters, train design and maintenance procedures. air for brakes and hamper the flow of air with The air quality can be constantly monitored by dew point malfunctioning brakes as result. measurement etc.

Water on brake discs The brake pads aquaplane, leading Manual or automatic exercising of the brakes during driving to to significantly longer brake keep surfaces dry. Use the pneumatic brakes more and distances. dynamic brakes less in winter. Better brake pad materials and designs.

Snow packing around The magnetic rail brake may be Inspections, brake exercise and de-icing facilities. The driving magnetic rail brakes jammed. speed must take into account that magnetic rail brakes (and other brakes) may be less effective under certain conditions.

Packing of snow in air Ventilation openings and filters may Place ventilation openings high on the vehicle to reduce ducts clog up and snow (water) enters the amount of snow being sucked in. Use filters and cyklon ventilation system and other systems arrangements to stop the snow using air for cooling (motors etc).

Snow and sand in door The snow, melting water and sand The mechanisms must be properly designed for this. and foot step mechanism following boarding passengers may Heating elements can be considered. cause corrosion, wear and mechanical problems in door and step mechanisms.

Low temperatures affect Gangways are stiffer in cold weather Materials for the gangway must not be too stiff or brittle in low gangway properties and may be damaged in sharp temperatures curves and large relative movements between the cars.

Typhoons packed with Roof mounted equipment like Install typhoons protected in the nose of the train (Norwegian snow typhoons can be muffled by a snow type 71/73), install a filter. Heating if necessary. cover. The snow can not be removed during operation due to the high voltage OHL.

Glass surfaces of The glass will not be clear and Such surfaces must be heated. Avoid overheating. Low cameras, mirrors, head function as intended. consumption light systems (LED, xenon etc) emit less heat lights, wind screens etc than conventional indescandent bulbs. Extra heating can be get covered with necessary when using these light sources. condense mist, snow or ice

Animals in the track Large animals like moose often Use fences. Keep vegetation away from the line. [20] Feed follow the track, especially when the animals to attract them away from the line. Construct animal snow depth is high outside the track. crossings (tunnels) at points on migration routes. Use Collisions with large animals are frightening smells, like wolf urine along the line costly and can cause derailment. Train design: Construct a snow plough that will keep the animal from coming under the train (causing derailment, damages and a mess). Construct the front (including couplers) to withstand a collision with minimal damages.

Water condensating on A cold train running into a damp Protect air intakes (see "Packing of snow in air ducts"). Heat the train tunnel will cause the water in the and ventilate electric cabinets inside the train. Ventilate the tunnel air to condensate. The same carbody with dry air. can happen when going in or coming out of workshops. (Simplon effect). Water on electric or electronic equipment can damage or temporarily cripple the train. Water

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Cause Problem Possible measures

entering the train this way can freeze in unexpected places causing blockages or even burst closed compartments.

Rime and ice layer on the There is arching when driving with The ice on the OHL can be removed with scraper trains [16]. It overhead line from rime on the pantograph carbon strip. can be possible to monitor or predict the carbon strip wear moisture condensating on This causes both high wear of the automatically. [14] The pantograph and carbon strip should be the line. carbon strip and high temperatures. properly designed (see [45]). Apart from the observed contact Damages to the carbon strip can strip wear, trains should be able to travel at full speed without

eventually tear down the OHL. The inducing problems due to rime or ice layer. [11][12][13] damages can be expected to increase with increasing speed.

Ice on pantograph air foils The pantograph forces are not De-icing maintenance. Stationary detectors can warn of wrong (spoilers) correct due to altered air foil function. pantograph forces. The problem can be expected to increase with increasing speed.

1.2.10 Climatic influence on the operation of the rail system

1.2.10.1 Introduction This section considers how adverse weather and climatic conditions might affect the operation of the HSR-line. Through different interviews and a literature study we found that extreme weather conditions for railway transport do not always correlate with the extreme peaks, but rather when sudden changes in weather conditions appears, or when bad weather lasts for a long time. We have also found that troubles with adverse weather do not only happen in the mountains, where the operator are used to it, but also in the lowland. The latter will sometimes cause even more problems because the organization will not be that well prepared for it. We have sorted out some main areas which we consider as extreme weather conditions for railway construction and operation. For some of these situations, we have found different solutions to deal with the weather. For other situations, it is mainly a question of good planning. Especially in the construction phase a lot of problems will be avoided as a result of a well made phasing plan.

1.2.10.2 Main disturbances of the operation of the line

1.2.10.2.1 Sudden changes in weather conditions Sudden changes are among the main reasons for much of the winter problems. Changes in precipitation will give peaks that can be hard to manage sufficiently, especially if the service system of the line is not prepared for the peaks due to economic reasons. Even worse is when the temperature changes from cold to warm, sometimes combined with rainy weather. This will make snow partly melt, which causes different problems. Wet snow is much heavier than dry snow, and can be a trigger for avalanches. Slush and ice plugs also often block the drainage, and therefore causes flooding of the area around the infrastructure.

1.2.10.2.2 Long-lasting snow weather When the snow weather last for days, the effort for snow clearance adds up and breaks the capacity. This applies for snow on the line and in stations, but also for melting capacity of snow from the trains. Both of this is hindering the traffic.

1.2.10.2.3 Wind gusts Heavy wind gusts can make the train . This is even more critical when the trains are running fast, because the kinetic energy of the train can superpose on the wind direction. This has to be evaluated when the corridors are going to be set. Different measures can help in some cases, but the best is always to avoid exposed locations.

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1.2.10.2.4 Ballast pickup Ballast pick-up is a phenomenon first experienced with the Japanese Shinkansen [18] and has also appeared in Sweden with X2000. Two mechanisms are thought to cause ballast stones from the track to be thrown up. The ballast can be thrown up both by ice falling from the trains and be sucked up by vacuum created by the trains aerodynamic properties. The flying stones can hurt people and damage surrounding installations as well as the undercarriage and windows of the train and passing trains. The train must be designed both to withstand ballast rock hits and to avoid aerodynamic suction even with additional ice build-up underneath. Ballast pickup is one of the main reasons that high speed trains in Germany [15] and France will travel at a lower speed during winter periods. During summertime, most of the problems can be handled through small measures, but it is hard to prevent ballast pickup caused by falling ice from the trains. A good measure for reducing this problem is the use of slab track instead of ballasted track.

1.2.10.2.5 General winter problems A set of different problems that occurs in the winter season are listed in the following table. Most of them can be minimized through thorough planning as well in the development of the line, as in the operation and maintenance of the line.

1.2.10.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures

Table 23: Problem/measure matrix of climatic influence for rail system operation

Cause Problem Possible measures

Drifting snow builds Driving through snowdrifts causes the Objects along the line should either be build on pillars or placed up on the track trains to run unevenly, with noise, on the opposite side of the track for the prevailing wind. Relatively behind objects and bangs and trembling, so that the dense passing of trains with or without front and rear plough equipment along the speed has to be reduced. If would be effective to get rid of the drifting snow (The line mechanically removed, the drifts will Gardermobanen does not require much snow clearing due to the re-establish in about one hour in train speed and frequency). Snow fences on the windward side of normal cold winter conditions. the track can prevent the snow from drifting on to the track. The fences should be designed to change the wind conditions so that the drifting snow is deposited behind them. Simulation of wind streams and local knowledge have to decide the optimal position of the fences, which could be as far as 100m away from the track.

[19]

Snow fills up the track Snow fills up the track during heavy Elevated tracks are the most effective, because the wind will blow snow fall and because of drifting the snow away. Many places they have to be 3-5 m high to snow. In bad weather, large drifts will accommodate the normal snow depth. Cuttings have to be well be re-established again in 30 minutes designed, so that the railway still runs on an embankment in the after clearing. middle of the cut. If the track have to cut deep through somewhere, the track should be covered or go through a tunnel. Snow fences can help snow blowing away from the track. [19]. Small fences near the track are being developed, and can probably be used as both snow fences as well as noise-deflection wall. Dense passing of trains with a snow plough can normally keep the track open. There are two different solutions for track superstructure, respectively high and low track. With high track we understand the standard, discrete bearing track, where the railhead is about 20-25cm elevated above the sleeper and ballast bed. With low track we understand slab track with continuous supported embedded rail. The low track will gather less snow than a normal track design. This should not be confused with grooved rails that can lead to derailment due to ice in the groove. Solutions of slab track and discrete bearing system which make use of concrete plates to fill up the space between the rails can also be considered. This solution unfortunately has the disadvantages of an approximately 25cm open space on both sides of the rail, needed for inspection and service of the rail and rail fastening. Embedded rail do not need such a gap, due to the continuous supported fastening system and thus also far less problems with rail breakage. On non-electrified lines, the rail head can be placed even lower than the surrounding track, on

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Cause Problem Possible measures

electrified lines the rail has to be about 4cm elevated from the slab to secure contact points in the case of a fall down of the catenary.

Snow load on trees Trees close to the railway line bend or Keep vegetation away from the tracks [20]. along the line fall across the tracks.

Switches blocked by Switches will be blocked for Critical switches have to be equipped with heavy heating systems snow or ice switching, caused by heavy snow fall, and covers [32]. Those systems still do not work satisfactorily, drifting snow or ice falling from the especially on really cold days or on days with sticky snow. On passing trains. bad days there will be a need for switch guards to maintain the switches by hand power. Some countries use to spread glycol water or hot water over the switch area [46], but this do not work very well on windy spots because of the cooling effect of wind. Switches could be placed under shelters or in tunnels, but this again means limited access for maintenance. [47] [48] Best solution is to restrict the number of switches to be built. Research for new switch designs can maybe help this problem in the future, possibly with self clearing sliding movement of the tongues. Investing in an improved design would benefit the whole industry.

Sudden change from Snow and ice melts to slush, which Drainage has to be oversized, so that slush can pass through the cold to warm weather, fills up and blocks the drainage. The bottlenecks. Open drainage with great capacity should be or changes in slush often freezes to ice when the considered. temperature around temperature goes down again. This zero increase the problem. From the heating of switches a similar problem happens, when melt water freezes again under the switch. If the water don’t get away, the new ice will ad up and block the normal movement of the switch. Surface water finds new ways. This can undermine the embankments, or the water fills up the sub-base and makes it less strong.

Ice in tunnels, caused Ice blocks builds up near the track Water proofing and insulation is essential. Water has to be guided by running water and on the equipment. in to canals, which may be built under or beside the track. Those canals have to be insulated or heated the last 500-600 m from the tunnel portal, to make sure they do not get blocked by ice.

Ice on the catenary Ice builds up on the catenary, Frequently traffic on the line will keep the ice away. Heating of the damaging the pantograph. The line through a overvoltage (German patent number damage can be expected to increase DE10337937B4). Performing of ice punching, to get the catenary with increasing speed. free from ice. Reducing water drips in tunnels reduce a big part of this problem at the root.

Ice falling off the train The snow that ads on to the train In France and Germany the trains will run at lower speed if these melts in long tunnels and stations, problems occur. Lowering of the ballast level and keeping the and then freezes to ice when the train sleepers free from ballast stones can be helpful. Slab track runs on the open line. Because of reduces the problem. Because this problem is likely to occur trembling in the train, this ice (also when the trains run into tunnels, a wider tunnel portal to reduce running at high speed) falls in to the the boom can be a part of the solution. Treating the ballast ballast and causes the ballast stones with resin, a sticky stuff, makes a film on the ballast that prevents to fly up and in to the train, often ballast pickup. Fitting the train with stronger windows and to accelerated even more by the air protect vulnerable equipment under the train reduces potential pressure along the train. Fragments damage. of the ice itself also behave this way. Damages occur when the stones and ice hit the train or equipment along the line. This problem can be expected to increase with increasing

speed. [18]

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Cause Problem Possible measures

Snow and ice block Causes flying ballast. The air stream In France and Germany the trains will run at lower speed if these the air stream under underneath the train gets so strong problems occur. Lowering of the ballast level and keeping the the train that some rocks are being picked up sleepers free from ballast stones can be helpful. Slab track and thrown through the air, reduces the problem. Because this problem is likely to occur sometimes at even greater speed when the trains run into tunnels, a wider tunnel portal to reduce than the train. The rocks reach up to the sonic bang can be a part of the solution. Fitting the train with the side and windows, as well as to stronger windows and to protect vulnerable equipment under the surrounding structures and passing train reduces potential damage. trains. This problem can also occur if the designs of the trains do not regard this.

Snow and ice The accumulated snow and ice under Avoid snow build-up on trains dropped from trains at the train has a tendency to thaw and Reduced speed through stations stations [45] drop off at stations. At the stations the brakes are hot, it is no chilling wind Separate high speed tracks away from platforms, possibly with and often there is a warmer climate. A protective barriers subsequent high speed train passing Frequent snow clearing of platform tracks in the same track can plough or whirl up the ice onto the platform, causing injury and damage. This problem can be expected to increase with increasing speeds.

Tunnel portals etc fills Must be removed with snow blowers. Available snow blowers. Heater cables on the ground in the portal up with snow deposits area. Fences or mounds to prevent snow drifting into the portals. Wider portals have more space for snow deposit. Portals with a collar on the end can prevent snowdrifts from entering the portal.

Wooden (not Snow shelters made of wood are not Make snow shelter walls 100 % air tight. Heater cables in the windproof) snow wind proof. Snow that accumulates shelter. shelters through the walls is very difficult to remove. Must be blown with snow blowers all the way out - ploughs cannot clear these drifts. The drifts inside snow shelters cannot be encountered at train speeds over 80 km/h.

Snow avalanche Fills up the track and causes the train If possible there should be provided shelters against avalanches. to derail. Snow sheds and shelters are the best. Supporting structures can prevent the triggering of avalanches by anchoring the snow in the

starting zones. [19]

Rock fall Rock fall can destroy the Rock fall catchment areas. Detection and warning systems to infrastructure, cause derailment if a stop the trains if the track gets destroyed. train crash into a rock or a falling rock can hit the train.

Other mass wasting Settlements in the ground under the Most mass wasting happens after rain. Increases in pore water track. The embankment can collapse pressure, higher weight when saturated with water and decreases and flow away. Landslides from in strength are all important triggers for mass wasting. Really nearby terrain can block the line. good surface water control is important to reduce the effect of heavy rain. Open ditches are important to handle storm water run-off. Track must be built up on a solid foundation which leads the water out of the embankment. A dense track (e.g. slab track) will help this. New lines should not be planned in area endangered by slides coming upon the track from nearby terrain.

Heavy gust of side Causes train to derail. Important is wind following through valleys where the track wind passes across it, especially on bridges or high embankments. This should be avoided in the first place. Also places where the wind will have a vector upwards must be assessed with this in mind. Walls that guide the wind over, or at least higher up on the train may solve the problem. A sag-curve on the alignment will help keeping the trains on track in such areas, due to the dynamic track forces which appears when the train runs through a sag- curve.

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Cause Problem Possible measures

Incidents with land All our effort to make the railway as There are a few different systems on the market and in research. wasting secure and reliable as possible Systems to detect land wasting as well as people and animals on cannot for sure save us from any the track should be investigated. Cables of glass fibres in the incidents. Therefore it will be useful to track are one promising solution, which can detect everything install early warning systems and entering the track. detection systems, to lower the impact of an accident.

1.2.11 Early warning systems – EWS

1.2.11.1 Early warning systems When new high speed railway lines are planned, robust and reliable infrastructure should always be the main goal. This includes bridges, tunnels and protecting embankments in places where the surrounding nature and climatic conditions are demanding this. In a few cases though, it is not technical or economical possible to build such infrastructure. In these cases an early warning system could be an option. Early warning systems are built to monitor the ground conditions, and give warnings as early as possible when land wasting happens. This can give the railway operator a few, valuable seconds to protect the running trains on the railway line. In most cases the train can be stopped on prepared stopping points before it runs into the problem area. In some rare cases, the train will not be able stop at all, but should at least be able to slow down the speed to reduce the damage of equipment and injuries of people. There is different ways to monitor exposed areas. Generally initial deformations in the bedrock indicate that something more will happen. This can be measured, but to make the system reliable, it also has to be calibrated. The latter is a main issue, because a very sensitive system will stop the trains far too often. Monitoring has to be combined with local knowledge to make an appropriate warning system. Simulation of different situations has to be accomplished, and also effects of different protecting measures have to be evaluated. Safe positions of where to stop the trains has to be selected and incorporated in the signal system. As far as we know, avalanches can’t be monitored through a safe and reliable method. This has to be monitored through metrological conditions and analysis of the snow cover, combined with statistical methods. A somewhat reliable output will be achieved after a long period of calibration. The most common areas for monitoring are listed below [49]: • External factors, like weather conditions and ground water conditions • Deformation in the bedrock or the • Behavior of forces in the bedrock • Seismic activity (vibrations) • Early detection of land wasting after it has happened • Surveillance cameras

1.2.11.2 List of existing monitoring methods

1.2.11.2.1 External factors Weather conditions are measured through different weather stations and statistical data are collected and systemized. Ground water and pore water pressure can be measured with a piezometer.

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1.2.11.2.2 Deformation in the bedrock or the terrain There are several different possibilities for monitoring of deformation in the terrain or the bedrock. With use of GPS or laser changes in some specific points can be measured continuously. Satellite radar or ground radar is another method for monitoring of greater areas. Laser scanning from aeroplane can be an alternative, but this method is not updated continually. For monitoring of small deformation in the bedrock, we can make use of an extensometer. With a crackmeter or jointmeter changes in cracks can be measured, and an inclinometer can give data on angular deflection.

1.2.11.2.3 Behaviour of forces in the bedrock Instrumentation rock bolt can give information on tensile stress in the bedrock. Axial stress can be monitored with strain gauge measurement, and measurements based on the oscillating string principle. Changes in the bedrock can give a good warning of coming rock slides/falls.

1.2.11.2.4 Seismic activities Before land wasting there will often be seismic activity in the ground. A geophone can listen to this activity and give an early warning of an incident. A geophone can also be used to register the occurrence of landslides and avalanches. A seismometer will do the same measurements as the geophone, but is much bigger and very sensitive. The sensitiveness is a problem, because it is a great source of error. Animals and people are often regarded as a potential problem. For all measurements of seismic activities the vibrations from passing trains must be sorted out. Experiences from early warning systems for earthquakes have shown that the ballasted track has to be replaced with slab track and embedded rail, to avoid too high disturbances from passing trains. In an embedded rail construction, vibrations from the rail will be significantly reduced. Another important option that comes with slab track is the opportunity to cast in glass fibre cable for seismically monitoring. This way a good sensor can be installed, making use of the track construction. A continually monitoring of the track can also be adjusted to monitor animals, people and falling objects along the line, but this system is still not available on the market.

1.2.11.2.5 Warning fences Warning fences can give information when an event occurs. Two different types are common: Fences consisting of electric wires that is being cut when an incident occurs, or poles with a joint that breaks if they are being hit of something. In both cases, there is electrical current flowing through the fence which will be interrupted if something happens. Warning fences can also be monitored with a geophone.

1.2.11.2.6 Surveillance cameras Manual or digital control through surveillance cameras can be an option in some situations. This can also be an extra option in combination with some of the other systems.

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1.3 Technical track solutions In railway design increasing traffic loads and volumes and particularly the introduction of high- speed trains in the last decade, have resulted in the need for new approaches. In addition, concern for the environment requires the concept of sustainability to be taken into account in the design process. Beside ballast-sleeper systems the slab track systems have been shown to provide good technical alternatives for several elements of traditional railway construction. Different systems have shown that these modern types of construction are able to meet the requirements of modern railway tracks. These systems offer the advantage of superior stability and almost complete absence of deformation. Thus also travel comfort is high. Ballastless track systems incur significantly lower maintenance costs compared to ballasted track. Due to the absence of any ballast, damage by flying ballast at speeds higher than 250 km/h is avoided. In addition high lateral track resistance of slab tracks allows increase of speed in combination with tilting technology. However, building a slab track is more expensive and modifications after implementation of the system are much more complex than for traditional ballasted track systems.

1.3.1 Summary Different track solutions are investigated and studied taken into account various parameters which are influencing the track systems (functional, operational, economical, technical, etc.). The task is to evaluate the different superstructure systems with regard to the parameters. Additionaly the relevance of the parameters with regard to a scenario has been weighted by a factor. The methodology can be described as a point rating system or scoring-model. Hereby the scoring value serves a grading of the different alternatives in an ordinal scale. The weighted scores for all discussed parameters are in the end summed up to compile an overall ranking which is documented in a total sum. The following different track systems have been studied in detail: Slab track: • Systems with supporting points and embedded sleepers (SES); e.g. Rheda 2000 • Systems with supporting points, without sleepers and prefabricated slabs (PS); e.g. Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen • System with continuous support, on longitudinal beams and stakes (NFF); NFF Thyssen (New slab track Thyssen) • Systems with supporting points, prefabricated booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS); e.g. EBS-Edilon, LVT • Systems with supporting points, sleepers, laid on asphalt layer (SA); e.g. Getrac, ATD • System with continuous support, prefabricated slab; embedded rails (SER); ERS-HR- Edilon Ballasted track systems: • B 450 Twin Block Sleeper • B 90 Sleeper • NSB 95 Sleeper/ B 70 Sleeper • Wide sleepers/ Y-Steel-sleepers Together with the influences out of:

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• Operational parameters (Lifetime, adjustment possibilities, availability, load, flexibility, repairing possibilities, suitability for tilting train operation, ) • Functional parameters (Cross section, station, tunnel, bridge, lateral track resistance, eddy-current brakes, safety) • Geotechnical parameters (Adaption to soft soil and rock) • Environmental impact (Noise, vibration) • Service parameters (Comfort criteria) • Cost parameters (Investment, maintenance) The main findings of this evaluation are: Scenario A and B: For both scenarios the track system with the highest ranking is the ballasted track with NSB 95 or B 70 sleepers. This system showed the highest scores and a stable result within the sensitivity analysis. The result was mainly influenced by: • flexibility in operation programme, • change of cant or relocation of switches can be performed very easily, • repair after accidents/damages, • rehabilitation of existing tracks, • time duration for exchange and maintenance of components for a single event, • investment costs, • construction time and • airborne noise emissions. These parameters are advantageous for the track system and are summarizing the strength of it. Scenario C For scenario C slab track system with prefabricated elements (e.g. Bögl, ÖBB-Porr) has the highest ranking based on the result of the point rating system. Nevertheless, in the next phases planning within this scenario has to go into more detail and should consider and evaluate both types of superstructure, slab tracks and ballasted tracks. Reason is that the final decision of the recommended track system is influenced by the corridor, the route, the operational programme etc. All related parameters should be scored and evaluated for each corridor individually. Scenario D In case of scenario D, where a pure high-speed line is built, the recommendation derived from the scoring-model is a slab track systems with prefabricated slabs. It has to be assessed which of the highest ranked systems are best suited for different segments with the varying conditions of a corridor. Reasons for this recommendation are: • lifetime will be much longer than compared to ballasted tracks, • track availability is outstanding, • reduction of maintenance operations, • suitability with regard to both speed and load is excellent, • lateral track resistance is much higher than with the conventional ballasted track,

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• eddy-current brakes match very much together with slab tracks, so rolling stock might be equipped with them, • emissions of structure borne noise in combination with a slab track system will achieve best results; if a mass-spring systems is selected. However, the track analysis was made without any reference to specific corridors with defined requirements. This means, that in forthcoming design phases the evaluation matrix has to be developed and applied with regard to specific corridors, lines and sections. Perhaps in a specific section some parameters are not influencing the track system at all or there are additional which might be introduced. Also the significance for a specific corridor or line might change. Another task of the further design phases is to calculate investment costs and introduce them in the decision matrix. Based on the approach in this analysis the track evaluation can be supplemented by a cost-effectiveness-analysis for a corridor or defined sections.

1.3.2 Description track construction types

1.3.2.1 Ballast sleeper tracks Now as before, concrete sleepers on ballast represent the classical, fundamental version of track systems around the world. In many cases, conventional ballasted track systems fully satisfy the requirements placed. Ballasted tracks offer great advantages where upgrading of existing lines is involved: rail traffic can be partially maintained, even during the construction phase. Total life-cycle costs are an important factor in the planning of new lines. Concrete sleepers can be laid, for example, on a flexible and cost-reducing basis, "under the rolling wheel" - i.e., without interruption of rail traffic. Traditionally, railway track has consisted of rails laid on timber or concrete sleepers, supported by a ballast bed. The main advantages of this traditional type of track are: • cost-effective construction process, • high elasticity, • high maintainability at relatively low cost and • high noise absorption. However, ballasted track also has a number of disadvantages: • Over time, the track tends to “float”, in both longitudinal and lateral directions, as a result of non-linear, irreversible behaviour of the materials (this is also a result of temperature differences); • Limited non-compensated lateral acceleration in curves, due to the limited lateral resistance offered by the ballast; • Ballast can be churned up at high speeds, causing serious damage to rails and wheels; • Reduced permeability due to contamination, grinding-down of the ballast and transfer of fine particles from the subgrade; • Ballast is relatively heavy, leading to an increase in the costs of building bridges and viaducts if they are to carry a continuous ballasted track; • Ballasted track is relatively high, and this has direct consequences for tunnel diameters and for access points; The rate at which the track deteriorates is closely related to the quality of the original construction, particularly the rail geometry, the homogeneity of the subgrade layers and the

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 75 of (270) supporting capacity of the sub-ballast. On bridges that include a continuous ballast bed, extra elasticity must be created by: • laying a ballast mat between the ballast bed and the bridge, • increasing the elasticity of the fastenings. Sleepers are the simplest and most secure method to set the required rail geometry for tracks. Sleepers may be hung together with rails to form the track panel or they may be laid separately. An advantage for is the fact that the use of pre-finished sleepers can provide a consistent level of quality. It is possible to use different sleeper types for the various forms of slab track manufacturing. Specially-suited pre-stressed concrete sleepers, twin-block sleepers and steel sleepers are in use.

► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL TWINBLOCK WITH B450 (U41 VAX) BY SATEBA Twinblock (bi-block) sleeper system is used in France for most new HSL. The sleeper can be used in any configuration of ballasted embankment structure.

Figure 20: TGV track with Twinblock sleeper B450 (formerly U41 VAX) The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [50].

► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL MONOBLOCK WITH B 70/90 SLEEPER Concrete sleepers B 70 are the classic sleepers in Germany. Type B 70 sleepers are pre-stressed concrete sleepers and are the simplest way to achieve a finished track. The main advantage of these sleepers lies in their great flexibility. For new rail lines or upgrading of existing tracks, for mainline tracks or urban transport, for trunk or secondary lines, and for freight and passenger traffic: this concrete sleeper offers a fast and reliable solution for any application. Simple assembly assures fast installation. The sleeper can be used in any configuration of ballasted embankment structure.

Figure 21: Ballasted track with B 70 sleepers

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The advantages: • Full performance capability, even for greatest operational demands; • Cost-effective optimization of the track, with maintenance at the same time of technical permanence and operational safety; • Assurance of operational continuity; • Standardisation of operation and maintenance procedures; • Possibility of fully mechanical sleeper installation at the track construction site; • Capability of adapting track elasticity to special sub-grade conditions. The maximum approved speed is up to 250 km/h. Elastic sole pads are also applicable if needed.

Figure 22: B 70 pre-stressed concrete sleeper The B 90 pre-stressed concrete sleepers have the same performance as the B 70 sleepers with a higher persistence. Maximum approved speed is up to 300 km/h.

Figure 23: B 90 pre-stressed concrete sleeper

The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [51].

► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL WITH STEEL Y-SLEEPER In comparison to conventional cross sleepers (wood, concrete or steel trough sleepers) Y- sleepers have the following four key features: • basic body casting made of supportive girder profiles, • Y- bracket shape, • three rail support areas per sleeper, • double support for rails.

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Figure 24: Ballasted track with Y-steel sleepers18 The support profile has a double-T shape with a large flange width and a low construction height (95mm). The “Y” shape together with the secondary support allows the rail to be supported in two places – the “double support”. The connection between the two main supports and the connection between the main and secondary supports is arranged through the upper and lower cross bracket. The upper welded cross bracket serves to keep the rail in position and transfer lateral forces from the rail to the sleeper. Below, the cross bracket is formed as a steel L-bracket and ensures a high lateral displacement resistance for the Y-steel sleeper in a ballast bed. Through its design, the Y- sleeper has following advantages: • an above-average lifespan, • excellent level of position stability, • reduction of the number of sleepers needed by half in comparison to straight sleepers, • about 30 % less ballast required. The sleeper design is also environmentally-friendly, e.g. the double support allows quieter vehicle running, and thus less wear occurs. Additionally, in contrast to wooden sleepers, ballast bed contamination through coal tar oil is prevented. Tamping efforts are lower due to longer tamping intervals. Also, the Y-sleeper is nearly completely recyclable due to its relatively high share of residual value. A disadvantage may be a tendency to higher noise emission, which has to be contrasted to the advantages in further investigations. Further, the Y-Sleeper design is for minor speed applications < 160 km/h only. The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [52].

18 Cp. [52]

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► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL WITH WIDE SLEEPERS

Figure 25: Wide Sleeper system The sleepers are laid without ballasted space between them, but with uncovered middle zones. These are located underneath the sleepers and do not contribute to the load. The advantages of the wide sleeper system are: • simple installation with conventional track-construction technology, • constant quality and stability, and avoidance of continuous changes in the ballast substructure, • up to 70 % higher resistance to lateral shift, plus less settlement, • significantly increased track availability, • high safety due to large mass of the sleepers and from continuous bearing-surface support, • simple vegetation control and minimal cleaning work, as a result of the closed surface of the track; no need for herbicides, • systematic drainage of surface water and other liquids and • considerably reduced emission of structure-borne noise into the soil foundation, owing to the greater mass of the sleepers. This type of sleeper can also be applied on asphalt layers as a ballastless track. Elastic sole pads are also applicable if needed. The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [51].

1.3.2.2 Slab tracks Rail traffic is reaching out toward new horizons on ballastless track systems. The arguments are indeed convincing: long life cycles, top speed, ride comfort, and great load-carrying capability. Practically maintenance free, ballastless track systems ensure close to 100 % availability over many years. A maintenance-free track system might be the more cost-effective solution over the long run. Slab track is used for Japanese HSL as well as recent German HSL (Köln – Frankfurt; Hannover – Berlin, Nürnberg-Ingolstadt). The success of ballastless-track technology is primarily based on the following advantages: • Stability, precision, and ride comfort Ballastless track assures a permanently stable track position and stands up to the loads subjected by high-speed train traffic, with performance characterized by top quality, functionality, and safety. Millimetre-exact adjustment of the track system during

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assembly on the construction site is the prerequisite for high ride comfort in the train, and for reduction of loads experienced by the rolling stock. • Long life cycles and practically no maintenance With its aimed service life of 60 years - with little or no requirement for service or maintenance on the slabs- ballastless track offers high availability and unmatched cost effectiveness in high-speed operations. • Flexibility and end-to-end effectiveness in application With its comparatively very low structural height, and with the possibility of achieving optimal required track position, ballastless track technology offers highly attractive and beneficial solutions as end-to-end systems technology for main-track and turnout sections, for application on a uniform basis on embankments, bridges, and tunnels. • Basis for optimal routing of rail lines For high-speed operations, ballastless technology enables more direct routing of train lines, with tighter radii and higher gradients. These benefits enable reduction for civil structures costs.

► Overview of ballastless track systems Ballastless tracks can be built on either asphalt or concrete supporting layers. Track systems installed on asphalt supporting layers predominantly feature direct-support configurations. On the other hand, systems implemented with concrete supporting layers offer the selection among an optimal diversity of models with homogeneous system structures. Starting from the basis of traditional trough-track designs with mono-block sleepers, the systems further developed to track systems with bi-block sleepers. Bi-block applications guarantee a safe and reliable bond between the sleeper and the infill concrete as well as easier handling. Further development resulted in design of the full-block bi-block sleepers. This sleeper is characterized by reduction in total structural height.

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM RHEDA 2000 BY RAIL.ONE (PFLEIDERER TRACK SYSTEMS) RHEDA 2000® is a flexible system that can be individually adapted to the specific requirements and the individual constraints of each project. The basic system structure, however, always consists of modified bi-block sleepers which are securely and reliably embedded in a monolithic concrete slab. Highly elastic rail fastenings are essential to achieve the vertical rail deflection required for load distribution and for smooth train travel. The B 355-M sleeper represents the core of the RHEDA 2000® system. Due to mass production of these precast components, the sleeper provides both maximum concrete quality and highest precision especially at the most critical rail seat area. The concrete sleeper blocks are designed to effectively function with all widely used fastening systems and sleeper- anchorage components. The lattice truss reinforcement between the concrete sleeper blocks, the result of long years of development, takes full account of the stability aspects of transport and construction, and of effective embedding for system reliability and durability. The concrete track-supporting layer is the major load-distributing element of the system. Since it is cast-in-place, it can be individually adapted to any substructure type and condition. For em- bankments, it is designed as a continuous slab with free crack formation. For highly compacted soil – which is strongly advised for ballastless tracks to prevent settlement – the slab can be constructed in unit dimensions of 2.8 m x 0.24 m. It fulfils even the most stringent demands for durability and reliability under various climatic conditions and applicable concrete standards. On embankments, an additional bonded support layer – often in the form of a hydraulically bonded support layer – is installed in order to conform to the permitted levels of stress in the supporting layers and in the subgrade.

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Figure 26: New high-speed line Cologne-Rhine/Main, Hallerbachtalbruecke, Germany

System design and components overview/layout:

Figure 27: Cross section RHEDA 2000®

Figure 28: Cross section RHEDA 2000 (Turnout area) The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [51].

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM FF BÖGLBY MAX BÖGL The System FF BÖGL is a ballastless track with concrete supporting layer on hydraulic bounded layer.

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Figure 29: New ICE high-speed line Nürnberg-Ingolstadt with System BÖGL

System design and components overview/ Layout:

Figure 30: System Bögl detail and description

Figure 31: Cross-section on earth structure with system BÖGL The ballastless track system Bögl consists of prefabricated slab tracks which are coupled in longitudinal direction. This construction method leads to a homogenous trackway with a good long-term behaviour. The system can be used on earth structures, in tunnels and on bridges.

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Earth structures are stabilised in such a way that the requirements for tolerable remaining settlements are met with. The earth subgrade is covered with an anti-frost layer for protection against climatic impacts (frost heavings). The slab tracks are placed on a hydraulically bounded layer or alternatively on a reinforced concrete base layer. In tunnels and troughs, these requirements are already fulfilled without further action. Standard slabs lie on bridges on a gliding, reinforced concrete base layer which are anchored with the bridge superstructure in defined spaces. Both base layers provide continuously decreased stiffness and load transfer. At the same time, they are blinding layers and support for the prefabricated slabs. In trough and tunnel structures, the existing blinding concrete replaces the base layer. The prefabricated slabs are installed with a standard spacing of 5 cm. Vertical and horizontal adjustment takes place using spindle devices and a computer-aided surveying system. The vertical gap between slab and base layer is sealed and subsequently fully filled using a specially developed grout. Then the longitudinal coupling process of the slabs follows so that a monolithic, continuous band is created with a high resistance to longitudinal and transverse displacement. The longitudinal coupling counteracts the so-called “whipping effect”, which is a warping of the slab ends due to thermal differences. A characteristic feature of the prefabricated slabs is the predetermined breaking points that are arranged between the rail support points. This will prevent an uncontrolled crack development primarily in the area of rail fasteners. The slab track consist of standard concrete or prestressed concrete or alternatively of steel fibre concrete. Results of different tests show that the train positioning systems were only insignificantly affected by the FFB – Slab Track Bögl. In order to drain the surface water, every slab is manufactured with a transverse slope of 0.5 % by default. The rail support points can be mechanically processed via a computer-controlled grinding machine. This allows a high accuracy of the track bed. The slab production is finished with the assembly of the rail fastenings. All rail fastenings systems which are approved and suitable for ballastless tracks can be used according to the track requirements. After installation of the rail there is no need for further surveying or correction of the track bed. The slabs are adjusted only on defined measuring points on the rail supporting points without the use of a mounting rail. Therefore the main disadvantage of the mounting rail due to deformation in temperature changes during fine adjustment of the slab tracks is solved. Technical data of the FF Bögl System: Construction height (top base layer to rail top): 474 mm Slab length (System length: nominal 6.5 m): 6.45 m Slab width: 2.55 m Slab height: 0.20 m Concrete class: (B 55) C45/55 Rail supports: 10 pairs per slab; spacing 650 mm Prestressing: transversal Longitudinal coupling: GEWI steel Optional noise-reduction systems can be applied The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [53].

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM NFF THYSSEN BY THYSSEN KRUPP GFT GLEISTECHNIK The new slab track “System NFF” is comprised of the rails, the rail fastening (such as Krupp ECF), the longitudinal support unit "LTE", the cross bar and the deep foundation consisting of drilling or piles. The LTE store on a two-span beam to the cross-stakes, turn on the stakes supports.

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Diameter, length, number and inclination of the piles to the respective soil conditions, the legislative requirements and the course of the rails have to be adjusted. The inclination of the piles in the soil can be both vertical and horizontal forces on the stakes, the transverse yokes are attached. The transverse yokes in turn, serve as support for the LTE. LTE and cross bar are made of precast concrete elements in the work be prepared under optimal conditions and can be delivered with consistent quality. Conventional ballasted and slab track systems differ in the interface under track: Hydraulically bound base instead of formation protection layer and concrete base instead of gravel. Gravel roads can be repaired within limits by plugs in height and position; in spring-mass systems it is possible with reductions in the rail fastening but limited. The gravel path requires more maintenance and has a shorter lifetime or complete restoration, Slab track systems have a longer life, require less repair, but a more elaborate preparation of the base (soil improvement, compaction, exchange, etc.).

Figure 32: Finished system NFF Thyssen

Figure 33: Constructional principal of NFF structure The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [54].

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM PORR-ÖBB BY PORR PTU TECHNOBAU The ÖBB-Porr elastic stored slab track is based on a low settlement substructure such as a tunnel floor, bridge construction or hydraulically bound base layer. Main element of the system is elastically supported slab track. The slab track system ÖBB / Porr is based on a 5.16 m long, reinforced precast slab. Eight couples of supporting points (type 300-1) are integrated with a distance of 65 cm. The precast slabs are adjusted in their position by spindles and afterwards backfilled with concrete through conical grouting openings. To decouple the concrete

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 84 of (270) backfill an elastic separating layer is applied on both the sole plate and on the conical grouting openings .This causes a reduction of the emitted into the ground vibrations (noise insulation). With a ton of weight per running meter the system can be classified as a light mass-spring system. As a rule the layer of poured concrete is minimum 8 cm thick and thus the total height of the system sums up to 47.3 cm to the rail top. Another advantage of the elastic separating layer is an easy replacement of single slabs. This ensures a fast renewal e.g. after an accident.19

Figure 34: System overview PORR ÖBB

Figure 35: System PORR ÖBB on embankment

19 Cp. [55].

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The laying on earthworks carried out on a load distribution plate or a hydraulically bound base layer. Due to the high quality level of the prefabricated slab structure and the relatively small grouting openings the impairment of weather is low. This is of course also valid for installation on bridges. The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [56].

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM J-SLAB (SHINKANSEN) The J-Slab system is another elastically supported slab track analogue to the system ÖBB- PORR. The system is basically of the same design as the ÖBB-PORR System with just an adjustment by connecting two slabs with a concrete cone.

Figure 36: J-SLAB System on open track

Figure 37: J-SLAB System overview Figure 38: J-SLAB (Taiwan HSL) with ballasted protection aside

The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [57].

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM LOW VIBRATION TRACK (LVT) BY SONNEVILLE The LVT-System consists of a concrete block, a resilient pad and a rubber boot, surrounded by unreinforced concrete (2nd stage concrete). No special demands on the rail fixation are made; merely an elastic rail pad is used. For each specific project, these two elastic components are matched to each other, thus bestowing upon the system the properties characteristic of dual- level elasticity.

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Figure 39: System LVT-Track The resilient pad provides for the load distribution analogous to the ballasted track and reduces the influence of low frequency vibrations. The rail pad in turn protects against the effects of higher frequencies. The rubber boot allows an unhindered deflection that, together with the high quality of the resilient pad, leads under dynamic loads to a very low system stiffening (c dyn/c stat < 1.5). All necessary functions for the track are taken over by the decoupled concrete block. This reduces the demands made on the 2nd stage concrete. Efficient surface drainage can be installed depending on the slope of the slab or specific ground conditions in the middle or along the side. Drainage gutters can also be installed in the turnout area up to the turnout's interior. Efficient surface drainage can be installed depending on the slope of the slab or specific ground conditions in the middle or along the side. Drainage gutters can also be installed in the turnout area up to the turnout's interior.

Figure 40: System overview LVT-Track The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [58].

► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM CONCRETE SLEEPERS ON ASPHALT SUPPORTING LAYER; GETRAC BY RAIL.ONE (PFLEIDERER TRACKS SYSTEMS) GETRAC® A1 is a non-ballasted track system with direct support of the track panel on an asphalt supporting layer. This configuration is build-up to guarantee safe and permanent positioning of the track. It can also be installed on an extremely cost-effective basis.

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The GETRAC® A1 ballastless track system is characterised by solid track support that retains its high levels of quality and safety throughout the entire life cycle. The technology is based on the development of anchoring prestressed-concrete sleepers to an asphalt layer. The prestressed-concrete sleepers are installed onto the asphalt supporting layer and are permanently and elastically attached to this layer by means of so-called anchor blocks made of special high-strength concrete. The anchor blocks are designed such that the longitudinal and lateral forces from the traffic loads are transferred into the asphalt supporting layer without any displacement of the sleepers. As a result of decades of experience gained in the emplacement of asphalt layers in traditional road construction, installation of asphalt track-supporting layers with conventional road-building machinery is fully unproblematic for GETRAC® technology. Installation of the asphalt layers takes place in several layers by an automatically controlled asphalt-laying machine guided by control cables. A ballast layer, or hydraulically bonded layer, serves as support for the asphalt layer above. The top layer consists of fine asphaltic concrete; the tolerance for unevenness is only ± 2 mm. Installation of the track panels likewise takes place with conventional civil-construction equipment. GETRAC® also allows sleepers to be laid individually – or by means of prefabricated track sections, in order to reduce construction time. These options guarantee fast availability of the track system.

Figure 41: System overview GETRAC (on asphalt support layer) The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [51].

► SLAB TRACK EMBEDDED RAIL SYSTEM – ERS-HR BY EDILON SEDRA INFUNDO is a Dutch development of a slab track system. The EDILON Corkelast ® Embedded Rail System (ERS) involves embedding the rails in a plastic medium. The INFUNDO slab track system features continuously-supported rails. Rail fastening is achieved by covering rails in an elastic, two-compound mass. A special feature is that no additional rail-fastening components are required. Rails are thus no longer mounted on sleepers, but are embedded elastically along their entire length. The durable elastic material guarantees that the rails remain homogeneously supported, and its elasticity can be specifically adjusted by a spring compression rubber pad. This unique material which has been tested over many decades combines the special characteristics of natural cork with specially-developed

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 88 of (270) polymers. The INFUNDO system uses traditional slab track layer design with a frost protection layer, a hydraulically-bonded layer and a concrete support slab. The concrete support slab is formed in-situ continuously without construction joints, and with a height of 40 cm and a width of 2.62 m. The rail fastening system features the following design: • guidance of rails within a trough, • continuous elastic support of rails and defined spring compression on rubber pad, • fixation of rail using elastic poured mass. The trough set in the concrete bed determines only approximately the position of the rail fine positioning within the trough defines the rail’s height, alignment, track gauge and inclination exactly and is fixed by pouring the rail into the polymer mass. Horizontal and vertical rail forces are absorbed by the elastic, two-component mass. The elasticity of the embedding medium may be adjusted by altering the component proportions. The ERS-HR system has several advantages: • lower wear of rails (use of smaller rail profiles possible), • reduction of noise emissions, • minimisation of components used, • short construction times with prefabricated – economical solution, • reduced height of track bed. The ERS-HR system can be used for conventional rail and HSR-systems with the INFUNDO slab track structure or an individual designed concrete slab track. Thus it is also excellently suitable for railway crossings and tunnels. Additional areas of application are connective rails and industrial tracks.

Figure 42: System overview of EDILON system The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [59].

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► SLAB TRACK EMBEDDED BLOCK SYSTEM – EBS BY EDILON SEDRA The Edilon Corkelast ® Embedded Block System (EBS), has pursued the concept of elastically supported sleeper blocks. This elastic support claims to provide the same dynamic spring and damping behaviour of ballasted track under traffic loads. As earlier demonstrated by the transition from monoblock to bi-block sleepers in ballasted track systems, the EBS solution is based on individual blocks. Due to the stable integration in a concrete slab structure, these blocks do not require additional alignment elements such as gauge bars. Corkelast provides elastic bonding of the individual blocks and the supporting concrete slab. The unique, proven, reliable, two component embedding compound assures outstanding position stability over decades - along with simple installation, low system costs, and minimum maintenance. Top view Cross section

Figure 44: Cross section EBS-system Figure 43: Top View EBS system

The advantages of the EBS-system can be summarised as follows: • embedded blocks not subject to wear, • no joint or gap problems, • no moisture, frost or corrosion damage, • no dirt or sludge to foul the block bearing area, • equivalent spring and damping characteristics compared to ballasted track, • no need for highly elastic rail fastenings, • favourable airborne noise behaviour, • simple concrete slab design, • electrical insulation of the rails, • low structural system height, • simple installation, • cost-effective, mechanised, large-series production and • the possibility of using all common discrete rail fastening systems. The Embedded Block System is designed to meet the requirements of heavy freight passenger and high-speed trains. The structural engineering features are designed conform to Load Model 71, as stipulated in UIC Code 702.

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It is possible to control the static stiffness of Embedded Block System (EBS). This enables adjustment of the track to meet various requirements such as ride comfort or structure-borne noise behaviour.

Figure 45: EBS system pictures from construction site

Figure 46: Details of the EBS-block

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1.3.2.3 Summary of described track systems In the last chapters different track systems where introduced. Some of the slab tracks share the same features, particularities and limits. Thus for the further discussion the different systems introduced are summarised in track types. Definition and classification is documented in the following table.

Table 24: Summary of track types Design Types of Examples Elements/ Particularities/ Applications Track/ Slab Track Limits

Supporting points, with Rheda 2000 In situ construction; reinforced In Germany the main solution on HSR embedded sleepers concrete slab; lines and tunnels; also other European (SES) countries, Taiwan, China;

Supporting points, Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Prefabricated reinforced concrete In use in Germany, Japan and Austria without sleepers, Shinkansen slabs on HSR lines and tunnels; HSR in prefabricated slabs (PS) China;

Continuous support, on NFF Thyssen (New In situ construction; no In soft and difficult soil; longitudinal beams and slab track Thyssen) underground preparation stakes (NFF) needed; for use in soft and difficult soils;

Supporting points, with EBS-Edilon, LVT In situ construction; blocks On main lines in different European prefabricated booted resting elastically within a “shoe”; countries; in tunnels all over the world, blocks embedded in slab embedded in reinforced concrete especially Switzerland; LVT in the (PBS) slab; ;

Supporting points, with Getrac, ATD In situ construction; on asphalt In Germany for rehabilitation of sleepers, laid on top of layer; anchor blocks connecting superstructures in existing tunnels; asphalt layer (SA) sleeper with asphalt layer;

Continuous support, on ERS-HR-Edilon In situ construction; rail On main High Speed Rail lines; slab; embedded rails in embedded in U-channel; rail tunnels; bridges; railway level U-like channels (SER) fastening by elastic two- crossings; compound mass (Corkelast);

Ballasted Track B 450 Twin Block Max axleload=17 t, On HSR lines in France; Sleeper v(max)=350 km/h; Two blocks (2.40m/245 kg) which increases the lateral resistance;

Ballasted Track B 90 Sleeper Max axleload = 25 t; On main lines; (2.60 m/340 kg) v(max)= 250 km/h;

Ballasted Track NSB 95 Sleeper Max. axleload=25 t; On main lines: on high speed lines in (2.60 m/270 kg)/B 70 v(max)= 250 km/h; Germany; Sleeper (2.60 m/280 kg)

Ballasted Track Wide sleepers Max. axleload=25 t; 70 % larger lateral resistance (2.40m/560kg)/Y- v(max)= 120 km/h for Y-sleeper compared to B70 sleeper; applied in Steel-sleepers and 160km/h for Wide sleeper; Germany for testing only;

1.3.3 Description of parameters influencing the track system To meet the requirements given, first of all relevant information referring to the Norwegian conditions (e.g. geotechnical parameters bedrock and soil) are evaluated. For that reason emphasis is put on all accessible data and information from related studies (e.g. operational concepts, geological and hydro geological surveys and maps). Cost aspects through the life cycle of the systems are brought in by international scientific studies and benchmarks from railway net operators.

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The understanding of making decisions on technical track solutions has to be prepared by a multi dimensional analysis of different parameters influencing the decision on a HSR track system. A matrix approach will guide through the combination of parameters which have been set for Norwegian local context. This track solution matrix has the dimensions: • operational parameters (speed, load, downtime), • functional parameters (Open section, station, tunnel, bridge, loop), • geotechnical parameters (Quick clay to solid rock), • environmental impact (Noise, vibration), • service parameters (comfort criteria), • cost parameters (Construction, operation, maintenance). Based on this study the matrix will show recommendations to the appropriate superstructure (conventional track with ballast, slab track) in relation to the scenarios A, B, C and D. In the following chapters the different parameters will be discussed, before the matrix be developed, explained and evaluated. In order to describe the suitability of the superstructure systems towards the evaluation parameters and vice versa scores will be assigned. In order to describe the significance of the evaluation parameters towards the scenarios A – D weights are introduced and assigned. The scoring and weighting is explained in detail within chapter 1.3.3.1.

1.3.3.1 Operational parameters

► Possibilities for adjustments in lateral and vertical directions Superstructures suffer heavy loads, high speeds and cyclical-dynamic impacts. This results at the end in deformations of the track. In special cases the track has to be adjusted and the alignment has to be brought back to the target parameters. For this extreme case the superstructure systems need possibilities to adjust the rail in lateral and vertical directions. Traditional ballasted track offer good possibilities for the adjustment of the track; whereby the Wide sleepers and Y-sleepers need special machinery. The slab track systems have reduced possibilities to adjust in vertical and lateral direction. In Germany for instance all systems are required to allow adjustments in lateral directions of a minimum of ±40 mm; in vertical direction the minimum adjustment has to be +20 mm. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10, for the ballasted systems, except the Wide and Y-sleeper - 8 scores - , because of their “closed” surface. • Minimum score: 2; for all slab track systems, because of the limited possibilities of adjustment. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 3, important if existing track has to be improved • Scenario B: 2, needed if alignment is not amended • Scenario C: 2, needed if alignment is not amended • Scenario D: 1, new line is constructed precisely and with high quality.

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► Lifetime The slab track systems are dimensioned generally for a longer life time of the superstructures without heavy maintenance. The newly designed slab tracks are required to have a life time of at least app. 60 years. This request generally results from the business case which is applied by the infrastructure manager, before initiating an investment. Experiences with a long observation period do not exist until now. In the case of ballasted tracks, the ballast needs to be renewed after approximately 30 years. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the slab tracks. Asphalt layers, constructed without reinforcement, might suffer cracks; water and frost will impact on asphalt layer. Therefore these systems gain 8 scores. • Minimum score: 4, 5 and 6; for the ballasted tracks. The heavy sleepers (Wide sleepers and B 90) will last longer. Awarded weights: Lifetime is most essential to all scenarios. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3 • Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

► Track availability / Frequency of maintenance / Downtime The majority of the ballasted track problems are well-known. They are related to the ballast contamination by fine particles, an instability under vibrations produced by vehicles and reduced lateral track resistance. The higher the speed the higher the contact stresses at the sleeper’s lower surface and on the ballast particles, which result in a faster track deterioration. The reduced uniformity of track elasticity results in irregular elastic deformations as well as an increase of dynamic loads from vehicles. Limited lateral track resistance of the ballasted track makes the track vulnerable to buckling phenomenon when rails are subject to high variation of temperature or when braking systems are applied using frictional or eddy-current brakes. Especially higher lateral forces due to tilting train operation and temperature differences in Norway are adding to a critical combination for ballasted tracks. All the aforementioned actions in combination with high speed and vibrations deteriorate the track stability increasingly. These problems can be solved by reducing speed or by implementing regular maintenance. Both solutions lead to a loss of track availability of the ballasted track. Slab track constructions avoid those problems. Operational downtimes usually occur, when the alignment has to be reconstructed. Because of the above mentioned reasons this will be more often the case with a ballasted track than it will be with a slab track. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the slab tracks. Asphalt layers, constructed without reinforcement laid on embankment are somewhat softer and therefore cause more likely deformations. These systems gain 8 scores.

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• Minimum score: 3, 4, 5 and 6; for the ballasted tracks. The heavier the track, the more scores the system obtained, except for the Wide- and Y-sleepers. Awarded weights: Track availability is most essential to all scenarios. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3 • Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

► Load The classic ballasted track is built-up of rails, sleepers and ballast. These tracks exist now since more than 150 years. The general maximum speed is 160 km/h to 200 km/h. Lots of experiences were gained during the years and the infrastructure managers are able to provide safety operations with reasonable costs. When talking about higher speeds of up to 250 km/h or even speeds of more than 250 km/h, forces acting on the rail become increasingly higher.20 In order to transmit the lateral, longitudinal and vertical forces safely into the underground, slab track systems were introduced worldwide. Concrete slabs, together with highly elastic rail fastening systems offer a higher degree of track bed stability than ballasted tracks. Due to rolling stock design and the design of bridge constructions, the loads are generally limited. The load model (UIC 71) requires designing of railway infrastructure with a maximum load of 250 kN. Whereby the ICE1 in Germany had an axle load of 200 kN, the axle load of the ICE 3 is already reduced to 160 kN. Nevertheless the higher speeds of modern HSR trains leads to higher loads. Load requires stable superstructures, which resist deformations. If an operational concept should be changed to higher loads and/or speed the slab track systems have a higher upwards compatibility. Among ballasted tracks it is the heavier track, which is advantageous and the one which has a larger sleeper undersurface. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the first 4 slab tracks and the SER systems of the matrix. The track type with the asphalt layer is without reinforcement and obtains 8 scores. • Minimum score: 4, 5 and 6; for the ballasted tracks. The heavier the track, the more scores the system will obtain, except for the Wide- and Y-sleepers. Awarded weights: The load and therefore the freight traffic will be programmed on scenario A and B. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 1; only high speed rail.

20 Cp. [60] p. 80.

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► Flexibility in operation programme (Change of speed and cant, relocation of turnout etc.) During the lifetime of superstructures the infrastructure manager might be forced to change the operation programme; freight trains will be redirected and the speed of passenger trains has to be increased. Here ballasted tracks show a high flexibility. Because sleepers resting without fixed connection in the ballast bed, the infrastructure manager are open for changes at any time without much effort, neither in money nor in time. Naturally slab tracks are fixed to a certain alignment; no changes are possible without a comprehensive re-construction. A certain decision regarding the alignment of the line with its comfort parameters etc cannot be changed over the whole lifetime. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the light monoblock sleeper B 70; 9 scores for the second lightest sleeper B 450; 8; for the B 90 sleeper and only 6 scores for the Wide sleepers and the Y-sleepers, which are generally not so flexible. • Minimum score: 2; for all the slab tracks. Awarded weights: Flexibility in operation programme will involve particularly the scenario A with its relatively low speed. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 1, since this will be a new line with a new alignment. No changes should occur!

► Repair after accidents/damages (costs and time) This parameter has a strong interrelation to both parameters already discussed and to the maintenance parameters still ahead. Ballasted systems do not show many problems with regard to repair and replacement. Depending on the kind of damage the different components can quite easily be exchanged or renewed. In case of the slab tracks the situation is different and usually more complicated. Eventually whole reinforced concrete slabs have to be demolished and replaced. Therefore heavy machinery and high amount of working time is needed. Some systems have taken necessary precautions to deal with this problem. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the first 3 ballasted tracks of the matrix. The Wide sleepers and the Y-sleepers have higher complexity and obtain 8 scores. • Minimum score: 2 and 4; for the slab tracks. Systems with prefabricated elements are able to exchange slab segments. The asphalt layer system is easier to demolish and reconstruct. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 3, because in case of an accident the line will be closed, speed will be reduced. • Scenario B: 2

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• Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 2, because traffic can be redirected to parallel line.

► Suitability of permanent way for tilting trains Since tilting trains induce higher lateral, vertical and probably even longitudinal forces, the track bed must be constructed as stable as possible. The significance will increase in mountainous regions, with small radii and large gradients. These requirements are met best with heavy slab track systems. Ballasted tracks (in combination with high speeds) are showing problems with the higher dynamic loads due to tilting train operation. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for 4 slab track systems; 8 scores for the asphalt layer systems, because of their softer support. 7 scores for the NFF Thyssen track, because the forces have to be transmitted from the rail to the piles into the soft underground. • Minimum score: 5 and 6 for the ballasted tracks. Awarded weights: Tilting train operational concepts are more interesting for the higher speed scenarios. • Scenario A: 1 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

► Adaptability of the permanent way for operation of tilting trains The question regarding this parameter is: Is it possible to adapt the existing permanent way for tilting trains? This question is close connected to the evaluation parameter: Flexibility in operation programme. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the first 3 ballasted tracks of the matrix. The Wide sleepers and the Y-sleepers are generally not so flexible than the other systems and therefore obtain 8 scores. • Minimum score: 2; for all the slab tracks. Awarded weights: Tilting trains are generally more interesting for the higher speed scenarios. • Scenario A: 1 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

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1.3.3.2 Functional parameters

► Cross section Discussion on cross section is related to the height and width of the superstructure with its permanent way. For the outline of the substructure reference is made to the chapter with the geological parameters. The following table shows the different components of the two principle track systems: ballasted and slab track. The comparison shows the substantial differences and the common generic terms. Furthermore it shows the components which are belonging to the superstructure and which will be compared with each other.

Table 25: Components of the permanent way Ballasted Track Slab Track

Superstructure Top of rail until the top of substructure: Top of rail until the top of substructure: - Rail - Rail - Rail fastening systems - Rail fastening systems - Sleeper - Sleeper, bi-block sleeper or single - Ballast support - Concrete slab - Upper unbonded formation protective layer - Hydraulically bonded bearing layer

Substructure From top of substructure downwards: From top of substructure downwards: - Unbonded frost protective layer - Unbonded frost protective layer - Lower unbonded bearing layer - Lower unbonded bearing layer - Improved embankment - Improved embankment - Improved subsoil - Improved subsoil - Underground - Underground

The average construction height of the different systems is stated below. These heights are the basis for the scores in the matrix of chapter 1.3.4

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Table 26 Construction height of track systems Design types of slab Examples Construction height bottom Width [mm] Width + track edge of rail –top frost construction protective layer [mm] height [score]

Supporting points, with Rheda 2000 3’400 incl. 4’159 embedded sleepers (SES) 759 Hydraulically bonded bearing layer (5)

Supporting points, without Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, 3’250 incl. 4’099 sleepers, prefabricated Shinkansen 849 Hydraulically bonded slabs (PS) bearing layer (6)

Continuous support, on NFF Thyssen Crossbar: 3’000 3’602 longitudinal beams and (New slab track 602/628 longitudinal support stakes (NFF) Thyssen) unit: 2’165 (8)

Supporting points, with EBS-Edilon, LVT 3’070 prefabricated booted blocks 590/570 2’500 embedded in slab (PBS) (10)

Supporting points, with Getrac, ATD 3’641 sleepers, laid on top of 441 3’200 asphalt layer (SA) (7)

Continuous support, on ERS-HR-Edilon 3’316 slab; embedded rails in U- 696 2’620 like channels (SER) (9)

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper Sleeper + Ballast + Upper 4’220 (2.40m/245 kg) unbonded formation protective layer 3’400 (3) 220 + 300 + 300 = 820

B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m/340 kg) Sleeper + Ballast + Upper 4’380 unbonded formation protective layer 3’600 (1) 180 + 300 + 300 = 780

NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m/270 kg) / Sleeper + Ballast + Upper 4’375 B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m/280 kg) unbonded formation protective layer 3’600 (2) 175 + 300 + 300 = 775

Wide sleepers (2.40m/560kg) / Sleeper + Ballast + Upper 4’214 Y-Steel-sleepers unbonded formation protective layer 3’400 (4) 214 + 300 + 300 = 814

A low construction height will directly positive influence the investment costs and will allow smaller overall construction heights (for instance: tunnel, railway bridges, points with constraints etc.). Additionally it will reduce the dead load on bridges. A small width of the superstructure is the basis of a general small overall construction which directly influences the land use and the land acquisition in a positive way. The width of the superstructure on the surface is indicated in the table above. The addition of the width and the construction height links directly to the awarded scores. Awarded scores: Reference is made to the table above. Awarded weights: The cross section is of utmost importance for all scenarios, since it is directly connected to the investment. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3

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• Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

► Lateral track resistance Since the superstructure has to transmit the forces from the train and the rail to the substructure, the ability to resist these forces and to directly transmit them to the next component, is definitely an extremely important parameter. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: highest scores for the slab track system (with marginal differences of the systems) as they have highest resistance for lateral forces. • Minimum score: 3; for the B 70-sleeper ballasted track, since this system is the one with the lowest resistance. The other systems are somewhere in between. Awarded weights: Lateral track resistance becomes more important with higher speeds. • Scenario A: 1 • Scenario B: 1 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 3

► Bridges Special problems related to ballasted tracks on bridges are not known. With increasing speeds and axle loads the ballast between the sleepers and the concrete bridge deck will wear out in a relatively short time. Reference is made to the parameter: Adaption on solid rock. Problems occur at the end of bridges on the transition from the bridge with a completely stable base construction to the earthwork with its relatively soft basis compared to the bridge’s concrete slab structure21. On these points a lack of comfort usually occurs in combination with increasingly deterioration of the whole track. Slab track systems on bridges need special coordination with national rail authorities. Special attention has to be paid to the bridge structure type and the alignment of the track. The design is influenced by the way in which the longitudinal forces are transmitted to the abutments or the supports between them. In some cases there is no need to transmit the horizontal forces to the bridge at all; for instance in case of a short bridge. Lateral forces also need to be transmitted to the bridge deck. Drainage system has to be installed and perhaps structure born noise has to be damped. All these very special requirements need special system solutions. Today a variety of solutions for different situations are available. The following systems have special solutions for bridges: Rheda 2000, Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen, ERS-HR Edilon. The following systems have no special solutions for bridges. EBS-Edilon, NFF-Thyssen (system is not intended for bridges), LVT, Getrac, ATD.

21 Cp. [62] p. 22.

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Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the systems with special solutions. • Minimum score: 0; for systems which cannot be applied on bridges. • 8 scores for the Wide-/ Y-sleeper system, because it is in the testing phase. Awarded weights: Bridges are relevant for all scenarios. • Scenario A: 2 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 2

► Tunnels Tunnels can be compared with bridges; so the problems for the different superstructure systems are similar. In Germany and Switzerland for instance, the infrastructure managers consider tunnels as ideal and generally equips them with slab tracks because of their stable subconstruction. Other requirements are related to drainage, to safety parameters like derailments or trafficability of the tracks. Open tracks, where the rail is in an elevated position, require special guide rails to prevent derailments. The systems in a U-like channel have the advantage not to require special guide rails. For the construction of a trafficability special concrete slabs are needed. They will be fixed between the rails and between the outer rails and the emergency escape route. These slabs need a sound foundation to carry heavy fire brigade trucks and . A ballasted track is therefore not suitable at all. Awarded scores: • Slab tracks: 10; for the ballastless tracks with a concrete slab, except the NFF-Thyssen, which obtains 0 scores, because it cannot be applied in tunnels. The asphalt layer tracks obtain 4 scores, because these systems might raise problems regarding the fire resistance. Getrac-systems were used quite often in the past for rehabilitation purposes of old tunnels. Fire resistance of all applied materials has to be kept in mind! • Ballasted tracks: 6 scores for the ballasted tracks, except the Wide sleeper track, which obtains 8 scores, because of the closed track surface, which might carry slabs for the trafficability more easily and the ballast, which is less stressed than the other ballasted systems. Awarded weights: Tunnels are relevant for all scenarios. • Scenario A: 2 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 2

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► Stations/switches The definition of a station includes the switch as a track element. Ballasted switches are well-known and standard products with no special problems. Switches for slab track structure are relatively new developments. In the past switches within slab track systems were handled as isolated application and were generally constructed with ballast. Apart from some attempts in the 1970’s, the first massive developments in switch construction on slab tracks started in the 1990’s. Since then many switch manufactures developed slab track solutions. Today’s competitive situation shows a variety of switch systems. Some constructors are in the position to handle all special problems related to the construction of switches on slab tracks. The following systems provide switches: Rheda 2000, Bögl, EBS-Edilon, LVT, B 70- and B 90- ballast-sleeper systems. The following systems do not provide switches: ÖBB-Porr, NFF-Thyssen. ERS-HR Edilon, Getrac, ATD, Wide- and Y- ballast-sleeper systems, B 450 ballast-sleeper systems. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10; for the systems with special solutions. • Minimum score: 0; for systems which do not provide solutions. Awarded weights: Stations are relevant for all scenarios. • Scenario A: 2 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 2

► Crossings and constructions carried out after the construction of the superstructure In case of a newly constructed railway line this problem should not occur, since the different elements of the railway and the technical equipment will be constructed in a bottom-up method. The scenarios A – C allow the rehabilitation, extension and modernisation of existing railway lines. In such cases it is most likely that all kinds of technical equipment must be installed by undercutting the existing superstructure. This leads to a punctually poor stability of the superstructure and to a non-linear behaviour of the bearing capacity. This way of construction must be considered a comprehensive change of the system and must be avoided, if possible. If not, the construction of a slab track is almost impossible or should be resigned. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 6; for the ballasted systems; except the Wide and Y-sleeper, they will get 4 scores, since reconstruction of the permanent way is more complicated. • Minimum score: 1; for the slab tracks, except the NFF-Thyssen will obtain 8, since the crossings etc will not affect the stability of the construction. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 3, because the rehabilitation of existing lines are involved. • Scenario B: 3, because the rehabilitation of existing lines are involved.

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• Scenario C: 3, because the rehabilitation of existing lines are involved. • Scenario D: 1, because new lines will be constructed.

► Eddy-Current brakes The performance of conventional air brake systems have well understood limitations related to speed, weight and length. Therefore modern rolling stock provides eddy-current brakes. The reasons comprise following aspects but are not limited to: • Rail safety is being improved by enabling shorter stopping distances when applied, • Rail safety is being improved by enabling reduced dependency between stopping distance and rail/ wheel adhesion, particularly during adverse adhesion conditions (for example caused by moisture, ice, leaves or other pollution on the rail head), • The use of the eddy-current brakes mitigates the thermal capacity problems of brake pads and discs associated with conventional friction braking systems, • The use of eddy-current brakes avoids harder application of conventional friction brakes leading to excessive wear of the pads and discs. In a position paper of the European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) from June 2009 the use of eddy-current brakes is restricted because of some issues of compatibility between the braking system and the infrastructure. These include: • Electromagnetic compatibility with train detection installations (for example track circuits and axle counters); • Electromagnetic and physical compatibility with line side equipment for train condition monitoring (for example hot wheel detection); • Elevated temperatures in the rail head, which can lead to buckling; • The uplift of the track panel can lead to a reduction of lateral stability and increased track distortion or buckling. This has lead to restriction of the use of eddy-current brakes for instance in Germany to slab track systems only22. In France, the use of eddy-current brakes is not allowed at all, because of their ballasted high speed lines. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the slab track systems; except the asphalt layer systems with 6 scores, because the track is laid on top and not embedded in a slab (uplift forces !!) and the embedded rail systems with 4 scores, because the head of the rail is embedded in an elastic two component mass. • Minimum score: 1 and 2; for the ballasted tracks. The B 90 and the Wide and Y-sleepers are quite stable and have a better lateral resistance than the other two ballasted tracks. Awarded weights: The importance increases with the speed. • Scenario A: 0 • Scenario B: 1

22 Cp. [61].

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• Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 3

► Safety: Access for road vehicle/ Protection against derailment For safety reason it is quite common to equip the track with concrete slabs in order to obtain trafficable track panels for safety cars (fire brigade, , etc.) in tunnels or on bridges or in section where it is impossible to access the track from outside areas (for example cuts, noise barriers, etc.). These concrete slabs can be easily integrated in a slab track system, but only with high efforts in a ballasted track. Additionally, tracks have to be equipped with special guard rails to prevent derailment on bridges, in tunnels, next to columns or supports for structures etc. Usually guard rails are used for this purpose; but for instance the ERS-Edilon system is already equipped with an U-like channel which prevents derailing. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the embedded rail slab track systems, because this track provides a trafficable panel as well as a U-like channel against derailing. • Minimum score: 2 for the ballasted tracks. • The other slab tracks obtain 6 scores and the NFF-Thyssen only 1, because of the limited range of application. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 1 • Scenario B: 1 • Scenario C: 1 • Scenario D: 2, because of speed and new lines, where actual safety requirements must be implemented.

► Flying ballast/ Ice-blocks Problems have been experienced with flying ballast. The air turbulences caused by high-speed trains may be sufficient to lift up individual ballast stones from the track bed. These single stones are then accelerated by the air, dropping down and impacting the ballast bed and dislodging other stones. In this way a chain reaction is being initiated. Ballast stones are ejected at high velocity, which results in serious damages: • Damages to the rail head • Damages to anything in the vicinity of the track • Damages to the rolling stock The same problems can occur when ice blocks during winter times dropping down from the rolling stock onto the track bed (the ballast). Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the slab track system, • Minimum score: 2 for the ballasted tracks; except the Wide-sleeper systems, they obtain 6 scores, because ballast is only found on the shoulder of the track. Awarded weights:

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The importance increases directly with speed. • Scenario A: 0 • Scenario B: 0 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 3

► Catchment area for snow Too much snow within the track bed leads to risks in operation and might cause derailment. This has to be avoided. Snow heights of up to probably 20 - 30 cm above top of rail are not problematic, the train itself or wind can sweep away the snow. Problems occur earlier when snow has an icy consistency. Snow above this level needs to be cleared by a special snowplough or rotary snowplough. Permanent ways with rails above the surface of the superstructure, like the traditional ballasted track have the advantage of a “catchment area”, which can be filled with snow before the top of rail is covered. This “design advantage” applies to all track systems, except the ERS-HR Edilon system. If the design type of the track is equipped with a “shoulder”, then there is an additional space for snow. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the slab track and the ballasted system, except the U-like channel system and the Wide-sleeper/ Y-steel sleeper systems; • Minimum score: 4 for the U-like channel system and 6 scores for the Wide sleeper and the Y-steel sleeper, because the catchment area is reduced compared to the other ballasted respectively ballastless system. Awarded weights: This parameter is essential for all scenarios. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3 • Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

1.3.3.3 Geotechnical parameters

► Adaption on soft subsoil On the earth structures the requirements are set to occur over the life cycle no impermissible deformations on the open section and the transitional areas on structures (tunnels, bridges, etc)23. Train services produce cyclical - dynamic effects on the superstructure and substructure. Reasons and effects on the earthwork are summarized by the following figure.

23 Cp. [63] p. 270, pp. 272.

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Figure 47: Impacts on earth structures The load cycles are irregular, because they are significantly determined by the operation. The dynamic effects are caused by the vehicle speed, vehicle weight and the condition of the track and rolling stock. These cyclic and dynamic impacts cause vibrations and stresses in the track and in the earth structures, which are depth-dependent. As a result, the infrastructure possibly does not meet the geometric requirements anymore because of a deformation which is associated with a compression or a flow of soil. With progressive change in soil structure even a threat to stability can be awaited due to decrease of shear strength. The permissible deformation of the substructure therefore corresponds to the maximum compensation tolerances at the rail fastenings, less the adjustability kept available for the construction tolerance in the case of slab track. Under the assumption that the comfort criteria of the driving dynamics are not violated, large- scale trough-shaped deformations can be allowed. In the classical ballasted track the loads are guided by the rails and the sleepers discretely and thus selectively into the ground. In contrast to this is the slab track, which guides the load usually by a concrete slab and a hydraulically bound base course over a large surface in the underground. Thus for the same guided load the stress in the ground is larger for the ballast track than for the slab track. But the effort to prepare a suitable subgrade is for the slab track system higher. Thus the adaption of slab track constructions for soft soils is higher than for the ballasted systems. Substructures which are not free of deformations and/ or for which an Ev2 value of 100 N/mm2 to 120 N/mm2 on the top-edge of the frost protection layer cannot be obtained, a slab track system should not be constructed [64]. In contrast the preparation of the subgrade for the ballasted track is easier. Corrections can be made relatively simple, quick and cheap when deformations occur.

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Awarded scores: • 10 scores: fort he NFF-Thyssen system, because it is dedicated for this application. • 8 scores: for the Wide and Y-steel sleeper systems, because of their reduced stress input into the substructure and additionally their possibility of easily reconstruction when deformed. • 6 scores: for all other ballasted systems • 2 scores for the slab track systems Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 2 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 3, because with higher speeds possible problems are increasing intensively.

► Adaption on solid rock Solid ground, i.e. all types of rock, is usually an excellent ground for of the rail superstructure. A functioning drainage is assumed as well, which should consider gaps in the rock. For ballasted track a hard underground will lead to a sustainable and early wear of the ballast. The separate ballast stones are exposed to high forces on the contact surfaces, which subsequently lead to a breaking of the edges; the higher the guided loads and the speeds driven, the stronger and faster runs this process. The solid underground of rock can be compared with bridges and tunnels, where the same problems occur. Awarded scores: • 10 scores: for the slab tracks with a concrete slab, because it can be best adapted on solid rock and the behaviour is very much similar to rock. • 9 scores: for the asphalt layer slab track system, because the substructure is more complicated to design and construct. This system needs a separate layer between the rock and the asphalt layer. • 0 scores: for the NFF-Thyssen system. It can not be used at all. • Regarding the ballasted tracks: the larger the areas of the bottom of the sleepers, the less are the tensions entering the ballast structure. This means: o 8 scores for the Wide sleeper; o 7 scores for the B 90 sleeper; o 6 scores for the B 70 sleeper, because the width of the bottom is 20 mm smaller than the B 90 sleeper; o 5 scores for the B 450, because of its 2 blocks only. Awarded weights: This parameter is relevant for all scenarios. • Scenario A: 2 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 2

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► Requirements on the formation layer and the subconstruction The superstructure rests on the formation layers and the subconstruction. The figure within the parameter “Cross section” shows the different components of the ballasted track and the slab track. The requirements on the components differ according to the design and the purpose: ballasted track, slab track, speed, load etc. The following tables show the requirements on the different components of the super- and substructure for the ballasted track and the slab track.

► Ballasted Track

Table 27: Requirements on super- and substructure of ballasted tracks

Components Quality requirements Thickness

Superstructure Ballast Ballast 31.5/63 mm 30.0 cm below bottom of sleeper

Upper unbonded Gravel with low hydraulic permeability; 25.0 cm to 35.0 cm formation protective Deformation modulus of the surface: layer New lines: Ev2 = 120 MN/m² to

Upgraded lines: Ev2 = 80 MN/m²

Substructure Unbonded frost Gravel with low hydraulic permeability; 25.0 cm to 35.0 cm protective layer Deformation modulus of the surface

New lines: Ev2 = 120 MN/m² to

Upgraded lines: Ev2 = 80 MN/m²

Lower unbonded Deformation modulus of the surface: Substructure must be compressed: bearing layer New Lines: Ev2 ≥ 60 MN/m² und New Lines ≥ 3,0 m with a deformation Upgraded Lines: Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m² modulus Dpr = 1.00 to 0.98 Upgraded Lines ≥ 2,5 m with deformation

modulus Dpr = 1.00 to 0.95

Improved Deformation modulus of the surface:

embankment Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m²

Improved subsoil Densification of substructure, 0.50 m to 1.00 m eventually particular measures for improvement, for example: lime, cement, vibratory gravel columns etc;

Underground The underground must be stable. The expected deformations must be balanced within the rail fastening system.

► Slab Track

Table 28: Requirements on super- and substructure of slab tracks

Components Quality requirements Thickness

Superstructure Concrete slab Strength class C 35/45 In accordance with the calculation (app. Share of reinforcement: 200 mm) 0.8 – 0.9 % of the cross section;

Hydraulically The compressive strength has to be in If necessary: app. 300 mm bonded bearing accordance with the concrete strength layer class C16/20. Necessity according to calculations.

Substructure Unbonded frost Unbonded frost protective layer 400 mm protective layer produced out of weather-resistant and frost-resistant gravel with a hydraulic permeability of k ≥ 5x10-5 m/s / k ≥ 5x10 4 m/s.

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Components Quality requirements Thickness Deformation modulus on the surface:

New Lines: Ev2 ≥ 120 MN/m²

Upgraded Lines: Ev2 ≥ 100 MN/m²

Lower unbonded Deformation modulus of the surface Substructure must be compressed: bearing layer New Lines: Ev2 ≥ 60 MN/m² New Lines ≥ 3.0 m with a deformation Upgraded Lines: Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m² modulus Dpr = 1.00 to 0.98 Upgraded Lines ≥ 2,5 m with deformation modulus Dpr = 1,00 to 0,95. Improved Deformation modulus of the surface:

embankment Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m²

Improved subsoil Densification of substructure, 0.50 m to 1.00 m eventually particular measures for improvement, for example: lime, cement, vibratory gravel columns etc;

Underground The underground must be stable. The expected deformations must be balanced within the rail fastening system.

The requirements for the ballasted tracks are generally lower. Awarded scores: • 10 scores: for the NFF-Thyssen, because the forces are transferred to load bearing layers in the underground; so the top layers must not be prepared. • 8 scores: for the “Wide sleepers”, because of its low pressure being entered into the ballast and subsequently into the subsoil. • 7 scores: for the B 90 sleeper system, because the width of the sleeper is 320 mm, compared to B 70, which is only 300 mm. • 6 scores for the B 70 and B 450 sleeper systems. • 2 scores: for the slab track systems, since these systems need a stable and firm substructure.

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Awarded weights: The higher the speed and the load the more important is a stable substructure. For the scenario B and C the axle loads will probably be low, because of possible separate lines for freight traffic. • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 3

1.3.3.4 Environmental parameters

► Airborne noise emissions Rail vehicles produce at the contact area of wheel and rail airborne noise. The size of the airborne noise is influenced, among others, by the surface condition of the track bed. Generally a hard and smooth surface – such as it is a feature of a slab track – induces higher noise emissions. A highly structured and broken surface – like the ballasted track – however, absorbs part of the airborne sound, and thus reduces the airborne noise emissions. In Germany, for example, in the federal emission regulation noise emission values are defined for different types of tracks. The ballasted track with wooden sleepers is thereby assigned a base value and the other types of tracks are provided with a correction value to this base value. The ballasted track with concrete sleepers therefore receives a correction of +2 dB (A) and the slab track of +5 dB (A)24. Many solutions exist for the absorption of noise, so called noise absorber. They are laid on top of the slab track and are trafficable. Awarded scores: • 8 scores: for the ballasted track systems except the Wide sleeper system. • 7 scores: for the Nff-Thyssen system, because is relatively open surface. • 4 scores: for the Wide sleeper system, because of their relatively closed surface. • 2 scores: for the slab track systems, because of their closed surface. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 1; existing routes will most likely profit from right of continuance • Scenario B: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration. • Scenario C: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration. • Scenario D: 3, any new line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration.

► Structure borne noise emissions In congested areas, the close vicinity of rail tracks to buildings and structures and thus to people or sensitive facilities often leads to conflict in respect of the transmission of noise and vibrations. Protection can be provided by the deployment of vibration isolation systems either to the source or to the receiver. Regarding the first case, there are quite a number of techniques available.

24 Cp. [65] p. 23.

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However, in many cases the best performances can be expected from low-tuned floating track beds. Noise and vibrations spread by rail tracks are mainly generated by the contact between wheels and rails. In the long run rail corrugation and deformation of wheels are almost unavoidable. A great deal of maintenance is required to keep the quality of the contacting surfaces within acceptable limits. The periodical grinding of rails in long track sections within sensitive areas is as expensive as the after-treatment of the wheels. Finally the application of other vibration attenuation measures may be more practicable and cost saving. Quite a number of techniques have been developed which differ significantly in efficiency and costs. Rail and baseplate pads mainly provide elasticity to the track as especially required in the case of a slab track system rather than reduce noise and vibration radiation. In this respect other systems like embedded rails or ballast mats can be expected to be more effective but at a higher cost. There is no doubt that the best performances in terms of vibration attenuation can be achieved by floating track bed systems if they are well designed. These mass-spring-systems (MSS) consist of floating slabs with the rails mounted on top. The slabs are usually constructed of massive concrete. Together with the dead load of rails, sleepers (if any) and fastenings (and the ballast, if any), they form dynamically active masses which are isolated from the sub-structure by elastic mounts which may be of rubber, elastomeric material or steel. In order to construct effective MSS a concrete slab is needed to provide the basis. With such a slab either so called “light”, “medium” or “heavy” mass-spring-systems can be constructed. The kind of MSS depends on the purpose and will generally be designed on the basis of a special survey. The different possibilities are shown in the following table:

Table 29 Mass-spring-systems

Light MSS Medium MSS Heavy MSS Slab Track systems • Baseplate pads • Continuous rail support • Point-like support of by antivibration mats heavy concrete slab • Rail pads • Full-surface support by • With elastomeric plats • Embedded rails antivibration mats • With steel springs • Full-surface support by antivibration mats

Ballasted Track systems • Rail pads • Rail pads • Point-like support of ballasted heavy concrete • Sub-ballast mats • Sub-ballast mats trough • Sleeper pads • Sleeper pads • With elastomeric plats • Sleeper boots • Sleeper boots • With steel springs • Insertion plates for • Insertion plates for sleeper boots sleeper boots

The above table shows that generally both systems can match the different purposes. In the case of medium and heavy MSS it is obvious that a concrete slab is needed. This requires height; in case of a ballasted track this means: additional height. The additional height sums up to 25 cm or even more. A slab track in order to fit the purpose of a MSS has only to be strengthened by reinforcement or additional few centimetres in height.

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Therefore slab track systems are much more suitable than ballasted track systems in case a medium or a heavy MSS is required. Awarded scores: • 8 scores: for the embedded block systems and the embedded rail systems, because these systems have got already an integrated resilient function. • 6 scores: for the other slab track systems, except the NFF-Thyssen. • 4 scores: for the NFF-Thyssen. • 2 scores: for the ballasted track systems, because of their limited possibilities towards a sound reduction of structure borne noise. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 1; existing routes will most likely profit from a “protection of the existing situation”. • Scenario B: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration. • Scenario C: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration. • Scenario D: 3; any new line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration.

1.3.3.5 Service parameters

► Comfort Criteria The different national railway technical guidelines established parameters for the design of the alignment. For the selection of the parameters maximum, minimum and nominal values and production values exist, which have to be met. Following this values no disadvantages in terms of safety, comfort and maintenance are expected. The planned and implemented parameters of the alignment exist only at the time of initial operation of the track and represent the ideal state of the track. During operation, the condition of the track deteriorates rapidly, which also decreases the comfort for passengers. A variety of negative influences on the track position have to be answered for by different other elements. But decisive influences on the track position arise from the superstructure. The ballasted track requires intensive care in order to ensure a durable planned track position. The higher the speeds driven and the axle loads are, the faster the deterioration of track position, the more suffers the comfort25. Slab track on the other hand ensures a good track position for long periods without any maintenance.26 Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the slab track system. • Minimum score: 7 for the B 90 and the Wide-/Y-sleeper; 6 scores for the B 70 sleepers and 5 scores for the B 450 sleepers. Decisive is the weight.

25 Cp. [66] pp 20. 26 Cp. [62] p. 36.

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Awarded weights: The demands of the passengers for comfort increases with the speed. • Scenario A: 1 • Scenario B: 1 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 3

1.3.3.6 Cost parameters

► Rehabilitation of existing tracks Depending on the category of the planned railway line two possibilities for the construction might occur: • the construction of a new line as a green-field project or, • the rehabilitation, modernisation or upgrading of an existing line. The first case will normally not cause any problems; the substructure will be built according to the required design parameters. The construction of every kind of track system is possible. The second case is more complicated. Difficulties will be faced in areas with problematic underground conditions. Usually it will not be possible to exchange or to improve the underground up to the required depths without causing problems to the neighbouring track. Due to these reasons reductions of the quality of the substructure will be inevitable. On the other hand will this limit the use of slab track systems, because their requirements on the stability of the substructures are high. Reference is also made to the before mentioned parameters. But also the use of ballasted tracks might cause problems, for instance if fine soil cannot be exchanged and these fine soil particles are penetrating the ballast (so called „pumping“). Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 8 for the Wide sleepers; least requirements. 6 scores for the B 70 and the B 450 sleepers and 5 scores for the B 90 sleepers. B 90 sleeper need a better prepared substructure, at least theoretically. • Minimum score: 2 for the slab track systems; 1 for the NFF-Thyssen system. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 3, current railway policy is continued and this requires rehabilitation of the existing tracks. • Scenario B: 3, offensive further development of current railway infrastructure needs rehabilitation of existing track. • Scenario C: 1; will include special built lines or complete upgrading of a line thus with renewed superstructure. • Scenario D: 1; mainly separate high speed lines.

► Vegetation A cost-intensive factor is the elimination or reduction of plant cover. Undisturbed growth affects the infrastructure; the resulting decomposition products – in the case of the ballasted track – fill the cavities of the gravel bed, reduce the shear strength, affect the drainage and reduce the frost resistance.

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In the case of slab track, plant cover arises hardly, usually because of lack of space for breeding ground. In addition, potential effects are harmless. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: 10 for the slab tracks, except the NFF-Thyssen. • Minimum score: 8 for the Wide sleeper system, because of the relatively closed surface. 6 scores for the NFF-Thyssen track and 4 scores for the other ballasted tracks. Decisive is the kind of surface: is it more open or closed, rough or slick. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 1; considered as not essential. • Scenario B: 1; considered as not essential. • Scenario C: 2; for higher speeds this parameter becomes more important, since vegetation can influence the stability of the track. • Scenario D: 2; for higher speeds this parameter becomes more important, since vegetation can influence the stability of the track.

► Costs for maintenance of components The measures for the ballasted track generally consist of cleaning or replacement of the ballast, rail grinding and possibly replacement of single rail fasteners. Occasionally, an underground rehabilitation will be required which restores the strength of the gravel or prevents the penetration of fine particles into the gravel (soil replacement, installation of geotextiles). Furthermore, measures to correct the track position and height are needed to restore the planned alignment parameters. The slab track will serve for many years without any restrictions [62]. The maintenance effort is usually limited to rail grinding and possibly to the replacement of single rail fasteners. Corrections in the track position and height that have to be made in the support bases are the exception. Slab track systems with continuous support and elastic (em-) bedded rails (mass- spring systems) have less wear than rigid systems with discrete rail support. In conclusion, it can be stated that the maintenance costs of ballasted tracks are much higher than for slab track. Awarded scores: • Maximum score: embedded continuous support scores highest, other slab track system score from 9 to 8 depending on their elastic support. • Minimum score: for the ballasted tracks from 6 to 4 scores dependant on the stability of the track system. Awarded weights: Maintenance costs have a high importance when higher investment costs are involved. • Scenario A: 2 • Scenario B: 2 • Scenario C: 3 • Scenario D: 3

► Investment costs The following figures shall serve as an overview and give an idea of the unit prices of the different systems. For the track analysis in hand only qualitative price differences are relevant. The price basis is the year 2010 of Western European countries. Reference is made to the so

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 114 of (270) called “Kostenkennwertekatalog”, which means catalogue with cost characteristic values, of the Deutsche Bahn AG; to the “Track Compendium” by Bernhard Lichtberger and results from tender submissions. The unit price contains: • for ballasted systems the rail, the fastenings, the sleepers and the ballast; • for ballastless systems the rail, the fastenings, the discrete or longitudinal support (monoblocksleepers, the bi-blocksleepers, the blocks) and the slab (concrete or asphalt). The unit price amounts: • Ballasted track: 350.- ... 500.- Euro/m • Slab tracks: 800.- ... 1.000.- Euro/m The actual unit price of a certain project is influenced by a wide variety of parameters. Some of them might not be directly connected to the place of the specific project, the technical nature of the project, the unit price of steel or concrete, the specific difficulties of the project (location, seasons, the specific technology of the constructor) etc., but influenced by subjective parameters like the situation of the market at a certain time, the workload of a company, the will of a company to enter into a certain market etc. Instead, the different systems will be evaluated by their components (price) and the technology (time, manpower etc) which can be used to construct them. After all, only the ranking of the superstructure systems is decisive. These are the unit price influencing parameters with the delimitations from each other and the explanations for the scoring: • The cheapest ballasted track system is the one with the B 450 sleeper, because least concrete is used and the 2 concrete-blocks are not pre-tensioned. This means: 10 scores. • The production costs of the B90 sleepers are slightly higher than the B 70 sleeper, because of the concrete volume and the weight. This results in 9 scores for the B 70 and 8 scores for the B 90 sleeper system. • The production costs of the Wide sleepers should be the most expensive of the ballasted track system, because of the volume and weight. The sleepers are pre-tensioned. This leads to 7 scores. • Regarding the slab track systems it is obvious that the NFF-Thyssen is the most expensive, because of its special features. This means only 1 score. • Systems with supporting points and embedded sleepers [A] are “cast in situ” systems with a heavy concrete slab and additional reinforcement. • Systems with supporting points with prefabricated blocks [B] are also “cast in situ” systems, were the prefabricated blocks are embedded in a heavy concrete slab. The slab is reinforced. • Systems with supporting points without sleepers on prefabricated slabs [C] are systems were the prefabricated slabs are brought to the construction site and the gap between the hydraulically bonded layer and the prefabricated slab is filled in situ by a special grout. From system [A] to [B] / [C] there is an increasing degree of prefabrication and mechanization and therefore the unit price should drop. This means: 2 for the system [A] and 4 scores for [B] and [C]. • Systems with supporting points with sleepers laid on top of asphalt layers should generally be less expensive than the concrete slab systems, because asphalt is cheaper

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than concrete (app. 50 %) and because of the high degree of automation by using pavers. This results in 5 scores. • Continuous support on slab in U-like channel; this system is constructed in situ within only two steps. In a first step the reinforced concrete slab with the U-like channel is constructed. In a second step the rail is laid into the channel and embedded in a special elastic compound mass. This results in 6 scores. Awarded weights: Investment costs getting less important when complete new lines are constructed: • Scenario A: 3 • Scenario B: 3 • Scenario C: 2 • Scenario D: 2

► Construction time The time for the construction of ballasted tracks is definitely shorter, because the requirements on the substructure is less strong, no concrete work has to be carried out and the requirements on the precision of the whole construction is less demanding. Of course, the “New slab track” of the Thyssen type is very special and with its deep foundation extremely time consuming. On the other hand the prefabricated slab track systems are perfected and the construction process is widely mechanized. The prefabricated slabs are installed within a just-in-time process. Awarded scores: • 10 scores for the B 450 and the B 70 sleepers. 9 scores for the Wide sleepers because of special adoptions regarding the machinery for the Wide and Y-sleepers. And 8 for B 90 sleeper systems, because the construction time of the heavy B 90 sleepers will be slightly higher. • 7 scores for the prefabricated slabs. • 6 scores for the asphalt layer system, because of the use of road pavers. • 5 scores for the concrete slab systems. • 2 scores for the NFF-Thyssen system, which is – of course – most complex. Awarded weights: • Scenario A: 3; very important, because of reconstruction of existing lines. Downtime must be kept low. • Scenario B:3 • Scenario C:3 • Scenario D: 2; new greenfield lines do not influence existing operation.

► Life cycle costs Theory and calculations of life cycle costs are complex and differ a lot by author and by country. Also the considered parameters itself differ as no standardised system exists. Some results of various studies:

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“Bringing objectivity into system decision between ballasted track and slab track at Deutsche Bundesbahn” Rail Technical Review, 2-3 (2003): Comparing the business cases of both systems in the narrow sense shows, that there are only very few cases involving the building of new lines to carry extremely dense traffic, in which the slab track has a slight cash-value advantage over ballasted tracks. “Track Compendium” by Bernhard Lichtberger (2005): However, the final margin is nowhere near enough – even for very optimistic estimations of increase in life time – to replace the ballasted track by slab track on earth formation. This economic inefficiency is caused by the substructure treatment required to a great depth and by the long track closures. These results were obtained by taking into account not only the kind of superstructures but whole projects; the structures, the substructure, the traffic profile, etc. The analysis within this chapter evaluates the superstructures systems only independent of their actual location within a certain line. Therefore a reliable evaluation of life-cycle costs is not possible and the parameter has to be calculated and implemented in a later stage.

1.3.4 Analysis matrix

1.3.4.1 Methodology of the analysis Objective of the task is to give recommendations on the appropriate superstructure for each of the different scenarios A – D. As already mentioned before, the recommendation is influenced by all the discussed decision- related parameters. All relevant parameters were described and discussed in the chapters before. The relevance of the parameters with regard to a scenario has been weighted by a factor. The task is to bring the different superstructure systems and the parameters in a relation. As a logic consequence this can be done within a two-dimensional evaluation matrix. The methodology can be described by a point rating system or scoring-model. Hereby the scoring value serves only a grading of the different alternatives in an ordinal scale. Thus it is not feasible to state that an alternative with a value of 10 is twice as good as one with a value of 5.

► Description of Scores In order to describe the suitability of the superstructure systems towards the evaluation parameters and vice versa scores will be assigned. If a track system is with regard to the described parameter more suitable the score will be higher. The scores range from: 1 = suitability is very low; the parameter does not suit the superstructure system or vice versa; 10 = highest suitability; the parameter suits the superstructure system very well.

► Description of Weighting Now the scenarios A – D have to be introduced, since it is obvious that not all evaluation parameters are equally significant to the different scenarios. One parameter, for instance the “speed”, is of course much more significant for High Speed Lines (= scenario D) than it is for scenario A (where the current railway politics is being continued). These particularities are being described by introducing weights for the significance of the evaluation parameter with regard to the scenarios A – D. The more significance a certain evaluation parameter has for a scenario, the higher will be the weight. The weighting ranges from: 0 = not relevant; the parameter is not relevant for the specific scenario. 1 = low relevance; the parameter is of low relevance for the specific scenario.

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2 = medial relevance; the parameter is of medial relevance for the specific scenario. 3 = strong relevance; the parameter is of strong relevance for the specific scenario. Scores and weights will be multiplied for each of the evaluation parameters and summed up for the different superstructure systems. The result is a scoring of the different track systems for one scenario. Hence a comparison of scores from two different scenarios has no informative value. For instance: Taking a certain evaluation parameter, e.g.: speed; the weight of scenario D = 3 multiplied with the unweighted scores of the superstructures, for instance the embedded sleepers (Rheda 2000) = 10, results in “weighted score” of 3*10 = 30. The weighted scores for all discussed parameters are in the end summed up to compile an overall qualitative ranking which is documented in total sum.

1.3.4.2 Results of track assessment The summarised quantitative ordinal results of the evaluation parameters for the different systems according to scenarios A–D are shown in the table. The matrix including all parameters can be found as Annex 3 attached to this document.

Table 30: Scoring values of track solutions according to scenario A - D

Types of track Examples Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D

Supporting points, with embedded sleepers Rheda 2000 345 7 377 6 439 4 468 3 (SES) Supporting points, Bögl, without sleepers, ÖBB-Porr, 366 4 396 4 455 1 480 1 prefabricated slabs Shinkansen (PS) Continuous support, on NFF longitudinal beams and 310 9 337 9 394 9 422 5 Thyssen stakes (NFF) Supporting points, with prefabricated booted EBS-Edilon, Slab Track 349 6 385 5 445 2 473 2 blocks embedded in LVT slab (PBS) Supporting points, with Getrac, sleepers, laid on top of 292 10 316 10 445 2 391 8 ATD asphalt layer (SA) Continuous support, on ERS-HR- slab; embedded rails in 341 8 371 7 425 5 452 4 Edilon U-like channels (SER)

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m/245 391 3 401 3 396 8 378 10 kg)

B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m/340 kg) 414 2 423 2 421 6 407 6

NSB 95 Sleeper (2,60 m / 270 kg) / 417 1 427 1 421 6 400 7 B 70 Sleeper ( 2,60 m / 280 kg) Ballasted Track Wide sleepers (2,40m / 560kg) / Y- 355 5 358 8 379 10 385 9 Steel-sleepers

For scenario A and B a ballasted track with monoblock concrete sleepers, namely NSB 95 and B 70 sleeper has a high ranking showing clear advantages for the project purpose.

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For scenario C ballasted track systems and slab track systems are coming closer together in the ranking but scoring of the slab track systems is higher. Within scenario D the prefabricated slab track systems have the highest ranking and are under consideration of the parameters discussed most advantageous.

1.3.4.3 Explanation of the results The starting points for the achieved results are the weights for the different scenarios. Secondly the scores for the parameters have to be checked. The results will be explained in the following paragraph. Scenario A and B ranking resulted in the general recommendation to make use of a ballasted track system with NSB 95 or B 70 sleeper type. It should be mentioned that this track system achieved more scores than the other ballasted tracks. The decisive parameters have been: • Flexibility in operation programme, • Maintainability i.e. repair after accidents/ damages, • Rehabilitation of existing tracks, • Time duration for exchange and maintenance of components for a single event, • Investment costs, • Construction time. These parameters are advantageous for the track system and are summarising the strength. Scenario C and D ranking resulted in in the general recommendation to make use of the prefabricated slab track systems. The decisive parameters have been: • Lifetime, • Track availability, • Speed, • Load, • Lateral track resistance, • Suitability of permanent way for tilting trains, • Eddy-current brakes, • Comfort criteria, • Construction time • Life-cycle costs,

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1.3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis In order to derive stable and reliable results from a model, in this case the point rating system, the sensibility of the calculation should be checked. This means, it has to be identified whether small changes in the distribution of the scores or weights have a strong impact on the results. Secondly, it has to be determined whether changes occur quickly and in which direction. In other words it is tested how sensible the calculation reacts. The scores and the weighting within the three dimensions of the table were changed in the following way: • Table 1: Change in minimum scores: o Scores: max. scores fixed; the minimal scores were increased by 1-2 scores, depending on the absolute figure. o Weighting: no changes. • Table 2: Change in maximum scores: o Scores: min. scores fixed; the maximal scores were decreased by 1-2 scores, depending on the absolute figure. o Weighting: no changes. • Table 3: Change in minimum weight o Scores: no change o Weighting: the minimum weight (0=not relevant) will be changed to 1 = low relevance. • Table 4: Change in maximum weight o Scores: no changes. o Weighting: the max. weight (3=strong relevance) will be changed to 2 = medial relevance

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Table 31: Results sensitivity analysis Table 1: Table 2: Change in minimum Change in maximum Basic scores scores Scenario Scenario Scenario Design types of track / slab track Examples ABCD ABCD ABCD Supporting points, with embedded 345 377 439 468 407 437 499 524 280 304 352 375 sleepers (SES) Rheda 2000 Supporting points, without sleepers, Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, 366 396 455 480 426 454 514 537 292 315 361 380 prefabricated slabs (PS) Shinkansen Continuous support, on longitudinal NFF Thyssen (New 310 337 394 422 370 394 454 478 250 269 313 335 beams and stakes (NFF) slab track Thyssen) Supporting points, with prefabricated 349 385 445 473 405 437 497 522 279 307 355 377

Slab Track Slab booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS) EBS-Edilon, LVT Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on 292 316 445 391 362 387 497 466 223 240 355 297 top of asphalt layer (SA) Getrac, ATD Continuous support, on slab; embedded 341 371 425 452 401 429 485 509 277 300 343 365 rails in U-like channels (SER) ERS-HR-Edilon

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2,40m / 245 kg) 391 401 396 378 440 447 469 459 301 311 319 306

B 90 Sleeper (2,60 m / 340 kg) 414 423 421 407 453 461 488 484 314 323 337 329

NSB 95 Sleeper (2,60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2,60 m / 417 427 421 400 462 468 490 477 324 334 342 327 280 kg) Ballasted Track Ballasted Wide sleepers (2,40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers 355 358 379 385 428 435 471 480 281 286 305 311

Table 3: Table 4: Change in minimum Change in maximum Basic weight weight Scenario Scenario Scenario Design types of track / slab track Examples ABCD ABCD ABCD Supporting points, with embedded 345 377 439 468 365 387 439 468 282 312 370 361 sleepers (SES) Rheda 2000 Supporting points, without sleepers, Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, 366 396 455 480 386 406 455 480 296 326 382 373 prefabricated slabs (PS) Shinkansen Continuous support, on longitudinal NFF Thyssen (New 310 337 394 422 330 347 394 422 234 264 318 297 beams and stakes (NFF) slab track Thyssen) Supporting points, with prefabricated 349 385 445 473 369 395 445 473 279 311 368 359

Slab Track booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS) EBS-Edilon, LVT Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on 292 316 445 391 308 326 445 391 227 251 368 295 top of asphalt layer (SA) Getrac, ATD Continuous support, on slab; embedded 341 371 425 452 355 381 425 452 276 302 354 349 rails in U-like channels (SER) ERS-HR-Edilon

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2,40m / 245 kg) 391 401 396 378 382 391 392 374 287 313 326 299

B 90 Sleeper (2,60 m / 340 kg) 414 423 421 407 403 410 416 402 309 335 351 323

NSB 95 Sleeper (2,60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2,60 m / 417 427 421 400 408 417 417 396 312 338 350 321 280 kg) Ballasted Track Wide sleepers (2,40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers 355 358 379 385 369 370 385 389 280 301 328 308

The results for the scenarios A, B, C and D with regard to the quantitative ranking are stable and did not change the ordinal values.

1.3.5 Recommendations of track system according to scenarios It is recommended to use ballasted track systems of the light type (NSB 95/B 70 sleepers or similar) for scenario A and B, because of: • flexibility in operation programme is high. Change of cant or relocation of switches can be performed very easily, • repairs after an accident or damages on the superstructure are easy, the required time and necessary costs are much lower compared to slab track systems, • airborne noise emissions are lower,

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• construction time is shorter, • time duration for exchange and maintenance of components is shorter compared to slab track systems. For scenario C the prefabricated slabs can be recommended based on the result of the point rating system. Nevertheless, in the next phases planning within this scenario has to go into more detail and should consider and evaluate both types of superstructure, slab tracks and ballasted tracks. The reason is that the final decision of the recommended track system is influenced by the corridor, the route, the operational programme etc. All related parameters should be scored and evaluated for each corridor individually. In case of scenario D, where a pure high-speed line is built, the recommendation is clearly a slab track systems with prefabricated slabs. It has to be assessed which of the highest ranked systems are best suited for different segments with the varying conditions of a corridor. Reasons for this recommendation are: • lifetime will be much longer than compared to ballasted tracks, • track availability is outstanding, • behaviour with regard to speed and load is excellent, • lateral track resistance is much higher than with the conventional ballasted track, • eddy-current brakes match very much together with slab tracks, so rolling stock might be equipped with them, • emissions of structure borne noise in combination with a slab track system will achieve best results; if a mass-spring systems is selected. The choice of a track system without ballast for a new HSL is often supported on the basis that higher initial investments will be counterbalanced with the reduction of maintenance costs and with greater track availability, which is the case for the Japanese network. Another situation relates with the need to run a great amount of freight traffic during the night, like in the German network. In these cases, maintenance operations are restrained by short periods of track availability. Moreover, the circulation of freight vehicles leads to faster track deterioration. This situation becomes more relevant if heavier axle loads are allowed. It may also be one of the reasons why France and Spain continue to build new high-speed lines with ballast, because in these countries there is almost a total segregation of the lines by traffic type. External constraints and specific technical considerations of each project influence the choice between ballasted and ballastless track. For reasons given in chapter 1.3.3 (regarding parameters “tunnel” and “bridges”) tracks in tunnel and on bridges should be equipped with slab track systems, since they produce more advantages than the ballasted tracks. Consequently, in high-speed projects with greater extension of track running on viaducts or in tunnels, the construction of ballastless track in these sections will most certainly be more favourable. The fact that leading countries on high-speed industry, such as France, continue to build railways on ballast is the evidence that the choice between ballasted and ballastless track is not consensual. The answer to that is not limited to a life-cycle costs analysis, but also requires the consideration of many other parameters and specific elements of each project. Some additional explanations and findings regarding the different track types are given in the next paragraph. Supporting points with embedded sleepers (SES): The characteristic feature is the monolithic in situ construction. The disadvantage therefore compared with the prefabricated systems is the inflexibility in case of exchange or maintenance. Additionally, a few cases occurred where the prefabricated bi-block detached from the concrete slab and the dowels, which fixe the fastening plate to the block, were unfastened.

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Supporting points, without sleepers, prefabricated slabs (PS): Advantage of the system is the prefabricated slab, which ensures short construction times and high quality. NFF Thyssen slab track: This type is a very special application and suitable for poor soil conditions. Supporting points, with prefabricated booted blocks embedded in a slab (PBS): The main feature of this system is the booted block embedded in a reinforced concrete slab. The difference to the SES system is that the prefabricated block in the PBS system is jacketed by a rubber boot. This ensures that the vibrations induced by the rail are absorbed and transmitted to the reinforced concrete slab a homogeneous and smoothed way. Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on top of an asphalt layer (SA): The most important component of this system is the asphalt layer. It ensures relative elasticity and also a short construction time, but the bearing capacity is limited. Asphalt layers cannot be reinforced. In the long run, especially in combination with embankments, deformations, frost etc cracks might occur. Generally, this system can not be recommended for Norwegian winter conditions. Continuous support, on slab, embedded rails in U-like channels (SER): The highlight of these systems is the usage of an elastic polymeric embedding compound, which fixes the rail within the U-like channel. In this way the rail is supported continuously and conventional fastening systems are not needed any more. Apart from that the track shows a very high lateral resistance. B 450 Twin Block Sleeper: This type of sleeper is quite light with the typical characteristic the two blocks as support for the rails. Even so the lateral resistance is increased with the two blocks, the overall stability is judged to be not convincing. Maintenance is enormous [67]. B 90 Sleeper : Are quite similar to the NSB 95 and B 70 sleeper type. Only difference is the weight and the width of the bottom of the sleeper. These two parameters are slightly higher compared to the two other sleepers. This gives the B 90 sleeper more stability and the pressure induced to the ballast is lower. On the other hand side, the price is also higher. The main applications are therefore mixed traffic with both high axle loads and high speeds. NSB 95 Sleeper/B 70 Sleeper: These are the standard types in Norway and Germany and therefore suitable for the standard conditions of scenario A and B. Wide Sleeper/Y-Steel Sleeper: These two sleepers are quite new developments. Their field is obviously the upgrading or renewal of existing lines, especially if the available width is small and limited. Another field of applications are reconstructions of the substructure in areas with bad soil conditions, since the Wide sleeper has a large undersurface.

► Some remarks for the further design phases: The scope of this chapter was to investigate and asses different state-of-the-art superstructure systems. In a second step parameters were described which are influencing the track systems. The third step resulted in the scoring of the point rating system, where the superstructure systems and the influencing parameters were linked and evaluated for their suitability. Additionally the significance for the scenarios A – D was assessed. Result was to obtain a ranking of the superstructure systems according to the scenarios. However the track analysis was made without any reference to specific corridors with defined requirements. This means, that in forthcoming design phases the evaluation matrix has to be developed and applied with regard to specific corridors, lines and sections. Perhaps in a specific section some parameters are not influencing the track system at all or there are additional which might be introduced. Also the significance for a specific corridor or line might change. Another task of the further design phases is to calculate investment costs and introduce them in the decision matrix. Based on the approach in this analysis a track evaluation matrix for a cost- effectiveness-analysis has been prepared for the phase 3.

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1.4 Infrastructure concepts

1.4.1 Summary Travel quality, comfort and investment costs of a railway line basically depend on the line layout. The determination of the parameters for the alignment thus represents an elementary basis for the success of every railway construction project. Case studies of countries where tilting trains are operated are collected to educe the experience of rail net providers and railway operators with tilting train infrastructure. For the determination of the line layout the alignment parameters for both conventional railway and tilting train operation have been assessed and described for three train service concepts. Under consideration of thresholds for alignment parameters for an interoperable rail service different European standards have been evaluated. It is assessed that the decisive thresholds like cant, cant deficiency and gradient for the line layout have been risen constantly. For both new and upgraded lines the layout could be developed with a reduction of investment costs for tunnel and bridge structures. As a matter of fact special thresholds of the alignment parameters for a pure HSR line with tilting train operation obviously will lead to minimum investment cost for a speed maximum. However the increase of the alignment thresholds causes operational limitations with regard to freight traffic. Furthermore it implicates higher applied loads on the superstructure and can lead to a reduction of travel comfort. Experts from manufacturers, railway infrastructure providers and railway operators of ten different countries have been interviewed in order to get an integrated view on tilting train operations. The case study shows that tilting train technology was developed to achieve increased speed on existing lines without or only small upgrading investments. Mainly for countries or areas with low population density and wide meshed railway networks these have been the decisive factors. An example for an existing or planned special new tilting train line could not be found. However Switzerland has chosen a renewal model by re-aligning two lines to implement tilting trains. Objective was to reach a defined travel time. Also in the United States and Spain are taking such re-alignments into account. Cost effects could not be quantified as many countries are not compiling detailed data with regard to tilting train operation as the delimitation of tilting bound effects from conventional operation effects can not sufficiently differentiated. Nevertheless qualitative result is that most important aspect for running a successful tilting train network is to consider the strong interdependency of infrastructure, rolling stock and operational concept. Only if all three fit together, a high profit tilting train operation can be achieved. This includes the importance of alignment parameters such as cant, cant deficiency and lateral acceleration. To achieve benefits in travel time the curviness of a line has to be in an appropriate range for the tilting system. Even though few tilting train exist which can reach a curve speed of up to 250 km/h (e.g. Alstom ETR 600) non of the interviewed railway operators is driving with these high curve speeds. Italy is operating tilting trains with the highest curve speed of 200 km/h. The Norwegian class 73 tilting train is operated up to 210 km/h. However rolling stock technology could also be developed further to use tilting mechanism with higher speeds if the dedicated line is designed to utilise fully alignment thresholds. If transverse forces are utilised to a maximum track set has to be on a high quality level. Also travel comfort has to be considered carefully as utilisation of these parameters can lead to motion sickness (Kinetose).

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For the development of an existing railway network and for new lines alignment parameters have to be determined taking into consideration the operational concept and a balanced cost- benefit ratio over the life-cycle. Based on today’s state-of-the-art line layouts can be designed with smaller curve radii and higher gradients as they have been aligned in past decades. However for the determination of a line the rail engineer has to take into consideration travel comfort and the forces acting on track and rolling stock. The use of limiting values for an alignment variant is reasonable. But it has to be considered that the line layout with limiting values for the alignment is only one variant which has to be compared to a line layout with standard values. Based on this the final optimal alignment elements have to be decided in the specific line corridor.

1.4.2 Infrastructure concepts – Alignment parameters The quality and the investment costs of a railway line basically depend on the line layout. The determination of the parameters for the line layout thus represents an elementary basis for the success of every railway construction project. The requirements on the layout of a railway line vary in accordance with what the track is to be used for. To assess the alignment parameters, a study is made taking into consideration the following variants:

1.4.2.1 Definition of variants

1.4.2.1.1 Variant 1: Dedicated high speed tracks Variant 1 includes tracks built solely for high speed traffic. Freight traffic and regional passenger services are run on the existing railway network. A uniform speed level and low train loads can thus be assumed for these lines.

1.4.2.1.2 Variant 2: High speed tracks with regional passenger services Variant 2 covers tracks used for high speed traffic as well as for regional passenger services. Freight traffic takes place on the existing railway network. These lines are thus suitable for a passenger transport system with two different levels of speed.

1.4.2.1.3 Variant 3: New line for mixed passenger and freight traffic Variant 3 includes tracks used for conventional mixed passenger and freight traffic. The line layout must therefore be designed for a broad level of speed and high train loads.

1.4.2.2 Alignment parameters A set of basic requirements entitled “Technical specifications for interoperable railway traffic“ (TSI) has been defined for the European railways. For the route alignment, only the main safety-relevant parameters for cant and cant deficiency in curved tracks and points as well as the maximum longitudinal grades have been defined in the TSI infrastructure. To assess the TSI limit values, the main alignment parameters of the TSI are compared below with the technical limit values of other standards.

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1.4.2.2.1 Comparison of TSI / ENV / JBV/ other (DB AG / SNCF / RENFE) main alignment parameters for conventional trains In the subsequent text, the technical parameters of the following specifications or organizations are compared: TSI: Technical Specifications for Interoperability ENV 13803-1: European Norm, Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters – Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Characterisation of track geometry JBV: Jernbaneverket, Norway ÖBB: Österreichische Bundesbahn, Austria HL-AG: Eisenbahn-Hochleistungsstrecken AG, Austria DB AG: Deutsche Bahn AG, Germany SNCF: Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français, France RENFE: Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles, Spain

► Cant (D) and Cant deficiency (I) Cant and cant deficiency are the main parameters for determining the geometrical properties of the line layout. The influences of the dynamics of vehicle movement are briefly described. When travelling along a curved track, the centrifugal force has an influence on the superstructure in addition to the vertical weight of the vehicle. The load on the superstructure from the centrifugal force increases as a square in accordance with the formula F = M * V² / R as the speed increases. Where a cant exists and the resultant force of weight and centrifugal force act at right angles to the plane of the track, the lateral acceleration can be compensated. The compensated cant is calculated in accordance with the formula Do = 11.8 * V² / R. Do = Compensated cant (mm); V = Speed (km/h); R = Radius (m)

For a speed of 120 km/h, a curve of 1’000 m results in a compensated cant of 170 mm. As the cant of a track is limited, a cant of for example 70 mm is compensated by a cant deficiency of 170 – 70 = 100 mm. In the case of a cant deficiency of 100 mm, an uncompensated lateral acceleration of 0.65 m/s² acts on the vehicle (aq = I * g / e). aq = Uncompensated lateral acceleration at track level (m/s²); g = Gravitation (9.81 m/s²); e = Distance between wheel treads of an axle (1’500 mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm)

For route alignment in the layout location diagram, the following dependencies between the maximum permissible travel speed and the curve apply where the cant and cant deficiency are limited: R = 11.8 * V² / D + I R = Radius ( m); V= Speed (km/h); D = Cant (mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm)

If the speed in a curve is to be increased without changing the radius, the cant and/or the cant deficiency can thus be increased. The table below compares the maximum permissible cant and cant deficiencies for tracks out of various technical standards. Since the TSI and the ENV (13803-1) as well as other technical standards define the speed ranges differently, the limit values are assigned to the scenarios considered in this report. To

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 126 of (270) illustrate this, where limit cases exist, the nearest values of the respective standard are shown to ensure uniformity of the table.

Table 32: Parameter comparison of different standards

D (mm) I (mm) Speed (km/h) 160 < V < 200 160 < V < 250 250 < V < 350 TSI III TSI II or III TSI I TSI 180 165 (130 Ballast / 150 Slab) 100 (80 V>300) ENV 13803-1 160 (Recommendation) 150 (Recom) 100 (Recom) 80 (Recom) 180 (Maximum) 165 (Max) 150 (Max) (130 Ballast / 150 Slab) JBV 150 (160)* 100 (130) 100 (130) ÖBB (HL-AG) 160 100 DB AG 160 (Ballasted Track) 130 130 130 170 (Slab Track) 150 150 150 SNCF 180 100 (130) 100 (130) 85 (100) / 65 (85) V=350 RENFE 150 100 (65 v>300) *existing tracks - plussmaterial

It can be seen from the table that the limit values of the TSI are at a very high level and in many cases the technical standards of the railways are below these values. The standards of the JBV and the ÖBB for high speed tracks are primarily designed for mixed traffic in terrains with high topographical demands. The limit values have been carefully selected, but inevitably result in a “more expensive line layout“ which can only be implemented with a number of tunnels and bridge constructions in a topographically demanding terrain. The required enlargement of the curve with increasing speed partly using the limit values is shown below based on the example of R= 1’000. Lower limit values (ENV / ÖBB / JBV)

Table 33: Lower limit values (ENV / ÖBB / JBV)

V (km/h) D (mm) I (mm) min R (m) 120 70 100 1000 140 130 100 1006 160 150 100 1208 200 150 100 1888 250 150 100 2950

TSI limit value

Table 34: TSI limit value

V (km/h) D (mm) I (mm) min R (m) 140 130 100 1006 160 170 130 1007 200 180 165 1368 250 180 130 2379 300 180 80 4085

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► Gradient (G) The following is a comparison of the maximum permissible route gradients taken from the various technical standards.

Table 35: Comparison of the maximum permissible route gradients

max. G (‰) TSI 35 (max. 6 km) / 25 (max. 10 km) ENV 13803-1 - JBV 12.5 (25 exceptional case) ÖBB (HL-AG) 8 DB AG 12.5 (40 exceptional case) SNCF 35 RENFE 12.5 (25) Station tracks (TSI) 2.5

A route alignment according to TSI limit values appears convincing. Using minimum radii and maximum route gradients, the number of tunnel and bridge constructions can be kept to a minimum in a topographically demanding terrain. However, it is necessary to note the following effects.

► Uncompensated lateral acceleration (aq) If the cant deficiency is increased from 100 mm to 130 mm, the uncompensated lateral acceleration increases from 0.65 m/s² to 0.85 m/s². Following an increase from 100 mm to 165 mm, the lateral acceleration increases from 0.65 m/s² to 1.08 m/s²! Hereby, the maximum cant deficiency / uncompensated lateral acceleration refers to track level not to floor level inside. The lateral acceleration acts directly as a horizontal force on the passenger and the track superstructure. In a number of standards the uncompensated lateral acceleration is limited to 1.00 m/s² (corresponds to I = 150mm). The 1.08 m/s² in the case of I = 165 mm should be regarded as the maximum limit value.

► Cant excess (E) The cant excess limit values limit the gradient accelerating forces, i.e. the load on the inner curve rail in the case of rails with a very high excess, for routes with passenger and freight traffic. In the TSI there are no limit values defined for cant excess. The ENV recommends a cant excess of max. 110 mm with an upper limit of 130 mm. The ÖBB has limited the cant excess to 85 mm. JBV has limited the cant excess to 90 mm (R<600 m) resp. 110 mm (R>600 m). Determination of the cant excess for freight trains with max. 80 or 100 km/h with reference to radii for route alignment limit values correspond to TSI.

Table 36: Cant excess depending on speed

V (km/h) D (mm) R (m) E (mm) 80 130 1006 55 80 170 1007 95 80 180 1368 125 80 180 2379 148 100 130 1006 13 100 170 1007 53 100 180 1368 94 100 180 2379 130

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In the case of large excesses it can be seen from the table that use of the tracks for mixed traffic would have to be avoided or excluded.

► Effect of gradient on the capacity of the route The speed/distance charts below show the effect of route gradient on high speed trains (TGV- A25) in relation to different gradients.

Tfz. GEC.TGV-A25; 300 km/h; Last=0 t; Länge=238 m; theor. Energiebedarf: 1193 kWh Brh=200 %; Brs=R; Zuschlag linear=3 %; Lastzuschlag=0 % mittl. Energiebedarf: 23,9 Wh/m stat 1 01 km 02 km 03 km 04 km 05 km 06 km 07 km 08 km 09 km 10 km 11 km 12 km 13 km 14 km 15 km 16 km 17 km 18 km 19 km 20 km 21 km 22 km 23 km 24 km 25 km 26 km 27 km 28 km 29 km 30 km 31 km 32 km 33 km 34 km 35 km 36 km 37 km 38 km 39 km 40 km 41 km 42 km 43 km 44 km 45 km 46 km 47 km 48 km 49 km stat 2 0,0 1,0 1,5 1,9 2,2 2,5 2,8 3,0 3,3 3,5 3,8 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,8 10,0 10,2 10,4 10,6 10,9 11,1 11,3 11,5 11,8 12,2 13,0 mi n 1,0 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,9 300 km/h 280

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Tfz. GEC.TGV-A25; 300 km/h; Last=0 t; Länge=238 m; theor. Energiebedarf: 1345 kWh Brh=200 %; Brs=R; Zuschlag linear=3 %; Lastzuschlag=0 % mittl. Energiebedarf: 26,9 Wh/m stat 1 01 km 02 km 03 km 04 km 05 km 06 km 07 km 08 km 09 km 10 km 11 km 12 km 13 km 14 km 15 km 16 km 17 km 18 km 19 km 20 km 21 km 22 km 23 km 24 km 25 km 26 km 27 km 28 km 29 km 30 km 31 km 32 km 33 km 34 km 35 km 36 km 37 km 38 km 39 km 40 km 41 km 42 km 43 km 44 km 45 km 46 km 47 km 48 km 49 km stat 2 0,0 1,0 1,5 1,9 2,2 2,5 2,8 3,0 3,3 3,5 3,8 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,8 10,1 10,3 10,5 10,7 10,9 11,1 11,3 11,5 11,8 12,0 12,4 13,3 mi n 1,0 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,9 300 km/h 280

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Tfz. GEC.TGV-A25; 300 km/h; Last=0 t; Länge=238 m; theor. Energiebedarf: 1291 kWh Brh=200 %; Brs=R; Zuschlag linear=3 %; Lastzuschlag=0 % mittl. Energiebedarf: 25,8 Wh/m stat 1 01 km 02 km 03 km 04 km 05 km 06 km 07 km 08 km 09 km 10 km 11 km 12 km 13 km 14 km 15 km 16 km 17 km 18 km 19 km 20 km 21 km 22 km 23 km 24 km 25 km 26 km 27 km 28 km 29 km 30 km 31 km 32 km 33 km 34 km 35 km 36 km 37 km 38 km 39 km 40 km 41 km 42 km 43 km 44 km 45 km 46 km 47 km 48 km 49 km stat 2 0,0 1,0 1,5 1,9 2,2 2,5 2,8 3,0 3,3 3,5 3,8 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,5 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,7 9,9 10,1 10,3 10,5 10,7 10,9 11,1 11,3 11,5 11,7 12,0 12,4 13,3 min 1,0 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,9 300 km/h 280

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Tfz. GEC.TGV-A25; 300 km/h; Last=0 t; Länge=238 m; theor. Energiebedarf: 1557 kWh Brh=200 %; Brs=R; Zuschlag linear=3 %; Lastzuschlag=0 % mittl. Energiebedarf: 31,1 Wh/m stat 1 stat 01 km 02 km 03 km 04 km 05 km 06 km 07 km 08 km 09 km 10 km 11 km 12 km 13 km 14 km 15 km 16 km 17 km 18 km 19 km 20 km 21 km 22 km 23 km 24 km 25 km 26 km 27 km 28 km 29 km 30 km 31 km 32 km 33 km 34 km 35 km 36 km 37 km 38 km 39 km 40 km 41 km 42 km 43 km 44 km 45 km 46 km 47 km 48 km 49 km 2 stat 0,0 1,1 1,6 2,1 2,4 2,8 3,1 3,4 3,7 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,8 5,0 5,3 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,8 9,0 9,3 9,5 9,7 9,9 10,1 10,4 10,6 10,8 11,0 11,2 11,4 11,6 11,8 12,0 12,2 12,4 12,7 13,0 13,3 14,2 min 1,1 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,9 300 km/h 280

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440 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 0 Figure 51: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 1.25 % gradient in the start zone The speed/distance charts show that route gradients in the TSI limit range can lead to clear drops in speed. In the case of a route gradient of 1.25 % in the start zone, it is hardly possible to reach the maximum speed. In addition to the main alignment parameters, a number of alignment rules must be met with regard to transition curve, minimum lengths of the route elements, point geometry, transition from one gradient to another etc.

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Almost every railway company has established its own rules for these alignment elements. In addition to the above-mentioned main alignment parameters, the following alignment elements have been taken into consideration for the analysis matrix:

► Length of transition curve (L) Different types of calculation have been used in the standards to determine length of the the transition curve. The limit values are between L = 5.5 * V * D / 1’000 (rate of rise = 50 mm/s) ENV L = 6.0 * V * D / 1’000 (rate of rise = 46 mm/s) JBV / DB AG (max.) L = 10.0 * V * D / 1’000 (rate of rise = 28 mm/s) DB AG / ÖBB / JBV (reg)

► Length of alignment elements - straights and curve – (Li) The limit values are between 0.40 * V DB AG 0.50 * V ENV (max.) / JBV 0.70 * V ÖBB / ENV (rec)

► Radius of vertical curve (Rv) The limit values are between 0.35 * V² ENV 0.40 * V² JBV / DB AG 0.60 * V² ÖBB

1.4.2.2.2 Limits to alignment parameters for tilting trains In the TSI there are no special alignment parameters or exceptions to limit values for tilting trains. In the ENV 13803 the following limit values for cant and cant excess are described according to an assessment of the current rules of the various railway organisations. Maximum cant: 150 to 160 mm Maximum cant deficiency: 275 to 300 mm On the basis of the above-mentioned example, the possible speed in a curve of 1’000 m is investigated with different limit values.

Table 37: Possible speeds in curves R = 1’000 m

D (mm) I (mm) R (m) V (km/h) 150 275 1’000 189.8 160 275 1’000 192.0 150 300 1’000 195.3 160 300 1’000 197.4 Limits of alignmenment parameters for R = 1’000 m for conventionnel train operation is shown in Table 33 and Table 34. The speed of 140 or max. 160 km/h for conventional trains at R = 1’000 m can be increased for tilting trains up to 190 km/h.

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For the length of transition curves (L) it should be aimed to design L = 10.0 * V * D / 1’000. A maximum threshold of L = 6.0 * V * D / 1’000 should only be used for straight ramps. In the case of these large increases in speed it must be remembered, however, that the centrifugal forces, e.g. for an increase in speed from 140 km/h to 190 km/h (36 %) in a curve of 1’000 m, increase by approx. 84 %. To prevent the maximum total loads on the superstructure exceeding the loads from conventional operation, the axle loads of the tilting trains should be limited to 160kN. Tilting trains are operated today for maximum curve speeds of 200 km/h up to 210 km/h (e.g. Italy and Norway). In the case of a maximum rail cant of 150 mm and a maximum cant deficiency of 275 mm, a speed of 230 km/h can be reached in a radius of 1’465 m. For conventional trains it is possible to travel along this radius at approx. 185 km/h with a cant deficiency of 130 mm. A freight train travelling at 80 km/h would have a cant excess of 98 mm.

1.4.2.3 Analysis matrix

1.4.2.3.1 Methodology of the analysis The descriptions of the alignment parameters indicate that a route study with alignment parameters in the TSI limit range can lead to considerable savings in costs. However, the cost savings are obtained at the expense of operational performance, ride quality and load on the superstructure. An analysis of the above-mentioned alignment elements for all variants in a table does not produce a clear result because of the many combinations. The limit values of the alignment parameters are assessed individually below for the different variants according to their effect on alignment, taking into consideration the superstructure load and the ride quality. The examples are explained with reference to the alignment parameters “cant deficiency (I)“ and “cant (D)“.

► Variant 1 In the speed range exceeding 250 km/h the cant excess is limited to between 0 and 80 mm. In the case of a cant deficiency I=0 the maximum ride quality and the lowest load on the superstructure result from the compensated cant (no horizontal forces). For the alignment, however, even with large cants I=0, a rigid system results with extremely large radii as a result of R = 11.8 * V² / D max.

► Variant 2 For the speed range up to 250 km/h a maximum cant excess of 165 mm is permitted. In the case of a cant excess of 165 mm the maximum limits are used for the uncompensated lateral acceleration which lead to the maximum horizontal forces on the passengers and on the superstructure. For the alignment, high speeds result with minimum possible radii (R min = 11.8 *V² / I max + D max) in combination with the maximum permissible cant.

► Variant 3 For mixed traffic, limits are set for the cant and cant excess which must simultaneously meet the requirements for slow freight and high speed passenger services. These have advantages for comfort criteria and superstructure load, but have a negative effect on the alignment. Taking 160 km/h as an example, the limit values for the minimum possible track radii are calculated as follows: • V = 160 km/h, D = 180mm, I = 0 mm, R = 1’678 m • V = 160 km/h, D = 180mm, I = 80 mm, R = 1’162 m

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• V = 160 km/h, D = 180mm, I = 165 mm, R = 876 m • V = 160 km/h, D = 150 mm, I = 130 mm, R = 1’079 m

Variant 1: Pure high speed tracks 250 < v < 350

Figure 52: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 1 Variant 2: High speed tracks with regional passenger service 160 < v < 250

Figure 53: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 2

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Variant 3: New line for mixed passenger and freight traffic v < 160 km/h

Figure 54: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 3

1.4.2.3.2 Interaction between alignment parameters and scenarios In the course of the study the four scenarios were developed while the analysis of the alignment parameters was coupled to the three defined variants. Therefore the four scenarios and the variants of the alignment have to be connected: • Scenario A: Further use of the existing track at v < 160 km/h • Scenario B: Minor adaptation of the existing track for speeds up to 200 km/h • Scenario C: Expansion of the existing track for speeds of 200 - 250 km/h • Scenario D: New line for speeds of 250 - 350 km/h. Since it is very difficult to combine the operation of freight and high speed services, variant 1 would equate to scenario D. With respect to the above-mentioned criteria, variant 2 should be used for scenario C. Variant 3 apply to scenarios A and B.

1.4.2.3.3 Explanation of the results It can be seen in the diagrams that the maximum alignment advantages result in variant 2. In pure high speed services with speeds of > 250 km/h the route study is characterised by a markedly reduced cant deficiency. In mixed traffic the cant, making simultaneous allowance for cant excess for the slow freight service, the cant deficiency and in particular the route gradient set the limits for the railway layout. The limit values for the element lengths of straight tracks and curves are practically pure comfort criteria. In designing the transition curves the short element lengths lead to considerable advantages in the alignment particularly in the case of reverse curves (S curves).

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The limits for the route gradient are of great importance for the efficiency of the line. To summarise it must be said that for high speed trains with limitation of the alignment parameters as seen from a travel-dynamic point of view a layout in a terrain posing high topographical demands is only possible with a number of way structures. Given that the “high speed level“ is limited to 200 - 250 km/h it is possible to design a technically and economically balanced railway layout with the maximum permissible alignment parameters for radii in excess of approx. 2’000 m. However, the use of extreme cants excludes mixed traffic (passenger and freight services). An overview of the different main parameters in combination with the scenarios A-D and their concerns to tilting and non tilting train operation is shown in Annex 4.

1.4.2.4 Effects of alignment parameters on structures, safety and control equipment Existing technical standards include in part exclusion criteria for the construction of bridges in curves, changes in gradient/ vertical radii on bridges etc. It was necessary to adapt the layout of the railway line to the limits of the building construction. On the basis of the standard/ possible bridge constructions today, the buildings can be largely adapted to the layout of the railway line. Regardless of this, the rail layout should make allowance for basic requirements such as gradients in tunnels with respect to safety and economic viability. Planning parameters for inter-track spacing and point geometry/ point arrangement are largely dependent on speed and widely influenced by tunnel and bridge constructions. In stations, allowance must be made for minimum radii and maximum track gradients when designing platforms as well as for locations and visibility of signalling systems. With regard to the definition of the railway layout parameters for alignment, these planning details are still neglected. Details of the planning fundamentals should be established in the next planning steps.

1.4.2.5 Recommendations regarding the appropriate alignment parameters in relation to scenarios and conventional / tilting train operation The explanations and examples of alignment parameters described above illustrate the alignment limits and their effects on the travel quality and load on the track superstructure. The experience gained from planning projects shows that the starting point for determining the railway layout is often the calculation of the limit radii and thus the design of the route. It is therefore advisable to define alignment parameters that permit a “balanced layout“ and only in extreme cases make provision for the use of limit values. The example below illustrates the different characteristics for a curve designed for travelling at 200 km/h.

Table 38: Illustration of different characteristics for curves at 200 km/h

R (m) D (mm) I (mm) alpha (deg) lc (m) Delta lc (m) re (m) Delta re (m) 1’400 180 157 10 460 7 1’400 20 704 23 1’400 30 949 51 1’400 40 1’193 91 1’400 50 1’437 146 1’600 150 145 10 459 -1 7 0 1’600 20 738 34 26 3

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R (m) D (mm) I (mm) alpha (deg) lc (m) Delta lc (m) re (m) Delta re (m) 1’600 30 1’017 69 57 6 1’600 40 1’296 104 104 13 1’600 50 1’576 138 166 21 1’900 150 98 10 511 51 8 1 1’900 20 843 138 30 7 1’900 30 1’174 226 68 17 1’900 40 1’506 313 123 32 1’900 50 1’837 400 197 54 2’100 130 95 10 522 62 9 2 2’100 20 889 184 33 10 2’100 30 1’255 306 75 24 2’100 40 1’621 428 135 44 2’100 50 1’988 551 218 75

Alpha = Change of direction (Degrees); lc = Length of curve (circular curve and transition curves); re = Retraction of tangent intersection to curve; Delta lc / re = Difference of length or retraction in relation to Radius 1’400m In the diagrams below the radii are shown to a scale of 1:5’000 from the table for change of direction of 20, 30 and 40 degrees. Even to this scale which is very detailed for preliminary planning it is hardly possible to show axle shifts for small changes of direction.

Figure 55: Radii to a scale of 1:5’000 from the table for change of direction of 20, 30 and 40 degrees It can be seen from the example that an alignment with curves exceeding the limit radii and clearly more comfortable alignment parameters with small changes of direction only leads to

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 136 of (270) relatively small changes of position. In a preliminary plan for the layout of the railway line to a scale of 1: 25’000 it is almost impossible to view position changes of less than 25 m. The differences in length of the curves are admittedly clear but inevitably lead to a “curved” layout in the alignment. Since the preliminary plan normally consists in defining the layout of the railway line for the subsequent planning phases and is fundamentally used in the further phases it is advisable to work initially with “comfortable parameters“ and first use higher values at the detailed planning stage for route obstacle solutions. Taking all the above explanations into consideration, limit values for the alignment parameters are recommended below. Use of the limit values in brackets is left to the planner’s discretion but they should be used for investigating route obstacles starting at the project planning stage.

► Conventional – non tilting – Trains

V = Speed (km/h); D = Cant (mm); E = Cant excess (mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm); L = Length of transition curve (m); Li = Length of alignment elements - straight and curves - (m); G = Gradient (%); Rv = Radius of vertical curve (m) Figure 56: Recommendation of alignment parameters for conventional (non tilting) trains

► Tilting Trains

Not recomm.

V = Speed (km/h); D = Cant (mm); E = Cant excess (mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm); L = Length of transition curve (m); Li = Length of alignment elements - straight and curves - (m); G = Gradient (%); Rv = Radius of vertical curve (m);

Figure 57: Recommendation of alignment parameters for tilting trains

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1.4.3 Infrastructure Concepts - Case Studies tilting train

1.4.3.1 Scope and objective of the survey Objective of the tilting train case studies is to gain an overview of the worldwide use of tilting trains which could be relevant for the decision of future High Speed Rail development in Norway. A basis of themes concerning the use of tilting trains in the categories of infrastructure, operation, vehicles and economics should be covered. Therefore the countries with the most important tilting train operation have been studied and technical as well as strategic data was collected. This is done by literature studies and most important by direct interviews with railway experts of each country. The interviews were held in the form of semi structured interviews, taking into account the expertise of each interviewed. The interviews were carried out as face-to-face or telephone interviews. The questionnaire was elaborated with support of the whole project team. Thus a broad basis of competence was given. The main topics of the questionnaire have been • Infrastructure • Rolling Stock • Background Information Before the interviews started the questionnaire was cleared with Jernbaneverket. During the interviews some points emerged to be difficult: Cost-benefit analyses on the use of tilting trains are rare and normally not accessible to the study. This applies to wear and maintenance cost too. The available data in literature respectively given by interview partners about the economical benefits of introducing tilting trains instead of re-location of a line are very poor. Often these comparative assessments do not exist or are for internal company use only. The information has been collected amongst others in interviews with the following organisations:

► : • VR Group Ltd/VR Engineering Head of division and Oy Ltd • Pöyry Finland Railway department

► Germany: • DB Competence centre tilting trains • DB Netz Infrastructure Planning

► Great Britain: • Interfleet Technology Railway department

► Italy: • FS Rete Ferroviaria Italiana in combination with FS

► Norway: • JBV Passenger traffic (Persontrafikk)

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• National Rail Administration of Norway, Planning and Development (JBV, Plan og utvikling) • JBV Passenger traffic, planning and route plans (Persontog Plan)

► Portugal: • CP-Rolling stock • REFER Communications department (Infrastructure company)

► Spain: • ADIF (Infrastructure Company) and Ineco (Infrastructure planning department) in combination with Renfe Division Rolling Stock

► Sweden: • SJ AB Division Rolling Stock and Division Business Development • Banverket

► Switzerland: • SBB Infrastructure Department for infrastructure planning and interoperability • SBB Passenger traffic Department for Rolling stock

► USA: • Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre (Part of US Ministry of Transportation; Planning and Research Centre for Railway Systems in USA) in combination with

1.4.3.2 Tilting train concepts The way tilting train operation has developed is country specific. This results in different technical, operational and infrastructural solutions. The chapter gives an overview on the main tilting train trends to provide a clearer understanding of the following national descriptions.

1.4.3.2.1 Use of tilting trains The use of tilting trains is a relatively new kind of railway operation. When introduced the railway network was already well developed in most countries but often had the drawback that it was designed for lower speeds than with current rolling stock achievable. Three main technical reasons can be found for the introduction of tilting trains: • Increased speed • Increased passenger comfort • Reduction of infrastructure cost on new lines In most countries the reason for the start of tilting train operation was to increase speed on existing (old) lines with preferably low infrastructure adaptations. Sometimes additionally a gain of passenger comfort is also welcome. The third point “Reduction of infrastructure cost on new lines” is imaginable if new lines are planned in difficult terrain. At the same design velocity the alignment parameters of a tilting train track allow narrower curves and thus a better adaption to the landscape than conventional alignment parameters.

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1.4.3.2.1.1 Increased speed Tilting of trains gives the only possibility of increasing speed on existing lines with narrow curves without expensive re-alignment of the track. The of trains is normally bound to the passenger comfort criterion which limits the maximal lateral forces on a passenger. The realizable gain of travel time depends on multiple points in the fields of infrastructure, type of train and operation. For example: • The infrastructure should have curves with adequate radiuses. This means radiuses in a similar range and of notable number. The radius should be narrow enough to allow higher speeds than for conventional trains. Furthermore the allowed lateral forces have influence on the gain of travel time. • The infrastructure should be of good quality to meet the higher lateral forces. Discontinuities in curves like turnouts or level crossings should be avoided. • Depending on the tilting system of the train different tilting angles can be realized. • The reliability of the tilting system (and the whole tilting train) should be high to avoid delays due to failures in the tilting system. • The higher speed of tilting trains can cause operational problems due to higher speed differences between the trains. This can cause capacity problems. For these reasons the gain of travel time with tilting trains can not be given in general. In some special cases reductions up to 30 % can be reached

1.4.3.2.1.2 Increased comfort Another possibility to use tilting trains is to increase the passenger comfort while the train rounds a curve due to reduced lateral accelerations. This type of tilting is sometimes used in sleeping cars. Deutsche Bahn used it for example in their passive tilted “DB-Nachtzug”, a Talgo based trainset used between 1994 and 2009. Often tilting trains have a speed limit up to which they can use tilting for increased speed. In Germany and Switzerland for example this limit is 160 km/h. Often these limits are bound to the capabilities of signalling systems. Beyond the limits a system could be needed for example and it would not be efficient to adapt such a system to tilting trains. In these cases tilting is used at higher speed too but only for comfort reasons.

1.4.3.2.2 Rolling stock During the last decades mainly two types of tilting systems have been implemented, a third is in development. 1. Active tilting 2. Passive tilting 3. Wako (in development) The active tilting system uses electromechanical or hydraulic systems to tilt the car body (see Figure 58). Most trains in use with this system have tilting angles up to 8°. Active tilting needs control equipment to operate the tilting system. Compared to the other tilting systems this system can achieve the highest gain of speed but is also technical ambitious.

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Figure 58: Active tilting system type Pendolino27 Passive tilting uses the lateral forces when running through a curve to tilt the body by centrifugal forces (see Figure 59). The most common trains of this type are the “Talgo” trains. The tilting angle normally can not exceed 3.5°. This leads to a smaller realizable gain of speed compared to active systems

Figure 59: Passive tilting system type Talgo28 The third system is the Wako-System which is currently under development (see Figure 60). This system tries to compensate the natural roll movement of the car body, integrated into the secondary suspension. It is integrated within the bogie and independent of the body structure. The first operator will be the SBB in Switzerland. “Wako” is an abbreviation for the German “Wankkompensation” which means compensation of the roll movement.

27 Source Alstom. 28 Source Talgo.

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Figure 60: Wako tilting system/bogie29

1.4.3.2.3 Infrastructure Tilting trains can be used for different infrastructure strategies. • Speed optimization on existing lines without expensive infrastructure cost • Cost reduction on new built lines due to better adaption at the landscape (narrower curves at same speed) • To achieve travel time goals on existing lines eventually with selective alignment upgrades. Important to the benefits of tilting train operation is the configuration of alignment parameters for tilting trains. On track level the allowed lateral acceleration can limit the use of tilting operation. Another restriction can be “discontinuities”. These are elements within the track which do not allow increased speed compared to conventional trains. Examples are turnouts or level crossings. These discontinuities only exist in some countries. In the USA for example they do not lead to speed reductions. Maintenance of the track is normally increased when tilting trains are introduced. The higher lateral forces on the track need a good quality of position and level of the track. In some cases this leads to a double number of track inspections. The wear rate can be increased due to tilting train operation.

1.4.3.2.4 Operation If tilting is used for increased speed in most cases the signalling system has to be upgraded. As tilting trains pass signals at higher speed than allowed for conventional trains an exception case has to be implemented or a signalling system has to be installed that is capable to operate with different braking distances. Scheduling of tilting trains can be a problem for two reasons: • Speed differences between the different trains on a line grow. As a result the capacity decreases due to higher gaps necessary between the trains.

29 Source Bombardier.

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• Reliability of the tilting trains can be a problem which gives instability to the overall timetable when tilting trains can not run with (the scheduled) increased speed. This is observed in some cases.

Figure 61: Icy bogie due to winter conditions30 Winter conditions can cause reduced reliability of tilting trains due to iced tilting systems. This can lead to reduced speed or complete train breakdowns.

1.4.3.3 Tilting train information and experience by country In the following the tilting train systems are described per country.

1.4.3.3.1 Finland

1.4.3.3.1.1 General Data The Finish railway infrastructure is relatively wide meshed and has a network length of 5’919 km (2008, destatis). With a population of about 5 million people and a population density of 16 per km the transport demand on the great lines is fairly low. Tilting operation was introduced in 1995 to reduce travel times on the existing railway network without expensive infrastructure reconstruction.

1.4.3.3.1.2 Infrastructure Finland uses the Russian broad gauge with 1’520 mm. The maximum cant is 120 mm (150 mm by permission). The maximum cant deficiency is 105 mm (130 mm on slab track) for conventional trains. For tilting trains the maximum cant deficiency can reach up to 293 mm and a maximum uncompensated lateral acceleration of 1.8 m/s². Track transition curves are mostly clothoides with a minimum length of 30 m or 1 second of travel time. Most of the tracks allow a maximum speed between 120 and 200 km/h for conventional trains and between 120 and 220 km/h for tilting trains. Finland does not have different alignment parameters for the introduction of tilting trains on existing lines nor for the construction of new lines. As superstructure only ballasted track is used in Finland. Most of the Finish railway infrastructure can be used with tilting trains. Important lines with tilting operation are:

30 Source SBB.

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• – • Helsinki – – • Helsinki – Jyväskylä – • Helsinki – – Kajaani The climatic requirements are the same for conventional and tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.1.3 Rolling stock

Table 39: Finnish tilting trains

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] Sm3 18 1995 Fiat 220

The Sm3 is powered electrically and has an active tilting system with tilting angles up to 8°. The operator VR regards the difference in maintenance cost and reliability between conventional and tilting trains as huge. The tilting system needs intensive maintenance and thus higher maintenance cost. By provident repairs in combination with cyclic maintenance the availability rate is nevertheless high. In case of failures in the tilting system the train can continue moving although the tilting system does not work. In these cases the train operates as a conventional train. In Finland it is acknowledged that in these cases the punctuality is lower. The absolute additional maintenance cost compared to conventional trains can not be given but is stated as “remarkable”.

1.4.3.3.1.4 Construction of new lines The Kerava – Lahti line has been constructed for the use of tilting and conventional trains. The alignment parameters have been adapted for that and allow maximum speeds up to 250 km/h. The current strategy for line upgrades is to achieve higher maximum speeds with tilting trains than with conventional trains. The construction of new lines designed for tilting trains is not considered as reasonable in Finland. The passenger potential and the geographic obstacles are too low. For the conditions in Norway this is regarded as possible due to the more demanding topography.

1.4.3.3.2 Germany

1.4.3.3.2.1 General Data The German railway infrastructure has a network length of 33’721 km (DB, 2009) and is the largest network in Western Europe. It is affected by most lines constructed 100 years or more ago as well as some new high-speed lines. Despite technical upgrades the speed levels of many older lines are fairly low (80-160 km/h) giving the network a broad variety in maximum speed. This was the reason for some early tests on tilting trains in the 1960s and the later introduction of scheduled tilting trains in 1992. These first tilting trains were fast regional DMUs with the aim of speeding-up the existing older lines with limited alignment parameter using narrow curves. They have a top speed of 160 km/h. The operation of the first high-speed tilting train in Germany began in the year 2000 which can reach up to 230 km/h (class 411 electrically powered).

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This shows that the tilting technology is used for both: High speed as well as standard speed in Germany. In contrast the advantage of increased speed due to tilting is only used up to 160 km/h. On higher speeds the trains are tilted as well, but only for comfort reasons with the same speed limits as conventional trains. The reason for the limited use of increased speed is mainly based on signalling. Currently two main signalling systems are used in Germany: PZB for speeds up to 160 km/h and LZB for speeds up to 300 km/h (ETCS is in introduction but not widespread yet). Only the PZB system was retrofitted with the additional GNT system to allow differing speed limits compared to the conventional speed limit of the track. Thus only the speed limits up to 160 km/h can be influenced. There are no plans to retrofit the LZB-system or to use the tilting technology beyond 160 km/h for increased speed. In the medium term the GNT system will be the only system allowing increased speed for tilting trains until ETCS gets a wide distribution and is adapted for tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.2.2 Infrastructure Germany has the most advanced alignment parameters for tilting trains in terms of lateral acceleration on track level. With non-tilted trains the maximum lateral accelerations are limited to 1.0 m/s² (for passenger comfort reasons). For tilting trains the lateral accelerations are limited to 2.0 m/s². These are the highest lateral accelerations observed worldwide. The maximum cant is 160 mm and the cant deficiency for tilting trains 300 mm. The maximum axle load is 16.0 tons +5%. When tilting operation is introduced on a line normally there are no expensive upgrades. The signalling system has to be adapted. In some cases discontinuities (e.g. turnouts) are replaced and cant ramps are adapted to allow increased speed for tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.2.3 Rolling stock Currently mainly five types of tilting trains are used in Germany. Three of these are regional trains.

Table 40: Tilted regional trains in Germany

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] 610 20 1992 MAN, Siemens 160 tilting: Fiat 611 50 1996 (now Bombardier) 160 612 192 1998 Bombardier 160

All trains are DMUs with active tilting and a tilting angle of about 8°.

Table 41: High speed tilting trains in Germany

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] 411/415 71 1999 MAN, SIEMENS 230 tilting: Alstom 605 20 2001 Siemens, Bombardier 200 tilting: Siemens

Class 411/415 are electrically powered high-speed trains with active tilting. The tilting angle is up to 8°. Class 605 is a diesel powered train with tilting of 8° too.

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The reliability of the German tilting trains is mixed. DB states that most of the problems are not directly bound to the tilting system. Due to problems of and bogies the tilting mechanism is not used for many years in sum. Class 605 is currently operated between and Aarhus, running without tilting on conventional speed. The tilting system of class 605 will not be used in future and there are plans of DB to dismantle the tilting system.

1.4.3.3.2.4 Construction of new lines There are no new lines in Germany that have been aligned and constructed especially for tilting trains, nor are there plans to do so. The use of tilting trains is limited to the speeding up of existing tracks with as little infrastructure investments as possible. However there are a few small investments in the upgrade of turnouts if this is necessary and economically justifiable.

1.4.3.3.3 Great Britain

1.4.3.3.3.1 General Data The British railway infrastructure has a network length of 16’321 km (2008, destatis). The railway system is affected by its liberalization and a spread market of railway companies. Tilting train operation was introduced to reduce journey time on the between London to Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow, without the need for expensive re-building of infrastructure. This route has many horizontal curves that would be very difficult and prohibitively expensive to straighten.

1.4.3.3.3.2 Infrastructure There is no mandatory limit on the length of a curve, but it is recommended that, for both tilting trains and conventional trains, it is not normally of a length equal to less than 2 seconds travelling time at maximum speed. The transition curve should normally be of the clothoid form, but the cubic parabola is acceptable. Many existing transitions on the routes used by tilting trains are of this form. Cant must increase (or decrease) linearly with distance along the transition. These rules apply equally to routes used by conventional trains; the transition design must be able to cater for such trains - which include a tilting train with the tilt mode isolated. Where a transition curve is provided, the normal minimum length is 30 m, but 25 m is permitted in exceptional conditions. Tilting trains are permitted to operate in "tilt" mode when taking the diverging route at a turnout, but must conform to the same speed as conventional trains. There are three rates quoted for the rate of change of cant deficiency, subject to increasingly onerous conditions, including, for the highest rate, a risk assessment and determination of ameliorating mitigation. The normal design value is 35 mm/s, the maximum design value is 110 mm/s and the exceptional design value is 150 mm/s. Conventional trains are limited to 35 mm/s, 55 mm/s and 70 mm/s respectively. The maximum speed is 125 mph (~200 km/h). This is the maximum permitted by current standards in Great Britain for lineside signals and applies to both tilting trains in "tilt" mode and conventional trains. Any greater speed would require cab signalling. The maintenance cost of the track may rise when introducing tilting train operation due to the higher speed: Where conventional trains run at a speed of "x"km/h, and tilting trains in "tilt" mode may run at "x+y"km/h, the track maintenance standards are those applying to "x+y"km/h. If the increase form "x"km/h to "x+y"km/h means that the track remains in the same maintenance speed band group, there is no change in maintenance parameters. However, for the routes where tilting trains run in "tilt" mode, there is an additional requirement to ensure that

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 146 of (270) the track is maintained to the Absolute Track Geometry design, and special rules apply to deliver this. There was a significant increase in service frequency and local speeds when tilting trains were introduced. These were mainly the reasons rather than operation in "tilt" mode that led to a change in inspection practice. It changed to more night-time and possession inspection which is more expensive than the previous day-time inspections under traffic. At the same time, the Absolute Geometry system, NR/L3/RK/0030, was introduced. There were significant costs in establishing the base, but much of that would have been necessary for monumenting any new track design. As the track machines used are fitted with appropriate software, they can survey, design and implement tamping that returns the track to its defined design position without much additional cost. The signalling system was upgraded with the Tilt Authorisation & Speed Supervision that enables trains to tilt if the necessary conditions are met. In addition, the train is provided with an active and safety critical tilt management system. Special lineside indicators are provided to remind drivers where trains fitted with a working TASS system can operate at higher speeds. Different types of tilting trains may be authorised to travel at different speeds. No British tilting trains currently operate in "tilt" mode over single lines.

1.4.3.3.3.3 Rolling stock Tilting trains are only operated by the operator “Virgin”

Table 42: Tilting trains currently in use in Great Britain

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] 390 53 2002 Alstom / Fiat 225 (registration) 200 (in operation)

The trains are based on the “APT” () developed in Great Britain in the 1970s and on the Italian Pendolino from Fiat. They are active tilted with electro mechanic tilt instead of hydraulic tilt of most other Pendolino-based trains. Tilting rolling stock have additional on-board equipment (to enable them to tilt), which equates to about a 20 % increase in mass (compared to non-tilt). The risk of reducing train reliability (due to more equipment) can be offset by increased equipment reliability requirements and use of degraded modes. Train reliability can be affected by many things and it would be difficult to pinpoint the exact reliability impact of tilt equipment fitted to a tilting train compared to a non- tilting train. Train reliability reported in January 2009 indicates that reliability of type tilting and non-tilting trains is broadly similar. There is limited available data on the relative maintenance costs for tilting versus non-tilting trains. Maintenance costs for tilting trains are typically around 5 %-10 % greater than non-tilting trains due to maintenance required for the additional tilting equipment and the need for dedicated test equipment, usually on a dedicated track in the maintenance depot. Regarding climatic condition tilting trains are treated in the same way as any other train without a miniature snow plough.

1.4.3.3.3.4 Construction of new lines Tilting trains have been introduced to reduce travel time without expensive infrastructure reconstruction. There are no new lines that have been designed with alignment parameters for tilting trains. HS2, the government organisation developing the case for a new north-south high speed line in GB has established that the costs for building a 300 kph or greater dedicated high speed railway are only a marginal increase compared to those for a new 200 kph railway. A large proportion of costs relate civil works to establish the line of route, track bed, which are broadly the same irrespective of speed.

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The key consideration regarding new built lines for tilting trains is value for money across the lifecycle for the new railway and the determining factors are what is the topography and line of route, required end-end journey time and what are the objectives for the future of the new railway. A new line should only be built for tilting operation if the costs to provide a straighter higher speed railway are prohibitively expensive. It will be necessary to compare and make an informed decision on construction costs and future operating costs for a railway with many curves that requires tilt to achieve the required end-end journey time and a straighter higher speed railway.

1.4.3.3.4 Italy

1.4.3.3.4.1 General Data The Italian railway infrastructure has a network length of 16’862 km (2008, destatis). The network consists of slow regional lines up to high-speed lines with speeds to 300 km/h. Italy has a long history in the use of tilting trains. The tests with the beginning of the 1970s led to an important development of tilting trains. The Fiat tilting trains (now part of Alstom) were an important basis for active tilting trains used all over the world. Tilting trains in Italy have always been long distance trains for higher speeds, some up to 250 km/h. They are all active tilting trains with maximum tilting angles about 8°. Tilting is used up to 200 km/h for increased speed. At higher speeds tilting is used for comfort reasons.

1.4.3.3.4.2 Infrastructure Italy did not construct new lines especially for tilting trains, nor are there plans to do so. What has been done is to refit existing lines from class C with a non compensated lateral acceleration of 1.0 m/s² to class P with a maximum non-compensated lateral acceleration of 1.8 m/s². The maximum cant is 160 mm. The maximum cant deficiency on track level is 275 mm. The main lines with tilting train operation in Italy are: • Transversal Turin – Milan – – , • Milan – Bologna – Florence – Rome, • Dorsal tirrenica (in the south of Italy between Salerno and Reggio Calabria), • Dorsal adriatica (southern north-east coast of Italy from to Otranto), • Transversal Caserta – Foggia – Bari, • Transversal Rome – Ancona, • Other minor lines.

1.4.3.3.4.3 Rolling stock Currently four types of tilting trains are operated by the Italian operator FS.

Table 43: Tilting trains currently in use in Italy

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] ETR 460 10 1994 Fiat 250 ETR 485 15 2005 Fiat / Alstom 250 ETR 600 12 2008 Alstom 250 ETR 610 14 2008 Alstom 250

All the tilting trains currently in operation in Italy are electrically powered long distance trains with a top speed of 250 km/h.

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The reliability is stated as “very good success for the trains in use since the 1990s”. This led to a higher realizable gain in the scheduled travel times.

1.4.3.3.4.4 Construction of new lines The construction of new lines is not specially addressed.

1.4.3.3.5 Norway

1.4.3.3.5.1 General Data The Norwegian railway infrastructure is affected by a mountainous terrain, sparse population and has a network length of 4’114 km (2009, UIC). The reason for the introduction of tilting operation was the desire to reduce travel time and increase comfort, which could result in increased demand and better the competitive advantage for NSB. Further goals where attracting business people and an increased and regular service. First tests of the tilting technology with the Swedish X2000 were conducted in autumn 1996. The regular operation with the class 73 was started in 1999. In summer 2000 a class 73 derailed at low speed (about 30 km/h in a curce R = 190 m) due to a broken axle at Nelaug station. Even if not caused by the tilting mechanism this created great uncertainty with respect to tilting trains. Today the tilting trains use the same speed as conventional trains. The tilting trains have permission to use the higher speed but due to passenger comfort (seasickness) NSB C to use the same speed as conventional trains.

1.4.3.3.5.2 Infrastructure The alignment parameters for tilting trains have been developed in the last years for safety and cost reasons. The maximum cant deficiency for tilting trains was decreased from the original value of 280 mm due to the shaft fracture in 2000. This, of course, reduced the possible gain of travel time. The travel time through different alignment elements (circles and straight lines) should be at least one second. It turned out later that the original value of two seconds was too expensive due to the necessary alignment upgrades. Level crossings have to be adapted as a result of higher speed (visibility as well as safety systems) or are partly closed. The signalling system had to be adapted to the higher maximum speed, e.g. by repositioning. The lines Sørlandsbanen and Dovrebanen do still have the so called blue speed signs, allowing higher speeds for tilting trains. This advantage will only be used when the trains are delayed, but on a regular basis the trains only run at standard speeds. The tilting technology is still being used for comfort reasons. Winter problems related to the tilting equipment are not known.

1.4.3.3.5.3 Rolling stock To test the tilting technology, test operation of the Swedish X2000 on Sørlansbanen were conducted in autumn 1996. The testing was carried without major problems but caused a number of motion sickness among passengers. This was regarded as unproblematic.

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Table 44: Tilting trains in Norway

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] 73 A 16 1999 Adtranz (now Bombardier) 210 73 B 6 2002 Bombardier 210 93 15 2000 Bombardier 140

The two classes of tilting trains in Norway have only minimal technical differences. Class 73 B was ordered a few years after class 73 A and has e.g. some additional seats. Both trains are electrically powered trains with active tilting. Class 93 is a DMU with a tilting angle of max 5°. Problems occurred when running double sets of tilting trains in certain higher speeds, due to mechanical fluctuations in the catenary. Having the tilting train technology limited to only single sets, the NSB found it better to stay with a schedule based on normal train speeds. There are no objections to resuming active use of the tilting trains. This could result in reduced travel time, which may lead to increased demand. NSB's new trainsets, FLIRT will be delivered in spring 2011 and put into operation/ normal traffic in January 2012. It was not considered to integrate tilting mechanisms in these train sets. The trains were upgraded to run 200 km/h, and have a good acceleration. Trains are not seen as a high end concept, and cannot compete with aircraft on travel time due to relatively low line speed. It is, however, important to take on the competition offered by bus services with approximately the same travelling time. Tilting trains must therefore be a cheap alternative. The additional costs of tilting trains are estimated based on a rough assessment of class 73 with 15-20 % compared to conventional trains.

1.4.3.3.5.4 Construction of new lines The strategy for planning and construction of new lines are under consideration. Up to now no new lines with special tilting train alignment parameters have been built. If this is reasonable is one question of the current project HSR Norge. In the future a clear route model will have to be worked out before a possible introduction of tilting. In the Intercity Triangle (Oslo-Skien, Oslo-Lillehammer, Oslo-Halden) it will be mixed traffic, therefore it is not easy to fully make use of the speed potential in this area. The route model must therefore take this into account (also, the same principles for high-speed train apply). Outside the Intercity Triangle (Lillehammer, Skien, Halden) the ability to take out the speed potential is much greater.

1.4.3.3.6 Portugal

1.4.3.3.6.1 General Data The Portuguese railway infrastructure has a network length of 2’842 km with different gauges (2008, destatis). The railway network is relatively wide meshed. The tilting trains are used on the Iberian gauge with 1’668 mm. The motivation for the introduction of tilting trains was to increase speed without construction of new lines or intensive upgrade works. For this reason CP ordered the Alfa Pendular at Fiat and took up service in 1999.

1.4.3.3.6.2 Infrastructure The maximum cant on the Iberian gauge is 180 mm (this corresponds to about 155 mm in the standard gauge). The maximum lateral acceleration is 1.0 m/s² on passenger level as well as on

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 150 of (270) track level for conventional trains. For tilting trains the maximum lateral acceleration on track level is 1.8 m/s². Tilting is used on the following lines: • – Faro (600 km) • – Oporto (336 km)

1.4.3.3.6.3 Rolling stock The only tilting train in Portugal is the Alfa Pendular.

Table 45: Tilting trains in Portugal

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] 4000 10 1999 Fiat / Adtranz 220 (Alfa (now Alstom and Pendular) Bombardier)

The tilting system is based on the Italian Fiat tilting technology with active tilting and tilting angles up to 8°. Tilting is used for speeds between 65 km/h and 220 km/h. The reliability is relatively high: The trains have 6 breakdowns on 1 million km on average. The contribution of the tilting mechanism for this figure is 13 %. CP rates these figures as good according to their standards.

1.4.3.3.6.4 Construction of new lines Up to now tilting is only used on existing lines and there are no new built lines especially for tilting trains in Portugal. On the other hand the Alfa Pendular is currently the only high speed train in Portugal. The separation between high-speed and tilting effects is therefore not easy. The currently planned new lines (Lisbon – ; Lisbon – Madrid) will not be designed with special tilting train parameters.

1.4.3.3.7 Spain

1.4.3.3.7.1 General Data The Spanish railway infrastructure has a network length of 15’046 km (2008, destatis) with different gauges. Most parts use the Iberian gauge of 1’668 mm whereas a new built high-speed network which has been built in the last 20 years uses standard gauge. Some parts of the network mainly in the north-west parts of Spain use the metre gauge. The tilting system in Spain is different to most other countries using tilting trains. The Spanish system is passive tilted without any active steering mechanism. The lateral forces in curves lead to a tilting of the car body. The only manufacturer of this special system is the Spanish company Patentes Talgo S.L.

1.4.3.3.7.2 Infrastructure The alignment parameters in Spain are varying on the gauge used.

Table 46: Cant and maximum lateral accelerations in Spain

Gauge / type of line Normal cant Maximum cant Max. lateral acceleration for passenger Standard gauge / HSR 350 km/h 140 mm 160 mm 0.39 m/s² Standard gauge / HSR 300 km/h 140 mm 160 mm 0.46 m/s² Iberian gauge / 160 – 200 km/h 160 mm 180 mm 0.65 m/s² (0.9 m/s² extreme) Metre gauge 110 mm

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The maximum lateral acceleration on track level is 1.5 m/s² for tilting trains. On the Iberian gauge lines tilting is used up to 160 km/h for increased speed; at lower speeds for comfort reasons.

1.4.3.3.7.3 Rolling stock The Spanish tilting trains are all of the type talgo pendular with its different variants.

Table 47: Tilting trains in Spain

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] Talgo 4 24 1980 Talgo Talgo 5 6 1981 Talgo Talgo Pendular 200 28 1989 Talgo 200 Talgo 250 (S-130) 45 2007 Talgo / Bombardier 250 Talgo 350 (AVE S- 46 2005 Talgo / Bombardier 350 102)

The passive tilting allows tilting angles up to 3.5°. Compared to active tilting systems this leads normally to a lower gain of travel time. The advantage is a technically easier system with a high reliability. The speed can be increased by approximately 10-20 %. Some of the Talgo trains can change their gauge between standard and Iberian gauge.

1.4.3.3.7.4 Construction of new lines Spain has huge investments in the introduction and extension of their high-speed-railway network. The use of the standard gauge is an important contrast to the residual network. Despite this radical change in planning principles and though Spain has an important use of tilting trains Spain did not built its lines especially for tilting trains nor are there plans to do so. Currently a study in the North of Spain with the Cantabrico railway line of FEVE (Narrow gauge) is conducted where an old metre gauge railway line has to be adapted to develop a maximum speed of 160 km/h. In this case an early proposition is made to retrofit this line for tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.8 Sweden

1.4.3.3.8.1 General Data During the last three decades the Swedish railway infrastructure with a network length of 9’830 km in 2008 (destatis) has been modernized. Especially the main lines have been upgraded with new signalling systems allowing higher speeds. Very important was the introduction of the Swedish X2000 high-speed tilting train in the early 1990s. The aim of the introduction of the high speed tilting train was to create a traffic system that can compete with air transport without building new high speed lines.

1.4.3.3.8.2 Infrastructure In the 1960s Sweden decided to develop rolling stock instead of building new lines. This led to the development of the X2000. The infrastructure was upgraded (e.g. signalling systems) for the higher speed levels but there where no special alignment adaptations for the tilting operation. The effect of tilting operation is a reduced travel time. The current lines with tilting operation are: • Stockholm – Malmö, • Stockholm – Gothenburg,

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• Stockholm – Karlstad, • Stockholm – Sundsvall – Ostersund. Due to the limited number of trainsets and to weak traffic demand on other destinations, the tilting trains are reserved for the above listed destinations. The maximum lateral acceleration is 1.6 m/s² on track level. On passenger level it is 0.65 m/s² for conventional and tilting trains. The maximum cant is 150 mm and the track transition curve is clothoid with a length of

5×= rl The maximum speed is 200 km/h and tilting is used up to 200 km/h. The maintenance costs and efforts are not documented specifically for tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.8.3 Rolling stock The Swedish tilting train is the X2000. It is currently the only tilting train in use.

Table 48: Tilting trains in Sweden

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] X2000 (X2) 40 1990 Bombardier 200

The X2000 has an active hydraulic tilting mechanism which is used between 70 and 200 km/h for increased speed. The tilting angle is between 6° and 8° depending on speed, curve radius and cant. A specific feature of the X2000 is the non tilted motor coaches at the rear end of the train. The driver has a special seat to compensate the increased lateral accelerations. The availability rate compared to conventional trains running 200 km/h like the Bombardier “Regina” trains X50-X55 is lower for the X2000. The reasons are the tilting system and the higher age of the trainsets. Currently the SJ has no open orders for tilting trains and does not plan to buy new tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.8.4 Construction of new lines Sweden did not build new lines especially for tilting trains nor are there plans to do so. Since 1990 some new lines for speeds up to 200 km/h have been built, e.g. the Øresund-Line and the Svealand-Line which are partly operated by the X2000 tilting train. None of them was constructed especially for tilting operation. Another new line is the connecting Stockholm Central Station with the airport Stockholm-Arlanda. The trains used are trains for speeds up to 200 km/h without tilting. This is one example for the Swedish strategy of using tilting trains for higher speeds on existing lines but to construct new lines with alignment parameters based on conventional trains. Strategic decisions for the future use of high speed tilting trains are under consideration. Trains for new lines with speeds higher than 250 km/h will most probably not use tilting technique.

1.4.3.3.9 Switzerland

1.4.3.3.9.1 General Data The Swiss railway operation is highly developed. Its infrastructure has a network length of 3’499 km in standard gauge (2008, destatis) and is one of the most dense networks in the world.

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First operational tilting trains were introduced in 1996 to reduce travel on the North – South corridor between Stuttgart and Mailand. A new type of tilting trains with the “WAKO” called tilting technology is ordered and will be introduced in 2013 (see below).

1.4.3.3.9.2 Infrastructure The min. curve radius for tilting trains (with tilting for higher speed) is 250 m. Other curve parameters depend on the line-specific alignment parameters and are the same for tilting and conventional trains. Track transition curves are the same for tilting and conventional trains. Important is the criteria “torsion”: δ u f ; on new lines this criteria should be limited to 150 mm/s. δ t Maximum cant for tilting and conventional trains is 150 mm normally, 160 mm by SBB limit and 180 mm limited by federal regulation. The maximum track level uncompensated side acceleration is for: • 150 mm for conventional trains, • 275 mm for tilting trains, • 210 mm for Wako. As for the track transition curves the torsion criteria is also important for the cant ramp (for conventional and tilting trains): δ u ; on new lines this criteria should be limited to 90 mm/s. δ t Between two curves should be a length of at least 1 second travel time or 20 meters. The wear of the tracks used for tilting trains is comparable to the wear caused by freight trains.

1.4.3.3.9.3 Rolling stock

Table 49: Tilting trains in Switzerland

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] ETR 470 9 1996 Alstom 200 ICN (RABDe 500) 44 2000 Bombardier 200 ICE-T (DB AG) owned by DB for details see chapter Germany (class 411/415) ETR 610 14 2009 Alstom 250

All tilting trains currently used in Switzerland are active tilted electrical powered trains with tilting angles up to 8°. They use the tilting technology up to 160 km/h for increased speed. Beyond it is used for comfort reasons. There currently no plans to use tilting for increased speed beyond 160 km/h due to higher cost in signalling systems and the lack of lines where this could give significant advantages. Reliability is varying: The most common ICN which serves the national market has a failure rate of the tilting system of 2’000 h MTBF which causes about 4 breakdowns per year. This is a rate which should be improved in future tilting trains.

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An important new development is the planned introduction of the “WAKO” technology to compensate the natural roll movement of the carbody. This new type of tilting systems is planned to be introduced in 2013 by 59 trainsets of the type TWINDEXX from Bombardier.

1.4.3.3.9.4 Construction of new lines Switzerland did not construct new lines dedicated for tilting trains nor are there plans to do so. But there have been important reconstructions of existing lines with special alignment parameters for tilting trains. These lines are the Jura south foot line ( – ) reconstructed at the early 2000s and the line – which is under construction. The goal was to reach a targeted travel time which was needed for the integrated schedule. On the Jura south foot line the cost could be reduced by 50 % through the introduction of tilting trains instead of constructing a new line.

1.4.3.3.10 USA

1.4.3.3.10.1 General Data The American railway infrastructure has a network length of 227’058 km (2008, destatis). It is very different to European railway systems as the fright transport is much more important than passenger transport. Nevertheless some lines with an important passenger train service exist especially at the densely populated Washington – New York – . Tilting was introduced to reduce travel times on existing lines without expensive infrastructure cost. Two tilting trains were introduced: The and the Express (also operated by Amtrak) as the Acela Express is much more important than the Amtrak Cascades the focus is on the Acela.

1.4.3.3.10.2 Infrastructure The infrastructure of the USA normally is optimised for freight trains. This even led to reduced cant when passenger trains lost importance. The track is heavy and allows axle loads up to 39 tons. Between Boston and Washington (Northeast Corridor) is the only line where the Acela is operated. The maximum cant deficiency on the Northeast Corridor is 178 mm for tilting trains (Acela). For conventional trains the maximum cant deficiency is normally 102 mm and at maximum 127 mm. The goal was to achieve a 229 mm maximum cant deficiency which could not be achieved. Track maintenance is increased due to higher quality parameters. Wear is even a bit lowered. The cab signalling was refitted to allow higher speed.

1.4.3.3.10.3 Rolling stock

Table 50: Tilting trains in the USA

Class Number of trainsets Introduction Manufacturer Max Speed [km/h] Acela Express 20 1999 Bombardier / Alstom 240 Cascades 4 1994 Talgo 200

The Acela Express is an active tilted high speed train with maximum tilting angles of 6.5°. Due to envelope restrictions only a smaller tilt angel can be used. The tilting is used up to 240 km/h with 25 tons axle load. The reliability and availability is quiet well. Detailed data to maintenance cost is not available.

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1.4.3.3.10.4 Construction of new lines The USA did not construct new lines especially for tilting trains. Even if there were some early ideas for a tilting train track layout for the Southeast High Speed Rail it is not expected to construct new lines with special alignment parameters for tilting trains.

1.4.3.3.11 Development in further countries

► Japan Japan has a wide use of tilting trains with many different types of tilting trains. Active and passive tilting can be found. In most cases the tilting is controlled by track switches instead of the most commonly used accelerometers.

► Poland wants to introduce tilting train operation. The Ministry of Infrastructure signed a 10-year contract for PKP Intercity to provide long distance train services. The trains will be 20 Pendolino trainsets from Alstom which should reach a top speed of 230 km/h.

► Taiwan Taiwan had introduced tilting train operation in 2007 with six Japanese tilting trains from Marubeni and Hitachi on their east coast line. In January 2011 the Taiwan Railway Administration ordered 17 inter-city tilting trainsets capable of operation at 150 km/h on their 1’067 mm gauge.

1.4.3.4 Manufacturers In the following some tilting train specific information to manufacturers is given.

1.4.3.4.1 Alstom As Alstom acquired the Italian in 2000 they grew to the world leader in tilting technology. Currently the Tiltronix technology used for Pendolino trains allows increased speed up to 250 km/h. The Tiltronix system can be built in two modes: In reactive mode, bends in the track are detected by gyroscopes, which determine their precise angle, and by accelerometers situated on the first bogie of the lead car. The onboard computer ascertains the tilt angle required and transmits an order to each car’s bogie cylinders, timed according to their position and speed of the train. In anticipative mode, the system relies on a database of the line’s parameters. By comparing the data to information received by onboard sensors, the system can pinpoint the train’s exact position on the line at any moment and order the corresponding tilt for the route as it is reached. By reacting quicker at approaching bends, it is less sensitive to track irregularities and so can offer a smoother transition, for greater passenger comfort.

1.4.3.4.2 Bombardier Bombardier is developing (in cooperation with SBB) the Wako technology. They see a high potential in this technology which can possibly exceed the currently limited tilting angles due to the double deck coaches developed for SBB. Another emphasis is set to the reliability which should be increased to a multiple of active tilting trains. Bombardier talks about MTBFs of more than 20’000 h for the tilting system.

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Unique to their technology is the possibility to combine the Wako-bogie with trains from other manufacturers as the tilting system is integrated in the bogie

1.4.3.4.3 Siemens Siemens had developed its own active tilting train bogie and used one version for the German class 605. The Siemens system is up to date and currently offered to clients.

1.4.3.4.4 Talgo Talgo gave some input to the case study. To the question of new high speed lines Talgo remarked: “It is advisable to optimize all the capital investments and number of km of new lines to be constructed. Some parts of older conventional lines could be reused with minor needs for infrastructure improvements. In summary tilting technology helps to lower infrastructure investments even allowing the same travel times as may be achieved without tilting technology on tracks with less curves. We recommend to just have one line (and no separate lines) for high speed, regional and freight operation. This is no contradiction and only if capacity limits are reached a second track (or separate freight tracks) will get necessary.”

1.4.3.5 Conclusions Regarding possible economic effects and the operational benefits of tilting train operation it is very important to regard the overall interrelationship in the specific railway system. This includes infrastructure, rolling stock, operation and economical aspects.

1.4.3.5.1 Infrastructure The case study revealed a wide variety in the use of tilting trains. The studied countries had all well developed railway systems before the introduction of tilting trains. Noticeable is the fact that especially the countries with a low population density and a wide meshed railway network introduced tilting trains to increase the top speed of their railway systems without expensive infrastructure investments. Examples are Finland and Portugal. Another occurrence is tilting as speed-up in the “second level”: A conventional high speed system without tilting trains already exists and has partly its own network. Tilting trains are then introduced to speed up regional and inter-city traffic mainly on existing lines. Example to this is Germany. A wide variation can be found in the alignment parameters observed. Some countries have ambitious limits in the allowed lateral accelerations others less. This could even lead to the curious situation that the lateral acceleration limits in the USA are nearly half of the limits in Germany. It is obvious that for the success of tilting train operation the strong relationship between infrastructure and rolling stock has to be considered. Only if both fit together a high profit of tilting operation can be achieved. This includes the importance of alignment parameters such as cant, cant deficiency and lateral acceleration as well as the layout of the line. For high benefits in travel time the curvature has to be in a capable range for the tilting system. Another limiting factor can be the signalling system. As seen in Switzerland and Germany for example the signalling system can limit the speed range in which tilting trains can operate with increased speed. This has to be considered when travel time savings are estimated.

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1.4.3.5.2 Tilting train rolling stock The reliability of tilting trains is varying. Especially some older active tilting systems have failure rates of less than 2’000 h MTBF and lead to a reduced reliability compared to conventional trains. An important point on the assessment of tilting train reliability is the differentiation between tilting related effects and other effects. The difficulty is the overlapping of tilting technology with ambitious, fast trains. Often it is stated that not the tilting mechanism directly is the problem but the conventional system of the car. At some components like e.g. the axels the assignment of failure to the tilting system or the conventional system is not well defined. This could lead to false estimations about the reliability of the tilting mechanism. Often tilting trains are within the fastest train classes of a country. This may lead to new “conventional” problems with pressure-tight doors for example which could wrongly be assumed as tilting problems.

1.4.3.5.3 Construction of new lines The conclusion for construction of new lines especially for tilting trains can be stated more clearly than for rolling stock. No country constructed a new line with dedicated tilting parameters. Switzerland has chosen a mixed model: They are re-aligning the track at some parts of the line Bern – Lausanne in combination with the introduction of tilting trains. The goal had been to reduce the travel time by 10 minutes. Five minutes can be achieved by the introduction of tilting trains and the other five are generated by as many track re-alignments as necessary. This led to cost savings compared to a more expensive reconstruction without tilting trains. Often it was stated that the construction of new lines should be driven by a lack of capacity. The design of new lines should then be oriented at the operational needs (types of train). Another point is the future suitability: With tilting train alignment parameters the line can only be operated with tilting trains at the design speed. This influences strongly the future use of train types on the whole network. With trains not only running on the tilting lines but also long distances in the conventional network a high number of tilting trains is necessary to operate the tilting line at design speed. In contrast some interviewees stated that demanding topography (e.g. mountainous areas, coastlines) are restrictive conditions for high speed railways. In these cases it should be studied if a special tilting train alignment shows economical advantages.

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1.5 Rolling stock

1.5.1 Summary The work presented in this report is mainly focused on the specific requirements and needs of the Norwegian Railway. An evaluation model has been used to identify potential issues or parameters that might be challenges when combining various kinds of rolling stock with various kinds of potential scenarios. The potential issues are in most cases connected to climate and/or topography but also other parameters have been assessed. These areas must be addressed in the specification phase not only for rolling stock but for the complete railway system. The group has not identified any issues that can be seen as a major obstacle concerning rolling stock for high speed railways in Norway. A large portion of the potential issues identified in this report must be seen in close connection with infrastructure issues. It is vital that the further work is done with not only the rolling stock or only the infrastructure in mind, but to look at the system as one including infrastructure, rolling stock and maintenance.

1.5.2 Objectives of rolling stock assessment The objective of the study is to identify rolling stock technical and safety issues that might be relevant for high speed rail concepts in Norwegian conditions. These issues will be presented in a format so that they can be used in a flexible manner in the specific corridor analysis to be carried out in phase 3 of the project. The study includes the following types of Rolling stock: • Dedicated high speed trains • Tilting trains, and • Other trains using high speed railways (Including High Speed Freight) Specifically the study includes: • Assess the technical requirements and assumptions related to the rolling stock to be used for high speed railways in Norway. • Consider to what extent tilting trains could be appropriate in certain concepts • Review general technical requirements for high speed freight trains • Consider comfort criteria in relation to large sudden pressure changes in trains with passengers through tunnels at speeds over 250 km/h • Map, analyse and evaluate different concepts for rolling stock for the high speed line. • Develop an evaluation model

1.5.3 Definition of concepts For the purposes of this report, the following definitions have been assumed.

1.5.3.1 Dedicated High Speed Trains High speed trains will have a typical maximum speed of greater than 250 km/h when operating on dedicated high speed lines and be capable of operating at 200 km/h or higher when operating on upgraded track.

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The trains will be compliant with the requirements of the High Speed Rolling Stock TSI and will use proven technology and be similar to existing trains already operating around the world. It has been assumed that all train concepts are based on steel wheel on steel rail technology and other concepts such as Maglev have not been considered.

1.5.3.2 Tilting trains Tilting trains achieve reduced journey times by negotiating curves at higher speeds and cant deficiencies than conventional non tilting trains. Passenger comfort is maintained by the use of a powered or non-powered mechanism to incline the vehicle body when negotiating curves. Tilting trains can be used to reduce journey times on both new high speed lines and upgraded lines. The tilting trains in Norway today are running at speeds up to 210 km/h but it is assumed that a new tilting train will potentially run at speed up to 300 km/h and will be compliant with appropriate elements of either the high speed or conventional rolling stock TSI’s. Tilting trains are used in Norway today. Hence an assessment for today’s service is not needed. The use of tilting trains on high speed lines will require an assessment to be undertaken to ensure that the trains are compatible with the infrastructure in areas such as vehicle gauging and lateral track forces. The outcome of these assessments could result in either design changes to the infrastructure or ongoing increased infrastructure maintenance costs.

1.5.3.3 Other trains using high speed railways There may be a requirement for trains other than high speed trains to use the new high speed lines. This report has considers both freight and passenger trains but has not considered infrastructure maintenance machines. It is assumed that the trains will not be designed to the requirements of the High Speed Rolling Stock TSI and will typically operate at speeds lower than 200 km/h. New trains may be built to the requirements of the Conventional Rolling Stock TSI or the Freight Wagon TSI, but an assessment may be required to ensure that the trains are compatible with the new high speed infrastructure. For example, the High Speed Infrastructure TSI permits track cants of up to 180 mm and the assessment would need to make sure that the trains could negotiate these curves in a safe and acceptable manner.

1.5.3.4 Mixed traffic There is no common opinion in Europe if mixed traffic should be used. In Germany most HSL are used with mixed traffic. Spain and France prefer dedicated HSL. In France the high speed trains are allowed to use the conventional lines but the other trains are not allowed to run on the high speed lines. If mixed traffic is to be used the demand for double track and more passing tracks increases to uphold the capacity on the line. The question of the feasibility of running freight trains on a high speed line is not really a question of the rolling stock. For the rolling stock itself it is not identified as a problem related to e.g. availability or any of the technical systems onboard. The issues with running freight trains on high speed lines is more likely to be linked to the overall utilization of capacity of the line and the impact to the line. The freight trains are not running at the same top-speed as the high speed trains and this will obviously generate additional hindrances when planning the service. One option is to have freight trains running at night time when normally the high speed trains are not in operation. This is affecting the planning of the service and is not within the scope of this report. The physical impact to the line might also be an issue. In many cases the axle load for freight trains are higher than normal passenger trains. In order to run freight trains on a high speed line

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 160 of (270) the high speed lines must be classified for higher loads, resulting in higher cost, and the maintenance of the lines will probably increase due to higher wear and tear of the track.

1.5.4 Assumptions

1.5.4.1 Scenarios given from JBV JBV has provided four scenarios as a basis for the studies (see chapter 1.0.1). Additional interpretations of the scenarios for rolling stock are listed below. A. A continuation of current priorities and policies in the railway sector. There will be no new tracks built compared to the projects already started as of November 2010. The normal maintenance work of the tracks will continue as today, e.g. replacement of worn tracks etc to keep the standard at the same level as today. B. A more ambitious development of the existing network. Compared to scenario A there will be some additional work for increasing the maximum speed. Such work can be removal of level crossings, increasing curve radii, increased cant etc. The line will still follow the existing one, meaning no new alignments. C. High-speed concepts which partly incorporate the existing network. Some new parts of the line which is built according to high speed concept without any level crossings and with double track. The new lines will not necessarily be built in same alignment as the existing track. The new line will only be built for part of the 6 major corridors. D. High-speed lines largely separate from the existing network. As scenario C but to be built for the complete corridor from start to end station.

1.5.4.2 Proven design solutions The assumption of the necessity of choosing proven design is based on the fact that the order for new trains will probably be limited in quantity compared to other nations e.g. Germany, France or Spain. The positive effect of choosing proven design are most likely to be seen in cost, reliability and more controllable risk connected to delivery schedule and products complying to international standards making the approval process smother. The negative side of the choice is of course that the trains will not be “tailor-made” both compared to physical appearance and special functional/technical requirements the operators have. This report does not include a detailed assessment of advantages and disadvantages for this topic; it only highlights the importance of awareness when choosing rolling stock. However, looking briefly at this item it seems likely that the advantages are greater than the disadvantages and therefore it has been assumed in this report that a proven design will be emphasized when the decision is made. JBV also made it clear when choosing the new intercity and regional EMU (FLIRT concept) from Stadler, that one of the major reasons was that the train was a proven design. This also supports the assumption made in this report and it is strongly recommended that a proven design should be chosen. Due to the fact that the time schedule for commencing a potential high speed railway is likely to be 15-20 years ahead it is difficult to say what proven design will be in the that time. The existing high speed trains will certainly be obsolete for new build HS trains within the next 15-20 years.

1.5.4.3 Compliance to TSI’s The assumption has been made are that all trains or concepts are in compliance with the following TSI’s and this task is concerning major aspects outside of the TSI’s: • TSI High speed rolling stock

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• TSI High speed energy • TSI-High speed operation • TSI-traffic operation and management • TSI-High speed infrastructure • TSI People with reduced mobility • TSI Safety in Railway Tunnels • TSI Control - Command and Signalling Subsystem High speed railway • TSI Control - Command and Signalling Subsystem Conventional railway • TSI Noise • TSI-Telematic application conventional railway

1.5.4.4 Particulars for Norway The group has focused on the specific parameters that exist for Norway, and not included all aspects with high speed trains. The reason for not including all aspects of high speed service is that high speed trains have been running for many years in other parts of the world and it is not necessary to map and assess areas of concern related to issues that have been solved many years ago. E.g. absolute speed is not a potential parameter assessed in the model. The reason is simply that due to the fact that high speed railway exist in other countries the aspect itself of “running in high speed” is already mapped and identified. Said in layman’s terms, high speed railways work in other countries, but what are the challenges for Norway?

1.5.5 Evaluation model, description The intention of the evaluation model is to map and identify the combinations of concepts and scenarios that might lead to challenges (potential issues), that are not solved as of today or where the level of information or experience is not sufficient. The model is used as a tool for identifying and prioritising of areas that will need future investigations. In Annex 6 the model is documented. A systematic assessment of the potential parameters has been done based on IRMA-structure (14 systems) in addition to functional requirements with the intention of identifying relevant parameters for Norway. A list of all parameters is shown in Annex 7. The relevant parameters are further investigated in the evaluation model. The model is built up as a matrix with the four service scenarios as superior groups and the three train concepts as sub-groups in each of the four scenarios in columns. See example below.

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Potential issue scenario D Other trains, freight, pass. High speed Tilting train coaches etc Parameters [>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h] Comments to scenario D Climate and environment Check reference high speed Temperature range Yes No No train with similar temp.range Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long tunnels and on/off long bridges Yes No No Possibly first train of the day slower speed? Panth wear due to "bounces" and light arcs.Undulations of OHL due to Ice and snow-packing, both catenary and rolling stock snow load, disconnection. issues Yes No No Icicle collisions pantograph.

All red marked areas are transferred to and described in chapter 1.5.6. The green marked areas are defined as not critical. The striped areas are not assessed (high speed trains on conventional lines)

Figure 62: Part of the evaluation model as example By presenting this model as a matrix all combinations are shown and all critical combinations can easily be identified and assessed. The combinations that are not fully known today are seen as potential issues and marked red. All combinations known today are seen as non potential issues and marked green. Hence most of the combinations that include the concepts with high speed trains are marked red due to the fact that those combinations are not proven in Norway. The red marked combinations are issues for further considerations. Assessing high speed trains in combination with scenario A and B is not done. It would not make commercial sense to buy high speed trains capable of running at 300km/h and only operate them at a conventional speed. Looking into the comparison between scenario C and D seen from a rolling stock perspective there is not any major difference. The only difference is the proportion of high speed track. In scenario D it is assumed new high speed railway for the complete corridor and in scenario C it is assumed new line for parts of the corridor. In that case the new built line should be in accordance with the high speed TSI’s. One of the major dimensioning criteria for rolling stock is maximum speed. Since the maximum speed in scenarios C and D would be identical the trains have to accommodate the same requirements, hence the parameters when choosing train concept will most likely be the same. The differences in scenario C and D will obviously be cost and average speed and both will be determined by the portion of new build line in scenario C. A systematic assessment of the potential parameters has been done based on 14-system structure in addition to functional requirements. A list of non critical parameters has also been assessed. All potential parameters for rolling stock are presented in rows so that a full matrix with all cross- checks is achieved. The methodology of identifying which parameters are to be cross-checked with the concepts and scenarios are consequently based on the thought: “What is special for Norway?” Comparing Norway to other countries the major differences are seen in climate, topography and low population density, hence most of the parameters are derived out of those areas. The complete evaluation model is shown in Annex 6.

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1.5.5.1 Train concepts For assessing the future variance in rolling stock running on Norwegian railway the following concepts are defined: • High speed trains (speed > 250 km/h) • Tilting trains (speed < 210 km/h) • Others, passenger coaches, freight etc (speed < 160 km/h)

1.5.5.2 Train parameters The identified train parameters that are special for Norway are: • Climate and environment o Temperature range o Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long tunnels and on/off long bridges o Ice and snow-packing, both catenary and rolling stock issues o Ventilation inlets o Train picking up ballast and snow blasting between underframe and track o Crosswinds on exposed areas o Maintenance concepts concerning de-icing • Route alignment • Pressure pulses o Entering tunnels and passing train in tunnels o Passing fixed installations • “Animal protection” o Plough to prevent the obstacle to get under the train in case of a collision • Fire and evacuation o Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed? • Noise o External noise • Coupler o Coupler for rescue of train • Length of train o Pantograph spacing in case of multiple service o Platform lengths • Signalling o ERTMS • Track impact • Energy consumption

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1.5.6 Critical parameters for train concepts When assessing which parameters that are seen as critical, the evaluation model is used as a basis. Combinations of scenarios, concepts and parameters that might have potential risks or challenges (red marked in model) are selected and described more in detail in this chapter.

1.5.6.1 Climate and environment The climatic and topographical challenges that exist in Norway include high mountains, bridges crossing open water, low temperature and numerous tunnels. The following areas have been identified as potential issues.

1.5.6.1.1 Temperature range This has been identified as potential issue for high speed trains. For tilting trains and others like coaches, freight this is not considered as an issue due to the long experience with these types of vehicles in Norway. It does not mean that there are no issues with this in service today, but that it is a known challenge. Given the Nordic climate the normal specification of temperature range should follow class T2 in EN50125-1 which is -40 to +35 ºC. This is also in accordance with TSI for rolling stock.

1.5.6.1.2 Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long tunnels and on/off long bridges This has been identified as potential issue for high speed trains. For scenarios D and C there might be longer tunnels and bridges than existing railway today. That might lead to unknown conditions concerning ice/snow growth due to fluctuations of temperature and humidity with different frequencies than existing today. Some of the systems that might be affected by these conditions are: • wind screens • brakes system • air pneumatic system • train electrical system • door steps

1.5.6.1.3 Ice and snow-packing, both catenary system and rolling stock issues The issue of ice-growth on the catenary system is a well known problem with the existing railway in Norway. This causes both pantograph-bounces and light arcs with the result that the wear of the “carbon strips” will increase and the transformers and line converters will have increased problems with keeping the power supply for other equipment such as motors etc. stable. This problem will become more severe on a dedicated high speed railway due to the lower frequency of trains. Normally the problem is worst for the first train in the morning. The snow packing is also a well known problem. Depending on the location of the snow packing it might also be a safety issue. E.g. if the snow packing is located in the bogie it might lead to a negative effect for the running comfort including stability. As it is today the use of dynamic brake system vs. the pneumatic brake is a potential issue during wintertime. Maximising the dynamic brake is positive due to cost savings, less wear of brake pads and discs. Unfortunately this can have a negative effect on the pneumatic brake performance. With long distances between stops the result can be that ice building up on brake pads will lower the brake performance. The lowered brake performance is only revealed when

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 165 of (270) the pneumatic brake is applied and the initial performance is lower than the system (e.g. ATC/ERTMS) anticipated. To avoid this on the Class 73/73B in Norway an automatic de-icing function has been included that applies a low brake force for some seconds every 3-4 minutes to ensure that the friction coefficient is as anticipated. Some other systems that might be affected by these conditions are: • main transformer • line converters • suspension • air supply system • tilting

1.5.6.1.4 Ventilation inlets This has been identified as potential issue for high speed train. In existing trains in Norway the ventilation inlets for passenger HVAC system and for cooling technical equipment are usually placed high up on the coach side or integrated in the roof. One of the reasons for this choice of locations is to reduce the risk of snow and ice getting into the ventilation inlets and further on into the ventilation system.

1.5.6.1.5 Train picking up ballast and snow blasting between underframe and track This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains. The problem is that the packed snow and ice under the trains falls down and together with the ballast bounces between the track and the underframe of the train. This can result in: • Damage to hatches and other equipment located in the underframe or bogies. • Damage to the rail because of ballast coming between the wheels and rail. • The ballast and ice being thrown away from the train. This can cause safety issues for people standing near the track e.g. on stations when a train is passing. Obviously this is also a risk for existing trains running in “conventional speed” but the probability and consequences will increase with higher speed. A reduction of this probability involves infrastructure (ballast level), shape of the rolling stock’s underframe and lowering of speed.

1.5.6.1.6 Crosswinds on exposed areas This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains for scenario C and D. Assuming a new high speed line is built one has to consider if the new route also will lead to potential increased crosswinds from the infrastructure such as on bridges over open water. The risk of rolling stock impact from crosswinds increases with increased running speed. Since the factor of crosswinds is more likely to be an issue in curves the combination of crosswinds, tilting trains and curves is a potential issue. The general aerodynamic design of the train will affect the impact from crosswinds.

1.5.6.1.7 Maintenance concepts concerning de-icing This has been identified as potential issue for all three concepts of trains both for scenarios C and D.

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Given scenarios C and D the maintenance concept for de-icing of all concepts of trains could possibly be affected. For high speed trains the potential issues are related to the items above such as snow packing etc. The concerns for tilting trains and others in this matter are related to new railway lines and if this will have an impact to the known issues that exist in service today. E.g. will the new line have the result that the ice/snow growth on existing trains will change in any way and by that realize so far unrevealed problems with those trains? Another topic is the future capacity and method of de-icing the trains. This is linked to the question of building new workshops for maintenance or incorporating the maintenance in existing facilities which also relies on which operator will service the line. The length of existing high speed trains is varying but on average they are approximately 200 m. This creates the demand for a rather large facility for the maintenance. Also the need for special equipment in maintaining future trains is not known today, hence the feasibility of incorporating maintenance in existing workshops with modifications is not known. It is likely that the new trains will need totally new workshop and this requires a large free land area.

1.5.6.2 Route alignment This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains for scenarios C and D. When building new high speed lines one should be aware of the impact the max gradient will have on brakes and traction system. The route alignment and stopping pattern will have an impact on both the acceleration and deceleration duty cycle. A route containing more gradients and more frequent stops will increase the energy consumption and result in increased maintenance cost due to higher wear and tear of brake and bogie equipment. Long gradients are a potential issue for all kinds of trains for scenarios C and D. With long downhill slopes the risk of overheating the brake discs is always a factor; it could be reduced by recuperation brakes. If the new high speed railway is built and it deviates from the existing railway when it comes to extended length of slopes, this might add an additional requirement on the trains of today concerning brake performance. For the high speed trains this potential additional requirement can be added in the specifications to the suppliers but one should be aware of the potential cost increase resulting from deviating from proven design. Seen from that perspective a new high speed railway must not be made in a way that excludes the possibility of using existing train concepts with proven design. The number and radius of curves will affect the average speed. This is also linked to energy cost and passenger comfort with rapid speed changes. The maintenance cost for the track will also be affected in the case of a tilting train which has the possibility for higher speed through curves which will lead to increased lateral track forces. It is important to look at the railway system as one system including infrastructure and rolling stock when deciding the route alignment.

1.5.6.3 Pressure pulses

1.5.6.3.1 Entering tunnels and passing trains in tunnel This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains in scenarios C and D. The primary pressure pulse is generated by the train front and secondary by the train tail. In multiple services the coupling area can also result in a pressure pulse. For a line only operated with high speed trains the potential issues are not seen as special for Norway. There are several high speed railways currently operating with extensive tunnelling e.g. the Shinkansen services in Japan. The current high speed trains (including Airport Express train and Class 73/73B in Norway) are equipped with pressure protection systems to reduce the impact from sudden changes in

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 167 of (270) pressure when travelling through tunnels or passing other trains. These protection systems can be pressure sealed external doors and gangways. The trains should be designed to be aero- dynamical efficient to reduce the impact from pressure changes. If existing trains including freight trains are running on the high speed lines it should be noted that the existing trains might not be designed for the pressure pulses that can occur when meeting a high speed train at full speed in tunnels. This could cause discomfort for passengers and train crew. Reference is made to the TSI relating to the rolling stock subsystem of the transeuropean high speed rail system section 4.2.6.4 where the requirements are listed. Due to the fact that the aerodynamic forces introduced are dependant on speed, shape of the rolling stock and shape/size of the cross-section it is recommended that an aerodynamic analysis is done when the railway system is specified.

1.5.6.3.2 Passing fixed installations This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains in scenario C and D. The effect passing trains could have on fixed installations like noise barriers should be assessed from the infrastructure perspective. Repeated passing with high forces acting on fixed installation could lead to a fatigue issue.

1.5.6.4 Collisions with animals This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains. In the evaluation model this issue is not classified as critical for tilting trains and other trains. Norwegian operators have experience of collisions with animals at speeds up to 210 km/h. This leads to service disturbances and additional maintenance cost but is not seen as a safety issue today. There is limited experience with collisions at 300 km/h. The energy released in a collision in 300 km/h is significantly higher than at 200 km/h. Information of animal collisions in Norway from the recent years is compiled in the following:

Figure 63: Number of animal collisions31

31 Cp. [68].

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Figure 64: Animal collisions 2009 according to type of animal32 Looking at high speed trains, the probability of hitting an obstacle is maybe the same but the consequences are more critical and the risk for derailment increases. One potential solution to this is to build fences combined with animal bridges along the track to prevent animal access to the track but this solution might not be feasible due the hindrance of migration of wild animals such as reindeers and moose. Also the cost for fencing would be high. Even with fencing the trains have to be capable of withstanding a hit at maximum speed since a fence is not 100 % safe when it comes to stopping animals accessing the track. This is something that has to be evaluated in the specification and design phase for the rolling stock. The existing tilting trains (73/73B) in Norway have a reinforced steel plough to prevent damages to the front of the train and to reduce the risk of obstacles getting under the train. Besides the task of preventing obstacles getting under the train the plough also have a task of clearing the track of snow.

1.5.6.5 Fire and evacuation - Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed? This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains for scenarios C and D. The tunnel length will probably increase when building a high speed line compared to existing infrastructure. This will also lead to a more demanding evacuation scenario in case of fire compared to today’s solution. In what way this will affect the new trains and the existing on, is not assessed but it might have an impact. This is depending on the length, width, type of tunnel, evacuation possibilities, smoke removal systems etc. The requirement today in TSI for Safety in railway tunnels is that the tunnels should be equipped with a platform running through the tunnel if the tunnel length exceeds 500 m. The general comment is that the evacuation strategy for tunnels must be a common one between infrastructure and rolling stock.

1.5.6.6 External noise The emitted noise from a train comes from train systems (engines etc), wheel rail interface and aerodynamic effects. The emitted noise is higher for high speed trains and the noise from aerodynamic effects becomes more significant with higher speed.

32 Cp. [68].

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For high speed trains the requirements for noise are specified in the TSI for high speed rolling stock and for conventional trains in the TSI for noise.

1.5.6.7 Length of train

1.5.6.7.1 Pantograph spacing in case of multiple service This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains and tilting trains for scenarios C and D. It is not linked to tilt or not, more linked to length of the trains. The potential issue is the minimum distance between pantographs when running in multiple operation, given one pantograph per train. The potential problem is the setting of an oscillation in the overhead line resulting in pantograph bouncing on the second pantograph and damage to the overhead line. As long as most of the high speed trains today are approximately 200 m long the potential issue can be disregarded. For the other EMU’s operating on the same line the issue can rise if the distance between pantographs in multiple operation is less than in today’s service.

1.5.6.7.2 Platform lengths This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains for scenario C. Where high speed trains run on existing track it might be an issue with the existing stations that do not have platform lengths to align with the new trains.

1.5.6.8 Signalling - ERTMS This has been identified as potential issue for scenario D regarding tilting and other trains and also potential issue for all trains in scenario C. For trains (new or old) running on track equipped with other signalling system (ERTMS or ATC) than fitted to the trains the rolling stock needs to be equipped with a translator module. (E.g. for existing trains with ATC, a STN device must be installed to be able to run on line with ATC2 installed.) This depends on the general strategy and time schedule for the implementation of ERTMS in Norway and is not seen as critical.

1.5.6.9 Track impact The track impact is both the forces acting on the track from the rolling stock affecting the track alignment and the wear of the rail. This has been identified as a potential issue for all trains for scenarios C and D. The track impact and consequently the maintenance cost for the track is dependant on speed and axle load amongst others. The impact from the heavy freight trains will probably be most significant resulting in higher maintenance cost and more time consuming work on the line which will affect the overall capacity on the line. Also the fact that the lateral forces to the track are higher for tilting trains than others it is recommended that this should be assessed.

1.5.6.10 Energy consumption This has been identified as a potential issue for all trains for scenarios C and D, and for tilting trains and others for scenario B. Due to the fact that the energy consumption is highly dependant on the service speed it is obvious that a high speed train will consume more energy than a conventional train running at 160 km/h. The alignment of the track will also affect the energy consumption.

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The potential issue for existing trains for scenarios C and D is more linked to the overall energy consumption of building a new railway, hence not fully belonging to the trains. The potential issue with scenario B is due to the overall speed increase it is hoped to gain from making smaller adjustments to the track. All electrical trains and locomotives running on Norwegian tracks have an energy meter connected to JBV for automatic measurement of actual used energy. This is to secure that the operators pay for the actual usage of energy provided.

1.5.7 Information of existing & future trains This section contains a brief description of the existing and future high speed concepts “to come” from some manufacturers. It has been difficult to get information concerning the future concepts and products due to confidentiality issues. Some of the manufacturers are working on new concepts including high speed tilting trains (approx 250km/h) but it has not been possible to obtain more information. The full list with the obtained information is shown in Annex 8.

1.5.7.1 Bombardier Transportation Bombardier Transportation is a rolling stock company with head office for railway industry in Berlin. It is owned by Bombardier Inc., , Canada. Bombardier bought Adtranz from Daimler Chrysler in 2001 with Scandinavian Sites in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Adtranz delivered the Airport Express train and tilting Class 73/73B to Norway. The concepts name for the Bombardier very high speed trains is Zefiro (up to 350 km/h). Zefiro is delivered to several operators. One is 50 trainsets of the V300 in a co-operation between Bombardier and AnsaldoBreda for the Italian railways Trenitalia. Bombardier also has other products in the speed range of up to 250 km/h including double deckers that are planned to be delivered to SBB (Swiss railways) in 2013-2014.

Figure 65: Zefiro train33

1.5.7.2 Siemens Siemens AG is a German engineering company that is the largest in Europe, active in various sectors like transport and energy. The concept name for the Siemens actual high speed train family is Velaro. It is in use in several countries like Spain (AVE, S 103), Germany (ICE 3) and (). Specifically the trains to Russia should be of interest due to its low temperature requirement of -50ºC.

33 Source: Bombardier.

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Siemens has delivered the new metro car to Oslo, the MX3000.

Figure 66: Velaro train34

1.5.7.3 AnsaldoBreda AnsaldoBreda SPA is a transport company based in Italy. It was formed in 2001 by the merger of Ansaldo Trasporti and Costruzioni Ferroviarie. The high speed train V 250 (called ) from AnsaldoBreda is today in service between the and . It connects and via Schipol, and . AnsaldoBreda has delivered the IC4 diesel inter city train to Denmark. This project is delayed several years.

Figure 67: V25035

1.5.7.4 Alstom Alstom is a French multinational company and active within the energy and transport sector. The new AGV is an EMU and partly based on the design philosophy of the TGV and fully in compliance with TSI. It can be delivered as single or double-decker for even more dense service. The Italian newcomer NTV (Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatore) has ordered 25 AVE trainsets. Alstom has delivered all TGV’s (push and pull trains) to SNCF, Eurostar and .

34 Source: Yrithinnd, wikipedia.de. 35 Source: AnsaldoBreda.

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Figure 68: AGV train36

1.5.7.5 Stadler Stadler is a Swiss owned company that have been successful and growth a lot the last 10 years. Stadler focus on delivering regional trains and . They do not have a dedicated high speed concept. Stadler will deliver the new NSB regional / intercity train FLIRT (Class 74). Maximum speed is 200 km/h. Stadler also delivered trams to Bergen Bybane.

Figure 69: Flirt to NSB37

1.5.7.6 Hyundai Rotem Hyundai Rotem is a South Korean company manufacturing rolling stock, defence products and plant equipment. It is part of the Hyundai Motor Group. It has delivered trains to (KTX) which is the South Korea's high- speed rail system.

1.5.7.7 Kawasaki Kawasaki is an international company based in Japan.

36 Source: Alstom. 37 [69].

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They have been involved in the Shinkansen project together with Hitachi and in the delivery to .

1.5.7.8 China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (CSR) CSR is state own Chinese company that produces a lots of rolling stock for the Chinese market and also abroad. The Polaris family is currently offered for sale in Europe. As of today the Polaris is not fit for purpose concerning the UIC-profile but an upgrade will be developed that will meet the demands regarding profile, platforms etc. Today the power car is electro-diesel, but will be made available as only electro version, enabling passenger seats also in the power cars. New version of Polaris will also be delivered with optional tilt.

1.5.7.9 Hitachi Recently Hitachi delivered the latest Shinkansen Series E5 and E6 high speed trains. These trains are supposed to partially run in areas with winter conditions similar to northern Europe. The UK Class 395 was delivered for service on CTRL (Channel Tunnel Rail Link), the first dedicated high speed railway in UK. The fleet introduction was in two stages. • A preview service with a limited number of trains (carrying passengers) started in June 2009 and • The full fleet service started in December 2009.

Figure 70: UK 39538

1.5.7.10 Mitsubishi Mitsubishi is a Japanese company who has delivered Maglev both for Airport Services and for intercity service. Maglev is a relative new technology using magnetic levitations. This method has the potential to be faster, quieter and smoother than wheeled rail systems.

38 Source: Sunil060902, en.wikipedia.org.

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Figure 71: Maglev train39

1.5.8 Absolute requirements for Rolling Stock The absolute requirements for future trains are dependant on a variety of factors like commercial, technical and environmental requirements. The aspect of choosing proven design is certainly important and must play a vital roll when rolling stock is to be specified and procured. Today’s standards and norms including TSI’s might change in the future. New trains for Norway will be required to be specified and built in accordance with the standards at that date. If the train was to be decided today the absolute requirement should have been derived out of the following regulations: 1. TSI’s adopted by Norway 2. Technical regulation JD5xx by JBV 3. Safety regulations by NRI (Statens Jernbanetilsyn Sikkerhetsforskriften) A reference is also made to the part concerning standards. This is also applicable for future potential high speed freight trains.

1.5.9 Remember list when buying trains This list includes some areas that are important when buying trains. The list can be extended in the next phase of the project. • Evaluate if magnetic track brake is needed and what kind, conventional or eddy current • New workshops, maintenance facility, location, de-icing capacity • Train capacity, train length, seating density, single or double decker • Requirements for RAMS • Requirements for redundant systems • People with reduced mobility, low floor area and entrance • Platform heights • Tilting or non tilting • Width of the train, gauging

39 Source: Stahlkocher, en.wikipedia.org.

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• Signalling system • Coupler for rescue of train • Total power consumption including regenerative brake • Adaption’s for Norwegian winter conditions, snow plough, snow packing, crash worthiness due to avalanches • Sanding system: Sanding on rails gives a better friction during acceleration and braking.

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2 Subject – Risk Assessment

2.0 Introduction Purpose of the High-Speed Rail Assessment Phase 1 was to give a total overview and presentation of the knowledge base that exists in Norway, including the final report on high- speed rail in Sweden [70]. Within the task of the Technical and Safety Analysis of Phase 2 a risk analysis according to the RAMS standard EN 50126 was carried out for high-speed operations on a Norwegian high- speed infrastructure. The analysis identifies relevant hazards and its associated incident rates and consequences. Incident rates and consequences are integrated into a judgement, or estimation, of risk levels. The risk analysis considered two different system variants and eight top-events. Through the elaboration of the model the assessment provides the following results: • Definition of Risk Acceptance Criteria; • Hazard Identification; • Consequence Analysis; • Residual risk, calculation model The generic calculation model is fitted to ensure changes in top-events and / or scenarios in later project phases.

2.1 Summary Chapters 2.5.3.4 to 2.5.3.10.8 include detailed descriptions regarding the underlying model for the estimation/calculation of the residual risk (collective and individual risk) for every defined top-event. Table 51 subsume the results and give an overview of the residual risks determined by point estimate of the two different potential high-speed system variants (see chapter 2.4) as well as the status quo40 concerning the risk in the Norwegian railway system (existing net).

Table 51: Residual risk related to Top-Events, overview

41 Top-Event Residual Risk Existing Net System-Variant 1 System-Variant 2

Derailment Collective risk 0.322 0.900 1.578 Individual risk 6.95E-06 1.95E-05 3.41E-05 Collision train-train Collective risk 0.042 0.118 0.045 Individual risk 3.61E-06 1.01E-05 3.89E-06 Collision train-object Collective risk 1.155 3.235 5.668 Individual risk 2.27E-05 6.35E-05 1.11E-04 Fire Collective risk 0.049 0.090 0.131 Individual risk 1.21E-07 2.22E-07 3.23E-07 Passenger injured at Collective risk 3.891 4.094 3.911 platform Individual risk 2.25E-05 2.37E-05 2.26E-05

40 Values for collective and individual risk evaluated on base of ERADIS-statistics [83]. 41 Values for collective risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities/year”, values for individual risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities/person * year”.

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41 Top-Event Residual Risk Existing Net System-Variant 1 System-Variant 2

Level crossing accidents Collective risk 0.982 1.033 Not applicable Individual risk 1.11E-06 1.17E-06 Not applicable Person injured at track side Collective risk 1.900 1.999 1.949 Individual risk 5.69E-06 5.98E-06 5.83E-06 Other accidents Collective risk 0.333 0.350 0.350 Individual risk 2.10E-06 2.21E-06 2.21E-06

In Table 52 the results regarding the estimated residual collective risk42 for the different groups of persons are subsumed. Table 53 shows the determined residual collective risk-values for the different rail-systems und benchmarks the point estimated results as well as the lower end estimations (see also chapter 2.6) with the tolerable number of 11 fatalities per year defined by JBV (see chapter 2.5.1.2).

Table 52: Residual collective risk, overview

Rail-System Residual collective risk for Residual collective risk Residual collective risk passengers for 3rd persons for personal

Existing Net 0.677 7.531 0.465 System-Variant 1 1.120 9.778 0.920 System-Variant 2 1.555 11.733 1.327

Table 53: Residual collective risk, point estimate overview

Rail-System Residual collective risk, Residual collective risk, Comment overall, point estimation overall, lower end

Existing Net 8.674 - JBVs collective risk criteria fulfilled System-Variant 1 11.818 8.731 JBVs collective risk criteria fulfilled considering lower end risk estimation. Slightly exceedance of criteria by point estimate System-Variant 2 14.615 8.764 JBVs collective risk criteria fulfilled considering lower end risk estimation. Significant exceedance of criteria by point estimate

An extrapolation of the collective risk of the Norwegian railway net assuming 5% additional mixed traffic as in the existing railway net results in an expected higher residual collective risk (9.125 equivalent fatalities per year) compared to the lower end estimations shown in the above table. JBVs risk acceptance criteria regarding personal (1st persons) is defined as less than 12.5 fatalities per 100’000’000 working hours (see chapter 2.5.1.2), respectively 1.25E-07 fatalities/working hour. As shows this risk criteria is fulfilled for both assumed system-variants.

42 Values for collective risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities / year”.

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Table 54: Residual collective risk of personal43. overview

Rail-System Residual collective risk for Residual collective risk for Comment personal [EqFa / year] personal [EqFa / working hrs]

JBVs individual risk criteria for 1st Existing Net 0.465 3.45E-08 persons fulfilled

JBVs individual risk criteria for 1st System-Variant 1 0.920 6.81E-08 persons fulfilled JBVs individual risk criteria for 1st System-Variant 2 1.327 9.83E-08 persons fulfilled

Table 55 shows the estimated residual individual risk-values44 for the different rail-systems und benchmarks the results with the respective boundary value (0.0001 fatalities / person * year) by JBV (see chapter 2.5.1.2).

Table 55: Residual individual risk of passengers and 3rd persons. overview

Rail-System Residual individual risk. Residual individual Residual individual Comment passengers & 3rd persons risk for passengers risk for 3rd persons

JBVs individual risk Existing Net 2.74E-06 2.26E-07 2.51E-06 criteria fulfilled

JBVs individual risk System-Variant 1 3.63E-06 3.73E-07 3.26E-06 criteria fulfilled

JBVs individual risk stem-Variant 2 4.43E-06 5.18E-07 3.91E-06 criteria fulfilled

43 Residual collective risk fro personal based on assumed 13.5 Mio. working hours per year [83]. 44 Values for individual risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities / person * year”.

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2.2 Definitions

Table 56: Definitions

Term Description

accident an unintended event or series of events that results in death, injury, loss of system or service, or

environmental damage [71]

collective risk the risk from a product, process or system to which a population or group of people (or the society as a whole) is exposed [71] Comment: Collective risk is often termed as societal risk

commercial risk the rate of occurrence and the severity of financial loss, which may be associated with an accident or

undesirable event [71]

environmental risk the rate of occurrence and the severity of extent of contamination and/or destruction of an natural habitat

which may arise from an accident [71]

equivalent fatality a convention for combining injuries and fatalities into one figure for ease of processing and comparison [71]

failure A failure is the termination of the ability of an item to perform the required function [71]

hazard a condition that could lead to an accident [71]

hazardous event “Hazard event” is used but not be defined in EN 50126-1. It should be noted that the term, as used in the standard, is not consistently related to a hazard only. In most cases, the term has been used in the standard

to mean an “accident” and should be interpreted as such [71]

individual risk the risk from a product, process or system to which an individual person is exposed [71]

Railway Authority In EN 50126-1 this term is defined as:

The body with the overall accountability to a Regulator for operating a railway system. [71]

risk the rate of occurrence of accidents and incidents resulting in harm (caused by a hazard) and the degree of severity of that harm (interpretation according to [71])

safety barrier a system or action, intended to reduce the rate of an hazard or a likely accident arising from an hazard and/or mitigate the severity of the likely accident The effectiveness will depend on the extent of the

independence [71]

tolerable risk EN 50126-1 [72] defines this term as the maximum level of risk of a product that is acceptable to the Railway Authority (RA) The RA is responsible for agreeing the risk acceptance criteria and the risk acceptance levels with the Safety Regulatory Authority (SRA) and providing these to the Railway Support Industry (RSI). Usually, it is the SRA or the RA by agreement with the SRA that defines risk acceptance levels. Risk acceptance levels currently depend on the prevailing national legislation or national/other regulations. In many countries risk

acceptance levels have not yet been established and are still in progress and/or under consideration [71]

2.3 Purpose of the HSR-risk assessment The risk assessment at hand shall provide a calculation model which is suitable to determine an expected residual risk of a new High-Speed-Rail-System in Norway. The result shall consider as well the risk for a single person (individual risk) as also the risk for the society (collective risk). As another aspect the estimated risk shall be comparable with risk acceptance criteria. As it is an attribute of any risk analysis- or prediction-model the quality of the result of the suggested models strongly depends on the quality / reliability of the available input parameters. In this phase of the risk assessment all values shall be interpreted as examples only.

2.4 Scope of the HSR-risk assessment As a requirement on the part of JBV [73] the risk assessment should contain concepts based on the existing network and InterCity strategy and on the other side mainly separated high-speed lines. Due to the fact that according to JBV specific corridors shall not be considered for the analysis at this phase and a final decision concerning technical solutions is not available at the time of the performance of this risk assessment. Two principal system-variants have been

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 180 of (270) appointed in order to have a principal differentiation for the risk assessment. Both system- variants represent “extreme” developments and all other potential concepts can be analyzed using the risk model described in chapter 2.5.3 et seq. • System-variant 1: The first principal variant is represented by an upgrade of an existing track to be a High Speed Rail track. • System-variant 2: The second variant is represented by a complete new track, which is used exclusively by high speed trains. The following descriptions identify the typical attributes of both variants.

2.4.1 System-variant 1 Attributes of the rolling stock in system-variant 1 are: • maximum speed is 200 km/h for high-speed-trains • mixed traffic (high-speed-trains, conventional passenger trains, freight trains) • mainly tilting vehicles used for high-speed-trains • F-ATC on the system-level • ETCS not used Attributes of the track are: • mixture of single and double track line • ballasted track • signalling allows trains operating in both directions • several (old) level crossings on the not upgraded part of the line • higher number of stations (for passenger and for crossing of trains) compared to system- variant 2 • higher time and effort related to track maintenance • long period for upgrade of the existing system while operation at the same time • increased passing of urban agglomerations compared to system-variant 2 • lower maximum incline compared to system-variant 2 • less percentage of tunnel trackway compared to the system-variant 2 • maximal length of tunnels less compared to the system-variant 2 • percentage of bridges trackway less compared to the system-variant 2 • maximal length/maximal height of bridges less compared to the system-variant 2 Attributes of the traffic mode are: • bimodal passenger traffic (long-distance and local transport) • bimodal traffic (freight trains/mass passenger transport/HSR-trains) • transit of regional stations with stopping or speed reduction

2.4.2 System-variant 2 Attributes of the high speed rolling stock in system-variant 2 are: • maximum speed is 300 km/h

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• none-tilting vehicles • ETCS at all trains Attributes of the track are: • single track line • exclusively slab track • very stable track leads to decreased maintenance compared to system-variant 1 • passing points allow trains operating in both directions • no level crossings • reduced passing of urban agglomerations compared to system-variant 1 (fractional track routing parallel to speedway or highway) • increased contingent of profile fixing (lanes/embankments) compared to the system- variant 1 • increased contingent compared to scenario of parts of track with increased sensitivity to side wind • higher maximum incline compared to system-variant 1 • increased percentage of tunnel trackway compared to the system-variant 1 • maximal length of tunnels higher compared to the system-variant 1 • increased percentage of bridges trackway compared to the system-variant 1 • maximal length/maximal height of bridges higher compared to the system-variant 1 Attributes of the traffic mode are: • no regional transport • exclusively High Speed traffic • no transit through regional stations (trains circumscribe without stopping or any speed reduction) • complete new stations (platform not in curves)

2.5 Risk assessment, general approach General approaches for risk assessments for railway systems are described in various standards and vary in different industrial sectors [74]. The risk assessment for HSR Norway, which is described in this document, is based on the European railway standard [72] and consists of four work packages: • Definition of risk acceptance criteria; • Hazard identification and assessment of consequences; • Probability and frequency; • Determination of risks. Due to the fact that European Standards, particularly [72], do not provide a normative risk tolerability criterion a suggestion has been developed concerning risk tolerability for the planned Norwegian high speed rail project. This suggestion considers as well Common Safety Methods (CSM) of the European Railway Authority (ERA) as safety guidelines of the Norwegian National Rail Administration Jernbaneverket (JBV).

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2.5.1 Risk acceptance criteria, general introduction The construction of a safe, modern integrated railway network is one of the EU’s major priorities. Railways must become more competitive and offer high quality, end-to-end services without being restricted by national borders. The European Railway Agency (ERA) was set up to help create this integrated railway area by reinforcing safety and interoperability. With the final constitution of the ERA in 2006 major safety tasks, such as to establish Common Safety Targets (CST) and monitor the safety performance on Europe’s railways, have been assigned to this organisation. Internationally a number of different risk assessment methodologies and risk acceptance criteria have been used to date. Examples for risk acceptance criteria given in [71] are Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM), Globalement Au Moins Equivalent (GAME) and As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP). For all risk assessments it is essential to establish the methodology followed by the definition of targets of risk acceptability. Due to different national laws and provisions even in the recent past no Europe-wide risk acceptance criteria has been accepted and practised. As a result of this situation safety targets vary and they usually base on the same principle as the chosen methodology for the risk assessment. To this day safety targets are derived for example as tolerable limits for a whole system, e.g. for the rail system in a specific country, or they are allocated to specific risk causes, e.g. hazards related to the system or sub-systems. With date of 24.04.2009 and the regulation No. 352/2009 [75] of the commission of the European community a binding base for the performance of risk analysis is available. http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:108:0004:0019:DE:PDF The European Railway Agency has also published a common method for the evaluation and assessment of risk in a guideline [76] at the date of 06.01.2009. http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/ERA-2009-0048-00-00-EN.pdf Considering the common safety methods for the evaluation and assessment of risks in accordance to the EC-regulation [75] one of the following three risk acceptance criteria can be used: • Code of practice (TSI, notified national regulations, European standards); • Similar reference system; • Explicit risk estimation and harmonized risk acceptance criteria. These three principles are exchangeable and there is no demand for a ranking between them. For the HSR Norway risk assessment the team proposes explicit risk estimation and the comparison of the estimated risks with harmonized risk acceptance criteria regarding collective and individual risk. In addition the Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS) [75] [91] shall apply for functional safety aspects. Both approaches are described in the following chapters.

2.5.1.1 Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS) For the HSR Norway risk assessment the team proposes the appliance of explicit risk estimation and the harmonized Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS) [75] [91]. Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS): Any failure mode of a function resulting in a hazard that has a credible immediate potential for catastrophic consequences shall not occur with a rate of occurrence higher than 10-9 per operating hour. The decision for the usage of RAC-TS is mainly justified on the following aspects:

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• Codes of practice (for example TSI, NNR, European Standards) describe various technical and operational requirements for rail-systems but they do not consider any quantitative safety targets or safety integrity requirements. • A similar reference system for the planned Norwegian high speed rail project is not available and sufficient convincing data of such a system are missing not least due to the short time of operation. • RAC-TS has been agreed by UNIFE in the meantime; • TSI [77] for High-Speed-Systems give a reference for a tolerable risk which could be generally applied to new functions or systems: “For the safety related part of one onboard unit as well as for one trackside unit, the safety requirement for ETCS Level 2 is a tolerable hazard rate of 10-9 / hour …”. • Various projects in different countries have proposed the same target for safety critical functions (e.g. electronic ) in the railway sector. • The approach is used for more than 20 years successfully in the civil-aviation-sector and is standardized in [78]. For the understanding of RAC-TS the significant notions and the reference conditions have to be defined: • A technical system is a product developed by a supplier including its design, implementation and support documentation. 1. The development of a technical system starts with its System Requirements Specification and ends with its safety approval. 2. Human operators and their actions are not part of a technical system. 3. Maintenance is not included in the definition, although maintenance manuals are. • [79] defines a function as a specific purpose or objective to be accomplished that can be specified or described without reference to the physical means of achieving it. • [72] describes catastrophic consequences as “Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries and/or major damage to the environment”. • Credible potential means that it must be likely that the particular failure mode will result in an accident with catastrophic consequences. • Immediate potential in this context means that no credible barrier exists that could prevent an accident. It has to be mentioned that the appliance of RAC-TS is limited to functional safety, which can be seen as the inherent safety aspect of a technical system. All other safety aspects issues, e.g. operational safety, have to be considered using an alternative risk approach because in those cases (e.g. avoidance of collisions with 3rd persons on track) RAC-TS is not applicable.

2.5.1.2 Explicit risk estimation and harmonized risk acceptance criteria Widely used risk acceptance criteria are boundary values for either risk concerning single persons (individual risk) which are using a (technical) system and for the risk related to a society (collective risk). Descriptions concerning the usage of boundary values for individual / collective risks are given amongst others in [72], [74] and [80]. As a further risk acceptance criterion (beside RAC-TS) the following tolerable boundary values, accepted and used in Norway [81], provide the basis for the risk assessment at hand: Individual risk: • 1st person less than 12.5 fatalities/ 100’000’000 working hours;

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• 2nd person (passengers) and 3rd person less than 0.0001 fatalities for the most exposed individual. Collective risk: • less than 11 fatalities per year for the total railway net Considering the collective risk it has to be mentioned that for any additional technical system, such as a potential new high speed rail system, existing risk acceptance values have to be proofed and where necessary adjusted.

2.5.2 Risk assessment, bottom-up-approach for RAC-TS As described before, the risk acceptance criteria RAC-TS is proposed for functional safety aspects of a potential new high-speed railway system in Norway. By the usage of RAC-TS so called tolerable hazard rates (THR) shall be identified. The bottom-up-approach in this regard covers the following steps and is described afterwards. RAC-TS-approach: 1. Hazard-identification; 2. Qualitative consequence (severity) estimation; 3. Evaluation if RAC-TS is applicable for specific hazard; 4. Estimation / quantification of safety barriers and THR-allocation.

2.5.2.1 Hazard identification Precondition for a risk assessment related to RAC-TS is the correct and complete identification of all relevant hazards. The hazard identification process used for the HSR-Norway risk analysis is in line with the approach described in [82]. An empirical phase using structured analysis (Interface Analysis) and exploiting past experience and a creative phase (brainstorming of safety experts combined with analysis of different hazard-checklists) increase confidence that all significant hazards have been identified. As long as a technical system is not finally defined, the hazard identification has to be performed on a functional system level. Therefore the system, in this case the planned Norwegian High-Speed-Rail-System, can be seen as a “Black box”. Hazards depend in particular on the system boundary and the respective interfaces.

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causecause

causecause

HSR-system- sub-system A boundary

cause nd cause 22nd-- system-system- level- UrUr sachelevel- sache level-level- accidentaccident hazard hazard cause hazard hazard cause

sub-system B

cause 2nd- cause 2nd- externalexternal level- level- eventevent hazard cause hazard cause

Railway-system in total

Figure 72: Hazard identification System-level-hazards occur at the HSR-systems-boundary while 2nd-level-hazards occur at sub- systems-boundary. Generally hazards are directed to the outside. Causes for hazards on the 2nd level can be divided in internal and external causes. For a pragmatically approach a high speed rail system, and so the HSR-system, can be divided in two major sub systems: • Rolling stock; • Infrastructure. While rolling stock consists of locomotives/traction vehicle and wagons, the appropriation of constituent parts of the infrastructure is more complex. Principally all technical parts which are not related to rolling stock but are needed / used for the operation of the HSR-system, e.g. tracks, bridges, tunnels, rails, railway control centre, stations, power supply etc., shall be appropriated to the infrastructure. Considering these aspects the following interfaces at system- boundary can be described:

Table 57: HSR-System, interfaces

No.O External Interface

1 vehicle ⇒ passenger

2 vehicle ⇒ personnel

3 vehicle ⇒ third party

4 vehicle ⇒ environment

5 infrastructure ⇒ passenger

6 infrastructure ⇒ personnel

7 infrastructure ⇒ third party

8 infrastructure ⇒ environment

2.5.2.2 Qualitative consequence (severity) estimation The classification of severity level is an essential requirement for the application of RAC-TS, respectively a risk matrix. Normative classifications are currently not available in the railway

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 186 of (270) sector. Corresponding delineations, e.g. in [72] have to be seen only as examples. Concerning classification / gradation of the different consequences to persons a factor 10 is given exemplarily in [71] and widely used especially in the rail sector: 1 Equivalent fatality = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 100 minor injuries This consequence classification has been used in the further analysis in this document. If any other gradations shall apply, the calculation model allows an easy appliance. Table 58 describes the classification of severity level, which is given exemplarily in [72].

Table 58: Hazard severity level, according to Table 3 in EN 50126-145

Severity Level Consequence to persons or environment Catastrophic Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries and/or major damage to the environment Critical Single fatality and/or severe injury and/or significant damage to the environment Marginal Minor injury and/or significant threat to the environment Insignificant Possible minor injury

So called risk matrices are common tools to express risks in several industry sectors. The semi- qualitative matrix which is given as an example in [72] can be adjusted with the target value for the frequency of occurrence of a hazardous event in order to appoint the reference rate of occurrence 10-9 per operating hour for catastrophic consequences.

Frequency of occurance of a Risk Level hazardous event

Frequent (tbd)

Probable (tbd)

Occasional (tbd)

Remote (tbd)

Improbable (tbd)

Incredible (10-9 per hour) RAC-TS

> 1 fatality or multiple tbd tbd tbd severe injuries Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic

Figure 73: Risk matrix with RAC-TS reference value RAC-TS can be used to calibrate the risk assessment method. For the calibration the tolerable field “RAC-TS” can be extrapolated linear within the matrix. This means that all fields on that line or there under represent tolerable risks. Precondition for the extrapolation is that the categories for severity level at one hand and for the frequency of hazardous events on the other hand are separated by the same factor. An example is shown in Figure 74.

45 Cp. [72].

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Frequency of occurance of a Risk Level hazardous event

Frequent (10-4 per hour) intolerable intolerable intolerable intolerable Factor 10 Probable (10-5 per hour) intolerable intolerable intolerable intolerable Factor 10 Occasional (10-6 per hour) tolerable intolerable intolerable intolerable Factor 10 Remote (10-7 per hour) tolerable tolerable intolerable intolerable Factor 10 -8 tolerable tolerable tolerable intolerable Factor Improbable (10 per hour) 10 Incredible (10-9 per hour) tolerable tolerable tolerable RAC-TS

Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic

Factor 10 Factor 10 Factor 10 Figure 74: Example for calibration of risk matrix

2.5.2.3 Evaluation if RAC-TS is applicable for specific hazard RAC-TS can be applied for the risk assessment directly if 46 • the failure mode relates to a function of the High Speed Rail system and • the potential is catastrophic and • there are no credible barriers to prevent an accident. If these aspects apply, a tolerable hazard rate (THR) of THR < 10-9 per hour can be allocated to the technical function which is related to the specific hazard. Examples for such functions -> hazards are: • Ensure correct setting of points -> undetected wrong setting of points in main line operation; • Ensure adequate breakage -> Loss or inadequate breakage;

2.5.2.4 Estimation / quantification of safety barriers and THR-allocation As described before only in case of immediate potential for a hazardous event the frequency of occurrence for that specific hazardous event can be deducted directly by reading off the corresponding value from the risk matrix (see Figure 75). In all other cases of functional safety the risk matrix has to be applied in respect to the parameters severity level and influence of barriers. Examples for functions that have no credible immediate potential are • Loss of fire extinguishing function; • Loss of emergency exit function; • Loss of service brake. The following example describes the THR-allocation in respect to the parameters severity level and influence of barriers: An actual potential 10 times less than catastrophic consequence would reduce the requirement also by the factor 10 to 10-8 per hour (see example in Figure 75). An additional safety barrier which is effective in 50 % of all cases would reduce the requirement to finally to 5*10-7 per hour.

46 RAC-TS (THR < 10-9 per hour) can not be applied directly, if either the hazard consequence is not catastrophic or there are credible barriers to prevent an accident. In those cases the THR has to be adapted as described in chapter 2.5.2.4.

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Frequency of occurance of a Risk Level hazardous event

Frequent (10-4 per hour) intolerable intolerable intolerable intolerable

Probable (10-5 per hour) intolerable intolerable intolerable intolerable

Occasional (10-6 per hour) tolerable intolerable intolerable intolerable

Remote (10-7 per hour) tolerable tolerable intolerable intolerable

Improbable (10-8 per hour) tolerable tolerable tolerable intolerable

Incredible (10-9 per hour) tolerable tolerable tolerable RAC-TS

Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic

Severity levels of hazard consequence

Figure 75: Risk matrix applied for hazard with lower severity but credible immediate potential For the risk assessment at hand and particularly for the identification and dimensioning of potential consequences the evaluation of data/statistics (see chapter 2.5.3.3) has been used. The existence and potential of credible barriers to prevent accidents depends significantly on the architecture / design of a technical system. The influence of safety barriers regarding the safety of a potential new high-speed rail system in Norway has to be evaluated in a later project phase considering more detailed information concerning the technical solution.

2.5.2.5 Hazard List with THRs As the result of the above described bottom-up-approach a semi-qualitative risk assessment has been worked out. The assessment includes a hazard identification which has been supplemented by qualitative risk estimation. Out of the hazard summary all hazards, which are related to functional safety aspects, have been identified and tolerable hazard rates (THR) for the related system functions have been dedicated. All other hazards that are not related to functional safety aspects are indicated in the hazard list as not applicable for RAC-TS. The hazard list, which represents Annex 9 of the document at hand, is directly linked to the performed top-down risk assessment described in the following chapters. The list includes information regarding causes as well as regarding potential consequences of hazards. This information has also been used to quantify the risks in the different system-variants. Furthermore the hazard list should be seen as a base for following tasks, such as the definition of tolerable hazard rates for safety functions. For this task detailed information regarding the technical design of a potential new high-speed rail system is required in order to determine / quantify the residual risk reduction factors.

2.5.3 Risk Assessment, Top-Down-Approach In addition to the identification of system-level-hazards by the described bottom-up-approach the expected residual risk of a new HSR-system has been evaluated using a top-down- approach for the explicit risk estimation. The purpose of this risk estimation is the calculation of either the expected risk for single persons (individual risk) as well as the risk for the society (collective risk). The top-down-approach for the risk assessment is characterized by the steps described in chapter 2.5.3.1 to chapter 2.5.3.8. The model described in the following is suitable to be fitted accordingly to the awareness / knowledge related to the foreseen technical solution / planning of a potential new Norwegian high-speed rail system in later project phases. A more detailed and / or higher quality of data for key figures (values of calculation parameters) should also be used for an adoption of the suggested calculation model.

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2.5.3.1 Definition of Top-Events In a first step all relevant so-called Top-Events have been defined. Top-Events can be seen as accidents with potential severe consequences. Due to the fact that consequences of specific accidents (e.g. collision) may vary extensively, a differentiation for “collision” as well as for “injury of person / passenger” seems to be reasonable. For the risk assessment at hand the following Top-Events have been identified by evaluation of the hazard identification (see chapter 2.5.2.1 and hazard table in the Annex 9). The list of Top-Events is also in accordance with input on side of JBV. At this point it should be mentioned that in particular JBV’s Sikkerhetshandboken [81] has been very helpful for this risk assessment. • Derailment; • Collision train-train; • Collision train-object; • Fire; • Passenger injured at platform; • Level crossing accidents; • Person injured at track side; • Other accidents.

Figure 76: Top-Events, overview The Top-Event 8 “Other accidents” has been defined in order to consider accidents scenarios which are not related to the first seven Top-Events. For this phase of the risk assessment electric shock accidents and affection by dangerous goods are included in the assessment. Accidents in warehouses, workshops and depots are excluded due to the fact that they are not captured in the available data [83] [84]. The performed top-down-approach considers the different system-variants respectively their specific attributes as described in chapter 2.4. For example the Top-Event “Level crossing accidents” is only relevant for the system variant 1 (upgrade of existing system) because corresponding directives exclude the planning of level crossings for new high-speed rail systems (system-variant 2). Also the scenarios (effects) in case of the occurrence of a Top-Event have to be differentiated in respect of the system- variants (see chapter 2.5.3.4).

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2.5.3.2 Quantification of Top-Events The top-down-approach is based on the expected occurrence of defined Top-Events itself as well as on the supposed severity of potential consequences. For every Top-Event the number of expected events per year had to be determined. In an ideal case this parameter could have been evaluated by analysis of railway statistics of a comparable rail system. At this point it has to be mentioned that European statistics [83] mainly allude to mixed traffic rail systems. Due to this fact those statistics do not enable to directly draw conclusions regarding a potential exclusively high-speed rail system. On the other hand existing Norwegian statistics / data [84] do not consider any high-speed aspects. For the risk assessment at hand the relevant input parameter (number of events per year) has been evaluated by different activities that complement one another: • Analysis of rail statistics and accident reports; • Estimations based on judgement. The first point has been done by evaluation/analysis of available Norwegian rail statistics [84] (see chapter 2.5.3.3.1) as well as other European statistics [83] (see chapter 2.5.3.3.1 and 2.5.3.3.2) and accident reports. On base of those data the expected frequency of occurrence of every Top-Event has been estimated for both system-variants 1 and 2. The main question in this context is, if a potential new High Speed Rail operation would presumably cause changes of the specific accident rates and / or a change of consequences of accidents, which are quantified as equivalent fatalities, compared to the actual Norwegian rail situation. In those cases, where presumable no change is expected, the evaluated data [83] [84] for either accident rates or number of equivalent fatalities have been applied. For all other cases the degree of the presumable change of both aspects has been determined by estimation. Reasons and underlying thoughts/considerations are stated as well as suggestions regarding possible adoptions of the risk model in further project phases. Evaluations of further and more detailed statistics, e.g. JBV accident /incident statistics and reports, are advised to minimize the level of uncertainty of the risk assessment for a potential new Norwegian high-speed rail system.

2.5.3.3 Top-Event, evaluation of rail statistics

2.5.3.3.1 Top-Event, Norwegian rail statistics For this analysis local data with focus on the Norway Rail System is crucial. The national rail safety authority “Statens Jernbane tilsyn” releases annual reports concerning safety and accident statistics [84]. Events per year can be evaluated by analysis of this railway statistics. According to the scope of work appropriate figures are needed in relation to the determined Top-Events. The data source [84] provide figures and detailed description incidents but in a difficult way to evaluate statistically. Reasons for that are: • No existence of figures with direct, clear relation to mentioned Top-Events; • Different type of data is reported in different ways during the years; • Change of definitions (e.g. “railway accident”, and “severe injury”) in the meantime; • Change of classifications of events (damage) and definition of requirements for the classification; • Only accidents or events over a certain size (severity) are reported. This statistic data is published with direct relation to any damage. The total railway traffic is considered in this report. So events which appear without mentioning and notification are disregarded. For an exact consideration that part has to be measured. In addition there exists lack of data. So a continuous and transparent evaluation isn’t possible. Because of that the following evaluations were made and some conclusions were drawn:

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Average number of derailments has decreased over the last 50 years (40 per year to 5 to 10 per year in 2009). The most derailments today appear on freight trains. Furthermore it becomes considerable that today’s derailments don’t cause any fatalities or severe injuries under normal circumstances. Damages on material and/or environment are the consequences which have to be considered. Also the number of level crossing accidents has decreased during the last 50 years from an average of 40 per year to 5 to 10 per year. During the years 1995 and 2004 a sum of 116 level crossing accidents occurred. Because of that, a number of 28 persons were killed and 8 persons were severely injured. The outcome of the Top-Event “collision train-train” varies in the period 1978 to 2005 between 0 and 5 accidents per year. The trend is constant with an average of slightly more than one collision per year. This is the type of accident that has caused the most fatalities (passengers and employees). Due to the fact of the difficult evaluation it has not been possible to extract the exact numbers of fatalities. Catastrophic collisions with multiple fatalities occur, but not frequently, the latest occurred in year 2000. The occurrence of “collision train-object” varies extremely over the last years. Between 1978 and 2005 an amount of 0 to 17 accidents appears per year. The trend is slightly increasing with an average level around 6 accidents per year. It has been estimated that about the half of these accidents are due to slide of snow, ice or stone. One scenario for person injured at platform is when using the entrance system to get in or off the train. Since the changed definition of railway accidents in this statistic this Top-Event presumes only vehicle in motion. That means, accidents related to the entrance system are not reported in the reports after 2003. Before 2003 several severe injuries were mentioned in the description (employees and 3rd party), unfortunately no figures were presented. Also no figures were published concerning the Top-Event “fire”. For fire in vehicle some severe injuries are mentioned because of the consequence of smoke inhalation. We also know that there has been a severe fire accident in Åsta. It has not been possible to separate the Top-Event “person injured at track side” from “person injured at level crossing” before year 2006. In addition several (84) incidents without consequences mentioned in year 2000 normally closed to Top-Event “person injured at track side”. But in the same year there have been some fatalities and severe injuries.

2.5.3.3.2 Other Data Sources The following data sources have been assessed additionally to the statistical data above: • ERADIS - Common Safety Indicators Database from ERA (ERADIS-CSID) • UIC Safety Database (UIC-SDB) Up to the year 2005 information on safety performance of the European railways has been difficult to find. The Safety Directive 2004/49 introduces common safety indicators (CSIs), which have to be collected by the national safety authorities and delivered to the ERA. Due to this fact a standardized method for collecting and reporting accident data has been accomplished for the years 2006-2009. The ERADIS-CSID reports accumulated accident data for each supplying country (29 countries + Eurotunnel). For the report at hand, the accident statistics of Germany, France, Norway and Sweden have been evaluated. The UIC Safety Database (UIC-SDB) is an internet application organised within the Infrastructure Forum activities. It is continuously maintained and developed in agreement with the Safety Platform, according to the necessities introduced by safety managers and EU bodies. The Safety Platform brings together safety directors (or employees with a comparable remit in line with the job titles used and corporate structure) from member companies of the UIC. Amongst these is a mixture of Infrastructure Managers and Railway Undertakings as well as a

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 192 of (270) number of organisations such as ATOC in the UK, representing groups of railway companies. This plenary structure is then supported by a core group made up of UIC member companies based in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United States of America. Considerable additional independence is provided by having representatives from organisations such as the Community of the European Railways (CER), European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) and Railway Safety Standards and Boards (RSSB) in Europe and FRA/AAR in the USA. Overall 20 European countries supply accident data to the UIC-SDB and for the statistical analysis all data has been evaluated.

2.5.3.3.3 Definitions The UIC database collects all significant accidents (any accident causing at least one fatality or serious injury or damage over 150 k€ or tracks blocked for more than 6 hours). Accidents in warehouses, workshops and depots are excluded. Accident classifications used are: • Collisions o train collision with an obstacle o train collision with another train • Derailment • Accidents to person caused by rolling stock in motion o individual hit by train o individual falling from a train • Fire in rolling stock • Accidents involving dangerous goods o without dangerous goods release o in which dangerous goods are released • Electrocution by traction power • Other The ERADIS database uses another definition of typical accidents according to the Safety Directive 2004/49: • Collisions of trains, including collisions with obstacles within the clearance gauge • Derailments of trains • Level-crossing accidents, including accidents involving pedestrians at level-crossings • Accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion, with the exception of suicides • Fires in rolling stock • Others

2.5.3.3.4 Evaluation procedure UIC (20 supporting countries) and ERADIS (as already stated Germany, France, Norway and Sweden) accumulated accident data (number of accidents, fatalities and serious injuries divided in passengers, staff and third persons) from the years 2006-2009 were imported into an MS- Excel database together with the accumulated train kilometres for each year. Then accident rates in number of accidents per train km for each type of accident were calculated by calculating accident rates for each year and taking the mean over four years. Equivalent fatality

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 193 of (270) rates based on the commonly known approach to count 10 seriously injured persons as equivalent to 1 fatality were calculated for each group of affected persons based on the UIC database. To be able to compare the results of the different accident definitions a mapping table was introduced, as well as a mapping table with the top event definition introduced with the report at hand. The results based on the UIC database are shown in the following table:

Table 59: Accident statistics UIC

Top-Event Accident rate per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatality rate per accident

Collision train-object 2.0E-08 4.3E-09 0.21

Collision train-train 7.4E-09 8.8E-10 0.12

Derailment 2.3E-08 3.1E-09 0.14

Other 1.2E-08 6.9E-09 0.60

Passenger injured at platform 1.7E-07 8.1E-08 0.48

Person injured at level crossing 1.4E-07 8.7E-08 0.63

Person injured at track side 2.0E-07 1.5E-07 0.72

Fire in rolling stock 6.3E-09 1.5E-10 0.02

Accident rates for the Norwegian rail network based on the ERADIS database:

Table 60: Accident statistics Norway ERADIS

Top-Event Accident rate per train km

Collision train-object 1.1E-07

Collision train-train 7.4E-09

Derailment 4.9E-08

Other 1.2E-08

Passenger injured at platform 1.7E-07

Person injured at level crossing 3.3E-08

Person injured at track side 5.5E-08

Fire in rolling stock 4.3E-08

If we now assume that the fatalities per type of accident should be the same for Norway as compared to 20 European countries and the distribution of the fatality rates for the different exposed person groups follows the same patterns as well, we get the following risks of fatality per year (assuming accumulated 48 Mio. train km) and person group:

Table 61: Distribution of fatalities to person groups, UIC

Top-Event Other Passengers Staff

Collision train-object 73.9% 11.6% 14.5%

Collision train-train 14.3% 21.4% 64.3%

Derailment 62.0% 22.0% 16.0%

Other 91.9% 3.6% 4.5%

Passenger injured at platform 86.6% 9.3% 4.1%

Person injured at level crossing 99.1% 0.2% 0.6%

Person injured at track side 95.7% 2.3% 2.0%

Fire in rolling stock 8.9% 89.4% 1.6%

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Table 62: Collective Risk parameters Norway

Top-Event Accident rate Fatalities per Fatalities per Fatalities per Fatalities per per train km year-collective year-other year-passengers year-staff

Collision train-object 1.1E-07 1.16 0.85 0,13 0,17

Collision train-train 7.4E-09 0.04 0.01 0,01 0,03

Derailment 4.9E-08 0.32 0.20 0,07 0,05

Other 1.2E-08 0.33 0.31 0,01 0,02

Passenger injured at platform 1.7E-07 3.89 3.37 0,36 0,16

Person injured at level crossing 3.3E-08 0.98 0.97 0,00 0,01

Person injured at track side 5.5E-08 1.90 1.82 0,04 0,04

Fire in rolling stock 4.3E-08 0.01 0.00 0,01 0,00

7.53 0.64 0.46

Comparing the results with the mean number of fatalities and severe injuries reported in [84] during the same period 2006-2009 we note a good correlation keeping in mind that accidents at platforms with train not moving (stations) are no longer reported in [84]:

Table 63: Comparison of risk parameters

Fatalities per year - Fatalities per year - Fatalities per year - other passengers staff

Risk model 7.53 0.64 0.46

Norwegian data source [94] 1.60 0.60 0.33

2.5.3.4 Evaluation of accident rate This chapter includes a description of evaluation of accident rates using the example of the Top- Event “Fire”. Based on the accident rates evaluated by available statistical data [83] [84], a prediction of the expected change of the specific accident rate related to the system-variant 1 or 2 has been the next step within the risk assessment. In this context the hazards as well as causes related to each Top-Event have been examined. The number of causes and the character of the causes itself has been considered for the estimation of the expected accident rates. As an example for the principal approach the following figure shows the fault trees for the Top-Event “Fire”. The green colour is used to label elements in the diagrams (fault trees as well as event trees) which can be quantified by the evaluation of the statistical data [83] [84].

Figure 77: Fire, causes

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“Fire at track” is not specifically comprehended in the available data and therefore this aspect could not be quantified. It is supposed that “fire at track” does not influence the resulting risk related to fire significantly. As it can be seen in the figure above, two different major events may cause fire. None of both events is specifically related to high-speed rail systems and therefore for the Top-Event “Fire” no presumable change of the accident rate compared to the existing railway net has to be expected and the parameter can be estimated as:

ΔλA = 1

2.5.3.5 Consequence analysis for every Top-Event Another core area within the risk assessment has been the prediction of potential consequences. Consequences can be expressed as described before as equivalent fatalities (see chapter 2.5.2.2) per accident. For every Top-Event presumable changes of the so called fatality rate have been evaluated for the defined system-variants. Therefore it has been necessary to proof if the new potential high speed traffic would influence directly the number of (equivalent) fatalities in case of an accident. As an example for the principal approach the following figure shows the event tree for the hazard “fire in rolling stock”.

Figure 78: Fire, consequence analysis As it can be seen different accident scenarios may occur. “Severe fire” represents fire in a train, which is stuck inside a tunnel or can not leave it. The second scenario represents fire inside a car in open track or at station/depot. For the system-variant 1 no presumable change of the fatality rate compared to the existing rail net has to be expected.

ΔλF = 1

For the system-variant 2 a potential increase of the fatality rate (Δλf > 1) is expected due to an increased percentage of track inside tunnels for the new system compared to the existing rail net and due to the expected higher number of passengers which may be exposed to the hazard.

2.5.3.6 Estimation / calculation of the collective risk According to CLC/TR 50126-2 [71] risk mathematically is represented as = (ofRateRisk accidents) × harmofseverityofDegree )( The collective risk has been determined for every Top-Event and if relevant data were available also for specific scenarios. The multiplication of the accident rate (evaluated / estimated number of events per year of every Top-Event) with the fatality rate (number of equivalent fatalities per accident) results in a value for the collective risk (equivalent fatalities (EqFa) per year).

R . − iEventTopcoll = Δλ ⋅ λ ⋅ Δλ ⋅ λ iTopFiTopFiTopAiTopA

λA Top i = Accident rate (for a specific Top-Event i); λF Top i = Fatality rate (for a specific Top-Event i) Due to the fact that accidents may affect passengers and/or personal and/or 3rd persons, a differentiation of the collective risk value between these groups has been done for every Top-

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Event. The differentiation is based on the percentage distribution regarding affected persons which has been evaluated by European data (see Table 61).

Collective risk for passengers Collision Collective risk Consequences Collective risk train –train for 3rd people Collective risk for personal Fatality rate Accident rate [ Equivalent fatalities [ Equivalent fatalities [ Equivalent fatalities [ Events / year] / year] / year] / year]

Figure 79: Derivation of the collective risk

2.5.3.7 Residual collective risk for every system-variant By calculation of the resulting collective risk for every system-variant the proof of the first risk acceptance criteria (see chapter 2.5.1.2) can be achieved.

n R rescoll .. ∑ ⋅= λλ iTopFiTopA i=1 The addition of all determined collective risks of the different Top-Events results in an indication for the resulting collective risk (equivalent fatalities per year). This calculation has been done for both system-variants. An overview of the residual collective risk is shown in Table 52.

Resulting collective x Fatalities / risk for Top-Event 1 year

Resulting collective x Fatalities / risk for Top-Event 2 year System-variant x Fatalities / specific residual Resulting collective x Fatalities / year risk for Top-Event 3 year collective risk . . . .

Resulting collective x Fatalities / risk for Top-Event 8 year

Figure 80: Example of derivation of the residual collective risk

2.5.3.8 Individual risk for every Top-Event As described in chapter 2.5.3.6 the collective risk related to passengers and/or personal and/or 3rd persons has been determined. By calculation of the resulting individual risk for the specific groups of persons and of every system-variant the proof of the second risk acceptance criteria (see chapter 2.5.1.2) can be achieved. Therefore the division of the calculated collective risk (equivalent fatalities per year) values with the number of affected persons (passengers, personal, residents etc.) 47 results in the individual risk.

47 The assumed number of passengers per year shall be seen exemplarily. The authors advise further evaluation of statistics in order to justify the assumptions.

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assumed 3.000.000 passengers / year

Resulting collective risk Resulting individual risk

3,15 1,05e-7 Equivalent Fatalities / Equivalent Fatalities / year person * year

passengers Figure 81: Example of derivation of the individual risk Mathematically the coherency between collective and individual risk can be simplified described as following: R R = ; systemcoll − jiant .var ; systemind − jiant .var n

Rind; system-variant j individual risk for a single user of the system (-variant) j or an individual which is affected / exposed by the system(-variant) j

Rcoll; system-variant j collective risk of the system (-variant) j n number of users of the system(-variant) j or number of individuals which are affected / exposed by the system(-variant) j The calculations regarding the individual risk for the different groups of persons is based on the operating figures:

Table 64: Operating figures

Persons Number Comment

Passengers 3’000’000 (individual) According to "Presentasjon av Jernbaneverket mai 2010", presented on JBV home passengers page, more than 5’.000’000 passengers travelled by train in 2009. The supposed number of 3 Mio. (individual) passengers is deduced by a average of approximately 20 train rides per individual and year.

Personal 13’500’000 working Source: ERADIS [83]. The number of working hours is considered to include all hours personal of JBV and outside companies.

3rd people 3’000’000 people Conservative estimation considering that not every person in Norway (∼ 5’000’000 residents) is exposed and / or affected by the railway system.

An overview of the resulting individual risks fort he different Top-Events is shown in Table 52.

2.5.3.9 Residual individual risk Analogous to the calculation of the resulting collective risk for every system-variant in compliance to the second risk acceptance criteria (see chapter 2.5.1.2) can be checked.

n R indPG . = ∑ R . iTopindPG i=1 The sum of all determined individual risks of the different Top-Events considering the different groups of individuals results in an indication for the resulting individual risk (fatalities per person * year). This calculation has been done for both system-variants.

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Resulting individual x Fatalities / risk for Top-Event 1 person * year

Resulting individual x Fatalities / risk for Top-Event 2 person * year System-variant x Fatalities / specific residual Resulting individual x Fatalities / person * year risk for Top-Event 3 person * year individual risk . .

Resulting individual x Fatalities / risk for Top-Event 8 person * year

Figure 82: Example of derivation of the residual individual risk An overview of the residual individual risk is shown in Table 52.

2.5.3.10 Top-Event-specific risk assessment The following chapters 2.5.3.10.1 to 2.5.3.10.8 include detailed descriptions regarding risk- evaluation and –predictions for the two system-variants considered in this document. It should be noted that at this stage of the risk assessment the shown combined fault and event trees are not exhaustive and are shown only to facilitate information of possible risk influencing factors. The calculated (equivalent) fatalities per year and following the values concerning residual individual risks are based on the Norwegian average of 48 Mio. train kilometres per year and a supposed5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

2.5.3.10.1 Top-Event 1, Derailment “Derailment” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 1 in this risk assessment. Based on Norwegian statistics [84] and the data related to “Derailment” the parameters for the risk assessment of Top-Event 1 as shown in Table 65 have been evaluated.

Table 65: Top-Event 1, statistical data48

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year Derailment 4.9E-9 3.1E-9 0.14 0.32

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and/or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts / considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and/or consequences. On the other hand the diagrams consist of some elements (displayed in white colour), which do influence either the hazard rate or the consequences can not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. System-variant 1: Figure 83 combines a fault tree to show causes which might lead to derailment as well as an event tree to display potential consequences related to system-variant 1.

48 Cp. [84].

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Figure 83: Top-Event 1 „Derailment“, system-variant 1 The evaluation of Norwegian statistics [83] shows that derailments are mainly caused by failures of infrastructural equipment (e.g. rail, switches, interlocking blocks etc.). A minor contingent is related to technical failures onside rolling stock (e.g. breakage of wheels/axles/rail). The speed itself has not been identified as a major factor/cause for derailment even if considering that a derailment might be caused by overspeed through a speed restriction. The higher forces on e.g. wheels or axles have to be compensated by adequate dimensioning/design. Due to an increased average speed the risk of derailment caused by side wind is supposed to be slightly higher as in the existing rail net, but appropriate windbreaks could be used to avoid a higher risk. Considering these aspects a differentiation regarding the accident rate for derailment on existing mixed rail traffic on one hand and for system-variant 1 on the other hand seems not to be required and in this phase of the risk assessment factor 1 regarding the potential change of the accident rate has been estimated:

ΔλA = 1 The evaluation of Norwegian statistics [59] further shows that the major contingent of derailments is supposed not to be followed by collisions. Anyway, the fatality rate per derailment is supposed to be higher in a High Speed Rail system as in the existing Norwegian Rail system due to the possibility of derailments followed by crashes and / or collisions, which would include higher kinetic energy due to an increased speed (estimated average speed of 120 km/h for system-variant 1 compared to an estimated average speed of 50 km/h in the existing net). The proportion of the masses of new high speed trains to conventional passenger trains (estimated to 1.5) is another factor which has to be considered. The accident rate also depends on the number of exposed persons, which presumably would be higher in system-variant 1 compared to the existing net (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains). 1202 400 λ 5.1 ⋅⋅=Δ TopF 2 502 100 An estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:

ΔλF = 35

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System-variant 2: Regarding to “Derailment” Figure 84 shows causes as well as potential consequences related to system-variant 2. The main difference to system-variant 1 is the exclusion of derailments followed by collisions with other trains on adjacent track.

Figure 84: Top-Event 1 „Derailment“, system-variant 2 For system-variant 2, the consequence analysis should consider higher average speed and the higher number of tunnels. As an influencing parameter a potential higher risk due to side wind have to be considered. In this phase of the risk assessment these factors can not be quantified due to lack of data. On the other hand for a new (exclusively) high-speed rail system, the probability of derailment and so the accident rate is supposed to be lower than in system- variant 1 as well as in the existing railway net, due to a more stable track and a reduced number of equipment (e.g. switches, interlocking blocks etc.) and less maintenance. As these factors influence the accident rate but can not be quantified at this phase of the risk assessment a factor 0.5 regarding the potential change of the accident rate for system-variant 2 has been estimated:

ΔλA = 0.5 The authors advise further analysis of causes, particularly side wind effects, related to derailment as well as the evaluation off reliable data / statistics concerning probability/frequency of derailment in exclusively high-speed rail systems in order to justify the assumptions. The fatality rate per derailment for system-variant 2 is influenced by different factors such as: • Accident scenario after derailment (crash and/or following collisions); • Higher kinetic energy in case of crash or collision may increase the fatality rate; • Higher number of exposed passengers may increase the fatality rate; • A higher percentage of railroad embankments, cambers, tunnels and bridges may increase the fatality rate because of potential more serious crashes/collisions after derailment; • Reduced passing of urban agglomerations and industrial areas may decrease the fatality rate. Analogous to the evaluation of system-variant 1 the major factors influencing the consequences which can be quantified are the resulting kinetic energy and the exposed passengers.

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2502 400 λ 5.1 ⋅⋅=Δ TopF 2 502 100 An estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:

ΔλF = 150 It should be noted that the risk of a violation of the train envelope may increase at higher train speed as well due to the fact that there exists a linear relationship of the quantity of derailed cars in relation to train speed which ultimately enhances the fatality rate per derailment. Table 66 gives an overview of the chosen parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

Table 66: Risk estimation, Top-Event 1

Top-Event 1: Derailment

λ per λ per train Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 4.9E-8 - - 0.14 - 0.14 0.32

System-Variant 1 4.9E-8 1 4.9E-8 0.14 35 4.71 + 0.579

System-Variant 2 4.9E-8 0.5 2.5E-8 0.14 150 20.44 + 1.256

Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 66 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 67.

Table 67: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 1

Top-Event 1: Derailment, collective risk

Fatalities Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 62.0% 0.199 0,559 0,979

Passengers 0.322 22.0% 0.071 0,197 0,346

Personal 16.0% 0.051 0,143 0,251

0.322 0.899 1.576

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed/affected persons.

Table 68: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 1

Top-Event 1: Derailment, individual risk

Number of exposed Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Persons / affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 6.65E-08 1.86E-07 3.26E-07

Passengers 3’000’000 2.36E-08 6.60E-08 1.16E-07

Personal 7’500 6.86E-06 1.92E-05 3.37E-05

6,95E-06 1.95E-05 3.41E-05

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 202 of (270) expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84]. As accident statistics [83] [84] show, consequences in case of a derailment may come up in very different spectrums. Derailment with only minor or severe outcome is possible, but also catastrophic outcome like rollover are realistic. At the end of the consequences spectrum worst case accidents, e.g. derailment followed by collision with edifices (buildings, bridges etc.) or with other train on adjacent track are extreme unusual but can not be excluded completely. It has also to be mentioned that any catastrophic accident like for example the ICE-accident in Germany, Eschede [86] would lead to a massive exceedance of defined risk acceptance criteria (either individual or collective risk).

2.5.3.10.2 Top-Event 2, Collision train-train “Collision train-train” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 2 in this risk assessment. Due to no data related to “Collision train- train” in Norwegian statistics [84] the accident rate evaluated in [83] , which is shown in Table 69, has been used as the basis for the risk assessment for Top-Event 2.

Table 69: Top-Event 2, statistical data [83]

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year Collision train-train 7.4E-9 8.8E-10 0.12 0.04

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and / or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts / considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and/or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84].

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System-variant 1: Figure 85 and Figure 86 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to collisions train- train as well as an event tree to display potential consequences related to system-variant 1.

Collision HS- train with freight train

no yes Wrong switch Automatic train Train approaching Side Collision HS- position stop on other track collision train with maintenance vehicle yes no Rear end collision Collision HS- train with conv. Head-on passenger train collision

Collision HS- train with other HS-train

Command Collision HS- Human error Switch failure failure train with freight train

Side Collision HS- yes collision train with maintenance vehicle Train approaching Rear end on other track collision Collision HS- train with conv. no Head-on passenger train collision

Collision HS- train with other HS-train

Safe state

Figure 85: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, wrong switch position

Figure 86: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, stop signal passed

The evaluation of Norwegian statistics [59] shows that collisions train-train are mainly caused by failures of infrastructural equipment (e.g. rail, switches, interlocking blocks etc.). The speed itself has not been identified as a major factor / cause for collision train-train. A small influence might be the higher braking distance at higher speeds.

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Considering this aspect a differentiation regarding the accident rate for collision train-train on existing mixed rail traffic on one hand and for system-variant 1 on the other hand seems not to be required and in this phase of the risk assessment factor 1 has been estimated:

ΔλA = 1 The fatality rate per collision train to train is supposed to be higher in a High Speed Rail system as in the existing Norwegian Rail system. Reasons may be on one hand higher kinetic energy in case of collision due to due the higher average speed (estimated 120 km/h for system-variant 1 compared to estimated 50 km/h in the existing net) and on the other hand the presumed higher number of potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains). The proportion of the masses of new high speed trains to conventional passenger trains (estimated to 1.5) is another factor which has to be considered. 1202 400 λ 5.1 ⋅⋅=Δ TopF 2 502 100 It is supposed that a major contingent of collisions between train in the existing Norwegian net as well as in other countries is related to collisions of shunting locomotives at low speed. An estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:

ΔλF = 35 System-variant 2: Figure 87 and Figure 88 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to collisions train- train as well as an event tree to display potential consequences related to system-variant 2.

no yes Wrong switch Automatic train Train approaching Side Collision HS- position stop on other track collision train with maintenance vehicle yes no Rear end collision Collision HS- train with other Head-on HS-train collision

Command Human error Switch failure failure

Side Collision HS- yes collision train with maintenance vehicle Train approaching Rear end on other track collision Collision HS- train with other no Head-on HS-train collision

Safe state

Figure 87: FTA / ETA system-variant 2, wrong switch position

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Figure 88: FTA / ETA system-variant 2, stop signal passed As described before collisions train-train are mainly caused by failures of infrastructural equipment (e.g. rail, switches, interlocking blocks etc.). Considering this aspect the accident rate for collision train-train in system-variant 2 is supposed to be lower due to a reduced number of potential collision points (train passing points) and less trains in operation. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a reduction by the factor 100 for the accident rate of collision train-train seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 0.01 The fatality rate per collision train to train is supposed to be even higher as it has been estimated for the system-variant 1. Collisions in system-variant 2 may only occur between high speed trains or maintenance vehicles and high speed trains. Analogous to the evaluation of system-variant 1 the major factors influencing the consequences are the resulting kinetic energy and the exposed passengers. 2502 400 λ 5.1 ⋅⋅=Δ TopF 2 502 100 An estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:

ΔλF = 150 Table 70 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5 % additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

Table 70: Risk estimation, Top-Event 2

Top-Event 2: Collision train-train

λ per λ per train km Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 7.4E-9 - - 0.12 - 0.12 0.04

System-Variant 1 7.4E-9 1 7.4E-9 0.12 35 4.10 + 0.076

System-Variant 2 7.4E-9 0.01 7.4E-11 0.12 150 17.79 + 0.003

Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 70 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 71.

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Table 71: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 2

Top-Event 2: Collision train-train

Fatalities Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 14.3% 0.006 0.017 0.006

Passengers 0.042 21.4% 0.009 0.025 0.010

Personal 64.3% 0.027 0.078 0.029

0.042 0.120 0.045

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed/affected persons.

Table 72: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 2

Top-Event 2: Collision train-train

Number of exposed / Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Persons affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 2.00E-09 5.61E-09 2.16E-09

Passengers 3’000’000 3.00E-09 8.39E-09 3.23E-09

Personal 7’500 3.60E-06 1.01E-05 3.88E-06

3.61E-06 1.01E-05 3.89E-06

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

2.5.3.10.3 Top-Event 3, Collision train-object “Collision train-object” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 3 in this risk assessment. On base of Norwegian statistics [84] and the data related to “Collision train-object” the parameters for the risk assessment of Top-Event 3 as shown in Table 73 have been evaluated.

Table 73: Top-Event 3, statistical data [84]

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year

Collision train-object 1.1E-7 4.3E-9 0.21 1.16

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa per train km) and / or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts/considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and/or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. Figure 89 combines a fault tree to show causes which might lead to collisions train-object as well as an event tree to display potential consequences. The diagram is related to both system- variants 1 and 2.

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Figure 89: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, object on track System-variant 1: Collisions train-objects are mainly caused by environmental / climatic situations or human failures. Human failures in this context may be on one hand lost or forgotten parts / tools mainly related to repair- and maintenance activities and on the other hand lost freight or lost train-parts. Heavy snowfall and very low temperatures are the main reasons for collisions with banks of snow and/or ice. Landslip and/or falling rocks represent another main cause for Top-Event 3. The specific Norwegian environmental/climatic situations are supposed to be responsible for a higher accident rate for “collision with object” compared to the European average (see Table 59 and Table 60). Regarding the causes displayed in Figure 18 a differentiation between system- variant 1 and the existing railway system in Norway seems not to be required. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the accident rate of collision train-object seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 1.0 The fatality rate per collision train to object is supposed to be higher in a High Speed Rail system as in the existing Norwegian Rail system. As for other Top-Events (derailment, collision train-train) reasons may be on one hand higher kinetic energy in case of collision due to due the mass ratio (estimated to 1,5 for new high speed trains compared to conventional passenger trains), the higher average speed (estimated 120 km/h for system-variant 1 compared to estimated 50 km/h in the existing net) and on the other hand the presumed higher number of potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains). 1202 400 λ 5.1 ⋅⋅=Δ TopF 2 502 100 An estimated increase of the fatality rate as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:

ΔλF = 35 System-variant 2: The accident rate for collision train-object in system-variant 2 is supposed to be lower as in the existing net. The exclusively operation of modern high speed trains should lead to a perceptible decreased probability of lost train-parts. The loosening of freight can be more or less excluded and due to less maintenance work at the more stable track the probability of lost or forgotten tools / parts should also lead to a reduced accident rate. As for other Top-Events, respectively their potential causes the problem is the missing quantification of these aspects due to missing

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 208 of (270) data. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a reduction by the factor 2 for the accident rate of collision train-object seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 0.5 The fatality rate per collision train to objects is supposed to be even higher in as it has been estimated for the system-variant 1. Analogous to the evaluation of system-variant 1 the major factors influencing the consequences are supposed to be the resulting kinetic energy and the exposed passengers. 2502 400 λ 5.1 ⋅⋅=Δ TopF 2 502 100 An estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:

ΔλF = 150 Table 74 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

Table 74: Risk estimation, Top-Event 3

Top-Event 3: Collision train-object

λ per λ per train Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 1.1E-7 - - 0.21 - - 1.16

System-Variant 1 1.1E-7 1 1.1E-7 0.21 35 7.29 + 2.079

System-Variant 2 1.1E-7 0.50 5.7E-8 0.21 150 31.62 + 4.513

As an important further conclusion of the calculation the relatively high influence of Top-Event 3 “collision train-object” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated. Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 74 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 75.

Table 75: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 3

Top-Event 3: Collision train-object

Fatalities Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 73.9% 0.854 2.390 4.189

Passengers 1.160 11.6% 0.134 0.375 0.657

Personal 14.5% 0.168 0.469 0.822

1.160 3.235 5.668

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed / affected persons.

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 209 of (270)

Table 76: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 3

Top-Event 3: Collision train-object

Number of exposed Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Persons / affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 2.85E-07 7.97E-07 1.40E-06

Passengers 3’000’000 4.47E-08 1.25E-07 2.19E-07

Personal 7’500 2.23E-05 6.25E-05 1.10E-04

2.27E-05 6.35E-05 1.11E-04

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

2.5.3.10.4 Top-Event 4, Fire “Fire” is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 4. Norwegian statistics [84] as well as the available European data [83] do only specify „Fire in rolling stock“. The data as shown in Table 77 have been evaluated for the risk assessment of Top-Event 4.

Table 77: Top-Event 4, statistical data49

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year

Fire in rolling stock 4.3E-8 1.5E-10 0.02 0.05

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and/or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts/considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and / or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. Figure 90 and Figure 91 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to fire as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The diagrams are related to both system- variants 1 and 2.

49 Cp. [84].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 210 of (270)

Fire extinguished no Train stuck in yes Fire in rolling stock by system or tunnel or can not Severe fire person leave it

yes no Fire in car

Safe state

Fire in rolling Fire due to stock unruly person equipment

Figure 90: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire in rolling stock

Fire extinguished no Train affected by yes Train stuck in yes Fire at track by system or fire tunnel or can not Severe fire person leave it

no yes no

Fire in car

Fire at infrastructure / environment

Fire in track- Fire along the Fire due to equipment trackside unruly person Safe state

Figure 91: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire at track System-variant 1: Fires in rolling stock or at track are mainly caused by overheating of technical equipment and / or leakage of easily flammable substances (e.g. fuel). The major contingent is supposed to be human misbehaviour (e.g. smoking or malicious arson), but the available data [83] [84] do not include information concerning the detected causes of fires in the past. A higher number of passengers (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) may implicate a higher risk for fire caused by persons. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 4 for the accident rate of fire in rolling stock seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 4.0 The fatality rate in case of fire in rolling stock is supposed to be higher in system-variant 1 as in the existing Norwegian Rail system due to the presumed higher number of potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains). Another aspect is the design of modern high speed trains which is typically represented by continuously open compartments. This aspect which may increase the risk of expansion of fire to other vehicles still can not be quantified on base of the evaluated statistics [83] [84] and therefore an estimated increase of factor 4 (based on the supposed number of passengers) for the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 4.0

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System-variant 2: Considering the aspects described above for the system-variant 1 a factor 4 (ratio of exposed number of passengers) for the accident rate of fire in rolling stock in system-variant 2 seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 4.0 The fatality rate in case of fire in rolling stock is supposed to be higher in system-variant 2 as in the existing Norwegian Rail system due to the presumed higher number of potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) and the design of modern high speed trains with continuously open compartments. This aspect as described before may increase the risk of expansion of fire to other vehicles. On the other hand modern high speed trains are rigged with fire alarm- and extinguishing systems. Another factor which may increase the fatality rate is the supposed higher percentage of track inside tunnels. A quantification of these aspects has not been possible on base of the evaluated statistics [83] [84] and therefore an estimated increase of factor 8 (factor 4 based on the supposed number of passengers and factor 2 considering the higher contingent of tunnels) for the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 8.0. Table 78 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

Table 78: Risk estimation, Top-Event 4

Top-Event 2: Fire in rolling stock

λ per λ per train Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 4.3E-8 - - 0.02 - - 0.05

System-Variant 1 4.3E-8 4.00 1.7E-7 0.02 4.00 0.10 + 0.041

System-Variant 2 4.3E-8 4.00 1.7E-7 0.02 8.00 0.19 + 0.082

As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 4 “Fire” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated. Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 78 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 79.

Table 79: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 4

Top-Event 4: Fire

Fatalities Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 8.9% 0.004 0.008 0.012

Passengers 0.049 89.4% 0.044 0.081 0.117

Personal 1.6% 0.001 0.001 0.002

0.049 0.090 0.131

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed/affected persons.

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Table 80: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 4

Top-Event 4: Fire

Number of exposed Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Persons / affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 1.46E-09 2.67E-09 3.89E-09

Passengers 3’000’000 1.46E-08 2.68E-08 3.91E-08

Personal 7’500 1.05E-07 1.92E-07 2.80E-07

1.21E-07 2.22E-07 3.23E-07

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

2.5.3.10.5 Top-Event 5, passenger injured at platform “Passenger injured at platform” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 5 in this risk assessment. Due to no data related to “Passenger injured at platform” in Norwegian statistics [84] the accident rate evaluated in [83] , which is shown in Table 81, has been used as the basis for the risk assessment for Top-Event 5.

Table 81: Top-Event 5, statistical data50

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year

Passenger injured at 1.7E-7 8.1E-8 0.48 3.89 platform

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa per train km) and/or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts/considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and/or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. Figure 92 and Figure 93 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to persons injured at platform as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The diagrams are related to both system-variants 1 and 2.

50 Cp. [84].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 213 of (270)

Figure 92: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform while entry /exit

Figure 93: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform by passing train System-variant 1: As statistics show the most injuries at platforms are related to entries/exits of passengers. Causes can be inadequate operation processes/human failures as well as technical failures of the door system and its monitoring equipment. Regarding these aspects a differentiation between system-variant 1 compared to the existing railway net seem not to be required. The second case, persons may come inside the train clearance profile can also be caused by different aspects as shown in figure 22. High speed of passing trains can lead to pulls at the platform. Especially small children and older persons may be affected by this scenario. Anyway a quantification of a potential increase of risk is not possible at this phase of the risk assessment and therefore as a first consideration a factor 1 for the accident rate of “persons injured at platform” seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 1.0 The fatality rate for “persons injured at platform” is also not supposed to be higher in system- variant 1 and therefore a factor 1 for a potential change of the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 1.0

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System-variant 2: The accident rate in system-variant 2 is influenced by different aspects: • A reduced number of stops of high speed trains and so less entries / exits may decrease the accident rate; • Longer stops and special operation processes may decrease the accident rate; • Suction at platform is expected to be higher and may increase the accident rate. These potential causes are displayed in white colour in figure 21 and 22 and can not be quantified by the evaluation of the available data. As first estimation for the change of the accident rate of “persons injured at platform” a reduction by factor 10 in system-variant 2 seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA = 0.1 The fatality rate for “persons injured at platform” is also not supposed to be higher in system- variant 2 and therefore a factor 1 for a potential change of the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 1.0 Table 82 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

Table 82: Risk estimation, Top-Event 5

Top-Event 5: Persons injured at platform

λ per λ per train Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 1.7E-7 - - 0.48 - - 3.89

System-Variant 1 1.7E-7 1.00 1.7E-7 0.48 1.00 0.48 + 0.203

System-Variant 2 1.7E-7 0.10 1.7E-8 0.48 1.00 0.48 + 0.020

As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 5 “Persons injured at platform” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated. Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 82 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 83.

Table 83: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 5

Top-Event 5: Persons injured at platform

Fatalities per Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 86.6% 3.370 3.545 3.387

Passengers 3.891 9.3% 0.362 0.381 0.364

Personal 4.1% 0.160 0.168 0.160

3.891 4.094 3.911

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed / affected persons.

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Table 84: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 5

Top-Event 5: Persons injured at platform

Number of exposed Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Persons / affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 1.12E-06 1.18E-06 1.13E-06

Passengers 3’000’000 1.21E-07 1.27E-07 1.21E-07

Personal 7’500 2.13E-05 2.24E-05 2.14E-05

2.25E-05 2.37E-05 2.26E-05

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

2.5.3.10.6 Top-Event 6, Passenger injured at level crossing “Passenger injured at level crossing” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 6 in this risk assessment. On base of Norwegian statistics [84] and the data related to “Passenger injured at level crossing” the parameters for the risk assessment of Top-Event 6 as shown in Table 85 have been evaluated.

Table 85: Top-Event 5, statistical data51

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year

Passenger injured at 3.3E-8 8.7E-8 0.63 0.98 level crossing

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and / or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts / considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and / or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. Figure 94 and Figure 95 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to persons injured at platform as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The Top-Event 6 and so the shown diagram is only related to system-variant 1.

51 Cp. [84].

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yes Collision Person(s) traverse Train approaching with level crossing person(s)

no

Safe state

Unruly person

Figure 94: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, person(s) traverse level crossing

Figure 95: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, level crossing unsecured As described before, accidents at level crossing can be excluded for system-variant 2 due to regulations that not allow installing level crossing at new high speed rail systems. This means in the context with system-variant 1 that only the actual existing cross levels have to be considered. The accident rate may be influenced by the following aspects: • A increased average speed of passing trains may increase the accident rate; • The fast approaching of trains in combination with a reduced noise level may increase the accident rate. Again these aspects can not be quantified by the evaluation of the available data and a significant change of the accident rate compared to the existing railway net in Norway seems not required.

ΔλA = 1.0 The fatality rate for “persons injured at level crossings” is also not supposed to be higher in system-variant 1 and therefore a factor 1 for a potential change of the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 1.0 Table 86 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

Table 86: Risk estimation, Top-Event 6

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Top-Event 6: Persons injured at level crossings

λ per λ per train Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 3.3E-8 - - 0.63 - - 0.98

System-Variant 1 3.3E-8 1.00 1.7E-7 0.63 1.00 0.63 + 0.051

As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 6 “Persons injured at level crossing” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated. Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 86 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 87.

Table 87: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 6

Top-Event 6: Persons injured at level crossing

Fatalities Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 99.1% 0.974 1.025 not applicable

Passengers 0.982 0.2% 0.002 0.002 not applicable

Personal 0.6% 0.006 0.006 not applicable

0.982 1.033 not applicable

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed / affected persons.

Table 88: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 6

Top-Event 6: Persons injured at level crossing

Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Number of exposed Persons / affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 3.25E-07 3.42E-07 not applicable

Passengers 3’000’000 6.55E-10 6.89E-10 not applicable

Personal 7’500 7.86E-07 8.27E-07 not applicable

1.11E-06 1.17E-06 not applicable

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

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2.5.3.10.7 Top-Event 7, Person injured at track side “Person injured at track side” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 7 in this risk assessment. On base of Norwegian statistics [84] and the data related to “Person injured at track side” the parameters for the risk assessment of Top-Event 7 as shown in Table 89 have been evaluated.

Table 89: Top-Event 7, statistical data52

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year

Passenger injured at 5.5E-8 1.5E-7 0.72 1.90 track side

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and / or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts / considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and / or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. Figure 96 and Figure 97 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to persons injured at platform as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The shown diagrams are related to both system-variants 1 and 2.

Figure 96: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person crosses track

52 Cp. [84].

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Figure 97: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, objects / parts loosened / raised System-variant 1: As shown in the diagrams above loosened parts or falling objects like snow represent potential causes for “persons injured at track side”. These aspects are not supposed to be different in system-variant 1 compared to the existing rail net. In contrast higher speed of passing high speed trains may lead to more raised ballast, but a significant change of the accident rate seems not to be required.

ΔλA = 1.0 The main aspect concerning the fatality rate is the presence of persons on or beside the track when trains are approaching / passing. The higher speed of high speed trains and their reduced noise level may increase the accident rate, but in this phase of the risk assessment a significant change of it seems not to be required.

ΔλF = 1.0 System-variant 2: The system-variant 2 is characterized by a more or less separated track. Due to this a reduction of the accident rate seems to be justifiable. The grad (factor) of the reductions depends massively on the technical realization. A reduction of the accident rate for the system-variant 2 by factor 2 seems to be sufficient at this phase of the risk assessment.

ΔλA = 0.5 As described before, the higher speed of high speed trains and their reduced noice level may increase the accident rate in system-variant 2 too, but in this phase of the risk assessment a significant change of accident rate seems not to be required.

ΔλF = 1.0 Table 90 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5 % additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 220 of (270)

Table 90: Risk estimation, Top-Event 7

Top-Event 7: Person injured at track side

λ per λa per train Fatalities per Δλf-hs1 Fatalities per Fatalities Rail-System a Δλ train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) per year

Existing system 5.5E-8 - - 0.72 - - 1.90

System-Variant 1 5.5E-8 1.00 5.5E-8 0.72 1.00 0.72 + 0.099

System-Variant 2 5.5E-8 0.50 2.7E-8 0.72 1.00 0.72 + 0.049

As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 7 “Person injured at track side” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated. Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 90 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 91.

Table 91: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 7

Top-Event 7: Person injured at track side

Fatalities Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Persons Distribution per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 95.7% 1.818 1.913 1.865

Passengers 1.900 2.3% 0.044 0.046 0.045

Personal 2.0% 0.038 0.040 0.039

1.900 1.999 1.949

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed/affected persons.

Table 92: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 7

Top-Event 7: Person injured at track side

Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Number of exposed / Persons affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 6.06E-07 6.38E-07 6.22E-07

Passengers 3’000’000 1.46E-08 1.53E-08 1.49E-08

Personal 7’500 5.07E-06 5.33E-06 5.20E-06

5.69E-06 5.98E-06 5.83E-06

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

2.5.3.10.8 Top-Event 8, Other accidents “Other accidents” is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 8 in this risk assessment. The risk assessment concerning Top-Event 8 focuses on electrocution accidents and dangerous goods incidents. Accidents in warehouses, workshops and depots are excluded due to the fact that they are not captured in the available data [83] [84].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 221 of (270)

Table 93: Top-Event 8, statistical data53

Top-Event λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident Fatalities per year

Other hazards 1.2E-08 6.9E-09 0.60 0.33

As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and / or the expected consequences given in fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and underlying thoughts / considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence and / or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour), may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84]. Figure 98vand Figure 99 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to fire as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The diagrams are related to both system- variants 1 and 2.

Figure 98: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, electrocution accidents

53 Cp. [84].

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Figure 99: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, dangerous goods accidents System-variant 1: As the above figures show, electrocution accidents and dangerous good incidents may be caused by technical failures or human failures. It is supposed that human failures cause the majority of accidents. A higher number of passengers (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) may implicate a higher risk regarding dangerous good incidents, but it seems not to be required to increase the accident rate due to this aspect. A differentiation between system-variant 1 and the existing net regarding electrocution accidents is also not advisable. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the accident rate of fire in rolling stock seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA =1.0 The fatality rate in case of fire in rolling stock is supposed to be approximately the same in system-variant 1 as in the existing Norwegian Rail. The presumed higher number of potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) is not supposed to influence the fatality rate significantly and therefore an estimated factor 1 for the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 1.0 System-variant 2: The accident rate in system-variant 2 may be lower than in system-variant 1 and the existing railway system in Norway, due to the fact that the contingent of potential dangerous goods or substances in high-speed trains is less than in mixed traffic with wagon trains. More secured tracks in system-variant 2 should reduce the probability of electrocution accidents of 3rd persons, but anyway, both aspects can not be quantified due to missing data. As a conservative estimation in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the accident rate of other hazards seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλA =1.0 The fatality rate for other hazards may be lower in system-variant 2 as in the existing Norwegian Rail due to the exclusion of dangerous goods incidents in the context with freight trains. Considering that the majority of serious accidents is related to electrocution and not to dangerous goods, a significant change of the fatality rate seems not to be required. As a

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 223 of (270) conservative estimation in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the fatality rate of other hazards seems to be justifiable and sufficient.

ΔλF = 1.0 Table 94 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway. Table 94: Risk estimation, Top-Event 8

Top-Event 8: other hazards

λ per λ per train Fatalities per Δλ Fatalities per Fatalities per Rail-System a Δλ a f-hs1 train km a-hs1 km (HSR) accident accident (new) year

Existing system 1.2E-8 - - 0.60 - - 0.33

System-Variant 1 1.2E-8 1.00 1.2E-8 0.60 1.00 0.60 + 0.017

System-Variant 2 1.2E-8 1.00 1.2E-8 0.60 1.00 0.60 + 0.017

As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 8 “other hazards” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated. Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the resulting collective risk as shown in Table 94 can be allocated to the different groups of affected persons as described in Table 95.

Table 95: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 8

Top-Event 8: other hazards

Persons Fatalities Distribution Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, Fatalities per year, per year existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 91.9% 0.306 0,322 0,322

Passengers 0.333 3.6% 0.012 0,013 0,013

Personal 4.5% 0.015 0,016 0,016

0,333 0.350 0.350

The individual risk depends on the number of exposed / affected persons.

Table 96: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 8

Top-Event 8: other hazards

Number of exposed Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year] Persons / affected persons existing rail net System-variant 1 System-variant 2 others 3’000’000 1.02E-07 1.07E-07 1.07E-07

Passengers 3’000’000 4.00E-09 4.20E-09 4.20E-09

Personal 7’500 2.00E-06 2.10E-06 2.10E-06

2.10E-06 2.21E-06 3.23E-07

In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they are given in [83] [84].

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2.6 Sensitivity analysis The following equation (risk model for collective risk) provides the basis for a sensitivity analysis.

8 R ⋅Δ⋅⋅Δ= λλλλ C ∑1 iTopFiTopFiTopAiTopA

λA Top i = Accident rate (for a specific Top-Event i)

λF Top i = Fatality rate (for a specific Top-Event i)

By systematically changing parameters in the model to determine the effects of such changes the level of uncertainty and robustness of the model is analyzed. As already discussed in the previous chapters the Top-Event “collision train-train“ does not have a significant influence to the overall residual risk and is therefore taken out of consideration for the sensitivity analysis. The Top-Event “other accidents” is also not considered here because of the general uncertainty which accidents are included in the available statistics. Therefore the risk model for the sensibility analysis reduces to the following equation:

6 R ⋅Δ⋅⋅Δ= λλλλ C ∑1 iTopFiTopFiTopAiTopA The following tables classify each influencing parameter to a particular level of uncertainty:

Table 97: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter of the collective risk model (system variant 1)

Top-Event Δλa-hs1 Level of Parameter Δλf-hs1 Level of Parameter uncertainty variation uncertainty variation

Collision train-object 1 medium 0.5..1 35 high 3.5..50

Derailment 1 high 0.1..2 35 high 10..50

Passenger injured at platform 1 medium 0.5..1 1 low -

Person injured at level crossing 1 medium 0.5..1 1 low -

Person injured at track side 1 medium 0.5..1.5 1 low -

Fire in rolling stock 4 high 0.4..4 4 high 0.4..10

Table 98: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter of the collective risk model (system variant 2)

Top-Event Δλa-hs1 Level of Parameter Δλf-hs1 Level of Parameter uncertainty variation uncertainty variation Collision train-object 0.5 high 0.05..1 150 high 10..300 Derailment 0.5 high 0.05..0.5 150 high 20..300 Passenger injured at platform 0.1 medium 0.05..0.5 1 low - Person injured at level crossing 0 low - 0 low - Person injured at track side 0.5 medium 0.1..2 1 low - Fire in rolling stock 4 high 0.4..4 8 high 0.8..10

The accumulated results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in the following diagram for the two system variants (collective risk):

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System variant 2 System variant 1

0,39 3,14 5,28

0,09 5,94 20,99

0 5 10 15 20 25

Figure 100: Range of collective risks The range of possible outcomes is huge because of the high level of uncertainty of many influencing parameters as discussed before. If all parameters are at the low end of the range (most optimistic scenario) the collective risk for system variant 1 would be lower than a scenario with conventional passenger trains (0.45 equivalent fatalities per year) and the most optimistic scenario for system variant 2 is even lower adding negligible risk to the current situation. The main drivers of the risk are the two accident scenarios derailment and collision train-object as can be seen in the following two diagrams:

Fire in rolling stock Person injured at track side Person injured at level crossing Passenger injured at platform Derailment Collision train-object

2,08 0,11 3,01 0,58 0,02 1,67

0,10 0,20

0,03 0,05

0,05 0,15

0,00 0,10

0,000 0,001 0,010 0,100 1,000 10,000

Figure 101: Results of the sensitivity analysis for each Top-Event (system variant 1)

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Fire in rolling stock Person injured at track side - Passenger injured at platform Derailment Collision train-object

4,51 0,03 18,05 1,26 0,02 2,51

0,01 0,10

0,01 0,20

0,00 0,10

0,000 0,001 0,010 0,100 1,000 10,000

Figure 102: Results of the sensitivity analysis for each Top-Event (system variant 2) To keep the above values in context, analysing the ICE accident statistics in Germany reveals the following: The point estimates of the proposed risk model for derailment (system variant 1) for Norway is predicted to be twice as high as the risk in Germany (8 accidents recorded with 110 equivalent fatalities) whereas the risk for collision train-object is predicted to be higher by a factor of 1.000 (Germany: 6 accidents recorded with 1 equivalent fatality)! Especially 1 severe accident collision train-object in 2008 (collision with a herd of sheep with a speed of 215 km/h, 12 of 14 cars derailed, has had only mild consequences mainly because the derailed train approached a tunnel and was therefore kept on track) could have changed the picture massively and the risk difference between the predicted model and statistical evidence would be only a factor of 8 instead of 1’000. Analysing the different accident scenarios from different sources of statistics and here especially derailments and collisions, the distribution of fatalities per accident follow a power-law model. This means that very few accidents cause the majority of fatalities. Finding the parameters of the power-law model for the fatality distribution over the different accident scenarios for a high-speed network could lead to a lower uncertainty regarding the proposed risk model.

2.7 Perspective With the risk analysis included in this document potential factors which are supposed to influence the risk and in the following the safety level regarding the operation of a new high- speed railway system in Norway have been identified. Collective and individual risks have been estimated for two assumed system-variants. Therefore the evaluation of events which may cause accidents and the prediction of potential consequences have been done. The perceptions out of these analyses allow limiting the scope of further safety studies by focusing on the significant accident scenarios which are • Derailment and • Collision train-objects. As described before these both accident scenarios are supposed to play a major role regarding the residual risk of a potential new high-speed railway system. Detailed information regarding the foreseen architecture / design of the system should be used to precise the risk analysis and to limit uncertainties. The further analysis of influencing factors would deliver precious information for the specification of safety requirements of a new system. Therefore it would be

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 227 of (270) necessary to refine and parameterise the combined event- and fault trees for a complete risk model with a full composition of causes, hazards and accidents. In this context, beside the described results, the risk assessment at hand provides an excellent basis for the following safety process.

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3 Subject – HSR Contribution to transport safety and security

3.0 Introduction An important basis for decisions regarding possible future high-speed rail operations in Norway is the impact of such an operation on the total transport safety in society. Subject 3 of the Technical Safety Analysis therefore comprises of a comparative study of comprehensive transport safety applied on present and possible future transport scenarios.

3.0.1 Objectives & Scope The overall objective of the study is to estimate the effect of a high speed railway operation on the total transport safety. This is accomplished by analysing the following three scenarios: • Future safety level of transport with present relevant means of transport. • Future safety level of transport with high-speed train operations on combined tracks as a part of the transport service. • Future safety level of public transport with high-speed train operations on separate tracks as a part of the public transport service. The study includes the development of a detailed methodology for the assessment, accompanied by a description and reasoning on decision. The model is then applied to quantify the expected change in transport safety due to the operation of a high-speed rail system. An economic valuation of the change in transport safety due to the implementation of high- speed rail operation is calculated as a function of the expected change in transport safety, expressed as the expected number of fatalities and the value of a statistical life (VSL) used in Norway. Additional safety factors that will follow from an introduction of a high speed railway are assessed and included in the analysis. Examples of such factors are: possible increase in safety level for road traffic caused by more goods transported on the railways and fewer trucks occupying roads. To accomplish the objectives, the study includes the following six major steps: • Estimation of the current transport safety level and development. • Estimation of the future distributions between types of transport means. • Estimation of future transport safety levels without high-speed operations. • Estimation of the future transport safety including high-speed operations. • Estimation of changes in safety and the consequences of the changes. • Uncertainty analysis.

3.0.2 Limitations During this phase of the project there will be no quantitative information available from the market analysis of the project on the expected future distribution of transports between different transport means due to the implementation of a high-speed rail system. In addition the assessment of the HSR future safety levels in Subject 2 could only be made on a general level in this phase of the project since no detailed information regarding the HSR operation is yet available. Therefore the safety analysis is subject to two important limitations: • The safety calculations had to be performed on a set of possible hypothetical future transport scenarios rather than quantitative forecasts of future transport volumes in different transport modes.

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• The safety calculations for the three scenarios and the economic consequences of the expected changes in safety levels should be regarded as generic at this stage rather than forecasts suitable for supporting decisions on a detailed level. As a result of the data limitations the work has been primarily directed at preparing a model for safety forecasts that can be updated as new information becomes available during later phases of the project. The model has been developed as an assessment tool that can be used to model different future transport scenarios for specific corridors of future HSR operations.

3.0.3 Definitions Passenger kilometres - Number of passengers multiplied by the distance in km Vehicle kilometres - Number of vehicles multiplied by the distance in km Road transport - In Subject 3 road transport is considered to be car, bus and truck traffic The two principal system-variants that have been described in Subject 2 are also used in subject 3. • System-variant 1: The first principal variant is represented by an upgrade of an existing track to be a High Speed Rail track. In Subject 3 called “HSR combined”. • System-variant 2: The second variant is represented by a complete new track which is used exclusively by high speed trains. In Subject 3 called “HSR separate”.

3.1 Summary The possibility of introducing High Speed Rail (HSR) connections in Norway has to be carefully analyzed and all economic and safety aspects have to be taken into account when choosing (or rejecting) different options considered. The safety of a HSR system can be looked at in isolation where fatality rates per passenger kilometre or train kilometre can be estimated. This has been done in Subject 2 of this work. The safety analysis evaluates the impact of a HSR system on the entire transport safety level. Any change in global safety level can be economically valued using the value of a statistical life. The total transport safety level reflects how many people are killed, when travelling, using available means of transportation. Means of transportation can be cars, busses, trains, airplanes, ferries etc. So the total safety level is the sum of the safety levels of all means of transportation. Any change in distribution between the means of transportation used affects the total safety level as will a transfer of passengers from existing means of transportation to a new mean of transportation like a HSR system. A typical example would be a transfer of passengers from cars to trains: this is a transfer to a safer system which would increase total transport safety. In this perspective a generalized assessment model has been developed that calculates the current transport safety level as well as estimates future levels of transport safety as a function of transport mode distributions and the introduction of different options for HSR. Economic valuation of this safety level is also performed by the model based on the value of a statistical life. This generalized approach enables the estimation of a total general transport safety level by combining safety calculations for HSR solutions current transport safety levels and future traffic and mode distribution forecasts as these become available in phase three of the project.

3.2 Availability of input data To determine the total safety level of the current transportation system and how this has developed over time, two main types of data have been collected for different types of

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 230 of (270) transportation means. The first type concerns the number of fatal accidents per year and the second the total quantity of transported person/passenger and vehicle kilometres per year. The availability of data varies. For example, data concerning private car transports are quite extensive whereas data is limited for other transport means. Due to data limitations, interactions and dependencies between different types of statistical information a number of simplifications and assumptions have been necessary. These are explained in the appropriate section below. The available data on the quantities of transport kilometres both passenger and vehicle kilometres vary greatly. This means that the estimates of transport kilometres and future transport kilometres are uncertain to evaluate the sensitivity of the model results due to uncertain parameter inputs a sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulations has been performed see 3.5.2. Statistics for transports in Norway have been collected from Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB) and Jernbaneverket. In statistics from SSB concerning passenger kilometres only passengers that have starting point and final destination in Norway are included. Due to limited or incomplete Norwegian transport data additional information has been gathered from Swedish and international data sources. Statistics concerning road and rail data from Trafikanalys, the Swedish Statistisk Centralbyrå (SCB) and Trafikverket (the Swedish Transport Administration) were used to estimate historical road and safety development. International aviation statistics from ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) was used to estimate the historical safety development in air traffic.

3.3 Transports

3.3.1 Types of data and evaluation approach Estimations of the transported kilometres were made for the following means of transport: • Railway transport o Conventional rail • Road transport o Car o Bus o Truck • Air transport • Ferry To estimate the current and predict the future transport kilometres for the selected means of transport the following historical information is necessary for each transport type: • Annual number of passenger transports • Annual number of vehicle kilometres • Annual changes of different types of transportation means The passenger transport information is needed to estimate the current and future passenger safety whereas the number of vehicle kilometres is needed as input for estimations of current and future safety levels for others e.g. workers and third party representatives (see section 3.4). The annual historical changes in transport kilometres (passenger and vehicle) display past development of different means of transport and are used for forecasts of the future transport and safety levels; see section 3.4). Since no detailed market analysis of future transports could

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 231 of (270) be performed within this phase of the project, the forecasts of future transport and safety levels had to be primarily based on historical data. Based on the historical transport information the current number of transport kilometres was estimated as the arithmetic mean of the last three years of historical data. The three-year mean value was used in order to get a representative value for the most recent period of the historical data while simultaneously achieving a reasonable reduction in the uncertainty of the estimate due to data variability. The outcome of this analysis was used to represent the current transport situation and as a starting point (first year) in the forecasts of future transports. Calculations of the annual change of transport kilometres over available periods of historical data were made using the Kendall slope factor analysis [95]. All observed slope estimates bi.j between years i and j in the observation period were calculated as: − xx b = ji , ji − ji where xi and xj are the log-transformed measurements for years i and j. where i < j. The median B of all bi.j provides an estimate of the annual change in %: K −= e−B )1(100 Since data availability varies greatly between different means of transport the annual changes should only be used generically for the 0-alternative, i.e. the current transport system. New values should preferably be calculated for the scenarios including HSR-transport, i.e. Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 once a more detailed market analysis of future transports has been performed.

3.3.2 Railway transport In Norway railway transports accounts for a relatively small part of the total quantity of passenger kilometres. A comparison between railway transport and air transport during the last 20 years shows that the passenger kilometres on rail are 70 % of the air plane passenger kilometres. In Figure 103 the passenger kilometres during 1970-2009 is presented and in Figure 104 the railway vehicle kilometres during 2005-2009 is presented. The three year average trend line is inserted in the diagrams.

Figure 103: Billion railway passenger kilometres in Norway54.

54 Cp. [96].

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The current annual number of train passenger kilometres on conventional rail was calculated to be 2.99 billion. This figure was used as a starting point on rail passenger kilometres in the 0- alternative. The annual increase in passenger kilometres was calculated to be 1.5 %.

Figure 104: Billion railway vehicle kilometres in Norway.55 The current annual train vehicle kilometres on conventional rail has been determined to be 0.05 billion. This figure was used as a starting point on rail vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in train vehicle kilometres was calculated to be 2.2 %.

3.3.2.1 High speed railway The passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres in scenario 1 and scenario 2 for future HSR have been estimated in chapter 3.6.

3.3.3 Road transport Road transports accounts for the largest part of the total transported kilometres concerning both passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres in Norway. The largest part of road passenger kilometres are made up of car transports (driver and passengers are counted) and a smaller quantity by bus transport. When looking at vehicle kilometres cars also make up the dominating part, however trucks contribute significantly.

3.3.3.1 Car transport Norwegian statistics for passenger kilometres in cars are available from 1970-2009. The statistics concerning car vehicle kilometres are more limited and were available only for the period 2005-2009. In Figure 105 the total passenger kilometres in cars in Norway is presented and in Figure 106 the total car vehicle kilometres.

55 Cp. [97].

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Figure 105: Billion passenger kilometres (driver and passenger) in cars on Norwegian roads.56 The current annual passenger kilometres of cars were calculated to be 55.78 billion. This figure was used as a starting point on car passenger kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in car passenger kilometres was calculated to be 2.3 %.

Figure 106: Billion vehicle kilometres in cars on Norwegian roads.57 The current annual car vehicle kilometres were calculated to be 32.53 billion. This figure was used as a starting point on car vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in car vehicle kilometres was calculated to be 3.70 %. Since data concerning vehicle kilometres only consist of five years. 2005-2009. it should be noted that the annual increase is rather uncertain. The increase is fairly consistent with the annual increase of passenger kilometres. 2.30 %.

3.3.3.2 Bus transport Norwegian statistics for passenger kilometres in buses are available from the period 1970-2009. The statistics concerning bus vehicle kilometres are more limited and were only available from

56 Cp. [96]. 57 Cp. [98].

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2005-2009. In Figure 107 the total passenger kilometres in buses in Norway is presented and in Figure 6 the total bus vehicle kilometres.

Figure 107: Billion passenger kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads.58 The current annual passenger kilometres in buses were calculated to be 4.34 billion, in the 0- alternative. This figure was used as a starting point on bus passenger kilometres in the 0- alternative. The annual increase in bus passenger kilometres for the last five years was calculated to be 0.3 %.

Figure 108: Billion vehicle kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads.59 The current annual bus vehicle kilometres was calculated to be 0.69 billion, in the 0-alternative. This figure was used as a starting point on bus vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual change in bus vehicle kilometres for the last five years was calculated to be - 4.45 %. A decrease of this degree may seem somewhat unrealistic perhaps the amount of seats in buses has increased. Since no other data are available this value was used for the present calculations.

58 Cp. [96]. 59 Cp. [98].

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3.3.3.3 Truck transport No passengers (of note) use trucks as a means of transport. Therefore only vehicle kilometres are an important factor for trucks. The statistics concerning truck vehicle kilometres are limited and have only been available from 2005-2009. There are two types of trucks mentioned in the statistics and these are merged to simplify the final model and enable calculations. The types of trucks are “small trucks” (Norwegian: “små godsbiler”) and “large trucks” (Norwegian: “store lastebiler”). In Figure 109 the total truck vehicle kilometres is presented.

Figure 109: Billion vehicle kilometres in trucks on Norwegian roads.60 The current annual truck vehicle kilometres were calculated to be 9.45. This figure was used as a starting point on truck vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in truck vehicle kilometres for the last five years was calculated to be 4.1 %.

3.3.4 Air transport Air transport in Norway has increased steadily during the latter part of the 20th century with some exceptions. Also during the first decade of the 21st century an increase can be noted. In Figure 110 the yearly total air plane passenger kilometres in Norway is presented for the years 1970-2009.

60 Cp. [98].

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Figure 110: Billion passenger kilometres with airplanes in Norway. 1970-2009.61 The current annual airplane passenger kilometres were calculated to be 4.48 billion. This figure was used as a starting point on airplane passenger kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in air plane passenger kilometres was calculated to be 5.4 %.

3.3.5 Ferry transport It is assumed that ferry transports will only have an effect on the future transport scenarios studied in this project if a high speed rail system is implemented between cities where major ferry lanes operate. The overall correlation effect between HSR and ferry transports is therefore assumed to be limited. Furthermore the amount of passenger kilometres on ferries is relatively limited as shown in Figure 111. Ferry transports have therefore not been included in the safety calculations.

Figure 111: Billion passenger kilometres with ferry transport in Norway. 2005-2008.62

61 Cp. [96]. 62 Cp. [99].

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3.4 Safety

3.4.1 Types of data and evaluation approach Estimations of the current and future transport safety levels were made for the following means of transport. • Railway transport o Conventional rail o High speed railway • Road transport o Car o Bus o Truck • Aviation • Ferry Estimations concerning safety levels for the selected means of transport that are needed for the estimations and forecasts of current and future safety levels for the studied scenarios are: • Fatalities per passenger kilometre. • Fatalities per vehicle kilometre. • Annual change of fatalities per passenger and vehicle kilometre. This information is needed for each of the different means of transportation included in the model. For transport means not concerning high speed rail (HSR) the safety level and annual safety change per passenger and/or vehicle kilometre were calculated. Since quantification of the HSR safety levels are not possible at this stage the safety forecast performed in the current phase of the project were based on subjective estimations of the safety of the HSR, see below. The reported number of annual fatalities of the different means of transportation was used to calculate the fatalities per passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres. For passenger fatalities safety levels are expressed per passenger kilometre and for other fatalities per vehicle kilometre. Consequently, both passenger safety and other people’s safety are included in the model. Some assumptions have been necessary in order to make estimations of the safety levels and are stated in the appropriate sections below. In some cases Swedish and International statistics have been used to complement the Norwegian statistics. The calculations of the current safety level for each transport means were made in analogy with the calculations of the transport see section 3.3.1. Calculations of the annual change of transport kilometres over available periods of historical data were made using the Kendall slope factor analysis [95], see 3.3.1

3.4.2 Railway transport The statistics on railway safety in Norway was gathered from Jernbaneverket for the years 1996-2009. Changes in reporting on accidents were made in 2003 after which only accidents with moving trains were reported. In Figure 112 the fatalities on Norwegian railways for passengers, employees and other persons are presented.

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Figure 112: Number of fatalities on Norwegian railways during 1996-2003.63 Trains affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first fatality category concerns passengers. The safety level for this category is dependent on the total number of passenger kilometres. The second category concerns fatalities where trains are causing fatalities among other people. This safety level is dependent on the total number of vehicle kilometres. Travel with train is safe but railways are less safe for people in the vicinity.

3.4.2.1 Conventional rail Determining the safety level for conventional rail passengers was made by using Norwegian statistics concerning fatality of passengers during 1996-2009 [97]. During this period one disastrous accident occurred. In the Åsta-accident which happened in 2000, 16 passengers and 3 employees were killed [100]. This means that the period contains one large scale accident. It should be noted that after 2003 the definition of a railway accident was changed. From 2004 a railway accident must involve a moving train. Fatality levels calculated in subject 2 of the project were used to calculate the safety level of conventional rail. The current safety level for conventional rail passenger which is equal to the first year of the model calculations was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of the last three years of passenger kilometres and the fatality level for passengers calculated in subject 2. The starting safety level for conventional rail passengers was calculated to be 0.23 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. The annual train passenger safety improvement was calculated to be 11.1 %. Due to the high variability of data concerning fatalities the trend analysis of safety development for conventional rail is not considered relevant. Therefore the goal on annual safety improvement given in Sikkerhedshandboken [101] 3.5 % was used. The annual fatality level per billion kilometres for conventional rail passengers is presented in Figure 113.

63 Cp. [100].

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Figure 113: Passenger fatality per billion conventional rail passenger kilometres. The current safety level for other persons (employees and third persons) which is equal to the first year of the model calculations was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of the last three years of passenger kilometres and the fatality level for others (others and staff) calculated in subject 2. The starting safety level for other persons was calculated to be 176.43 fatalities per billion train vehicle kilometres. The annual train passenger safety improvement was calculated to be 15.8 %. Due to high variability of data concerning fatalities the trend analysis of safety development for conventional rail is not considered relevant. Therefore the goal on annual safety improvement given in Sikkerhedshandboken [101] 3.5 % was used. The annual fatality level for other persons per billion vehicle kilometres for conventional rail is presented in Figure 114.

Figure 114: Fatality for others per billion conventional rail vehicle kilometres.

3.4.2.2 High speed railway A prerequisite for real-world forecasts of the effect on transport safety in Norway with and without HSR operations is that a future safety level of HSR can be determined. Detailed information on future HSR levels will be available in later phases of the project. Therefore estimations of future HRS safety at the present phase have to be based on expert judgement in order to enable development and testing of the assessment tool presented here see also

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 240 of (270) subject 2 of the report. The safety estimations for HSR presented here thus need to be updated once the future HSR safety levels have been quantified in detail. Approximate estimations were made of safety levels where HSR are combined with conventional rail (“HSR combined”, scenario 1) and where HSR operate on separate tracks (“HSR separate”, scenario 2). It was assumed that the main differences between a future HSR system and the present rail system are that level crossings will be removed and that improved warning systems will be applied on the HSR. In Norwegian Sikkerhedshandboken [101] safety goals are given regarding how many fatal accidents a year are acceptable. Of these fatalities 30 % constitute of level crossings fatalities. It was therefore assumed that if a HSR system is built the safety level per billion vehicle kilometres for other persons will be improved by 30 % compared to conventional rail. Concerning passenger safety the same safety level was used for all scenarios. This assumption can be questioned since it can be argued that the safety level may both increase and decrease; accident frequency may be reduced in HSR operations but at the same time the consequences (no. of fatalities) in case of an accident may increase, see also subject 2. Given the absence of specific information regarding the design and operation of future HSR in Norway at this stage, it was concluded that the current knowledge regarding passenger safety levels of future HSR operations only allows for hypothetical assumptions of differences between different railway means. The future safety levels were therefore set to be constant between the different railway transport means. However, although the passenger safety may not be reduced going from conventional to HSR, for the reasons mentioned above, it was found reasonable to assume that HSR will be built with a high initial safety standard and that the annual safety improvement therefore should be limited. It was assumed that both passenger safety and safety for others will be improved with 0.5 % annually for both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 over the studied time horizons. For the scenario ”HSR combined” the starting safety level for passengers was estimated to be 0.23 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. The starting safety level for other persons was estimated to be 123.50 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres. For the scenario ”HSR separate” the starting safety level for passengers was estimated to be 0.23 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. The starting safety level for other persons was estimated to be 123.50 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres.

3.4.3 Road transport A dominating part of the total number of persons killed in transports related accident in Norway is killed by road transport, car; bus or truck. In Figure 115 the total number of people killed in road traffic accidents during 1970-2009 is presented.

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Figure 115: The number of persons killed in road traffic accidents in Norway during 1970-2009.64 The available data on road traffic accidents where people are killed vary greatly. To estimate the current and future safety level some adjustments have been necessary. These will be explained in the following sections. In addition Swedish statistics have been used in some instances to predict Norwegian levels.

3.4.3.1 Car Cars affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first and largest fatality category concerns drivers and passengers. The safety level for this category is dependent on the total number of passenger kilometres (driver and passenger). The second category concerns fatalities were cars are causing fatalities among other people which use roads or are close to roads. This safety level is dependent on the total number of vehicle kilometres. The safety level for car drivers and passengers was calculated by using Norwegian statistics concerning killed drivers and passengers during 1970-2009. The current safety level, which is equal to the first year of the model calculations, was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of the last three years. The starting safety level for passengers and drivers was calculated to be 2.81 fatalities per billion car passenger kilometres. The annual car passenger safety improvement was calculated to be 3.3 %. The annual fatality level for car passengers is shown in Figure 116.

64 Cp. [102].

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Figure 116: Passenger and driver fatality for car traffic per billion passenger kilometres Calculation of the safety level for others than car drivers and passengers that are exposed to car vehicles (“cars involved in killing others”) was made by using both Norwegian and Swedish [103] statistics. The reason for this is that no Norwegian statistics concerning fatalities involving cars was available. An assumption was made that the relative frequency between fatalities in cars (passengers and drivers) compared to others are approximately the same in Norway and Sweden. To strengthen this argument the proportion of drivers and passengers that was killed in road traffic between 2003 and 2009 in Norway and Sweden were compared. In Sweden 65.1 % of the people killed in traffic accident were drivers or passengers in cars and in Norway the corresponding proportion was 67.5 %. It was assumed, with the help of Swedish statistics, that most of the fatalities with cars involved excluding the car driver or passenger, are persons walking, biking or otherwise “unprotected”. According to Swedish statistics, based on the years 2003-2009, 13.4 % of the total numbers of fatalities in Swedish road accidents are car accidents where other persons than the car driver or passenger are killed. Since the total numbers of fatalities on Norwegian roads are known the number of persons killed by cars can be estimated. The estimated fatalities are presented in Figure 117.

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Figure 117: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion car vehicle kilometres (“cars involved in killing others”) excluding passenger and drivers in Norway during 2005-2009. The reason that the only estimated numbers of “cars killing others” presented are for the years 2005-2009 are that the vehicle kilometres in Norway are only known for this period. With the estimation of fatalities caused by cars and the known vehicle kilometres the safety level and the annual change of “cars involved in killing others” was calculated. For the starting year the safety level for “cars involved in killing others” was calculated to be 0.96 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres. The annual safety increase was calculated to be 4.1 %. Due to the small amount of data available of car vehicle kilometres the annual safety improvement for others is somewhat unreliable.

3.4.3.2 Bus Buses affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first fatality category concerns drivers and passengers. The safety level for this category is dependent on the total number of passenger kilometres. The second category concerns fatalities were buses are causing fatalities among other people which use roads or are close to roads. This safety level is dependent on the total number of vehicle kilometres. A comparison of fatalities between buses and cars show that the number of fatalities caused by buses is very small compared to fatalities caused by cars. No Norwegian statics concerning the quantity of bus passengers could be identified in this study. The Swedish statics cover a short time span and were therefore not used to calculate the passenger safety. However, in the report Nasjonal Tiltaksplan for trafikksikkerhet på veg [104] the number of passenger and driver fatalities per person kilometre in Norway during 1998-2002 is stated to be 0.93 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. This figure was used to represent the current safety level for bus passengers in this study. Since no yearly statics were identified concerning bus safety the annual bus passenger safety improvement was estimated to be the same as for car passengers, i.e. 3.3 %. Determining the safety level for others than bus passengers that are exposed to bus vehicles (“buses killing others”) was made by using both Norwegian [102] and Swedish [103] statistics. The reason for this is that no Norwegian statistics concerning fatalities involving buses were available. An assumption was made that the relative frequency between fatalities in buses (passengers and drivers) compared to other fatalities on roads is approximately the same in Norway and Sweden. It was assumed, with the help of Swedish statistics, that most of the fatalities with buses involved, buses and single bus accidents are excluded, are accidents with cars, persons walking, biking or otherwise “unprotected” persons. According to Swedish statistics, based on the years 2003-2009, 1.51 % of the total numbers of fatalities in Swedish road accidents are bus accidents where other persons than the bus driver or passengers are killed. Since the total numbers of fatalities on Norwegian roads are known the number of persons killed by buses can be estimated. The estimated fatalities are presented in Figure 118.

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Figure 118: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion bus vehicle kilometres (“bus involved in killing others”) after accidents with cars; buses and single bus accidents are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009. The reason that the only estimated numbers of “bus involved in killing others” presented are for the years 2005-2009 is that the vehicle kilometres in Norway are only known for this period. Based on the estimation of fatalities involving buses and the known vehicle kilometres the safety level and the annual safety change of “buses involved in killing others” were calculated. For the starting year the safety level for “buses involved in killing others” was calculated to be 5.15 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres. The annual safety change was calculated to be - 4.4 %, i.e. a decrease in safety. It should be emphasized that this figure is based on a very limited statistical sample and that a more detailed study on bus safety should be performed in the subsequent phase of the project.

3.4.3.3 Truck Trucks affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first fatality category concerns truck drivers. This category is not calculated separately because it was assumed that the number of truck drivers that are killed constitute a small part of the total fatalities where trucks are involved. The second category concerns fatalities were trucks are causing fatalities among other people, which use roads or are close to roads. This safety level is dependent on the total number of vehicle kilometres. A comparison of fatalities between trucks and cars show that the number of fatalities caused by trucks is small compared to fatalities caused by cars. Determining the safety level for others that are exposed to truck vehicles (“trucks involved in killing others”) was made by using both Norwegian [102] and Swedish [103] statistics. The reason for this is that no Norwegian statistics concerning fatalities involving trucks was available. An assumption was made that the relative frequency between fatalities caused by trucks compared to others is approximately the same in Norway and Sweden. Two important factors should be noted about this safety level concerning cars and trucks. Accidents involving cars are subtracted from the number of fatalities involving trucks because these fatalities are already accounted for in the calculations of the car safety level. Concerning trucks, the safety level for “trucks involved in killing others” also includes truck drivers killed in truck-truck and single truck accidents. It was assumed with the help of Swedish statistics, that most of the fatalities with trucks involved, after accidents with cars are excluded, are persons walking, biking or otherwise “unprotected”. Also truck drivers are counted in these fatalities. According to Swedish statistics,

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 245 of (270) based on the years 2003-2009, 7.94 % of the total numbers of fatalities in Swedish road accidents are truck accidents where other persons than car drivers and passengers are killed. Assuming that the fraction of truck fatalities of the total number of road fatalities is approximately the same in Norway and Sweden, the number of persons killed where trucks are involved was estimated, see Figure 119.

Figure 119: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion truck vehicle kilometres (“trucks involved in killing others”) after accidents with cars are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009. The reason that the numbers of “trucks involved in killing others” presented is restricted to the years 2005-2009 is that the vehicle kilometres in Norway are only known for this period. With the estimation of fatalities involving trucks and the known vehicle kilometres the safety level and the annual change of “trucks involved in killing others” was calculated. For the starting year the safety level for “trucks involved in killing others” was calculated to be 1.96 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres. The annual safety increase was calculated to be 4.3 %. It should be emphasized that this figure is based on a very limited statistical sample and that a more detailed study on truck safety should be performed in the subsequent phase of the project.

3.4.3.4 Dependencies The number of road accidents is affected by several different means of transportation and also both the quantity of passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres among other things. In addition there are some dependencies between the different categories of accidents that need to be addressed in the calculations of the present and future safety levels. The following dependencies affecting the quantity of road and total fatalities have been identified: • Some fatalities in road traffic are probably also counted as level crossing accidents in railway statistics. Since this number is assumed to be small compared to the total number of fatalities in the transport system no special attention is given to this issue. In the Swedish statistics concerning fatalities involving different types of road transport no separate category deals with level crossing accidents. • In the safety level for both trucks and buses no correction have been made for accidents were both bus and truck are involved. This means that a few fatalities can be included in the calculations of both safety levels. In the statistics concerning fatalities involving buses and trucks no separate category deals with accidents involving buses and trucks. It is therefore assumed that the effect this will cause on the total number of fatalities is very limited. • Since buses and trucks are involved in several accidents with cars per year a decrease in the quantity of bus and truck traffic will lead to less car fatalities. To correct for this the

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quantity of car accidents involving trucks and buses, respectively have been calculated from Swedish statistics. It is assumed that the relative frequency of traffic elements involved in fatal car accidents are approximately the same in Norway and Sweden. Trucks are involved in 21.76 % of the fatal car accidents and it was assumed that all of the fatalities in these accidents are car drivers or passengers. Buses are involved in 2.93 % of the fatal car accidents and it is assumed that all of the fatalities in these accidents are car drivers or passengers. It is possible that some of the fatalities in these accidents are truck drivers, bus drivers or passengers. However these fatalities are estimated to constitute only a small part of the total number of fatalities. With the help of these estimations a correction of the safety levels of cars when truck and bus traffic change was made.

Based on these assumptions the change in number of fatal car accidents, F →so , from Scenario 0 to Scenario s[1,2] can be calculated as:

⎛ − DD ⎞ F = ⎜ T ,0, sT ⎟ 218.0 ×× F 0→s ⎜ D ⎟ c 0, ⎝ T 0, ⎠ where DT. 0 is the number of truck vehicle kilometres in Scenario 0. DT.s is the number of truck vehicle kilometres in s and Fc.0 is the number of car passenger fatalities in Scenario 0. The car fatalities involving buses change analogously.

3.4.4 Air transport The dominating part of accidents with air planes concerns passengers. This means that fatalities that occur due to air transport are related to the safety level for passengers. The number of fatalities is governed by the quantity of passenger kilometres. Few fatal air plane accidents occur in Norway. The safety level for air plane passengers was therefore approximated by using international statistics from ICAO [105]. Norwegian statistics concerning transported passenger kilometres were also used. The starting safety level for air plane passengers was calculated with the fatalities per billion air plane passenger kilometres 2008 and 2007 to 0.10 fatalities per billion air plane passenger kilometres. The annual air plane passenger safety improvement was calculated to be 7.5 %. The annual fatality level for international air plane passengers is shown in Figure 120.

Figure 120: The estimated number of international air plane passenger fatalities per billion air plane passenger kilometres according to the ICAO

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3.4.5 Ferry transport Statistics concerning fatalities for all persons on Norwegian ferries are available for the years during 2000-2009. It is probable that these fatalities also include staff persons. The fatalities are presented in Figure 121. Since the quantity of ferry passenger kilometres transported has not been available no estimation of the safety level has been made.

Figure 121: Fatalities on ferries in Norway during 2000-2009.65

3.5 Model description

3.5.1 Model structure A model for calculations of current safety levels and forecasts of future safety levels was developed in Excel format. The model was developed to facilitate efficient updating once new information on safety and transport data becomes available. The model is able to calculate present and future safety levels for three different scenarios: • Future safety level of transport with present relevant means of transport. • Future safety level of transport with high-speed train operations on combined tracks as a part of the public transport service. • Future safety level of transport with high-speed train operations on separate tracks as a part of the public transport service. Safety calculations can be made for these three scenarios on several different scales. In the present report the model was used for safety calculations on a national level, given the used input estimates on transport and safety levels and predicted future changes. When more specific information concerning the details regarding future high-speed operations the pre- defined scenarios can be updated and the model can be used for specific corridors and stretches of future HSR operations. The current model does not include ferry transport due to lack of information on the quantity of passenger kilometres and the assumption that future HSR operations have a rather limited correlation to safety on ferries. The model consists of four major parts: • Input data on safety information o Safety per billion person kilometres (bpkm) for road, rail and air travel.

65 Cp. [106].

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o Safety per billion vehicle kilometres (bvkm) for road and rail transports. o Annual safety change for the different transport means. • Input data on transports o Person kilometres for road, rail and air travel. o Vehicle kilometres for road and rail transports. • Input on economic factors o Value of Statistical Life (VSL) o Discount rate • Output data o Total current societal safety level for the different transport means and in total. o The predicted societal safety levels for the three scenarios without HSR operations o The predicted societal safety levels for the three scenarios without HSR operations o The changes in safety levels due to HSR operations o The economic consequences of the changes in safety levels due to HSR operations o Uncertainty estimations of the economic consequences of the changes in safety levels due to HSR operations. The total societal safety levels and the economic consequences of the changes in levels due to HSR operations were calculated for four different time horizons: 25, 40, 60 and 100 years. A specific time horizon for the HSR operations could not be defined at this stage of the project and therefore four alternative time horizons were used. The economic consequences of changed societal safety levels due to operation of HSR were calculated as the net present value (NPV) over the specific time horizon T for each scenario s=[1,2]: T 1 NPVs = ∑ t →so )( ⋅VSLtF t=0 + r)1( where r is the discount rate, t represents the specific years of the time horizon T, F →so is the change in safety level between scenario 0 and s, and VSL is the value of a statistical life. The model was developed to facilitate a user-friendly application and the input and output information is compiled on a four-page printable form. The Transport Safety Model is shown in the Annex 11. The economic consequences of changed safety level were calculated using the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). A VSL [101] of ~ 20 MNOK is currently applied in Norway and was used in the model calculations. However, this value can be changed according to changes in statistical life valuations. A discount rate of 4.5 % with possible changes to 3.5 % and 5.5 % was used for the calculations.

3.5.2 Uncertainty analysis An important feature of the safety forecasts is the ability to account for the inherent uncertainties in the estimations of input data. The principal approach for managing the uncertainties is shown in Figure 122.

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Variable 1 Variable 2

Minimum Most likely 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.67 0.89 Max

Simulation

10 20 30 40 50 Safety level

Figure 122: Schematic description of the approach for uncertainty analysis. The input parameters are regarded as random variables and their uncertainties are represented by statistical distributions. The uncertainties of the input percentages, e.g. the annual safety changes, are represented by beta-distributions [107] and the uncertainties of the transport kilometres are represented by lognormal distributions. The uncertainties of the passenger safety levels are represented by lognormal distributions. The VSL was represented by a normal distribution and the discount rate was represented by a discrete custom distribution with equal probabilities for possible discount rates. The resulting uncertainty of the model results is calculated by statistical simulation (Monte Carlo). The method allows for sensitivity analysis of the modelling in order to identify the most uncertain variables in the calculation of the transport safety and its economic consequences. This information is then used in selecting variables most relevant for further studies and data collection in order to achieve more reliable model results. The safety modelling tool was developed to facilitate an efficient updating procedure as soon as new and more detailed information becomes available. The tool is an Excel spreadsheet model that includes Monte Carlo simulation. To facilitate the Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis the Crystal Ball © software is needed as an add-in to Excel.

3.6 Estimation of the future distributions between types of transport means The three different scenarios that were studied are described in this section. The estimated values of the input parameters for Scenarios 1 and 2 are also given here. Many of these input values were based on subjective judgement and should be updated when a more detailed safety analysis and market analysis of future transports have been made in subsequent phases of the project. The subjective judgment has been made with the help of a document produced in phase 166 and general documentation on HSR67. At present, the model can be used for generic

66 Cp. [108]. 67 Cp. [109].

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 250 of (270) calculations and to investigate what are the most important input parameters to the uncertainties of the model results. The studied scenarios are: • Transport with present relevant means of transport – Scenario 0. • Transport with high-speed train operations on combined tracks as a part of the public transport service (“HSR combined”) – Scenario 1. • Transport with high-speed train operations on separate tracks as a part of the public transport service (“HSR separate”) – Scenario 2.

3.6.1 Scenario 0 Transport with present relevant means of transport means that no HSR system is built. The expected quantity of transported kilometres and annual changes are for different means of transports are stated in section 3.3 Transports.

3.6.2 Scenario 1 When a “HSR combined” system, Scenario 1, is built it is assumed that parts of other means of transports are moved to HSR. It was assumed that no changes of the annual changes of transported kilometres on the different means of transports will take place which probably is a conservative assumption. The only change accounted for is the amount of transported kilometres year 0. Note that these estimates are primarily based on subjective judgements without detailed research of future transport patterns. The estimated changes are as follows: • “HSR combined” transports are estimated to transport 0.5 billion passenger kilometres the first year of operation. This gives an estimate of 0.005 billion vehicle kilometres assuming 100 passengers per vehicle. • The addition of HSR is assumed to increase the total quantity of travel in Norway with 0.06 billion passenger kilometres. • Passenger transports with conventional rail are assumed to decrease with 0.06 billion passenger kilometres to 2.93 passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR traffic. The transported vehicle kilometres do not decrease since goods instead of passengers will be transported on the available rail capacity. • Air transports are assumed to decrease with 0.06 billion passenger kilometres to 4.41 billion passenger kilometres. These transports are transferred to HSR. • Car transports are estimated to decrease with 0.25 billion passenger kilometres to 55.53 billion passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR. The car vehicle kilometres will decrease accordingly by 0.15 billion vehicle kilometres. • Bus transports are estimated to decrease with 0.06 billion passenger kilometres to 4.28 billion passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR. The transported bus vehicle kilometres will decrease accordingly by 0.01 billion vehicle kilometres. • Truck transports are estimated to decrease with 0.08 billion vehicle kilometres. The reasoning for this is as follows: According to Norwegian statistics approximately 89 % of the transports on railways are passenger transports. This means that almost the entire part of the vehicle kilometres that is made available by transferring passenger traffic from conventional rail to HSR will be available for new goods transport. A goods train is assumed to be able to transport the same amount as 100 trucks.

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Table 99: Estimated changes when HSR combined with conventional rail is implemented billion passenger and vehicle kilometres "HSR combined" Conventional rail Air Billion Passenger Billion Vehicle km Billion Passenger km Billion Vehicle km Billion Passenger km km 0.50 0.005 -0.061 - -0.061

Car Bus Truck Billion Passenger Billion Vehicle km Billion Passenger km Billion Vehicle km Billion Vehicle km km -0.25 -0.146 -0.061 -0.010 -0.0825 3.6.3 Scenario 2 When a “HSR separate” system, Scenario 2, is built it is assumed that parts of other means of transports are moved to HSR. It was assumed that no changes of the annual changes of transported kilometres on the different means of transports will take place which probably is a conservative assumption. The only change accounted for is the amount of transported kilometres year 0. Note that these estimates are primarily based on subjective judgements without detailed research of future transport patterns. It was assumed that the number of passenger kilometres on HSR is doubled compared to scenario 1. The estimated changes are as follows: • “HSR separate” transports are estimated to transport 1 billion passenger kilometres the first year of operation. This gives an estimate of 0.01 billion vehicle kilometres; this corresponds to 100 passengers per vehicle. • The addition of HSR is assumed to increase the total quantity of travel in Norway with 0.25 billion passenger kilometres. • Passenger transports with conventional rail are assumed to decrease with 0.125 billion passenger kilometres to 2.87 passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR traffic. The transported vehicle kilometres do not decrease since goods instead of passengers will be transported on the available rail capacity. • Air transports are assumed to decrease with 0.13 billion passenger kilometres to 4.35 passenger kilometres. These transports are transferred to HSR. • Car transports are estimated to decrease with 0.25 billion passenger kilometres to 55.28 billion passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR. The car vehicle kilometres will decrease accordingly by 0.29 billion vehicle kilometres. • Bus transports are estimated to decrease with 0.125 billion passenger kilometres to 4.22 billion passenger kilometres, which are transferred to HSR. The transported bus vehicle kilometres will decrease accordingly by 0.02 billion vehicle kilometres. • Truck transports is estimated to decrease with 0.17 billion vehicle kilometres. The reasoning for this is as follows. According to Norwegian statistics approximately 89 % of the transports on railways are passenger transports. This means that almost the entire part of the vehicle kilometres that is made available by transferring passenger traffic from conventional rail to HSR will be available for new goods transport. A goods train is assumed to be able to transport the same amount as 100 trucks.

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Table 100: Estimated changes when a separate HSR is implemented "HSR separate" Conventional rail Air Billion Passenger km Billion Vehicle km Billion Passenger km Billion Vehicle km Billion Passenger km 1.00 0.010 -0.125 - -0.125

Car Bus Truck Billion Passenger km Billion Vehicle km Billion Passenger km Billion Vehicle km Billion Vehicle km

-0.50 -0.292 -0.125 -0.020 -0.1684

3.7 Results

3.7.1 Estimation of the current transport safety level and development The total society safety level of the current transport system without any HSR operations was calculated based on the input data described in chapter 3.3 and 3.4. The calculations show that in total 217 fatalities are expected to occur annually in the current Norwegian transport system. The annual safety development, based on available information, varies between 3.3 % and 7.5 % for studied transport means excluding bus safety for others. The calculated development for bus safety for others than passengers is based on a very limited statistical sample and not in correspondence with the trend on safety developments for other means of transport. The results of the calculations are shown in Table 101 and in Figure 123.

Table 101: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in Norway and the annual safety development.

Transport type Current societal safety level fatalities Safety development annual change in fatalities per Billion passenger/vehicle km Railway tranpsport Conventional rail Passengers 0.7 3.5% Others 8.0 3.5% Road transport Car Passenger 156.7 3.3% Others 31.2 4.1% Bus Passenger 4.0 3.3% Others 3.5 -4.4% Truck Others 18.5 4.3% Air transport Passengers 0.4 7.5% Total 223.2

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Current societal transport safety

250.00 223.17

200.00

156.73 150.00

100.00 Annual Fatalities

50.00 31.24 18.51 8.00 0.68 4.04 3.53 0.45 0.00 l rs s s s s s s s a e he er er r r er r t g t g h ge he h e o n O n t n t t ng T e il e O e O O e s a s r s s k s s R s a s u c s a a C a B ru a l P P P T P ai ar s ir R C u A B Figure 123: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in Norway expressed as the expected number of fatalities for each means of transport.

3.7.2 Estimation of changes in safety and the consequences of the changes The total societal safety levels and economic consequences concerning fatalities of transport systems with HSR operations are presented here. Observe that the estimated changes in passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres if HSR systems are implemented have been based on subjective judgement. The results should therefore be seen as generic rather than results to support real decisions. Given the input data used, the societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios shown as total amounts of fatalities during 25 years are presented in Table 102 and in Figure 124 for 25, 40, 60 and 100 year time horizons. In Figure 125 the changes in predicted societal transport safety levels are presented. The implementation of either “HSR combined” (Scenario 1) or “HSR separate” (Scenario 2) in Norway would lead to a reduction in loss of life with 14 lives in S1 and 28 lives in S2 lives when studying the first 25 years and given the input information used here.

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Table 102: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios presented as total number of fatalities during 25 years. Transport type Safety level S0 Safety level S1 Safety level S2 total fatalities during 25 years total fatalities during 25 years Railway tranpsport "HSR combined" Passengers -2.8 - Others -15.3 - "HSR separate" Passengers --5.7 Others --30.7 Conventional rail Passengers 13.3 13.1 12.8 Others 170.1 170.1 170.1 Road transport Car Passenger 3'451.7 3'428.2 3'404.4 Others 731.5 728.2 724.9 Bus Passenger 71.7 70.7 69.6 Others 7.7 7.6 7.5 Truck Others 442.4 438.6 434.5 Air transport Passengers 8.4 8.3 8.2 Total 4'896.8 4'882.9 4'868.4

Total fatalities of scenarios

14'198 14'177 14'155 14'000

12'000

10'000 25 years 40 years 8'000 60 years 100 years

Total fatalities 6'000 4'897 4'883 4'868

4'000

2'000

0 S0 S1 S2 Scenarios

Figure 124: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios presented as total number of fatalities for four different time horizons.

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Change in predicted societal transport safety, S1 and S2 compared to S0

50

45

40

35 25 years 30 40 years 60 years 25 100 years 20

Change in fatalities in Change 15

10

5

0 S1 S2 Scenarios Figure 125 Change in predicted societal transport safety S1 and S2 compared to S0 in Norway for four different time horizons. The economic consequences of safety changes resulting from implementation of HSR systems were estimated by integrating the expected safety changes with the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). The VSL currently used in Norway is 20 MNOK. Given the input data used. the implementation of either “HSR combined” (Scenario 1) or “HSR separate” (Scenario 2) in Norway would for a 25-year time horizon lead to a societal benefit of approximately 175 MNOK for Scenario 1 (net present value) and 360 MNOK for Scenario 2 (net present value) due to decreased fatality rates. The results are presented in Figure 126. Economic consequences (net present value) of scenarios

450

400

350

300 25 years 250 40 years 60 years MNOK 200 100 years

150

100

50

0 S1 S2 Scenarios Figure 126: The economic consequences of transport safety level changes with the implementation of HSR systems in Norway for different time periods.

3.7.3 Uncertainty analysis Uncertainty analysis was made for safety calculations for the three scenarios and for the calculations of economic consequences of safety changes in Scenarios 1 and 2. Due to the limitations of the input data, a detailed uncertainty analysis of each input parameter was not possible. Instead all input parameters were assigned an uncertainty of ±10 % of the input value.

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A more detailed uncertainty assessment of each input parameter should be performed when more detailed information on the future HSR operations becomes available. As a consequence of this the uncertainty analysis should be considered as generic at this stage. The model can be easily updated to incorporate more detailed uncertainty assessments. Uncertainty analysis was made for the 25-year time horizon. The uncertainty analysis was performed on 10’000 Monte Carlo runs of the model. The model is structured so that uncertainty analysis can easily be made also for the other time horizons but was not considered to provide any substantial information to the present assessment. Figure 127 displays the 5-percentile, median and 95-percentile values for the safety forecasts for a time horizons of 25 years. Figure 128 displays the corresponding results for the calculations of economic consequences of safety changes for Scenarios 1 and 2. Uncertainty analysis, Total Safety, T = 25 Years

6'000

4'889 4'875 4'861 5'000

4'000

5-percentile 3'000 Median 95-percentile Fatalities 2'000

1'000

0 S0 S1 S2

Scenarios Figure 127: The uncertainties of total societal safety level forecasts of transports, presented as total number of fatalities during 25 years in Norway, for the studied scenarios. Uncertainty analysis, Economic consequences, T = 25 Years

5000.00

4000.00

3000.00

2000.00

1000.00 5-percentile Median

MNOK 0.00 95-percentile S1 S2 -1000.00

-2000.00

-3000.00

-4000.00 Scenarios Figure 128: The uncertainties of economic consequences of safety changes for Scenarios 1 and Scenario 2. Below the uncertainty analyses of the total safety and economic consequences are presented for each scenario. Figure 129, Figure 131 and Figure 133 figures show the histograms for total transport safety from 10’000 Monte Carlo runs for the three studied scenarios. Figure 135 and

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Figure 137 show the histograms for the economic consequences of safety changes for Scenarios 1 and 2. Sensitivity analyses based on rank correlation were made for both safety and economic calculations. The sensitivity analysis identifies the parameters that for which more detailed studies are most important in order to perform model calculations with a higher degree of certainty. Based on the assigned an uncertainty of ±10 % of each input value of the model and the selected statistical distributions described above the parameters contributing most to the uncertainty of the calculations are shown in the sensitivity charts of Figure 130, Figure 132, Figure 134, Figure 136 and Figure 138.

Figure 129: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years.

Figure 130: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years.

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Figure 131: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 1 during 25 years

Figure 132: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 1 during 25 years

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Figure 133: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 2 during 25 years

Figure 134: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 3 during 25 years

Figure 135: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25 years

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Figure 136: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25 years

Figure 137: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25 years

Figure 138: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25 years

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A full uncertainty analysis could not be performed due to the limited information on several input parameters. However, the sensitivity analysis where each input value was given an uncertainty of ±10 % of the input value identified the parameters most sensitive to the final model results. It was shown that the inputs on car transport will be of great importance to the reliability of the model calculations. The reason for this is that a dominating part of the total person transports is made by car and that the safety level is relatively low compared to other transport means.

3.8 Conclusions The study on transport safety has primarily been directed at developing an assessment tool for calculations of the current safety transport level, forecasts of future transport safety levels with and without HSR operations, evaluation of economic consequences due to changed future safety levels and uncertainty analysis of the results. The assessment tool handles information on the following transport means: • Road transports and safety including cars, buses and truck transports. • Rail transports and safety including conventional rail, HSR on tracks with combined HSR and conventional rail operations and HSR operations on separate tracks. • Air transport and safety. The input information that could be collected within the scope of this project was in some instances rather limited regarding transport information and safety levels for different means of transport. The calculations and forecasts presented in this study should therefore be considered as generic. When more detailed information becomes available in subsequent phases of the project regarding risk and safety levels of future HSR operations and expected distributions between transport means the input information and model calculations can be updated to a higher degree of certainty. In this study the model was used for safety calculations on a national level given the available information on transport and safety levels and predicted future changes. When more specific information concerning the details regarding future high-speed operations the pre-defined scenarios can be updated and the model can be used for specific corridors and stretches of future HSR operations. The current model does not include ferry transport due to lack of information on the quantity of passenger kilometres, the relatively small amounts of passenger transport and the assumption that future HSR operations will have a rather limited correlation with safety on ferries. In addition to the transport and safety information the assessment tool also uses inputs regarding the time horizon of interest and economic valuation of forecasted safety changes due to HSR operations. The model was set up to facilitate forecasts for 25, 40, 60 and 100 year time horizons. The economic consequences of changed safety levels were calculated using the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). A VSL of 20 MNOK is currently applied in Norway and was used in the model calculations. However, this value can be changed according to changes in statistical life valuations. A discount rate of 4.5 % with possible changes to 3.5 % and 5.5 % was used for the calculations. The model was developed in Excel-format for easy access and application. Further, the model was developed to be able to facilitate uncertainty analysis based on Monte Carlo simulation. The add-in software Crystal Ball © is necessary to run the uncertainty analysis. Given the input information used the model calculations show that implementation of HSR operations may have a positive effect on the total transport safety. From the uncertainty analysis it can be seen that the probability of a positive net present value is in the order of 53% for Scenario 1 and 56 % for Scenario 2. This means that with these input values there is a slightly larger probability of positive societal economic effects than negative from HSR operations with respect to safety. Given the input data used the total economic benefit of the

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 262 of (270) operations was assessed to be in the order of 175 MNOK for Scenario 1 and 360 MNOK for Scenario 2 for a 25 year time horizon. It should be emphasized that these results may not be representative of a true future transport situation since fundamental information regarding the future transport conditions and HSR safety are not yet available. A full uncertainty analysis could not be performed, due to the limited information on several input parameters. However, a sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulation, where each input value was given an uncertainty of +/- 10 % of the input value, identifies the parameters most sensitive to the final model results. It was shown that the inputs on car transport will be of great importance to the reliability of the model calculations. The reason for this is that a dominating part of the total person transports is made by car and that the safety level is relatively low compared to other transport means. The model described here should be an important tool in assisting decisions on future HSR operations and can be used on both a national level and for specific HSR corridors.

3.9 Security of HSR Systems regarding sabotage and terrorism Sabotage and terrorism are elements which have not been included in the current assessment model due to the difficulty quantifying their probabilities and extents. Rail transport systems are more vulnerable to sabotage and terrorist attacks than air transport systems, due to their size and extent as well as their accessibility along the entire travel paths. An overall and permanent surveillance and protection is very difficult to render, if it is not impossible. It is conceivable that if a significant amount of travellers transfer from road and air towards High Speed Rail one would have more ‘easy targets’ with potentially high media impact compared to the current situation, due to the possible higher occupancies and operational speeds and therefore possibly larger numbers of fatalities and attack consequences. The protection of railway infrastructure systems is compared to aviation more extensive as railway infrastructure is spacious and includes a number of hard controllable system components: • Railway line, • Station areas, • Rail operation areas (depots, shunting yards, holding etc.), • Operation buildings (control centre, energy distribution stations etc.), • Passenger trains. Already this overview list makes it clear that a entire and complete protection of all rail system components can hardly be reached. There have been some sabotage and terrorist attacks on HSR systems so far. Some of the notable ones were a bomb in France in a TGV luggage area and a concrete object lain on the tracks and also a bomb found on the high speed line Madrid – Sevilla [110]. Catastrophic consequences had the bombing in Russia on the – St. Petersburg line [111] with a lot of dead and injured persons. Only the latter of these examples has caused a significant death toll, even though the line was under surveillance by the army. However, it has to be noted that most of the “successful” terrorist attacks so far have been against commuter rail or metro systems, mostly in station areas, where significant numbers of passengers are present [112], [113], [114], [115] or against conventional railway lines like in India. The only major differences between a HSR system and a conventional rail system are, otherwise as often assumed not the speed, but the separate tracks and corridors. Thus it is

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Page 263 of (270) reasonable to assume that attack patterns on a high speed rail system are similar to those on a conventional rail system. However, depending on the risk exposure preventive measures have to be taken to protect passengers and safeguard rail operation. The preventive measures are planned under consideration of their operational costs and the assessment of risk potential. Measures from different countries practise could be: • Introducing an overall security concept including a security centre responsible for all security aspects over the entire system and lines. This security centre should not be directly involved in traffic operations but be in permanent contact with operations personnel, and must have a global coordination and surveillance role over the entire system. It should also coordinate any emergency response. • Ensuring permanent communication between the security centre, operation centre and the trains (redundant radio system, emergency frequency) • Redundancy of all telecommunication and signaling systems and cables, as well as ensuring that these systems and cables are resistant to attack, sabotage and vandalism. • Ensuring quick emergency access to all areas and tracks, in case of an accident or attack, and that an appropriate emergency response is possible, especially in remote areas. • Applying of existing security concepts whose aim it is to prevent assaults on the station architecture as described in [116] and [117] in all stations and buildings. • Security areas or enclosures in stations. • Security check of baggage resp. security check equivalent to air transport. • Access control to platforms e.g. closed ticketing system. • Complete fencing in all high speed track sections to prevent easy access, if possible including intrusion detection. • Fencing on bridges to prevent throw of objects on the train and to avoid suicides. • Prevention of collisions with vehicles went astray by constructing of crash barriers / walls. • Countries with high risk exposure are planning or operating following measures:: o Permanent operation of patrol services (incl tracking dogs in Russia) o Drones to detect bombs along the line (Russia) o Permanent CCTV control of the line (planned in Russia) • Preventing tampering with rolling stock when not in use. • Coordination of measures with other countries. With the implementation of the Task Force on Rail Security, Jernbaneverket took first step to define where rail security has to be improved based on risk exposures. Right now station areas are in the focus of discussions but with entering into the design phase of HSL the handbook for “Security on Rail” should include HSR related aspects. Support is given by the discussion and working group at UIC [118] on the subject of HSR safety and security. In addition to this the risk assessment within subject 2 provides a sound basis to develop the security handbook further. Especially by filling and developing the risk assessment with transportation data out of the corridor analysis.

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Table of references

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Annexes

Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 Standard Evaluation Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather & climate– base information Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track Evaluation Matrix Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 4 TSI INS Parameter matrix Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire Annex 6 Subject 1 Task 5 Evaluation model Annex 7 Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters Annex 8 Subject 1 Task 5 Existing trainconcepts Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 Standard Evaluation

Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY TSI Infrastructure - High Speed-Rail System JD 530 Overbygning, Prosjektering JD 532 Overbygning, Vedlikehold JD 520 Underbygning, Prosjektering og bygging JD 525 Bruer, Prosjektering og bygging

MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA 4.2.9 prEN 13715 Railway applications – Wheelsets and bogies – Wheels – Tread profile Equivalent conicity NS-EN 13715:2006 4.2.9.2 Design values 4.2.9 EN 15302:2006 Railway applications - Method for determining the equivalent conicity Equivalent conicity NS-EN 15302:2008 4.2.9.2 Design values 4.2.13 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Track Resistance NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.13.1 Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - clause 6.5.4 Lines of category 1 c) Longitudinal forces due to interaction between structures and track 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.1 Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraphs 6.3.2 (2), 6.3.3 (3); paragraphs 6.3.2 (3) and 6.3.3 (5) ; Vertical loads paragraphs 6.4.3 (1) and 6.4.5.2 (2) 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.2 Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - section 6.4.4; paragraphs Dynamic analysis 6.4.6.1.1 (3), (4), (5) and (6); paragraph 6.4.6.2 (1) ; paragraph 6.4.6.5 (3) 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraph 6.5.1 (4) Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.3 Centrifugal forces 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraphs 6.5.2 (2) and (3). Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.4 Nosing forces 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraphs 6.5.3 (2), (4), (5) and (6) ; paragraph 6.5.3 Traffic load on structures Actions due to traction NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.5 (6). and braking (Longitudinal loads) 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges -clause 6.5.4. Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.6 Longitudinal forces due to interaction between structures and track 4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges -section 6.6. Traffic load on structures Aerodynamic actions NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.7 from passing trains on line side structures

4.2.14 EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1 Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges + national application documents Traffic load on structures Application of the NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010 4.2.14.8 requirements of EN 1991-2:2003 4.2.14 EN 1990: 2002/ - annex A2 Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1990:2002+NA:2008 4.2.14.1 Vertical loads 4.2.14 EN 1990: 2002/ - annex A2 Traffic load on structures NS-EN 1990:2002+NA:2008 4.2.14.2 Dynamic analysis 5.3.1 EN13674-1:2003 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Annex A The rail NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007 5.3.1.1 Railhead profile a) Plain line 5.3.1 EN13674-1:2003 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Chapter 5 The rail NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007 5.3.1.3 Steel grade a) Plain line

A1-1 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL6.2.5 SPECIFICATIONSEN 13674-1:2003 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above – rail sections 60 E 1 and Technical solutions given presumption of NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007 60 E 2 conformity at design phase 6.2.5.2 Assessment of equivalent conicity 5.3.1 EN13674-2:2003 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 2: switch and crossing rails used in conjunction with flat-bottom The rail NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010 5.3.1.1 symmetrical railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Annex A. Railhead profile b) Switches and crossings 5.3.1 EN13674-2:2003 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 2: switch and crossing rails used in conjunction with flat-bottom The rail NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010 5.3.1.3 symmetrical railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Chapter 5 Steel grade b) Switches and crossings 5.3.2 EN 13481-2:2002 Railway applications – Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: Fastening systems for The rail fastening system NS-EN 13481-2:2002 a) concrete sleepers Minimum Resistance to rail longitudinal slip 5.3.2. EN 13481-2:2002 Railway applications – Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: Fastening systems for The rail fastening system NS-EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006 b) concrete sleepers Resistance to repeated loading 5.3.2. EN 13146-5 Railway applications – Track – Test methods for fastening systems – Part 5: Determination of electrical The rail fastening system NS-EN 13146-5:2002 d) resistance Minimum electric resistance 6.2.6 EN 13848-1:2003 Railway applications/Track - Track geometry quality - Part1: Characterization of track geometry- section 4.2.2 Particular requirements for conformity NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008 assessment 6.2.6.2 Assessment of minimum value of mean track gauge

VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA 5.3.1.2 EN13674-1:2003+A1:2007 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above Design linear mass NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007 5.3.1.2 EN13674-2:2006 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 2: switch and crossing rails used in conjunction with flat-bottom Design linear mass NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010 symmetrical railway rails 46 kg/m and above. 5.3.2 EN13146-1:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test Methods for Fastening Systems - Part 1: Determination of longitudinal rail The rail fastening system NS-EN 13146-4:2002 a) restraint Minimum resistance to rail longitudinal slip 5.3.2 EN13146-4:2002+ A1:2006 Railway applications - Track - Test Methods for Fastening Systems - Part 4: Effect of repeated loading The rail fastening system NS-EN 13146-4:2002/A1:2006 b) Resistance to repeated loading 5.3.2 EN13481-2:2002 +A1:2006 Railway applications – Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: Fastening systems for The rail fastening system NS-EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006 c) concrete sleepers Dynamic stiffness of the rail pad on concrete sleepers 5.3.3 EN13230-1:2002 Railway applications - Track - Concrete bearers and sleepers - Part 1: General Requirements Mass and dimensions NS-EN 13230-1:2009 (Revision under process – published next year) 4.2.2 EN13848-1:2003 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 1:Characterisation of track geometry Nominal track gauge NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008 (+ Amdt A1/2008) 4.2.6 EN 13803-1:2010 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Minimum radius of curvature NS-EN 13803-1:2010 Characterisation of track geometry 4.2.7 ENV 13803-1:2002 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Track cant NS-EN 13803-1:2010 Characterisation of track geometry 4.2.8 ENV 13803-1:2002 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Cant deficiency NS-EN 13803-1:2010 Characterisation of track geometry 4.5 ENV 13803-1:2002 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Maintenance rules NS-EN 13803-1:2010 Characterisation of track geometry 4.2.6 EN 13803-2: 2006+ AC2007 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches Minimum radius of curvature NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007 and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature

4.2.7 EN 13803-2:2006 + AC 2007 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches Track cant NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007 and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature

A1-2 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.8 SPECIFICATIONSEN 13803-2:2006/ INTEROPERABILITY AC 2007 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches Cant deficiency NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007 and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature

4.2.12 EN 13803-2:2006/ AC 2007 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches Switches and crossings NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007 and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature

4.2.13 EN 13803-2:2006/AC 2007 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches Track resistance NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007 and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature

4.5 EN 13803-2:2006 /AC 2007 Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches Maintenance rules NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007 and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature

4.2.7 EN 14363:2005 Railway application – Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Track cant NS-EN 14363:2005 running behaviour and stationary tests 4.2.8 EN 14363:2005 Railway application – Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Cant deficiency NS-EN 14363:2005 running behaviour and stationary tests 4.2.13 EN 14363:2005 Railway application – Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Track resistance NS-EN 14363:2005 running behaviour and stationary tests 4.2.9.2 EN 15302: 2008 Railway applications –Method for determining the equivalent conicity Equivalent Conicity NS-EN 15302:2008 Design values 4.2.10 EN13848-5:2008 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 5: Geometric quality levels Track geometrical quality and limits on isolated NS-EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010 defects 4.2.9.3 EN13848-5:2008 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 5: Geometric quality levels In service values NS-EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010 4.2.9.3.1 Minimum values of mean track gauge 4.2.9.3 EN13848-1:2003+A1 2008 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 1:Characterisation of track geometry In service values NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008 4.2.9.3.1 Minimum values of mean track gauge 4.2.10 EN13848-1:2003/ A1 2008 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 1:Characterisation of track geometry Track geometrical quality and limits on isolated NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008 defects 4.5 EN13848-1:2003/AC2007 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 1:Characterisation of track geometry Maintenance rules NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008 4.2.12 EN 13232-2:2003 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 2: Requirements for geometric design Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-2:2003 4.2.12 EN 13232-2:2003 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 2: Requirements for geometric design Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-2:2003 4.2.12.3 Geometrical characteristics 4.2.12 EN 13232-9:2006 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 9: Layouts Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-9:2006 4.2.12 EN 13232-9:2006 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 9: Layouts Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-9:2006 4.2.12.3 Geometrical characteristics 4.5 EN 13232-9:2006 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 9: Layouts Maintenance rules NS-EN 13232-9:2006 4.2.12 EN 13232-4: 2005 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 4: Actuation locking an detection Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-4:2005 4.2.12.1 Means of detection and locking 4.2.12 EN 13232-4:2005 Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 4: Actuation locking an detection Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-4:2005 4.2.12.3 Geometrical characteristics 4.2.12 prEN13232-7:2006 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 7: Crossings with movable parts Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-7:2006 4.2.12.2 Use of swing nose 4.2.12 EN13232-5: 2005 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 5: Switches Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-5:2005 4.2.12.3 Geometrical characteristics 4.2.12 EN13232-6:2005 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 6: Fixed common and obtuse crossings Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-6:2005 4.2.12.3 Geometrical characteristics 4.2.12 EN 13232-7:2006 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 7: Crossings with movable parts Switches and crossings NS-EN 13232-7:2006 4.2.12.3 Geometrical characteristics

A1-3 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.13 SPECIFICATIONSprENV 13803-1:2002 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Track resistance NS-EN 13803-1:2010 Characterisation of track geometry 4.2.16 EN14067-5:2005 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 5: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in tunnel Maximum pressure variations in tunnels NS-EN 14067-5:2006 4.2.17 prEN 14067-6: 2006 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 6: Cross wind effects on railway operation (In preparation in TC 256 Effect of crosswinds NS-EN 14067-6:2010 WG6) 4.4.3 EN14067-4:2005/prA1 2008 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics on open Protection of workers against aerodynamic NS-EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009

FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS

UIC LEAFLETS UIC 505-1 Rolling stock construction gauge UIC 505-4 Effects of the application of the kinematic gauges defined in the 505 series of leaflets UIC 506 Rules governing application of the enlarged GA, GB and GC gauges UIC 510-2 Trailing stock: wheels and wheelsets. Conditions concerning the use of wheels of various diameters UIC 527 Coaches, vans and wagons - Dimensions of buffer heads - Track layout on S-curves UIC 606 Consequence of the application of the kinematics gauges defined by UIC leaflets in the 505 series on the design of the contact lines UIC 716 Maximum permissible wear profiles for switches UIC 741 Passenger stations - Height of platforms - Regulations governing the positioning of platform edges in relation to the track UIC 779-11 Determination of railway tunnel cross-sectional areas on the basis of aerodynamic considerations

OTHER EUROPEAN NORMS Eurocode 1 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne laster - Tetthet, egenvekt og nyttelaster i bygninger NS-EN 1991-1-1:2002/AC:2009 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne laster - Tetthet, egenvekt og nyttelaster i bygninger NS-EN 1991-1-1:2002+NA:2008 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Allmenne laster - Laster på konstruksjoner ved brann NS-EN 1991-1-2:2002+NA:2008 Eurocode 1 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Allmenne laster - Snølaster NS-EN 1991-1-3:2003/AC:2009 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Allmenne laster - Snølaster NS-EN 1991-1-3:2003+NA:2008 Eurocode 1 Endringsblad A1 - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Allmenne laster - Vindlaster NS-EN 1991-1-4:2005/A1:2010 Eurocode 1 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Allmenne laster - Vindlaster NS-EN 1991-1-4:2005/AC:2010 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Allmenne laster - Vindlaster NS-EN 1991-1-4:2005+NA:2009 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Allmenne laster - Termiske påvirkninger NS-EN 1991-1-5:2003+NA:2008 Eurocode 1 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Allmenne laster - Laster under utførelse NS-EN 1991-1-6:2005/AC:2008 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Allmenne laster - Laster under utførelse NS-EN 1991-1-6:2005+NA:2008 Eurocode 1 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Allmenne laster - Ulykkeslaster NS-EN 1991-1-7:2006/AC:2010 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Allmenne laster - Ulykkeslaster NS-EN 1991-1-7:2006+NA:2008 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 3: Laster fra kraner og maskineri NS-EN 1991-3:2006+NA:2010 Eurocode 1 Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 4: Siloer og beholdere NS-EN 1991-4:2006+NA:2010 Eurocode 2 Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner Eurocode 2 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1992-1-1:2004/AC:2008 Eurocode 2 Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1992-1-1:2004+NA:2008

A1-4 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEurocode 2 INTEROPERABILITYEurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1992-1-2:2004+NA:2010 Eurocode 2 Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1992-2:2005+NA:2010 Eurocode 2 Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 3: Siloer og beholdere NS-EN 1992-3:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3 - Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1993-1-1:2005/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1993-1-1:2005+NA:2008 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-10: Materialets slagseighet og egenskaper i tykkelsesretningen NS-EN 1993-1-10:2005/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-10: Materialets bruddseighet og egenskaper i tykkelsesretningen NS-EN 1993-1-10:2005+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-11: Kabler og strekkstag NS-EN 1993-1-11:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-11: Kabler og strekkstag NS-EN 1993-1-11:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-12: Konstruksjoner med høyfast stål NS-EN 1993-1-12:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-12: Konstruksjoner med høyfast stål NS-EN 1993-1-12:2007+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1993-1-2:2005/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1993-1-2:2005+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede tynnplateprofiler NS-EN 1993-1-3:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede tynnplateprofiler NS-EN 1993-1-3:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Konstruksjoner av rustfritt stål NS-EN 1993-1-4:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Plater påkjent i plateplanet NS-EN 1993-1-5:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Plater påkjent i plateplanet NS-EN 1993-1-5:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Skallkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1993-1-6:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Skallkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1993-1-6:2007+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Plater påkjent normalt på plateplanet NS-EN 1993-1-7:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Plater påkjent normalt på plateplanet NS-EN 1993-1-7:2007+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-8: Knutepunkter og forbindelser NS-EN 1993-1-8:2005/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-8: Knutepunkter og forbindelser NS-EN 1993-1-8:2005+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-9: Utmattingspåkjente konstruksjoner NS-EN 1993-1-9:2005/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-9: Utmattingspåkjente konstruksjoner NS-EN 1993-1-9:2005+NA:2010 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1993-2:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1993-2:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 3-1: Tårn og master NS-EN 1993-3-1:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 3-1: Tårn og master NS-EN 1993-3-1:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 3-2: Skorsteiner NS-EN 1993-3-2:2006+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-1: Siloer NS-EN 1993-4-1:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-1: Siloer NS-EN 1993-4-1:2007+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-2: Tanker NS-EN 1993-4-2:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-2: Tanker NS-EN 1993-4-2:2007+NA:2009 Eurocode 3 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-3: Røranlegg NS-EN 1993-4-3:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-3: Røranlegg NS-EN 1993-4-3:2007+NA:2009

A1-5 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEurocode 3 INTEROPERABILITYEurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 5: Peler (spunt) NS-EN 1993-5:2007+NA:2010 Eurocode 3 Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 6: Kranbaner NS-EN 1993-6:2007+NA:2010 Eurocode 4 Eurokode 4 - Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong Eurocode 4 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for byginger NS-EN 1994-1-1:2004/AC:2009 Eurocode 4 Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for byginger NS-EN 1994-1-1:2004+NA:2009 Eurocode 4 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1994-1-2:2005/AC:2008 Eurocode 4 Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1994-1-2:2005+NA:2009 Eurocode 4 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1994-2:2005/AC:2008 Eurocode 4 Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1994-2:2005+NA:2009 Eurocode 5 Eurokode 5 - Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner Eurocode 5 Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1995-1-1:2004+A1:2008+NA:2010 Eurocode 5 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1995-1-2:2004/AC:2009 Eurocode 5 Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1995-1-2:2004+NA:2010 Eurocode 5 Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1995-2:2004+NA:2010 Eurocode 5 Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Valg av materialer og utførelse av murverk NS-EN 1996-2:2006+NA:2010 Eurocode 6 Eurokode 6 - Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner Eurocode 6 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler for armerte og uarmerte murkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1996-1-1:2005/AC:2009 Eurocode 6 Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler for armerte og uarmerte murkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1996-1-1:2005+NA:2010 Eurocode 6 Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1996-1-2:2005+NA:2010 Eurocode 6 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Valg av materialer og utførelse av murverk NS-EN 1996-2:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 6 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 3: Forenklede beregningsmetoder for uarmerte murkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1996-3:2006/AC:2009 Eurocode 6 Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 3: Forenklede beregningsmetoder for uarmerte murkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1996-3:2006+NA:2010 Eurocode 7 Eurokode 7 - Geoteknisk prosjektering Eurocode 7 Eurokode 7: Geoteknisk prosjektering - Del 1: Allmenne regler NS-EN 1997-1:2004+NA:2008 Eurocode 7 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 7: Geoteknisk prosjektering - Del 2: Regler basert på grunnundersøkelser og laboratorieprøver NS-EN 1997-2:2007/AC:2010 Eurocode 7 Eurokode 7: Geoteknisk prosjektering - Del 2: Regler basert på grunnundersøkelser og laboratorieprøver NS-EN 1997-2:2007+NA:2008 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8 - Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning Eurocode 8 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 1: Allmenne regler, seismiske laster og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1998-1:2004/AC:2009 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 1: Allmenne regler, seismiske laster og regler for bygninger NS-EN 1998-1:2004+NA:2008 Eurocode 8 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1998-2:2005/AC:2010 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 2: Bruer NS-EN 1998-2:2005+A1:2009+NA:2009 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 3: Vurdering og forsterkning av eksisterende bygninger NS-EN 1998-3:2005

A1-6 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEurocode 8 INTEROPERABILITYRettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 3: Vurdering og forsterkning av eksisterende bygninger NS-EN 1998-3:2005/AC:2010 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 4: Siloer, beholdere og rørledninger NS-EN 1998-4:2006 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 5: Fundamenter, støttekonstruksjoner og geotekniske forhold NS-EN 1998-5:2004+NA:2008 Eurocode 8 Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 6: Tårn, master og skorsteiner NS-EN 1998-6:2005+NA.2008 Eurocode 9 Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner Eurocode 9 Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler NS-EN 1999-1-1:2007+A1:2009+NA:2009 Eurocode 9 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1999-1-2:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 9 Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering NS-EN 1999-1-2:2007+NA:2010 Eurocode 9 Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Utmattingspåkjente konstruksjoner NS-EN 1999-1-3:2007+NA:2010 Eurocode 9 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede tynnplateprofiler NS-EN 1999-1-4:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 9 Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede tynnplateprofiler NS-EN 1999-1-4:2007+NA:2010 Eurocode 9 Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Skallkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1999-1-5:2007/AC:2009 Eurocode 9 Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Skallkonstruksjoner NS-EN 1999-1-5:2007+NA:2010 EN 971-1 Maling og lakk Termer og definisjoner for beleggmaterialer DEL 1 - Generlle termer NS-EN 971-1 EN 1274 Termisk sproyting Pulver Sammensetning Tekniske angivelsesbetingelser NS-EN 1274 EN 13145:2001 Railway applications - Track - Wood sleepers and bearers NS-EN 13145:2001 EN 13146-1:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 1: Determination of longitudinal rail NS-EN 13146-1:2002 restraint EN 13146-2:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 2: Determination of torsional NS-EN 13146-2:2002 resistance EN 13146-3:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 3: Determination of attenuation of NS-EN 13146-3:2002 impact loads EN 13146-6:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 6: Effect of severe environmental NS-EN 13146-6:2002 conditions EN 13146-7:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 7: Determination of clamping force NS-EN 13146-7:2002

EN 13146-8:2002 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 8: In service testing NS-EN 13146-8:2002 EN 13146-8:2002/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 8: In service testing NS-EN 13146-8:2002/A1:2006

EN 13146-9:2009 Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 9: Determination of stiffness NS-EN 13146-9:2009

EN 13230-1:2009 Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 1: General requirements NS-EN 13230-1:2009 EN 13230-2:2009 Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 2: Prestressed monoblock sleepers NS-EN 13230-2:2009

EN 13230-3:2009 Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 3: Twin-block reinforced sleepers NS-EN 13230-3:2009

EN 13230-4:2009 Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 4: Prestressed bearers for switches and NS-EN 13230-4:2009 crossings EN 13230-5:2009 Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 5: Special elements NS-EN 13230-5:2009 EN 13231-1:2006 Railway applications - Track - Acceptance of works - Part 1: Works on ballasted track - Plain line NS-EN 13231-1:2006

A1-7 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEN 13231-2:2006 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Track - Acceptance of works - Part 2: Works on ballasted track - Switches and crossings NS-EN 13231-2:2006

EN 13231-3:2006 Railway applications - Track - Acceptance of works - Part 3: Acceptance of rail grinding, milling and planing NS-EN 13231-3:2006 work in track EN 13232-1:2003 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 1: Definitions NS-EN 13232-1:2003 EN 13232-3:2003 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 3: Requirements for wheel/rail interaction NS-EN 13232-3:2003

EN 13232-8:2007 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 8: Expansion devices NS-EN 13232-8:2007 EN 13450:2002+NA:2009 Aggregates for railway ballast NS-EN 13450:2002+NA:2009 EN 13481-1:2002 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 1: Definitions NS-EN 13481-1:2002 EN 13481-1:2002/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 1: NS-EN 13481-1:2002/A1:2006 Definitions EN 13481-2:2002 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: Fastening systems for NS-EN 13481-2:2002 concrete sleepers EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: NS-EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006 Fastening systems for concrete sleepers EN 13481-3:2002 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 3: Fastening systems for NS-EN 13481-3:2002 wood sleepers EN 13481-3:2002/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 3: NS-EN 13481-3:2002/A1:2006 Fastening systems for wood sleepers EN 13481-4:2002 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 4: Fastening systems for NS-EN 13481-4:2002 steel sleepers - (Corrigendum AC:2004 incorporated) EN 13481-4:2002/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 4: NS-EN 13481-4:2002/A1:2006 Fastening systems for steel sleepers EN 13481-4:2002/AC:2004 Corrigendum AC - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 4: NS-EN 13481-4:2002/AC:2004 Fastening systems for steel sleepers EN 13481-5:2002 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 5: Fastening systems for NS-EN 13481-5:2002 slab track EN 13481-5:2002/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 5: NS-EN 13481-5:2002/A1:2006 Fastening systems for slab track EN 13481-7:2003 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 7: Special fastening NS-EN 13481-7:2003 systems for switches and crossing and check rails EN 13481-7:2003/A1:2006 Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 7: NS-EN 13481-7:2003/A1:2006 Special fastening systems for switches and crossings and check rails EN 13481-8:2006 Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 8: Fastening systems for NS-EN 13481-8:2006 track with heavy axle loads EN 13597:2003 Railway applications - Rubber suspension components - Rubber diaphragms for pneumatic suspension NS-EN 13597:2003 springs EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 2: Switch and crossing rails used in conjunction with Vignole railway NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010 rails 46 kg/m and above EN 13674-3:2006+A1:2010 Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 3: Check rails NS-EN 13674-3:2006+A1:2010 EN 13803-1:2010 Railway applications - Track - Track alignment design parameters - Track gauges 1435 mm and wider - Part 1: NS-EN 13803-1:2010 Plain line EN 13803-2:2006+A1:2009 Railway applications - Track - Track alignment design parameters - Track gauges 1 435 mm and wider - Part 2: NS-EN 13803-2:2006+A1:2009 Switches and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of curvature

EN 13848-2:2006 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality - Part 2: Measuring systems - Track recording vehicles NS-EN 13848-2:2006

A1-8 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEN 13848-3:2009 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Track - Track geometry quality - Part 3: Measuring systems - Track construction and NS-EN 13848-3:2009 maintenance machines EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010 Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality - Part 5: Geometric quality levels - Plain line NS-EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010 EN 14033-1:2008 Railway applications - Track - Railbound construction and maintenance machines - Part 1: Technical NS-EN 14033-1:2008 requirements for running EN 14033-2:2008 Railway applications - Track - Railbound construction and maintenance machines - Part 2: Technical NS-EN 14033-2:2008 requirements for working EN 14033-3:2009 Railway applications - Track - Railbound construction and maintenance machines - Part 3: General safety NS-EN 14033-3:2009 requirements EN 14067-1:2003 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 1: Symbols and units NS-EN 14067-1:2003 EN 14067-2:2003 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 2: Aerodynamics on open track NS-EN 14067-2:2003 EN 14067-3:2003 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 3: Aerodynamics in tunnels NS-EN 14067-3:2003 EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics on open NS-EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009 track EN 14067-5:2006 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 5: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in tunnels NS-EN 14067-5:2006

EN 14067-6:2010 Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 6: Requirements and test procedures for cross wind assessment NS-EN 14067-6:2010

EN 14587-1:2007 Railway applications - Track - Flash butt welding of rails - Part 1: New R220, R260, R260Mn and R350HT NS-EN 14587-1:2007 grade rails in a fixed plant EN 14587-2:2009 Railway applications - Track - Flash butt welding of rails - Part 2: New R220, R260, R260Mn and R350HT NS-EN 14587-2:2009 grade rails by mobile welding machines at sites other than a fixed plant EN 14969:2006 Railway applications - Track - Qualification system for railway trackwork contractors NS-EN 14969:2006 EN 15016-1:2004 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 1: General Principles NS-EN 15016-1:2004 EN 15016-2:2004 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists NS-EN 15016-2:2004 EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007 Corrigendum AC - Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists NS-EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007 EN 15016-3:2004 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 3: Handling of modifications of technical documents NS-EN 15016-3:2004

EN 15016-4:2006 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 4: Data exchange NS-EN 15016-4:2006 EN 15227:2008 Railway applications - Crashworthiness requirements for railway vehicle bodies NS-EN 15227:2008 EN 15273-1:2009 Railway applications - Gauges - Part 1: General - Common rules for infrastructure and rolling stock NS-EN 15273-1:2009 EN 15273-2:2009 Railway applications - Gauges - Part 2: Rolling stock gauge NS-EN 15273-2:2009 EN 15273-3:2009 Railway applications - Gauges - Part 3: Structure gauges NS-EN 15273-3:2009 EN 15302:2008 Railway applications - Method for determining the equivalent conicity NS-EN 15302:2008 EN 15528:2008 Railway applications - Line categories for managing the interface between load limits of vehicles and NS-EN 15528:2008 infrastructure EN 15594:2009 Railway applications - Track - Restoration of rails by electric arc welding NS-EN 15594:2009 EN 15610:2009 Railway applications - Noise emission - Rail roughness measurement related to rolling noise generation NS-EN 15610:2009

EN 15611:2008 Railway applications - Braking - Relay valves NS-EN 15611:2008 EN 15686:2010 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles with cant NS-EN 15686:2010 deficiency compensation system and/or vehicles intended to operate with higher cant deficiency than stated in EN 14363:2005, Annex G EN 15687:2010 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of freight vehicles with static axle NS-EN 15687:2010 loads higher than 225 kN and up to 250 kN EN 15689:2009 Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Crossing components made of cast austenitic NS-EN 15689:2009 manganese steel EN 15746-1:2010 Railway applications - Track - Road-rail machines and associated equipment - Part 1: Technical requirements NS-EN 15746-1:2010 for running and working

A1-9 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEN 15746-2:2010 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Track - Road-rail machines and associated equipment - Part 2: General safety NS-EN 15746-2:2010 requirements

A1-10 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Energy subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY JD 510 Felles elektro – Regler for prosjektering og TSI Energy bygging JD 540 Kontaktledning - Regler for prosjektering

JD 541 Kontaktledning - Regler for bygging JD 542 Kontaktledning - Regler for vedlikehold

JD 546 Banestrømforsyning - Regler for prosjektering JD 548 Banestrømforsyning - Regler for vedlikehold

MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS 4.2.2 EN 50163:2004 RA - Supply Voltages of Traction Systems, clause 4 Voltage and frequency NEK EN 50163:2004 4.2.3 EN 50388:2005 RA - Power Supply and Rolling Stock – System performance and installed NEK EN 50388:2005 Technical Criteria for the Coordination Between Power power Supply (Substation) and Rolling Stock to Achieve Interop- erability - clauses 6, 8.3, 8.4, 14.4.1, 14.4.2, 14.4.3 4.2.4 EN 50388:2005 RA - Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination Between Power Regenerative braking NEK EN 50388:2005 Supply (Substation) and Rolling Stock to Achieve Interoperability - clauses 12.1.1, 14.7.2. 4.2.6 EN 50121-2:1997 RA - Electromagnetic compatibility External electromagnetic compati- NEK EN 50121-2:2006 Part 2: Emission of the whole railway system to the outside world bility 4.2.9.1 EN 50119:2001 RA - Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines - clauses 5.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.2.4.1 to 5.2.4.8, Overhead Contact Line – Overall NEK EN 50119:2001 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.2.8.2, 5.2.10, 5.2.11 and 5.2.12 Design 4.2.9.2 EN 50119:2001 RA - Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines - clause 8.5.1 Geometry of overhead contact line NEK EN 50119:2001 4.2.9.2 EN 50367:2006 RA - Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction Between Pantograph and Geometry of overhead contact line NEK EN 50367:2006 Overhead Line (to Achieve Free Access) Annex A.3 4.2.9.2 EN 50122-1:1997 RA - Fixed installations. Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing clauses 4.1.2.3, 5.1.2.3 Geometry of overhead contact line _

4.2.11 EN 50149:2001 RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction – Copper and copper alloy grooved contact wires: clauses 4.1 Contact Wire Material NEK EN 50149:2001 to 4.3 & 4.5 to 4.8. 4.2.14 EN 50206-1:1998 EN 50206-1:1998 – RA – Rolling Stock – Pantographs: Characteristics and Tests; Part 1:Pantographs Static Contact Force NEK EN 50206-1:1998 for mainline vehicles, clause 3.3.5 4.2.14 EN 50317:2002 EN 50317:2002 – RA – Current Collection Systems – Requirements for and Validation of Static Contact Force NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 Measurements of the Dynamic Interaction Between Pantograph and Overhead Contact Line 4.2.16 EN 50367:2006 RA - Current collection systems - Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph and overhead Dynamic Behaviour and Quality of NEK EN 50367:2006 line (to achieve free access) Current Collection 4.2.16 EN 50317:2002 RA - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the dynamic Dynamic Behaviour and Quality of NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 4.2.16.1 interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line Current Collection - Requirements 4.2.16 EN 50318:2002 RA – Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Dynamic Behaviour and Quality of NEK EN 50318:2002 4.2.16.1 Overhead Contact Line and Pantograph Current Collection 4.2.16 EN 50119:2001 RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, clause 5.2.1.3 Dynamic Behaviour and Quality of NEK EN 50119:2001 4.2.16.1 Current Collection 4.2.16.2 EN 50317:2002 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Conformity assessment NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 4.2.16.2.1 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line Interoperability Constituent Overhead 4.2.16.2 EN 50318:2002 Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Contact ConformityContact Line assessment NEK EN 50318:2002 4.2.16.2.1 Line and Pantograph Interoperability Constituent Overhead Contact Line

A1-11 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Energy subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.16.2.2 SPECIFICATIONSEN 50317:2002 INTEROPERABILITY Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Interoperability Constituent Pantograph NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line 4.2.16.2.3 EN 50318:2002 Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Contact Interoperability Constituent Pantograph NEK EN 50318:2002 Line and Pantograph 4.2.16.2.3 EN 50317:2002 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the IC OCL in a newly installed line (Integration NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line into a Subsystem) 4.2.16.2.4 EN 50317:2002 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the IC Pantograph integrated in new rolling stock NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line 4.2.16.2.5 EN 50206-1: 1998 RA – Rolling Stock – Pantographs: Characteristics and Tests; Part 1:Pantographs for mainline vehicles IC Pantograph integrated in new rolling stock NEK EN 50206-1:1998

4.2.17 EN 50317:2002 RA - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the dynamic Vertical movement of the contact point NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line 4.2.17 EN 50318:2002 RA – Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Vertical movement of the contact point NEK EN 50318:2002 Contact Line and Pantograph 4.2.18 EN 50388:2005 RA – Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination between Power Supply Current capacity of the overhead contact line NEK EN 50388:2005 (Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability, clause 7.1 system: AC and DC systems, trains in motion

4.2.18 EN 50119:2001 RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, clause 5.2.9, Annex B Current capacity of the overhead contact line NEK EN 50119:2001 system: AC and DC systems, trains in motion

4.2.18 EN 50149:2001 RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction – Copper and copper alloy grooved contact wires, clause 4.5, Current capacity of the overhead contact line NEK EN 50149:2001 tables 3 & 4 system: AC and DC systems, trains in motion

4.2.20 EN 50367:2006 RA – Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction between Pantograph and Overhead Current capacity, DC systems, trains at NEK EN 50367:2006 Line (to Achieve Free Access), clause 6.2, Annex A.4.1 standstill 4.2.20 EN 50119:2001 RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, Annex B see clause 5 in pr50199 Current capacity, DC systems, trains at NEK EN 50119:2001 standstill 4.2.21 EN 50367:2006 RA – Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction Between Pantograph Phase Separation Sections NEK EN 50367:2006 and Overhead Line (to Achieve Free Access), Annex A.1.3, Annex A1.5 4.2.23 EN 50388:2005 RA – Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination between Power Electrical Protection Coordination NEK EN 50388:2005 Supply (Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability, clause 11, 14.6 Arrangements 4.2.25 EN 50388:2005 RA – Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination between Power Supply Harmonics and Dynamic Effects NEK EN 50388:2005 (Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability, clause 10, 10.4 4.7.1 EN 50122-1:1997 RA Fixed installations. Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing, clauses 8 (excluding Protective provisions of substations and posts _ EN 50179) and 9.1 4.7.2 EN 50119:2001 RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, clause 5.1.2 Protective provisions of overhead contact line NEK EN 50119:2001 system 4.7.2 EN 50122-1:1997 RA. Fixed installations. Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing, clauses Protective provisions of overhead contact line _ 4.1, 4.2, 5.1 (excluding 5.2.1.5), 5.2, 7 system 7.4.6 EN 50163:2004 Particular features of the British Network - NEK EN 50163:2004 Voltage and frequency 7.4.7 EN 50388:2005 RA – Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination between Power Supply Particular features of the British Network - NEK EN 50388:2005 (Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability Voltage and frequency 7.4.12 EN 50367:2006 RA – Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction between Pantograph and Particular features of the Polish Network NEK EN 50367:2006 Overhead Line (to achieve Free Access), Annex B, Figures B.8 and B.3 Annex B EN 50317:2002 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Conformity Assessment of Interoperability NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line Constituents: Overhead Contact Line Annex B EN 50318:2002 Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Contact Conformity Assessment of Interoperability NEK EN 50318:2002 Line and Pantograph Constituents: Overhead Contact Line

A1-12 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Energy subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICALAnnex C SPECIFICATIONSEN 50317:2002 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Assessment of the Energy Subsystem NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line Annex C EN 50318:2002 RA – Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Assessment of the Energy Subsystem NEK EN 50318:2002 Contact Line and Pantograph

VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA 4.2 EN 50125-2;2002 RA – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 2: Equipment in fixed installations Functional and technical specifications of the NEK EN 50125-2:2002 4.2.1 subsystem General Provisions 4.2.6 EN 50121-1 RA – EMC Part 1 General External Electromagnetic Compatibility NEK EN 50121-1:2006

4.2.6 EN 50121-5 RA – EMC Part 5 Fixed Installations External Electromagnetic Compatibility NEK EN 50121-5:2006

4.2.7 EN 50126-1 RA The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) – Part Continuity of Power Supply in case _ 1: Basic requirements and generic process of disturbances 4.2.8 EN 50122-2:1998 RA Fixed Installations – Part 2 Protective Provisions against the effects of stray currents caused by dc traction Protection of the environment NEK EN 50122-2:1998 systems 4.2.9 EN 50345 RA Fixed Installations – Electric traction - Insulating synthetic rope assemblies for the support of overhead Overhead Contact Line NEK EN 50345:2009 contact lines 4.2.24 EN 50122-3 Effects of DC Operation on AC systems NEK EN 50122-3:2010

4.2.24 EN 50122-2:1998 RA Fixed Installations – Part 2 Protective Provisions against the effects of stray currents caused by dc traction Effects of DC Operation on AC systems NEK EN 50122-2:1998 systems 4.7.1 EN 50122-2:1998 RA Fixed Installations – Part 2 Protective Provisions against the effects of stray currents caused by dc Protective Provisions of substations and posts NEK EN 50122-2:1998 traction systems 4.7.1 EN 50122-3 Protective Provisions of substations and posts NEK EN 50122-3:2010

4.7.2 EN 50151 RA Fixed Installations – Electric traction - Special requirements for composite insulators Protective Provisions of overhead contact line NEK EN 50151:2003 system 4.7.2 EN 60383-1:1998 Insulators for overhead lines with a nominal voltage above 1000 V. Part 1: Ceramic or glass insulator units for Protective Provisions of overhead contact line _ a.c. systems. Definitions, test methods and acceptance criteria system 4.7.2 EN 60383-2:1998 Insulators for overhead lines with a nominal voltage above 1000 V. Part 2: Insulator strings and insulator sets Protective Provisions of overhead contact line _ for a.c. systems. Definitions, test methods and acceptance criteria system 4.7.2 EN 50124-1:2001 RA – Insulation Coordination – Part 1: Basic requirements – Clearances and creepage distances for all Protective Provisions of overhead contact line NEK EN 50124-1:2001 electrical and electronic equipment system 4.7 EN 50124-1:2001 RA – Insulation Coordination – Part 1: Basic requirements – Clearances and creepage distances for all Health and Safety conditions NEK EN 50124-1:2001 4.7.4 electrical and electronic equipment Other general requirements 4.7 EN 50124-2 RA – Insulation coordination – Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection Health and Safety conditions NEK EN 50124-2:2001 4.7.4 Other general requirements

FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS

A1-13 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Safety in Railway Tunnels subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY TSI on Safety in Railway Tunnels in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail System JD 520 Underbygning - Regler for prosjektering og bygging

MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS 1.1.3 prEN 45545-1 TS 45545-1 Railway applications/Fire protections on railway vehicles – - part1: General 4.2.5.3.2. EN 1363-1:1999 Fire resistance tests, Part 1: General requirements Driver’s protection - 4.2.2.4. EN 13501-1:2002 Fire classification of construction products and building elements - Part 1: Classification using data from Fire safety requirements for building material - reaction to fire tests 4.2.2.9 ISO 3864-1 Graphical symbols -- Safety colours and safety signs -- Part 1: Design principles for safety signs in workplaces Escape signage - and public areas 4.2.3.4. EN 50267-2-1:1998 Common test methods for cables under fire conditions - Tests on gases evolved during combustion of Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels - materials from cables - Part 2-1: Procedures - Determination of the amount of halogen acid gas. EN 50267-2-2:1998 Common test methods for cables under fire conditions - Tests on gases evolved during combustion of - materials from cables - Part 2-2: Procedures - Determination of degree of acidity of gases for materials by measuring pH and conductivity. EN 50268-2:1999 Common test methods for cables under fire conditions. Measurement of smoke density of cables - burning under defined conditions Part 2: Procedure. 6.2.8.2 EN 401:1994 Respiratory protective devices for self-rescue. – Self-contained closed-circuit breathing apparatus – Self-rescue device - Chemical oxygen escape apparatus – Requirements, testing, marking EN 402:2003 Respiratory protective devices for escape – Self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing - apparatus with full face mask or mouthpiece assembly - Requirements, testing, marking EN 403:2004 Respiratory protective devices for self-rescue – Filtering devices with hood for self rescue from fire - - Requirements, testing, marking

VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA General UIC leaflet 779-9 R :2003 Safety in Railway Tunnels Recommended measures for safety in new and - existing tunnels. Covers the subsystems of infrastructure, energy, rolling stock and operation. UIC leaflet 779-11 Determination of railway tunnel cross-sectional areas on the basis of aerodynamic considerations UNECE document TRANS/AC.9/09:2003

FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS

A1-14 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in TSI relating to ‘Persons with Reduced Mobility’

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY TSI relating to ‘persons with reduced mobility’ in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail JD 543 Lavspenning - Regler for prosjektering System JD 560 Tele - Regler for prosjektering JD 530 Overbygning - Regler for prosjektering

MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS Subsystem Infrastructure: - 4.1.2.11.1 EN 81-70:2003 Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Particular applications for passenger and good Visual information: signposting, pictograms, - passengers lifts - Part 70: Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability ; Appendix E.4 dynamic information

4.1.2.17 EN 81-70:2003 Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Particular applications for passenger and good Ramps, escalators, lifts, travelators - passengers lifts - Part 70: Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability ; clause 5.3.2.1 table 4.1.2.18.2 pr EN 15273-3:2006 Railway1 Applications – Gauges – Part 3: Structure gauges Platform offset NS-EN 15273-3:2009

Annex F EN ISO 9001:2000 Quality management systems - Requirements Procedures for assessment of conformity and - suitability for use Subsystem Rolling Stock: 7.1.2.2 EN 12663:2000 Railway applications – Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies Newly built rolling stock of an existing design NS-EN 12663-1:2010

7.4.1.3.4 pr EN 15273-2:2005 Railway Applications – Gauges – Part 2: Rolling stock gauge; Annex related to Portuguese Kinematics Specific case for Rolling Stock intending to NS-EN 15273-2:2009 Gauges (CP) operate on the existing conventional rail network in Portugal Annex F EN ISO 9001:2000 Quality management systems - Requirements Procedures for assessment of conformity and - suitability for use

VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA Subsystem Infrastructure: 4.1.2.2 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Parking facilities for PRM - 4.1.2.3 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Obstacle-free route - 4.1.2.4 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Obstacle-free route - 4.1.2.3.2 CEN/TS 15209:2008 Tactile paving surface indicators from concrete, clay and stone Route identification - 4.1.2.4 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Doors and entrances - 4.1.2.5 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Floor surfaces - 4.1.2.5 CEN/TS 15209:2008 Tactile paving surface indicators from concrete, clay and stone Floor surfaces - 4.1.2.6 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Transparent obstacles - 4.1.2.7 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Toilets and baby-changing facilities - 4.1.2.8 UIC Code 141 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Furniture and free-standing devices - 4.1.2.9 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Ticketing, Information desks and Customer - Assistance points 4.1.2.9 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Ticketing, Information desks and Customer - Assistance points 4.1.2.10 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Lighting - 4.1.2.11 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Visual information: signposting, pictograms, - dynamic information 4.1.2.11 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Visual information: signposting, pictograms, - dynamic information

A1-15 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in TSI relating to ‘Persons with Reduced Mobility’

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.1.2.11 SPECIFICATIONSEN 81-70: 2003 INTEROPERABILITYSafety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Part 70: Particular applications for passenger Visual information: signposting, pictograms, - and good passenger lifts - Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability. dynamic information

4.1.2.12 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Spoken information - 4.1.2.12 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Spoken information - 4.1.2.13 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Emergency exits, alarms - 4.1.2.13 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Emergency exits, alarms - 4.1.2.14 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Geometry of footbridges and subways - 4.1.2.15 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Stairs - 4.1.2.16 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Handrails - 4.1.2.17 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Ramps, escalators, lifts, travelators - 4.1.2.17 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Ramps, escalators, lifts, travelators - 4.1.2.17 EN 81-70: 2003 Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Part 70: Particular applications for passenger Ramps, escalators, lifts, travelators - and good passenger lifts - Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability.

4.1.2.19 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Platform width and edge of platform - 4.1.2.21 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Boarding aids for passengers using - wheelchairs 4.1.2.21 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Boarding aids for passengers using - wheelchairs 4.1.2.22 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Level track crossing at stations - 4.1.2.23 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Commercial outlets, restaurant area - 4.1.2.24 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Clean, smoke-free stations - 4.1.6 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Professional qualifications - Annex M prEN 12184 Electrically powered wheelchairs, scooters and their chargers – Requirements and test methods Transportable wheelchair - Annex N UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe PRM signage - Annex N ISO TR 7239:1984 Development and principles for application of public information symbols PRM signage - Subsystem Rolling Stock: 4.2.2.3 UIC 565-3 Indications for the lay out of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs Wheelchair spaces -

4.2.2.4.2 EN 14752:2005 Railway applications – Bodyside entrance systems Exterior doors NS-EN 14752:2005 4.2.2.4.2 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Exterior doors - 4.2.2.4.2 UIC Code 580 Inscriptions and markings, route indicators and number plates to be affixed to coaching stock used in Exterior doors - international traffic 4.2.2.4.3 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Interior doors - 4.2.2.5 EN 12665:2002 Light and lighting - Basic terms and criteria for specifying light requirements Lighting - 4.2.2.5 EN 13272:2001 Railway applications - Electrical lighting for rolling stock in public transport systems Lighting NS-EN 13272:2001 4.2.2.6.3 UIC 565-3 Indications for the lay out of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs Universal toilet -

4.2.2.8 UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe Customer Information - 4.2.2.8 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Customer Information - 4.2.2.8 UIC Code 580 Inscriptions and markings, route indicators and number plates to be affixed to coaching stock used in Customer Information - international traffic 4.2.2.8.2 ISO 7010:2003 Graphical symbols – safety colours and safety signs – Safety signs used in workplaces and public areas Information (signage, pictograms, inductive - loops and emergency call devices)

4.2.2.8.2 ISO 17398:2004 Safety colours and safety signs – Classification, performance and durability of safety signs Information (signage, pictograms, inductive - loops and emergency call devices)

A1-16 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in TSI relating to ‘Persons with Reduced Mobility’

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.2.8.2 SPECIFICATIONSISO TR 7239:1984 INTEROPERABILITYDevelopment and principles for application of public information symbols Information (signage, pictograms, inductive - loops and emergency call devices)

4.2.2.9 UIC 565-3 Indications for the layout of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs Height changes -

4.2.2.11 UIC 565-3 Indications for the layout of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs Wheelchair Accessible sleeping - accommodation 4.2.2.12 EN 14752:2005 Railway applications – Bodyside entrance systems Step position for vehicle access and egress NS-EN 14752:2005

4.2.2.13 UIC 565-3 Indications for the layout of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs Boarding aids -

4.3 EN 12665:2002 Light and lighting - Basic terms and criteria for specifying light requirements Definitions of the terms used in the TSI - 4.3 EN 13272:2001 Railway applications - Electrical lighting for rolling stock in public transport systems Definitions of the terms used in the TSI NS-EN 13272:2001 4.2.6 UIC Code 413 Measures to facilitate travel by rail Professional qualifications - Annex M prEN 12184 Electrically powered wheelchairs, scooters and their chargers – Requirements and test methods Transportable wheelchair -

Annex N UIC Code 140 Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe PRM signage -

Annex N ISO TR 7239:1984 Development and principles for application of public information symbols PRM signage -

FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS

A1-17 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Control-Command and Signalling TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY JD 510 Felles elektro – Regler for prosjektering og TSI Control-Command and Signalling - High Speed-Rail System bygging JD 550 Signal - Regler for prosjektering JD 560 Tele - Regler for prosjektering

JD 590 Infrastrukturens egenskaper 01.07.10

MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS 4.2.12.2 EN 50121-4: 2000 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and Electromagnetic Compatibility between Rolling NEK EN 50121-4:2006 Index A7 telecommunications apparatus Stock and Control-Command Track-side equipment: General immunity characteristics of equipment

4.2.16 Reserved 06E068 ETCS marker board definition Visibility of track-side Control-Command - Index 38 4.3.2.5 EN 50125-1: 1999 Railway applications – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 1: equipment on board rolling stock Interface to the Subsystem Rolling Stock: NEK EN 50125-1:1999 Index A4 Physical environmental conditions 4.3.2.5 EN 50125-3 : 2003 Railway applications – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 3: equipment for signalling and Interface to the Subsystem Rolling Stock: NEK EN 50125-3:2003 Index A5 telecommunications Physical environmental conditions 4.3.2.6 EN 50121-3-2: 2000 Railway applications – Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock – Apparatus Electromagnetic Compatibility between Rolling NEK EN 50121-3-2:2006 Index A6 Stock and Control Command On-Board equipment 4.3.4.1. EN 50121-4: 2000 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and Interfaces to Subsystem Energy: NEK EN 50121-4:2006 Index A7 telecommunications apparatus Electromagnetic Compatibility: 4.3.4.1. EN 50121-3-2: 2000 Railway applications – Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock – Apparatus Interfaces to Subsystem Energy: NEK EN 50121-3-2:2006 Index A6 Electromagnetic Compatibility: 6.1.2 EN 50126: 1999 Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability Interoperability constituents: Modules NEK EN 50126-1:1999 Index A1 and safety (RAMS) Part 1: Basic requirements and generic process Part 2: Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for safety (CLC/TR) Part 3: Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for rolling stock RAM (CLC/TR) 6.1.2 EN 50128: 2001 Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Software for railway control Interoperability constituents: NEK EN 50128:2001 Index A2 and protection systems Modules 6.1.2 EN 50129: 2003 Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic Interoperability constituents: NEK EN 50129:2003 Index A3 systems for signalling Modules 6.2.2.3 EN 50126: 1999 Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability Conditions for use of Modules for onboard NEK EN 50126-1:1999 Index A1 and safety (RAMS) and trackside Assemblies 6.2.2.3 EN 50128: 2001 Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Software for railway control NEK EN 50128:2001 Index A2 and protection systems 6.2.2.3 EN 50129: 2003 Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic NEK EN 50129:2003 Index A3 systems for signalling

A1-18 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Control-Command and Signalling TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICALANNEX C SPECIFICATIONSEN 50238: 2003 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications – Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems List of specific technical characteristics and the NEK EN 50238:2003 List, N° 9 Parts added: Part 2: Compatibility with track circuits requirements associated with an interoperable Index A8 Part 3: Compatibility with axle counters (version 2003 will become Part 1) line and with an interoperable train Susceptibility of track-side C/C equipment to emission from trains in terms of EMC Electromagn. emission of the train with respect to admission of the trains in terms of EMC

ANNEX C EN 50125-1: 1999 Railway applications – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 1: equipment on board rolling stock Climatic conditions and physical conditions NEK EN 50125-1:1999 List,N° 10 along the line Index A5 ANNEX C EN 50125-1: 1999 Railway applications – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 1: equipment on board rolling stock Climatic conditions and physical conditions in NEK EN 50125-1:1999 List,N° 10 which the on-board assembly can work Index A4

VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA

FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS

A1-19 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY TSI Rolling Stock JD 550 Signal, Prosjektering Rullende materiell, Infrastrukturens JD 590 egenskaper

MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS 4.2.2.3.3 EN 12663:2000 Railway applications - Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies Strength of vehicle structure NS-EN 12663:2010 Longitudinal and vertical static loads of category P II Specifications 4.2.3.1 prEN 50367:2006 Kinematic gauge NEK EN 50367:2006 Clause 5.2 4.2.3.3.2.3.2 EN 12082: 1998 Railway applications - Axle boxes – Performance testing Axle bearing health monitoring NS-EN 12082:2007 Annex 6 Functional requirements for the vehicle 4.2.3.3.2.3.6 EN ISO 2813: 1998 Paints and varnishes – Determination of specular gloss of non-metallic paint films at 20 degrees, 60 degrees Axle bearing health monitoring - Clause 3.1 and 85 degrees Emmissivity 4.2.3.4.1 EN 14363: 2005 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 14363:2005 Clauses 5.2.2, and annex C Testing of running behaviour and stationary tests General 4.2.3.4.2 EN 14363: 2005 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 14363:2005 Clauses 4.1.3, 5.5.1, 5.5.2, running behaviour and stationary tests Limit values for running safety and appropriate sections of 5.3.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.5 and 5.6

4.2.3.4.3 EN 14363: 2005 Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of running behaviour and Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 14363:2005 Clauses 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and stationary ests Track loading limit values appropriate sections of clauses 5.3.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.5 and 5.6

4.2.3.4.7 EN 13674-1: 2003 Railway applications - Track – Rail – Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46kg/m and above Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007 Rail section 60 E 1 Design values for wheel profiles 4.2.3.4.7 prEN 13715: 2006 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies – Wheels – Tread profile Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 13715:2006 S1002 and GV1/40 profiles Design values for wheel profiles 4.2.4.3 EN 50163: 2004 Railway applications - Supply voltage of traction systems Brake system requirements NEK EN 50163:2004 Clause 4.1 4.2.5.2 ISO 3864-1: 2003 Graphical symbols – Safety colours and safety signs – Passenger information signs - Part 1: Design principles for safety signs in workplaces and public areas 4.2.6.1 EN 50125-1: 1999 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment Environmental conditions NEK EN 50125-1:2002 Part 1: Equipment on board rolling stock 4.2.6.4 EN 14067-5 : 2006 Railway applications - Aerodynamics Maximum pressure variations in tunnels NS-EN 14067-5:2006 Part 5: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in tunnels 4.2.6.5.2 EN ISO 3095: 2005 Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by railbound vehicles Exterior noise NS-EN ISO 3095:2005 Limits for stationary noise 4.2.6.5.3 EN ISO 3095: 2006 Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by railbound vehicles Exterior noise NS-EN ISO 3095:2005 Limits for starting noise 4.2.6.5.4 EN ISO 3095: 2005 Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by rail bound vehicles Exterior noise NS-EN ISO 3095:2005 Limits for pass-by noise 4.2.6.6.2 EN 50121-3-1: 2000 Electromagnetic compatibility Electromagnetic interference NEK EN 50121-3-1:2006 Part 3-1: Rolling stock – train 4.2.6.6.2 EN 50121-3-2: 2000 Electromagnetic compatibility Electromagnetic interference NEK EN 50121-3-2:2006 Part 3-2: Apparatus 4.2.7.2.3.2 EN 3-3:1994 Portable fire extinguishers – Construction, resistance to pressure, mechanical tests Fire extinguisher -

A1-20 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.7.2.3.2 SPECIFICATIONSEN 3-6:1995 amended INTEROPERABILITY in 1999 Portable fire extinguishers – Part 6: Provisions for the attestation of conformity of portable fire Fire extinguisher - extinguishers in accordance with EN 3 part 1 to part 5 4.2.7.2.3.2 EN 3-7:2004 Portable fire extinguishers – Part 7: Characteristics, performance requirements and test methods Fire extinguisher -

4.2.7.2.3.3 EN 1363-1: 1999 Fire resistance tests – Part 1: General requirements Fire resistance - 4.2.7.2.5 EN ISO 2719 Determination of flash point - Pensky-Martens closed cup method (ISO 2719:2002) Specific measures for tanks containing - flammable liquids 4.2.7.2.5 ISO 11014-1 Safety data sheet for chemical products -- Part 1: Content and order of sections Specific measures for tanks containing - flammable liquids 4.2.7.3 EN 50153: 2002 Railway applications - Rolling stock – Protective provisions relating to electric hazards Protection against electric shock NEK EN 50153:2002 4.2.7.12 EN 13272 : 2001 Railway applications - Electrical lighting for rolling stock in public transport systems Emergency lighting system NS-EN 13272:2001 Clause 5.3 4.2.7.13 EN 50128 : 2001 Software NEK EN 50128:2001 4.2.7.13 EN 50155 : 2001/A1 : 2002 Software NEK EN 50155:2007 4.2.8.3.1.1 EN 50163: 2004 Railway applications - Supply voltage of traction systems Voltage and frequency of the electricity NEK EN 50163:2004 Clause 4 supply Energy supply 4.2.8.3.1.2 EN 50388: 2005 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock Voltage and frequency of the electricity NEK EN 50388:2005 Clauses 12.1.1 and 14.7.1 Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve supply interoperability Energy recuperation 4.2.8.3.2 EN 50388: 2005 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock Maximum power and maximum current that it is NEK EN 50388:2005 Clauses 7 and 14.3 Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve permissible to draw from the catenary interoperability 4.2.8.3.3 EN 50388: 2005 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock Power factor NEK EN 50388:2005 Clauses 6 and 14.2 Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve interoperability 4.2.8.3.4.1 EN 50388: 2005 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock Harmonic characteristics and related over- NEK EN 50388:2005 Clause 10 Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve voltages on the overhead contact line interoperability 4.2.8.3.6.3 EN 50163: 2004 Railway applications - Supply voltage of traction systems Insulation of pantograph from the vehicle NEK EN 50163:2004 Clause 4 4.2.8.3.6.3 EN 50124-1: 2001 Railway applications - Insulation coordination Insulation of pantograph from the vehicle NEK EN 50124-1:2001 Table A2 Part 1: Basic requirements – Clearance and creepage distances for all electrical and electronic equipment

4.2.8.3.6.4 EN 50206-1: 1998 Railway applications - Rolling stock – Pantographs: characteristics and tests Pantograph lowering NEK EN 50206-1:1998 Clauses 4.8, 4.9, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 Part 1: Pantographs for main line vehicles

4.2.8.3.6.4 EN50119:2001 Railway applications – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines Pantograph lowering NEK EN 50119:2001 Table 9 4.2.8.3.6.6 EN 50388: 2005 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock Electrical protection coordination NEK EN 50388:2005 Clauses 11, 14.6 Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve interoperability 4.2.8.3.7.1 EN 50206-1: 1998 Railway applications - Rolling stock – Pantographs: characteristics and tests Overall Design (Pantograph) NEK EN 50206-1:1998 Clause 4 Part 1: Pantographs for main line vehicles 4.2.8.3.7.2 EN 50367: 2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems – Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph Pantograph head geometry NEK EN 50367:2006 Clause 5.2 and overhead line (to achieve free access) 4.2.8.3.7.3 EN 50206-1: 1998 Railway applications - Rolling stock – Pantographs: characteristics and tests Pantograph static contact force NEK EN 50206-1:1998 Clauses 3.3.5, 6.3.1 Part 1: Pantographs for main line vehicles

A1-21 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.8.3.7.4 SPECIFICATIONS EN 50206-1: 1998 INTEROPERABILITY Railway applications - Rolling stock – Pantographs: characteristics and tests Working range of pantographs NEK EN 50206-1:1998 Clauses 4.2, 6.2.3 Part 1: Pantographs for main line vehicles 4.2.8.3.7.5 EN 50206-1: 1998 Railway applications - Rolling stock – Pantographs: characteristics and tests Current capacity NEK EN 50206-1:1998 Clauses 6.13. Part 1: Pantographs for main line vehicles 4.2.8.3.8.1 EN 50405: 2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems – Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips General (Contact strip) NEK EN 50405:2006 Clauses 5.2.2 to 5.2.4 and 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 4.2.8.3.8.3 EN 50367: 2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems – Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph Material (Contact strip) NEK EN 50367:2006 Clause 6.2 and overhead line (to achieve free access) 4.2.8.3.8.4 EN 50405: 2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems – Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips Detection of contact strip breakage NEK EN 50405:2006 Clause 5.2.5 4.2.8.3.8.5 EN 50405: 2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems – Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips Current capacity NEK EN 50405:2006 Clause 5.2 4.2.9.4.2 CEE 7 Electrical Sockets - Standard Sheet VII (Train interior cleaning) 7.1.4 EN 14363: 2005 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Rolling stock being upgraded or renewed NS-EN 14363:2005 Clause 5.5.5 and table 3 running behaviour and stationary tests A.1.1 EN 12663: 2000 Railway applications - Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies Protection against a low obstacle NS-EN 12663-1:2010 Clause 3.4.2 F EN/ISO 9001:2000 Quality management systems – Requirements Modules for the EC Verification of Subsystems -

G.5.1.1 EN 14067-1: 2003 Railway applications - Aerodynamics Part 1: Symbols and units Assessment of Characteristic Wind Curves NS-EN 14067-1:2003 Aerodynamic properties determination

G.5.4.3 EN 14363: 2005 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Assessment of Characteristic Wind Curves NS-EN 14363:2005 Clauses 5, 5.5 running behaviour and stationary tests Vehicle dynamics determination

G.8 EN 14363: 2005 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Effects of Cross Winds NS-EN 14363:2005 Clause 5.6 running behaviour and stationary tests Required Documentation H.1 CIE Publication No2 15.2-1986 (CIE means ʊInternational Commission on Illumination) Definitions (Front and rear lamps) - CIE1931

H.2 CIE S004/E-2001 Colours of light signals Front Lamps - H.3 CIE S004/E-2001 Colours of light signals Rear Lamps - H.4 CIE Publication No. 15.2 Conformity type testing of interoperability - constituents (lamps) H.4 CIE 69:1987 Methods for characterising illuminance meters and luminance meters; performance, characteristics and Conformity type testing of interoperability - specifications constituents (lamps) H.4 ISO/CIE CD 10527 CIE standard colorimetric observers (under development; stage CD = study/ballot initiated) Conformity type testing of interoperability - constituents (lamps) J.1.1 ECE R 43 A3/9.2 Optical Distortion (Windscreens) - J.1.1 ISO 3538:1997 Road vehicles -- Safety glazing materials -- Test methods for optical properties Optical Distortion (Windscreens) - Section 5.3 J.1.3 ECE R 43 A3/4 Haze (Windscreens) - J.1.4 ECE R 43 A3/9.1 Transmittance (Windscreens) - J.1.4 ISO 3568:1997 Road vehicles -- Safety glazing materials -- Test methods for optical properties Transmittance (Windscreens) - Clause 5.1 N1 EN ISO 3095: 2005 Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by railbound vehicles (ISO/FDIS 3095:2005) Measuring Conditions for Noise Deviations NS-EN ISO 3095:2005

A1-22 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICALN2.2 SPECIFICATIONSprEN ISO/IEC 17025:2000 INTEROPERABILITY General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories Measuring Conditions for Noise Measurement - system N2.4 IEC 60263: 1982 Scales and sizes for plotting frequency characteristics and polar diagrams Measuring Conditions for Noise Test report -

N2.4 EN ISO 3740: 2000 Acoustics – Determination of sound power levels of noise sources – guidelines for the use of basic standards Measuring Conditions for Noise Test report -

P.2.2 prEN15328:2005 Railway applications — Braking — Brake pads Rig test for determining the effects of - Annexes A, B reduced friction (Brakes)

VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA Interoperability constituents 4.2.2.2.2.2 prEN 15566:2008 Railway applications - Railway rolling stock - Draw gear and screw coupling Buffing and draw gear components NS-EN 15566:2009 4.2.2.2.2.2 prEN 15551:2008 Railway applications - Railway rolling stock - Buffers Buffing and draw gear components NS-EN 15551:2009 4.2.2.2.2.3 EN 15020:2006 Railway applications - Rescue coupler - Performance requirements, specific interface geometry and test Towing coupler for recovery and rescue NS-EN 15020:2006 methods 4.2.2.7 EN 15152:2007 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheels - Product requirements Wind screen NS-EN 15152:2007 4.2.7.4 EN 15153-1:2007 Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 1: Lights and horn: Devices NS-EN 15153-1:2007 Head, marker and tail lamps 4.2.7.4 EN 15153-2:2007 Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 2: Warning Lights and horn: Devices NS-EN 15153-2:2007 horns Parameters of the rolling stock subsystem

4.2.2.3.3 EN 15227:2008 Railway applications - Crashworthiness requirements for railway vehicle bodies Strength of vehicle structure. Specification NS-EN 15227:2008

4.2.2.3.3 prEN 12663-1:2007 Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies. Part 1 Railway vehicles other than Freight wagons Strength of vehicle structure. Specification NS-EN 12663-1:2010

4.2.2.3.3 prEN 15663:2008 Definition of vehicle reference masses Strength of vehicle structure. Specification NS-EN 15663:2009

4.2.2.4.2 EN 14752 Railway applications - Bodyside entrance systems External access door NS-EN 14752:2005 4.2.2.6 EN 15152:2007 Cab windscreens of high speed trains Driver’s cab NS-EN 15152:2007 b – External visibility 4.2.2.7 EN 15152:2007 Railway applications – Front windscreen for trains cab Wind screen NS-EN 15152:2007 -optical quality -ability to resist to impacts 4.2.3.2 EN 50215:1999 Static axle load NEK EN 50215:1999 4.2.3.2 prEN 15663:2008 Definition of reference vehicle masses Static axle load NS-EN 15663:2009 4.2.3.3.1 EN 13260:2003 Wheelsets and bogies - Wheelsets - Products requirements Electrical resistance NS-EN 13260:2009 4.2.3.3.1 prEN 15313:2008 Railway applications - In-service wheelset operation requirements - In-service and off-vehicle wheelset Electrical resistance NS-EN 15313:2010 maintenance 4.2.3.3.2.2 prEN 15437-1:2008 Railway applications - Axlebox condition monitoring - Performance requirements - Part 1: Track side Axle bearing health monitoring. NS-EN 15437-1:2009 equipment Class2 train 4.2.3.3.2.3 EN 12082:2007 Railway applications - Axle boxes- Performance testing Hot axle box detection for Class 2 trains NS-EN 12082:2007 4.2.3.4.1 EN 13103:2001 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Non-powered axles - Design method Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 13103:2009 General 4.2.3.4.1 EN 13104:2001 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Powered axles - Design method Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 13104:2009 General

A1-23 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.3.4.1 SPECIFICATIONSEN13260:2003 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheelsets - Products requirements Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 13260:2009 General 4.2.3.4.1 EN13261:2003 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Axles - Product requirements Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 13261:2009 General 4.2.3.4.1 prEN 15313:2008 Railway applications - In-service wheelset operation requirements - In-service and off-vehicle wheelset Rolling stock dynamic behaviour NS-EN 15313:2010 maintenance General 4.2.3.4.4 EN 13715:2006 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheels – Wheel tread Wheel/rail interface NS-EN 13715:2006 4.2.3.4.6 EN 15302:2008 Railway applications - Method for determining the equivalent conicity Definition of equivalent conicity NS-EN 15302:2008 4.2.3.4.9.1 EN 13260:2003 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheelsets - Products requirements Wheelsets NS-EN 13260:2009 4.2.3.4.9.1 prEN 15313:2008 Railway applications - In-service wheelset operation requirements - In-service and off-vehicle Wheelsets NS-EN 15313:2010 wheelset maintenance 4.2.3.4.9.2 EN 13262:2004 Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheels - Product requirements Interoperability Constituent Wheels NS-EN 13262:2004+A1:2008 4.2.3.8 EN 15427 :2008 Wheel/Rail Friction Management - Flange Lubrication Flange lubrication NS-EN 15427:2008 4.2.3.9 EN 14363: 2005 Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Suspension coefficient NS-EN 14363:2005 Clauses 4.3 Testing of running behaviour and stationary tests 4.2.4.1 EN 14531-1 :2005 Railway applications - Methods for calculation of stopping distances, slowing distances and immobilization Minimum braking Characteristics NS-EN 14531-1:2005 braking - Part 1: General algorithms 4.2.4.2 prEN14531-6:2008 Methods for calculation of stopping distances, slowing distances and immobilization braking - Part 6: Step Minimum braking Characteristics NS-EN 14531-6:2009 by step calculations for train sets or single vehicles 4.2.4.1.c EN50215:1999 Minimum deceleration NEK EN 50215:1999 Maximum braking distance 4.2.4.1.c prEN 15663:2008 Definition of vehicle reference masses Minimum deceleration NS-EN 15663:2009 Trains Maximum braking distance 4.2.4.1.c UIC 544-1 Brakes- Braking power Minimum deceleration - Maximum braking distance 4.2.4.1.c UIC 544-2 Brakes- Dynamic brake Minimum deceleration - Maximum braking distance 4.2.4.3 EN 14198 :2004 Railway applications - Braking – Requirements for the brake system of trains hauled by a locomotive - Brake system requirements NS-EN 14198:2004 Trains 4.2.4.3 EN 15179:2007 Railway applications - Braking- Requirements for the brake system of coaches Brake system requirements NS-EN 15179:2007 4.2.4.3 EN 15220-1:2008 Railway applications - Brake indicators - Part 1: Pneumatically operated brake indicators Brake system requirements NS-EN 15220-1:2008 4.2.4.3 EN 15355:2008 Railway applications - Braking – Distributor valves and distributor isolating devices Brake system requirements NS-EN 15355:2008 4.2.4.3 prEN 15595:2008 Braking – Wheel slip prevention equipment Brake system requirements NS-EN 15595:2009 4.2.4.3 EN 15611:2008 Railway applications - Braking- Relay valves Brake system requirements NS-EN 15611:2008 4.2.4.3 EN 15612:2008 Railway applications - Braking- Brake pipe accelerator valve Brake system requirements NS-EN 15612:2008 4.2.4.3 EN 15625:2008 Railway applications - Braking- Automatic variable load sensing devices Brake system requirements NS-EN 15625:2008 4.2.4.4 EN50215 :1999 Service braking performance NEK EN 50215:1999 (FprEN 50215:2008 under vote)

4.2.4.8 EN 15220-1:2008 Railway applications - Brake indicators - Part 1: Pneumatically operated brake indicators Brake requirements for rescue purposes NS-EN 15220-1:2008

4.2.4.8 EN 15355 :2008 Railway applications - Braking – Distributor valves and distributor isolating devices Brake requirements for rescue purposes NS-EN 15355:2008

4.2.4.8 EN 15611:2008 Railway applications - Braking- Relay valves Brake requirements for rescue purposes NS-EN 15611:2008

4.2.4.8 EN 15612:2008 Railway applications -Braking- Brake pipe accelerator valve Brake requirements for rescue purposes NS-EN 15612:2008

4.2.5.3 EN 15327-1 :2008 Railway applications - Passenger alarm subsystem - Part 1: General requirements and passenger Passenger alarm NS-EN 15327-1:2008 interface for the passenger system

A1-24 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL4.2.6.2 SPECIFICATIONSEN 14067-2:2003 INTEROPERABILITY Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 2: Aerodynamics on open track Train aerodynamic load in open air NS-EN 14067-2:2003 4.2.6.2 EN 14067-4:2005/prA1:2008 Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics on Train aerodynamic load in open air NS-EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009 open track 4.2.6.4 EN 14067-3 :2003 Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 3 : Aerodynamics in tunnels Maximum pressure variation in tunnels NS-EN 14067-3:2003 4.2.6.4 EN 14067-5 :2006 Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in Maximum pressure variation in tunnels NS-EN 14067-5:2006 tunnels 4.2.6.5.4 EN 15461:2008 Railway applications - Characterisation of the dynamic properties of track sections for pass by noise Exterior noise NS-EN 15461:2008 measurements Limits for pass-by noise 4.2.6.5.4 prEN 15610 Railway applications - Noise emission - Rail roughness measurement related to rolling noise generation Exterior noise NS-EN 15610:2009 (foreseen date of availability 2009-05) Limits for pass-by noise 4.2.7.2 TS 45545-1 to 4, 6&7:2008 Fire protection of railway vehicles Fire safety - and TS 45545-5:2005 4.2.7.6 EN ISO 3381: 2005 Acoustics – Measurement of noise inside rail bound vehicles Interior noise NS-EN ISO 3381:2005 4.2.7.7 EN 14813-1 :2006 Railway applications - Air conditioning for driving cabs – Part 1: Comfort parameters Boundary characteristics linked to air NS-EN 14813-1:2006 conditioning 4.2.7.7 EN 14813-2 :2006 Railway applications - Air conditioning for driving cabs – Part 2: Type tests Boundary characteristics linked to air NS-EN 14813-2:2006 conditioning 4.2.7.7 EN13129-1 :2002 Railway applications - Air conditioning for main line rolling stock – Part 1: Comfort parameters Boundary characteristics linked to air NS-EN 13129-1:2002 conditioning 4.2.7.7 EN13129-2 :2002 Railway applications - Air conditioning for main line rolling stock – Part 2 : Type tests Boundary characteristics linked to air NS-EN 13129-2:2004 conditioning 4.2.7.8 UIC 641 Conditions to be fulfilled by automatic vigilance devices used in international traffic Driver vigilance device - 4.2.8.1 prEN 15663:2008 Definition of vehicle reference masses Traction and electrical equipment. Traction NS-EN 15663:2009 performance requirements 4.2.8.3.4 EN50124-2:2001 Railway Applications – Insulation Coordination – Part 2 : Overvoltages and related protections Short over-voltages generated NEK EN 50124-2:2001

4.2.8.3.6.8 EN 50119:2001 Will be superseded by revised version EN 50119:200x; voted, to be ratified in 2008-10 Running through system separations NEK EN 50119:2001

FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS

UIC LEAFLETS

UIC 606 Gestaltung des Oberleitungssystems unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Kinematik der Fahrzeuge UIC 641 Conditions to be fulfilled by automatic vigilance devices used in international traffic UIC 796 Spannung am Stromabnehmer UIC 797 Koordinaten der elektrischen Schutzeinrichtungen Unterwerk

EUROPEAN NORMS EN 13298:2003 Railway applications - Suspension components - Helical suspension springs, steel NS-EN 13298:2003 EN 13597:2003 Railway applications - Rubber suspension components - Rubber diaphragms for pneumatic suspension NS-EN 13597:2003 springs EN 15016-1:2004 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 1: General Principles NS-EN 15016-1:2004 EN 15016-2:2004 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists NS-EN 15016-2:2004 EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007 Corrigendum AC - Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists NS-EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007 EN 15016-3:2004 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 3: Handling of modifications of technical documents NS-EN 15016-3:2004

EN 15016-4:2006 Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 4: Data exchange NS-EN 15016-4:2006

A1-25 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEN 15153-1:2007 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 1: Head, marker NS-EN 15153-1:2007 and tail lamps EN 15153-2:2007 Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 2: Warning NS-EN 15153-2:2007 horns EN 15227:2008 Railway applications - Crashworthiness requirements for railway vehicle bodies NS-EN 15227:2008 EN 15273-1:2009 Railway applications - Gauges - Part 1: General - Common rules for infrastructure and rolling stock NS-EN 15273-1:2009 EN 15273-2:2009 Railway applications - Gauges - Part 2: Rolling stock gauge NS-EN 15273-2:2009 EN 15273-3:2009 Railway applications - Gauges - Part 3: Structure gauges NS-EN 15273-3:2009 EN 15461:2008 Railway applications - Noise emission - Characterisation of the dynamic properties of track sections for pass by NS-EN 15461:2008 noise measurements EN 15528 Railway applications - Corresponding load limits for railway vehicles and payloads for freight wagons NS-EN 15528:2008

EN 50119:2001 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction overhead contact lines NEK EN 50119:2001 EN 50119:2009 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction overhead contact lines NEK EN 50119:2009 EN 50121-1:2006 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 1: General NEK EN 50121-1:2006 EN 50121-2:2006 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 2: Emission of the whole railway system to the NEK EN 50121-2:2006 outside world EN 50121-3-1:2006 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 3-1: Rolling stock - Train and complete vehicle NEK EN 50121-3-1:2006

EN 50121-4:2006 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and NEK EN 50121-4:2006 telecommunications apparatus EN 50121-5:2006 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 5: Emission and immunity of fixed power supply NEK EN 50121-5:2006 installations and apparatus EN 50122-2:1998 Railway applications - Fixed installations -- Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents NEK EN 50122-2:1998 caused by d.c. traction systems EN 50122-2:1998/A1:2002 Railway applications - Fixed installations -- Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents NEK EN 50122-2:1998/A1:2002 caused by d.c. traction systems EN 50122-2:2010 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing and the return circuit -- Part 2: Provisions NEK EN 50122-2:2010 against the effects of stray currents caused by d.c. traction systems EN 50122-3:2010 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing and the return circuit -- Part 3: Mutual NEK EN 50122-3:2010 Interaction of a.c. and d.c. traction systems EN 50123-1:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 1: General NEK EN 50123-1:2003 EN 50123-2:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 2: D.C. circuit breakers NEK EN 50123-2:2003 EN 50123-3:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 3: Indoor d.c. disconnectors, switch- NEK EN 50123-3:2003 disconnectors and earthing switches EN 50123-4:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 4: Outdoor d.c. disconnectors, switch- NEK EN 50123-4:2003 disconnectors and earthing switches EN 50123-5:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 5: Surge arresters and low-voltage limiters NEK EN 50123-5:2003 for specific use in d.c. systems EN 50123-7-2:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 7-2: Measurement, control and protection NEK EN 50123-7-2:2003 devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating current transducers and other current measuring devices EN 50123-7-3:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 7-3: Measurement, control and protection NEK EN 50123-7-3:2003 devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating voltage transducers and other voltage measuring devices EN 50124-1:2001 Railway applications - Insulation coordination -- Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage NEK EN 50124-1:2001 distances for all electrical and electronic equipment EN 50124-1:2001/A1:2003 Railway applications - Insulation coordination -- Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage NEK EN 50124-1:2001/A1:2003 distances for all electrical and electronic equipment

A1-26 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEN 50124-1:2001/A2:2005 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Insulation coordination -- Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage NEK EN 50124-1:2001/A2:2005 distances for all electrical and electronic equipment EN 50124-2:2001 Railway applications - Insulation coordination -- Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection NEK EN 50124-2:2001 EN 50125-2:2002 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment -- Part 2: Fixed electrical installations NEK EN 50125-2:2002 EN 50125-3:2003 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment -- Part 3: Equipment for signalling and NEK EN 50125-3:2003 telecommunications EN 50128:2001 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and NEK EN 50128:2001 protection systems EN 50129:2003 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety related electronic systems NEK EN 50129:2003 for signalling EN 50149:2001 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction - Copper and copper alloy grooved contact wires NEK EN 50149:2001

EN 50151:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction - Special requirements for composite insulators NEK EN 50151:2003

EN 50152-1:2007 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 1: Single-phase NEK EN 50152-1:2007 circuit-breakers with Un above 1 kV EN 50152-2:2007 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 2: Single-phase NEK EN 50152-2:2007 disconnectors, earthing switches and switches with Un above 1 kV EN 50152-3-1:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 3-1: NEK EN 50152-3-1:2003 Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Application guide

EN 50152-3-2:2001 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 3-2: NEK EN 50152-3-2:2001 Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase current transformers EN 50152-3-3:2001 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 3-3: NEK EN 50152-3-3:2001 Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase inductive voltage transformers EN 50159:2010 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety-related communication in NEK EN 50159:2010 transmission systems EN 50159-1:2001 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems -- Part 1: Safety-related NEK EN 50159-1:2001 communication in closed transmission systems EN 50159-2:2001 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems -- Part 2: Safety related NEK EN 50159-2:2001 communication in open transmission systems EN 50160 Voltage characteristics of electricity supplied by public distribution systems EN 50163:2004 Railway applications - Supply voltages of traction systems NEK EN 50163:2004 EN 50163:2004/A1:2007 Railway applications - Supply voltages of traction systems NEK EN 50163:2004/A1:2007 EN 50206-1:1998 Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs: Characteristics and tests -- Part 1: Pantographs for main NEK EN 50206-1:1998 line vehicles EN 50206-1:2010 Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs: Characteristics and tests -- Part 1: Pantographs for main NEK EN 50206-1:2010 line vehicles EN 50215:2009 Railway applications - Rolling stock - Testing of rolling stock on completion of construction and before entry into NEK EN 50215:2009 service EN 50238:2003 Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems NEK EN 50238:2003 EN 50239:1999 Railway applications - Radio remote control system of traction vehicle for freight traffic NEK EN 50239:1999 EN 50264-3-2:2008 Railway applications - Railway rolling stock power and control cables having special fire performance -- Part 3- NEK EN 50264-3-2:2008 2: Cables with crosslinked elastomeric insulation with reduced dimensions - Multicore cables

EN 50305:2002 Railway applications - Railway rolling stock cables having special fire performance - Test methods NEK EN 50305:2002

A1-27 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSEN 50317:2002/A1:2004 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004 dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line EN 50318:2002 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between NEK EN 50318:2002 pantograph and overhead contact line EN 50327:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Harmonisation of the rated values for converter groups and tests on NEK EN 50327:2003 converter groups EN 50328:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electronic power converters for substations NEK EN 50328:2003 EN 50329:2003 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Traction transformers NEK EN 50329:2003 EN 50329:2003/A1:2010 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Traction transformers NEK EN 50329:2003/A1:2010 EN 50345:2009 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction - Insulating synthetic rope assemblies for support of NEK EN 50345:2009 overhead contact lines EN 50367:2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph NEK EN 50367:2006 and overhead line (to achieve free access) EN 50388:2005 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock - Technical criteria for the coordination between power NEK EN 50388:2005 supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve interoperability EN 50405:2006 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips NEK EN 50405:2006

EN 50500:2008 Measurement procedures of magnetic field levels generated by electronic and electrical apparatus in the NEK EN 50500:2008 railway environment with respect to human exposure EN 60000-6-2 Elektromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - General standards - Immunity for industrial environment EN 61000-6-3 Elektromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - General standards - Emission standard for domestic, commercial and light industrie EN 60383 Insulator for overhead lines with a nominal voltage above 1 kV EN 62267:2009 Railway applications - Automated urban guided transport (AUGT) - Safety requirements NEK EN 62267:2009 EN 301515:2002 Globales System für mobile Kommunikation (GSM): Requirements for GSM operation on railways CLC/TR 50451:2007 Railway applications - Systematic allocation of safety integrity requirements NEK CLC/TR 50451:2007 CLC/TR 50506-1:2007 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Application Guide for EN 50129 -- NEK CLC/TR 50506-1:2007 Part 1: Cross-acceptance CLC/TR 50506-2:2009 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Application Guide for EN 50129 -- NEK CLC/TR 50506-2:2009 Part 2: Safety assurance CLC/TR 50511:2007 Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - ERTMS/ETCS - External NEK CLC/TR 50511:2007 signalling for lines equipped with ERTMS/ETCS Level 2 CLC/TR 50542:2010 Railway applications - Communication means between safety equipment and man-machine interfaces (MMI) NEK CLC/TR 50542:2010

CLC/TS 50206-3:2010 Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs: Characteristics and tests -- Part 3: Interface between NEK CLC/TS 50206-3:2010 pantograph and rolling stock for rail vehicles CLC/TS 50238-2:2010 Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems -- Part 2: Compatibility NEK CLC/TS 50238-2:2010 with track circuits CLC/TS 50238-3:2010 Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems -- Part 3: Compatibility NEK CLC/TS 50238-3:2010 with axle counters CLC/TS 50459-1:2005 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management NEK CLC/TS 50459-1:2005 System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 1: Ergonomic principles for the presentation of ERTMS/ETCS/GSM- R information CLC/TS 50459-2:2005 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management NEK CLC/TS 50459-2:2005 System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 2: Ergonomic arrangements of ERTMS/ETCS information

CLC/TS 50459-3:2005 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management NEK CLC/TS 50459-3:2005 System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 3: Ergonomic arrangements of ERTMS/GSM-R information

A1-28 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSCLC/TS 50459-4:2005 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management NEK CLC/TS 50459-4:2005 System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 4: Data entry for the ERTMS/ETCS/GSM-R systems

CLC/TS 50459-5:2005 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management NEK CLC/TS 50459-5:2005 System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 5: Symbols CLC/TS 50459-6:2005 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management NEK CLC/TS 50459-6:2005 System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 6: Audible information CLC/TS 50534:2010 Railway applications - Generic system architectures for onboard electric auxiliary power systems NEK CLC/TS 50534:2010 CLC/TS 50535:2010 Railway applications - Onboard auxiliary power converter systems NEK CLC/TS 50535:2010 CLC/TS 50537-1:2010 Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 1: HV bushing for NEK CLC/TS 50537-1:2010 traction transformers CLC/TS 50537-2:2010 Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 2: Pump for NEK CLC/TS 50537-2:2010 insulating liquid for traction transformers and reactors CLC/TS 50537-3:2010 Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 3: Water pump for NEK CLC/TS 50537-3:2010 traction converters CLC/TS 50537-4:2010 Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 4: Gas and liquid NEK CLC/TS 50537-4:2010 actuated (Buchholz) relay for liquid immersed transformers and reactors with conservator for rail vehicles

IEC 60077-1 Railway applications - Electric equipment for rolling stock - Part 1: General service conditions and general rules NEK IEC 60077-1

IEC 60494-1 Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs - Characteristics and tests - Part 1: Pantographs for NEK IEC 60494-1 mainline vehicles IEC 60850 Railway applications - Supply voltages of traction systems NEK IEC 60850 IEC 61287-2 Power convertors installed on board railway rolling stock - Part 2: Additional technical information NEK IEC 61287-2 IEC 61992-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 1: General NEK IEC 61992-1 IEC 61992-2 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 2: DC circuit-breakers NEK IEC 61992-2 IEC 61992-3 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 3: Indoor d.c. disconnectors, switch- NEK IEC 61992-3 disconnectors and earthing switches IEC 61992-4 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 4: Outdoor d.c. disconnectors, switch- NEK IEC 61992-4 disconnectors and earthing switches IEC 61992-5 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 5: Surge arresters and low-voltage limiters for NEK IEC 61992-5 specific use in d.c. systems IEC 61992-6 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 6: DC switchgear assemblies NEK IEC 61992-6 IEC 61992-7-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 7-1: Measurement, control and protection NEK IEC 61992-7-1 devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Application guide IEC 61992-7-2 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 7-2: Measurement, control and protection NEK IEC 61992-7-2 devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating current transducers and other current measuring devices IEC 61992-7-3 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 7-3: Measurement, control and protection NEK IEC 61992-7-3 devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating voltage transducers and other voltage measuring devices IEC 62128-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 1: Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing NEK IEC 62128-1

IEC 62128-2 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents NEK IEC 62128-2 caused by d.c. traction systems IEC 62236-1 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 1: General NEK IEC 62236-1 IEC 62236-2 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 2: Emission of the whole railway system to the NEK IEC 62236-2 outside world

A1-29 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IEC 62236-3-1 INTEROPERABILITYRailway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-1: Rolling stock - Train and complete vehicle NEK IEC 62236-3-1

IEC 62236-3-2 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock - Apparatus NEK IEC 62236-3-2 IEC 62236-4 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and NEK IEC 62236-4 telecommunications apparatus IEC 62236-5 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 5: Emission and immunity of fixed power supply NEK IEC 62236-5 installations and apparatus IEC 62279 Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and NEK IEC 62279 protection systems IEC 62280-1 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Part 1: Safety-related NEK IEC 62280-1 communication in closed transmission systems IEC 62280-2 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Part 2: Safety-related NEK IEC 62280-2 communication in open transmission systems IEC 62290-1 Railway applications - Urban guided transport management and command/control systems - Part 1: System NEK IEC 62290-1 principles and fundamental concepts IEC 62313 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock - Technical criteria for the coordination between power NEK IEC 62313 supply (substation) and rolling stock IEC 62425 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety related electronic systems NEK IEC 62425 for signalling IEC 62427 Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems NEK IEC 62427 IEC 62486 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph NEK IEC 62486 and overhead line (to achieve free access) IEC 62497-1 Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage NEK IEC 62497-1 distances for all electrical and electronic equipment IEC 62497-2 Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection NEK IEC 62497-2 IEC 62498-1 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 1: Equipment on board rolling stock NEK IEC 62498-1

IEC 62498-2 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 2: Fixed electrical installations NEK IEC 62498-2 IEC 62498-3 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for signalling and NEK IEC 62498-3 telecommunications IEC 62499 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips NEK IEC 62499

IEC 62505-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 1: Single-phase NEK IEC 62505-1 circuit-breakers with Un above 1 kV IEC 62505-2 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 2: Single-phase NEK IEC 62505-2 disconnectors, earthing switches and switches with Un above 1 kV IEC 62505-3-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-1: Measurement, NEK IEC 62505-3-1 control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. tractions systems - Application guide

IEC 62505-3-2 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-2: Measurement, NEK IEC 62505-3-2 control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase current transformers

IEC 62505-3-3 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-3: Measurement, NEK IEC 62505-3-3 control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase inductive voltage transformers IEC 62589 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Harmonisation of the rated values for converter groups and tests on NEK IEC 62589 converter groups IEC 62590 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electronic power converters for substations NEK IEC 62590 IEC/PAS 62267 Railway applications - Automated Urban Guided Transport (AUGT) safety requirements NEK IEC/PAS 62267

A1-30 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY PRELIMINARY EUROPEAN NORMS

OTHER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS / REGULATIONS ASTM A729/A729M:09 ASTM A729/A729M:09 Standard Specification for Alloy Steel Axles, Heat-Treated, for Mass Transit and Electric Railway Service IEC 60850 Ed. 3.0 Railway applications - Supply voltages of traction systems IEC 60850 Ed. 3.0 IEC 61375-1 Ed. 2.0 Electric railway equipment - Train bus - Part 1: Train communication network IEC 61375-1 Ed. 2.0 IEC 61375-2 Ed. 1.0 Electric railway equipment - Train bus - Part 2: Train communication network conformance testing IEC 61375-2 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61991 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Rolling stock - Protective provisions against electrical hazards IEC 61991 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61992-1 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-1 Ed. 2.0 IEC 61992-2 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-2 Ed. 2.0 IEC 61992-3 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-3 Ed. 2.0 IEC 61992-4 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-4 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61992-5 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-5 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61992-6 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-6 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61992-7-1 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-7-1 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61992-7-2 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-7-2 Ed. 1.0 IEC 61992-7-3 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s IEC 61992-7-3 Ed. 1.0 IEC 62128-1 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 1: Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing IEC 62128-1 Ed. 1.0

IEC 62128-2 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents IEC 62128-2 Ed. 1.0 caused by d.c. traction systems IEC 62236-1 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 1: General IEC 62236-1 Ed. 2.0 IEC 62236-3-2 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock - Apparatus IEC 62236-3-2 Ed. 2.0 IEC 62236-4 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and IEC 62236-4 Ed. 2.0 telecommunications apparatus IEC 62236-5 Ed. 2.0 Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 5: Emission and immunity of fixed power supply IEC 62236-5 Ed. 2.0 installations and apparatus IEC 62267 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Automated urban guided transport (AUGT) - Safety requirements IEC 62267 Ed. 1.0 IEC 62279 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and IEC 62279 Ed. 1.0 protection systems IEC 62280-1 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Part 1: Safety-related IEC 62280-1 Ed. 1.0 communication in closed transmission systems IEC 62280-2 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Part 2: Safety-related IEC 62280-2 Ed. 1.0 communication in open transmission systems IEC 62313 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock - Technical criteria for the coordination between power IEC 62313 Ed. 1.0 supply (substation) and rolling stock IEC 62425 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety related electronic systems IEC 62425 Ed. 1.0 for signalling IEC 62427 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems IEC 62427 Ed. 1.0 IEC 62486 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph IEC 62486 Ed. 1.0 and overhead line (to achieve free access) IEC 62497-1 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage IEC 62497-1 Ed. 1.0 distances for all electrical and electronic equipment IEC 62497-2 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection IEC 62497-2 Ed. 1.0

A1-31 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSIEC 62498-2 Ed. INTEROPERABILITY 1.0 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 2: Fixed electrical installations IEC 62498-2 Ed. 1.0 IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for signalling and IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0 telecommunications IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0 Cor.1 Corrigendum 1 - Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0 Cor.1 signalling and telecommunications IEC 62499 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Current collection systems - Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips IEC 62499 Ed. 1.0

IEC 62505-1 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 1: Single-phase IEC 62505-1 Ed. 1.0 circuit-breakers with Un above 1 kV IEC 62505-2 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 2: Single-phase IEC 62505-2 Ed. 1.0 disconnectors, earthing switches and switches with Un above 1 kV IEC 62505-3-1 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-1: Measurement, IEC 62505-3-1 Ed. 1.0 control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. tractions systems - Application guide

IEC 62505-3-2 Ed. 1.0 IEC 62505-3-2 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-2: Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase current transformers IEC 62505-3-3 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-3: Measurement, IEC 62505-3-3 Ed. 1.0 control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase inductive voltage transformers IEC 62589 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Harmonisation of the rated values for converter groups and tests on IEC 62589 Ed. 1.0 converter groups IEC 62590 Ed. 1.0 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electronic power converters for substations IEC 62590 Ed. 1.0 ISO 6305-4:1985 Railway components -- Technical delivery requirements -- Part 4: Untreated steel nuts and bolts and high- ISO 6305-4:1985 strength nuts and bolts for fish-plates and fastenings UNISIG SUBSET-023 -V200 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 026-V222 ERTMS/ETCS functional statements – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 027-V200 FFFIS juridical recorder downloading tool – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 030-V200 ERTMS/ETCS SSRS, Part 1: system macro functions overview – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 031-V200 ERTMS/ETCS SSRS, Part 2: Onboard-subsystem requirements specification – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 032-V200 ERTMS/ETCS SSRS, Part 3: trackside subsystem requirements specification – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 033-V200 FIS for the man-machine UNISIG SUBSET– 034-V200 FIS for the train interface – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 035-V200 Specific transmission module FFFIS – 03 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 036-V200 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 037-V200 Euroradio FIS – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET-040 -V200 Dimensioning and engineering rules – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 041-V200 Performance requirements for interoperability – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 043-V200 FFFS for Euroloop subsystem – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 044-V200 FFFIS ‘A’Euroloop UNISIG SUBSET– 045-V200 FFFIS ‘C’Euroloop L subsystem 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 046-V200 Radio infill FFFS – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 047-V200 Trackside-trainborne FIS for radio infill 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 048-V200 Trainborne FFFIS for radio infill – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 049-V200 Radio infill FIS with LEU/interlocking – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 050-V200 Description for the Euroloop system

A1-32 of A1-33 Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Standard Evaluation Technical and Safety Analysis

Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI

adopted in Norway TSI section Standard-No. Description Characteristics as / in TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSUNISIG SUBSET– INTEROPERABILITY 051-V200 FIS key management second phase – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 054-V200 Assignment of values to ETCS variables – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 055-V222 Clarification and amendment specification – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 056-V200 STM FFFIS safe timer layer – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 057-V200 STM FFFIS safe link layer – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 058-V200 FFFIS STM application layer supervision connection – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 059-V200 Performance requirements for STMs – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 060-V111 Key management migration – 06 2002 UNISIG SUBSET– 093-V200 MORANE A11T6001-3 (July 98) ETSI EN300 330-1: 2000 – Frequency used EUROSIG/WP3.1.2.3 ABB007 EUROSIG/WP3.1.2.3 ABB020 EUROSIG/WP3.1.2.3 ABB009 EUROSIG/WP3.1.2.3 GA0347 CEPTTR25-09

A1-33 of A1-33 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather & climate– base information

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-1 of A2-17

Table of contents

Table of contents...... 1 List of tables ...... 2 List of figures...... 2 1. General climatic conditions in Scandinavia ...... 3 2. The climate of Norway...... 4 3. Observations of weather in Norway and Sweden ...... 5 4. Extreme weather and weather records ...... 6 4.1. Temperature...... 7 4.1.1. Maximum temperature...... 7 4.1.2. Minimum temperature...... 8 4.2. Precipitation ...... 8 4.2.1. Daily precipitation sums...... 8 4.2.2. Monthly precipitation sums ...... 10 4.2.3. Precipitation intensity...... 10 4.2.4. Maximum snow depth...... 11 4.3. Wind...... 11 5. Future climate change...... 15 Table of references...... 17

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-2 of A2-17

List of tables

Table 1: Beauforts scale...... 12 Table 2: Wind measurement ...... 12

List of figures

Figure 1: Scandinavian relief map...... 3 Figure 2: World map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification...... 4 Figure 3: Weather normal 1971-2000 for the parameters mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation and normal annual maximum snow depth...... 5 Figure 4: Norwegian Counties...... 7 Figure 5: Daily mean temperature - 20.06.1970...... 7 Figure 6: Daily mean temperature - 10.01.1987...... 8 Figure 7: Daily precipitation - 18.09.1978...... 9 Figure 8: Daily precipitation - 25.08.1996...... 9 Figure 9: Daily precipitation 21.06.1977...... 9 Figure 10: Daily precipitation - 14.02.1961...... 9 Figure 11: Precipitation, monthly deviation in % of normal (1971-2000) in January 1989 ...... 10 Figure 12: Snow depth in Norway - 31.3.1989 ...... 11 Figure 13: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 16610 Fokstugu, Oppland county ...... 13 Figure 14: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 39040 Kjevik, Vest-Agder county ...... 13 Figure 15: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 27470 Torp, Vestfold county...... 14 Figure 16: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 17150 Rygge, Østfold county ...... 14 Figure 17: Expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation from normal period 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.[6]...... 15 Figure 18: Expected change in annual temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100. [6]...... 16 Figure 19: Expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. [6] ...... 16 Figure 20: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. [6] ...... 16

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-3 of A2-17

1. General climatic conditions in Scandinavia The Scandinavian Peninsula is a geographic region in northern Europe, consisting of Norway, Sweden and part of northern Finland. It is the largest peninsula in Europe, stretching from 55º latitude in southern Sweden to 71º latitude in northern Norway. The peninsula stretches 1’850 kilometres from south to north and with a width varying from 350 – 800 km.

Figure 1: Scandinavian relief map The geography of Scandinavia is extremely varied; with long and deep fjords and a high mountain range in the west along the Norwegian coast, gentler eastward slopes along the east coast of Sweden, flat and low areas in Denmark and a relatively flat and forested Finland with many lakes. All these are geographic elements which affects the general climatic conditions. The climate varies greatly from north to south and from west to east; a marine west coast climate (Cfb) typical of western Europe dominates in Denmark, southernmost part of Sweden and along the west coast of Norway reaching north to 65° northern latitude, with orographic lift giving up to 5’000 mm precipitation per year in some areas in western Norway. The central part – from Oslo to Stockholm – has a humid continental climate (Dfb), which gradually gives way to subarctic climate (Dfc) further north and cool marine west coast climate (Cfc) along the north- western coast. A small area along the northern coast east of the North Cape has tundra climate (Et) as a result of a lack of summer warmth. The Scandinavian Mountains block the mild and moist air coming from the southwest, thus northern Sweden and the Finnmarksvidda plateau in Norway receive little precipitation and have cold winters. Large areas in the Scandinavian mountains have alpine tundra climate. All abbreviations refer to the Köppen- Geiger climate classification system shown in Figure 2.

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-4 of A2-17

Figure 2: World map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification1 The warmest temperature ever recorded in Scandinavia is 38.0 °C in Målilla (Sweden) [1]. The coldest temperature ever recorded is −52.6 °C in Vuoggatjålme (Sweden) [2]. The warmest month on record was July 1901 in Oslo, with a mean (24hr) of 22.7 °C, and the coldest month was February 1985 in Vittangi (Sweden) with a mean of -27.2 °C. [2]

2. The climate of Norway Because of Norway’s northern location, is often regarded as a cold and wet country. In some aspects this is true, because we share the same latitude as Alaska, Greenland and Siberia. But compared to these areas we have a pleasant climate. Thanks to its location in the westerly’s, on the east side of a vast ocean, with a huge, warm and steady ocean current near its shores, Norway has a much friendlier climate than the latitude indicates. Norway's climate shows however great variations. From its southernmost point, Lindesnes, to its northernmost, North Cape, there is a span of 13 degrees of latitude, or the same as from Lindesnes to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore we have great variations in received solar energy during the year. The largest differences we find in Northern Norway, having midnight sun in the summer months and no sunshine at all during winter. The rugged topography of Norway is one of the main reasons for large local differences over short distances. [7] As a short description of the variability in Norwegian weather, the weather normal’s for the period 1971-2000, for a selected few parameters are shown in Figure 3. The highest annual temperatures can be found in the coastal areas of the southern and western part of Norway. Skudeneshavn (Rogaland) has a normal temperature of 7.7 °C. In 1994 Lindesnes lighthouse (Vest-Agder) recorded the highest annual temperature ever, with 9.4 °C.

1 Source: Peel, M. C., Finlayson, B. L. and McMahon, T. A. (University of Melbourne).

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-5 of A2-17

Figure 3: Weather normal 1971-2000 for the parameters mean annual temperature, mean annual precipitation and normal annual maximum snow depth. Excluding mountain areas, the coldest areas throughout the year is the Finnmark Plateau. One of the stations, Sihccajavri, has an annual temperature of -3.1 °C. The coldest year ever was in 1893, when Kautokeino (Finnmark) recorded a mean temperature of -5.1 °C. Sihccajavri equaled this in 1985. In the mountains, large areas have an annual temperature of -4 °C or less. There are large differences in the normal annual precipitation in Norway. The largest amounts are found some kilometres inland from the coast of Western Norway. In these areas the frontal and orographic precipitation dominates, and most of the precipitation is received during autumn and winter. Showery precipitation occurs most frequently in the inner districts of Østlandet and Finnmark. Here, summer is the wettest part of the year, and winter and spring the driest. The largest normal annual precipitation occurs in the area from the Hardanger fjord to the Møre area. These amounts are also among the highest in Europe. Brekke in Sogn og Fjordane county has an annual precipitation of 3575 mm, and several other stations in this area follow close behind. However, based on measurements of annual run-off, some glaciers must have an annual precipitation of about 5’000 mm. Brekke has also the record for one year precipitation, with 5’596 mm in 1990. The inner part of Østlandet, the Finnmark Plateau, and some smaller areas near the Swedish border, are all lee areas in relation to the large weather systems mainly coming from the west. Common for these areas is the low annual precipitation and that showery precipitation during summer is the largest contributor. Øygarden (Oppland) has the lowest annual normal precipitation with 278 mm. Other noteworthy dry places are Dividalen (Troms) 282 mm, Kautokeino (Finnmark) 360 mm and Folldal (Hedmark) 364 mm. The lowest recorded precipitation for one year is only 118 mm, measured at Saltdal (Nordland) in 1996.

3. Observations of weather in Norway and Sweden Observations of weather in Norway are primarily done by the Norwegian Meteorological Institute. Information and data is available at the following web addresses http://met.no/ [7] and data freely available at http://sharki.oslo.dnmi.no/ [12]. Weather forecast and data are also found at http://www.yr.no/ [13]. Observations of weather and climate in Sweden are primarily done by the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute. Information and data (to some extent) are freely available at their web-site http://www.smhi.se/ [8].

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-6 of A2-17

4. Extreme weather and weather records Climate is more than mean values and seasonal variation, also more rare events with extreme weather is part of the climate. Extremes can be local and violent, but extreme events can also be less violent but stretch out in both time and space such as for example heat waves and drought. For this study we have concentrated on the somewhat more violent events with the exception of heat and cold which can affect the project.

► Temperature • There is several ways to describe temperature extremes. Here only daily maxima and minimums are described for each county in Norway. Monthly and annual means also have extremes which are not given here.

► Precipitation • Precipitation extremes can be given in several different ways, daily and monthly maxima for each county are given here, sums can also be given as yearly and monthly maxima but also conditions with very little rain or snow (drought) can be described if need be. • Precipitation intensity is also of interest; short time rain events can cause serious problems with regards to erosion, floods, landslides and avalanches. • Snow and snow depth can also cause problems and annual maximum snow depth is given for each county and maximum amount for each month.

► Wind • Adverse wind conditions such as highest recorded mean wind speed (measured over a period of 10 minutes) and wind gusts.

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-7 of A2-17

Figure 4: Norwegian Counties

4.1. Temperature 4.1.1. Maximum temperature Maximum in Norway was recorded in Nesbyen, Buskerud 20.6.1970 at 35.6 ºC.

Maximum Daily Temperature County (°C) Place Date

Østfold 34.2 Rygge flystasjon 3. august 1982 Akershus 35.2 Fornebu 27. juni 1988 Oslo 35.0 Observatoriet 21. juli 1901 Hedmark 35.0 Staur forsøksgård 6. august 1975 Oppland 34.0 Lillehammer 19. juni 1970 Buskerud 35.6 Nesbyen 20. juni 1970 Vestfold 33.1 Melsomvik 3. august 1982 Telemark 34.6 Vefall i Drangedal 20. juni 1970 Aust-Agder 33.7 Byglandsfjord 11. juli 1986 Vest-Agder 32.6 Kjevik 11. august 1975 Rogaland 33.5 Sola 10. august 1975 Hordaland 34.0 Voss stasjon 5. juli 1889 Sogn og Fjordane 33.3 Fortun i Luster 8. juli 1933 Møre og Romsdal 33.8 Tafjord 16. juli 1945 Sør-Trøndelag 35.0 Trondheim 22. juli 1901 Nord-Trøndelag 34.5 Stjørdal 17. juli 1945 Nordland 33.1 Finnøy i Hamarøy 3. juli 1972 Troms 31.7 Fagerlidal 20. juni 1939 Figure 5: Daily mean temperature - Finnmark 34.3 Šihččajávri 23. juni 1920 20.06.1970

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-8 of A2-17

4.1.2. Minimum temperature Minimum temperature in Norway was recorded as far back as 1886 and is still standing after 120 years. The record was observed in Karasjok, Finnmark, on 1st January 1886 at -51.4 ºC.

Minimum Daily Temperature County (°C) Place Date

Østfold –34.9 Båstad 9. februar 1966 Akershus –37.5 Vormsund 9. februar 1966 Oslo –27.7 Bjørnholt 6. januar 2010 Hedmark –47.0 Drevsjø 10. januar 1987 Oppland –45.0 Lesjaskog 6. januar 1982 Buskerud –39.8 Dagali flyplass 7. januar 2010 Vestfold –33.3 Lauvkollmyra i Sande 4. januar 2003 Telemark –37.8 Gvarv 9. februar 1966 Aust-Agder –38.0 Hovden 8. januar 1982 Vest-Agder –33.0 Tjørhom i Sirdal 8. januar 1982 Rogaland –28.8 Høgaloft 10. januar 1987 Hordaland –39.6 Finse 7. januar 1982 Sogn og Fjordane –34.3 Myklemyr i Luster 7. januar 1982 Møre og Romsdal –29.2 Aursjøen 9. februar 1966 Sør-Trøndelag –50.4 Røros 13. januar 1914 Nord-Trøndelag –40.7 Nordli 15. mars 1940 Nordland –44.5 Svenningdal 30. desember 1978 Troms –44.1 Øverbygd 30. desember 1978

Finnmark –51.4 Karasjok 11. januar 1886 Figure 6: Daily mean temperature - 10.01.1987

4.2. Precipitation

4.2.1. Daily precipitation sums In Norway, precipitation for the past 24 hours is measured at 08:00 each morning. That also means that much of the precipitation can have fallen on the date before.

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Daily precipitation County (mm) Place Date

Østfold 96.6 Trolldalen i Moss 23. august 1988 Akershus 95.0 Dikemark i Asker 5. oktober 1905 Oslo 104.3 Bjørnholt i Nordmarka 29. august 1901 Hedmark 149.5 Magnor i Eidskog 25. august 1996 Oppland 109.1 Tyinkrysset 4. februar 1993 Buskerud 113.2 Heggelia i Nordmarka 28. oktober 1959 Vestfold 139.1 Natvoll i Sandar 25. august 1950 Telemark 168.6 Drangedal 15. august 1896 Aust-Agder 173.2 Mykland 28. august 1939 Vest-Agder 159.2 Bakke 15. desember 1936 Rogaland 190.0 Jørpeland 26. november 1940 Indre Matre i Hordaland 229.6 2 26. november 1940 Kvinnherad Sogn og Fjordane 207.8 Hovlandsdal 26. november 1940 Møre og Romsdal 178.5 Eide på Nordmøre 18. september 1978 Sør-Trøndelag 143.9 Momyr i Åfjord 31. januar 2006 Nord-Trøndelag 129.5 Brattingfoss i Verran 25. november 1983 Nordland 181.8 Lurøy på Helgeland 14. februar 1961 Troms 110.1 Kobberpollen på 28. januar 1992 Skjervøy Lanabukt i Sør- Finnmark 98.5 Varanger 21. juni 1977 Figure 7: Daily precipitation - 18.09.1978

The precipitation record in Norway is from Indre Matre in Hordaland County on the western coast of Norway. After several wet days, it was measured, from 08:00 on the 25th until 08:00 on the 26th November, 229.6 mm of rain. It has however fallen more because the measuring cup was filled on some spilled out. The next few days was also very wet and during this 5 day period of rain a total of 495.4 mm was measured. [3] Figures for dates marked with yellow in the table above are showed in figures below.

Figure 8: Daily precipitation - Figure 9: Daily precipitation Figure 10: Daily precipitation - 25.08.1996 21.06.1977 14.02.1961

2 The observation cup was filled up and spilled over. The actual amount could be higher.

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4.2.2. Monthly precipitation sums Monthly precipitation County (mm) Place Date

Østfold 351 Moss november 2000 Akershus 507 Jeppedalen i Hurdal november 2000 Oslo 564 Bjørnholt i Nordmarka november 2000 Hedmark 380 Storåsen på Sjusjøen november 2000 Oppland 357 Nordre Etnedal august 1951 Buskerud 612 Mykle november 2000 Vestfold 553 Hedrum november 2000 Telemark 582 Farsjø november 2000 Aust-Agder 670 Nelaug november 2000 Vest-Agder 711 Konsmo november 2000 Rogaland 1049 Ulladal i Suldal januar 1983 Haukeland i Hordaland 1150 januar 1989 Masfjorden Sogn og Fjordane 1190 Grøndalen i Flora januar 1989 Møre og Romsdal 797 Overøye i Stordal desember 1975 Sør-Trøndelag 665 Hemne desember 1975 Nord-Trøndelag 715 Follavatn i Verran desember 1975 Nordland 965 Strompdal i Velfjord mars 1953 Troms 466 Eidet i Gullesfjorden desember 2003 Finnmark 265 Gamvik mars 1953 Figure 11: Precipitation, monthly deviation in % of normal (1971-2000) in January 1989

4.2.3. Precipitation intensity The data is solely based on measurements from observation stations with pluviometers. Of the meteorological surveys some 400 precipitation stations only around 40 is equipped with such instruments and they have relatively few years of measurements. There are also a few higher measurements done manually such as 14 millimetres in three minutes in Tana in Finnmark County, 3rd July 1916 and in Folldal in Hedmark County they measured 100 millimetres in 90 minutes on 27th June in 1935.

Duration in Precipitation sum Place County Date Time of start minutes in millimetre

1 4.3 Gardermoen 3 Akershus 08.jul.73 09:32 2 8.1 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 11.aug.86 17:11 3 11.9 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 01.aug.86 17:11 5 16.2 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 01.aug.86 17:11 10 25.6 Nøisomhed i Molde Møre og Romsdal 01.aug.86 17:10 15 27.3 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 23:04 20 34.4 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 23:01 30 42.0 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:59 45 49.1 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:40 60 54.9 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:35 90 56.7 Asker Akershus 15.jul.91 22:35 120 59.3 Gjettum Akershus 17.jul.73 05:25 180 60.8 Grimstad Aust-Agder 11.jul.78 01:29

360 87.8 Sømskleiva i Kristiansand Vest-Agder 06.okt.87 00:15

3 Tangert av Nøisomhed i Molde 1. august 1986.

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4.2.4. Maximum snow depth Snow depth in County Place date centimetres

Østfold 165 Ørje 1. februar 1920 Akershus 235 Asker batteri 31. mars 1988 Oslo 302 Tryvannshøgda 8. april 1951 Hedmark 225 Os i Østerdalen 25. mars 1902 Oppland 394 Sognefjellhytta 31. mars 1989 Buskerud 300 Geilo 6. mars 1936 Vestfold 180 Hedrum i Larvik 26. februar 1900 Telemark 340 Haukeliseter 27. mars 1989 brøytestasjon Aust-Agder 290 Bjåen i Bykle 24. mars 1993 Vest-Agder 263 Skreådalen i Øvre 12. april 1962 Sirdal Rogaland 176 Suldalsvatnet 25. mars 1994 Hordaland 585 Grjotrusti 3. april 1918 Sogn og Fjordane 395 Myrdal i Aurland 15. februar 1925 Møre og Romsdal 270 Innerdal 29. februar 1924 Sør-Trøndelag 329 Lysvatnet i Åfjord 1. mars 1940 Nord-Trøndelag 310 Sandåmo i 16. februar 1976 Namsskogan Nordland 370 Dunderlandsdalen 12. mars 1920 Troms 260 Innset i Bardu 1. april 1943

Finnmark 246 Porsa gruber i 1. april 1911 Kvalsund Figure 12: Snow depth in Norway - Snowdepth in Month Place date 31.3.1989 centimeters January 486 Grjotrusti, Hordaland a januar 1918 Some years the Norwegian Water February 572 Grjotrusti, Hordaland februar 1918 Resources and Energy Directorate March 576 Grjotrusti, Hordaland mars 1918 has measured up to 12 meters of April 585 Grjotrusti, Hordaland april 1918 snow depth on the glaciers May 490 Grjotrusti, Hordaland mai 1920 June 341 Grjotrusti, Hordaland juni 1927 Svartisen and Ålfotbreen. Luly 190 Grjotrusti, Hordaland juli 1923 August 106 Fannaråki, Sogn og august 1962 Fjordane September 168 Fannaråki, Sogn og september 1962 Fjordane October 200 Innerdal, Møre og oktober 1997 Romsdal November 210 Grjotrusti, Hordaland november 1916 December 365 Grjotrusti, Hordaland desember 1917

4.3. Wind Wind is a parameter with great variations in both regional and local scale. Small variations in topography or altitude can give highly variable results. Wind is also highly variable parameter in a temporal scale and wind measurements are for that reason measured as mean wind speed over a 10 minute period at both 2 and 10 meters height above ground. Wind direction and max speed in the same period is also recorded. Wind speed is often measured in the Beaufort scale, shown below in Table 1 . Wind data, such as mean wind and maximum wind speed (gusts), are shown for a few selected stations along the proposed railroad corridors. For the each one of these observation stations, the one year of data with the highest recorded wind gusts, are shown. Other wind statistics and also real time data can be found on http://nb.windfinder.com/ [11]

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Table 1: Beauforts scale

Beaufort Description Wind speed km/h m/s 0 Calm < 1 km/h < 0.3 1 Light air 1.1-5.5 km/h 0.3 - 1.5 2 Light breeze 5.6-11 km/h 1.6-3.4 m/s 3 Gentle breeze 12-19 km/h 3.4-5.4 m/s 4 Moderate breeze 20-28 km/h 5.5-7.9 m/s 5 Fresh breeze 29-38 km/h 8.0-10.7 m/s 6 Strong breeze 39-49 km/h 10.8-13.8 m/s 7 High wind, moderate gale, near gale 50-61 km/h 13.9-17.1 m/s 8 Gale, fresh gale 62-74 km/h 17.2-20.7 m/s 9 Strong gale 75-88 km/h 20.8-24.4 m/s 10 Storm, whole gale 89-102 km/h 24.5-28.4 m/s 11 Violent storm 103-117 km/h 28.5-32.6 m/s 12 Hurricane-force[6] > 118 km/h ? 32.7 m/s

As can be seen from the table below, most of the high measurements are from the coast or at islands (lighthouses).

Table 2: Wind measurement

County Mean wind (m/s) Place date Wind gust (m/s) Place Date

4 Østfold 30.9 Jeløya 26 september 1963 33.4 Gullholmen fyr 5 oktober 2008 Akershus 22.6 Gardermoen3 5 november 1957 31.9 Fornebu 6 desember 1986 Oslo 26.8 Tryvannshøgda3 18 desember 1992 28.8 Blindern 16 oktober 1987 Hedmark 28.8 Sæter i Kvikne3 29 januar 1989 - - - - Oppland 35.0 Sognefjellhytta3 29 desember 1980 40.6 Fokstugu 18 januar 1993 Buskerud 26.8 Geilo3 21 januar 1957 - - - - Vestfold 35.0 Færder fyr3 20 desember 1968 35.0 Færder fyr 14 januar 2007 Telemark 30.9 Langøytangen fyr3 13 januar 1984 37.5 Møsstrand 14 januar 2007 Aust-Agder 35.0 Torungen fyr3 13 januar 1957 38.1 Torungen fyr 12 januar 2005 Vest-Agder 35.0 Lista fyr3 22 september 1969 41.7 Lista fyr 30 oktober 2000 Rogaland 37.0 Obrestad fyr 16 oktober 1987 42.7 Utsira fyr 16 oktober 1987 Hordaland 35.8 Slåtterøy fyr 14 januar 2007 47.6 Slåtterøy fyr 14 januar 2007 Sogn og Fjordane 43.9 Kråkenes fyr 3 januar 2000 60.1 Kråkenes fyr 3 januar 2000 Møre og Romsdal 46.0 Svinøy fyr 1 januar 1992 62.0 Svinøy fyr 1 januar 1992 Sør-Trøndelag 40.0 Halten fyr 1 januar 1992 55.0 Halten fyr 1 januar 1992 Nord-Trøndelag 41.2 Nordøyan fyr 1 januar 1992 45.3 Sklinna fyr 12 januar 1983 Nordland 37.0 Myken fyr 11 januar 2005 51.4 Andøya 1 februar 1993 Troms 37.0 Torsvåg fyr 15 november 1996 46.3 Fugløykalven fyr 31 januar 1997 Finnmark 35.0 Slettnes fyr3 20 desember 1992 43.7 Vardø radio 3 januar 1993

The strongest mean winds are however seldom measured because the capacity of the traditional measurement instruments is exceeded.

4 Visual observation. The factual wind speed might have been higher or lower.

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Figure 13: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 16610 Fokstugu, Oppland county5

Figure 14: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 39040 Kjevik, Vest-Agder county6

5 Cp. [5]. 6 Cp. [5].

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-14 of A2-17

Figure 15: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 27470 Torp, Vestfold county7

Figure 16: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 17150 Rygge, Østfold county8

7 Cp. [5]. 8 Cp. [5].

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-15 of A2-17

5. Future climate change Systematic variation in the atmospheric circulation pattern over the North-Atlantic, The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), is an important reason for the big natural year to year variation we experience in wind, temperature and precipitation in mainland Norway. These natural variations in air and ocean circulation give significant climate variation in Norway for periods up to a few decades. For time periods up to 10-20 year these natural variations are of the same size or greater than the expected future human induced climate change. So a climate change assessment has to go beyond 2030 [4]. In general, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, concludes within its regional climate projections for northern Europe that the annual mean temperatures in Europe are likely to increase more than the global mean. The warming in northern Europe is also likely to be largest in winter and the lowest winter temperatures are likely to increase more than average winter temperature. Annual precipitation is very likely to increase together with extremes of daily precipitation in most of northern Europe. Confidence in future changes in windiness is relatively low, but it seems more likely than not that there will be an increase in average and extreme wind speeds in northern Europe. The duration of the snow season is very likely to shorten in all of Europe, and snow depth is likely to decrease in at least most of Europe. [1] The annual mean temperature for mainland Norway has increased 0.8 ºC in the last 100 years. This is consistent with global mean change in the same period. Annual precipitation has increased by around 20 % since 1900 with most of the increase in the period after 1980. [4]

In Figure 17 the map shows expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation from normal period 1961-1990 to the normal period 2071-2100.The presented results are based on the global climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German “Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie”, the regional climate model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere and the hydrological model HBV. [6]

In Figure 18 The map shows change in annual temperature from normal period 1961- 1990 to period 2071-2100. The results are based on the global climate model HadAM3H, following SRES emission scenario A2. The results are downscaled Figure 17: Expected percentage change in using met.no's HIRAM model; ~55km2 spatial normal annual precipitation from normal resolution and 19 vertical levels. Finally the period 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.[6] results are empirically adjusted to local

conditions to 1 km spatial resolution. [2]

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-16 of A2-17

Figure 18: Expected change in annual Figure 19: Expected percentage change in temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100. [6] 2071-2100. [6] In Figure 19 the expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100 are shown. The presented results are based on the global climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German “Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie”, the regional climate model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere and the hydrological model HBV. The changes during the winter months seem to be much greater than for the other seasons. The season’s spring, summer and autumn shown are shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON) runoff from 1961- 1990 to 2071-2100. [6] For the amount of storms in our ocean and coastal areas there seem to be no clear trend since 1880. The climate models show little or no change in mean wind conditions in Norway in the period towards 2100. Some results however indicate that high wind episodes might happen more frequent. [4]

Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A2-17 of A2-17

Table of references

[1] Christensen, J.H.; B. Hewitson, A. Busuioc; A. Chen; X. Gao; I. Held; R. Jones; R.K. Kolli; W.-T. Kwon; R. Laprise; V. Magaña Rueda; L. Mearns; C.G. Menéndez; J. Räisänen; A. Rinke; A. Sarr and P. Whetton (2007): Regional Climate Projections. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S.; D. Qin; M. Manning; Z. Chen; M. Marquis; K.B. Averyt; M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. [2] Engen-Skaugen,T.; Haugen, J.E. & Hanssen-Bauer, I. (2008): Dynamically downscaled climate scenarios available at the Norwegian Meteorological Institute. Met.no report 24/2008.15 pp. [3] Mamen, J. (2006): Dypdykk i klimadatabasen. Rekorder og kuriositeter fra Meteorologisk Institutts klimaarkiv. Naturen nr.8/2006. 17 pp. [4] Miljøverndepartementet, NOU 2010: 10 Tilpassing til eit klima i endring. Samfunnet si sårbarheit og behov for tilpassing til konsekvensar av klimaendringane. 240 pp., 15.november 2010. [5] http://eklima.met.no (Norwegian meteorological data). Date 25.11.2010. [6] http://senorge.no (Norwegian meteorological and hydrological data). Date 15.11.2010. [7] http://www.met.no (Norwegian Meteorological Institute). Date 15.11.2010. [8] http://www.smhi.se (Swedish Meteorological Institute). Date 15.11.2010. [9] http://www.dmi.dk (Danish Meteorological Institute). Date 15.11.2010. [10] http://www.verogvind.net (Norwegian weather, run by weather statistician Bernt Lie). Date 15.11.2010. [11] http://nb.windfinder.com/ (Wind, waves and weather worldwide). Date 25.11.2010. [12] http://sharki.oslo.dnmi.no (Norwegian meteorological data). Date 15.11.2010. [13] http://www.yr.no (Weather forecast and data). Date 15.11.2010.

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track Evaluation Matrix

Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track evaluation matrix HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Design types of track / slab track Examples A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Supporting points, with embedded 26442 10 30 30 30 30 10 30 30 30 30 0000 10 30 30 20 10 26642 26444 10 10 20 30 30 22466 sleepers (SES) Rheda 2000 Supporting points, without sleepers, 26442 10 30 30 30 30 10 30 30 30 30 0000 10 30 30 20 10 26642 412888 10 10 20 30 30 22466 prefabricated slabs (PS) Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen Continuous support, on longitudinal beams 26442 10 30 30 30 30 10 30 30 30 30 0000 10 30 30 20 10 26642 26444 7 7 14 21 21 22466 and stakes (NFF) NFF Thyssen (New slab track Thyssen) Supporting points, with prefabricated 26442 10 30 30 30 30 10 30 30 30 30 0000 10 30 30 20 10 26642 26444 10 10 20 30 30 22466 booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS) EBS-Edilon, LVT Scores Slab Track Slab Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on 26442 8 24 24 24 24 8 24 24 24 24 0000 8 24 24 16 8 26642 412888 8 8 16 24 24 22466 top of asphalt layer (SA) Getrac, ATD

Continuous support, on slab; embedded 26442 10 30 30 30 30 10 30 30 30 30 0000 10 30 30 20 10 26642 26444 10 10 20 30 30 22466 rails in U-like channels (SER) ERS-HR-Edilon

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m / 245 kg) 10 30 20 20 10 4 12 12 12 12 4 12 12 12 12 0000 4 12 12 8 4 9 27 27 18 9 10 30 20 20 20 6 6 12 18 18 9 9 18 27 27

B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg) 10 30 20 20 10 5 15 15 15 15 6 18 18 18 18 0000 6 18 18 12 6 8 24 24 16 8 10 30 20 20 20 5 5 10 15 15 9 9 18 27 27

NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m / 280 kg) 10 30 20 20 10 4 12 12 12 12 5 15 15 15 15 0000 5 15 15 10 5 10 30 30 20 10 10 30 20 20 20 5 5 10 15 15 10 10 20 30 30 Scores Ballasted Track Ballasted Wide sleepers (2.40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers 8 24 16 16 8 6 18 18 18 18 39999 0000 4 12 12 8 4 6 18 18 12 6 8 24 16 16 16 6 6 12 18 18 7 7 14 21 21

Scores

Scenario A: The reference alternative: continuing the current railway politics 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 1 1 • not relevant to the TSI • Speed < 160 km/h Scenario B: More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the InterCity area: 2 3 3 0 3 3 2 2 2 • in accordance with TSI-Category II: Weighting of the

specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h Weighting Scenario: • speed: 160 – 200 km/h.

0=not relevant Scenario C: High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity 1=low relevance strategy: • in accordance with TSI-Category II / III 2=medial relevance specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or 2 3 3 0 2 2 2 3 3

specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted 3=strong relevance special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case. • speed: 200 – 250 km/h. Scenario D: Mainly separate high-speed lines • In accordance with TSI-Category I: 1 3 3 0 1 1 2 3 3 Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h Weighting • Speed: 250 - 350 km/h Weighting

Flexibility in operation Track availability / Adaptability of the Possibilities for programme (Change Repair after accidents Suitability of Frequency of permanent way for adjustments in lateral Lifetime Speed Load of speed and cant, / damages (costs and permanent way for maintenance / operation of tilting Evaluation parameters and vertical directions relocation of time) tilting trains Downtime trains turnouts…)

Operational parameters

A3-1 of A3-4 Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track evaluation matrix HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Design types of track / slab track Examples A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Supporting points, with embedded 5 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 20 30 10 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 13331 10 0 10 20 30 6 6 6 6 12 10 0 0 20 30 sleepers (SES) Rheda 2000 Supporting points, without sleepers, 6 18 18 18 18 8 8 8 16 24 10 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 13331 10 0 10 20 30 6 6 6 6 12 10 0 0 20 30 prefabricated slabs (PS) Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen Continuous support, on longitudinal beams 8 24 24 24 24 9 9 9 18 27 00000 00000 00000 8 24 24 24 8 10 0 10 20 30 11112 10 0 0 20 30 and stakes (NFF) NFF Thyssen (New slab track Thyssen) Supporting points, with prefabricated 10 30 30 30 30 9 9 9 18 27 00000 10 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 13331 10 0 10 20 30 6 6 6 6 12 10 0 0 20 30 booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS) EBS-Edilon, LVT Slab Track Slab Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on 7 21 21 21 21 7 7 7 14 21 00000 48888 00000 13331 6 0 6 12 18 6 6 6 6 12 10 0 0 20 30 top of asphalt layer (SA) Getrac, ATD

Continuous support, on slab; embedded 9 27 27 27 27 10 10 10 20 30 10 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 00000 13331 4 0 4 8 12 10 10 10 10 20 10 0 0 20 30 rails in U-like channels (SER) ERS-HR-Edilon

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m / 245 kg) 39999 5 5 5 10 15 10 20 20 20 20 6 12 12 12 12 00000 6 18 18 18 6 10123 22224 20046

B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg) 13333 4 4 4 8 12 10 20 20 20 20 6 12 12 12 12 10 20 20 20 20 6 18 18 18 6 20246 22224 20046

NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m / 280 kg) 26666 33369 10 20 20 20 20 6 12 12 12 12 10 20 20 20 20 6 18 18 18 6 10123 22224 20046 Ballasted Track Ballasted Wide sleepers (2.40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers 4 12 12 12 12 6 6 6 12 18 8 16 16 16 16 8 16 16 16 16 00000 4 12 12 12 4 20246 22224 6 0 0 12 18

Scores

Scenario A: The reference alternative: continuing the current railway politics 3 1 2 2 2 3 0 1 0 • not relevant to the TSI • Speed < 160 km/h Scenario B: More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the InterCity area: 3 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 0 • in accordance with TSI-Category II: Weighting of the specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h Scenario: • speed: 160 – 200 km/h.

0=not relevant Scenario C: High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity 1=low relevance strategy: • in accordance with TSI-Category II / III 2=medial relevance specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 2

specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted 3=strong relevance special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case. • speed: 200 – 250 km/h. Scenario D: Mainly separate high-speed lines • In accordance with TSI-Category I: 3 3 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h • Speed: 250 - 350 km/h Weighting

Crossings and Safety: Access for constructions carried Lateral track road vehicle / Flying ballast / Ice- Cross section Bridges Tunnels Stations / switches out after the Eddy-Current brakes resistance Protection against blocks Evaluation parameters construction of the derailment superstructure

Functional parameters

A3-2 of A3-4 Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track evaluation matrix HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Design types of track / slab track Examples A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Supporting points, with embedded 10 30 30 30 30 24446 10 20 20 20 20 26446 22666 6 6 18 18 18 10 10 10 20 30 26622 10 10 10 20 20 sleepers (SES) Rheda 2000

Supporting points, without sleepers, 10 30 30 30 30 24446 10 20 20 20 20 26446 22666 6 6 18 18 18 10 10 10 20 30 26622 10 10 10 20 20 prefabricated slabs (PS) Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen

Continuous support, on longitudinal beams 10 30 30 30 30 10 20 20 20 30 00000 10 30 20 20 30 7 7 21 21 21 4 4 12 12 12 10 10 10 20 30 13311 6 6 6 12 12 and stakes (NFF) NFF Thyssen (New slab track Thyssen)

Supporting points, with prefabricated 10 30 30 30 30 24446 10 20 20 20 20 26446 22666 8 8 24 24 24 10 10 10 20 30 26622 10 10 10 20 20 booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS) EBS-Edilon, LVT

Slab Track Slab Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on 10 30 30 30 30 24446 9 18 18 18 18 26446 22666 6 6 18 18 18 10 10 10 20 30 26622 10 10 10 20 20 top of asphalt layer (SA) Getrac, ATD

Continuous support, on slab; embedded 4 12 12 12 12 24446 10 20 20 20 20 26446 22666 8 8 24 24 24 10 10 10 20 30 26622 10 10 10 20 20 rails in U-like channels (SER) ERS-HR-Edilon

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m / 245 kg) 10 30 30 30 30 6 12 12 12 18 5 10 10 10 10 6 18 12 12 18 8 8 24 24 24 22666 5 5 5 10 15 10 30 30 10 10 44488

B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg) 10 30 30 30 30 6 12 12 12 18 7 14 14 14 14 7 21 14 14 21 8 8 24 24 24 22666 7 7 7 14 21 10 30 30 10 10 44488

NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m / 280 kg) 10 30 30 30 30 6 12 12 12 18 6 12 12 12 12 6 18 12 12 18 8 8 24 24 24 22666 6 6 6 12 18 10 30 30 10 10 44488

Ballasted Track Ballasted Wide sleepers (2.40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers 6 18 18 18 18 8 16 16 16 24 8 16 16 16 16 8 24 16 16 24 4 4 12 12 12 22666 7 7 7 14 21 8 24 24 8 8 8 8 8 16 16

Scores

Scenario A: The reference alternative: continuing the current railway politics 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 3 1 • not relevant to the TSI • Speed < 160 km/h Scenario B: More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the InterCity area: 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 3 1 • in accordance with TSI-Category II: Weighting of the specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h Scenario: • speed: 160 – 200 km/h.

0=not relevant Scenario C: High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity 1=low relevance strategy: • in accordance with TSI-Category II / III 2=medial relevance specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 2

specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted 3=strong relevance special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case. • speed: 200 – 250 km/h. Scenario D: Mainly separate high-speed lines • In accordance with TSI-Category I: 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h • Speed: 250 - 350 km/h Weighting

Requirements on the Catchment area for Adaption on soft Adaption on solid Airborne noise Structure borne noise Rehabilitation of formation layer and Comfort Criteria Vegetation snow subsoil rock emissions emissions existing tracks Evaluation parameters the subconstruction

Geotechnical parameters Environmental impact Service parameters

A3-3 of A3-4 Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track evaluation matrix HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Design types of track / slab track Examples A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D Supporting points, with embedded 8 16 16 24 24 26644 5 15 15 15 10 0000 345 7 377 6 439 4 468 3 sleepers (SES) Rheda 2000

Supporting points, without sleepers, 9 18 18 27 27 4 12 12 8 8 7 21 21 21 14 0000 366 4 396 4 455 1 480 1 prefabricated slabs (PS) Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen

Continuous support, on longitudinal beams 8 16 16 24 24 13322 26664 0000 310 9 337 9 394 9 422 5 and stakes (NFF) NFF Thyssen (New slab track Thyssen)

Supporting points, with prefabricated 9 18 18 27 27 4 12 12 8 8 5 15 15 15 10 0000 349 6 385 5 445 2 473 2 booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS) EBS-Edilon, LVT

Slab Track Slab Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on 8 16 16 24 24 5 15 15 10 10 6 18 18 18 12 0000 292 10 316 10 445 2 391 8 top of asphalt layer (SA) Getrac, ATD

Continuous support, on slab; embedded 10 20 20 30 30 6 18 18 12 12 5 15 15 15 10 0000 341 8 371 7 425 5 452 4 rails in U-like channels (SER) ERS-HR-Edilon

B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m / 245 kg) 4 8 8 12 12 10 30 30 20 20 10 30 30 30 20 0000 391 3 401 3 396 8 378 10

B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg) 5 10 10 15 15 8 24 24 16 16 8 24 24 24 16 0000 414 2 423 2 421 6 407 6

NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m / 280 kg) 5 10 10 15 15 9 27 27 18 18 10 30 30 30 20 0000 417 1 427 1 421 6 400 7

Ballasted Track Ballasted Wide sleepers (2.40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers 6 12 12 18 18 7 21 21 14 14 7 21 21 21 14 0000 355 5 358 8 379 10 385 9

Scores

Scenario A: The reference alternative: continuing the current railway politics 2 3 3 0 • not relevant to the TSI • Speed < 160 km/h Scenario B: More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the InterCity area: 2 3 3 0 • in accordance with TSI-Category II: Weighting of the specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h Scenario: • speed: 160 – 200 km/h.

0=not relevant Scenario C: High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity 1=low relevance strategy: • in accordance with TSI-Category II / III 2=medial relevance specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or 3 2 3 0

specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted scores unweighted 3=strong relevance special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case. • speed: 200 – 250 km/h. Scenario D: Mainly separate high-speed lines • In accordance with TSI-Category I: 3 2 2 0 Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h • Speed: 250 - 350 km/h Weighting

Maintenance of Investment costs Construction time Life cycle costs components Evaluation parameters

Cost parameters

A3-4 of A3-4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 4 TSI INS Parameter matrix

Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

Issue 1: Track, superstructure, installations, operation and maintenance Track without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting [1] x Minimum infrastructure gauge (GC reference kinematic profile) Minimum x *Requirements for pantograph gauge and electrical insulation infrastructure clearance X X X X X X X X gauge 4.2.3 6.2.6.1 [2] Minimum distance between main track centres: Distance between track if < 4.00 m, (V d 230 km/h) centres Regulations determined on the basis of the reference kinematic X X X X X X 4.2.4 profile

4.00 m (230 < V d 250 km/h) X X X X

4.20 m (250 < V d 300 km/h) X X X X

4.50 m (V> 300 km/h) X X X X

x for different track cants: minimum distance between main track X X X X X X X X centres + distance measurement according to [1] [3] Maximum rising and falling gradients: Maximum X X X X X X X X 35 ‰ rising and d falling Maximum rising and falling gradients of tracks in train stations: gradients X X X X X X X X 2.5 ‰ 4.2.5 d Slope of the moving average profile over 10 km: X X X X X X X X d 25 ‰ Maximum length of continuous 35‰ gradient X X X X X X X X d 6’000 m For higher values because of specific local conditions the limiting characteristics of the rolling stock of the high speed system in traction X X X X X X and braking have to be taken into account. Consideration of non-interoperable trains X X X X X X X X in the choice of the maximum value of the gradient [4] min R (m) = 11.8˜v 2 Minimum e radius of u  zulu f X X X X X X X X curvature v local design speed [km/h] 4.2.6 e

Page A4-1 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting u cant [mm] zul uf admissible cant deficiency [mm] [5] Tracks in draft: Track cant 4.2.7 x u d 180 mm Tracks in operation: x u d 180 mm and tolerance r 20 mm, with X X X X X X X X u d 190 mm or u d 200 mm (pure passenger transport) [6] Plain line track and main track of switches:

Cant defi- ciency [a] [b] 4.2.8.1 160 mm 180 mm v d 160 km/h 140 mm 165 mm 160 < v d 200 km/h X X X X X X

120 mm 165 mm 200 < v d 230 km/h X X X X 100 mm 150 mm 230 < v d 250 km/h X X X X

100 mm 130 mm* 250 < v d 300 km/h X X X X 80 mm 80 mm v > 300 km/h X X X X

[a] - normal limit [b] - maximum limit * for slab track 150 mm

Rolling stock for HSR with compensation of lateral acceleration (NeiTech): highest cant deficiency has to take into account the X X X X acceptance criteria according to 4.2.3.4 of HSR TSI RST [7] Branch track of switches: Sudden [a] Speed change of the

cant defi- uf d 120 mm 30 d VAbzw. d 70 km/h ciency in the X X X X X X X X branch track uf d 105 mm 70 < VAbzw. d 170 km/h of switches X X X X X X X X 4.2.8.2 uf d 85 mm 170 < VAbzw. d 230 km/h [8] x Crosswind stability must be guaranteed for the HS trains running Effects of on the track even under critical operating conditions X X X X X X X X crosswinds x Crosswind safety of vehicles is subject to national regulations 4.2.17 x If crosswind stability cannot be established, the infrastructure

Page A4-2 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting operator must take measures to ensure the required level of crosswind stability, e.g.: - local reduction of train speeds, possibly temporarily in weather conditions with risk of storms - constructions to protect the section of track concerned against crosswinds - other appropriate measures and keep a safety analysis log [9] Noise: Noise and x Proof of permitted noise emissions of HS trains taking into account vibrations the sound level at locally permissible speeds 4.2.19 x Further taking into account: X X X X X X X X 6.2.6.6 - other trains running on this section of track - the actual quality of the track bed - the topological and geographical constraints Vibrations: x National vibration limit values must not be exceeded by HS trains in X X X X X X X X transit in compliance with HGV TSI RST [10] x There must not be any level crossings. Access to or x Further measures in order to prevent intrusion into - people line installa- - animals and X X X X tions - vehicles from accessing and undesirable 4.2.22 intrusion into line installations are subject to national regulations. National regulations apply. X X X X

[11] x Lateral space must be provided along all tracks designated for HS Lateral space trains for passen- x Lateral space must permit passengers to alight from the train on gers and the non-track side if the nearest tracks continue to be in operation X X X X onboard staff during detrainment in the event of x Lateral space on railway bridges and on constructions with risk of detrainment of falling for passengers must be equipped with railings on the non- passengers track side between x Lateral space must be provided wherever possible at reasonable stations cost and effort X X X X 4.2.23.1 [13] No regulation in the TSI. National regulations apply. Ballast pick- X X X X X X X X up 4.2.27 [17] Presence and position of sidings, beyond handling and stabling

Stabling sidings, that comply with HGV TSI Infrastructure:

Page A4-3 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tracks and Stabling tracks must tally with the length of the trains to be stabled in X X X X X X X X other loca- accordance with HGV TSI vehicles tions with Maximum rising and falling gradients of stabling tracks: very low X X X X X X X X speed d 2.5 ‰ 4.2.25.1 The following applies for station and overtaking tracks: 4.2.25.2 4.2.25.3 Curve radius t 150 m X X X X X X X X 6.5 Annex D Reverse curves without straight track in between must be planned X X X X X X X X with radii of t 190 m.

If the radius of one of the curves is d 190 m, a straight track of t 7 X X X X X X X X m must be planned in between. The following applies for stabling and feeder tracks: Vertical curve radius:

x Crest t 600 m X X X X X X X X x Trough t 900 m [18] Presence and position of fixed installations for servicing trains that Fixed installa- comply with HGV TSI Vehicles tions for servicing Note: detailed requirements not illustrated. X X X X X X X X trains 4.2.26 6.5 Annex D

Page A4-4 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

Superstructure without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting [22] Nominal track gauge Track gauge 1435 mm 4.2.2 4.2.9.3.1 Minimum values of the mean track gauge in operation over a section 4.2.9.3.2 of 100 m on straight stretches of track and on curved track of R > 6.2.6.2 10,000 m 1’430 mm (V d 160 km/h)

1’430 mm (160 < V d 200 km/h) X X X X X X 1’432 mm (200 < V d 230 km/h) X X X X

1’433 mm (230 < V d 250 km/h) X X X X 1’434 mm (250 < V d 280 km/h) X X X X

1’434 mm (280 < V d 300 km/h) X X X X 1’434 mm (V> 300 km/h) X X X X [23] Dynamic running characteristics of a rail vehicle on straight stretches

Equivalent of track on curved track with a large radius conicity 4.2.9 0.20 (160 < V d 200 km/h) X X X X X X 4.2.9.1 4.2.9.2 0.20 (200 < V d 230 km/h) X X X X 6.2.5.2 0.20 (230 < V d 250 km/h) X X X X 0.20 (250 < V d 280 km/h) X X X X

0.10 (280 < V d 300 km/h) X X X X 0.10 (V > 300 km/h) X X X X Calculation of limit values based on the amplitude (y) of the lateral deflection of the wheelset: - y = 3 mm if (TG – SR) t 7 mm - y = ((TG - SR) - 1) / 2 X X X X X X X X if 5 mm d (TG - SR) < 7 mm - y = 2 mm if (TG - SR) < 5 mm TG - track gauge SR - wheelset gauge

Page A4-5 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting Calculation with the wheelset gauges (SR) specified for the wheel profiles below as per the definition in prEN 13715: - S 1002 with SR = 1420 mm X X X X X X X X - S 1002 with SR = 1426 mm - GV 1/40 with SR = 1420 mm - GV 1/40 with SR = 1426 mm [24] The railway infrastructure company must define appropriate limit Track geomet- values for threshold of immediate action, threshold of action and rical quality action value for the parameters below in the maintenance schedule: and - taking into account HGV TSI RST and limits on - combined occurrence of isolated defects isolated x Longitudinal level (standard deviation AL) defects x Track alignment (direction) (standard deviation AL) 4.2.10 x Track alignment (isolated value) x Longitudinal level (isolated defect) x Track distortion (isolated defect) Distortion limit value = (20/l + 3) with l as the measurement basis 1.3 m ” l ” 20 m and the distortion limit values - 7 mm/m for VStretch” 200 km/h - 5 mm/m for VStretch > 200 km/h

Measurement basis l is to be specified in the maintenance sched- ule x Track gauge (isolated defect) in mm V (km/h) Minimum gauge Maximum gauge widening

narrowing V ” 80 - 9 + 35 80 < V ” 120 - 9 + 35 120 < V ” 160 - 8 + 35 160 < V ” 230 - 7 + 28 X X X X X X V > 230 - 5 + 28 X X X X X X x Mean track gauge over 100 m (isolated defect)

Requirements as per test point [22]

Page A4-6 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting [25] Plain line track: Rail inclina- rail inclination of a specific stretch of track with value in the range X X X tion between 1:20 and 1:40 (inclination towards track axis) 4.2.11 6.2.6.4 Switches and crossings: rail inclination corresponds to that of plain line track with the following exceptions: - Inclination can be achieved by grinding/milling the active side of the railhead profile - V 200 km/h d X X X X X X X X without inclination in switch and crossing area and permissible on the short stretch of the plain line track - 200 < V d 250 km/h without inclination in switch and crossing area and permissible on the short stretch (L d 50 m) of the plain line track [26] x The tongues of switches and crossing switches as well as movable Switches and frog noses must be equipped with locking devices crossings x The correct position for locking the locking devices of movable X X X X X X X X 4.2.12 parts must be clearly indicated 4.2.12.1 4.2.12.2 Implementation of movable frog noses: 4.2.12.3 - V t 280 km/h Switches and crossings must be equipped with movable frog noses X X X X - Stretches with V < 280 km/h Switches and crossings with rigid frog nose can be implemented Track guidance dimensions (operating limit values):

- free run-through in d 1’380 mm tongue region

- Check rail gauge in region of t 1’392 mm frog nose

- Check rail gap in d 1’356 mm region of frog nose

- free run-through in region d 1’380 mm of check rail/wing rail - Flangeway t 38 mm - Calculation of the max. permissible length of the frog nose gap

Page A4-7 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting

(corresponding to a switch inclination of 1:9 with t 45 mm check rail cant and minimum wheel diameter of 330 mm)

- Flange depth t 40 mm

- Check rail cant d 70 mm [27] Tracks including switches and crossings must bear the following Track resis- loads: tance – verti- - maximum static wheelset load according to HGV TSI RST 4.2.3.2, X X X X X X X X cal loads Table 1: 4.2.13 225 kN (maximum value specified here) 4.2.13.1 - maximum dynamic wheel load in accordance with HGV TSI RST

6.2.5.1 4.2.3.4.3: 180 kN (190 < V d 250 km/h) X X X X X X

170 kN (250 < V d 300 km/h) X X X X 160 kN (V > 300 km/h) X X X X - maximum quasi-static wheel force in accordance with HGV TSI RST 4.2.3.4.3: 145 kN National requirements for other trains that do not comply with HGV X X X X X X TSI RST [28] Tracks including switches and crossings must bear the following Track resis- loads: tance – longi- a) Acceleration and braking forces tudinal loads - Minimum braking power as per HGV TSI RST 4.2.4.1 4.2.13 (requirements not illustrated) 4.2.13.1 - Minimum deceleration for service braking as per HGV TSI RST 6.2.5.1 4.2.4.4 (requirements not illustrated) - Trains with brake independent of wheel/rail traction (eddy-current brake) as per HGV TSI RST 4.2.4.5: Minimum deceleration: X X X X X X X X < 2.5 m/s² Maximum braking force: d 105 kN at 2/3 of full service braking linear between > 105 and d 180 kN for braking between 2/3 and full service braking d 180 kN full service braking d 360 kN for emergency braking

Page A4-8 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting b) Thermal longitudinal forces from temperature change - due to local environmental conditions - through activation of braking systems whose braking effect causes heating of the rails X X X X X X X X - implementation of eddy-current brakes as service brake: specification of max. permissible braking force for the track (less than permitted by HGV TSI RST) taking into account the projected number of repeated brakings c) Longitudinal forces from interaction between constructions and tracks in compliance with EN 1991-2:2003: 6.5.4: X X X X X X X X Longitudinal forces from interaction between bridge and track National requirements for other trains that do not comply with HGV X X X X X X TSI RST [29] - maximum total dynamic lateral force exerted by a wheelset (without Track resis- cant equalisation) tance – verti- (6Y2m)lim = 10 + (P/3) (kN) cal loads X X X X X X X X 4.2.13 where P = maximum static wheelset load (in kN) of each individual 4.2.13.1 vehicle approved for the stretch of track 6.2.5.1 - quasi-static guidance force (Yqst) (Y/Q)lim = 0.8 as per HGV TSI RST National requirements for other trains that do not comply with HGV X X X X X X TSI RST [30] Global track x Requirements for maximum stiffness of the rail ties as per para- stiffness graph 5.3.2 4.2.15 X X X X X X X X 5.3.2 6.2.6.3

[31] x Minimum electrical resistance: Electrical characteris- Track: t 3 :km tics 4.2.18 rail tie system: t 5 k: ENE 4.7.2 (The track must maintain the insulation value required for the X X X X X X X X ENE 4.7.3 coded track circuits used for train location systems: the infrastructure operator can demand a higher value in both cases for specific systems for train control/train safety and signal- ling.)

Page A4-9 of A4-13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting The provisions of HGV TSI ENE for the safety devices of the over- head contact systems* in particular for civil engineering structures apply: x EN 50122-1:1997, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 7, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6 (without EN 50179) x Design review: proof that the return current circuit for each system is adequate x Construction: proof that the safety devices and rail potential meet design specifications

Further requirements for installations along the tracks without with without with without with without with

tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting EN 1991-2:2003, 6.6 in combination with national appendix: x 6.6.1 General information Paragraphs (1) to (5) Paragraph (3) with national appendix x 6.6.2 Simple vertical surfaces parallel to the track (e.g. noise barriers):

r q1k as per paragraphs (1) to (3) x 6.6.3 Simple horizontal surfaces over the track (e.g. shock-hazard [33] protection): Aerodynamic q as per paragraphs (1) to (5) effects of r 2k passing trains x 6.6.4 Simple horizontal surfaces close to track (e.g. platform roofs X X X X X X X X on lineside without vertical walls): structures r q3k as per paragraphs (1) to (3) 4.2.14.7 x 6.6.5 Multiple-surface constructions along the track with vertical 4.2.14.8 and horizontal or inclined surfaces (e.g. angled noise barriers, platform roofs with vertical aprons etc.):

r q1k as per paragraphs (1) and (2) x 6.6.6 Surfaces that enclose the infrastructure gauge for a limited length (up to 20 m) (horizontal surfaces over the tracks and at least one vertical wall, e.g. scaffolding, construction apparatus etc.):

r k4 q1k and r k5 q2k as per paragraph (1)

Further requirements for tracks in stations

Page A4-10 of A4- 13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting [34] Nominal distance L from the track axis parallel to top of rail: Distance of L (mm) = 1’650 + 3'750 g 1'435  the platform R 2 INS 4.2.20.5 PRM 4.1.2.18 R - curve radius [m] X X X X X X X X PRM 4.1.2.18.2 g - track gauge [mm] L must be kept below the height of 400 mm above top of rail (Tolerance -0 mm / + 50 mm) Distance of platform from the track axis for the conventional High- Speed network: x bq0 = 1’650 + 3’750 / R with R = curve radius in m with bqlim as per EN 15273-3: 2006 with bq with fluctuation Tq and standard without: - track widening on curved track - cant - switches and crossings - quasi-static inclination - design-specific and maintenance- specific tolerances

x bqlim d bq d bqlim + Tq

for Tq it applies that 0 d Tq d 50 mm Note: x Infrastructure gauge according to national regulations insofar as EN 15273-3:2006 is not enforced x Quasi-static lateral inclination of infrastructure gauge due to cant u t 25 mm is to be compensated by corbelling the platform edge on the outer side of the curve [35] x Tracks as straight as possible along stations; Track ar- X X X X rangement x R t 500 m along the x R < 500 m possible if required by present track layout; platforms maintain minimum infrastructure gauge regarding installation X X X X INS 4.2.20.6 dimensions for heights and gaps of platform edges (see test point PRM 4.1.2.18 [1]) PRM 4.1.2.18.3 Tracks as straight as possible along stations.

x R must be at least t 300 m [36] The provisions of HGV TSI ENE for the safety devices of the over- Protection head contact systems* apply: X X X X X X X X against elec- x EN 50122-1:1997, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 7, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6 tric shock on (without EN 50179)

Page A4-11 of A4- 13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting platforms x Design review: proof that the return current circuit for each system INS 4.2.20.7 is adequate ENE 4.7.2 x Construction: proof that the safety devices and rail potential meet ENE 4.7.3 design specifications

Operation and maintenance without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting [37] In the scope of the initially planned work there might be temporary Construction deviations from the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the TSI; and mainte- In this case the railway infrastructure company must define extraor- nance meas- dinary operating conditions to ensure safety (see HGV TSI OPE for ures regulations); 4.4.1 - non-TSI-conform extraordinary operating conditions must be X X X X X X X X planned beforehand and limited in time - railway transport companies plying the stretches of track concerned must be informed about temporary extraordinary operating condi- tions (type of restriction, geographical location, type and form of signalling) [38] The railway infrastructure company must inform the railway transport Hints for the companies about temporary restrictions that might be caused by railway trans- unforeseen events and which affect the infrastructure X X X X X X X X port compa- nies 4.4.2 [39] x The railway infrastructure company defines protection measures Protection of for track workers against aerodynamic effects workers x For trains as per HGV TSI RST the limit values for aerodynamic against aero- effects as per HGV TSI RST, 4.2.6.2.1, are to be taken into ac- X X X X X X X X dynamic count (requirements not illustrated) effects 4.4.3

Page A4-12 of A4- 13 Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Infra parameters TSI Technical and Safety Analysis Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant for the topic TSI "Infrastructure" Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D.1 Scenario D.2 TSI/RL High-speed con- A more offensive Point cepts, which in part Pure high-speed on Mixed traffic on further development are based on the mainly separate mainly separate No. of the current existing network and high-speed lines high-speed lines Description / Test parameters infrastructure IC strategy

250 - 350 kph 160 - 350 kph 160 - 200 kph Safety Reliability Availability Health protec- tion Environmental protection Technical com- patibility 160 - 250 kph

without with without with without with without with tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting tilting [40] Maintenance schedule must include the following: Maintenance x Standard limit values plan x Explanations of the methods, expertise of personnel and safety 4.5.1 measures for protection of personnel 6.4 x Rules for the protection of track workers on and alongside the track x Means for checking that operating values are adhered to x Measures to be taken if prescribed values are exceeded X X X X X X X X x Specifications must refer to: - Cant [5] - Quality of track bed [24] - Switches and crossings [26] - Platform edges [34], [35] - State of tunnels [97] - Curve radius of stabling tracks [17] [41] Technical procedures and the products used in maintenance / ser- Maintenance vice must not be a hazard to human health and must not exceed limit requirements values for environmental protection. X X X X X X X X 4.5.2 National requirements apply. 6.4 [43] x Health and safety measures specially for maintenance personnel Health and on and along the tracks safety condi- x Maintenance personnel must wear reflective clothing with "CE" X X X X X X X X tions mark 4.7

Page A4-13 of A4- 13 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire case study

Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A5-1 of A5-4

Questionnaire

Introduction

The present survey studies the national experiences in tilting train operation. It addresses to rail companies as well as railway infrastructure companies and manufacturers with experiences in tilting train operation.

The questioning is organized as semi-structured interview. Depending on the conversational partner the interview takes about 90 minutes and will be carried out as face-to-face or telephone interview.

Questions

Infrastructure

x Alignment parameters for tilting trains and conventional lines o Curve radius (Minimum curve radius, optimized curve radius, length, reversed arch) o Track transition curve (type, length) o Cant / superelevation (type, max. cant) o Cant ramp o Gradient o Speed o Lateral acceleration o Allowed variation (can tilting trains operate on conventional tracks (alignment) with increased speed?)

x Track o Track systems used for tilting train operation (e.g. ballasted track / slab track) o Requirements on lateral resistance (resistance of the track to lateral displacement) o Switches o Stations o Maintenance/Wear (maintenance efforts / cost, wear rate compared to conventional operation) o Track development (new track system concepts for tilting trains, specifications for future track systems)

x Signalling o Additional safety and control equipment for tilting train operation o Additional operational regulation in the signalling system o Interoperability between conventional and tilting train equipment o Cost comparison conventional vs. tilting train track equipment

x Number of tracks / passing loops/stations o Number of tracks (single/double track) normally used with tilting train operation o Passing / Crossing of trains o distances (pure tilting train operation / mixed with conventional passenger trains / mixed with fright trains)

Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A5-2 of A5-4

x Weather & Climate o Technical solutions regarding adverse weather situations like ice, snow, heavy rain

Rolling Stock

x Types of tilting trains in use o Regional tilting trains (type of vehicle, type of tilting mechanism) o Long-distance tilting trains (type of vehicle, type of tilting mechanism) o Tilting angle

x Availability rate

x Failure causes due to o Vehicle construction o Wear / Maintenance o Weather conditions (ice, snow, rain) o Accidents o Other

x Additional safety and control equipment for tilting train operation an signalling

x Decision making o Choice reasons for tilting trains in use o Compared alternatives o Cost comparison

x Future o Open orders o Specifications for future tilting trains

Operation

x Service concepts (pure tilting train operation / mixed with conventional passenger trains / mixed with fright trains)

x Railway network requirements for optimal gain of travel time

x Operational effects o Gain of travel time / percentage of increased speed, method of calculation o Buffer times (in particular compared to conventional operation) o Reliability of tilting train operation (availability rate, failure cause) o Tilting for speed or comfort reasons o Occupancy of vehicles

x Weather & Climate o Operational methods (e.g. to keep tracks clear of snow) o Special regulations during adverse weather situations e.g. due to higher lateral forces o Critical points during adverse weather situations

Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A5-3 of A5-4

National tilting train development

x National history of introducing tilting trains o Background of existing railway network o Topographical reasons o Cost reasons o Political reasons x Current tilting train operation o Number of connections on regional/long-distance relations o Percentage of regional/long-distance rail transport o Percentage (or km) of railway tracks equipped for tilting train operation

x National technical development regarding tilting trains o Tracks o Signalling o Rolling stock o Operation o Regulation

x Future use of tilting train concepts o Development of tilting train operation o Refitting of conventional tracks for tilting train operation o Construction of new lines dedicated for tilting trains; interoperability with non- tilting trains

x National experiences to actual cost effects of tilting train operation o Alignment o Buildings and Structures o Track systems (construction, maintenance) o Signalling systems (construction, maintenance) o Rolling stock (purchase, maintenance) o Ex post analysis of estimated and realized cost effects with tilting trains

x Current regulation o Overview over national regulation for tilting trains o Influence of transnational regulation (e.g. EU-Regulation, TSI)

x Passenger acceptance o System acceptance (acceptance of high-speed traffic, tilting trains, etc.) o Motion sickness

Recommendations to the use of high speed tilting trains in Norway

x Recommendations to the introduction of high speed tilting trains in Norway o General recommendation o Construction of dedicated tilting train lines with special alignment parameters o Integration in the conventional rail-network

x Recommendations to infrastructure o Alignment parameters o Track systems (in particular due to the special climatic conditions in Norway) o Signalling o Number of tracks

Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis A5-4 of A5-4

o Distances of passing loops

x Recommendations to Operation o Service concepts o Operation on adverse weather situations

x Recommendations to Rolling Stock o Types of tilting trains o Safety and control systems o Climatic adaptation

HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 6 Subject 1 Task 5 Evaluation model

Annex 6 Subject 1 Task 5 Evaluation model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Potential issue scenario D Potential issue scenario C Potential issue scenario B Potential issue scenario A Other trains, Other trains, Other trains, Other trains, freight, pass. freight, pass. freight, pass. freight, pass. High speed Tilting train coaches etc High speed Tilting train coaches etc High speed Tilting train coaches etc High speed Tilting train coaches etc Parameters [>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h] Comments to scenario D [>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h] Comments to scenario C [>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h] Comments to scenario B [>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h] Comments to scenario A Climate and environment Check reference high speed Temperature range Yes No No train with similar temp.range Yes No No Same as scenario D N/A No No Same as scenarion D N/A No No Same as scenarion D Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long tunnels and on/off long bridges Yes No No Yes No No N/A No No N/A No No Possibly first train of the day slower speed? Panth wear due to "bounces" and light arcs.Undulations of OHL due to Ice and snow-packing, both catenary and rolling snow load, disconnection. Icicle stock issues Yes No No collisions pantograph. Yes No No N/A No N/A No Ventilation inlets Yes No No Yes No No N/A No No N/A No No

Speed restrictions due to frequent "collisions" with smaller snow drifts across track? No problem in 120, but uncomfortable in 160. Damage Train picking up ballast and snow blasting between to train in 250? No experience underframe and track Yes No No with >160 on mountain lines. Yes No No N/A No No N/A No No Crosswinds on exposed areas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No N/A No No Maintenance concepts concerning de-icing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No N/A No No

Route alignment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No N/A No No

Pressure pulses Entering tunnels and passing trains in tunnel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No No No Passing fixed installations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No No N/A No No

“Animal protection” Plough to prevent the obstacle to get under the train in case of a collision Yes No No Yes No No N/A No no N/A No no

Fire and evacuation Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Noise Potential new requirements if new track is built with up to External noise Yes No No date noise requirements Yes No No N/A No No N/A No No

Coupler Must be covered when buying Coupler for rescue of train No No No new trains No No No Same as scenario D N/A No No Same as scenario D N/A No No Same as scenario D

Length of train Most of high speed trains today are approx 200m, means no Pantograph spacing in case of multiple service Yes Yes No issue Yes Yes No Same as scenario D N/A No No N/A No No Platform lengths No No No Yes No No Same as scenario D N/A No No N/A No No

Signalling 1) Yes if new high speed trains running on tracks without ERTMS 2&3) Yes if the trains are old and running on new line with ERTMS No Yes Yes Yes if the trains are "old" Yes Yes Yes ERTMS N/A No No N/A No No

Increased maintenance cost for higher speed and/or higher Track impact Yes Yes Yes axleload Yes Yes Yes Same as scenario D N/A No No N/A No No

Linked to the total consumtion including construction of new Energy consumption Yes Yes Yes line and service consumption Yes Yes Yes Same as scenario D N/A Yes Yes Same as scenario D N/A No No

A6-1 of A6-1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 7 Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters

Annex 7 Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

List of parameters that have to be assessed when specifing train for Norway

The comments in column "Comment" should be seen in relation to the basic question of "what is special for Norway" System (no. refers to No. Parameter maintenance system IRMA) Comment 1 Carbody, pressure sealing 1.Carbody Relevant 2 Gangways 1.Carbody Not relevant 3 Couplers (between coaches) 1.Carbody Not relevant 4 Side window 1.Carbody Not relevant 5 Front window 1.Carbody Not relevant 6 Front window heaters 1.Carbody Not relevant 7 Entrance step 1.Carbody Not relevant 8 Plough 1.Carbody Relevant 9 Passenger doors, number of doors, width 1.Carbody Not relevant 10 Insulation 1.Carbody Not relevant 11 Wheelchair lift/ramp 1.Carbody Not relevant 12 Bogie 2.Running gear Not relevant 13 Suspension 2.Running gear Not relevant 14 Wheelset 2.Running gear Not relevant 15 6.Traction Not relevant 16 Anti roll bar 2.Running gear Not relevant 17 Carbody-bogie bolster 2.Running gear Not relevant Running performance incl. yaw-damping (bog-rotation), vertical/lateral 18 movements 2.Running gear Not relevant 19 Bogie mounted tilt-components 2.Running gear Not relevant 20 Guard iron 2.Running gear Not relevant 21 Dynamic brake 3. Brakes Not relevant 22 Pneumatic brake incl pads and discs 3. Brakes Relevant 23 WSP - wheel slide protection 3. Brakes Not relevant 24 Magnetic Track Brake 3. Brakes Not relevant 25 Emergency brake passenger 3. Brakes Not relevant 26 Emergency brake override 3. Brakes Not relevant 27 Compressed air reservoirs 4. Compressed air Not relevant 28 Air compressor 4. Compressed air Not relevant 29 Pantograph 5.High voltage Relevant 30 Main transformer 5.High voltage Not relevant 31 Converters 6.Traction Not relevant 32 Carbody tilt equipment 9.Tilt equipment Not relevant 33 Seats 10.Interior Not relevant 34 Internal doors 10.Interior Not relevant 35 HVAC 11.HVAC Not relevant 36 Air pressure protection - doors 1.Carbody Relevant 37 Air pressure protection - ventilation inlet 11.HVAC Relevant 38 Air pressure protection - exhaust air 11.HVAC Relevant 39 Fire detection system 13.Safety/communication Not relevant 40 PA-system 13.Safety/communication Not relevant 41 ERTMS 13.Safety/communication Relevant 42 Tyfon 13.Safety/communication Not relevant 43 Trip recorder (TELOC) 13.Safety/communication Not relevant 44 Front window viper 13.Safety/communication Not relevant 45 Pressure waves in tunnels Functional requirement Relevant 46 Climate impact, e.g. snow packing, ice-growth etc Functional requirement Relevant 47 Instant monitoring of lateral acceleration Functional requirement Not relevant 48 Max speed Functional requirement Not relevant 49 Number of passengers Functional requirement Not relevant 50 Comfort requirements Functional requirement Not relevant 51 Maintenance concept and workshops Functional requirement Relevant 52 Availiability and reliability requirements Functional requirement Not relevant 53 Proven design solutions Functional requirement Relevant 54 Tilting train or not Functional requirement Not relevant 55 Energy consumption Functional requirement Relevant 56 Running resistance Functional requirement Relevant 57 External noise Functional requirement Relevant 58 Internal noise Functional requirement Relevant 59 Recyclable material used Functional requirement Not relevant 60 Track alignment Functional requirement Relevant 61 Fire and evacuation, tunnels Functional requirement Relevant 62 Train length Functional requirement Relevant

A7-1 of A7-2 Annex 7 Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

List of parameters that have to be assessed when specifing train for Norway

The comments in column "Comment" should be seen in relation to the basic question of "what is special for Norway" System (no. refers to No. Parameter maintenance system IRMA) Comment 63 Track forces etc. Functional requirement Relevant

A7-2 of A7-2 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 8 Subject 1 Task 5 Existing trainconcepts

Annex 8 Subject 1 Task 5 Existing trainconcepts HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Information of existing & future trains Bombardier V300 Zefiro D AnsaldoBreda Alstom Hyondai Rotem CSR Hitachi UK Class 395 (Germany) V 250 AGV KORAIL KTX-II Polaris Max speed 360 km/h 320 km/h 250 km/h 360 km/h 330 km/h 225 km/h with upgrade 225 km/h Number of coaches pr. trainset 8 8 8 7, 8, 10, 11 or 14 Two power cars + max 12 6 trailor cars Number of seated passengers pr. 600 460 (111/349) 546 E.g. approx 460 seats for Custom made, max 82 Standard 298 + priority 42 trainset (first/second class) 11 coaches Disabled people area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Length of trainset or coach 202 m 200 m 200 m 132 m (7coach) - 252 m (14 Power car ~20 m 122 m coach) Trailor car ~24 m Total weight pr. trainset or coach 500 t 442 t 485 t E.g. approx 41 t for 11 Power car ~64 t 268.5 t plus 3% tolerance coaches Trailor car ~33 t Max width 2'924 mm 2'950 mm 2'870 mm 2'985 mm 2'970 mm 2'810 mm Max height 4'080 mm 3'890 mm 4'080 mm 4'125 mm 3'750 mm 3'817 mm Max coach length 26'300 mm end car 23'535 mm end car 17'300 mm for internediate 20'100 mm 24'000 mm 20'000 mm 24'900 mm intermediate car 24'175 mm intermediate cars, 22'800 mm for end car cars Floor height from t.o.r. 1'240 mm 1'250 mm 1'260 mm 1'150 mm 1'235 mm Max axleload 17 t 17 t 17 t 17 t 16 t 14.5 t Carbody material Aluminum Aluminium (welded Aluminum + Steel (cab Aluminum Stainless steel Stainless steel Aluminum aluminium extrusion structure) (locomotive) and profile) aluminum (passenger coaches) Number of passenger doors pr 26+2+2 20 24 10 4 doors pr coach 4 doors pr coach trainset or coach Door width 900 mm 800 / 900 mm 900 mm 900 mm 1'100 mm 1'100 mm Track gauge 1'435 mm 1'435 mm 1'435 mm 1'435 mm 1'435 mm 1'435 mm 1'435 mm Line voltage 25 kV AC; 15 kV AC; 3 kV 25 kV AC; 15 kV AC; 3 kV 25 kV 50 Hz or 3 kV-1.5 25 kV, 15 kV, 3 kV or 1.5 25 kV 25 kV DC; 1.5 kV DC DC; 1.5 kV DC kV DC kV Traction motor efford Max tractive efford 320 kN 300 kN 300 kN 270 kN 2 * 2.4 MW 16 * 210 kW Temperature range -25°C to 45°C -25°C to +45°C Range -25°C +45°C Range -17°C +35°C ('-50°C to +40°C for Russian market) Tilt (yes/no) No No No No No, but will come No TSI compliant (yes/no) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Energy consumption pr.km ~ 15 kWh/km depending on TBD operation mode Possibility for multiple trainsets Yes, 2 trainsets Yes Yes Yes Yes

Max acceleration 0.7 m/s² acc. TSI HS 0.58 m/s2 ~0.6 m/s2 0.8 m/s2 0.7 m/s2 Emitted noise in max speed acc. TSI HS 92 dB[A] at 330km/h 72 dB[A] Pressure protection for High degree of pressure Yes Yes Yes Yes passengers tightness, compliant with UIC 660. good pressure comfort, especially on tunnels

A8-1 of A8-1 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list

Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

System Level ID 2nd Level Hazard Cause Accident Effect after accident Severity Functional safety measurements other safety measurements Hazard 1 guidance of loss of structural breakage of wheel derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic wheel defect detection system on periodic inspections / maintenance vehicle not integrity of wheel rim or axcles over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; train and hot box detectors and ensured or axcles vehicle(s) may come into the other track and wheel defect detection on strategic collision with mixed traffic possible (only in places system-variant 1) loss of structural earthquake / derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic signalling system for detection of rail periodic inspections / maintenance integrity of bridge landslip over; in worst case vehicle falling from bridge brakage

loss of structural earthquake / derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic landslide warning system on critical periodic inspections / maintenance integrity of track / landslip over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; parts of track rail vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) rail fracture derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic signalling system detects rail periodic inspections / maintenance over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; brakage in case of total fracture vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) undercutting of derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic landslide warning system on critical periodic inspections / maintenance track over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; parts of track vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) deformation of rail high temperature derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic _ periodic inspections / maintenance (lateral buckling) over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) loss of structural breakage of switch derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic none (because end position detector, none (because end position detector, integrity of switch tongue over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; tongue detectors are not efficient for tongue detectors are not efficient for component vehicle(s) may come into the other track and this hazard in case of switch of this hazard in case of switch of collision with mixed traffic possible (only in tongue while train movement) tongue while train movement) system-variant 1)

A9-1 of A9-6 Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

System Level ID 2nd Level Hazard Cause Accident Effect after accident Severity Functional safety measurements other safety measurements Hazard climbing obstacle (e.g. derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic landslide warning system on critical periodic inspections / maintenance; stones, wood) on over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; parts of track falling-object protective systems track vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) severe snow / derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic snowslide warning system, snow periodic inspections / maintenance; large amount of ice over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; shelter snowshells on track, heavy vehicle(s) may come into the other track and snowfall, collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) foreign object (e.g. derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic end position detector, tongue periodic inspections / maintenance. stones, snow, ice) over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; detector at switches in switch vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) inadequate high derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic ETCS or F- ATC periodic inspections / maintenance speed in curves over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; vehicle(s) may come into the other track and collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) 2 vehicle´s stability too high lateral too high side wind derailment multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic _ walls, windshells, closing track if not ensured forces over; collision with 3rd properties possible ; information of heavy wind; no double vehicle(s) may come into the other track and tracks on one bank collision with mixed traffic possible (only in system-variant 1) 3 adequate forward erroneous "system signalling failure Front or rear multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic ETCS or F- ATC periodic inspections / maintenance ordering not track holding/train collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by ensured routing" train derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

train detection Front or rear multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic axel counter at station periodic inspections / maintenance failure collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by train derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

4 inadequate braking insufficient brake failure of brake Front or rear multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic emergency brake sytem periodic inspections / maintenance force system collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by train derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

too high failure of brake tumble of None marginal _ periodic inspections / maintenance deceleration system passengers

A9-2 of A9-6 Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

System Level ID 2nd Level Hazard Cause Accident Effect after accident Severity Functional safety measurements other safety measurements Hazard 5 objects / obstacle vehicle on level level crossing Side collision train only relevant in system-variant 1, multiple catastrophic level crossing monitoring system / periodic inspections / maintenance in or besides track crossing failure/ human Ÿ vehicle effects possible: structural deformation of equipment (induction loops, infrared error vehicle(s) may followed by derailment and / or lightbarriers, radar etc.) fire, explosion or pollution loss of train failure of coupling Front or rear multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic ETCS or F- ATC ETCS or F- ATC integrity system collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by external coach derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

loss structural inadequate secure Front or side multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic _ periodic inspections / maintenance integrity of tunnel of construction collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by (e.g. falling of obstacle derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution rocks) rocks in track rock slide Front or side multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic landslide warning system on critical periodic inspections / maintenance collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by parts of track obstacle derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

trees in track storm Front or side multiple effects possible: structural marginal _ safety corridor at relevant track collision train Ÿ deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by sectors obstacle derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

animals in track missing fencing Collision train Ÿ damage on train marginal _ fences animal(s) ice in track snowslide Front or side multiple effects possible: force effect on third critical _ _ collision train Ÿ party and/or derailment and / or fire, explosion obstacle or pollution vehicle in track accident / defect of Front collision train multiple effects possible: structural catastrophic vehicle detection system on bridges periodic inspections / maintenance (outside level vehicle Ÿ vehicle deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by that crosses the rail track crossings) derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution

person intrudes missing fencing Collision train Ÿ None critical _ _ track person(s) person on platform inadequate Collision train Ÿ None critical _ _ process person(s) personal in track inadequate Collision train Ÿ None catastrophic _ _ process person(s) maintenance inadequate Front collision train derailment, damages on train, inadequate catastrophic special requirements for operation / special requirements for operation / vehicle / machines process Ÿ train / vehicle force effect on third party, explosion (not signalling signalling in track meaning accident), fire (not meaning accident)

loading / parts of lost of loading / Front collision train derailment, damages on train, inadequate catastrophic _ _ trains in track or parts of trains Ÿ obstacle force effect on third party dispersing

A9-3 of A9-6 Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

System Level ID 2nd Level Hazard Cause Accident Effect after accident Severity Functional safety measurements other safety measurements Hazard 6 loss of fire loss of onboard fire-loss of / fire in rolling stock multiple effects possible: smoke emission, catastrophic fire-alarm- / fighting monitoring periodic inspections / maintenance prevention alarm- / fighting errouneous loss of structural integrity of vehicle, system system sensoring inadmissibly increase of temperature, pollution (not meaning accident) failure of fire fire in rolling stock multiple effects possible: smoke emission, catastrophic fire-alarm- / fighting monitoring periodic inspections / maintenance extinguishing loss of structural integrity of vehicle, system system inadmissibly increase of temperature, pollution (not meaning accident) loss of tunnel fire- loss of / fire multiple effects possible: smoke emission, catastrophic fire-alarm- / fighting monitoring periodic inspections / maintenance alarm- / fighting errouneous loss of structural integrity of vehicle, system system sensoring inadmissibly increase of temperature, pollution (not meaning accident) failure of fire fire multiple effects possible: smoke emission, catastrophic fire-alarm- / fighting monitoring periodic inspections / maintenance extinguishing loss of structural integrity of vehicle, system system inadmissibly increase of temperature, pollution (not meaning accident) 7 adequate adequate loss or failure of multiple scenario multiple effects possible: inadmissibly catastrophic _ operational procedure evacuation of evacuation of onboard possibles increase of temperature and / or smoke passengers in passengers by evacuation system emission in case of fire; panic reaction of case of emergency onboard / equipment passengers; passengers my stand on not ensured evacuation system adjacent track(s) in case of emergency not ensured adequate loss or failure of multiple scenario multiple effects possible: inadmissibly catastrophic _ operational procedure evacuation of tunnel evacuation possibles increase of temperature and / or smoke passengers by system / emission in case of fire; panic reaction of tunnel evacuation equipment passengers; passengers my stand on system in case of adjacent track(s) emergency not ensured adequate loss or failure of multiple scenario multiple effects possible: inadmissibly catastrophic _ operational procedure evacuation of bridges evacuation possibles increase of temperature and / or smoke passengers while system / emission in case of fire; panic reaction of train on bridge in equipment passengers; passengers may stand on case of emergency adjacent track(s) (only in system-variant 1) not ensured

8 safe entry / exit of entry / exit system loss / failure of improper force None critical door monitoring system periodic inspections / maintenance passengers / failure door system effect to passenger personal not / personal ensured pinched passenger None critical door monitoring system periodic inspections / maintenance

operation failure inadequate pinched passenger None critical door monitoring system operational procedure process

A9-4 of A9-6 Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

System Level ID 2nd Level Hazard Cause Accident Effect after accident Severity Functional safety measurements other safety measurements Hazard 9 electrical hazards inadequate track workers (incl. electrocution fire (not meaning accident) critical _ special requirements for operation / distance to machines) in track signalling overhead line third party in track electrocution fire (not meaning accident) critical _ fencing, information

third party on electrocution fire (not meaning accident) critical _ fencing, information bridges overtrack 10 chemical hazards thightness of subsystem- / emission of pollution, intoxication marginal _ periodic inspections / maintenance vehicle component failure dangerous goods subsystems / (e.g. hydraulic (e.g. cooling components not system, electrical medium, oil etc.), ensured power system etc.) explosion

thightness of subsystem- / emission of pollution, intoxication marginal _ periodic inspections / maintenance infrastructure component failure dangerous goods subsystems / (e.g. hydraulic (e.g. cooling components not system, electrical medium, oil etc.), ensured power system etc.) explosion

11 structural integrity thightness of subsystem- / improper force None critical _ periodic inspections / maintenance. of vehicle vehicle component failure effect to passenger subsystems / subsystems / (e.g. pneumatic / personal / third components not components not system) party ensured ensured thightness of subsystem- / improper force None critical _ periodic inspections / maintenance infrastructure component failure effect to passenger subsystems / (e.g. pneumatic / personal / third components not system) party ensured 12 other hazards disperse of ballast high speed and ice improper force None critical _ _ on the train effect to personal / third party adeqaute noise inadeqaute noise noise limit None marginal _ periodic inspections / maintenance level not ensured protection exceeded

A9-5 of A9-6 Annex 9 Subject 2 RAC-TS HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

THR (without THR (with ID System Level Hazard Severity RAC-TS statement consideration of risk Risk reduction (credible / immediate potential) consideration of risk reduction factors) reduction factors)

1 guidance of vehicle not catastrophic Hazard partially related to functional 1*10-9 1/h tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd. ensured safety aspects, RAC-TS partially the technical solution applicable 2 vehicle´s stability not catastrophic Hazard not related to functional n.a. _ n.a. ensured safety aspects, RAC-TS not applicable 3 adequate forward ordering catastrophic Hazard related to functional safety 1*10-9 1/h tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd. not ensured aspects, RAC-TS applicable the technical solution

4 inadequate braking catastrophic Hazard partially related to functional 1*10-9 1/h tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd. safety aspects, RAC-TS partially the technical solution applicable 5 objects / obstacle in or catastrophic Hazard partially related to functional 1*10-9 1/h tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd. besides track safety aspects, RAC-TS partially the technical solution applicable 6 loss of fire prevention catastrophic Hazard related to functional safety 1*10-9 1/h tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd. aspects, RAC-TS applicable the technical solution

7 adequate evacuation of catastrophic Hazard not related to functional n.a. _ n.a. passengers in case of safety aspects, RAC-TS not emergency not ensured applicable 8 safe entry / exit of critical Hazard related to functional safety 1*10-8 1/h tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd. passengers / personal not aspects, RAC-TS applicable the technical solution ensured 9 electrical hazards critical Hazard not related to functional n.a. _ n.a. safety aspects, RAC-TS not applicable 10 chemical hazards marginal Hazard not related to functional n.a. _ n.a. safety aspects, RAC-TS not applicable 11 structural integrity of critical Hazard not related to functional n.a. _ n.a. vehicle subsystems / safety aspects, RAC-TS not components not ensured applicable 12 other hazards critical Hazard not related to functional n.a. _ n.a. safety aspects, RAC-TS not applicable

A9-6 of A9-6 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model

Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Crystal Ball Report - Custom Simulation started on 2/8/2011 at 14:00:55 Simulation stopped on 2/8/2011 at 14:02:10

Run preferences: Number of trials run 10'000 Monte Carlo Random seed Precision control on Confidence level 95.00%

Run statistics: Total running time (sec) 74.88 Trials/second (average) 134 Random numbers per sec 12'019

Crystal Ball data: Assumptions 90 Correlations 0 Correlated groups 0 Decision variables 0 Forecasts 5

A10-1 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecasts

Worksheet: [S3_Model_PSL_Uncert_110208.xls]Inputs and results

Forecast: Economic consequences S1, 25 Years Cell: W127

Summary: Certainty level is 90.00% Certainty range is from -3518.48 to 3944.48 Entire range is from -8765.40 to 11823.36 Base case is 174.29 After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 22.55

Statistics: Forecast values Trials 10'000 Mean 172.04 Median 184.27 Mode --- Standard Deviation 2255.07 Variance 5085330.61 Skewness 0.0248 Kurtosis 3.20 Coeff. of Variability 13.11 Minimum -8765.40 Maximum 11823.36 Range Width 20588.76 Mean Std. Error 22.55

A10-2 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Economic consequences S1, 25 Years (cont'd) Cell: W127

Percentiles: Forecast values 0% -8765.40 10% -2637.67 20% -1703.11 30% -989.98 40% -394.96 50% 184.05 60% 716.53 70% 1305.74 80% 2031.25 90% 3044.11 100% 11823.36

A10-3 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Economic consequences S2, 25 Years Cell: X127

Summary: Certainty level is 90.00% Certainty range is from -3342.27 to 4053.96 Entire range is from -9939.67 to 8432.76 Base case is 354.53 After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 22.63

Statistics: Forecast values Trials 10'000 Mean 337.66 Median 313.54 Mode --- Standard Deviation 2263.00 Variance 5121164.77 Skewness -0.0020 Kurtosis 3.22 Coeff. of Variability 6.70 Minimum -9939.67 Maximum 8432.76 Range Width 18372.44 Mean Std. Error 22.63

A10-4 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Economic consequences S2, 25 Years (cont'd) Cell: X127

Percentiles: Forecast values 0% -9939.67 10% -2539.27 20% -1519.19 30% -795.19 40% -247.90 50% 313.31 60% 903.89 70% 1522.55 80% 2209.05 90% 3185.94 100% 8432.76

A10-5 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Total Safety S0, 25 Years Cell: V118

Summary: Certainty level is 90.00% Certainty range is from 4 454 to 5 461 Entire range is from 4 092 to 6 938 Base case is 4 897 After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 3

Statistics: Forecast values Trials 10'000 Mean 4'913 Median 4'889 Mode --- Standard Deviation 309 Variance 95'457 Skewness 0.6218 Kurtosis 4.07 Coeff. of Variability 0.0629 Minimum 4'092 Maximum 6'938 Range Width 2'846 Mean Std. Error 3

A10-6 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Total Safety S0, 25 Years (cont'd) Cell: V118

Percentiles: Forecast values 0% 4'092 10% 4'540 20% 4'653 30% 4'740 40% 4'815 50% 4'889 60% 4'963 70% 5'045 80% 5'149 90% 5'316 100% 6'938

A10-7 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Total Safety S1, 25 Years Cell: W118

Summary: Certainty level is 90.00% Certainty range is from 4 442 to 5 436 Entire range is from 3 976 to 7 219 Base case is 4 883 After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 3

Statistics: Forecast values Trials 10'000 Mean 4'900 Median 4'875 Mode --- Standard Deviation 309 Variance 95'445 Skewness 0.5832 Kurtosis 4.05 Coeff. of Variability 0.0631 Minimum 3'976 Maximum 7'219 Range Width 3'243 Mean Std. Error 3

A10-8 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Total Safety S1, 25 Years (cont'd) Cell: W118

Percentiles: Forecast values 0% 3'976 10% 4'527 20% 4'641 30% 4'727 40% 4'802 50% 4'875 60% 4'950 70% 5'036 80% 5'146 90% 5'298 100% 7'219

A10-9 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Total Safety S2, 25 Years Cell: X118

Summary: Certainty level is 90.00% Certainty range is from 4 424 to 5 429 Entire range is from 3 948 to 6 974 Base case is 4 868 After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 3

Statistics: Forecast values Trials 10'000 Mean 4'886 Median 4'861 Mode --- Standard Deviation 310 Variance 95'965 Skewness 0.5925 Kurtosis 3.94 Coeff. of Variability 0.0634 Minimum 3'948 Maximum 6'974 Range Width 3'027 Mean Std. Error 3

A10-10 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Forecast: Total Safety S2, 25 Years (cont'd) Cell: X118

Percentiles: Forecast values 0% 3'948 10% 4'518 20% 4'628 30% 4'710 40% 4'784 50% 4'861 60% 4'938 70% 5'020 80% 5'128 90% 5'292 100% 6'974

End of Forecasts

A10-11 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumptions

Worksheet: [S3_Model_PSL_Uncert_110208.xls]Inputs and results

Assumption: Air safety (pass) Cell: E14

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.10 (=E14) Std. Dev. 0.00 (=E14*0.03333)

Assumption: Air safety change (pass) Cell: H14

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 6.8% (=H14*0.9) Maximum 8.3% (=H14*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Bus safety (other) Cell: K14

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 5.15 (=K14) Std. Dev. 0.17 (=K14*0.0333)

A10-12 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Bus safety (pass) Cell: E12

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.93 (=E12) Std. Dev. 0.03 (=E12*0.03333)

Assumption: Bus safety change (other) Cell: N14

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum -4.8% (=N14*1.1) Maximum -4.0% (=N14*0.9) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Bus safety change (pass) Cell: H12

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.0% (=H12*0.9) Maximum 3.6% (=H12*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-13 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Car safety (driver and pass) Cell: E10

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 2.81 (=E10) Std. Dev. 0.09 (=E10*0.03333)

Assumption: Car safety (other) Cell: K10

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.96 (=K10) Std. Dev. 0.32 (=K10*0.3333)

Assumption: Car safety change (other) Cell: N10

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.7% (=N10*0.9) Maximum 4.5% (=N10*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-14 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Car safety change (pass) Cell: H10

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.0% (=H10*0.9) Maximum 3.6% (=H10*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Air bpkm Cell: K57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 4.41 (=K57) Std. Dev. 0.15 (=K57*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Air bpkm change Cell: K72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 4.9% (=K72*0.9) Maximum 5.9% (=K72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-15 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bpkm Cell: I57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 4.28 (=I57) Std. Dev. 0.14 (=I57*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bpkm change Cell: I72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.3% (=I72*0.9) Maximum 0.3% (=I72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bvkm Cell: J57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.68 (=J57) Std. Dev. 0.02 (=J57*0.0333)

A10-16 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bvkm change Cell: J72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum -4.1% (=J72*1.1) Maximum -3.3% (=J72*0.9) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bpkm Cell: G57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 55.53 (=G57) Std. Dev. 1.85 (=G57*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bpkm change Cell: G72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 2.1% (=G72*0.9) Maximum 2.5% (=G72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-17 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bvkm Cell: H57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 32.38 (=H57) Std. Dev. 1.08 (=H57*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bvkm change Cell: H72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.3% (=H72*0.9) Maximum 4.1% (=H72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bpkm Cell: E57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.50 (=E57) Std. Dev. 0.02 (=E57*0.0333)

A10-18 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bpkm change Cell: E72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.5% (=E72*0.9) Maximum 0.6% (=E72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bvkm Cell: F57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.01 (=F57) Std. Dev. 0.00 (=F57*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bvkm change Cell: F72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.4% (=F72*0.9) Maximum 0.5% (=F72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-19 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Truck bvkm Cell: L57

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 9.37 (=L57) Std. Dev. 0.31 (=L57*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Truck bvkm change Cell: L72

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.7% (=L72*0.9) Maximum 4.5% (=L72*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Air bpkm change Cell: K75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 4.9% (=K75*0.9) Maximum 5.9% (=K75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-20 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Bus bpkm change Cell: I75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.3% (=I75*0.9) Maximum 0.3% (=I75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Bus bvkm change Cell: J75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum -4.1% (=J75*1.1) Maximum -3.3% (=J75*0.9) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Car bpkm change Cell: G75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 2.1% (=G75*0.9) Maximum 2.5% (=G75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-21 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Car bvkm change Cell: H75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.3% (=H75*0.9) Maximum 4.1% (=H75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Train bpkm change Cell: E75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.5% (=E75*0.9) Maximum 0.6% (=E75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Train bvkm change Cell: F75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.4% (=F75*0.9) Maximum 0.5% (=F75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-22 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Truck bvkm change Cell: L75

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.7% (=L75*0.9) Maximum 4.5% (=L75*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S0 Air bpkm Cell: K55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 4.48 (=K55) Std. Dev. 0.15 (=K55*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S0 Air bpkm change Cell: K70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 4.9% (=K70*0.9) Maximum 5.9% (=K70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-23 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bpkm Cell: I55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 4.34 (=I55) Std. Dev. 0.14 (=I55*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bpkm change Cell: I70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.3% (=I70*0.9) Maximum 0.3% (=I70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bvkm Cell: J55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.69 (=J55) Std. Dev. 0.02 (=J55*0.0333)

A10-24 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bvkm change Cell: J70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum -4.1% (=J70*1.1) Maximum -3.3% (=J70*0.9) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bpkm Cell: G55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 55.78 (=G55) Std. Dev. 1.86 (=G55*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bpkm change Cell: G70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 2.1% (=G70*0.9) Maximum 2.5% (=G70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-25 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bvkm Cell: H55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 32.53 (=H55) Std. Dev. 1.08 (=H55*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bvkm change Cell: H70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.3% (=H70*0.9) Maximum 4.1% (=H70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bpkm Cell: E55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 2.99 (=E55) Std. Dev. 0.10 (=E55*0.0333)

A10-26 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bpkm change Cell: E70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 1.4% (=E70*0.9) Maximum 1.7% (=E70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bvkm Cell: F55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.05 (=F55) Std. Dev. 0.00 (=F55*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bvkm change Cell: F70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 2.0% (=F70*0.9) Maximum 2.4% (=F70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-27 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S0 Truck bvkm Cell: L55

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 9.45 (=L55) Std. Dev. 0.31 (=L55*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S0 Truck bvkm change Cell: L70

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.7% (=L70*0.9) Maximum 4.5% (=L70*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S1 Train bpkm Cell: E58

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 2.93 (=E58) Std. Dev. 0.10 (=E58*0.0333)

A10-28 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S1 Train bpkm change Cell: E73

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 1.4% (=E73*0.9) Maximum 1.7% (=E73*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S1 Train bvkm Cell: F58

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.05 (=F58) Std. Dev. 0.00 (=F58*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S1 Train bvkm change Cell: F73

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 2.0% (=F73*0.9) Maximum 2.4% (=F73*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-29 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S2 Train bpkm Cell: E61

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 2.87 (=E61) Std. Dev. 0.10 (=E61*0.0333)

Assumption: Common rail S2 Train bpkm change Cell: E76

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 1.4% (=E76*0.9) Maximum 1.7% (=E76*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common rail S2 Train bvkm Cell: F61

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.05 (=F61) Std. Dev. 0.00 (=F61*0.0333)

A10-30 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common rail S2 Train bvkm change Cell: F76

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 2.0% (=F76*0.9) Maximum 2.4% (=F76*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common Rail safety change S0 (other) Cell: N21

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.2% (=N21*0.9) Maximum 3.9% (=N21*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common Rail safety change S0 (pass) Cell: H21

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.2% (=H21*0.9) Maximum 3.9% (=H21*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-31 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common Rail safety change S1 (other) Cell: N30

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.2% (=N30*0.9) Maximum 3.9% (=N30*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common Rail safety change S1 (other) (N39) Cell: N39

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.2% (=N39*0.9) Maximum 3.9% (=N39*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common Rail safety change S1 (pass) Cell: H30

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.2% (=H30*0.9) Maximum 3.9% (=H30*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-32 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common Rail safety change S2 (pass) Cell: H39

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.2% (=H39*0.9) Maximum 3.9% (=H39*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Common Rail safety S0 (other) Cell: K21

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 176.43 (=K21) Std. Dev. 5.88 (=K21*0.0333)

Assumption: Common Rail safety S0 (pass) Cell: E21

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.23 (=E21) Std. Dev. 0.01 (=E21*0.03333)

A10-33 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common Rail safety S1 (other) Cell: K30

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 176.43 (=K30) Std. Dev. 5.88 (=K30*0.0333)

Assumption: Common Rail safety S1 (pass) Cell: E30

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.23 (=E30) Std. Dev. 0.01 (=E30*0.03333)

Assumption: Common Rail safety S2 (other) Cell: K39

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 176.43 (=K39) Std. Dev. 5.88 (=K39*0.0333)

Assumption: Common Rail safety S2 (pass) Cell: E39

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.23 (=E39) Std. Dev. 0.01 (=E39*0.03333)

A10-34 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Common Rail safety S2 (pass) (cont'd) Cell: E39

Assumption: Discount rate (%) Cell: F85

Custom distribution with parameters: Value Probability 3.5% 0.33 4.5% 0.33 5.5% 0.33

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S1 (other) Cell: N32

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.5% (=N32*0.9) Maximum 0.6% (=N32*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-35 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S1 (pass) Cell: H32

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.5% (=H32*0.9) Maximum 0.6% (=H32*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S2 (other) Cell: N41

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.5% (=N41*0.9) Maximum 0.6% (=N41*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S2 (pass) Cell: H41

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 0.5% (=H41*0.9) Maximum 0.6% (=H41*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

A10-36 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S1 (others) Cell: K32

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 123.50 (=K32) Std. Dev. 4.11 (=K32*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S1 (pass) Cell: E32

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.23 (=E32) Std. Dev. 0.01 (=E32*0.03333)

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S2 (others) Cell: K41

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 123.50 (=K41) Std. Dev. 4.11 (=K41*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S2 (pass) Cell: E41

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.23 (=E41) Std. Dev. 0.01 (=E41*0.03333)

A10-37 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S2 (pass) (cont'd) Cell: E41

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Air bpkm Cell: K60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 4.35 (=K60) Std. Dev. 0.14 (=K60*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Bus bpkm Cell: I60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 4.22 (=I60) Std. Dev. 0.14 (=I60*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Bus bvkm Cell: J60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.67 (=J60) Std. Dev. 0.02 (=J60*0.0333)

A10-38 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Bus bvkm (cont'd) Cell: J60

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Car bpkm Cell: G60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 55.28 (=G60) Std. Dev. 1.84 (=G60*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Car bvkm Cell: H60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 32.24 (=H60) Std. Dev. 1.07 (=H60*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Train bpkm Cell: E60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 1.00 (=E60) Std. Dev. 0.03 (=E60*0.0333)

A10-39 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Train bpkm (cont'd) Cell: E60

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Train bvkm Cell: F60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 0.01 (=F60) Std. Dev. 0.00 (=F60*0.0333)

Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Truck bvkm Cell: L60

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 9.28 (=L60) Std. Dev. 0.31 (=L60*0.0333)

Assumption: Truck safety (other) Cell: K12

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 1.96 (=K12) Std. Dev. 0.07 (=K12*0.0333)

A10-40 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Assumption: Truck safety (other) (cont'd) Cell: K12

Assumption: Truck safety change (other) Cell: N12

Beta distribution with parameters: Minimum 3.9% (=N12*0.9) Maximum 4.7% (=N12*1.1) Alpha 2 Beta 3

Assumption: Value of Statistical Life (VSL) Cell: F82

Lognormal distribution with parameters: Mean 20.00 (=F82) Std. Dev. 0.67 (=F82*0.0333)

End of Assumptions

A10-41 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Sensitivity Charts

A10-42 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

A10-43 of A10-44 Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

End of Sensitivity Charts

A10-44 of A10-44 HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Annex

Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport safety

Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Inputs

Safety information - Assign input values in grey cells.

For all scenarios

Passenger Safety (f/bpkm) Expected annual passenger safety change Safety for others (f/bvkm) Expected annual safety change others

Car safety (driver and pass) 2.81 Car safety change (pass) 3.3% Car safety (other) 0.96 Car safety change (other) 4.1%

Bus safety (pass) 0.93 Bus safety change (pass) 3.3% Truck safety (other) 1.96 Truck safety change (other) 4.3%

Air safety (pass) 0.10 Air safety change (pass) 7.5% Bus safety (other) 5.15 Bus safety change (other) -4.4%

Scenario 0

Passenger Safety (f/bpkm) Expected annual passenger safety change Safety for others (f/bvkm) Expected annual safety change others

Conventional Rail safety S0 0.23 Conventional Rail safety 3.5% Conventional Rail safety 176.43 Conventional Rail safety 3.5% (pass) change S0 (pass) S0 (other) change S0 (other)

Scenario 1 - Combined tracks

Passenger Safety (f/bpkm) Expected annual passenger safety change Safety for others (f/bvkm) Expected annual safety change others

Conventional Rail safety S1 0.23 Conventional Rail safety 3.5% Conventional Rail safety 176.43 Conventional Rail safety 3.5% (pass) change S1 (pass) S1 (others) change S1 (other) HSR Combined Tracks safety S1 0.23 HSR Combined Tracks safety 0.5% HSR Combined Tracks 123.50 HSR Combined Tracks safety 0.5% (pass) change S1 (pass) safety S1 (others) change S1 (other)

Scenario 2 - Separate tracks

Passenger Safety (f/bpkm) Expected annual passenger safety change Safety for others (f/bvkm) Expected annual safety change others Conventional Rail safety S2 0.23 Conventional Rail safety 3.5% Conventional Rail safety 176.43 Conventional Rail safety 3.5% (pass) change S2 (pass) S2 (others) change S2 (other) HSR Separate Tracks safety S2 0.23 HSR Separate Tracks safety 0.5% HSR Separate Tracks 123.50 HSR Separate Tracks safety 0.5% (pass) change S2 (pass) safety S2 (others) change S2 (other)

A11-1 of A11-5 Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis Inputs Transport information - Assign expected transport values in billion passenger km (bpkm) or billion vehicle kilometers (bvkm) in grey cells for first year in time horizon.

Train Car Bus Air Truck Scenarios Passenger km Vehicle km Passenger km Vehicle km Passenger km Vehicle km Passenger km Vehicle km

Scenario 0 (Present) Conventional rail 2.99 0.05 55.78 32.53 4.34 0.69 4.48 9.45

Scenario 1 (Combined tracks) HSR + Conventional rail 0.50 0.01 55.53 32.38 4.28 0.68 4.41 9.37 Conventional rail 2.93 0.05

Scenario 2 (Separate tracks) HSR Separate tracks 1.00 0.01 55.28 32.24 4.22 0.67 4.35 9.28 Conventional rail 2.87 0.05

Transport information - Assign expected annual change in transport values (%)

Train Car Bus Air Truck Scenarios Passenger km Vehicle km Passenger km Vehicle km Passenger km Vehicle km Passenger km Vehicle km

Scenario 0 (Present) Conventional rail 1.5% 2.2% 2.3% 3.7% 0.3% -3.7% 5.4% 4.1%

Scenario 1 (Combined tracks) HSR + Conventional rail 0.5% 0.5% 2.3% 3.7% 0.3% -3.7% 5.4% 4.1% Conventional rail 1.5% 2.2%

Scenario 2 (Separate tracks) HSR Separate tracks 0.5% 0.5% 2.3% 3.7% 0.3% -3.7% 5.4% 4.1% Conventional rail 1.5% 2.2%

Economic information

Value of statistical life, VSL (MNOK) 20

Discount rate (%) 4.5%

A11-2 of A11-5 Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Results

Current societal transport safety Predicted societal transport safety (no of fatalities) Safety level Safety (fatalities per development year) (%) Time horizon (years) S0 S1 S2 Railway transport 25 years 4'897 4'883 4'868 Passengers 0.68 3.5% 40 years 7'310 7'291 7'271 Others 8.00 3.5% 60 years 10'038 10'015 9'992 Road transport 100 years 14'198 14'177 14'155 Car Passengers 156.73 3.3% Others 31.24 4.1% Bus Passengers 4.04 3.3% Others 3.53 -4.4% Truck Others 18.51 4.3% Air transport Passengers 0.45 7.5% Total 223.17 3.1%

Current societal transport safety Total fatalities of scenarios

250.00 14'198 14'177 14'155 223.17 14'000

200.00 12'000

156.73 10'000 150.00 25 years 40 years 8'000 60 years 100.00 100 years

Total fatalities 6'000 4'897 4'883 4'868 Annual Fatalities 4'000 50.00 31.24 18.51 2'000 8.00 0.68 4.04 3.53 0.45 0.00 0

Total S0 S1 S2

Rail Othes CarOthers Bus Others Scenarios Truck Others Rail Passengers Car Passengers Bus Passengers Air Passengers

A11-3 of A11-5 Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Results

Change in predicted societal transport safety (no of fatalities) Economic consequences of societal transport safety change (MNOK)

Time horizon (years) Change S1 Change S2 Time horizon (years) S0 S1 S2 25 years 14 28 25 years 0 174 355 40 years 19 38 40 years 0 198 404 60 years 22 46 60 years 0 206 421 100 years 21 43 100 years 0 206 421

Change in predicted societal transport safety, Economic consequences (net present value) of scenarios S1 and S2 compared to S0

450 50

45 400

40 350

35 300 25 years 25 years 30 40 years 250 40 years 25 60 years 60 years MNOK 200 100 years 100 years 20

Change in fatalities 150 15

10 100

5 50

0 0 S1 S2 S1 S2 Scenarios Scenarios

A11-4 of A11-5 Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II Technical and Safety Analysis

Uncertainty analysis

Uncertainty analysis, Total Safety, T = 25 Years Uncertainty analysis, Economic consequences, T = 25 Years

6'000 5000.00

4'889 4'875 4'861 4000.00 5'000 3000.00

4'000 2000.00

5-percentile 5-percentile 3'000 1000.00 Median Median 95-percentile 0.00 MNOK 95-percentile Fatalities 2'000 S1 S2 -1000.00

1'000 -2000.00

-3000.00 0 S0 S1 S2 -4000.00 Scenarios Scenarios

A11-5 of A11-5

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