Swedish Neutrality and Policy of Neutrality The Second World War and the Ensuing Peacetime By Rolf H. Lindholm*

Introduction Swedish neutrality has seldom been the subject of scientific juridical study. This can seem rather striking, bearing in mind that the policy of neutrality has for so long been, and still is, the principal course of Swedish foreign policy. The situation is quite different in Switzerland which has a much longer tradition of neutrality, but also in Austria which became a neutral state in 1955. Switzerland and Austria are permanently neutral states. Sometimes is also described as such a state. There is, however, an important difference in so far as Swedish neutrality is not anchored in international law, nor in munici- pal law. To this must be added that the Swedish parliament has on several occa- sions rejected motions for declaring Sweden permanently neutral. For this reason, as far as Sweden is concerned it is more correct to speak of de facto permanent neutrality. The main course of our foreign policy is usually described as "non-participation in alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in the event of war." Sweden has had peace since 1814, but this does not mean that the policy of neutrality is as old as that. It is hardly possible to speak of a policy of neutrality as a matter of principle before 1864. Sweden's neutrality did not make its ap- pearance as a fixed policy at a particular time in history. It has rather evolved slowly and by stages. Many neutral states were dragged into the world wars, and there was little room for neutrality in the school of thought of collective security. The word "neutrality" does not appear either in the Covenant of the or in the Charter of the United Nations. It has even been maintained that collec- tive security and neutrality are irreconcilable. Consequently, neutrality as such gives no reliable protection against war, and it is sometimes looked upon as "disloyal". The has, however, again led to a better comprehension of neutral states. The neutrality of Austria gained general recognition in 1955, and Austria as a permanent neutral state was admitted to membership of the United Nations in the same year - without objections and without special treatment. The right to neutrality is nowadays endorsed by the Final Act of 1 August 1975 from the Con- ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is stated in the first of the ten principles: "they (the participating States) also have the right to neutrality."

Swedish neutrality during the Second World War There are many historical accounts of Swedish conduct during the Second

LL.D. , LundUniversity (Sweden), Counsellor at the PermanentMission of Swedento the United Nations,New York.

133 World War. The standard work is "Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War" by Wilhelm M. Carlgren, London 1977. The main objective of policy was to keep Sweden out of the war. The policy of neutrality was a means for the realization of this aim. On the whole it was efficient, but on some occasions the means had to be adapted to the more im- portant objective. Paradoxically enough, it happened a few times that the risk of war was considered greater if the Government clung to neutrality than if it departed from it. In 1940, after the cessation of fighting in Norway, Sweden gave in to German demands for transit through Sweden. This applied to war material and soldiers on leave but in regard to the so-called horseshoe traffic between Storlien and Riksgrdnsen, also to troops. Germany infringed on Swedish neutrality by de- manding and carrying out the transits, and Sweden violated neutrality by allow- ing them. Attempts were made to interest the Germans in transits through Swedish ter- ritorial waters instead of railway transports. Sea transits were considered irre- proachable from the point of view of neutrality law, as distinct from railway transits. An understanding was reached on the passage of German troop-ships to a certain extent within Swedish territorial waters, but the transits by rail con- tinued. On the same day as Germany attacked the - 22 June 1941 - a list,of German demands was handed over to Foreign Minister Christian Gun- ther. The most important and most urgent demand concerned the transporta- tion of one division of German troops from the Oslo region to Finland on the Swedish railways. Opinions differed within the Government and the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. The Government met for final deliberations in the evening of 24 June. The Prime Minister, , stated that his parliamentary faction was willing to say no, if the other factions took the same stand. The ensuing discussion was at intervals heated and ended with the resolution of the Prime Minister that, as unanimity within the Government and between the par- ties could not be reached on a refusal of the demand for the transit of troops, he interpreted the situation so that this demand should be acceded to. The Government was fully aware of the fact that this meant a departure from neu- trality. When Foreign Minister Gunther informed the German negotiator of the decision of the Government he pointed out that the permission concerned this single case and created no precedent. The division, which is usually referred to as Division Engelbrecht after its commander, started its transit during the night of 25-26 June. When the transit was completed by the middle of July a little more than 15,000 men - against originally stated 18,000 - had been transported through Sweden from Oslo to TorneA. By way of comparison it can be mentioned that Germany engaged more than three million men in the east. Soon after, on 31 July, a new German demand was presented for the trans- portation of a division through Sweden, this time from Germany to Finland. The next day, Foreign Minister Giinther communicated the absolute refusal of the Government to the German negotiator. Around the turn of the month Oc- tober-November the Germans tried to get permission for the transit of soldiers on leave as well as for limited troop transports from Germany to Finland (and

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