DOCSLIB.ORG

Constitutional Peace, Political Order, Or Good Government? Organizing Scholarly Views on the 2008 Prorogation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Constitutional Peace, Political Order, Or Good Government? Organizing Scholarly Views on the 2008 Prorogation Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 102-125 Constitutional Peace, Political Order, or Good Government? Organizing Scholarly Views on the 2008 Prorogation Johannes Wheeldon Norwich University - Email address: [email protected] Abstract: This paper reports the views of 25 constitutional scholars on the 2008 prorogation. A large majority of scholars agree that the Governor General had discretion in 2008 to refuse the Prime Minister. Most hold that the 2008 prorogation harmed principles of responsible government, and a majority favour the development of a cabinet manual to outline roles and responsibilities to avoid future crises. Based on the survey data, I propose four unique schools of thought on this event, and consider how future research can test, assess, and further refine these findings. Keywords: Prorogation; Canada; Constitutional scholars; Mixed methods Résumé: Cet article rapporte les points de vue de 25 constitutionnalistes sur la prorogation de 2008. Une vaste majorité convient que la Gouverneure Générale disposait de l'autorité de la refuser au Premier Ministre. La plupart soutiennent que la prorogation de 2008 a mis à mal le principe de responsabilité gouvernementale, et la majorité favorise la mise sur pied d'un "manuel de cabinet" précisant les rôles et responsabilités, de manière à éviter de futures crises. Sur la base des données de l'enquête, l'auteur montre qu'existent 4 écoles de pensée distinctes sur l'événement, et considère comment les recherches futures peuvent tester, évaluer, et raffiner ces résultats. Mots-clés: prorogation, Canada, constitutionnalistes, approches variées Acknowledgements: I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the editors of CPSR, and thank those who participated in this project, and especially those who waived anonymity. The assistance, arguments, and interactions by Peter Russell, Phillip Lagasse, Andrew Heard, and Thomas Hall have been especially useful in this project. 102 Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 102-125 Introduction This paper presents results of original research that suggests a fourth Nearly 5 years to the day of the 2008 group exists. Data drawn from a purposeful prorogation of Parliament, Conservative MP sample of 25 constitutional scholars suggest Michael Chong introduced a private that a majority of those surveyed argue that member's bill that would, if passed, shift the Governor General’s discretion to refuse power away from party leaders and towards prime ministerial advice is limited to members of Parliament and their party ensuring any such advice is given by a prime caucuses. Chong’s bill cannot be seen as minster whose government holds (and is divorced from the view that Canada’s seen to hold) the confidence of the House. In system of parliamentary democracy looks this paper, I assess support for key neither particularly parliamentary nor very propositions on this event, discuss areas of democratic (Aucoin, Jarvis & Turnbull, consensus and disagreement, and lay the 2011). In 2008, a motivated prime minster groundwork to better define existing views was able to silence the majority of those in by applying an analytic approach known as the House of Commons, who represented a the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses majority of the Canadian electorate, by (ACH).1 Against the idea that avoiding a scheduled confidence vote. While divisions within the field undermine the the Governor General ultimately granted his value of survey-based research or that only a request for prorogation, her decision resulted few views count in constitutional in much hand wringing among scholars and scholarship, in this paper I model a means to exposed the general ignorance many compare and contrast support for peer- Canadians have about their system of reviewed propositions published between government (Wheeldon, 2011). 2008 and 2012. The findings suggest far The wisdom of refusing the Prime more consensus than is often assumed. A Minister’s advice in 2008 remains contested. large majority agree that the Governor Andrew Heard argues that constitutional General had discretion in 2008 to refuse the scholars fall into three general categories Prime Minister. Most hold that the 2008 (2012: 88-90). The first holds that the prorogation harmed principles of responsible Governor General has very limited government, and all but a few scholars discretion, and can only constitutionally surveyed favour the development of a refuse cabinet advice when the government cabinet manual to outline roles and has formally and explicitly lost the responsibilities to avoid similar crises in the confidence of the House (Brun, 2008). The future. second holds that the Governor General has Beyond demonstrating a mixed constitutional authority to refuse a prime methods approach to assess support within minister’s advice but must be wary of the political and constitutional costs of a 1 confrontation between the Crown and a duly This paper is part of a larger effort I have dubbed the Prorogation project. This paper focuses on the elected government (Franks, 2009; establishment of four schools of thought on the 2008 Monahan, 2012). Third and finally, some prorogation. Future work examines in more detail the hold that the Governor General has a views of constitutional scholars who waived broader discretionary role to assess the anonymity through the research, and compares the formation, popularity, and political viability views of journalists, commentators, and constitutional scholars. This project has led to of any alternative government (Hogg, 2010). another effort to survey subject matter experts on the role of governor general in the formation of government in Canada. 103 Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 102-125 the sample, the paper contributes to existing prorogation is no longer a reserve power of literature by proposing that four main the Governor General based on schools of thought exist. These schools may constitutional precedents including historical assist larger and longer-term empirical developments in Canada, "received" English projects exploring the views of Canadians practice, and contemporary practice in the on prorogation, executive power, and Commonwealth using the Westminster parliamentary democracy. model of Parliamentary (McWhinney, 2009: 3-5). Understanding the Constitutional Issues A related view is that while the of Prorogation in 2008 Governor General might possess constitutional authority in principle, he or In previous work, I have sought to she cannot normally act outside the advice review a wide variety of literature regarding of the political executive in practice. Citing the 2008 prorogation (Wheeldon, 2011). McWhinney (2009), and historian Barbara Since the publication of that paper, new Messamore (2011), MacDonald & Bowden, contributions have better defined some (2011: 15) attempt to link a request for positions and identified key debates (Aucoin prorogation in 1873 with the events in 2008 et al. 2011; Smith & Jackson, 2012; and conclude: “…it is unfathomable that a Twomey, 2011). It may be useful to governor general could ever refuse a prime organize existing literature based on three minister's request for prorogation.” In a criteria: the existence and nature of the reply to MacDonald and Bowden, Peter Governor General's discretion to prorogue; Russell (2011) argued that there could be the impact of prorogation on principles of little doubt that discretion to refuse prime responsible government; and options to ministerial advice existed both in principle guide efforts to address constitutional and practice. Indeed, even under the most confusion in Canada. limited historical view of Crown prerogative, the Governor General is Existence and Nature of the Governor reported to retain certain discretionary General's Discretion to Prorogue powers (Dawson, 1987: 189-194). Even among those who disagree It may be useful to establish once about the wisdom of the Governor General’s and for all how many scholars argue that the decision to prorogue Parliament in 2008, Governor General had no discretion in 2008 few established scholars doubt that to refuse the advice of a prime minister to Michaëlle Jean had the discretion, in both prorogue Parliament while a vote of principle and practice, to refuse the Prime confidence was pending. Of specific interest Minister’s request (Heard, 2012; Hogg, is the justification that the Prime Minister 2010; Monahan, 2012; Russell & Sossin, retained the formal confidence of the House 2009). Those who challenge this consensus (Brun, 2008), and that the events in 2008 have done so in a variety of venues and offer could not be considered an example of the several justifications for a limited view for ‘exceptional circumstances’ that would the role of the Crown related to activate the Governor General’s reserve prorogation.2 Ted McWhinney suggests that powers (Cameron, 2009). Others have suggested that the prorogation, based on the 1873 example, is no longer a reserve power, 2 These include Op/Eds in the popular press (Brun, 2008; Tremblay, 2008), personal blogs, and that well- either in principle (McWhinney, 2009) or in known venue for constitutional debates in Canada: practice (MacDonald & Bowden, 2011). A Twitter. 104 Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 102-125 related concern follows from the question of personal political judgement about the constitutional legitimacy. If the Crown political viability and acceptability of any retains the constitutional power to refuse
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Wednesday, March 23, 1994
    VOLUME 133 NUMBER 043 1st SESSION 35th PARLIAMENT OFFICIAL REPORT (HANSARD) Wednesday, March 23, 1994 Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent HOUSE OF COMMONS Wednesday, March 23, 1994 The House met at 2 p.m. anglophone and francophone families in Quebec has narrowed from 8.2 per cent to 1.9 per cent. _______________ The income gap can be closed, Mr. Speaker, but one has to Prayers conclude that federal policies are not a contributing factor. _______________ * * * [English] STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS CREDIT RATING [English] Mr. Jim Gouk (Kootenay West—Revelstoke): Mr. Speaker, BIODIVERSITY yesterday after the announcement of the downgrading of Cana- da’s rating for foreign currency debt, the Minister of Finance Hon. Charles Caccia (Davenport): Mr. Speaker, biodivers- stated it only affected a small portion of our total debt so it was ity means a richness of life as it surrounds us in nature. We must no big deal. preserve biodiversity because it is nature’s protection against catastrophes. The loss of biodiversity has serious implications Now the Bank of Canada has increased its key lending rate for life on earth. which undoubtedly will result in increased borrowing costs for Canadian consumers and businesses. It is also having an impact We have been told that since the beginning of the century 75 on the cost of government borrowing. per cent of crop diversity has been lost. This leaves us vulner- able. For example uniformity in corn crops could have resulted The budget did not address the deficit or debt. Now all in disaster when a severe blight threatened corn crops in the Canadians are starting to pay for this short–sightedness.
    [Show full text]
  • Wednesday, October 1, 1997
    CANADA VOLUME 135 S NUMBER 008 S 1st SESSION S 36th PARLIAMENT OFFICIAL REPORT (HANSARD) Wednesday, October 1, 1997 Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent CONTENTS (Table of Contents appears at back of this issue.) The House of Commons Debates are also available on the Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire at the followingaddress: http://www.parl.gc.ca 323 HOUSE OF COMMONS Wednesday, October 1, 1997 The House met at 2 p.m. Columbians are crying out for federal leadership and this govern- ment is failing them miserably. _______________ Nowhere is this better displayed than in the Liberals’ misman- Prayers agement of the Pacific salmon dispute over the past four years. The sustainability of the Pacific salmon fishery is at stake and the _______________ minister of fisheries sits on his hands and does nothing except criticize his own citizens. D (1400) Having witnessed the Tory government destroy the Atlantic The Speaker: As is our practice on Wednesday we will now sing fishery a few years ago, this government seems intent on doing the O Canada, and we will be led by the hon. member for Souris— same to the Pacific fishery. Moose Mountain. It is a simple case of Liberal, Tory, same old incompetent story. [Editor’s Note: Members sang the national anthem] This government had better wake up to the concerns of British Columbians. A good start would be to resolve the crisis in the _____________________________________________ salmon fishery before it is too late. * * * STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS TOM EDWARDS [English] Ms. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the outstanding municipal career of Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Discretion and the Reserve Powers of the Crown
    Discretion and the Reserve Powers of the Crown Peter H. Russell The decision of Governor General Michaëlle Jean to grant prorogation when requested by Prime Minister Harper in 2008 and 2009 led to considerable debate among students of Parliament as to the discretionary power of a governor general to reject advice of a prime minister. This article agrees with those who believe that Mme Jean did not err in acting on those specific requests but rejects the idea that it would violate constitutional convention for a governor general to ever refuse such a request from a prime minister. It further argues that in the Westminster system the monarch or her representative, in exercising any of the Crown’s legal powers in relation to Parliament, retains the right to reject a prime minister’s advice if following that advice would be highly detrimental to parliamentary democracy. That rationale applies equally to prorogation and to dissolution. recent article by Nicholas MacDonald and scholars, that “in this democratic age, the head of state James Bowden1 quite rightly stressed that or her representative should reject a prime minister’s Ain the democratic age the reserve powers advice only when doing so is necessary to protect of the Crown should be rarely used. They say that parliamentary democracy.” Those words of mine are “most scholars” agree that it is only under the “most quoted, with what I take to be approval, by MacDonald exceptional circumstances” that the governor general and Bowden in their article. The justification for the may reject the prime minister’s advice.
    [Show full text]
  • The Intermittent Sovereign
    THE INTERMITTENT SOVEREIGN I MAX RADIN It is impossible to escape from Austin, or rather from Aristotle, for the whole history of Western civilization is saturated with the concept of the state or community as composed of one part which gives commands and another which obeys them. Few people have held that all states were in fact so organized or that the existing states were developed in order to effectuate this concept. But most of those who have seriously thought about state organization have thought about it in these terms and a good deal of our state machinery has been formed under the influence of people who were trained to think so. And again since Aristotle, a favorite way of classifying states has been on a quantitative basis in respect of those who issued commands. This power might be wielded by one person or a few persons or a great many persons and the state was in con- sequence a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy. Plainly that is not the only way in which classification might be made. Instead of how many wielded this power, we might first of all ask what kind of persons, where they came from, and how they were selected. Or we might have in mind the purposes for which the power was exercised. All these classifications have in fact been used to some extent at different times. But however classified, the prevailing idea has nearly always been that the state is based on authority, that .its essential characteristic is the fact that, somewhere, some place, there are people who give orders and others who obey them.
    [Show full text]
  • Ouvrir La Voie Vers Un Compromis
    toi 7Ï - • •;» . *\ . >1 ' * /; I ■, , ! 5 „ist Itlfll ^11 âp |g||j il s ■ U ï;.5^ »8 I Ifêl / \ nB a K # GM / Professeur émérite Edward Watson McWhinney, Q.C. Président de la soixante-dixième session, Vancouver, 2001 Institute of International Law Yearbook Volume 69, 2000-2001 Session of Vancouver, 2001 Preparatory Work and Deliberations of the Institute The Institute of International Law Origins and organization Justitia et Pace Editions A. Pedone - 13, me Soufflot - Paris Institut de Droit international Annuaire Volume 69, 2000-2001 Session de Vancouver, 2001 Travaux préparatoires et délibérations de l’Institut L’Institut de Droit international Origines et organisation Justitia et Pace Editions A. Pedone - 13, rue Soufflot - Paris Adresses de l’Institut de Droit international http://www.idi-iil.org/ Secrétariat : Trésorerie : M. Christian Dominicé M. Fausto Pocar Secrétaire général Trésorier “La Vague” Tribunal Pénal International 33, route de Suisse B.P. 13888 CH-1297 Founex NL-2501 EW La Haye Tél. (+41-22) 776.0646 Tél. (+31-70) 512.5362 Fax. (+41-22) 776.9626 Fax. (+31-70) 512.5307 Mme Hans Wehberg M. Paul Mulhauser Conseillère Assistant du Trésorier 1, avenue de Frontenex 4, rue John Rehfous CH-1207 Genève CH-1208 Genève Tél. (+41-22) 736.2620 Tél. (+41-22) 700 7404 Fax. (+41-22) 700 7416 Mme Isabelle Gerardi E-mail: [email protected] et Mme Elisa A. Krähenbühl Assistantes - HEI Mme Emmy Lachenal 132, rue de Lausanne 12, rue du Vieux Moulin Boîte postale 36 CH-1213 Onex CH-1211 Genève 21 Tél. (+41-22) 792.4109 Tél. (+41-22) 908.5720 Fax.
    [Show full text]
  • Emeritus Professor Edward Mcwhinney QC
    Emeritus Professor Edward Watson McWhinney QC The title of Honorary Fellow of the University was conferred upon Emeritus Professor Edward Watson McWhinney QC at the Faculty of Law graduation ceremony held at 2.00pm on 21 May 2010. Deputy Chancellor Mr Alan Cameron AM conferring the honorary title upon Emeritus Professor McWhinney, photo, copyright Memento Photography. Citation Chancellor, I present to you Emeritus Professor Edward Watson McWhinney QC, of Vancouver Canada, for the award of Honorary Fellow of the University of Sydney. Edward Watson McWhinney was born in Sydney on 19 May 1924. After Studying at North Sydney Boys' High School he read law at the University of Sydney, graduating with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1949. While he was a student, Ted McWhinney as he was then known, was President of the Students Representative Council, (SRC), and also President of the Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association (SUPRA). Subsequently he completed doctoral studies in constitutional law and in international law at Yale University. Professor McWhinney became a truly outstanding legal academic, and held chairs at the University of Toronto, at McGill University in Montreal, at Indiana University, and of course at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver. He has been a visiting professor at very many universities, including the Sorbonne, the University of Heidelberg, the Meiji University in Tokyo, and the Hague Academy of International Law. Professor McWhinney has authored thirty books, co-authored fourteen other volumes and written very many learned articles. Professor McWhinney was also a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague from 1985 to 1991.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of Governing Council Meetings
    AGENDA FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING October 11 - 20, 1996 W X Opening Session 1. Address of welcome was given by Ted McWhinney Member of Parliament for Vancouver Quadra and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. 2. Remarks by representatives of contracting parties. 3. Remarks by the Chairman. 4. Announcements. 5. Keynote lecture by Prof. Timothy R. Parsons. Taking Stock of Biological Studies in the Ocean. Governing Council 1. Preliminary report on administration. 2. Relations with other international organizations and observers from such organizations. 3. Membership and observers from other countries. 4. Election of Chairman. 5. Appointment of Executive Secretary. 6. Rule change to allow past Chairman to serve as an ex officio participant of Council. 7. Report of Finance and Administration Committee. a) Audited accounts for financial year 1995 b) Estimated accounts for financial year 1996 c) Budget for financial year 1997 d) Forecast budget for financial year 1998 e) Trust Fund f) Working Capital Fund g) Home Leave Relocation Fund h) Other funds held i) Appointment of Finance and Administration Committee Chairman 8. Report and recommendations of Science Board. 9. PICES Perspectives. 3 10. Future meetings of the Organization and subsidiary bodies, including time and place for the 7th and 8th Annual Meetings. 11. Any other business. Access for cooperative research. 4 REPORT OF OPENING SESSION W X The meeting of October 14 was called to order Act that was avant-garde in international law by the Chairman, Dr. Warren S. Wooster, who terms. Though it drew upon the Conservation welcomed all delegates, observers and protocols attached to the proceedings of the researchers to the Fifth Annual Meeting.
    [Show full text]
  • Friday, April 29, 1994
    VOLUME 133 NUMBER 060 1st SESSION 35th PARLIAMENT OFFICIAL REPORT (HANSARD) Friday, April 29, 1994 Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent HOUSE OF COMMONS Friday, April 29, 1994 The House met at 10 a.m. showed that Canadians had lost complete faith in its approach to the situation. _______________ Because of the magnitude of Pearson airport and because it was the only profitable airport in the country, the Conservatives Prayers decided they would take a different approach. They entered into negotiations which were behind the scenes and not public tender _______________ to lease, sell and give away property belonging to the taxpayers. It seems ironic they would choose their friends and those of GOVERNMENT ORDERS other political parties to come forth and negotiate with the government behind the scenes. The agreement would allow them to take charge of one of the prime federal assets in this [English] country, hundreds of acres of property close to downtown Toronto. They would have a sweetheart lease on it for many PEARSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AGREEMENTS years which guaranteed them income, all at the taxpayers’ ACT expense. The House resumed from April 26 consideration of the motion When the situation blew up in their faces during the last that Bill C–22, an act respecting certain agreements concerning election this government decided it was time to do something the redevelopment and operation of terminals 1 and 2 at Lester about it and said to stop the deal from going forward. Of course B. Pearson International airport, be read the second time and the government did not heed the cries and concerns of the referred to a committee; and of the amendment; and of the electorate and the last government in its dying days signed a amendment to the amendment.
    [Show full text]
  • The English Constitution: Walter Bagehot
    The English Constitution: Walter Bagehot MILES TAYLOR Editor OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS ’ THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION W B was born in Langport, Somerset, in , the son of a banker. After taking BA and MA degrees from University College London he studied for the bar, and was called in . However, he decided to return home and join his father’s bank, devoting his leisure to contributing literary, historical and political reviews to the leading periodicals of the s. In he returned to London, succeeding his father-in-law as editor and director of the Economist. Three books ensured Bagehot’s reputation as one of the most distinguished and influential Victorian men-of-letters: The English Constitution (), published at the height of the debate over parliamentary reform; Physics and Politics (), his application of Darwinian ideas to political science; and Lombard Street (), a study of the City of London. Walter Bagehot died in . M T is a Lecturer in Modern History at King’s College, London. He is the author of The Decline of British Radicalism, – (Clarendon Press, ) and is currently completing a biography of the last Chartist leader, Ernest Jones. ’ For almost years Oxford World’s Classics have brought readers closer to the world’s great literature. Now with over titles–– from the ,-year-old myths of Mesopotamia to the twentieth century’s greatest novels–– the series makes available lesser-known as well as celebrated writing. The pocket-sized hardbacks of the early years contained introductions by Virginia Woolf, T. S. Eliot, Graham Greene, and other literary figures which enriched the experience of reading.
    [Show full text]
  • Court File No.: CV-18-00605134-00CP ONTARIO
    Court File No.: CV-18-00605134-00CP ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: MICKY GRANGER Plaintiff - and - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO Defendant Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 MOTION RECORD OF THE PLAINTIFF (CERTIFICATION) (Returnable November 27 & 28, 2019) VOLUME II of II March 18, 2019 GOLDBLATT PARTNERS LLP 20 Dundas Street West, Suite 1039 Toronto ON M5G 2C2 Jody Brown LS# 58844D Tel: 416-979-4251 / Fax: 416-591-7333 Email: [email protected] Geetha Philipupillai LS# 74741S Tel.: 416-979-4252 / Fax: 416-591-7333 Email: [email protected] Lawyers for the Plaintiff - 2 TO: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT - OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO Crown Law Office – Civil Law 720 Bay Street, 8th Floor Toronto, ON, M5G 2K1 Amy Leamen LS#: 49351R Tel: 416.326.4153 / Fax: 416.326.4181 Lawyers for the Defendant TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB DESCRIPTION PG # 1. Notice of Motion (Returnable November 27 and 28, 2019) 1 A. Appendix “A” – List of Common Issues 6 2. Affidavit of Micky Granger (Unsworn) 8 3. Affidavit of Tanya Atherfold-Desilva sworn March 18, 2019 12 A. Exhibit “A”: Office of the Independent Police Review Director – 20 Systemic Review Report dated July 2016 B. Exhibit “B”: Office of the Independent Police Review Director - 126 Executive Summary and Recommendations dated July 2016 C. Exhibit “C”: Office of the Independent Police Review Director – Terms of 142 Reference as of March 2019 D. Exhibit “D”: Affidavit of David D.J. Truax sworn August 30, 2016 146 E. Exhibit “E”: Centre of Forensic Investigators & Submitters Technical 155 Information Sheets effective April 2, 2015 F.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Right to Refuse Cabinet Advice As a Democratic Reform1 Tyler
    1 The Right to Refuse Cabinet Advice as a Democratic Reform1 Tyler Chamberlain Trinity Western University, Langley BC [email protected] Prepared for delivery at the 2018 Canadian Political Science Association Conference in Regina, SK This is a draft. Please do not cite without permission of the author. 1 Note: This is a slightly different title than that in the 2018 CPSA program. 2 Abstract Recent years have seen a rise in interest and concern over the centralization of power in the Canadian Prime Minister’s Office. Politicians, journalists, and academics alike have decried the “elected” or “friendly” dictatorship into which the office of First Minister has transformed. This paper will review several of the solutions on offer before proposing and defending an alternative solution, namely strengthening the Crown’s right to refuse advice of First Ministers, under particular circumstances. This solution will be presented via the Constitutional Traditionalism of Eugene Forsey and John Farthing, two Canadian political thinkers whose arguments have been, I suggest, vindicated by recent experience. The final section will reflect on, and hopefully clarify, the tension between strengthening the power of unelected Governors General and the project of democratic reform. It will do this by reviewing some of the relevant literature on the potential conflict between the logic of electoral competition and the logic of good governance, including, but not limited to the work of Fukuyama (2014), Zakaria (1997, 2007), and Achen & Bartels (2016). I will conclude by suggesting that a proper conception of democratic reform in a Westminster system must not be reduced to merely increasing voter input, but must balance responsiveness to voters with the ability of the House of Commons to hold the Prime Minister and Cabinet to account.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 14 Federalism-E
    Volume 14 Federalism-e Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy VERONIKA REICHERT Canadian institution.”2 Does the monarchy play University of Alberta an important, positive role in Canada today? Those who would answer “no” to its importance or its being positive have argued Anytime a royal makes an appearance at that we should abolish the Crown in Canada. an event, great public interest in royalty is However, by looking at the constitutional generated, and with that the monarchy as an structures of Canadian institutions, the design institution is brought to the attention of of our federalist democracy, and aspects of the Canadians and the Commonwealth. There is a Canadian identity, I will show that the popular opinion that the monarchy no longer monarchy does play an important, and positive, plays, and should no longer play, an important role in contemporary Canada. Further, the role in contemporary Canada, and with that a criticisms of the monarchy would be better view that the monarchy is a useless addressed through reform of the role of the appropriation of tradition, or even a harmful Crown, in terms of preserving the important symbol of oppression, the latter view taken by function the monarchy plays as well as being a Marc Chevrier who writes that “the Canadian much more accomplishable task. neomonarchy feeds illusions of false grandeur that have no meaning in America and distract One argument against the monarchy is the people from thinking that they can be that it is viewed as an archaic institution, and sovereign.”1 Others, however, see the thus it should have no place in today’s world, monarchy as an important part of modern and especially not in a federalist democracy.
    [Show full text]