Lecture by Lt-Gen Keith Dayton on Palestine

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Lecture by Lt-Gen Keith Dayton on Palestine THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY PROGRAM OF THE SOREF SYMPOSIUM MICHAEL STEIN ADDRESS ON U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY SPEAKER: LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH DAYTON, U.S. SECURITY COORDINATOR, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY THURSDAY, MAY 7, 2009 Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C. The following is a transcript of a keynote address delivered by Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton to The Washington Institute's 2009 Soref Symposium on May 7, 2009. General Dayton currently serves as U.S. security coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, a post he has held since 2005. He recently accepted appointment for another two-year term. It is truly an honor for me to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished audience. My name is Keith Dayton, and I head a small team of Americans, Canadians, British, and a Turkish officer who were sent to the Middle East to assist in bringing some order to the Palestinian Authority's security forces. The name of our group is the United States Security Coordinators Team—USSC for short—but we are really an international effort. We are English speakers all, just with a lot of accents. [Laughter.] I look forward to sharing my thoughts with you on this evening's topic: Peace through Security: America's Role in Building Palestinian Authority Security Forces. But do keep in mind as I go along, it is not just the United States, but Canada, the United Kingdom, and Turkey, who are working on the task at hand. Looking out at this group, we have a lot of people here tonight, and this is no doubt due to the invaluable work being done by the Washington Institute scholars here. It reminds me of a story that I heard about Winston Churchill. I love Churchill stories; I have to warn you, there will be two of them in this talk. The story is that once a young woman cornered Churchill and in a gushing voice, she walked up to him and said, "Oh, Mr. Prime Minister, doesn't it thrill you to know that every time you make a speech, the hall is filled, packed to overflowing?" And Churchill, of course—he was never at a loss for words—said, "Yes, Madame, it is quite flattering. But whenever I feel this way, I always remember that if, instead of making a speech, I was being hanged, the crowd would be twice as big." [Laughter.] Well, tonight, I will be direct with you, as befits a soldier who has served in the uniform of his country for almost thirty-nine years. I will tell you what is unique about our team, what we've been doing, and what we hope to accomplish in the future. I will talk about opportunities and I will touch on challenges. I would like to leave politics and policy to those better qualified than I am. The countries involved in this enterprise have sent officers to be part of this mission because, in the words of an esteemed Washington Institute scholar, Las Vegas rules no longer work in the Middle East. While it may be true that what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas, it is no longer true that what happens in the Middle East stays in the Middle East. And all of us on the security coordinator's team share the conviction that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the national interests of our respective nations, and for that matter, of the world. Let me state at the outset a few bedrock principles that guide me in my work. First, as I just said, I profoundly believe that it is in the national security interest of the United States to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Second, I am one of those who firmly believes in a two-state solution: a Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside the state of Israel is the only solution that will meet the long-term needs of Israel and the aspirations of the Palestinian people. This has long been the policy of our national leadership, and I share it. Third, let me state very clearly my deep conviction—and I tell this to my Israeli friends all the time—that as President Obama said last year, the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable today, it is unbreakable tomorrow, and it is unbreakable forever. [Applause.] Before I begin, I want everyone in this room to know that I consider—and this is really sincere—The Washington Institute to be the foremost think tank on Middle East issues, not only in Washington, but in the world. [Applause.] I'm not done yet. I read the Institute's reports, I talk with the Institute fellows and staff about key matters. The people here at The Washington Institute give analytical and unbiased advice. I depend on it, and sometimes I feel I would be lost without it. Moreover—and some of you may not know this—but Washington Institute staff give of themselves. Mike Eisenstadt, you've got to be in the room—are you here? Mike, would you stand up? [Applause.] What some of you may not know—no Mike, you've got to keep standing. [Laughter.] That's an order—What some of you may not know is that this is Lt. Col. Mike Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve. And he is a senior fellow here at The Washington Institute, and he's just completed an active duty tour as the plans officer on my staff in Jerusalem. [Applause.] I will tell you that Mike's knowledge and wisdom has contributed much toward our future plans and strategy, and Mike, I've got to tell you, I'm proud of you and this Institute should be proud of you too and thank you for your service. [Applause.] Okay, let's get started. I arrived in the region in December 2005, coming from the Pentagon in Washington, where I served as the deputy director of strategy plans and policy on the Army staff. Before that, I was in Iraq, where I set up and commanded the Iraq survey group, which was charged with the search for weapons of mass destruction. And some have questioned whether this assignment in the Middle East was a reward for the Iraq effort or someone's idea of retribution. [Laughter.] Secretary Wolfowitz, I won't ask you which it is. [Laughter.] I had been the defense attache of the United States in Russia, but in my heart, I'm an artilleryman. [Applause.] Thank you, I appreciate that. [Laughter.] It's important because artillerymen are schooled in the concept of "adjust fire." You fire your first round down range to get as close to the target as you can using all the local information you have available to you and then you apply that local knowledge to subsequent rounds and adjust until you hit the target. That is very much what the team and I do in the Middle East. We have become steeped in an understanding of the context and dynamics of the conflict from the perspective of both sides through daily interaction on the ground, and we adjust fire accordingly. Now, the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator came into existence in March of 2005 as an effort to assist the Palestinians in reforming their security services. The Palestinian security forces under Yasser Arafat were never able to achieve internal cohesion, they were not properly trained, they were not properly equipped, and they had no clear or effective security mission. The idea in forming the USSC was to create an entity to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian security forces. The USSC was to help the Palestinian Authority to right-size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom they serve. Why was a U.S. general officer chosen to command this thing? Well, three reasons. The first was that senior policymakers felt that a general officer would be trusted and respected by the Israelis. Put that one in the "yes" block. The second was that a general's prestige would help leverage Palestinian and other Arab cooperation. You can put that in the "yes" block. And the third idea was that a general officer would have greater influence over the U.S. government interagency process. Two out of three isn't bad. [Laughter.] Okay, so where are we now, or who are we and how do we fit into the regional context? And this is kind of important. We're kind of "coming out" tonight to let you know what we are, because we don't do this very often. As I said earlier, we are a multinational team. This is important. U.S. personnel have travel restrictions when operating in the West Bank. But our British and Canadian members do not. In fact, most of my British contingent—eight people—live in Ramallah. And those of you who know about the overseas missions [know] that the United States does understand that living among the people you work with is invaluable. The Canadians, who are going up to about eighteen people, are organized in teams we call road warriors, and they move around the West Bank daily visiting Palestinian security leaders, gauging local conditions, and working with real Palestinians in sensing the mood on the ground.
Recommended publications
  • U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority
    U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority Jim Zanotti Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs January 8, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40664 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority Summary Since shortly after the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States has periodically provided assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for civil security and counterterrorism purposes. Following the death of Yasser Arafat in late 2004 and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor as PA President in early 2005, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the office of U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to help reform, train, and equip PA security forces which had been personally beholden to Arafat and his political allies. Previous Israeli-Palestinian efforts at security cooperation collapsed during the second Palestinian intifada that took place earlier this decade. Since Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, head of the USSC since November 2005, and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) have helped with the “gendarmerie-style” training of West Bank-based PA security personnel. As of June 2009, approximately 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 2,200 National Security Forces troops have been trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) near Amman. All troops, new or already serving, are vetted for terrorist links, human rights violations, and/or criminal records by the State Department, Israel, Jordan, and the PA before they are admitted to U.S.-sponsored training courses at JIPTC.
    [Show full text]
  • ROLLING BACKWARD Russia’S Troubled Relations with Its Neighbors Table of Contents Features
    per VOLUME 5, ISSUE 4, 2014 ConcordiamJournal of European Security and Defense Issues RUSSIAN REVISIONISM EXAMINING EU POLICY Moscow undermines European order The lessons from Ukraine THE NORDIC VIEW PLUS Finland weighs its neutrality Montenegro’s Road to the EU ORGANIZED CRIME Building Partnerships How it corrupts Russia Reviewing NATO Priorities ROLLING BACKWARD Russia’s Troubled Relations with its Neighbors Table of Contents features ON THE COVER Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine — aggressive rhetoric and nationalist symbolism, eerily reminiscent of the Cold War — have raised fears that the Kremlin may be adopting a revanchist strategy to reassert control over former Soviet- era republics. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 18 10 Explaining Russian Behavior 24 EU Enlargement to the East By Dr. Gregory Gleason, Marshall Center By Dr. Katrin Böttger, deputy director of the Russia’s actions in Ukraine have Institute for European Politics, Berlin shattered a carefully constructed post- Russia views economic treaties with Cold War consensus. Ukraine as intrusions into its sphere of influence. 18 Curbing Russian Aggression By Valentyn Badrak, director, Center for Army NATO’s Northern Edge Conversion and Disarmament Studies, Ukraine 30 By Tuomas Forsberg, professor of international The international community must relations, University of Tampere, Finland be assertive in deterring violations of Finland is reconsidering its neutral Ukraine’s sovereignty. status as a result of aggressive behavior from Moscow. departments COOPERATION 50 Redefining NATO By Dr. Teodora Crina Popescu, International Defense Cooperation Directorate, Romanian Ministry of Defense The Alliance has been forced to re-evaluate its mission in light of actions to the east. 54 Building Social Capital By Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • A Case Study of Executive Military Leadership
    UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE STRATEGIC BEACON IN THE FOG OF LEADERSHIP: A CASE STUDY OF EXECUTIVE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By ROY J. PANZARELLA Norman, Oklahoma 2006 i UMI Number: 3207186 Copyright 2006 by Panzarella, Roy J. All rights reserved. UMI Microform 3207186 Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 STRATEGIC BEACON IN THE FOG OF LEADERSHIP: A CASE STUDY OF EXECUTIVE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE COLLEGE By ____________________________ Dr. Gary Copeland ____________________________ Dr. Jerry Weber ____________________________ Dr. H. Dan O’Hair ____________________________ Dr. Keith Gaddie ____________________________ Dr. Russell Lucas i © Copyright by ROY J. PANZARELLA 2006 All Rights Reserved i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the magnificent staff and faculty of the University of Oklahoma for their vision, dedication and hard work helping cohort members turn their dreams into realities. Special thanks to my dissertation committee, but especially the chair, Dr. Gary Copeland, for his professionalism, time, mentorship, friendship and encouragement. I would like to express my gratitude to American military members and their families for their bravery, selfless service and sacrifices at home and on foreign battlefields, principally the men and women from the interagency who served honorably in the Iraq Survey Group.
    [Show full text]
  • Impact on Democracy and Transatlantic Relations
    9 THE PANDEMIC, DEMOCRACY AND THE UNITED STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION BY DAVID J. KRAMER Tbilisi 2020 The author, an assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor in the George W. Bush administration, is Director of European and Eurasian Studies and Senior Fellow in the Vaclav Havel Program on Human Rights and Diplomacy at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs. The publication was made possible by the Black Sea Trust, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent those of the Black Sea Trust or its partners. © Economic Policy Research Center Contents An Especially Bad Week ............................................................................................................................................5 Impact on Democracy and Transatlantic Relations ......................................................................................................6 Impact on Black Sea Countries ...................................................................................................................................7 When historians write about the year 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic will feature prominently in their narratives. The virus’ toll in public health terms has been staggering: as of June 9, close to 7 million cases worldwide and more than 400,000 deaths. A potential second wave could see those numbers rise significantly. The pandemic has exacted a major economic cost as well, with nearly 40 million people filing for unemployment in the United States alone and economies around the globe struggling to reopen after enduring painful shutdowns to reduce the risk of contagion. Beyond the cost in human lives and the economy, the pandemic has exacted a toll on democracy. According to The Economist, more than 80 countries have granted emergency powers to the executive, in many cases with no sunset provisions.
    [Show full text]
  • Intelligence Failures in the Iraq War
    Intelligence Failures in Iraq 7/16/03 Page 1 CSIS___________________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 (To comment: [email protected] For Updates see Executive Summary: http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons_exec.pdf; Main Report: http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons.pdf) Intelligence Failures in the Iraq War July 16, 2003 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman: May be quoted or excerpted with proper attribution Intelligence Failures in Iraq 7/16/03 Page 2 Table of Contents Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses _________________________________________ 3 The Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems _________________________________________ 4 Key Points in the US and British White Papers__________________________________________ 5 Problems in Collecting Data on Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems 17 Problems in Analyzing Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems_______ 20 The Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems __________________________________________________________________ 21 Dealing with a Proven Proliferator __________________________________________________ 22 The Issues Left By Iraqi Compliance with the UN Effort _________________________________ 23 The Costs of Politicizing Intelligence ________________________________________________
    [Show full text]
  • Shutting Down Transnational Organized Crime Table of Contents Features
    per VOLUME 7, ISSUE 3, 2016 ConcordiamJournal of European Security and Defense Issues n GLOBAL CORRUPTION n PROTECTING REFUGEES Building good governance Greece and Italy cope with migration n KOSOVO COMBATS CRIME PLUS EU laws aid the Balkan nation Fighting terror with intelligence n MEDITERRANEAN SMUGGLING Guarding against WMD Refugee crisis feeds illegality NATO’s Russia strategy Shutting Down Transnational Organized Crime Table of Contents features ON THE COVER Transnational organized crime — including smuggling weapons, narcotics and people — is both a symptom and a cause of governmental instability. Interagency cooperation at the national level and international cooperation at the regional and global levels are the best ways to fight the problem. PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION 10 10 Corruption and 24 Mobility and Border Controls Government Effectiveness By Susana de Sousa Ferreira and Dr. Andrés de Castro By Dr. Valbona Zeneli, Marshall Center Effectively managing borders can reduce security Corruption has far-reaching effects on threats. international security. 30 Refugees, Smugglers and Terrorists 18 Joint Investigation Teams By Vasileios Koutsoliakos and Anastasios Filntisis By Roxana Bulancea A dangerous smuggling enterprise has formed from Multinational joint investigation teams Europe’s refugee crisis. cooperate to solve crimes. 36 Fighting Organized Crime in Kosovo By Lt. Col. Fatos Haziri Crime groups impede Southeast European progress. departments COOPERATION 50 The Marshall Center’s Seminar for Regional Security By the Marshall Center The Marshall Center’s seminar focuses on peaceful conflict resolution. SECURITY in every issue 52 Wielding Intelligence as a Weapon 4 DIRECTOR’S LETTER By. Col. (Ret.) József Kis-Benedek, 5 CONTRIBUTORS Ph.D., professor, National University of Public Service, Hungary 7 VIEWPOINT Collecting information on the enemy is vital to its defeat.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority
    U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority Jim Zanotti Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs June 24, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40664 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority Summary Since shortly after the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States has periodically provided assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for civil security and counterterrorism purposes. Following the death of Yasser Arafat in late 2004 and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor as PA President in early 2005, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the office of U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to help reform, train, and equip PA security forces which had been personally beholden to Arafat and his political allies. Previous Israeli-Palestinian efforts at security cooperation collapsed during the second Palestinian intifada that took place earlier this decade. Since Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, head of the USSC since November 2005, has helped with the “gendarmerie-style” training of West Bank-based PA security personnel. As of June 2009, 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 1,700 National Security Forces troops have been trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) near Amman. All troops, new or already serving, are vetted for terrorist links, human rights violations, and/or criminal records by the State Department, Israel, Jordan, and the PA before they are admitted to U.S.-sponsored training courses at JIPTC.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 MEMORANDUM To: Maen Areikat From: Negotiations Support Unit
    Confidential Not for Circulation MEMORANDUM To: Maen Areikat From: Negotiations Support Unit Subject: US Envoys Dayton, Jones and Frazier: Mission Description and Biographical Highlights Date: January 13, 2008 Lieutenant-General Keith W. Dayton, US Army: US Security Coordinator for Israel - Palestinian Authority Role In the past the USSC had been given a broad mandate over security related issues (training, equipping security forces as well as tackling the problems of smuggling through tunnels and the rocket attacks from Gaza). Its work also extended to movement and access (certain aspects of the implementation of the AMA), in particular the Gaza crossings, the deployment therein of the Presidential Guards and the upgrade of the GACB. At present, given the takeover in Gaza and the recent appointment of two other US envoys and Quartet envoy Blair, the mission scope has been restricted to training the equipment of security forces operating in parts of the West Bank. Highlights from Biography Assignments: Gen. Dayton was commissioned as an artillery officer through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1970. Prior to his current assignment, he spent 37 years in a variety of command and staff assignments, most recently serving as the director of the Iraq Survey Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom and as Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army, before his current assignment as U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Other key assignments include deputy director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff; United States Defense Attaché, Moscow, Russia; senior Army fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ukrainian Weekly, 2020
    INSIDE: l Testimony at U.S. ambassador-designate’s hearing – page 4 l The story behind Agnieszka Holland’s “Mr. Jones” – page 5 l Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Crimea faces threat – page 6 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXXXVIII No. 32 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, AUGUST 9, 2020 $2.00 Verkhovna Rada replaces 490 raions Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds with 136 new districts nationwide hearing on ambassador-designate to Ukraine Ukrainian National Information Service WASHINGTON – On August 5, several months after President Donald Trump nominated him as the next U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Keith Dayton appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) for his nomi- nation hearing. The hearing was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic and included a panel of nominees, among them the ambas- sador-designate for Belarus. Members of the SFRC engaged with the prospective nominees via computer screens. Opening statements were followed by a question- and-answer period. Presidential Office SFRC Chairman Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho) At the Verkhovna Rada, which voted to change the raion zoning in Ukraine, decreas- opened the hearing and thanked the panel Screenshot of Lt. Gen. (ret.) Keith Dayton ing the number of such districts from 490 to 136. for their patience in the nomination pro- testifying on August 5 before the Senate cess. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), rank- Foreign Relations Committee. This massive change comes only three by Roman Tymotsko ing member of the Senate Foreign Relations months before local elections, when depu- Committee, began with an opening state- Dignity and the Russian invasion of eastern KYIV – On July 17 a big step in decentral- ties and heads of raion councils will be cho- ment about U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional Record—House H377
    February 4, 2004 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H377 President Bush has led our country further bring home the tens of thousands men and GENERAL LEAVE and further away from the fold of the inter- women whose lives have been placed on the Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I ask national community, ignoring the United Na- line for no good reason. We must see change unanimous consent that all Members tions Security council’s findings, and virtually for the better. may have 5 legislative days within demolishing the international support we had More numbers: which to revise and extend their re- received following September 11th. He has For the cost of every cluster bomb, we can marks on the subject of my Special challenged Americans to a ‘‘you’re either with enroll 2 children in Head Start. Order. us or against us’’ agenda, which leads to the For the cost of every minute of the war on The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Iraq, we could have paid the annual salary most dangerous kind of patriotism—where KING of Iowa). Is there objection to the questioning and dissent are considered un- and benefits for 15 registered nurses. For request of the gentleman from Mary- American. Well I, as an American and a pa- every hour of the war on Iraq, we could im- land? triot, am now standing again to ask questions prove, repair, and modernize 20 schools. For There was no objection. about the cost of this war. the cost of one day’s war on Iraq, we could We spent $396 billion in military spending have prevented all of the budget cuts to edu- f alone for 2003.
    [Show full text]
  • State with No Army Army with No State
    NERI ZILBER AND GHAITH AL-OMARI STATE WITH NO ARMY ARMY WITH NO STATE Evolution of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces 1994–2018 STATE WITH NO ARMY ARMY WITH NO STATE Evolution of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces 1994–2018 NERI ZILBER GHAITH AL-OMARI THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 154 First publication: March 2018 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publi- cation may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2018 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors CONTENTS Acknowledgments v Executive Summary vii 1 RETURN OF ARAFAT AND THE PLO 1 The Oslo Accords Era: 1994–2000 The PLA “Return” 2 Cairo Accords and Oslo II 4 Agreements vs. Reality 6 The Arafat Method 8 Role of the International Community 9 Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation 11 PASF vs. Hamas 12 PASF Clashes with the IDF 13 Notes 15 2 THE MILITARY OPTION 19 The Second Intifada and Fall of Gaza: 2000–2007 PASF, Tanzim, and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the Intifada 20 The Israeli Response 21 PASF after Defensive Shield 22 Diplomatic and Political Dimension 23 Post-Arafat Era 25 Gaza Disengagement 26 PASF under Hamas Rule 27 The Fall of Gaza 29 Notes 30 (continued) 3 RECONSTITUTION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 37 The Contemporary PASF: 2007–18 Internal Palestinian Security Reform under Fayyad 38 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • What Should the Next President Do First?
    What should the next president do first? Winter 2008 –09 www.belfercenter.org For the Next President— Center Scholars Suggest Priority Actions on Security and Climate/Energy R E ith a new president of the United –No loose nukes; T N E States soon to be elected, Belfer Cen - –No new nascent nukes; C W R ter scholars offer their advice on issues of –No new nuclear weapons states; E F L E national security and climate/energy policy. –No role for nuclear weapons in B The Belfer Center’s Graham Allison , Ashton international affairs. B. Carter , and Joseph S. Nye summarize what • Appoint a Deputy National Secu - they think the president’s top priorities should rity Advisor whose sole responsibil - be to increase security and decrease the threat ity is to integrate, shape, and define of terrorism in the United States. The Center’s the strategic, technical, and political John P. Holdren , Kelly Sims Gallagher , and dimensions of your strategy, to set Henry Lee join together to suggest steps they targets for all departments and agen - believe the next president should take to cies, and to lead U.S. participation in The Belfer Center’s John P. Holdren (left) with Kelly Sims Gallagher (center) and Henry Lee increase energy security and decrease poten - the Global Alliance. tially catastrophic effects of climate disruption. For additional information on these recom - investments in national security are out of mendations, see: www.belfercenter.org/advice . America’s reputation matters balance, with spending on “soft power,” diplomacy, and foreign aid still tiny in com - Improving National Security as much as its power.
    [Show full text]