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ED228123.Pdf DOCUMENT RESUME ED 228 123 SO 014545 AuTHOR Jacobson, Harald W. TITLE The Educational System and Academicand Technological Exchanges of the People's-Republicof China. Research Report. INSTITUTION International CommunicationAgency, Washington, D.C. REPORT NO USICA-4-6-80 PUB pATE 6 May 80 NOTE 39p.; Paper presented at theConference on Communication and China's. ExternalRelations (Honolulu, HI, January 7, 1980). PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120)-- Speeches/Conference iapeit (150) EDRS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus postage. DESCRIPTORS Comparative.Education; EducationalAdministration; '*Educational Change; EducationW1 History;Educational Needs; Educational Philosophy;Elementary Secondarl? Education; Foreign Countries; HigherEducation; *Internatiónal Educational Exchange;Modernization; *Sciences; Technological Advancement IDENTIFIERS *China: ABSTRACT . A program to reverse the impedimentsto scientific and technological advancementbrought on by the Cultural Revolution in.the People's Republic of Chinais described. The CUlturl Revolution impededprogress through the denigratiOn of intellectuals, the closing of schools, and thephilosophy that loreigh influences wgre contradictory to the Maoist-principleof self-reliance. The report discusses the relevance ofeducational exchanges to the modernization Program, educational developmentAand chahge,since the death of Zhpu Enlai (ChouEn' Lai), effarts to improve theimage and role of intellectuals,the Cultural Revolution, and the administration of foreign.exchangeprograms: The program calls for advancement in agriculture; industry,science and technology, and' defense. It'also focusesOA development of new sources'ofenergy, omputer technology, spacesciende, laserusage, high energy physics, and genetic engineering. To accomplishthese goals, Chinese leaders 'are expanding and modernizing educationalfacilities.and creatingan atmosphere conducive to intellectulactivity. China has also launched a majoreffort to.send Chinesestudents abroad for scientific, technological, andlanguage training and to invite loreign,specialists-to China to lecture,teach, and participate in'. joint research efforts. (KC) 0 **********************************************************************. Reproductions supplied by EDRSare too hest that can be-made froM the oiiginal dOcument. ***************************************************W******************* 4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) Thts docurniegt has betn reproduced as Iecetved horn the person Oforganization originating d XMinOf changes have been made to impra4 \ reproduction Quality Points ol view or opintons stated in this docu rnent do not necessarily repre,sent official NIE posdion Of (>0110) f . THiE EDUCATIONALSYSTEM AND .NCADEMIC AND :TtoliNoLoGfcAL EXCHANGES. Or THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA RESEARCH REPORT t. This report was prepared by Harald W. Jacobson East Asia & Pacific granch , rif R-6780 )/ ( May.6, 1980 Office of Research- International Communication Agency - United States of America USICA DISTRIBUTION D - Mr., Cohen STATEWS - Mr. 'Tarnoff-(10) * STATE/INR PGM - Mr. Spiers - Mr. Schneidman STATE/INR/XR - Mr. Platig - Mr. Winkler ) PGM/A - Mr. Morrison NSC Staff PGM/D - Mr. Schulick. PGM/G qedretary (6) - Mr. Roth CIA/CRS/ADD PGM/GF - Mr. Blackburn Publidation PGM/P Unit-(15) Mr. McGinley (3) CIA/OAPA/AMERS- Mr. Grupp ECA -Mrs.Ilchman (5) Office of the ECA/PPE, - Mr. Dodds Secretary of Defense (5) CPL Mr. Pistor EA (7)ffice of Joint Chiefs - Mr. Carter of Staff (10) VOA - Ms, Ritterman (4), VOA/PF Defense,IntelligenceAgency: - Mr- §allivan Dr. Romance AC - Ms. McKnew Office of the Specia,l,Trade Representative (5) USICA Advisor - (2) Fort Bragg Library of Congress: USICA CINCPAC - Mr. Rosinus Area Studies USICA Rep. (OJCS) - Dr, Tsuneishi' (2) °CRS. - Mr. Whitson USICA Beijing -.Mr. Thomson (2) USICA Hong.Kong- Mr. Britton (2) The Office, of Research welcoMeb commntson the report fromi any recipient. Please address suchcommen to the OfficeofResearch PGM/R, InternationalCommunication Agency, (USICA), D.0 20547. Washington, OSGOvernment officesrequiringaddjitionalcopies of this re:port may request them by writing to the Program Coordinatorof PGM/R or by telephoning (202) 724-9048. Persons outside the USGovernment may refer to copies search reports at of USICA re- any of approximately 45 universitydepositories located throughout the, UnitedStates. For a list of the depos-i- t9ries, write to the aboveaddress. ) 4 4-, r r :- e I I s NOTE t O'r .. Except for 1imite4 additional data, the attached paper was prepare& by Harald W. Jacobson (PqM/REA) and presented at-the Conference on Communication and China's External Relations held.at the East-West Communication Institute of the Eas-West Center,-Honolulu, Hawaii, January 7, 1980. , .. , , 4 4 4, _ r 1 . '. 4 art s 4 r . i Is I / I ., r. SUMMARY , The People's'Republic of China (PRC) hasembarked uponan ambitious modernizationprogram intended to the world's move China into the forefrontof industrialized nationsby the end of the , tury and to aChieve present can- significant progressin that directionby 1985.- The program, officiallytermed "the four China to attain modernizations.," calls for advanced world levelsof the 1970s, t410.4aar...1000 in the or beyond, by four fields of agriculte, industry, science and technology; andnational defense. Aosic t jnas declared, is all fields, the PRC progress in science anditechn ogy. Although the unrealistically ambitiousprogram initially ou back ae a result of ned has been cut periodic reassesipments,the goals remain.high. nines abilityto approach them willdepend heavily success in mobilizing its on the PRC's human and materialresources and its ef- forts ,to acqui`re quicklythe necessary scientific skills. and technological , Chine's fourmodernizationsprogram bears littleresemblance plrograms commonly to associated with mostdeveloping cOuntries. at-tending to basic While elements and principlesof development, thePRC program also focuseson highly ,pophisticated and technological areas of scientific' advancement that wouldcontribute toa high level of economic and militaryprogress, such as the development sources of energy, of ne* computer'technology,space science, laser usage, high energ7 physics,and genetic engineering. To accomplish these goals, the Chineselea,dership seeksto expand -and-modernize its educationfacilities, eradicate toward intellectuals adverse attitudes and "thkngs foreign"cultivated during the Cultural Revolution,create an atmosphere condubive"to'intellectu activity, and develop ektensive programs ofscientific and technol- ogicar`exchange with advanced countries,particularly with countries of the West andJapan. During the Cultural Revolution, intellectualsandantellectual' pursuits were denigrated. Many oX China's intellectuals cuted and driven from were perse- their normal fields ofoperation; many,were purged. Schools at all levelswere closed and reopened only with colleges and slowly, tiniversities reopeningonly in the 1910s andthen with a heavy curriculumconcentration on politics. permitted to function, Where they were intellectualiswere placedunder the adminis-- trative control of'politicalcadres, for wbom ideology over, science. held priority The transfer from abroad'ofscience and technology wete hela to be in , contradiction with the Maoistprinciple of self- reliance: 4 As a consequence, anintensiveeffort is being made eradicate ancl reverse to these and other attitudesthat impede scien-, Atifc and technologicalprogress. Sik In corder to acquirequi kly the skills e.#-P-of the fOur necessary for achievement modernizations, the FRC-1.mslaunched a major effort to send-Chinese students abroad fot scientific,technological and language training,'andto invite foreign spedialists lecture, teach And to'China4to participate in jointresearch pro,jects. sands of Chinese students Thou- have been sent to the'UnitedStates, West Germany, France,England, Japan and other training and the numbers countries for vich can be expected to mountsignificantly. Earlier policies of striqPRC Embassy control their respective over students-in countries have beendropped And Chinese abroad are widely students dispersed and permitted,even encouraged, to reside with privatefamiliesind integrate with local students. , PRC officials haveestimated the need ofa corps of 800,000 scien- tists and technicianS for the modernizationprogram, of which only 60,000 were availablein 1978. Thus, despite the crash train such specia4sts, effort to China will remain shortof the nede-ssary skilled personnel fora prolonged period of time. 4' 1 CONTENTS Introduction 1 Relevance of Exchangesto PRC Modernization Efforts Educational Reforms and Deirelopments 7 Efforts to Improve theImage and Role of Intellectuals 12 The Role of InternationalExchanges in China'S Modernization Effort 15 Pre,-1966 Academic and Technological'Ex.changes 16 The Cultural Revolution 19 Reacti4ation of the Foreign Exchange Programs 19 (I . A ministration of Exchanges 22 Footnotes 74. Introduction As part of a comprehensive modernizationprogram, the People'sRe- public of China (PRC)committed itself, in in 1977 and 1978, a series of conferences to an ambitious undertakingintended to advance China in fields ofscience and technology 1970s (and berond to world levels of the in some fields) bythe.year 2000.1 Significant progress toward this generalgoal was initially series of specific contemplated ina tatgets incorporated inan interim program for the period of 1978and 19852
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