Questions of Sovereignty: Redefining Politics in Scotland?
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Political Quarterly Questions of Sovereignty: Redefining Politics in Scotland? DAVID MCCRONE AND MICHAEL KEATING Abstract The issue of sovereignty has never been resolved in Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act, creating the Scottish Parliament affirmed that the Westminster Parliament is sovereign, but this is dis- puted. In practice, the issue was left largely in abeyance as sovereignty was seen as an out- dated concept. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the UK Brexit referendum of 2016 both brought back the question of sovereignty in stark terms. Analysis of data from the British Election Study of 2019 with regard to (a) the right of Scottish self-determination, and (b) the right of a UK-wide majority to take Scotland out of the EU, allows us to identify ‘sovereigntists’ and ‘unionists’. Sovereigntists, on both dimensions, now constitute a majority. A smaller group of unionists reject both positions. There remains a group of ‘semi-sovereign- tists’ who accept Scottish self-determination, but also that the UK as a whole should decide on Brexit. Controlling for the social and political factors, Scots are increasingly polarised around issues of sovereignty, which have become central to contemporary Scottish politics. Keywords: sovereignty, UK, Scotland, self-determination, Brexit, nationalism broader epistemic theories of sovereignty The sovereignty conundrum and legitimacy, and to take conventions seri- 2 THE QUESTION of sovereignty has never been ously. Neil McCormick developed a theory resolved in Scotland. On the one hand, there of post-sovereignty, in which sovereignty is is the Westminster doctrine, that the Crown- shared both within Europe and within the in-Parliament is sovereign and subject to no United Kingdom.3 The 1989 Scottish Claim higher or lower authority. On the other is of Right, signed by all Scottish MPs bar the the view that the United Kingdom is a union Conservatives and one Labour member, of nations created by successive instruments, asserted that Scotland had the right to which did not extinguish their historic rights. choose its own form of government. There is In a famous obiter dicta of 1953, Lord Cooper also the fact that even staunch unionist declared in the Court of Session that, as the Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John old Scottish Parliament had never exercised Major conceded that Scotland could, if it untrammelled sovereignty, it could not have wished, become independent.4 Whatever the passed it onto the Parliament of Great Bri- wording of the Scotland Act, it would be tain created by the Union of 1707. accurate to say that the devolution settle- The Scotland Act (1998), creating the new ment left these issues in abeyance. Scottish Parliament, affirmed the Westmin- Since the 1970s there have been numerous ster doctrine in clear terms. The courts have surveys about Scots’ constitutional prefer- upheld this view, including the Supreme ences. These have consistently shown major- Court, called on to adjudicate in Miller v Sec- ity support for some form of self-government, retary of State for Exiting the European Union with the largest number historically support- (2017) and on the Scottish Continuity Bill ing devolution within the United Kingdom. (2018).1 Yet the basis of this is merely an Indeed, the findings are consistent with a assertion by Parliament of its own preroga- post-sovereign conception of shared author- tives. Many scholars have argued that we ity. After devolution, the most favoured must look beyond Westminster itself, to option was a stronger Scottish Parliament. © 2021 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) 1 This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Attitudes to the European Union in many Scottish electors voted 55 per cent to remain ways mirrored this, with voters clustering in within the United Kingdom. In 2016, while the middle of the europhile-eurosceptic scale. voters in England and Wales voted nar- Taking the two scales together, a small minor- rowly (52 per cent) to leave the EU, Scot- ity supported Scottish independence outside land voted by a larger margin (62 per cent) the EU and an even smaller minority wanted to remain. The relation between voting yes to abolish the Scottish Parliament and leave in 2014 and remain in 2016, however, was the EU.5 Although since the mid-1980s, the not obvious—see Table 1 below. Scottish National Party (SNP) favoured inde- In the following years, however, this has pendence within the European Union, the cor- changed and the two issues have become relation between support for independence linked. Curtice and Montagu have shown a and support for European integration was movement after 2016 towards independence rather loose. Scots were less eurosceptic than among europhiles and a movement against English voters, but this was not primarily among eurosceptics.9 This was reflected in connected to nationalism; it was true of sup- the pattern of SNP losses and Conservative porters of all parties in Scotland, but espe- gains in Scotland in the 2017 general elec- cially Labour. Among political commentators, tion. By the 2019 general election, the vote attention had moved away from the classic had polarised between the SNP, supporting and abstract idea of sovereignty, to focus on a second independence referendum and the balance of political power in a complex remaining in the EU, and the Conservatives, and interdependent world.6 supporting Brexit and opposed to an inde- Two critical events have changed this pic- pendence referendum.10 Issues of sover- ture and created a new division around the eignty appeared to have reshaped Scottish issue of sovereignty. One was the arrival of political space. the SNP in government in Scotland from Surprisingly, there has been no direct sur- 2007 and the consequent movement vey evidence on what Scottish voters make towards the independence referendum of of the arguments around sovereignty, as 2014. The other was the growth over much opposed to their views on devolution or the same period of the movement to with- independence. One reason is that sover- draw from the European Union, culminat- eignty is such a slippery concept and diffi- ing in the Brexit referendum of 2016. cult to operationalise. We see it as the Neither followed a change in public opin- ultimate source of legitimate authority. So, it ion. It was, rather, the changed political is not about what powers or degree of supply of options that stimulated demand. autonomy Scotland should have, but about Both referendums posed the question of who should make that decision. It is not sovereignty in stark terms after the period about competences, but what constitutional of abeyance or neglect. In fact, during the lawyers call kompetenz-kompetenz. The con- 2014 independence referendum campaign, juncture of two referendums posing the issue both sides sought to move to the middle gave us the option to probe attitudes in ground. The ‘yes’ side promised what critics more detail. called ‘indy-lite’, preserving much of the infrastructure of union, including the cur- ‘ ’ rency. The no side promised further auton- Table 1: Vote for EU and independence in ‘ ’ 7 omy or devolution-max . Neither, Scotland 2014-16. Percentage however, was on the ballot paper. Brexit, similarly, was presented in 2016 as a stark Yes indepen- No indepen- Total choice, even though the leave campaign did dence dence not stipulate that it would entail leaving the Remain 27 34 61 European Single Market. The two cam- EU paigns thus polarised opinion and increased Leave 17 21 37 the numbers of people supportive of Scot- EU tish independence and of withdrawal from Total 44 55 the EU beyond what had previously been registered in opinion surveys. In 2014, Source: British Election Study8 2DAVID M C C RONE AND M ICHAEL K EATING The Political Quarterly © 2021 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC) included in the BES 2019 survey, we have The survey the added advantage of access to a suite of To explore issues of sovereignty in Scotland, variables on political attitudes and beha- we asked two questions in the British Elec- viours, making it possible to tie views on tion Study (BES 2019) survey, based around sovereignty back to politics and sociology. reactions to two statements. The first, relat- ing to the right of self-determination was: ‘People in Scotland should have the ultimate Who has sovereignty? right to decide for themselves how they Although the question of sovereignty is com- should be governed.’ The second placed the plex and multidimensional, the two referen- constitutional onus on Scotland to accept the dums simplified the matter, and this is our UK Brexit vote as a whole, as opposed to starting point. We divide opinion into two Scotland having the right to go its own way: groups. Sovereigntists are those who think ‘Because a majority of people in the UK that ultimate authority belongs to the people voted to leave the EU in the 2016 Referen- of Scotland. Unionists are those who believe dum, people in Scotland should accept that that the UK as a whole is where it lies. Later, decision.’ we introduce a third category of semi- Following survey design best practice, one sovereigntists. Let us start with the distribu- question is framed around the ‘sovereigntist’ tion of responses to the two questions: position, and the second, on Brexit, around a There is undoubtedly strong support for ‘unionist’ position (that is, it assumes that the right of self-determination such that 60 the UK is sovereign).