CHAPTER FOUR

DEMOCRITUS

Democritus (c. 460-396 B.C.) was a younger contemporary ofProtagoras; both were born in Abdera. 1 Although he had encyclopedic interests and was the author of many works, the 298 fragments ascribed to him in Diels-Kranz are at most all that has survived of his writings? Almost all of these fragments concern ethical matters. But despite this, Democritus has generally not been known for his moral theory. He has always, and rightly, been considered an important figure in the history of natural philosophy for his theory of atomism. Commentators on the ethical fragments have often found them to be of little or no philosophical importance3 and have sometimes questioned their authenticity. The issue of whether these fragments are authentic is not important in the context of the present study, which is only interested in these fragments insofar as they re­ present the views of an early Greek moral theorist concerned with the issue of the compatibility of self-interest and morality. Thus, it would make little difference here whether the fragments be attributed to Democritus or one of his contemporar­ ies, although my own view is that they probably should be assigned to Democri­ tus.4 On the other hand, it is a crucial question in the present context whether the fragments have philosophical importance. It is true, of course, that the ethical fragments are written in a style closer to the philosophically unrigorous fragments of Antiphon's On Concord than to those from On Truth. But it cannot be concluded from this fact that they are trivial. On the contrary, the fragments strongly imply that Democritus held moral views which he rigorously argued for. They not only reflect the concerns of the other theorists so far discussed in this study, but also mark an important advance. A brief glance at several of the fragments provides a useful, preliminary indication of both the focus of Democritus' moral theory and the relationship between his views and those of Protagoras and Antiphon. The following fragment, for example, shows that Democritus shared with Protagoras certain beliefs about the value of nomoi:

Law (nomos) wishes to benefit the life of men. It is able (to do this) when­ ever men themselves wish to receive benefit. For it shows to men (agents) who obey it, their own particular excellence (idie arete ). (fr. 248) In this fragment Democritus endorses the view that nomoi are of benefit to men. Indeed, an harmonious political community provides goods which "no one would be able to enumerate" (fr. 255). Nomoi are necessary for harmony in the city (fr. 245); and in fr. 252 he remarks that "the well-run polis is the greatest source of safety and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe, when it is destroyed, all is destroyed." Democritus thus adopts the Protagorean view that nomoi are a 76 CHAPTER FOUR necessary condition for political communities and human survival. In addition, he follows Protagoras in linking nomima kai dikaia (fr. 174) and thus thinks of nomoi in terms of moral requirements. These views are traditional and Protagorean; but his following remarks suggest that he went well beyond traditional defenses of nomoi:

The one employing exhortation and persuasion of reason (peitho logou) ap­ pears stronger in respect to arete than one employing nomos and constraint (ananke ). For it is probable that the one who is prevented from injustice by nomos would commit wrong in secret, but it is not likely that the man who is led to what is necessary (deon) by persuasion would do anything discordant (plemmeles). And thus, a man acting rightly through intelligence (synesis) and knowledge becomes at the same time courageous and a man of upright thought. (fr. 181)

Democritus suggests he has an answer to the escaping-notice problem. There is, he says, some logos which will convince men to act morally on all occasions. Further, to act in this way is to act with intelligence (synesis), that is, with prudence and practical wisdom.5 Thus Democritus is claiming that agents have self-interested reasons for acting morally even when they can escape notice in acting. Of course, neither Protagoras nor any other traditional defender of nomoi made such a strong claim. And needless to say, Democritus would not have tried to defend this claim on the basis of Protagorean arguments. In this fragment Democritus implicitly acknowledges the validity of Antiphon's critique of Protagorean views. But insofar as he claims that there is some logos which will convince agents not to do wrong in secret, he rejects Antiphon's conclusion that agents do not always have reasons to act morally. Fr. 248 (already quoted) gives some indication of how Democritus went about rejecting Antiphon's conclusion. He remarks that nomos shows to agents who obey it their own particular excellence (arete ). 6 That Democritus is thinking of this good (arete) as prudential is made clear by the fact that he mentions it in the context of arguing that observing nomoi is beneficial for agents. In obeying nomoi, agents are shown (promote) their own good. His argument suggests that he responded to Anti­ phon's claim that moral requirements ought not always be obeyed by arguing that there is some prudential good for persons which is promoted by acting morally .7 It appears, then, that the focus of Democritus' moral theory is on the individual and the good for persons. His focus is the same as Antiphon's, but it is a focus which is quite different from Protagoras'.

The fragments and ancient testimony indicate that Democritus saw the good for persons in terms of the attainment of an ideal state or condition. He used a number of different terms to characterize this state. Stobaeus8 notes that Democritus characterized this state as eudaimonia, euthymia, euesto, harmonia, symmetria, and ataraxia. Diogenes Laertius9 remarks that Democritus gave many names to euthymia, including euesto; and Clement10 notes the same thing, but adds that Democritus also used the word 'athambia' to designate man's end (telos) or ideal state. That