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Looking Through Pascal's Window Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 30 Issue 1 Article 2 1-1-2013 Looking Through Pascal's Window John T. Mullen Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Mullen, John T. (2013) "Looking Through Pascal's Window," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 30 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20133012 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol30/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. LOOKING THROUGH PASCAL’S WINDOW John T. Mullen This paper is an attempt to draw a time-honored insight from Blaise Pascal, generalize it for contemporary use, and apply it to two topics of general con- cern to contemporary philosophers of religion. The two topics are the status of evolutionary biology as evidence for Philosophical Naturalism, and bio- logical versions of the problem of evil (I focus specifically on the problem of long ages of animal suffering). The “Pascalian” insight is that God wants human beings to be in a state of epistemic ambiguity when we consider im- portant, life-altering claims. I call this state of epistemic ambiguity “Pascal’s Window,” and argue that God’s desire to place human beings into Pascal’s Window with respect to important, life-altering claims generates the im- portant constraint on His creative activity that He must create gradually. This constraint is then employed to argue that evolutionary biology supplies very little evidential support for Philosophical Naturalism, and that appeals to “divine hiddenness” can become effective responses to the problem of “biological evil.” Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) is most widely known for his famed “wager ar- gument.” But there is another aspect of his legacy that is (in my view) even more significant for contemporary philosophy of religion. This is his now time-honored insight that (to paraphrase) God has intentionally placed human beings in a state of epistemic ambiguity with respect to His own existence and some of His attributes and actions.1 God’s reasons for wanting us to be in this condition of ambiguity (which I shall call “Pascal’s Window”) are further claimed by Pascal to be related to our moral condition, and perhaps also to the preservation of our freedom. However, Pascal makes these claims in a characteristically vague and imprecise way. We must first seek to clarify his claims and to uncover his implicit assumptions before we can usefully apply his insight, while simultaneously recognizing that the subject matter is such that a certain amount of vagueness and imprecision is unavoidable. However, once it 1Others, most notably William James and John Hick, have advanced and made use of similar insights. This is why we may regard Pascal’s insight as “time-honored.” But Pascal can be regarded plausibly as the historical source for apologetic appeals to “divine hidden- ness,” so the designation of this epistemic condition as “Pascal’s Window” is historically appropriate. Also, Pascal’s subsequent appeal to “reasons of the heart,” as distinct from publically accessible, widely agreed-upon reasons, is especially amenable to the particular application of this paper (i.e., a constraint on God’s creative activity arising from the need to keep Philosophical Naturalism viable in a scientifically sophisticated age). FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 30 No. 1 January 2013 26 All rights reserved LOOKING THROUGH PASCAL’S WINDOW 27 has been suitably clarified, Pascal’s insight can shed light on two ques- tions of considerable contemporary interest: the status of evolutionary biology as evidence for Philosophical Naturalism, and potential theistic responses to biological versions of the problem of evil. What Is “Pascal’s Window”? Let us begin with Pascal’s own remarks in the most explicit communica- tion of this point that may be found in his writings: God’s will has been to redeem men and open the way to salvation to those who seek it, but men have shown themselves so unworthy that it is right for God to refuse to some, for their hardness of heart, what he grants to others by a mercy they have not earned. If He had wished to overcome the obstinacy of the most hardened, He could have done so by revealing Himself so plainly that they could not doubt the truth of His essence, as He will appear on the last day with such thunder and lightning and such convulsions of nature that the dead will rise up and the blindest will see Him. This is not the way He wished to appear when He came in mildness. It was therefore not right that He should appear in a manner manifestly divine and absolutely capable of convincing all men, but neither was it right that His coming should be so hidden that He could not be recognized by those who sincerely sought Him. He wished to make Himself perfectly rec- ognizable to them. Wishing to appear openly only to those who seek Him with all their heart, and to remain hidden from those who shun Him with all their heart, God has moderated the way He might be known by giving signs, which can be seen by those who seek Him and not by those who do not. There is enough light for those whose only desire is to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition.2 Pascal then goes on to cite Old Testament prophecies of a coming Messiah as those very “signs” by which God simultaneously reveals Himself and remains hidden. It should be noted that the above passage is embedded within an attempt on Pascal’s part to argue that the Old Testament must be interpreted figuratively if it is to be rationally believed at all. Thus those who desire to embrace the Messiah who (according to the ortho- dox Christian theology that Pascal obviously endorses) did in fact enter human history will interpret the prophecies correctly (i.e., figuratively) and thereby arrive at a reasonable faith. On the other hand, those of a “contrary disposition” will interpret the prophecies incorrectly (i.e., liter- ally) and thereby reject them, but their rejection of the prophecies is a perfectly reasonable conclusion given their prior “decision” to interpret literally. Thus Pascal, in the above passage, is thinking entirely in terms of an apologetic for the specifically Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. 2Blaise Pascal, Pensees, #149, according to the numbering employed in Oeuvres Completes, ed. L. Lafuma (Paris: Seuil, 1963). The cited translation appears in David Wetsel, “Pascal and Holy Writ,” chap. 9 of The Cambridge Companion to Pascal, ed. Nicholas Hammond (Cam- bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 166–167. 28 Faith and Philosophy He is concerned with the rationality of believing that God Himself “came in mildness.” We will be concerned with a wider range of religious beliefs that human beings might form, and so we will want to generalize Pascal’s remarks as much as possible and apply the generalized principles to ad- ditional religious contexts that are of interest to us. But to do that, we must first identify which features of his “argument” are thus generalizable. I would like to suggest that there are three, each of which carries with it certain auxiliary assumptions that must be made explicit. Let us examine them in order. First, Pascal believes that God wants human beings to believe the doc- trine of the Incarnation from a position of epistemic ambiguity. The total evidence available to us must be such that it compels neither belief nor disbelief, but instead allows both states (and also the third state of with- holding belief) to be rationally permissible. In this way, the outcome (either belief or non-belief, where non-belief is the disjunction of disbelief and withholding) will be indicative of one’s desires and moral disposi- tions, and not merely of the proper functioning of one’s rational facul- ties. Thus Pascal seems to be thinking of an epistemic “window” that is defined at its lower boundary by the threshold at which the epistemic strength of our total evidence renders belief rationally permissible, and at its upper boundary by the threshold at which the epistemic strength of our total evidence rationally requires, or compels, belief. We will not be able to specify these thresholds precisely. But the notion of an epistemic condition that fits the above description should be both intelligible and familiar to anyone who has lived as a human being long enough to reflect on his/her evidence and beliefs. Let us call this condition “Pascal’s Window.” Those who have difficulty hearing Pascal’s name without simultaneously thinking of the wager argument are hereby provided with an alternative and further exhorted to lay the wager aside.3 Now it is clear that Pascal’s Window is easily generalizable to all sub- jects and all beliefs. We may give it the following more formal explication: (PW) A subject s is in Pascal’s Window (PW) with respect to proposi- tion p iff the total evidence e of which s is aware is such that it is rational for s to believe p on the basis of e, and s is not rationally required to believe p on the basis of e.4 3This may not be easy, because the wager and the window are clearly related to each other.
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