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RELIABILISM COSMIC OPTIMISM Naoki Kitta RELIABILISM AND COSMIC OPTIMISM Situating John Hick in The History of Philosophy of Religion Naoki Kitta, M.A. (The University of Nottingham) M.A. (Hitotsubashi University) Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy July 2016 Abstract This dissertation aims to rehabilitate the reasonableness of Hick’s religious pluralism by disclosing the deep structure of his philosophical system. To realize this aim, this dissertation will introduce a new philosophical method of reliabilism, which is proposed by Ernest Sosa and emphasizes total balance and historical maturation. As a result of the introduction of reliabilism, Hick’s philosophical system is disclosed to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, combined with the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume. Instead of emphasizing one of them, this dissertation will propose to read these different components of Hick’s philosophical system as forming a total worldview, which are complementary with each other. Also, this dissertation will situate Hick’s philosophy in the history of philosophy of religion (e.g. pre-analytical paradigms of British Idealism and Critical Realism, and analytical paradigms of Logical Positivism, neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology). Hick’s project will be discussed as a recovery of a pre- analytical worldview from within analytical contexts. As Hick’s central philosophical works, this dissertation will focus on Faith and Knowledge and An Interpretation of Religion. Faith and Knowledge has not been examined in detail in past literature. But Hick’s arguments about personhood, Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume in An Interpretation of Religion originates in Faith and Knowledge (both the first edition and the second edition). A correct understanding of Hick’s religious pluralism in An Interpretation of Religion is impossible without a detailed examination of Faith and Knowledge. For Reiichi Miura Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 1. Related Fields of Research 14 I. THREE PARADIGMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 14 II. FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE 17 III. PARADIGM SHIFTS IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 20 2. A Framework for the Reading of Hick 32 3. An Outline of the Argument 53 Chapter 1. A METHODOLOGICAL PREPARATION: Hermeneutics and Reliabilism 57 1. Two Conflicting Hermeneutics 59 I. AN INTERPRETATION OF JOHN HICK’S HERMENEUTICS 59 II. AN ALTERNATIVE HERMENEUTICS OF GEORGE LINDBECK 63 III. PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE CONFLICT 67 iv 2. Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Reliabilism 70 I. FOUNDATIONALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGION 70 II. COHERENTISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGION 73 III. A METHOD OF RELIABILISM 77 3. Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge 80 I. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN 80 II. ALVIN PLANTINGA 83 III. ERNEST SOSA AND THE RELIGIOUS IMPLICATION 87 Chapter 2. CRITICS OF HICK: A Proposal of Reliabilist Ethics 91 1. Reformed Epistemology 94 I. WILLIAM P. ALSTON 94 II. ALVIN PLANTINGA 99 III. A PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF WEAK FOUNDATIONALISM 113 2. Theologians of Religions 119 I. GAVIN D’COSTA 119 II. S. MARK HEIM 123 III. A PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF COHERENTISM 129 v 3. Reliabilist Ethics of Normality 134 I. A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF CRITICISMS OF HICK 134 II. AN ETHICS OF RELIABILISM 141 III. A RELIABILIST READING OF HICK 151 Chapter 3. PHILLIPS AND SELLARS: Contradiction between Language and Reality 153 1. Faith and Knowledge 156 2. An Interpretation of Religion 163 I. NON-REALISM OF D. Z. PHILLIPS 163 II. CRITICAL REALISM OF ROY WOOD SELLARS 174 3. Hick’s Defence of Critical Realism 184 Chapter 4. COSMIC OPTIMISM: Contradiction between the Particular and the Universal 189 1. Faith and Knowledge 194 I. WILLIAM JAMES 194 II. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 203 III. THE ORIGIN OF COSMIC OPTIMISM 208 vi 2. An Interpretation of Religion 218 3. An Intermediate Summary of the Argument 225 Chapter 5. HICK’S INHERITANCE FROM KANT: The System of An Interpretation of Religion 234 1. Incompatible Readings of Kant 239 I. WILLIAM FORGIE 239 II. JOHN MILBANK 240 III. PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE CONFLICT 241 2. An Alternative Reading of Kant 243 I. NORMAN KEMP SMITH 243 II. JOHN OMAN 251 III. JOHN HICK 258 3. Hick’s Religious Pluralism 265 I. IMCOMPATIBLE READINGS OF HICK’S RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 265 II. CRITICAL REALISM AND COSMIC OPTIMISM 268 III. AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF HICK’S RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 274 vii Chapter 6. COMMON SENSE AND HISTORY: Two Complementary Aspects of Hick’s Philosophy 277 1. Philosophy of Common Sense: Hume 282 I. JOHN HICK 282 II. NORMAN KEMP SMITH 290 III. JOHN MILBANK 295 2. Philosophy of History: Theodicy, Eschatology, and Soteriology 301 I. THEODICY 301 II. ESCHATOLOGY 317 III. SOTERIOLOGY 311 3. The Reception of Idealism in Britain, and the Relation between Philosophy and Practice 318 Conclusion 329 Bibliography 347 viii Acknowledgements My gratitude goes first of all to my supervisor, Prof. Philip Goodchild. He has been an encouragement throughout my study in Nottingham. The theology department at Nottingham provided me a stimulating environment to study and live. I am deeply thankful to Conor Cunningham, Simon Oliver, Karen Kilby, John Milbank, Alison Milbank, and Agata Bielik-Robson. I am also grateful to other individuals for their support. I would like to thank Alan Darley, Lukas Theo Paul, Mark Warrener, Andy Hall, Derek Chandler, Mike Coep, Sam Townsend, Rachael Pain, Satoshi Ukai, Tomoko Takemura, Masami Narita, Hidetaka Fukazawa, Takaya Suto, Ikuo Tsuboko, Eijiro Hazama, Daisuke Arie, Ryuichi Yamaoka, Yoshiyuki Kato, Keisuke Sato, and Saori Makino. Above all, I am deeply grateful to my parents for their unflinching support and encouragement. My academic education and formation would have been impossible without their help. ix Introduction The philosophy of John Hick has been accepted as a typical position in the field of philosophy of religion in the English-speaking world, especially with regard to the problem of religious diversity. However, Hick’s position has generated considerable critical response.1 This study will aim to clarify hidden philosophical methods that these critiques of Hick have been presupposing and propose an alternative philosophical method of reliabilism that is more appropriate to understand the contribution Hick makes to the philosophy of religion. Therefore, the aim of this study is twofold. The first is a rehabilitation of Hick’s philosophy against key criticisms. To realize this aim, this study will introduce a new philosophical method of reliabilism, which emphasizes total balance and historical maturation. As a result of the introduction of reliabilism, Hick’s philosophical system is 1 See, for example, Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000, pp. 24-29 and 45-52. S. Mark Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995, pp. 13-43. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca and London; Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 27-28, and 264-66. Alvin Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ in The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Kevin Meeker & Philip Quinn, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 172-92. John Milbank, ‘The End of Dialogue,’ in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology, Eugene, Oregon: CACADE Books, 2009, pp. 279-300. David Cheetham, Ways of Meeting and the Theology of Religions, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 39-60. 1 disclosed to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, combined with philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume. Instead of emphasizing one of them, this dissertation will propose to read these different components of Hick’s philosophical system as forming a total worldview, which are complementary with each other. Second, this study will situate Hick’s philosophy in the history of philosophy of religion. Various phases of Hick’s philosophy can be understood as responses to his contemporary situations (e.g. the ‘theology and falsification’ debate, neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology). However, the central insight of Hick’s philosophy can be understood to be inherited from a pre-analytical paradigm, which had been almost wholly neglected in the latter half of twentieth century philosophical thinking. For example, in Faith and Knowledge2, one can find an influence from British Idealism 2 John Hick, Faith and Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge, First Edition, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957. 2 (through Norman Kemp Smith3 and John Oman, etc.4). In An Interpretation of Religion5, 3 ‘The philosophical reader can see in Faith and Knowledge the influence of Kant, received through Kemp Smith at Edinburgh.’ See John Hick, An Autobiography, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002, p. 115. Under the influence from Edward Caird and John Watson, Norman Kemp Smith defines Kant’s position as ‘objective idealism’ and situates Kant in the traditions of ‘Lotze, Sigwart, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Jones and Dewey.’ See Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, London: Macmillan and Co., 1923, pp. l, 36, and 274. See also Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1889. John Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained, Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1908. Norman Kemp Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1924. In various phases of his philosophy, Hick is also influenced by Kemp Smith’s interpretation of Hume: ‘we thus come to rest in something like the ‘natural belief’ that Hume – according to Norman Kemp Smith’s interpretation … – adumbrated.’ See John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1989, p. 213. See also Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 124-25. John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 110. Hick, An Autobiography, p. 314. John Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, New York: Palgrave, 2006, pp.
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