Bachelor thesis

The Kremlin and Washington in the Levant - A most similar comparative case study of the actions by the United States and Russia in the Syrian civil war

Author: Isak Flink Supervisor: Anders Persson Examiner: Daniel Silander Term: HT20 Subject: Political Science Level: Bachelor Course code: 2SK31E

Abstract

Ever since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war two countries have been outspoken about the situation, Russia and the United States. As the conflict has developed these two actors have been active within the conflict both militarily and diplomatically. This outlines the research problem, why these actors have had an interest in Syria. The aim of this research is to find explanations of why the two countries have acted like they have in the conflict. The actions and events are analyzed through several concepts drawn from two international relations theories, namely neoliberalism and neorealism. Some core concepts of the theories are operationalized into several indicators which make up the model used in the analysis. Furthermore, the thesis is considered as being a most similar comparative case study using qualitative methods. The main findings in the analysis shows that many of the actions by both Russia and the United States can be explained through both theories. Neorealism shows of being more suitable when explaining military events and neoliberalism is found to be better at explaining diplomatic or non-military matters.

Key words

Syria, Russia, United States, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, Foreign intervention

Table of contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Research problem 2 1.2 Aim and research questions 3 1.3 Previous research 3 1.3.1 On Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war 3 1.3.2 On the United States involvement in the Syrian civil war 4 1.3.3 Joshua Landis and Syria Comment 5 2 Theoretical Framework 7 2.1 Neorealism 7 2.2 Neoliberalism 9 2.3 Model of analysis and operationalization 11 3 Methodology and Material 13 3.1 Research design and scope of the study 13 3.2 Material and Data collection 15 3.3 Validity and reliability 17 4 Analysis 18 4.1 Neorealism 18 4.1.1 Alliances 18 4.1.2 Capabilities 20 4.1.3 Intentions 22 4.2 Neoliberalism 25 4.2.1 Interdependence 25 4.2.2 International institutions 27 4.2.3 Soft power 29 5 Conclusion 31 5.1 Answers to research questions 31 5.2 Discussion 33 6 References 34

1 Introduction

The Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 in the wake of the protests that swept through parts of the Middle East and North Africa in what now is called the Arab Spring. Before all out civil war broke out, protests reached Syria as well. The main event that triggered wide-scale protests occurred in early March of 2011. A group of teenagers had been arrested and tortured by the regime, after they had scribbled anti-government sentiments on the wall of their school in the town of Deraa. This event resulted in large-scale protests up against the Assad regime throughout the nation in multiple different cities (Abouzeid, 2018 p. 11-12, 16; Phillips, 2016 pp. 49-50). Crackdowns by the regime on the protests followed throughout 2011 and violence escalated between the regime and the opposition, which organized in the loosely connected Free Syrian Army the same year. Though, it is also important to note that rallies in favour of the Assad regime were also present, this shows the complexities of the situation even in the very early stages of the conflict (Phillips, 2016 p. 85). These events laid the foundation for what would later become the very multifaceted conflict, with many different groups and states active in the conflict. The Syrian opposition that started out as the loosely connected Free Syrian Army, has splintered into many different groups with different wills, except for the shared will of wanting the ousting of Assad. Secular, Islamist, Jihadi and Kurdish rebel groups has been formed in the years that has passed since the war started (Phillips, 2016 p. 129). One of the most known groups that swept through Syria and neighbouring Iraq was the Islamic State, which rise and fall occurred during the war (Phillips, 2016 p. 196). Furthermore, multiple nation states around the world have been active in the conflict following the uprising, most prominently Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States. These actors have had different goals, sympathies and actions carried

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out during the conflict. Two of these states will be looked further into in this thesis, Russia and the United States. These two countries both hold very important roles in the geopolitical game and their actions throughout the world shapes the geopolitical situation. In the last few years, the operations of these two countries have often been acted out in or in relation to Syria. Today, Syria is the only place in the world where fully equipped Russian and American military personnel can be found facing each other on the ground (BBC News, 2020; Detsch & Gramer, 2020; Seligman & Swan, 2020), this makes the case especially interesting. Since 2011, the tragedy of the conflict has displaced Syrians all over the world and has resulted in casualties in the hundreds of thousands (UCDP, 2020).

1.1 Research problem This thesis will be focused on two specific players and their actions in the region, the United States and the Russian Federation. Both states have held different sympathies in the conflict since the initial phase of protests in Syria. The US has aligned themselves with the Syrian opposition whilst Russia took a stance with the Assad regime (Lund, 2019 p. 20). In the duration of the conflict the actions of the US and Russia have been different in both their sympathies but also in the level of intervention in Syria. In 2014 the US announced the formation of an international coalition to defeat the Islamic State, mainly through cooperation with the Kurdish forces (Minardi, 2016 p. 184). Russia officially joined the war in September of 2015 siding with the Assad regime (Lund, 2019 p. 27). What can explain these two states differing alignments? What goals and motives might these two nations have had regarding the situation in Syria? The central research problem is thus to attempt to explain these two major players interests and actions in Syria. Further investigation of the subject of foreign intervention in the Syrian civil war could be argued to be highly relevant, both in the field of political science/international relations and in the interests of the public sphere

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(Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 33-34). The war has had effect throughout the world and has been called “[...] the worst man-made disaster the world has seen since World War II.” (OHCHR, 2017; Landis, 2017). A crisis of this large scale, that has led to millions of Syrians displaced around the world and leaving hundreds of thousands deceased (UCDP, 2020) is surely a case for further research to provide both the public domain and academia with further insight (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 33-34).

1.2 Aim and research questions The aim of this research is to compile and analyze the United States' and the Russian Federation's actions in Syria. Even though certain emphasis is put on the military actions by the states, other actions such as aid and general sympathies towards different factions in the conflict will be considered as well. The theories that will be applied in the analysis will be those of neoliberalism and neorealism. Both theories will be applied in the sense of attempting to explain the different events and actions within the Syrian civil war by the United States and Russia, through the theories. The two research questions that has been formulated for this thesis follows: • How can the Russian Federation's actions within the Syrian civil war be explained through the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism? • How can the United States actions within the Syrian civil war be explained through the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism?

1.3 Previous research

1.3.1 On Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war Ever since the start of the Syrian civil war many scholars have found interest in the conflict. Most of the scholarly work has been published in research journals, but there have also been multiple publications of papers and books have been published about the conflict even if the conflict is still active. Aron Lund (2019) has written about Russia's relationship with Syria as well as the

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nations activities in the civil war. In his research paper ‘From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations’ Lund raises the reasons on why Russia decided to back the Assad regime. Lund’s main finding on this question is that the Russian stance on Syria and the subsequent direct intervention in the war can be considered a countermeasure to the western powers and other global competitors. Lund expands this notion on the idea that Russia acted like it did to reassert its relevance as a substantial player in the international system (Lund, 2019a p. 18, 50-51). That is, the main motives of Russia in the conflict should not be interpreted as an overt fondness of keeping Assad in power, but rather an opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its power and military capabilities to its adversaries (Lund, 2019a p. 51). Lund’s previous research on the Syrian conflict will be considered in the thesis and is helpful for further insight in the Russian Syrian relationship.

1.3.2 On the United States involvement in the Syrian civil war The previous research on the role of the United States in Syria has not been covered as much in academia as the case of the Russian intervention. Nevertheless, there has been some research conducted regarding the United States’ actions in Syria during the civil war. In their research article, International Law and Humanitarian Intervention in the Syrian Civil War: The Role of the United States, Chidozie & Ogunnowo (2020) attempts to investigate the legality of the American actions during the war and the potential interests of the United States in Syria (Chidozie & Ogunnowo, 2020 pp. 1, 8). The authors explain the actions of the United States in the war, as having been motivated by strategic interests. The authors present three broad points of interest that the US have attempted to gain ground. First, the will of destroying ISIS as a safeguard for national security. Second, the will of ousting Assad in order to potentially gain an ally in a new Syrian regime in favour of the US. Third, the interest of controlling natural resources, as have been observed in the wake of the destruction of ISIS where American troops have

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guarded the oil reserves in areas controlled by the Kurds. The authors also raise the American-Russian rivalry as a factor of why the US has interests in Syria, as well as an opportunity for the US to strengthen its ties with its allies in the region who hold grievances towards Assad. Furthermore, the authors stress that the relatively attentive stance of the US, can be explained by the worry of Syria becoming another Libya (Chidozie & Ogunnowo, 2020 p. 8).

1.3.3 Joshua Landis and Syria Comment When the Syrian civil war is brought up in academia and in more common media scenarios, it is almost impossible to not include the work of Joshua Landis. Landis with his top-tier expertise on the conflict, could be considered as being the most influential scholar in the western world on Syria and the Syrian civil war. Landis is most famous for his blog Syria Comment where he and other scholars frequently write about current affairs regarding Syria, everything from domestic events within the country to international relations and great power politics is discussed on the blog. Although this acclamation towards Landis and his knowledge about the conflict is very useful, he has published relatively little about the topics in academic settings. This does not have to be considered as an issue of course, as Landis and his blog contributes to large amounts of information and analysis about the events in the civil war (Landis, 2017). One of the few published peer-reviewed articles by Landis was written in the early stages of the civil war. His article; ‘The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad regime is likely to survive to 2013’ consists of (as the name implies) an overhaul of factors of why Landis doubted an imminent fall of the Assad regime. The first factor brought up by Landis is the military strength, but mainly the structure of the Syrian Arab Army. The higher ranks of the army, just as in government in general, consists of those of the Alawite ethnic group and other Assad loyalists. This would protect the regime from large scale desertions from the army (Landis, 2012a pp. 73-74). The second factor

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was the relatively weak armed opposition in place at the time, where Landis identified the lack of a centralized opposition with many different factions involved in the conflict. Many splinter-groups without central leadership would contribute to a weaker opposition in contrast to the Syrian Arab Army (Landis, 2012a pp. 75-77). The third factor, which might be the most useful information for this thesis, was the unwillingness of the international community to intervene in the early stages of the civil war. Although a large part of the west as well as the Arab League had called for the ousting of Assad, none were ready to militarily intervene at the time (Landis, 2012a pp. 77-78). The fourth and final factor is the economic decline of Syria both before and after the revolution. Landis claimed that even though the economy took a hard hit after the uprising, Syria would look for other partners for help i.e., Russia, China and Iran (Landis, 2012a pp. 81-82). The work of Joshua Landis will surely be of benefit for this thesis, the frequent updates and analysis on his blog, as well as his previous academic work will be very helpful when analyzing the actions of the US and Russia in the Syrian civil war. To be clear, Landis could be considered as being an adherer to the realist school of international relations. He is against the US involvement in Syria and the calls for toppling Assad because of the risks of the nation falling into instability. In his article Stay Out of Syria from the year 2012, Landis said that the idea of a potential democratic regime being established was slim to none to succeed. On top of that, he argued that “the Syrian revolution will be less bloody if Syrians carry it out for themselves” (Landis, 2012b). Landis has persisted in his view of non-interventionism by the US in Syria, in a 2017 interview he called for sanction relief by the US, as he acknowledged the failure of America and the success of Russia and Iran in the war (Landis, 2017). Even though Landis takes a clear stance in the conflict and how it should and should have been handled, his insight is still beneficial and should be considered when analyzing Russia’s and the US’s actions in the conflict.

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2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Neorealism The first theory that will be used in the analysis of the actions in the conflict by Russia and the United States is the international relations theory of neorealism, the theory is split into two variations, offensive and defensive realism. The two most prominent figures in the development of the theory are Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Kenneth Waltz was be the first scholar to formulate and draw an outline for the theory of neorealism of what could be categorized as defensive realism. In his 1979 classic Theory of International Politics, Waltz brings up some basic assumptions that is the basis of neorealism. Waltz puts emphasis on the notion that the international political system is anarchical, not hierarchical in nature. That is, there is no higher authority in the international arena between state actors (Waltz, 1979 pp. 88- 89). Within a state, a hierarchy in the form of the monopoly of violence exists, but beyond the national sphere entering the international arena, a higher authority does not exist or possess any control. This anarchical structure of the international system leads to the fact that a state cannot rely on no other entity but the state itself. This in turn means that all states coexist in a self-help system where every state needs to account for its own security (Waltz, 1979 pp. 118-119). Waltz assumes that the primary goal of a state is to survive, and that a state is only able to survive in the anarchical self-help system through establishing security (Waltz, 1979 pp. 91, 126). Waltz in contrast to offensive neorealists, maintains that power is only a means and not an end for states i.e., power is used only when necessary. Because states only use power as a means and not as an end to gain security and thus survival, states attempt to balance against each other (Waltz, 1979 p. 126). There are two ways that states can indulge in the balance of power, internal and external balancing. Internal balancing is achieved through the military power of a state on its own, and external balancing is achieved through military coalitions and alliances

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between states. Internal balancing, although not possible for all states, is the preferred variant between the two as a state does not have to rely on any other state for its security (Waltz, 1979 p. 168). In a scenario where there are two coalitions (according to defensive realism) states prefer to join the weaker of the two for balancing purposes, to maintain their position in the international system (Waltz, 1979 p. 126). The further development of neorealism is as stated earlier, offensive realism. Offensive realism was introduced by the scholar John Mearsheimer in his 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Offensive realism holds five main assumptions, firstly the assumption that the international system is anarchical. Second, great powers in the international system hold some forms of offensive capabilities that they can use against each other. Third, states cannot be certain if other states will use these powers against it or others. Fourth, the primary goal of states is to survive, finally states are rational in their decision-making in the international arena (Mearsheimer, 2001 pp. 30-32). These assumptions held by Mearsheimer show a lot of similarities with Waltz’s defensive realism. The fundamental difference between the two is the view on the concept of power. As formerly declared, defensive realism holds the view that power is used as means and not an end (Waltz, 1979 p. 126). In contrast, offensive realism holds that the latter is a more adequate description of how power is used. Instead of balancing against each other, states attempt to maximize their power in the world. This does not mean that states always act in a mindless aggressive manner, rather states attempt to calculate their costs vs. benefits before intervening. Although this is usually the case, states sometimes miscalculate their chances in their interventions and end up coming off second best against their opponent (Mearsheimer, 2001 p. 37-38). Furthermore, Mearsheimer states that the offensive behaviour of states is a result of the structure of the international system, i.e., it is not an intrinsic will of said states as it is argued within the school of classical realism (Mearsheimer, 2001 pp. 53-54).

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A third prominent scholar that has contributed to neorealism is Stephen Walt. Walt argues that balancing and bandwagoning behaviour of states goes beyond the aggregated power states possess. According to Walt, the main factor that states consider is not power, but threat. State behaviour such as coalition-building is viewed as a response to threats rather than simply as a response to the amount of power a state holds (Walt, 1985 pp. 8-9). Walt brings up four factors that form the level of threat a state may pose: Aggregate power, proximate power, offensive power and offensive intentions. Aggregate power shows the level of resources that a state can use for threatening purposes, e.g., population, technology, industry and military capability (Walt, 1985 p. 9). Proximate power embodies the geographical aspect of threat, states that are located nearby usually pose a greater threat than states located far away (Walt, 1985 p. 10). Offensive power compromise that states with greater offensive capabilities are more likely to give rise to the creation of alliances. Either as a driving force on its own, or as a reaction by other states to the threat of said state (Walt, 1985 p. 11). The last factor, offensive intentions encompasses the idea that aggressive states are likely to be balanced against by other states. I.e., hostile intentions and ambitions usually lead to counterbalancing measures by other states because of the perceived threat by the aggressive state (Walt, 1985 pp. 12-13). In conclusion, the ideas by Waltz, Mearsheimer and Walt provide the basis and outline of neorealism. Some core concepts from neorealism will be chosen and put into place in the model of analysis further on in this section.

2.2 Neoliberalism The second theory that will be utilized in the analysis of the actions in Syria by the US and Russia is neoliberalism. Neoliberalism was first developed by Robert Keohane in his 1984 classic After Hegemony. In the book, Keohane agrees with the realist notion that the international system is anarchic and that states act on a rational basis (Keohane, 1984 pp. 7, 245). Keohane and other neoliberals do not dismiss realism, but criticism against the theory exists,

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evidently by the development of the theory. The main point of criticism posed, is against realists' unwillingness to regard international institutions as important in the international system. Neoliberals do take international institutions into account, and they stress the importance of looking at the cooperation between states that occur through these institutions (Keohane, 1984 pp. 245-246). Keohane and fellow co-author Joseph Nye further developed this in their book Power and Interdependence. The authors argue that realists fall short on some of the basic assumptions posed about the international system (Keohane & Nye, 2012 p. 19). Keohane & Nye addresses these shortcomings through the idea of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence consists of three main characteristics. First, there are multiple channels that are in play in the international system, relations between nation states (as assumed by realists), trans-governmental relations i.e., with non-governmental elites, and relations with transnational organizations such as corporations, are considered as channels of communication. Thus, connections between societies exceed mere government to government relations (Keohane & Nye, 2012 pp. 20-21). Second, objectives and issues facing governments are not hierarchical, military security is not always the primary objective of states, other issues might be on the agenda, and coalitions are created from that issue e.g., economic agreements or trade (Keohane & Nye, 2012 pp. 20, 22). Third, when complex interdependence prevails, states do not use military force against each other to resolve issues (Keohane & Nye, 2012 pp. 22-24). When these different criteria are present, societies become connected or more appropriately, interdependent. A form of mutualism between societies can be achieved through the different channels. Furthermore, Keohane and Nye are clear with the message that their theory is posed as an alternative to realism and not as a replacement (Keohane & Nye, 2012 pp. 20, 24). Drawing from neoliberal and complex interdependence reasoning, international institutions are significant in contrast to the realist view.

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International organizations allow for cooperation and coalitions between states with common interests and allows for weaker states to form coalitions in institutions such as the United Nations. Furthermore, institutions like these helps to set the international agenda and governments are influenced to act accordingly (Keohane & Nye, 2012 pp. 29-30). Another important concept coined by Joseph Nye is soft versus hard power. Hard power is using coercive means to get others to do what you want, either via incentives or punishment e.g., economic sanctions or military means. In contrast, soft power is the ability to get others to share the same norms and preferences through attraction. Soft power in action is such things as cultural influences through movies and media or spreading the use of languages, mostly through information technology but has historically and still does spread through other media. Shared values and the view of a nation's policies is also two elements of soft power influences (Nye, 2009 p. 160-161; Keohane & Nye, 2012 pp. 216-218). The effective spread of soft power influence varies over time and depends on the geographical setting. An example of this is how American culture historically has been influential in Europe, but less so in the Middle East as well as a decline in Europe in the last few decades (Nye, 2009 p. 161). Another example of soft power is the spread of Russian language and culture in Syria, as well as Russia being praised for their policies by Syrians supporting the regime (Sosnowski & Hastings, 2019; Todman, 2018).

2.3 Model of analysis and operationalization With the previous discussion of the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism a model of analysis will be constructed. To be able to analyse the actions by the US and Russia in Syria, the main concepts drawn from the theories need to go through the operationalization process. Each theoretical concept that is selected will be assigned with indicators, which helps to make the theoretical concepts somewhat measurable. This in turn will allow for a further understanding of the research questions posed in the previous chapter

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(Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 56-57). The operationalization of the core concepts chosen can be seen in Table 1 for neorealism and Table 2 for neoliberalism.

Neorealism

Concept Alliances Capabilities Intentions States join coalitions or States possess military The main motive of states form alliances based on capabilities that they can is survival. States do this the perceived threat use for either offensive or either through maintaining posed upon them by balancing purposes. Their their position in the system another state. Alliance position in the by balancing against each and coalition building international system is other, or by maximizing can also be based on determined by their their power to dominate offensive or balancing military capabilities and the international arena. purposes. how they are used.

Indicators -Alignment in Syria -Military resources -Power maximizing -Coalition alignment -Position in the -Security maximizing -Coalition behaviour international system -Position of military (Joining/Leaving) -Deployment/Absence of troops Table 1. Core concepts drawn from Neorealism operationalized to three indicators per concept

Neoliberalism

Concept Interdependence International Soft Power As societies become Institutions The ability to obtain more interdependent the The role of international preferred outcomes for a importance of military institutions is of high society through attracting force declines. No importance as they and appealing to other hierarchy of issues, other counter international societies via culture, issues e.g., trade may be anarchy. Resolutions values and policies. prioritized. Multiple through the United channels prevail between Nations can help during societies. Corporations conflict. play a role in the system.

Indicators -Policy priorities -Peace talks -Spread of language and -Trade relations -Actions by the UN culture -Corporations -UNSC resolutions -Spread of political values -Humanitarian aid projects Table 2. Core concepts drawn from Neoliberalism operationalized to three indicators per concept

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3 Methodology and Material

3.1 Research design and scope of the study The research problem of this study is to investigate why the United States and Russia have acted like they have done in Syria; this is possible through looking at their actions within the conflict. As this study attempts to investigate the actions of two countries (The US and Russia) within one conflict (The Syrian civil war) the methodology that has been deemed the most suitable is most similar comparative case study. This study should be regarded as a ‘comparative’ case study rather than simply a ‘case study’, the reasoning behind this is that the study includes two contexts i.e., the actions of the US and Russia, within one timeframe i.e., the Syrian civil war (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 p. 109; Baxter & Jack, 2008 p. 550). Moreover, the study is regarded as a ‘most similar’ study because of the two actors being similar in terms of their position in the international sphere e.g., both are permanent members of the security council with veto rights, both could be argued as possessing great military power and so on (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 p. 103; George & Bennett, 2005 pp. 50-51). These arguments indicate that the study falls into the most similar design. However, this might be disputed by some claiming that the two countries differ in many ways. Even though the US and Russia might differ in many ways, I argue that within the specific subject area of conflict and great power politics, the two states could be argued as being very similar in many respects. As the study is considered as being a comparative case study, the methodology is deemed as being qualitative. One strength with qualitative case studies is that they enable the researcher to answer and deal with complex ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Baxter & Jack, 2008 p. 556) for this reason the comparative case study methodology was chosen. Moreover, case study research allows for numerous data sources to be collected and analyzed (Baxter & Jack, 2008 pp. 554-555) this is also beneficial with regards to the research problem as it requires interpretation through many different sources.

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Furthermore, this study has been delimited to investigating the actions of the United States and Russia without delving deeper into the actions of other countries in the conflict. Even though other countries such as Turkey and Iran are major actors in the Syrian conflict and should be considered, the scope of this study does not allow for any deeper analysis of any other actions than those executed by the US and Russia. This does not mean that the actions of other states should be disregarded, but they will only be analyzed when in relation to Russia and the US, this reasoning also applies to international institutions i.e., Russia or the US must have been involved in some way or another. The timeframe of this study is delimited to the span of the Syrian Civil War (so far 2011-2020), only looking at the events and actions involving either the United States or Russia. Furthermore, the actions and events that will be analyzed will have to be selected carefully, as an analysis of every action committed would be impossible. This applies to military and diplomatic events alike. These considerations when delimiting the study were chosen in order to avoid that the span of the study becomes too broad and thereby pose the risk of the analysis being irrelevant or shallow. As the aim of this study is to investigate why the US and Russia have acted like they have in the Syrian conflict, two theories of international relations have been chosen and applied to try to find explanatory factors of the actions committed. The theories are used as tools to analyze the central part of the study i.e., the cases of involvement in Syria during the civil war. The case is in focus and the theories are used as tools to explain the cases, the study can be considered as being theory consuming. The aim is thus to find explanatory factors valid to the specific case of Syria through the theories, the analysis is consequently guided by and dependent on the theories. Furthermore, within theory consuming studies the primary goal is not to find generalizability to other cases (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 42, 89-90). Even though this is the case, generalizability might be possible to similar scenarios, e.g., the situation in Libya in the last few

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years. Thus, generalizability to other cases is possible, but not considered a priority as this is a theory consuming study.

3.2 Material and Data collection The material has been collected from a wide variety of mediums, as the methodology of qualitative case studies allows for data collection from multiple sources (Baxter & Jack, 2008 p. 554). It is also beneficial for this study to be able to collect material from many different origins as the subject area of war can be very complex, this complexity does apply greatly in Syria as the conflict has been very multifaceted in many respects. When collecting data regarding the theories, the classic literature on neorealism and neoliberalism has been used. This includes works by Mearsheimer, Waltz and Walt (Neorealism) as well as Keohane and Nye (Neoliberalism). This was chosen because these scholars and the works by them are regarded as a foundation in the creation of the two theories. Large parts of the material collected for analysis regarding the conflict in Syria has been journal articles and other publications. Many of these publications have been written by the authors presented in the section on previous research, as they evidently possess great knowledge about the conflict. Several books by other authors have also been used to gather material about certain events in the war as well as documents and publications by international entities such as the UN security council. A few news articles have also been used in the material for certain parts of the analysis. This has only been done as a last expedient when information about certain events could not be found in other types of sources. When news articles have been utilized, multiple articles from different news agencies have been collected to be able to avoid significant bias. When collecting the material, the author must evaluate the sources before making use of the data. To make sure that the material collected is credible, four criteria must be considered: Authenticity, neutrality, timeliness and tendency (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 p. 288). The criteria of Authenticity simply

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cover whether the source material is genuine or forged. It is most often not that difficult to determine if materials are forged or not, but it is nevertheless important to be thorough when sources are selected for analysis (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 291-292). Neutrality includes three aspects: First, if several independent sources retell corresponding accounts of an event it increases credibility. Second, primary sources are usually preferable to secondary sources as the primary source has experienced an event firsthand, whereas the secondary source is only retelling that of the primary source. Third, the degree of independence a source inhabits, whether the source of an account has been affected by anyone else or other circumstances, the less the better (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 292-293). Timeliness encompasses the timespan between an event occurring to being reported, the longer an event goes unreported, the information might risk being distorted in hindsight. The final criteria of Tendency cover if a source of an event intentionally distorts information to fit the narrative that they want to prevail, an example of this is political bias in news media. Tendentious material can be difficult to avoid when researching conflict as it is done in this thesis. There is however a way of being able to make use of tendentious material, if multiple different independent sources also confirm the same chain of events then the material may be considered valid (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 294-296). All these criteria have been taken into consideration when selecting material to make use of in the analysis, but as stated before, the risks are high when conducting research on a conflict. When potentially tendentious material e.g., claims and statements by biased actors, will be used in the analysis it will be clearly stated as such, of which actor is claiming what and so forth.

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3.3 Validity and reliability The discussion of validity and reliability is most often associated with quantitative research (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 64-65) but can be considered being at least as important in qualitative research as well. Validity and reliability are set terms within quantitative methods, while within qualitative research different viewpoints are present regarding the meaning of the terms. In qualitative research, validity and reliability can be viewed as being connected and not separated as they are in quantitative research, this leads to qualitative methods using several concepts that encompasses both, such as credibility, transferability and trustworthiness. (Golafshani, 2003 pp. 600- 601). The previous discussion on the source evaluation of the material, plays a part in achieving sought after results regarding these concepts. To recite, as this is considered qualitative research and is based on a multitude of sources and not on numerical data, the four criteria brought up in the previous section is of considerable importance to achieve credibility and trustworthiness. This has been utilized as shown in the previous section. Another important aspect is achieving conceptual validity in the operationalization, i.e., that the indicators are consistent to the theoretical concepts (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 59-61; George & Bennett, 2005 pp. 21-22). During the operationalization process, there are risks in losing validity if the indicators stretch too far from the theoretical concepts and this risk might be lowered by using an already existing model of analysis (Esaiasson et. al, 2017 pp. 59-61). Even though the model of analysis in this thesis has been shaped by me, the indicators chosen have been well considered to be in accordance with the theories to attempt to avoid any errors regarding conceptual validity.

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4 Analysis

4.1 Neorealism

4.1.1 Alliances Ever since the civil war broke out in Syria, the US and Russia have been on different sides in the conflict. Russia has stood firmly with the Assad regime since the start of the conflict whilst the US and other western nations has called for the ousting of Assad (Lund, 2019a p. 18). From 2011 until 2015, Russia supported the Syrian regime diplomatically along with arms shipments with no direct participation by Russian troops on Syrian soil (Lund, 2019a pp. 21- 22). Russia directly joined the Syrian war after being invited by the Assad regime in September of 2015 and has been actively participating ever since. The public reasoning for intervening in the war was to combat ISIS, but since the intervention other opposition groups have been targeted as well (Lund, 2019a p. 27; Lund, 2019b pp. 23-24). The Russian Syrian bond strengthened by Russia joining the war could be interpreted in several different ways. The strengthening of the alliance could be regarded as a balancing effort based on a perceived threat. The Russian intervention in 2015 did in fact come after the US led coalition against ISIS had been established in 2014 (Cîrlig, 2015 p. 8- 9) and the Russian participation in the conflict could thus be interpreted as a balancing effort. Keeping Assad in power would also mean keeping a Russian ally in power. The potential consequences regarding a Syrian regime change could harm Russia’s national security. A western-backed democratic Syria or an Islamic State would effectively mean that Russia would have had a weaker position in the Middle East. The siding with Syria also had military motives such as keeping aerial access to the Middle Eastern theatre that could potentially be weakened with a different Syrian regime (Charap et. al, 2020 p. 12). The Syrian arena can be argued as being very important with regards to

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the balance of power in the region, where the Kremlin has acted accordingly to enact balancing efforts in the heart of the Levant. The United States has had somewhat of a more complicated position in the Syrian conflict, posing different sympathies throughout the war. Initially, the US and the western world called for the expulsion of Assad and supported some rebel groups diplomatically and by arming and training the groups. The US attempted to arm and train the moderate rebel groups, but to no great success as they were crushed by opposing Islamic groups the longer the war went on. The initial American support for the moderates can be considered as being a failure as many of the groups the Americans supported do not exist today, and a lot of the arms eventually ended up in the hands of al-Qaeda affiliated groups (Landis, 2017). Even though the US support for the rebel groups is an important part of their actions in Syria, the coalition against ISIS that would follow is of even more significance. The US led coalition named; Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve; abbreviated CJTF- OIR (Minardi, 2016 p. 192) was formed in September of 2014 as a response to the expansion of ISIS territory throughout Syria and Iraq (Cîrlig, 2015 p. 6). In the start of the campaign, the US stated that the area of operations would be mainly focused on destroying ISIS and the coalition was not intended to overthrow the Syrian regime (Cîrlig, 2015 pp. 8-9). The coalition includes more than 60 members around the world but only a few have participated militarily in the campaign (Cîrlig, 2015 p. 8). One member part of the coalition was the Kurdish group the Syrian Democratic Forces, whose relationship with the US would change throughout the campaign. US and the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces fought side by side against ISIS up until the group was declared defeated in 2018 by President Trump. In connection to this declaration the President also announced his intentions to pull out US forces from Syria (AJIL, 2020 pp. 143-144). The partial withdrawal of troops was followed through in connection to the Turkish invasion of Kurdish held northern Syria in October of 2019. American troops

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were pulled out from the north except for a few hundred that were ordered to guard oil fields in the southeast (AJIL, 2020 pp. 144, 147). With the US being out of northern Syria virtually leaving the Kurds behind, Kurdish forces struck a deal with Russia and Syria to withstand the Turkish invasion through deterrence. The deal allowed Syrian and Russian troops to enter north-eastern Syria (AJIL, 2020 p. 146) which has led to the situation in 2020 where Syrian, Russian, Turkish, Kurdish and American troops are present today (Baldor, 2020; Coskun & Osborn, 2020).

4.1.2 Capabilities Both the United States and Russia have been involved militarily in the Middle East ever since the cold war, the range of involvement has varied from alliances with different countries to full scale war. One important factor regarding capabilities is the military bases that Russia and the US operate from and where these are located. In the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited a Soviet naval base in the Syrian coastal city of Tartus. The base was built in the early 1970s when the USSR had a strong relationship with Syria (Charap et. al, 2020 p. 8, 11). Before the war in Syria the base was mostly used for maintenance purposes, since Russia joined the war in 2015 the base has been heavily upgraded and the areas of operations have been expanded. Other than the naval base in Tartus, Russia has had access to the Basel al-Assad air base located in the Latakia province north of Tartus (Charap et. al, 2020 p. 9- 10; Helou, 2018; Landis, 2017). These two bases have been the main military facilities where Russia has operated from in the conflict. Further expansion and improvement of the military bases was brought up for discussion by Vladimir Putin in May of 2020, which shows the importance for Russia to maintain and protect the bases (Suchkov, 2020). The United States has not had a historical presence in Syria, but military bases were established during the American intervention against the Islamic State in Syria. The most notable American base on Syrian soil is the

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al-Tanf base located in south-eastern Syria near the border to Jordan and Iraq. Al-Tanf was established in early 2016 after ISIS was ousted from the area and US troops have been present ever since in varying numbers (Magruder, 2020). In 2016, US troops were also deployed in the Kurdish held areas in north- eastern Syria in order to assist, train and fight along the Kurdish SDF against ISIS (AJIL, 2020 p. 143; Khlebnikov, 2019). In December of 2018 President Trump announced that American troops in Syria would begin to withdraw their military after the defeat of ISIS. The announced withdrawal was initially intended to include all troops except for those assigned for guarding oil fields in south-eastern Syria (AJIL, 2020 p. 143-144, 146-147). This complete withdrawal of troops did not follow through as the US has further deployed additional troops on Syrian soil (Baldor, 2020). When looking at the military capacities held by Russia and the United States, both states have been present with ground infantry and aerial support within Syria. Russia could be seen as having a larger presence stretching throughout most parts of Syria as of 2020. That said, the US still has personnel in al-Tanf, in parts of the Kurdish held areas and protecting several oil fields in the area around Deir Ezzor. It is important to note that the military capabilities the US holds are not primarily located on Syrian soil, the US has multiple military bases in the neighbouring countries and in the Middle East region. The types of bases stretch from naval bases in allied Gulf states to several air bases located in Iraq and Jordan (Wallin, 2018 p. 4). Furthermore, the US is still determined as the most capable military power in the world (IISS, 2020a p. 45-46). Comparing the capabilities in sheer numbers as of early 2020, the US had a deployment of 1500 troops (IISS, 2020a p. 60) compared to Russia with its 5000 military personnel in Syria (IISS, 2020b p. 208). This implies a Russian dominance, but if forces in neighbouring countries are considered the US shows greater military capabilities. As of February of 2020, 6000 American soldiers were present in Iraq as well as 2300 troops in Jordan (IISS, 2020a p. 59). Moreover, the US could be argued to hold a more modern

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arsenal of weapons than Russia, thus increasing its position regarding capabilities. Concluding this section, Russia could be determined as holding greater capabilities within Syria but looking beyond the borders, the US appears to be a contender.

4.1.3 Intentions This section of the analysis will deal with the general intentions behind the two countries when acting in Syria. As brought up previously, the United States and Russia have essentially been on different sides since the civil war broke out. This means that they have had different motives behind their actions. A few examples of actions and events involving the countries will be brought up to shed light on the intentions the countries have had throughout the conflict starting with the United States. The American intervention in Syria has been mostly in north-eastern Syria and that includes their main area of operations throughout the conflict. The American sentiment towards the Syrian regime has been harsh in words, in 2013 President Obama called for an Assad ousting with the words “Assad must go” (The White House, 2013) and in 2018 President Trump called the Syrian president; “Animal Assad” (Trump, 2018). These statements have sometimes, but not always turned into action. The first direct attack by the US on Syrian forces occurred on the 6th of April in 2017 as a response to the Syrian use of chemical weapons (AJIL, 2017 p. 781-782) and a few other US missile strikes against the regime has occurred since with the same reasoning. From a neorealist point of view, the missile strikes on different targets as a response to the use of chemical weapons might be interpreted as a balancing effort to attempt to weaken the Syrian regime, but this inference is distant in some senses as the reasonings behind the attacks could be more properly interpreted within neoliberalism. What is more interesting is the general presence and actions of US troops in north-eastern Syria and partly in neighbouring countries. That the US even has a presence in Syria after the

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destruction of ISIS could be deemed as a balancing effort. Syria plays a part in the geopolitical game that is the Middle East, and the United States is involved in that game. It maintains a dominant position in the southern Middle East by being allied with several Gulf states but the US faces challenges in the north, competing with other powers (Landis, 2018). The American presence in Syria could be explained as a balancing effort as they still do have a military presence in the country. Even after the partial withdrawal of troops from NE Syria, the troops that remain in the country are functioning as a balance towards other powers (AJIL, 2020 p. 143-144, 146-147). The number of soldiers within Syria does contribute to the power and thereby security the countries hold in that specific case. Even though the US only has a few hundred soldiers still on Syrian soil (Detsch & Gramer, 2020) the mere presence of American soldiers can function as a deterrent of firefights and thereby greater conflict between the great powers, especially Russia. This illustrates balancing in action, the US maintains a number of troops in Syria instead of withdrawing all their troops, to attempt to balance against other nations involved in the conflict, notably Russia and Iran. American troops are also present to a certain extent in the al-Tanf garrison as well (Magruder, 2018). American and Russian forces have had face to face encounters in the northeast, resulting in great tensions between them and sometimes even in injuries. In August of 2020, a few American soldiers were injured after an incident with Russian forces in the north-eastern countryside. Both sides were out on patrol when Russian vehicle struck an American Humvee, allegedly leaving four Americans with mild concussion-like symptoms (BBC News, 2020; Detsch & Gramer, 2020; Seligman & Swan, 2020). Even though the incident was relatively feeble, it is nevertheless two great powers flexing their military might against each other. As a response to increasing tensions, the US sent additional forces to the northeast to further increase their power in the area (BBC News, 2020; Kube, 2020). The most interesting part about the

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situation is the fact that the north-eastern part of Syria is the only place in the world right now where it is possible to see fully equipped Russian and American troops face each other. The increasing tensions and actions could be seen as power maximizing efforts by both countries, as both states have increased their presence in the area acting with relatively high levels of animosity. The Russian presence and actions in the northeast could be interpreted as balancing through power maximizing efforts, but their general presence in Syria could be interpreted as either power or security maximizing efforts. Russia has military access to a large part of Syria as they have access to both regime held areas as well as joint areas of operations in the northeast, compared to the US who is relatively restricted only having access to the northeast and al-Tanf (AJIL, 2020 p. 143; Khlebnikov, 2019; Magruder, 2020). Therefore, Russia has wider possibilities to operate within the country. As brought up earlier in the analysis, the Russian intervention in Syria came in 2015 after the coalition against ISIS was operating (Cîrlig, 2015 p. 8-9). To safeguard Syria would indeed increase their position in the international system. Russia is not seeking to be the preserver of Syria forever. Rather, Russia is seeking to establish a stable, friendly and strong ally. Russia is attempting to secure future endeavours and territorial interests in the region by strengthening the Syrian Arab Army through training and equipping them (Khlebnikov, 2020). In this goal it is not the United States, but Iran that is the true competitor to the Kremlin. Might Russia succeed to gain an upper hand by strengthening the SAA in favour of Iranian backed militias, their influence will be settled in Syria (Khlebnikov, 2020). This aspiration does imply security maximizing efforts in the long term, as Russia seeks to form external balancing structures with Syria as an ally. Furthermore, the Russian intervention from the start of the conflict was partially based on a worry of western interventionism that would negatively impact their national security (Lund, 2019a p. 18). Russian balancing against potential western intervention could be argued as either being offensive or defensive. The

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Russian involvement in the war thus indicates intentions of attaining security through power by securing a position in the Middle East and thereby an increased position in the geopolitical system.

4.2 Neoliberalism

4.2.1 Interdependence Interdependence between the countries will be examined in this section of the analysis. The two states' policy priorities regarding the war, trade relations with Syria as well as activities by corporations in Syria during the war will be examined. Starting with the Russian-Syrian relationship, which is rooted in the days of the USSR, whose relationship has been heavily strengthened since the outbreak of the war (Charap et. al, 2020 pp. 8, 11). Before the war, Russia did have trade relations with Syria, but was not the main trading partner as Damascus was mostly trading with other MENA countries, China and the EU (Lund, 2019a p. 17). Furthermore, Russian trade with Syria has increased, increased investments mostly in strategic sectors such as natural resources and infrastructure. This trade has been slanted in favour of Russia, that said it does not have to be exploitative and could help the Syrian society to recover (Lund, 2019a pp. 44, 48). Some of these investments have been led by Russian corporations. An example of this is a company named Stroytransgaz which has been active in Syria even before the conflict erupted. Stroytransgaz has participated in projects related to natural resources in Syria and has reached further agreements with the Syrian government in the last few years (Bagdonas, 2012 p. 64; Lund, 2019a p. 44). Several other Russian companies have voiced interest for further investments within infrastructure and natural resource extraction. (Lund, 2019a p. 44). When it comes to policy priorities, Russia has arguably held Syria at a quite high priority at least since their intervention in 2015. Even though the Kremlin was hesitant in the first few

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years of the war, they nevertheless stepped up when the Syrian regime had lost a lot of ground (Phillips, 2016 p. 214). The policy priorities of the United States are more in line with complex interdependence reasoning. The US has shown support for the Syrian opposition ever since the start of the revolution but was hesitant to intervene militarily against the regime, it was not until 2017 for the first direct attack on Syria to occur (AJIL, 2017 p. 781-782). The United States previous experiences in the interventions in Iraq and Libya could have been a factor why the hesitant stance has been taken (Chidozie & Ogunnowo, 2020 p. 8; Khlebnikov, 2017) other priorities have been held by the US. The US has imposed and intensified economic sanctions on Syria as a repercussion instead of a full-scale military intervention (Khlebnikov, 2018; Philips, 2016 p. 86- 87) therefore trade has been negligible between the two countries. In August of 2020, the US company Delta Crescent made a deal with the Kurdish authorities in north-eastern Syria to build a refinery for oil and to modernize the oil fields in the Kurdish held areas. Even though the US won't deal with Damascus, it may do so with the Kurds even though investment has been limited (Kajjo, 2020). In conclusion, it is difficult to identify any significant signs of interdependence in the case of Syria. The US hesitation of using full scale military power has been the status-quo, partly because of other priorities in US policy. American trade and foreign investment for the Syrians has been limited with sanctions in place instead, which speak against interdependence. The Russian-Syrian relationship could be argued to be somewhat interdependent as both societies cooperate on a voluntary basis and gain something from it, but it could also be argued that Syria is dependent on Russia. Furthermore, Russia has acted mainly through military means, the one part that might show stronger signs of interdependence is the foreign investments and trade by Russia and Russian corporations.

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4.2.2 International institutions International institutions have been active in and around Syria ever since the war started in the months leading up to the winter of 2011/12 (Philips, 2016 p. 84). The channel where the US and Russia has acted through for the most part is within the United Nations Security Council where both states are permanent members with veto rights. The UNSC has been the main entity where resolutions regarding the conflict have been published, since the outbreak of the war 26 resolutions have been voted through in the security council, without any of the states using their veto rights (Security Council Report, 2020). Even though some success in passing resolutions have been seen through the UNSC, vetoing has been used by Russia in some instances (Philips, 2016 p. 92). To this date, the 26 successfully passed resolutions have covered many different issues; UN Observers, condemnations of the use of chemical weapons, calls for ceasefires and access to humanitarian aid are a few of the resolutions that have been unanimously passed in the security council (Security Council Report, 2020). Bringing up all the UNSC resolutions regarding Syria would be far too excessive, therefore four substantial resolutions have been chosen for further analysis. Resolution 2042 was the first resolution to be successfully unanimously approved in the UNSC in April of 2012, the resolution contained general calls for de-escalation of violence from all parties in the conflict. The resolution also called for 30 unarmed military observers from the UN to be sent to Syria to attempt to “monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties” (UNSC, 2012). Resolution 2118 was adopted in September of 2013, this resolution contained one very important notion of the development of the war, the call for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. This came as a response to several instances where chemical weapons had been used against civilians (UNSC, 2013). The resolution also welcomed efforts by Russia and the US in putting together a framework for the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria (UNGA, 2013).

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These efforts by the UNSC, Russia and the US shows that in the first years of the conflict, small signs of cooperation existed when addressing issues in Syria. Resolution 2254 can be regarded as a staple in the meaning of international institutions in the Syrian conflict. The resolution was adopted in December of 2015, reaffirming the notions brought up in earlier resolutions. The most important part of 2254 was that the focus of the resolution was put on finding political solutions to the conflict (Security Council Report, 2020) by propounding the idea of free and fair elections in Syria within 18 months (UNSC, 2015). The efforts addressed in resolution 2254 were going to be mediated by the International Syria Support Group that organized the Vienna peace talks in 2015. The ISSG consists of different organizations and nation states whose mission is to resolve the Syrian conflict ever since the negotiations began in Vienna in October of 2015 (Cengiz 2020, p. 206; Phillips, 2016 pp. 223-224). A most relevant detail about the ISSG is that the United States and Russia hold a co-chair leadership of the group (U.S. Department of State, 2016; Cengiz 2020, p. 206). The co-chair leadership as well as the ISSG as a whole show indications of attempts of greater cooperation between the different parties in the conflict. The final resolution to be brought up is UNSC resolution 2336 that was adopted in December of 2016. The UNSC recalled all of its previous resolutions, in addition to this the security council welcomed mediation efforts by Russia and Turkey in arranging what would later be called the Astana talks (UNSC, 2016). The Astana talks were to be led by Russia, Turkey and Iran in contrast to previous talks and efforts such as the Geneva talks that had been led by the UN with the US and Russia as the main actors (Cengiz, 2020 p. 206, 210). The Astana talks were initiated in January of 2017 after the Geneva series of talks had repeatedly failed to show substantial results (Cengiz, 2020 p. 207). As the Astana peace process was and still is led by Russia, Turkey and Iran, cooperation between these countries is relatively strong. The U.S. on the other hand has lost the role as key mediator with the Astana peace process in

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motion. The resolutions that have been presented do show some willingness of the security council to de-escalate the situation in Syria. Both Russia and the United States have been involved in all of these resolutions and therefore a relatively collected level of cooperation through the UNSC can be identified. This cooperative spirit between the US and Russia could also be argued of having become weaker in the later years in mediation efforts with the entry of the Astana talks. Even though the security council has been successful in passing some resolutions, disagreements between parties have still been largely present in the overarching sphere that is Syria. As shown in the failure of establishing peace from several peace talks and the fact that the war in Syria is still active. Attempts of mediation through international organizations and forums have been present and somewhat successful in things such as ceasefire agreements, but less successful in establishing permanent peace.

4.2.3 Soft power This section of the analysis will examine if and in what way soft power has been exerted by Russia and the US during the war in Syria. Soft power in Syria has mostly been exerted by Russia and it has been quite successful in improving the Syrian view of the Kremlin. A large part of Russian soft power has been achieved through humanitarian aid projects in areas controlled by the Syrian regime. The aid efforts have been exercised by at least 13 different Russian organizations (Sosnowski & Hastings, 2019); these organizations are diverse in their organizational structure, governmental, non-governmental and the Russian Orthodox Church’s aid organizations are all active within Syria (Robinson, 2020). These organizations have varied in their activities within different types of support and aid and increasing Russian soft power has not only been restrained to humanitarian efforts. An example of this is how Russian language has been introduced in the Syrian school curriculum ever since 2014. This was even before the Russian military intervention in 2015 but was introduced as a recognition for the Russian diplomatic support in favour

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of Syria through other channels. Since the Russian language is being taught throughout the country, increased knowledge and spread of Russian culture is prevailing (Todman, 2018). When the spread of language and culture occurs, Russia becomes more positively viewed amongst Syrians and Russian soft power increases. Another interesting note on the activities by the Russian aid groups is securing loyalty amongst religious and ethnic minorities in Syria, the Russian Orthodox Church is a prime example of this via their support of Christian communities in the country (Robinson, 2020). Furthermore, the Russian soft power efforts could be argued as being well planned out, as increasing aid throughout the world has been promoted with the goal to “strengthen the credibility of Russia and promote an unbiased attitude of the Russian Federation in the international community.” (Sosnowski & Hastings, 2019; Robinson, 2020). American soft power in the Middle East has been decreasing in the last few decades, one monumental reason for the US becoming less influential in the area was the invasion of Iraq (Nye, 2009 p. 161; Phillips, 2016 p. 24). Syria is not excluded from this decrease in the view of the United States. The overall view of both Russia and the US amongst Syrians is difficult to determine, as opinions of the two countries and their cultures may differ depending on which side in the conflict a person is loyal to. Supporters of Assad might be more inclined to favour Russian efforts than a supporter of the opposition. To determine sympathies amongst the opposition become even more complex as there are so many different factions and wills within the opposition against Assad. Secular democratic groups might be more impressed by American values, whilst Islamic groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and The Islamic State hold outright hatred for the west and everything America stands for, of course Russia is not excluded from this animosity from the Islamic extremists. The Kurdish groups sympathies and views of the US have shifted throughout the conflict as US-Kurdish operations have shifted. The view of America might have been very positive when they fought side by side against ISIS but has

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been impaired ever since the partial pullback of US forces, leaving the Kurds to deal with clashes with Turkey in the north-east (AJIL, 2020 pp. 144-146). In terms of soft power, Russia can be determined as coming out on the stronger end as Russian influences reign supreme in government held areas. American soft power efforts have been lacking greatly, maybe because of the splintered opposition where political Islamic values play a factor as a competitor to American ones, resulting in a weak soft power impact. The complex relationship between the Kurdish population and the US could also be considered a weak position regarding soft power.

5 Conclusion

5.1 Answers to the research questions The aim in this thesis has been to analyze the US and Russia’s actions in the Syrian conflict and to explain the actions through the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism. Two research questions were posed, and the main findings will be presented below: • How can the Russian Federation's actions within the Syrian civil war be explained through the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism? Neorealism - Russia has strengthened its alliance with Syria after it joined the war in order to safeguard their position in the international system. - Russia possess strong military capabilities within Syria and has accumulated more power on Syrian territory in the lapse of the war, strengthening its power. Less military capabilities in the rest of the Middle East. - Russia intervened in the conflict in order to balance against the American regime change status-quo and securing their own national interests and influence in the Middle East.

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Neoliberalism - Russia has increased trade, corporate activity and investments in the lapse of the war, even if trade may have been slanted. - Ceasefire agreements have sometimes been achieved and multiple peace talks have been led by Russia. In accordance with the US, but also with Turkey and Iran in Astana. - Russian soft power has increased in the Syrian society through cultural influences, aid projects, and a spread of the Russian language.

• How can the United States actions within the Syrian civil war be explained through the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism? Neorealism - The US has led a coalition against ISIS with other nations and Kurdish groups. Support for other rebel groups have been present but has changed overtime. Attacks on the Syrian regime has occurred sporadically in the form of airstrikes. - The US hold strong capabilities in neighboring countries to Syria. The military presence within Syria is fewer in sheer numbers compared to Russia, but the mere presence of troops has a balancing effect. - Even after promises of American withdrawal, troops remain in parts of the country to secure the American position in the system. Neoliberalism - The US has held other policy priorities than waging war which might explain the hesitation to intervene against Assad. - Frameworks for the elimination of chemical weapons have been shaped in coordination with Russia and peace talks have been conducted. - American soft power has been weak and been insufficient in spreading the western sentiment for secularism and democracy as large parts of

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the opposition has favored Islamic fundamentalist ideals in the lapse of the war. Kurdish opinion of America has been weakened overtime.

5.2 Discussion When looking at the results, explanatory factors for the actions of both countries lean stronger towards neorealist explanations such as balancing efforts, even if neoliberal explanations were found as well. This might have been because of the selection of the material, where a focus has been put on military events. Also, it might have been because of the case selection where the actions by states was analyzed and a major portion of these where military actions. This already speaks in favor of the neorealist point of view, even though neoliberalism hold states as the center of analysis. The results presented in the previous section draw an outline of what the theories was capable to explain. These results should be taken into consideration but should be avoided to be blindly followed as the complete explanation for the actions by the countries. As theories are limited to their own frameworks, other explanations might had been formulated with the use of different theories such as constructivism. Furthermore, the methodology that was utilized has also contributed to the findings. Different results might have shown using a different methodology, a quantitative methodology would be insufficient to deal with the research problem of this thesis but might have been successful in other models regarding conflict. This study allows for future research of other conflicts, similar or different cases alike. One case where a similar study could be conducted is the case of American vs. Russian actions in the Libyan uprising, or even a comparison between Syria and Libya. In conclusion, the results of this thesis demonstrated the great scope of foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict and found theoretical explanations of the actions by Russia and the United States during the now almost decade long conflict. I sincerely hope that this thesis has contributed with further understanding behind the mechanisms in these kinds of situations and opens for further research.

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