Th e Br o o k i n g s In s t i t u t i o n 1775 Ma s s a c h u s e t t s Av e ., NW Wa s h i n g t o n , D.C. 20036-2103 ANALYSIS PAPER www.brookings.edu Number 13, October 2007
Up g r a d i n g Au thoritarianism i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d
St e v e n He y d e m a n n ANALYSIS PAPER Number 13, October 2007
Up g r a d i n g Au thoritarianism i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d
St e v e n He y d e m a n n Ta b l e o f Co n t e n t s
Ac k n o w l e d g m e n t s ...... V.
Ex e cu t i v e Su m m a r y ...... VII
Th e Au t h o r ...... IX
Up g r a d i n g Au thoritarianism ...... 1
Ke y Fe a t u r e s o f Au thoritarian Up g r a d i n g ...... 5
Em e r g i n g Pa t t e r n s i n Ar a b Go v e r n a n c e : Th e Normalization o f Ar a b Au thoritarianism ...... 27
Cr a c k s i n t h e Wa l l ? Au thoritarian Up g r a d i n g a n d U .s . De m o c r a c y Pr o m o t i o n ...... 31
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n iii Ac k n o w l e d g m e n t s
wish to acknowledge, with thanks, the generous support of the Smith-Richardson Foundation for a larger project I of which this analysis paper is a part. Ariel Ahram provided invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this paper. The views presented here are solely those of the author.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n V Ex e cu t i v e Su m m a r y
uthoritarianism in the Arab world is not what it promotion and to recognize, in particular, that Arab Aused to be. Indeed, it might well be stronger, more regimes are converging around policies that are explic- flexible, and more resilient than ever, despite the best itly designed to stabilize and preserve authoritarian efforts of the United States, its European Union part- rule in the context of ongoing demands for political ners, and Arab democrats to bring about sustained and change. At the same time, authoritarian upgrading systematic political reform over the past two decades. holds out clues to the kinds of democratic changes While U.S. conceptions of Arab authoritarianism and it is reasonable to expect in the Arab world, and how U.S. strategies for promoting democratic reform have these are likely to differ from the Latin American and remained largely unchanged during this period, Arab Eastern European experiences that have been a princi- regimes have not stood still. They have adapted by re- pal inspiration for U.S. democracy promotion policies organizing strategies of governance to adjust to new worldwide. To be effective in this context, democracy global, regional, and domestic circumstances. Autocrats promotion efforts must also adapt. have not simply fallen back on coercion to fend off pres- sures for change—though repression remains a visible After twenty years, Arab regimes have become profi- and potent element in the arsenal of Arab governments. cient at containing and disarming democracy pro- Regimes have turned instead to a process that can best motion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. be described as “authoritarian upgrading.” Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance These emerging strategies of governance have un- democratic change in the Middle East than the con- dermined gains achieved by democracy promotion tinuation of policies that do not take into account how programs, and will continue to blunt their impact in governance in the Arab world is being transformed. the future. Has democracy promotion in its current Two openings hold out particular promise: form run its course? Has it outlived its usefulness? The possibility should be on the table. If democra- • First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion poli- cy promotion has, even if unintentionally, provided cies to exploit more effectively the openings that Arab regimes with new tools for securing authoritar- upgrading itself produces; ian forms of governance, should it be continued? If • Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on so, in what form? which upgrading depends.
At a minimum, authoritarian upgrading underscores Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. de- the need to rethink how the U.S. pursues democracy mocracy promotion policies.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n VII Th e Au t h o r
St e v e n He y d e m a n n is Associate Vice President at the adjunct professor in the Department of Government. U.S. Institute of Peace. He was formerly a Nonresident He is the author or editor of several books, including Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Con- Policy at the Brookings Institution. From 2003 to 2007 flict, 1946-1970; War, Institutions and Social Change in he directed the Center for Democracy and Civil So- the Middle East; and Networks of Privilege in the Middle ciety at Georgetown University, where he remains an East: The Politics of Economic Reform Reconsidered.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n iX Up g r a d i n g Au thoritarianism
“Tunisia is our model. Just look at them! They are much more repressive than we are, yet the West loves them. We need to figure out how they do it.” Syrian political analyst, personal interview, May 2006.
n recent years, a new model of authoritarian gover- out trade, investment, and political ties with states that Inance has emerged in a number of key Arab states. either share or are broadly sympathetic to the political A product more of trial and error more than inten- concerns of Arab autocrats in the Levant and North Af- tional design, Arab regimes have adapted to pressures rica, such as the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf. for political change by developing strategies to contain They have built relations with states such as China that and manage demands to democratize. They have ex- are largely indifferent to issues of human rights and panded political spaces—electoral arenas in particu- democracy. This not a “zero sum game” for these Arab lar—where controlled forms of political contestation regimes. They continue to enhance their commercial can occur. They have also tempered their opposition relationships with European Union countries and the to Islamist political participation. In some instances, United States. Yet the diversification of their economic notably Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, Islamist repre- and political relationships generates new sources of sentatives have secured meaningful representation in leverage for Arab regimes in an international system parliament. dominated by the United States, even while diminish- ing the West’s economic and diplomatic influence. Regimes have also adapted selectively to demands for economic liberalization and the integration of Arab Authoritarian upgrading consists, in other words, economies into global markets, and expanded op- not in shutting down and closing off Arab societies portunities for social and economic élites. They have from globalization and other forces of political, eco- developed techniques for managing and easing public nomic, and social change. Nor is it based simply on access to the internet and new communications tech- the willingness of Arab governments to repress their nologies that until recently were resisted as potential opponents. Instead, authoritarian upgrading involves carriers of democratic ideas. They have also recognized reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommo- that authoritarian governance is not inconsistent with, date and manage changing political, economic, and and that its persistence may actually depend upon, social conditions. It originated in no small part as a the strengthening of state capacity and public services defensive response to challenges confronting Arab au- through programs such as civil service reform, educa- tocrats during the past two decades. In recent years, tion reform, and labor market reform. however, authoritarian upgrading has accelerated. It has benefited from U.S. failures in Iraq, and the asso- In addition, upgrading has involved shifts in the for- ciation of democracy promotion with regime change, eign policies of Arab regimes. They increasingly seek social violence and political chaos. Yet the core features
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 1 of authoritarian upgrading have been shaped more to reinforce systems of authoritarian rule.3 The Arab by concerns about how to sustain authoritarian gov- world is often treated as exceptional in its resistance ernance in an era of global democratization than in to democratization—a global outlier that avoided the response to U.S. experiences in Iraq. so-called Third Wave of democratization. Yet its ex- perience of authoritarian upgrading and the rise of Authoritarian upgrading takes a variety of forms, each new hybrid styles of authoritarian governance across influenced by the particular tensions facing individual the region place the Arab world squarely within lead- regimes. Consequently, it would be a mistake to exag- ing global trends over the past decade or more. As a gerate its coherence. There is no single model or tem- result, authoritarian upgrading in different countries plate of authoritarian upgrading that Arab regimes exhibits shared features and reflects common percep- have followed. Nor should we overstate the capacity of tions among Arab autocrats and their counterparts Arab regimes to absorb and implement policy innova- outside the Middle East about how best to position tions. their regimes to survive.
What is clear, however, is that authoritarian upgrading If upgrading has produced frameworks of authoritari- is shaped by what might be called “authoritarian learn- an governance in the Arab world that are more flexible, ing.” Lessons and strategies that originate within, and open, and adept in confronting the demands of global- outside the Middle East, are diffused across the region, ization, democratization, and market-based economic traveling from regime to regime and being modified reforms, coercion nonetheless remains an important in the process. Regimes learn from one another, often part of the mix. Arab regimes have conceded the com- through explicit sharing of experiences.1 However, manding heights of authoritarian rule, opened limited they also learn by observing experiences elsewhere. space for civil societies, permitted opposition parties Most recently, China has emerged as a model of par- to operate more freely, broadened press freedoms, and ticular interest for Arab governments exploring ways acknowledged the legitimacy of human rights. None- to improve economic performance without conceding theless, they continue ruthlessly to police the boundar- political control. Yet learning goes well beyond fascina- ies of acceptable political practice. tion with the Chinese model.2 As Joshua Stacher has observed, in 2006 the Egyptian While attention was focused in the 1990s on pros- authorities cracked down on civil society activists and pects for global democratization, what transpired renewed emergency laws giving extraordinary power in much of the developing world was instead the to security agencies in the teeth of U.S. opposition. globalization of new hybrid forms of authoritarian Egypt has postponed local elections, arrested hundreds governance, including electoral-authoritarian, com- of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, placed the petitive authoritarian, and other hybrid regime types Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide under a travel that exploit elements of openness and contestation ban, and prevented Muslim Brotherhood candidates
1 Anecdotal evidence exists concerning the development in recent years of regional networks of authoritarian expertise, with delegations traveling from one country to another to discuss issues such as how to manage the internet, respond to pressures for political reform, and ensure the fiscal autonomy of regimes. 2 Ellen Lust-Okar, “Reform in Syria: Steering Between the Chinese Model and Regime Change,” Carnegie Paper No. 69 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2006), available at
2 up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d from making additional gains in student and labor as steps toward reconfiguring authoritarianism rather union elections.4 Similar harassment and repression than a process of democratization that would constrain of opposition figures, especially those associated with the power of the monarchy.5 Repression and human the Muslim Brotherhood, have occurred throughout rights abuses also remain commonplace in Morocco, 2007. In Syria, 2006 was marked by the escalating re- even if they are less severe or widespread than in many pression of activists associated with the Beirut-Da- other Arab states. mascus Declaration issued in the spring of that year. Further crackdowns occurred in spring and summer What is emerging in the Arab world, therefore, is a of 2007. This ongoing campaign has included the ar- hybrid form of authoritarianism. It combines tried- rests of dozens of journalists, intellectuals, and activ- and-true strategies of the past—coercion, surveillance, ists, and the imposition of travel bans on prominent patronage, corruption, and personalism—with inno- dissidents. vations that reflect the determination of authoritar- ian élites to respond aggressively to the triple threat of In Tunisia, the convening of the World Summit on the globalization, markets, and democratization. These ef- Information Society in November 2005 was accompa- forts are aimed at creating and sustaining an emerging nied by increased repression and physical abuse of lo- “authoritarian coalition,” one that hinges on preserv- cal and visiting civil society organizers, reporters, and ing existing bases of institutional and social support internet activists. Even in Morocco, often cited as an while strengthening ties to or at a minimum buying exemplar of Arab reform, the political openings en- off, groups that have been regarded by regimes as un- gineered by King Muhammad VI are now recognized reliable, if not potentially antagonistic.
4 Joshua Stacher, “Election Exposure: Comparing the NDP and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt’s 2005 Legislative Elections,” paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 2006. 5 Marina S. Ottaway and Meredith Reilly, “Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition,” Carnegie Paper No.71 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2006), available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 3 Ke y Fe a t u r e s o f Au thoritarian Up g r a d i n g
ive features stand out as defining elements of au- challenges they might contain and to generate political Fthoritarian upgrading. All of these elements are resources that bolster regimes’ hold on power. In few evident in varying combinations in major Arab states, domains has this practice been as visible, widespread, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tu- successful—and for Western promoters of democracy nisia, and Yemen. Indeed, elements of these features less welcome—than in the effectiveness with which are ubiquitous throughout the Arab world, although Arab regimes have appropriated and contained civil the particular mix differs from case to case. The five societies. features are: Beginning in the 1980s, civil society organizations pro- 1. Appropriating and containing civil societies; liferated throughout the Arab world. The expansion of 2. Managing political contestation; Arab non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was in large measure a response to openings from above. Yet 3. Capturing the benefits of selective economic over the subsequent decade there was a new vibrancy reforms; in the civic and associational sectors in Algeria, Egypt, 4. Controlling new communications technologies; Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.6 By the 5. Diversifying international linkages. early 1990s, Arab NGOs had become an active pres- ence in the region’s political life, working to advance agendas that included human rights, political reform, Appropriating a n d Co n t a i n i n g issues of governance and transparency, the environ- Ci v i l So c i e t i e s ment, and women’s rights, among others. The hallmark of authoritarian upgrading is the abil- ity of Arab regimes to exploit rather than resist broad If Arab regimes initially viewed these openings as po- social, political, and economic trends both to blunt the litically expedient—a means to improve their standing
6 The United Nations Development Program explicitly links civil society expansion in Morocco in the 1990s to the country’s “close relations with the European Union,” see Program on Governance in the Arab Region, Civil Society Country Profiles: Morocco, n.d., available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 5 with Western donors and with international financial These trends are clearly visible in the graph “Democ- institutions at a moment of fiscal crisis—the speed and racy in the Arab World.” Data from Freedom House scope of the growth in civil societies led them to reca- on variables relating to the degree of democracy in librate the cost of political openings. Rather than shut the Middle East and North Africa reflects the modest down civil societies entirely, however, regimes gradu- upward trend that was visible during the late 1980s ally adopted a range of complex strategies to reassert and early 1990s in Arab countries. This brief period state control over burgeoning civic sectors. In varying of openness was followed by the reassertion of state degrees, Arab regimes blended repression, regulation, control, including increased restrictions on civil soci- cooptation and the appropriation of NGO functions by ety activities and declining levels of overall democracy the state to contain the deepening of civil societies and beginning in the late 1990s and continuing into the to erode their capacity to challenge political authority.7 current decade.
D�������� �� ��� A��� W���� (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) 3
4
5
6 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
World Average Source: Freedom House. Note: Freedom House measures freedom on a scale of 1 to 7. Arab Average Countries scoring 1.0 to 2.5 are "Free"; 3.0 to 5.0, are termed "Partly Free"; and 5.5 to 7.0 are deemed "Not Free". See “Freedom in the World Frequently Asked Questions,” (Wa shington D.C., Freedom House, 2007), available at:
7 Maha M. Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2004).
6 up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d Regime strategies that emerged to address the growing prohibited NGOs other than registered political par- activism of civil societies included the repression of or- ties from participating in political activities, a broadly ganizations that were deemed especially threatening— framed restriction that could be applied to the work of often those focusing on human rights, government almost any advocacy organization.12 accountability, and electoral reform—and the routine intimidation and harassment of leading political activ- Egypt is not alone in using this tactic. Tunisia reformed ists. Yet they featured other elements, as well, including its association law in 1992, imposing new conditions on the reform of legal frameworks governing NGOs to en- NGOs that essentially forced the Tunisian Human Rights hance the capacity of governments to regulate and con- League to suspend its activities. The League reopened in trol independent civil society organizations, as well as 1993, adopted a much less confrontational stance in its legal measures that did not target civil society per se but relations with the government, but was forced to close were seen by local NGOs as providing regimes with new again in 2000 under pressure from the regime. It has re- mechanisms to intervene in and disrupt their work.8 cently been the subject of government-initiated legal ac- These include laws relating to media control, and new tion. In October 2002, the Jordanian Society for Citizens’ counterterrorism legislation enacted in both Jordan and Rights was closed by the Ministry of Interior for alleg- Morocco in 2005.9 edly violating the Societies and Social Institutions Act. Similar practices are also evident in Morocco, where the The most blatant example of the use of legal reform U.S. State Department noted in 2005 that “under a de- to contain civil societies was the highly controversial cree restricting civil society organizations, persons who passage in 2002 of a revised Law of Associations in wish to create an organization are required to obtain the Egypt.10 The new law—which replaced a 1999 version approval of the Ministry of Interior to hold meetings. In struck down by Egypt’s Supreme Court—imposed new practice the ministry generally used this requirement to restrictions on NGO activities and funding, limiting prevent persons suspected of advocating causes opposed their access to external resources. It required as many by the government from forming legal organizations.”13 as 16,000 Egyptian NGOs to re-register with the Min- Restrictions on NGO participation in politics are in- istry of Social Affairs. During this process the ministry cluded in Jordan’s 1996 Law on Associations and Foun- rejected the applications of a number of well-known dations, in modified form in Algeria’s Organic Law Gov- human rights and advocacy organizations, includ- erning Political Parties, amended in March 1997, and in ing the New Women Research Center.11 The law also Morocco’s Code of Public Liberties.
8 Pete Moore and Bassel F. Salloukh, “Struggles Under Authoritarianism: Regimes, States, and Professional Associations in the Arab World,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 53-76. 9 Jillian Schwedler, “Don’t Blink: Jordan’s Democratic Opening and Closing,” Middle East Report Online, July 3, 2002, available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 7 Without criminalizing NGOs across the board or en- In Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, for example, regime élites gaging in blanket repression the introduction of these have become visible sponsors of semi-official NGOs new frameworks for the governance of non-profit or- that enjoy protected status, benefit from privileged re- ganizations and civic associations has weakened their lations with powerful political actors, but lack mean- autonomy and limited their capacity to challenge gov- ingful autonomy. These tend to be located in service ernment policies and practices. They also contribute provision, education, training, sports, youth develop- to a legal and institutional context that promotes frag- ment, and other areas that are seen as apolitical and mentation and competition among NGOs dependent therefore non-threatening. upon scarce local resources. In addition, the complexity and opaqueness of regulatory regimes creates ambigu- First ladies in the Arab world are especially prominent ous legal environments, leaving civil society groups as founders and sponsors of such semi-official NGOs. uncertain about the legality of everyday activities (for The wife of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, Asma al- instance, what constitutes political participation?). Le- Asad, is the official sponsor of seven NGOs, including gal reforms are often seen by civil society activists as a youth organization, Shabab (Youth); Modernising forcing NGOs to break the law by engaging in activities and Activating Women’s Role in Economic Develop- that are formally illegal but tolerated, exposing them ment (MAWRED, meaning “the source” in Arabic), to the constant threat of arbitrary government action which focuses on strengthening womens’ participation should they fall out of favor or cross poorly-defined in the economy; and the Rural Fund for Development red lines.14 As noted by Human Rights Watch in its of Syria (FIRDOS, meaning “paradise” in Arabic) coverage of Tunisia: which is active in the areas of microfinance, cultural authorities have refused legal recognition to conservation, education, women’s empowerment, every truly independent human rights orga- tourism, and the environment. Recently, all seven of nization that has applied over the past decade. these organizations were centralized within the Syrian They then use the pretext of an organiza- Trust for Development. Queen Rania of Jordan estab- tion’s “illegal” status to hamper its activities. lished the Jordan River Foundation, which is active in On September 3 [2005], police encircled the the areas of microfinance, cultural conservation, edu- Tunis office of the non-recognized National cation, women’s empowerment, tourism, and the envi- Council on Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT) and, ronment. Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of Egypt’s presi- as they had done many times before, prevent- dent, has long been active as a sponsor and supporter ed members from meeting.15 of NGOs and a vocal advocate of Egypt’s civil society in international forums, whether as president of Egypt’s Repression, however, comes at a cost. The suppression National Council of Women, founder and chair of the of independent NGOs has exposed Arab regimes to Helioplis Services Development Society, patron of the sharp criticism, damaging their reputations at home Egyptian co-production of Sesame Street, or founder and abroad. To fend off this scrutiny, coercion has been of the Egyptian Society For Childhood and Develop- supplemented by additional strategies through which ment, among other high-profile NGO affiliations. regimes exploit the rhetoric and organizational frame- works of civil society to generate political resources Semi-official or privileged NGO sectors serve a num- that can be appropriated and used to their advantage. ber of useful functions. They often provide meaning-
14 Personal interview with NGO. 15 Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Overview: Tunisia” (New York: Human Rights Watch, n.d.), available at
8 up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d ful services to citizens, draw local and international man Rights League, formed in 1975, three years before attention to worthy causes, attract both domestic and the establishment of Helsinki Watch (later Human international funding (with fewer restrictions than Rights Watch) is widely regarded as the first Arab hu- those imposed on independent civil society organi- man rights NGO. The Tunisian Association for Human zations) and are able by virtue of their prominent Rights was created not long after in 1977. By the early sponsors to act more boldly than independent coun- 1990s, however, at the moment in which the Tunisian terparts. Despite these benefits, state-sponsored and government was retreating from political liberalization dependent civil societies are incapable of playing an and engaging in widespread repression of civic orga- autonomous political role. They are largely unable to nizations and opposition movements, it expanded its serve as mechanisms of accountability and transpar- official role as defender of human rights. In 1991, the ency, as a check on government power, or as meaning- government created two new offices, a Special Advisor ful sources of civic mobilization. They offer regimes to the President on Human Rights and the Supreme opportunities to posture as supporters of civil society Authority for Human Rights. Within less than a year, while preventing the emergence of autonomous civic the Tunisian Human Rights League shut down. By the life and insulating themselves from any meaningful end of the 1990s, Human Rights Watch indicated that public accountability. in “Tunisia, the government sought not only to present its own version of human rights and democratization Finally, Arab regimes not only sponsor semi-official but employed repressive and sometimes brutal mea- civil society sectors, they have themselves appropri- sures to muzzle Tunisian human rights activists who ated and internalized specific functions—notably tried to portray a truer picture.”17 advocacy and watchdog roles—pre-empting existing frameworks for civic engagement and mobilization Regimes in virtually every Arab state engaged in similar while hoping to enhance their own legitimacy in the moves. In Algeria, independent human rights organi- process.16 Regimes thus insert themselves directly into zations emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fol- key political debates in which civil societies have been lowed in the 1990s, during a period of political closure especially vocal, forcing engagement on controversial and wrenching social violence, by the establishment of issues into official, state-dominated channels, and state institutions tasked with overseeing human rights crowding out or simply repressing independent NGOs practices. Jordan established the governmental Nation- working in these spheres. This is most visible in an area al Center for Human Rights in 2002. In Egypt, unsur- where Arab regimes are highly vulnerable to criticism: prisingly, the appropriation of human rights oversight human rights. by the state has led to the proliferation of offices and agencies with overlapping roles, including the Public In country after country, governments have appropri- Administration for Human Rights, established in 2001, ated the role of human rights monitor and protector and a Human Rights Directorate at the Ministry of the while simultaneously repressing independent human Interior, the agency that oversees some of Egypt’s in- rights organizations. During the 1970s and 1980s, hu- ternal security forces, created in 2005. Yemen’s govern- man rights emerged as key focus of civic mobilization ment hosted an international event in June 2006 called across the Arab world; Tunisia was a model in the de- the “Sana’a International Conference on Democracy, velopment of human rights NGOs. The Tunisian Hu- Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression.” Though
16 André Bank, “Rents, Cooptation, and Economized Discourse: Three Dimensions of Political Rule in Jordan, Morocco and Syria,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1-2 (2004), pp. 155-79. The author wishes to thank Joshua Stacher for bringing this article to his attention. 17 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 9 sponsored in part by an Italian NGO and the European by government to keep civic activism low, NGO sectors Union, and including a number of civil society repre- fragmented, and civil society organizations weak. sentatives, the final communiqué of the meeting was characterized by NGOs as reflecting a “governmental vision,” rather than NGO views. In Morocco, indepen- Ma n a g i n g Po l i t i c a l Co n t e s t a t i o n dent human rights organizations first appeared in the In recent years the Arab world has seen growing levels late 1970s. By the early 1990s, however, the monarchy of political competition, increased attention from re- had begun to insert itself directly into human rights gimes to issues of electoral reform, and a widespread issues. A formal Advisory Council on Human Rights sense of progress in the liberalization, if not the de- was established by King Hassan in 1990; a full-fledged mocratization, of electoral arenas. Egypt, Algeria, Ye- Ministry of Human Rights was established in 1993. If men, Jordan and Morocco have all modified electoral Morocco has moved further than most Arab regimes laws to improve voter participation, ease restrictions to address human rights abuses, it has nonetheless jux- on political competition, and strengthen oversight taposed the appropriation of human rights oversight and administration of elections.18 In some instances, as a government function with restrictions on inde- these reforms have produced real gains. Egypt’s 2005 pendent groups—even though the Advisory Council, parliamentary elections resulted in the unexpected like similar bodies in other Arab states, has included victory of 88 candidates associated with the Muslim representatives of civil society organizations. Brotherhood, the strongest electoral performance of moderate Islamists in the Arab world.19 In September This dual strategy of appropriating civil society while 2007, Morocco’s main Islamist movement, the Justice restricting independent civic organizations has pro- and Development Party secured 47 seats in parliamen- duced a distinctive civic landscape in the Arab world. tary elections.20 Earlier in 2007, King Abdullah ended Regimes have retreated from the commanding heights months of speculation about a delay in parliamentary of authoritarianism, repressing more selectively, em- elections in Jordan by confirming that they would he bracing discourses of human rights and democratiza- held on schedule, in the fall of 2007.21 tion, and opening more space for civic forms of orga- nization than in the past. In some instances, such as Foreign officials have praised regimes for these chang- Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen there have been substan- es. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice congratulated tive gains for society and new possibilities for holding Jordan in October 2006 for “making really great strides government accountable to citizens. At the same time, in its political evolution.”22 A European Union Election however, these civic spaces are contained, regulated, and Observer Mission characterized the September 2006 hemmed in by regimes that combine legalism, coercion, elections in Yemen as a “milestone in the democratic cooptation, and the appropriation of civil society roles development of Yemen.”23
18 Amy Hawthorne, “Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?” Carnegie Paper No. 52 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2004), available at
10 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d As most observers of Arab politics recognize, however, groups to arbitrary regulation, impose obstacles to po- there is less to these changes than meets the eye. Elec- litical party formation and financing, and restrict op- toral reforms in Arab countries have less to do with position access to media while regimes sanction media democratization than with making elections safe for campaigns that demonize opposition figures. These authoritarianism.24 Regime management of electoral measures are often accompanied by abuse of state au- arenas reflects the double-edged logic of authoritarian thority during elections to repress voter participation upgrading. Reforms permit increased levels of political (surrounding polling stations with soldiers and police, contestation—and in this sense they cannot be dismissed creating obstacles to voting, or outright attacks by of- as meaningless. Yet they also ensure that elections re- ficial forces on voters), along with many instances of main tightly managed and operate as substantially un- fraud in the conduct of elections, with vote buying be- even playing fields that distort electoral outcomes to ing the most common example.25 the benefit of regimes. As recent elections in Yemen and Egypt showed, regimes combine tolerance for higher The most important advantage exploited by regimes, levels of electoral competition, including participation however, is the manner in which, over time, states and by Islamists willing to play within state-defined limits, ruling parties in the Arab world have become virtually with tactics designed to ensure that ruling parties con- indistinguishable.26 This phenomenon is pervasive, but tinue to dominate electoral outcomes. is often difficult to detect. Incumbents benefit in count- less ways from their capacity to exploit the full scope The instruments that regimes have adopted to ad- of state resources and personnel on their own behalf— vance these aims are similar to those used to manage and not only in the distribution of pork and patron- and contain civil societies more broadly. Opposition age, but also in the conduct and oversight of elections. activities and leaders seen as especially threatening The visible expression of this advantage may appear in- become targets of regime coercion and repression, as nocuous: in Yemen’s 2006 elections, soldiers plastered in the cases of Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman Nour their weapons, jeeps, and clothing with photographs in Egypt—senior opposition figures imprisoned by of the president while guarding polling stations. More the government on highly suspect charges. In a num- often, however, it is both explicit and ominous. Elec- ber of instances, including Algeria, Egypt, and Syria, tion commissions are stacked with regime supporters; countries continue to be governed under emergency election judges and monitors are often partisan, as well. security laws that have been in force for decades, ex- Investigation of complaints about bias and abuse re- posing opposition activists and parties to charges of ceive unequal treatment. Vote counts are overseen by subversion, treason, and violation of emergency stat- officials who owe their positions to the ruling party. utes under systems that provide little transparency or Regions or districts that are known to favor opposition accountability. candidates are more heavily policed than others. And so on. In countless ways both large and small regimes have In addition, legal frameworks fragment and disorga- exploited their control of the state to stack the deck— nize political oppositions. They subject opposition legally and otherwise—against opposition parties.
24 Marsha Pripstein-Posusney, “Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World,” Middle East Report, No. 209 (Winter 1998), available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 11 Interestingly, ruling parties have also embraced the ticipation allows them to demonstrate a willingness technological apparatus associated with elections in to play by the rules of the electoral game. Whether established democracies. High-tech “war rooms,” a this will continue, however, remains an open ques- term that has been imported in English into the po- tion. The failure of elections to produce meaningful litical vernacular in places like Egypt, have been estab- shifts in the distribution of political power is visibly lished by the technocratic cadres of ruling parties in eroding public confidence in and support for - elec recent elections in both Egypt and Yemen. In the Egyp- toral politics.28 tian case, the “war room” became the base for massive efforts to identify likely voters, track voter turnout, Even as the space for contestation expands, therefore, conduct survey research and focus groups, amass pho- electoral outcomes reinforce the status quo. The results tographs of polling stations throughout the voting to are at once visible and deeply entrenched. In Yemen, monitor traffic at the polls, and other practices asso- election observers from the European Union conclud- ciated with state-of-the-art election management.27 ed that “the fairness of the campaign was undermined Whether these efforts connect to the actual experience by the systemic and exclusive use of State resources to of electoral politics, however, seems doubtful. favour the incumbent. State agencies, especially the police and military, showed overwhelming support for As these examples illustrate, in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, President Saleh and the ruling party. The SCER [Su- Morocco, and Yemen, regimes have moved gradually, preme Commission for Elections and Referendum] and less by design than through ad hoc adjustments, took no action to enforce legal provisions that pro- to accommodate external and internal pressure, to- hibit such conduct.”29 In Egypt, according to the Inter- wards top-down and controlled strategies for manag- national Crisis Group, “Egypt’s first multi-candidate ing political contestation. These permit more limited presidential election [in 2005], a response to U.S. pres- and selective use of repression, establish regimes as sure, was a false start for reform. . . . The conditions for at least partly responsive to demands for the expan- a genuinely contested presidential election simply did 30 sion of political participation, and diffuse criticism of not exist.” Concerning Morocco, Democracy Report- slow progress on political reform. Such changes pre- ing International noted that: serve, if not enhance, regime capacity to control the The election system favours the fragmenta- levers of political power. Moreover, these hybrid ap- tion of the political landscape and represen- proaches to contestation pose a significant dilemma tation in Parliament, preventing the emer- for opposition parties and activists: whether or not gence of any significant political force that to participate in elections knowing that the political could more forcefully promote an extension game is largely fixed. For many opposition activists, of Parliament’s prerogatives or a better use however, the benefits of campaigning, the chance to of its existing powers. . . . The limited role of raise issues and establish reputations (at home and, Parliament in the constitutional architecture no less important, among the democracy promotion and the political context of Morocco reduces community abroad) justify participation despite its the importance of elections for democrati- limits and risks. Similarly, for Islamists electoral par- sation.31
27 Joshua Stacher, personal communication with the author, April 2007. 28 In Morocco’s recent elections, some 20 percent of ballots cast were ruined, an exceptionally high rate of spoilage that has been widely read as a reflection of popular disenchantment with elections that do not produce meaningful change. 29 European Union Election Observer Mission, op.cit., p.2. 30 International Crisis Group, Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy, Middle East Africa Report No. 46, October 4, 2005, available at
12 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d Not all regimes have adopted these strategies to the states remain prominent economic actors and public same degree. Among the most repressive regimes, in- sectors provide regime patronage and political support, cluding Syria and Tunisia, electoral contests continue private sectors are receiving encouragement from gov- to function as empty exercises in political symbolism. ernments anxious to improve economic performance In 2004 Tunisia’s President Zine El Abidine Bin Ali and spur the creation of new jobs. Although populism made clear that the practice of Arab leaders produc- remains alive and well in much of the Arab world, at ing comically-outsized electoral victories is alive and least rhetorically, economic reforms have opened the well when he claimed some 94.5 percent of the votes door to foreign investment and trade. Governments with virtually 100 percent turnout. This number was, offer incentives for exporters and are moving toward however, a notable decline from the 99 percent he had more flexible labor markets. They are seeking mem- received in 1999. It was also less than the 98 percent bership in international institutions such as the World that Bashar al-Asad received in a national referendum Trade Organization, and participate in efforts support- in 2000 when he succeeded his late father as president ed by international financial institutions to strengthen of Syria and the 97.6 percent vote in his favor in a simi- systems of economic governance. lar 2007 referendum. These shifts in public policy are increasingly visible in For the most part, however, upgrading suggests that the daily lives of Arab citizens, especially those with these outsized margins will become a thing of the past. the resources to take advantage of economic openness. In much of the Arab world new strategies for manag- Across the Arab world, public space has been trans- ing political contestation permit levels of opposition formed by the region’s growing connection to global activity that would have seemed intolerable a decade markets. There are dozens of upscale coffee shops pop- ago. Thus, recent presidential elections in Egypt and ping up in Cairo that offer free wireless internet access Yemen did not produce the 99 percent victory for in- to laptop toting students and businessmen, as do the cumbents that have made Arab elections the subject of local McDonalds outlets.32 There is a proliferation of widespread derision. Rather, as in the case of Yemen’s American-style multi-story shopping malls complete President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a victory of 77 percent with multiplex cinemas, stores selling high-end luxury was more than adequate to preserve his regime’s grip goods and the latest in high-technology gadgetry.33 on power. For regime opponents, however, 77 is the These trends are evident even among the region’s eco- new 99: true democratic breakthroughs remain as dis- nomic reform laggards such as Syria. On a busy street tant a possibility in the Arab world today as they were corner in the upscale Abu Roumaneh neighborhood of two decades ago. Damascus the staff at a bustling Kentucky Fried Chick- en franchise invite diners to “upsize,” their “combo” meals. Nearby, a massive billboard for Benetton looms Ca p t u r i n g t h e Be n e f i t s o f Se l e c t i v e over Toscana, a popular destination for young afflu- Ec o n o m i c Re f o r m s ent Damascenes who puff on water pipes and chat on Over the past two decades markets have made signifi- cell phones until the early hours of the morning, not cant inroads across the Middle East, far outpacing the concerned about spending on dinner as much as some progress of political reform. Even in countries where Syrians earn in a week.
32 Diane Singerman and Paul Amar, eds., Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in the New Middle East (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006). 33 Large American-style shopping malls have long been present in Saudi Arabia and in the other Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. In recent years they have spread to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Aqaba. One will open in 2008 in Aleppo in Syria.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 13 In this domain as well, however, regime strategies re- for example, the decision to award a license to run flect an explicitly political logic, and take a common the country’s first private telecoms company, Syriatel, form, one not limited to the Middle East. Across the was a barely concealed exercise in high-end patron- region selective processes of economic liberalization age politics: some 55 percent of the company’s shares provide enhanced economic opportunities for regime are held by Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of President supporters, reinforce the social base of authoritarian Bashar al-Asad. As one indicator of the scale of this regimes, and mitigate pressures for comprehensive business, in June 2006 Makhlouf announced that Syri- economic and social reforms.34 atel’s tax payments alone represented 1.7 percent of Syria’s GDP.36 In the Jordanian case, privatization of Alongside limited but nonetheless meaningful im- the telecommunications sector provoked stiff compe- provements in some economic indicators, selective tition among competing networks of business élites, reforms have provided governments in Algeria, Egypt, political élites, and international partners. In the end, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia with the resourc- the initial license went to a consortium that included es needed to sustain systems of rule that continue to “former chief of staff and chief of police Abd al-Hadi rely heavily on patronage networks. These selective al-Majali and his son Sahil, the London-based Iraqi in- changes also secure the privileged position of military- vestor Nathmi Awji, and the Abu Jaber business family; industrial establishments that have become large-scale the foreign partner of the consortium was the Ameri- economic actors. Limited reforms also co-opt impor- can Motorola company.”37 tant segments of the private sector that strongly sup- port selective processes of economic liberalization. In Egypt, one of the largest of the country’s early priva- These strategies permit politically-connected busi- tization episodes concerned the sale of the state-owned nessmen and their political counterparts within the Coca Cola bottling plant, which went to Mohamed bureaucracy to enrich themselves but do not provide Nosseir, a close ally of powerful political élites includ- for the broad-gauged transparency, accountability, or ing the prime minister at the time, Atef Sidqi, and fu- true democratization of access to economic opportu- ture prime minister Atef Ebeid. “After all,” Sfakianakis nity that might accompany comprehensive strategies notes, “Nosseir and the rest of the crony business élite of economic reform.35 were only doing what the structure of the economy had allowed them to do: provide politically helpful services Evidence of these strategies can be found throughout to the regime.”38 the Middle East and North Africa. They are visible in the privatization of state-owned enterprises, especially Beyond these high profile instances of privatization, in the sale of state-owned enterprises in such lucra- regimes are also able to exploit economic liberalization tive and fast-growing sectors as telecoms. In Syria, with less public but equally important regulatory re-
34 This view of the political uses of economic reform by authoritarian regimes runs directly counter to the claims of Geddes and other scholars of authoritarianism and democratization that “various economic reforms were cutting profit opportunities out from under rent seekers all of over the world.” Geddes, op. cit., p. 139. A set of case studies detailing the persistence of pre-reform rent seeking networks during and after the introduction of reform programs can be found in Steven Heydemann, (ed.), Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 35 John Sfakianakis, “The Whales of the Nile: Networks, Businessmen, and Bureaucrats During the Era of Privatization in Egypt,” in Heydemann (ed.), op. cit., pp. 77-100. 36 Joshua Landis, “Could Syria’s GDP Growth be 5.5%?!,” SyriaComment.com, June 4, 2006, available at
14 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d forms such as tariff liberalization, the imposition of an friends and penalizing adversaries. Selective economic income tax, or banking sector reform. The general pat- reforms generate the essential economic resources tern is for formal regulatory changes—tax, fiscal, and upon which processes of authoritarian upgrading de- trade reforms being among the most common—to pend. They also provide the basis for expanding the so- provide opportunities for regime officials and business cial coalitions that help to stabilize regimes politically, élites to renegotiate rent-seeking arrangements. They providing incentives that bind private sector actors to are able to do this through for example the arbitrary élite counterparts in government and the bureaucracy. award of exemptions from tax and customs duties, or other forms of privileged treatment over which regime Moreover, economic reform programs and the inter- officials possess considerable discretion. national relationships that develop to manage them offer an additional arena in which regime élites exploit These reforms cement longstanding alliances between their privileged access to international institutions, ex- key business élites and regimes. Yet they also generate pertise, and resources. They can thereby enhance their less well-publicized but equally important spill-over domestic standing, and use these international links to benefits that enhance the standing of regimes among insert their allies and clients into positions of interna- much larger segments of Arab societies. These include tional influence and visibility. In some instances, hun- the opportunities such reforms provide to larger net- dreds of millions of dollars are at stake.39 Large-scale works of business actors that circulate on the margins projects aimed at reforming higher education sectors of the leading business families and their political al- across the Middle East and North Africa, the modern- lies. Though less visible, these larger networks are no ization of core infrastructure such as the Cairo Airport less important politically. If small-scale manufactur- project, and similar activities in public services, health ers, traders, and retailers benefit far less from selective care, and other fields are used instrumentally by re- reforms than do their more influential counterparts, gimes as potent political assets. These activities are not they are nonetheless significant constituencies for au- the object of political competition, political capture, thoritarian regimes that continue to claim a role as de- or predatory rent seeking in a crude sense, although fenders of the economic interests of workers and the such behavior is unquestionably present. Rather, they middle class. express the dual-edged character of authoritarian gov- ernance in which processes such as development lend- In this sense, selective liberalization reflects the broad- ing, and the oversight and accountability that typically er dynamics of authoritarian upgrading: Arab regimes accompany it, are now seen less as threats to the au- appropriate and exploit economic policies that are of- tonomy of Arab regimes than as instruments for ex- ten seen as inimical to authoritarianism because they tending and deepening their authority. are able to use these instruments to reinforce their hold on political power. For governments, the political Nonetheless, selective reform programs also carry po- benefits of selective liberalization are particularly im- litical risks. They have helped regimes to sustain redis- portant. Regime élites and their allies use their political tributive programs and subsidies that preserve the sup- privileges to capture the resources generated by eco- port of key constituencies, including labor. Yet social nomic openings. Incumbents manage access to eco- safety nets in the Arab world have substantially frayed nomic opportunities as a political resource, rewarding in recent decades, and they face increased strain from
39 Florian Kohstall, “Policy Transfer, Social Reforms, and the Dynamics of Dynastic Succession in Egypt,” paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Boston, November 2006.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 15 an expanding population of urban poor and growing mal sector, where few workers have access to social in- ranks of unemployed youth—often college-educated surance, retirement benefits, or other social protections. children of a downwardly mobile middle class.40 Im- The decline in public sector employment is driving provements in overall economic growth rates are highly some job seekers not into the private sector, but out of uneven and highly volatile. Since 2003, Egypt, Morocco, the workforce altogether. This trend is especially notable and Tunisia have all reformed the basic laws regulating among college-educated women, who have the highest labor markets, increasing the flexibility of employers to unemployment rates in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tu- hire and fire. Unemployment rates have declined in all nisia. Overall, moreover, economic inequality is growing three countries, as well as in Syria, and private sectors in a region that has long placed a premium on economic are now outpacing public sectors as sources of job cre- equity and distributive justice (see graph “GDP growth ation.41 Yet the vast majority of new jobs are in the infor- and income inequality in the Arab World”).
GDP G����� ��� I����� I��������� �� ��� A��� W���� (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen)
49 14
48 12 47 10 46 8 45
44 6
43 4 42 2 41 0 40
39 -2
38 -4 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Source: World Development Indicators, University of Texas Inequality Project, available at
40 Shana Cohen, Searching for a Different Future: The Rise of a Global Middle Class in Morocco (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004); Julia Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development and the State in Cairo (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005). 41 Ragui Assaad, “Employment and Unemployment Dynamics,” paper presented at the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey 2006 Dissemination Conference, Cairo, October 30, 2006.
16 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d Public sector employment remains desirable, particu- For institutions such as the World Bank, these con- larly among university graduates, but provides far less ditions underscore the need to move from selective protection or security than it did in the past. Indeed, to comprehensive strategies of economic reform, even as public sectors remain useful for regime pa- strengthen accountability and governance, and put in tronage (and continue to represent an important share place new social contracts for managing state-labor of new job creation), they are home to an organized relations.43 Arab regimes, however, have drawn the labor élite that could become a significant source of opposite conclusion. They perceive powerful politi- opposition if its position and privileges are threatened. cal incentives in preserving selective reforms, retain- Despite the close links between regimes and orga- ing the capacity to control and regulate markets, and nized labor, and strict controls across the Arab world maintaining the hybrid, selectively reformed econo- on the right to strike, recent outbreaks of grassroots mies emerging across the Arab world. Arab incum- labor militancy in Egypt’s unionized textile sector un- bents have thus adapted to shifts in the global econ- derscore the political costs associated with economic omy and to pressure for economic liberalization in liberalization and deepening inequality.42 These costs ways that the advocates of economic reform have yet also help to explain why the Middle East has under- to recognize. gone less privatization than any other region in the world (see graph “Number of Privatized Firms by Re- For almost two decades before 9/11, U.S. policymak- gion, 2000-5”). ers and others argued that the road to democracy in
N����� �� P��������� F���� �� R�����, ����-����
120 102 100 89 83 80 80
60 44 40
20
0 East Asia & Pacific Latin America & Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Arab World (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia)
Source: Privatization Database, 2007, available at
42 Some 20,000 textile workers at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company, a large-scale public enterprise, took part in protests sparked by salary concerns in December 2006. Joel Beinin and Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Egyptian Textile Workers Confront the New Economic Order,” Middle East Reports Online, March 25, 2007, available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 17 the Arab world ran through economic reforms that again framing U.S. engagement with Arab governments, would spur growth, create jobs, and mitigate the so- the capacity of regimes to sustain strategies of selective cial conditions felt to promote extremism, and create economic reform as a key element of authoritarian up- the conditions necessary for advancing political liber- grading faces few meaningful challenges. alization. A “markets first, democracy later” approach became the cornerstone of U.S. policies toward the Arab world in the early 1990s, when experiments in Co n t r o l l i n g Ne w Co m m u n i c a t i o n s “dual reform” ended in an Islamist upsurge in Algeria, Te ch n o l o g i e s Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Leading schol- In upscale neighborhoods in Damascus, internet cafés ars of democracy promotion continue to advocate dot almost every block. Juice bars and cafés offer their the use of economic reforms such as privatization as customers wireless access with their fruit smoothies way to reshape “how power is distributed in a soci- or cappuccinos. In neighboring Jordan, Yarmouk ety,” and “how ruling political forces” can be shaken University in Irbid is home to more than 130 on-cam- loose from entrenched positions.44 pus internet sites, and nearby Shafiq Street claims to be home to more internet cafés than any other single However, Arab regimes have become adept at ap- street in the Middle East. In Cairo, new coffee house propriating and exploiting processes of economic chains with names like Beano and Cilantro provide reform, and of integrating market-based notions of free broadband wireless access to students versed in economic development, as well as broader engage- technology, as do local McDonalds franchises. In all ment with global markets and international financial of these settings, customers reflect a diverse cross-sec- institutions, into authoritarian strategies of gover- tion of contemporary Arab society, including women nance. The results have indeed mitigated pressure in head-scarves and blue jeans, couples, young men, for political change, especially among those segments and families. Arabic-language websites are growing of Arab society, such as youth in Cairo, Amman, or at an astonishing rate, with more than 10,000 regis- Casablanca, that have far easier access than their par- tered in Morocco alone as of 2006. Opposition fig- ents could have imagined to globalized lifestyles that ures such as Nadia Yassine, daughter of the founder approximate those of their peers in the United States of the Islamist party al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and and Western Europe. Spirituality), use the web to circumvent official cen- sorship. Underscoring her intent to reach as many Regimes have thereby reaped the social and political readers as possible, Yassine’s site is available in four benefits of selective economic reform and retained their languages, Arabic, English, French, and Spanish.45 control over politically sensitive economic sectors while According to the Initiative For an Open Arab Inter- forestalling indefinitely the political openings that such net (run by the Arabic Network for Human Rights reforms were expected to foster. Nor did this dynamic Information), Egypt also boasts some 1,293 “public change appreciably with the shift in U.S. policy after information technology clubs” neatly merging new 2003 when the Bush Administration intensified its focus communications technologies with long-established on democratization in the Arab world. Today, with the forms of civic association.46 Even if absolute numbers failure of U.S. policy in Iraq and issues of stability once of Arab internet users remain low in global terms,
44 Carothers, op. cit., p. 18. 45 Nadia Yassine’s website is available at
18 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d their numbers are increasing with dizzying speed.47 This dramatic growth in access to media, telecommu- Blogging is also increasingly popular and provides nications technologies, and the internet is among the political activists with new possibilities for reaching most significant and tangible changes of recent decades. wider publics.48 Compared to even the relatively recent past, when Arab media were marked by a stultifying, obsequious focus In addition, growth trends in internet usage combine on political leaders, limited and poorly-produced state- with other shifts in the region’s media and telecoms approved programming, heavy-handed censorship, landscape. From Morocco to Yemen urban skylines outmoded technologies, and tightly regulated access to bristle with satellite dishes. Arab satellite channels the outside world, the Arab region has at last begun to compete for audiences with programming that rou- experience the media and communications revolutions tinely provokes dire rumblings from governments. that for many are emblematic of what it means to be Mobile telephones have also become pervasive, with modern. Without question, literate Arab citizens today tens of millions of Arab citizens “going mobile” in the are more connected to global media flows and have bet- Middle East and North Africa region in the last five ter access to information about their own countries and years. the world than any previous generation.
I������� U���� (per 1,000 inhabitants)
Algeria
Egypt
Jordan
Syria
Morocco
Lower Middle Income Average 020406080 100 120
Source: The orW ld Bank, Information and Communications for 2000 Development 2006: Global Trends and Policies (Washington D.C.: The orW ld Bank, 2006). 2004
47 Although the regional average for internet usage also remains low, at only 10 percent of the region’s population, the growth rate of internet usage in the Middle East and North Africa is among the world’s fastest: between 2000 and 2007 usage increased almost 500 percent, more than twice the rate of increase in the rest of the world. See Internet World Stats, Internet Usage in the Middle East (Middle East Internet Usage & Population Statistics), 2007, available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 19 M����� P���� S������������ (per 1,000 inhabitants)
Algeria
Egypt
Jordan
Tunisia
Syria
Morocco
Lower Middle Income Average
050 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Source: The orW ld Bank, Information and Communications for 2000 Development 2006: Global Trends and Policies (Washington D.C.: The orlW d Bank, 2006). 2004
For regimes, however, these changes pose a distinc- high-profile visit to Washington in 2005. The official tive and daunting set of challenges. On the one hand, curriculum vitae of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad they generate substantial social and political benefits. highlights his role as former Chairman of the Syrian Projects of technological modernization create a Computer Society. Gamal Mubarak, the son and pos- sense among Arab publics of progress and of societies sible successor to his father, Egyptian President Hosni emerging from years of repressive insularity. They per- Mubarak, is equally eager to associate himself with the mit regimes to present themselves domestically and in- modernization of Egypt’s communications infrastruc- ternationally as promoters of technological innovation ture and the spread of new information technologies. and openness, less defensive and rigid in their styles of governance than their predecessors, and more accept- On the other hand, new communications technologies ing of the social and political changes that the internet pose significant risks. They have the potential to weak- seems to symbolize. Nor are political élites shy about en official control over information, erode the ability exploiting these impressions. Across the region, a new of regimes to dominate media space and define media generation of presidents and kings stress their open- content.49 The internet in particular provides spaces in ness to new media and their embrace of the internet. which oppositions can mobilize, and governments in Jordan’s King Abdullah II frequently affirms his com- the region routinely voice concerns about the use of mitment to freedom of expression, including during a the internet by militant Islamists—concerns that are
49 This remains the case even if we acknowledge that the potential of new communications technologies to challenge authoritarian rule is more limited than was often claimed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
20 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d just as routinely used to justify tight controls on in- liable for the content of their sites; inspections and ternet access and use.50 In addition, new technologies monitoring of internet usage by ministry personnel, strain the capacity of internal security agencies which internal security personnel, or the police; and systems as a rule tend to lag in their technological capacity and requiring individual users to register for permission to competence. New media contexts push Arab politicians establish internet access accounts from their homes. towards unfamiliar and typically unwelcome terrain, forcing them to justify policies, defend government ac- In Jordan, for example, state regulations stipulate that tions, and respond to public grievances on terms and internet stations in cafés be open to public view, not in settings they are unable to control. enclosed in booths. In Tunisia, the Ministry of Com- munications Technology, via the Agence Tunisienne To balance these pressures, Arab regimes are converg- d’Internet (ATI, Tunisian Internet Agency), controls ing on strategies to control and manage public access all internet infrastructure, and all internet service pro- to new communications technologies along lines that viders are required to provide the ATI with lists of sub- reflect broader patterns of authoritarian upgrading. scribers on a monthly basis. Café owners are required Governments now accept, however reluctantly, the to post regulations governing internet use publicly in spread of new communications and media technolo- their cafés, and are held accountable for violations by gies. Arab leaders value the political and reputational customers. A study by Human Rights Watch of online gains associated with their self-proclaimed roles as censorship in the Arab world recorded the text that champions of innovation. They also recognize the café owners are legally required to post: “Opening disk value of these technologies as steam valves: outlets that drives is strictly forbidden. Do not touch the param- mitigate social pressures that might otherwise become eters of the configurations. It is forbidden to access politicized. At the same time, virtually every Arab re- prohibited sites. Thank you.”53 A report on internet gime has built up extensive systems of regulation, sur- filtering in Tunisia by the OpenNet Initiative noted veillance, oversight, and coercion that vastly limit the that “the Tunisian state clearly views the Internet as a autonomy and privacy of users.51 powerful social and economic force and has invested in telecommunications infrastructure and passed Typically, these systems begin with centralized con- modern telecommunications legislation.” However, trol of access to internet sites, with close attention to the report then observed that: sites that carry political content but also pornography The state employs the SmartFilter software, or other material deemed, for whatever reason, to be produced by the U.S. company Secure Com- “inconsistent with the religious, cultural, political and puting, to target and prevent access to four moral values” of a country.52 Controls also include reg- types of material in particular: political op- ulations requiring ministerial approval for opening an position to the ruling government, sites on internet café; requirements that internet service pro- human rights in Tunisia, tools that enable viders report the names of subscribers to government users to circumvent these controls, and pages agencies; holding owners of internet cafés legally liable containing pornography or other sexually ex- for their customers’ actions; holding website owners plicit content. . . . Tunisia has deployed the In-
50 Gamal Eid, “Arab Activists and Information Technology: The Internet: Glimmer of Light in Dark Tunnel,” (sic) paper presented to the Forum, “Mundos Arabes: Ideas, Players, Spaces,” Madrid, Casa Arabe, January 2007 available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 21 ternet in a way that implements a multi-lay- are adjudicated, as in Syria, by powerful and largely ered architecture of control. All of the state’s unaccountable State Security Courts established when Internet Service Providers (ISPs) purchase emergency laws were first put into effect several- de access from Tunisia’s Internet Agency, which cades ago. performs filtering at the network backbone. This ensures greater consistency of control. In When they feel sufficiently threatened, moreover, re- addition, the primary means of going on-line gimes have not hesitated to resort to violence against for Tunisians are the “Publinets” - Internet those who use new communications technologies to cafés that are required by the state to monitor challenge their authority, and to do so in the most pub- users’ access to prevent them from obtaining lic of ways. An especially glaring instance of this was prohibited materials.54 Tunisia’s performance as host of the second World Summit on the Information Society in November 2005. Similar systems have been adopted in other Arab The United Nations chose to hold this prominent inter- countries. Moreover, as home-based internet ac- national forum in Tunisia despite the country’s record cess expands, regimes are putting controls in place to of repressing freedom of expression on the internet and monitor individual account holders. In Syria, those in the media more broadly. According to Amnesty In- who wish to subscribe to an internet service provider ternational, the decision was intended to “prompt the (state-controlled, of course) are required to fill out an Tunisian government to allow greater freedom and re- application containing not only names and extensive lax its controls on free speech and peaceful association.” personal information, but also their user names and In the event, as Amnesty International noted, “this has passwords.55 As text-messaging grows in importance, not occurred.”56 Before the summit, international hu- regimes are honing their ability to monitor and censor man rights organizations circulated reports on internet this means of communication, as well. It is entirely like- censorship in Tunisia, the number and scope of banned ly that within the next year the use of text messages to sites, and the unlawful arrest, torture, and detention of mobilize participants in political rallies—a technique individual internet users. Reporters Without Borders used by leaders of the Kifaya (Enough!) movement in included Tunisia on a list of the ten most repressive Egypt among others—will no longer be possible. regimes with respect to internet censorship. During the summit itself, Tunisian activists were physically Lurking not so far away in the background is the con- harassed and prevented from attending sessions with tinuing reliance of Arab regimes on repression and Western counterparts. Internal security agents main- violence to enforce restrictions on use of the internet tained a visible presence. Several reports of beatings and on other media. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria and physical intimidation of participants appeared in have all arrested and imprisoned individuals for viola- the Western press. Unsurprisingly, the United Nations’ tion of laws governing internet use. In many instances World Summit on the Information Society website charges include violations of state security laws. Cases contains no reference to these events.57
54 The OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Tunisia in 2005: A Country Study, 2005, available at
22 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d In broad terms, therefore, what has emerged in the that promote political and economic reform and have Arab world is a hybrid approach to the management demonstrated their willingness to use conditionality to of the internet and new media communications advance reform agendas.60 technologies that is characteristic of authoritarian upgrading. Regimes have become more open to and For example, Arab regimes in the Levant and North accepting of these technologies. They acknowledge Africa are seeking out ties with states in Asia, the Arab their social, political, and economic benefits. Yet they monarchies of the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere that also assimilate these technologies into authoritar- are largely indifferent to issues of governance and po- ian strategies of governance, using them to enhance litical reform. They are exploiting the rise of newly and upgrade their own capacity to keep tabs on their competitive markets in foreign aid and development citizens, and to surround them with a “multi-layered lending to blunt the influence of the World Bank on architecture of control.” 58 In addition, and in keep- issues of economic governance. Regimes are using ing with upgrading as a regional phenomenon, man- these ties to mobilize international coalitions to un- agement of new communications technologies is an dermine Western diplomacy, a trend evident in the area in which regimes learn from each other. Cross- effectiveness with which Syria has fended off U.S. and learning and the regional exchange of techniques and French efforts to isolate it following the assassination strategies among Arab governments have been espe- of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in cially important. Regional and international meet- February 2005. Such coalitions have long been a fea- ings that bring Arab officials together—sometimes ture of Arab diplomacy in such settings as the United under the auspices of U.S. democracy promotion or- Nations. They are now expanding to become core ganizations—provide opportunities for sharing ideas elements in the strategies adopted by Arab regimes and experiences about strategies for more effectively to ensure their own persistence in an international managing new technologies. There is also evidence system that is increasingly unsympathetic to authori- of bilateral exchanges between Arab governments for tarianism. such purposes.59 These shifts are especially evident among the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf, where oil creates Di v e r s i f y i n g International Li n k a g e s strategic incentives for both Arab exporters and Upgrading is evident both in the reorganization of do- non-Western importers to strengthen relationships. mestic politics but also in Arab regimes’ efforts to di- Among the first states that Saudi Arabia’s King Ab- versify their international linkages. Arab governments dullah visited after he ascended the throne were Chi- are establishing diplomatic, trade, and investment rela- na, India, and Malaysia. Yet this shift is also evident tionships to insulate themselves from the pressures ex- among the core Arab states of the Levant and North erted by Western states and international institutions Africa which have sought out diplomatic, trade, and
58 The OpenNet Initiative, op.cit. Secure Computing trumpets the exhaustive database it provides to clients who purchase SmartFilter ( “the web you want, the control you need”), which includes among its seventy categories of URLs that can be blocked with the click of a key websites for: Government and Military, Education and Reference, General News, Nonprofit Organizations and Advocacy Groups, Politics and Opinion, and Religion and Ideology. 59 Information about the use of regional meetings for the informal exchange of ideas among Arab officials on how to upgrade authoritarian governance was provided in an interview with a leading democracy promotion specialist in Washington D.C., November 2006. Information on bilateral exchanges of technical delegations among Arab states to share information on managing internet technologies was provided in a personal interview with a leading political analyst in Damascus, May 2006. 60 As expressed by Egyptian journalist Ibrahim Nafie, “the good news about China is that it doesn’t have the same historic baggage and political hang-ups about this region as Europe or the US does. So the road to cooperation appears for the moment to be trouble-free.” Ibrahim Nafie, “Regarding China,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 8-14 February, 2007, available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 23 investment relationships with important non-West- Syria’s formal recognition that China’s economy now ern states, most notably China.61 Top Chinese leaders meets many World Trade Organization standards.63 have encouraged the deepening of these ties. Chinese China has also become more active in development President Hu Jintao has made repeated visits to the lending, promoting the role of its own financial institu- region, including stops in the Persian Gulf, Yemen, tions in the Middle East and North Africa such as the and Oman. He also visited Algeria and Egypt, which Export-Import Bank of China. It has established itself as China has identified as Arab countries of particular a major donor presence in North Africa, often adopting importance because of their diplomatic support to practices that undercut Western donors whose funding the Chinese Communist government at key points in requires borrowers to meet standards of accountability, its history. transparency, and performance.64
Beyond these high-level diplomatic visits, China and the China has received significant attention as Arab states Arab states have expanded the organizational frame- diversify international linkages, but it is not alone. India, works that foster Sino-Arab cooperation on various lev- Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, and Vietnam also figure els. In December 2001, a ceremony in Beijing attended prominently in this process. In 2006, India was appar- by Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, ently the second largest non-Arab investor in Syria after and senior Chinese officials inaugurated a China-Arab Iran. In 2007, the Saudi Arabian government agreed to Friendship Association which affirmed non-interfer- send more than 200 university students to Singapore ence in the internal affairs of members states (“politi- on paid fellowships. Singapore’s foreign ministry has cal relations on the basis of mutual respect”) as one of commented on the improvement in the country’s rela- its founding principles. This was followed in September tions throughout the Arab world including with Egypt, 2004 by the signing of cooperation agreements creating Jordan, and North Africa (where it recently initiated a Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum, which reiterated the diplomatic relations with Libya). Singapore has also principle of relations based on non-interference. Multi- announced the establishment of a major research cen- lateral agreements have been outpaced, however, by an ter focusing on West Asia and North Africa. expanding array of bilateral economic agreements be- tween China and Egypt, Syria, Tunisia,62 and other Arab In addition, countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria states. Between 2000 and 2006, bilateral trade between have made the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf Syria and China increased from about $100 million to states a key focus of their regional diplomacy as a $1.5 billion, a figure projected to double by 2011. In the means of developing alternative sources of investment, summer of 2007 Syria and China signed the latest in a trade, and political support. These activities reflect the series of trade agreements designed to further expand interest of poorer Arab states in capturing a share of Chinese investment in the Syrian economy, including the enormous capital surpluses that have flowed into
61 As one analyst put it: “When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the oil giant Saudi Aramco last year, he didn’t need a translator. Plenty of Chinese- speaking Saudis were on hand. A few years earlier, Saudi Aramco had sent dozens of employees to study in Beijing. After all, China, not the United States, represents the future growth for Saudi oil exports.” Afshin Molavi, “The New Silk Road,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2007; p. A13, available
24 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d the Persian Gulf states since 2003. Yet they are also a explore ways to address pressing problems of econom- reflection of the interest of Arab autocrats in building ic and social development. China stands out in this regional relationships that increase their autonomy regard. It has gained visibility as a developmentally and strengthen their capacity to resist Western de- effective, politically stable non-democracy that holds mands for reform. In Syria, large-scale commitments out potentially important lessons for Arab leaders.66 from Persian Gulf investors in the period immediately In contrast to Russia, where the experience of dual re- following the Hariri assassination were interpreted lo- form during the 1990s is seen as deeply destabilizing, cally not simply as evidence of progress on economic China is admired for its managed, top-down approach reform, but as an important indicator that Western to economic liberalization without political reform; pressure had not succeeded in constraining Syria’s its attention to political stability and social peace; its ability to conduct business as usual.65 capacity to manage communications technologies and the media without apparently sacrificing innovation; No less important, diversification also reflects an in- and its assertiveness relative to the West. It has come to terest among Arab regimes in states that are seen as be seen as a model of successful authoritarian upgrad- potential models, examples to be emulated as leaders ing—and Arab regimes are paying attention.67
65 Joshua Landis, “Investments in Syria? Fighting Islolation by Derhally” (sic), SyriaComment.com, October 28, 2005, available at
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 25 Em e r g i n g Pa t t e r n s i n Ar a b Go v e r n a n c e : Th e Normalization o f Ar a b Au thoritarianism
ollectively, these trends reflect a broad-based of governance with older, coercive and personalistic Cprocess of adaptation and change among Arab approaches to social, political, and economic control. regimes. They mark the emergence of new patterns of authoritarian governance that have reduced the Moreover, upgrading has generated problems of its vulnerability of Arab governments to pressures for own, including new opportunities for corruption, political and economic reform, and equipped them to social polarization, and increased levels of economic capture and exploit the gains from economic openness inequality. It has fostered the political and social exclu- and technological innovation. These trends also make sion of significant segments of Arab society for whom Arab regimes able to mitigate at least some of the so- the state is notable largely by its absence. In this sense, cial and political pressures associated with the sense of upgrading has been accompanied, as witnessed in the stagnation, vulnerability, and insularity that have long recent wave of strikes among Egyptian textile workers, been evident in Arab perceptions of their own circum- by the deepening of social conflicts around questions stances. Upgrading has been effective in part because it of social welfare and redistribution that states are in- has delivered visible, meaningful benefits to Arab soci- creasingly unable to address. To the extent that regimes eties, even as it reinforces existing regimes. Not least, it have been effective in capturing and exploiting the has provided the framework through which Arab lead- practices and rhetoric of democracy and civil society erships have extended and reinforced the social coali- for their own purposes, upgrading also reinforces a tions upon which their regimes depend. growing cynicism among Arabs, especially Arab youth, about the value of political participation and the pos- As noted earlier, these new patterns are not a product sibilities for meaningful political change. of planning and foresight on the part of Arab leaders. They are, instead, the result of ad hoc and often de- These are significant challenges, and it is not at all fensive responses to shifts in the political, economic, clear that upgrading itself offers the tools that Arab and social environment over the past two decades. Nor governments need to address them. States are un- should their coherence be exaggerated. Regimes differ likely to resume the redistributive role that anchored in the speed with which they have “upgraded,” and the the populist social pacts of the 1960s to 1980s across extent to which they combine new-fangled strategies the Arab world.68 In effect, Arab leaders are gambling
68 Steven Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in Oliver Schlumberger (ed.), Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-Democratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 21-38.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 27 that the economic and social payoffs of upgrading for Arab regimes and the dozens of other hybrid forms some segments of Arab society will exceed the costs of authoritarianism in other regions—the liberalized that are imposed on those it excludes and marginal- autocracies, electoral authoritarian regimes, and illib- izes. Whether this wager will succeed remains to be eral democracies that now populate wide swathes of seen. Yet there can be little question that it is around the post-“Third Wave” global landscape. In this sense, these issues—social and economic concerns that have authoritarian upgrading reflects the normalization not figured prominently in U.S. democracy promotion of Arab authoritarianism and the end of the Middle programs to date—that the United States is likely to East’s exceptionalism with respect to democratization find opportunities for advancing political reform. and political change.
Authoritarian upgrading has, nonetheless, trans- These trends have significant and deeply troubling im- formed the political landscape of the Arab world. It plications for those working for democratic change in not only reflects a higher capacity for innovation and the Arab world. For many analysts of the region, fail- adaptation than Arab governments are often believed ures of democratization are used to advance a view of to possess, it underscores the extent to which they ac- Arab regimes as stagnant, stuck in their ways, and de- tively participate in and benefit from the globalization termined to resist changes that threaten them and ex- of authoritarian strategies of governance. Arab gov- ceed their control. By contrast, authoritarian upgrad- ernments learn from one another, share information ing suggests that failures of democratization are not a and tactics, and draw lessons from the experiences of product of Arab resistance to change but rather of the authoritarian states outside the region as models. As a effectiveness of regimes in adapting to and managing result, there are not only growing similarities among the pressures for change created by democracy promo- Arab regimes in their strategies of governance, there tion. Perhaps most troubling for democratic reformers is a broader process of convergence underway that is in the Arab world and their allies, Arab regimes have eroding the purported distinctiveness of authoritari- concluded that the most effective strategy for resolv- anism in the Arab world, a region often depicted as sui ing the economic, political, and social problems that generis in its resistance to the “Third Wave” of democ- threaten their stability is not democratization, but the ratization. The practices associated with authoritar- upgrading of authoritarian strategies of governance, a ian upgrading have narrowed the differences between strategy that is proving remarkably successful.
28 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d Cr a c k s i n t h e Wa l l ? Au thoritarian Up g r a d i n g a n d U .s . De m o c r a c y Pr o m o t i o n
Authoritarian upgrading is transforming the politics in the Arab world. In effect, regimes have the system and political economies of the Arab world in ways that gamed. They now exploit for their own authoritarian current democracy promotion debates have not taken purposes the democracy promotion strategies that into account. At present, the impact of upgrading has have long been favored by the United States—includ- been overshadowed by other concerns, from failures of ing strengthening civil society organizations, promot- U.S. policy in Iraq to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, tensions ing electoral reform, improving political participation, in Lebanon, and the ongoing stalemate between Israel capacity-building in legislatures and other institu- and the Palestinians. The Iraq experience in particular tions of governance, economic liberalization measures has undermined U.S. confidence in the desirability of aimed at increasing transparency, political party devel- regime change and renewed the appreciation of poli- opment, and opening the region to new information cymakers for political stability in the Arab world. As flows. The more U.S. policy continues to rely on these Arab analysts have noted, U.S. diplomats, including well worn and time tested strategies, the less effective Secretary of State Rice, have little to say these days on it is likely to be. the subject of democracy.69 The point is not that these U.S. strategies have failed. The results have not been helpful for those struggling They have forced authoritarian regimes to adjust, to find a way to preserve democracy promotion as a adapt, and reconfigure themselves in response to U.S. U.S. government priority and to develop alternative and domestic pressures for democratic reform. Yet strategies for engaging Arab regimes on issues of po- adjust they have. As a result, current U.S. democracy litical reform. If the diagnosis presented here is cor- promotion policies in the Arab world have largely rect, however, the problems that the United States con- exhausted their value. They may continue to gener- fronts in the Arab world go well beyond, and extend far ate modest incremental gains in a few select areas of deeper, than the immediate issues of Iraq, Iran, Syria, political, civic, and social life. In the current political Hamas and Hizballah. climate, modest expectations may be all that can be expected. Furthermore, to the extent that democracy Authoritarian upgrading has major implications for activists within the Arab world benefit from a visible how the United States promotes democratic reform U.S. presence in the promotion of democratic reform,
69 See Radwan Ziadeh and Steven Heydemann, “Inhisar al-D’am al-Ameriki lil-Dimuqratiyya [The Decline of American Support for Democratization], Al-Hayyat, March 22, 2007.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 31 such strategies can have useful signaling effects. They What is needed, instead, is a second generation of de- are unlikely, however, to achieve substantial progress mocracy promotion policies: democracy promotion towards the goal of systematic democratic change in 2.0. Two “second generation” strategies stand out as the Arab world. Where U.S. policy fits neatly into a most likely to be effective in advancing democratic re- broader process of upgrading—giving Arab leaders form in the Arab world. tools they can manipulate for their own purposes— they may actively undermine prospects for meaningful First, authoritarian upgrading offers opportunities for political change. the United States to hold Arab regimes accountable for their commitments to processes such as electoral What is happening, in other words, is a growing dis- reform and good governance. The United States can connect between the conceptions of authoritarianism exploit regime strategies designed to contain and man- that drive U.S. policy, and the strategies of authori- age participation as tools for broadening democratic tarian governance now emerging in the Arab world. practice and can transform the cynical use by Arab Since the 1980s, the U.S. has made significant invest- regimes of democratic rhetoric to develop and apply ments in the development of civil societies in the benchmarks that will determine the quality of U.S. re- Arab world.70 Reflecting in part a Tocquevillian view lations with these governments. of civil societies as carriers of democracy, civic asso- ciations and non-profit organizations have been sup- Measures to exploit the openings created by upgrading ported as incubators in which democratic norms take require adjustments in how the United States pursues root and positive forms of social capital are created.71 political reform in the Arab world. The fundamental Even today U.S. policy continues to reflect notions of requirement is especially daunting: the United States democratization that draw heavily on experience in should systematically adhere to its own expressed Eastern Europe and Latin America—including the commitments in support of political reform in the recent “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union Arab world and include a clear mandate to integrate during which civil society organizations, many fund- democracy promotion into broader U.S. relationships ed through U.S. democracy promotion programs, with Arab governments.72 It should use benchmarks played prominent roles. that provide for a measurable assessment of the prog- ress of Arab governments towards meaningful political These conceptions offer poor starting points, however, reform. in the context of authoritarian upgrading, where Arab regimes have demonstrated their ability to absorb, ap- Such a shift would also require the broader use of con- propriate, and exploit processes of globalization, tech- ditionality in U.S. relations with Arab governments, nological change, and economic liberalization to re- including guidelines that take into account restrictions structure and strengthen their grip on political power. they impose on the activities and independence of civil
70 Tamara Cofman Wittes and Sarah Yerkes, What Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration’s Freedom Agenda (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2006), available at
32 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d society organizations—among them controls on their In addition, the United States needs to recognize that access to foreign funding—and on the activities of de- authoritarian upgrading is possible, in part, because of mocracy activists and moderate opposition parties. A the support Arab regimes receive from business links recent increase in repressive measures directed against to the United States, Asia, and European states. From Arab reformers and human rights activists in Egypt the software that permits governments to control in- and Syria underscores the need for a strong U.S. re- ternet use to telecommunications infrastructure pro- sponse to what has widely been described as a backlash vided through international partnerships, upgrading is against democracy promotion in the Arab world since dependent upon technologies and expertise that Arab 2003. Increased use of conditionality is an important governments secure from outside the region. A truly step in this direction. This recommendation is not integrated strategy of democracy promotion would re- based on a naïve expectation about the effects of con- quire an oversight process for technology exports to the ditionality, but on the value to the United States and to Arab world similar to those that now govern interna- Arab reformers in the region of clear U.S. expectations tional trade in many other domains considered essen- that play a meaningful role in shaping the quality of tial to U.S. national interests. End-use agreements that U.S. relations with Arab governments. prevent the abuse of U.S. technology by authoritarian governments would be an important advance for efforts Recent efforts by the U.S. Congress to cut Egypt’s for- to bring U.S. policy into line with longstanding commit- eign assistance in response to concerns about the re- ments to democratic reform in the Arab world. pression of democracy activists are a useful movement in this direction. This is, however, only one small part Second, U.S. democracy promotion programs must of what needs to be done. The more demanding chal- adapt to changed strategies of authoritarian gover- lenge, of identifying meaningful benchmarks and inte- nance. There are no magic bullets that will achieve this grating them consistently and coherently into U.S. pol- transformation easily or quickly. Nor can the prospects icies at the country level across government agencies for democracy promotion be detached from events in and across issue areas, has proven more elusive. U.S. the region—in Iraq and the Palestinian territories in democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world too particular. These developments affect both regional often are undermined by inter-agency competition, and U.S. perceptions about whether, and in what form, competing policy priorities, and the skill with which democracy promotion policies should be continued. Arab governments exploit these intra-U.S. government tensions to weaken the impact of democratization Nonetheless, upgrading has not rendered Arab regimes programs.73 U.S. diplomatic missions need to improve immune to policies aimed at achieving further, and the effectiveness with which they communicate the potentially more substantial, democratic reforms. One importance of democracy promotion programming set of possibilities, in particular, deserve consideration: to local governments and the manner in which they exploiting the potential fault lines within the coalitions publicly and privately support democracy promotion that have emerged as a result of authoritarian upgrad- efforts. U.S. embassies should make explicit the links ing, and creating incentives among the beneficiaries of between progress toward established benchmarks and upgrading to support meaningful processes of political the overall quality of bilateral relations with the United reform. Together with more coherent and consistent States. Their efforts also require both greater support support for democratic change by the United States, from, and deeper coordination with, other govern- such approaches hold out tangible hope for progress ment agencies. on political reform.
73 Wittes and Yerkes, op. cit.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 33 Authoritarian upgrading as a project is contingent dent upon the capacity of regimes to control ac- upon the ability of Arab regimes to build and sustain cess to markets and to manage the distribution of new, broad-based authoritarian coalitions, linking benefits associated with economic liberalization. the interests of widely diverse social groups to regime Efforts that weaken this capacity can serve as a survival. Yet these coalitions are both unwieldy and powerful source of political and social change. only thinly consolidated. They are vulnerable to shifts Measures that ensure fairness, accountability, and in economic conditions that weaken the position of transparency in access to economic opportuni- new economic and social élites. They are also subject ties in areas that are vulnerable to U.S. influence to internal strains, both within regimes, and between have the potential to weaken one of the central regimes and their allies in societies. As ruling coali- elements of authoritarian upgrading. Over time, tions expand, new possibilities emerge for tensions these measures will strengthen the rule of law. and friction among their members. The wave of strikes They will also contribute to the economic em- in Egypt’s textile sector that began in the fall of 2006 powerment of private sectors that are less reliant highlights the challenges regimes face in managing on regimes for their profits, and that have an in- social coalitions that now include both business and centive to support political reforms that strength- labor. en systems of economic governance;
These strains represent potential fault lines within • Strengthening links between social reform and emerging authoritarian coalitions and offer possible political reform. Even as Arab governments re- targets for an alternative strategy of democracy pro- treat from populist and redistributive social motion. Such a strategy would not be designed to split policies they continue to struggle with problems off “moderates” from “hardliners” in the hope of accel- of employment and job creation, social service erating authoritarian breakdowns, as “transitologists” provision, health care, housing, and education. might have it. Indeed, the likelihood of such break- The beneficiaries of these policies—the urban downs in the Arab world is low. Rather the intent is to poor and middle classes, workers, students and create incentives for groups within authoritarian coali- youth—have long been among the core constitu- tions to benefit from the internal reform of the regimes encies of Arab regimes. Today, however, their eco- that they currently support. nomic security and future prospects are far less certain. Addressing the concerns of social groups The most effective way to advance such aims is through that are becoming increasingly marginal within policies that weaken the ties binding core constituen- Arab societies is among the greatest challenges cies to regimes. Yet this is not an aim that current de- confronting Arab governments in the Twenty- mocracy promotion efforts can address. What is need- First century. The link between these issues and ed instead are programs that would make it possible for questions of governance has become increasingly broader segments of the private sector to benefit from clear in recent years, including to organizations economic reform, or that would engage with Arab re- such as the World Bank and the United Nations. gimes to link ongoing processes of social policy reform Yet U.S. democracy promotion agencies have not to programs of political reform. A number of specific developed strategies to engage Arab governments steps to advance such aims are not only feasible but are with programs that address pressing social con- in keeping with a more consistent and coherent overall cerns through the lens of political reform and the U.S. democracy promotion policy. These include: reform of governance.
• Democratizing access to economic opportuni- Such alternative approaches would mean redeploy- ties. Authoritarian upgrading is heavily depen- ing U.S. democracy promotion resources and shifting
34 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d program priorities. The United States would have to ent course. It will probably be less dramatic, more am- reframe democracy promotion around broad-based biguous, and slower. Efforts to achieve this end, more- policies designed to enhance the quality of gover- over, must contend with regimes that have proven to nance, develop interventions that target a wider range be more adaptive and flexible than many might have of institutions and actors, and craft strategies aimed at believed possible. loosening the economic ties that bind social groups to regimes. In turn, the success of such efforts is closely What seems clear, however, is that in the face of author- tied to the effectiveness with which the U.S. govern- itarian upgrading, current policies that stress working ment embraces a comprehensive and systematic policy from the outside by strengthening the democratic and in support of political reform in the Arab world—and oppositional potential of Arab societies have reached does so in coordination with allies and international their limits. Improving the coherence and consistency institutions already active in these areas. of U.S. policy implementation, while at the same time working from the inside, pursuing opportunities to As these options indicate, democratic transitions in erode and weaken the coalitions on which authoritarian the Middle East are not likely to resemble those experi- regimes rely, hold out stronger possibilities for further enced in Eastern Europe or Latin America. Institutional advancing the process of political reform and, perhaps, rigidity, economic failures, and ideological exhaustion democratization in the Arab world. Sustaining current created the setting in which local civil societies and approaches to democracy promotion, in the absence of political oppositions could achieve rapid and decisive a coherent and consistent policy architecture, will fail to processes of democratization in Eastern Europe and achieve the stated purposes of U.S. policy and will help Latin America. The unmaking of authoritarianism in to ensure the survival of authoritarianism in the Arab the Arab world, if it occurs at all, will follow a differ- world well into the Twenty-First century.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 35 Pr o j e c t o n Mi d d l e Ea s t De m o c r a c y a n d De v e l o p m e n t
his paper was produced as part of the Saban Cen- Saban Center publications addressing Middle East de- Tter for Middle East Policy’s Project on Middle East mocracy and development include: Democracy and Development (MEDD). The project aims to forge a new consensus on behalf of construc- Tamara Cofman Wittes & Andrew Masloski, Elections tive U.S. engagement for change in the Middle East. in the Arab World: Progress or Peril?, Saban Center Mid- dle East Memo #11, February 12, 2007; MEDD aims to address this challenge. It is led by Ta- mara Cofman Wittes, the Project Director and a Sa- Tamara Cofman Wittes & Sarah E. Yerkes, What Price ban Center Senior Fellow, with the participation of Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration’s Freedom Suzanne Maloney, a Saban Center Senior Fellow spe- Agenda, Saban Center Analysis, Number 10, Septem- cializing in the political economy of the Persian Gulf ber 2006; region. MEDD also hosts the Patkin Visiting Fellows, experts from the Middle East with direct experience in Abdel Monem Said Aly, An Ambivalent Alliance: The political and economic reform. Future of U.S.-Egyptian Relations, Saban Center Analy- sis, Number 6, January 2006; MEDD is built on the premise that economic, social and political reform must be discussed and advanced Tamara Cofman Wittes, The 2005 Egyptian Elections: together. Pairing political and economic analysis and How Free? How Important?, Saban Center Middle East bringing together U.S., European and regional activ- Memo #8, August 24, 2005; ists and analysts, MEDD helps build an informed un- derstanding on workable strategies to support of po- Paul Salem, Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding An litical and economic development in the Middle East. Arab Democracy, Saban Center Middle East Memo #7, These insights strengthen the efforts of regional re- May 31, 2005; formers as they seek to define a more effective course for change. Donor governments and others support- Tamara Cofman Wittes & Sarah E. Yerkes, The Middle East ing reform also benefit from a better understanding Partnership Initiative: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, of how to target their resources and manage complex Saban Center Middle East Memo #5, November 29, 2004; transitions in the Middle East. The result is more ef- fective development strategies and the creation of Tamara Cofman Wittes, The New U.S. Proposal for a greater space for moderate political voices to counter Greater Middle East Initiative: An Evaluation, Saban Islamist extremism. Center Middle East Memo #2, May 10, 2004.
T h e Sa b a n Ce n t e r a t Th e Br o o k i n g s In st i t u t i o n 37 Th e Sa b a n Ce n t e r f o r Mi d d l e Ea s t Po l i c y
he Saban Center for Middle East Policy was es- development; Shibley Telhami, who holds the Sadat Ttablished on May 13, 2002 with an inaugural ad- Chair at the University of Maryland; and Daniel By- dress by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. The man, a Middle East terrorism expert from Georgetown creation of the Saban Center reflects the Brookings University. The center is located in the Foreign Policy Institution’s commitment to expand dramatically its Studies Program at Brookings, led by Brookings Vice research and analysis of Middle East policy issues at a President Carlos Pascual. time when the region has come to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Saban Center is undertaking path breaking re- search in five areas: the implications of regime change The Saban Center provides Washington policymakers in Iraq, including post-war nation-building and Per- with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely research sian Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domestic and policy analysis from experienced and knowledge- politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; mecha- able scholars who can bring fresh perspectives to bear nisms and requirements for a two-state solution to the on the critical problems of the Middle East. The cen- Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for the war against ter upholds the Brookings tradition of being open to a terrorism, including the continuing challenge of state- broad range of views. The Saban Center’s central ob- sponsorship of terrorism; and political and economic jective is to advance understanding of developments change in the Arab world, and the methods required in the Middle East through policy-relevant scholarship to promote democratization. and debate. The Saban Center also houses the Brookings Proj- The center’s foundation was made possible by a gener- ect on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, which ous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of Los Ange- is directed by Stephen Grand, a Fellow in Foreign les. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Senior Fellow in For- Policy Studies. The project focuses on analyzing the eign Policy Studies, is the Director of the Saban Center. problems in the relationship between the United Kenneth M. Pollack is the center’s Director of Research. States and Muslim states and communities around Joining them is a core group of Middle East experts the globe, with the objective of developing effective who conduct original research and develop innovative policy responses. The project’s activities include: the programs to promote a better understanding of the Doha Forum, an annual global conference bringing policy choices facing American decision makers in the together American and Muslim world leaders; a Ford Middle East. They include Tamara Cofman Wittes, a Foundation Visiting Fellows program for specialists specialist on political reform in the Arab world who from the Muslim world; initiatives in science and the directs the Middle East Democracy and Development arts; and a monograph and book series. Under the Project; Bruce Riedel, who served as a senior advisor directorship of Hady Amr, a Fellow in Foreign Policy to three Presidents on the Middle East and South Asia Studies, the Saban Center is opening the Brookings- at the National Security Council during a twenty-nine Doha Center in Qatar, which will extend the Brook- year career in the CIA, a specialist on counterter- ings tradition of independent, in-depth research and rorism; Suzanne Maloney, a former senior State De- quality public policy programs to Doha, and the partment official who focuses on Iran and economic broader Muslim world.
38 Up g r a d i n g Au t h o r i ta r i a n i s m i n t h e Ar a b Wo r l d Th e Br o o k i n g s In s t i t u t i o n 1775 Ma s s a c h u s e t t s Av e ., NW Wa s h i n g t o n , D.C. 20036-2103 ANALYSIS PAPER www.brookings.edu Number 13, October 2007
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