Islamic Studies 46:3 (2007) pp. 317-380
The Removal of Blame from the Great Imams: An Annotated Translation of Ibn Taymiyyah's. Raf al Maldm 'anal-A 'immatal-A 'lam
AHMAD IBN 'ABDAL-HALIM IBNTAYMIYYAH Tr. andAnn. ABDUL HAKIM AL-MATROUDI
I INTRODUCTION
Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Halim b. ?Abd al-Salam b. 'Abd Allah b. Abi '1-Qasimal Khidr b. Muhammad b. Taymiyyah1 (661-728/1263-1328) is arguably the most distinguished and influentialmedieval Hanbali jurist2and perhaps one of themost prolific among them.3He was born inHarran (presentday Turkey) and livedduring the era of thefirst Mamluks (648-784/1250-1382).However, he was forced to move from his native region and take up residence in Damascus due to theMongol onslaught from theEast.4 He lived in turbulent
1 For a discussion of the possible reasons forhim being given thename Taymivyah/ see,Abdul Hakim Ibrahim al-Matroudi, The Hanbali School of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah: Conflict or Conciliation (London: Routledge Curzon, 2006), 199-200 f. 2 'Abd al-Rahman b. Ahmad Ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl 'old Tabaqat al-Handbilah (Beirut:Dar al Ma'rifah, n.d.), 2:388-91; 'Umar b. 'Ali al-Bazzar, al-A'lam al-'Altyyab ft Manaqib Ibn Taymiyyah (Beriut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1400 ah), 18-20, 40,77. 3 The total number of works written by Ibn Taymiyyah are not known exactly but there is agreement thathe was a prolific author. See, 'Abd al-Hayy b. Ahmad Ibn al-'Imad, Shadharat al Dhahab fi Akhbar Man Dhahab pamsacus-Beirut: Dar Ibn Kathir, 1992), 8:147. See also, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabi, Dhayl Ta'rikh alhtam (Riyadh:Dar al-Mughni, 1990) 326; Muhammad b. Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi, al-Vqudal-Durriyyah minManaqibShaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (Riyadh:Maktabat al-Mua'yyad, n.d.), 64-66; al-Bazzax, al-A'lam, 25-28;Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah Ibn Rushayyiq, Asmd'Mu'allafat Shaykhalhlam Ibn Taymiyyah (Beirut:Dar al Kitab al-Jadid,1983), 8, (it is attributedmistakenly toMuhammad b. Abi Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim, d. 751/1350); Mar'i b. Yusuf al-Karmi, al-Kawakib al-Duriyyahfi Manaqib alMujtahid Ibn Taymiyyah (Beirut:Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1986), 78; and cf. al-Matroudi,The Hanbali School of Law, 23-30. 4 Ibrahim b. Muhammad Ibn Muflih, al-Maqsad al-Arshadfi Dhikr Ashab al-Imdm Ahmad (Riyadh:Maktabat al-Rushd, 1410 ah), 1:133.
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was timeswhen Muslim political fragmentation clearlyvisible. Moreover, legal fanaticismand doctrinal laxityprevailed inMuslim lands and he is historically as portrayed someone who sought to rectifyboth religious and political disparities and deviancies which led to open encounters with his contemporariesas well as to long spells in prison.5 a Ibn Taymiyyah is often seen through simplisticanti-rationalist prism, that is, as someonewith strictand literalinclinations towards Hadith which he over emphasised and preferred to acceptance of broader legal theories and principles. The present textwould sufficeto undermine that view. Raf al Malam 'anal-A'immat aUA'ldm is a short text inwhich the readerobserves Ibn Taymiyyah as a juristpar excellence.In this treatise,which has a balanced tone and is couched in erudite language,he proceeds to argue as towhy a mujtahid might depart from directly acting upon a hadith text and follow insteadhis methodological principles (usiil).This forms the basis of his delineating the reasons underlying the disagreementsfound among fyluslim jurists in general and theirholding differinglegal opinions and profferingdivergent arguments in supportof those opinions. It is interestingthat Ibn Taymiyyah turneddown the request of some of a his studentsto compose treatisein the Science of Jurisprudence(usiil alfiqh) which would contain all of his jurisprudentialopinions and preferences in order to be used as a basis for issuing legal verdicts (fatawa).He justifiedhis refusalby pointing out that rulingson jurisprudentialissues are based upon independentreasoning (ijtihad)and there is no harm for the subject of the law (mukallafi to imitate a mujtahid for thatpurpose.6 Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah did not see the existence of various jurisprudentialapproaches to be problematic; rather,he believed that the real problem lay in intolerance and fanaticism.In Raf al-Malam, Ibn Taymiyyah pleads for toleranceby identifyingthe different possible causes for jurisprudentialdisagreements (ikhtilafjand seeks to absolve themujtahid of any blame in committingan error and/or in departing froma hadith in his judgment. No doubt, Ibn Taymiyyah's espousal of thisposition was an outcome of various contributory factors.In what follows, I hope to give to the reader a glimpse of Ibn Taymiyyah's lifeand thoughtwhich would hopefully provide some insightinto the reasonsunderpinning this sensitivity.The first sectionof this Introductionwill focus on some of the statementsof his contemporaries as mentioned in the biographical sources, which reflect their opinions regardingIbn Taymiyyah's "natural and acquired attributes."The next section will present some of the unique featuresof Ibn Taymiyyah's scholarship,such
5 Sec, al-Matroudi,The Hanbali School ofLaw, 13-16. 6 Al-Bazzar, alA 'lam, 35-37.
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as his distinguishedknowledge ofHadith and jurisprudenceand some of his opinions with regard to legal imitation (taqlid) and ijtihdd.The last sectionwill draw attention to some of the salientpoints inRaf al-Maldm in the hope of to sense context presenting the reader the and of this treatise before finally offeringa full translationof theoriginal Arabic text. The biographical sources extol the virtues of Ibn Taymiyyah and biographical works are repletewith praise by his contemporaries, especially his students,7 and also his successors.8 He was fortunate that his father Shihab al-Din ?Abd al-Halim b.Abd al-Salam (d. 682/1283) and his grandfatherMajd al-Din Abd al-Salam b. Abd Allah (d. 652/1254)?both distinguished legal to scholars in their times?greatly contributed his early learning. So thorough and intensewas his early trainingthat by the age of twentyor even earlier,he was issuing legal opinions within theHanbali School and according to the statementof the greatHanbali jurist,Muhammad b. Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Hadl (d. 744/1345), who was also Ibn Taymiyyah's student, the people of Damascus, where Ibn Taymiyyah lived,were dazzled by the intensityof his intelligenceand acumen.9 It isno wonder thatwhile he was stilla child,he was as a described "precocious genius."10 Ibn Taymiyyah had a phenomenal and prodigious memory and there would be very littlehe would read and fail to commit tomemory.11 Often he a would memorize large number of works in various branches of learning,12 and 'Umar b. 'All al-Bazzar (d. 749/1348) remarked that itwas rare to finda book which Ibn Taymiyyah did not know about.13His sharp and systematic memory enabled him to acquire knowledge of encyclopaedic proportions and Muhammad b.All al-Zamalkanl (727/1327)notes thatwhen Ibn Taymiyyah answer a one would question in of the traditional disciplines, the listener would think thathe did not know any other discipline due to the depth and nature a comprehensive of his answer.14 Even cursory reading of Ibn
7 His students include themost pre-eminentfigures such as Ibn Kathir, al-Dhahabi, IbnQayyim al-Jawziyyah, al-Bazzar and Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi. 8 Indeed, the sources also document themore controversial episodes of Ibn Taymiyyah's life especially his doctrinal conflicts and legal interpretationsthat have been discussed and treated elsewhere. See, Al-Matroudi, TheHanbali School ofLaw, 20-23 for an account of his admirers and detractors. 9 Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi, al-Vqiid, 3. 10 Al-Bazzar, al-A'ldm, 18-19 and al-Karmi, al-Kawdkib, 53. 11 See, Ibn al-'Imad, Shadhardta al-Dhahab, 8: 144. 12 See, Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi, al-'Uqud, 6 and al-Bazzar, al-A'ldm, 19. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 7. For furtherdetails of the testimonyof leading scholars regarding the breadth of his 22-31 and al knowledge, see, Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi, al-'Uqud, 3-26; al-Bazzar, al-A'ldm, al-Karmi,
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a Taymiyyah's works reveals thoroughnessand an encompassing attention to detail, possible only on the basis of extensive knowledge and sharp understanding of the various Islamic and non-traditional disciplines.15As a leading scholar repliedwhen asked about him, "I saw a man as though all the sciences [were laid] open beforehis eyes and he took as he wished.'916 Ibn Taymiyyah not only read theology,Arabic grammarand semanticsas well as exegesis (tafsir),but he also became proficient inAlgebra, logic,history and philosophy. As a result,he wrote polemical treatisesrefuting Aristotelian philosophy that had seeped into the academic life of his day.17Although it must be mentioned that thanks to his studies in logic, there are undeniable traces of its influence especially in his systematicpresentation of arguments and his use of explicit reasoning fromestablished premises. Aside from the tributes paid to Ibn Taymiyyah's intellectual and scholarly qualities, the biographical sources also mention the strengthand resolve of his character.Al-Bazzar, for example, describes Ibn Taymiyyah as "one of themost courageous people who he had not seen the likes of."18This courage is reflected in his long periods of detention in both Cairo and Damascus. Although Ibn Taymiyyah's detentionswere extremelydistressing for him, it is obvious that he was able to turn them to his advantage by concentratingon scholarlypursuits of teachingand writing.19This is perhaps
Kawakib, 55-72, 80-82. 15 See, Al-Karmi, al-Kawakib, 71, 79; al-Bazzar, al-A'lam, 32; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl, 2: 389-393 and 'Abd al-Rahman b. Salih al-Mahmud,Mawqiflbn Taymiyyahmin al-Asha'irah (Riyadh:Maktabat al-Rushd, 1995), 1: 262,294. 16 Muhammad 'Aziz Shams, et al, al-Jami'fi StrutShaykh d-Islam Ibn TaymiyyahKhildl Sab'at Qurun (Makkah: Dar 'Alam al-Fawa*id, 1420ah), 258. See also, Ibn al-'Imad, Shadharat al Dhahab, 8:146. 17 See,Muhammad b. 4Ali al-Dawudi, Tabaqat alMufassirin (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'flmiyyah, 1983), 1:49. Ibn Taymiyyah composed severalworks to refuteGreek logic,most notable being his,Naqd al-Mantiq (Cairo:Maktabat al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah,n.d.) and volume 9 of his, Majmu* Fatawa Shaykh allslam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (Riyadh: Dar 'Alam al-Kutub, 1991), [henceforth referred to as *Faiawa"\. It is not difficult to see the reason underpinning his scathing attack as itwas through inheritingGreek logic that Islamic philosophers espoused the doctrine of the eternityof theworld; an incongruentaccount of the nature and attributesof God; thePlatonic cosmological hierarchywith mediatory roles of the 'Intelligences'; a deficient notion of prophethood; the creation of theQur'an, etc.All these teachings,as espoused by the philosophers, stood in stark contrast to what Ibri Taymiyyah perceived to be the Sunni or orthodox position thatwas dictated by the text of theQur'an and the Sunnah. See,Wael B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyyahagainst theGreek Logicians (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1993), xii. 18 Al-Bazzar, al-A 'lam, 69 and al-Karmi,al-Kawakib, 91. 19 This can be seen clearly through the vast number of extant treatises. Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi, al Vqiid, 51; Ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl, 2:403, he observes that themajority of Ibn Taymiyyah's books were written in prison oftenwithout any referencesto consult and use. See also, al-Bazzar, al
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 321 what Ibn Taymiyyah meant when he declared, "There is great benefit in it," when he was informed of his imprisonment.20Indeed, apart from the opportunity provided by these detentions to concentrate on scholarly pursuits, there isno doubt that thesedetentions also added to his fame.21 Important for the comprehension of the present text is the fact that Ibn Taymiyyah was especially noted for his knowledge inHadith andfiqh. With regardto Hadith, Ibn Taymiyyahwas not a juristwho had just a smatteringof it. Far from that, he had studied it under several eminentHadith specialists (muhaddithun)of his time. So extensivewas his knowledge ofHadith that it evoked the admiration of themost distinguishedHadith scholars.Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348), for example, remarked that if someone claimed that if any particular hadithwas not known to Ibn Taymiyyah, it could not be counted as a hadith,his claimwill be true.22In addition,Yusuf b. *Abd al-Rahman al-MizzI (d. 742/1341) asserts that he had not seen anyone more knowledgeable than Ibn Taymiyyah inQur'an and SunnahP Ibn Taymiyyah's vast knowledge ofHadith had a significantimpact on his opinions.24It enabled him to declare in plain termsthat a correct textdoes not conflictwith correct reason,25and that several opinions in some of the schools of law had "no supportingproofs,"26 or at best, theywere supported
A 'lam, 24;Muhammad b. 'All al-Shawkani,al-Radr al-Tali' hiMahasin man ba'd al-Qam al-Sdbi' (Cairo: Matba'at al-Sa'adah, 1348), 1:72, he states that if Ibn Taymiyyah had not been confronted by all the excessive trials (mihan) he would have presentedmore research. It could be also safely concluded that if Ibn Taymiyyah had not faced all thesemihan, he would have to areas as probably directed more of his attention other such jurisprudence and its fundamentalsor Hadith. 20 Al-Karmi, al-Kawakib, 149. 21 Al-Bazzar, alA Ham,78. 22 See, Ibn al-'Imad, Shadharat al-Dhahab, 8:145. 23 ' See, Ibn Abd al-Hadi, */-'Uqiid, 7. 24 For instance, he used to hold the opinion thatwhen thewater is less than qullatayn, it becomes impure as soon as itmeets dirt even if its smell, colour or tastehas not been changed. However, lateron he changed his opinion concerning this issue aswe findhim denying the use of qullatayn as a measure. This change in Ibn Taymiyyah's opinion seems to reflectthe change in his knowledge of hadith, as he later arrived at the conclusion that the hadith of qullatayn is on not correct, going furtherto say that itwas attributed incorrectlyto the Prophet (peace be him), and these are instead thewords of one of the companions. For other examples, see, Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 21: 512-518,22: 71-72 and for another example, see, 'All b.Muhammad al Ba'li, al-Ikhtiyaratal-Fiqhiyyah min Fatawa Shaykhal-Isldm Ibn Taymiyyah (Riyadh:Maktabat al Riyadh al-Hadithah, n.d.), 16, [henceforthreferred to as "al-Ikhtiyarat"]. 25 Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Halim Ibn Taymiyyah deals with this issue in various parts of his treatises; see, for instance,his work Dar* Ta'arud al-'Aql wa 'l-Naql (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'Dmiyyah, 1997). 26 For some examples of this point, see, Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 22: 595-596 and 26: 270.
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"27 by "weak evidences. On several occasions, Ibn Taymiyyah's knowledge ofHadith helped him to deal with the problem of the existence of conflicting jurisprudential opinions.He asserts that in some cases, all thedifferent opinions have "correct bases," i.e. they are grounded inHadith and thereforeall of these opinions are accurate but all of them ought not to be simultaneously acted upon.28He perceived differencesof opinion on legal issues as instancesof legal diversity ratherthan of conflict. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah's knowledge of the terminology of Hadith influencedhis legal judgements in several disputes involving jurisprudential specifics. Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that the reason behind these disputes lay in themisunderstanding of some of the complex and ambiguous terminologies related to and found inHadith texts.29 With regard to fiqh> Ibn Taymiyyah possessed a broad and detailed understanding of the statements and jurisprudential terminology of the eponym of theHanball School of law,Ahmad ibnHanbal (d. 241/855). There are, for instance, several rulings issued by Hanball scholars which Ibn Taymiyyah has argued to be "incorrect." He attributes this to "the misunderstanding of Ahmad ibnHanbal's statementsand words"30 and his discussions and clarificationswere to have a lasting influence on the subsequentdiscussions within the school.He does add, however, that at times
27 For instance, in theHanbali School there is an opinion which states that the recommended prayer before the obligatory zuhr prayer is four rak'at.This opinion is attributed toAhmad ibn Hanbal and held and mentioned by several leadingHanbali scholars, such as Abu 'l-Khattab Mahfud b. Ahmad al-Kulwac&ani and Muhammad b. al-Husayn al-Ajurri (d. 360/971). This opinion is based on the hadith reporting that the Prophet used to pray four raka'at before the 'Asr prayer. See, 'All b. Sulayman Al-Mardawi, al-InsafftMa'rifat al-Rajih min al-Khilaf *ala Madhhab al-Imam Ahmad ibnHanbal (Beirut:Mu'assasat al-Ta'rikh al-'Arabi, n.d.), 2:177. Ibn Taymiyyah states that this ruling is not accurate as it is based on a weak hadith.He asserts that there is no correct hadithwhich supports this ruling.For other examples of thispoint, see, Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawd, 21: 512. 28 Ibn Taymiyyah gives various examples of this point, see for example, his, Fatdwa, 22: 335 355. 29 For example, in the issue of the typeof hajjwhich was performedby theProphet (peace be on him), Ibn Taymiyyah attributes the existence of the conflicting opinions in this issue to a number of factors,one of which is themisunderstanding of some termsmentioned in hadiths dealing with this point. See, Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatdwa, 22: 292-293 and 26: 61-79. For further examples of thispoint, see, ibid., 21:122. 30 For examples of thispoint, see, al-Ba'li, allkhtiyarat, 54, 76, 211-212. Another point to note is that Ibn Taymiyyah thinks that this problem i.e. themisunderstanding ofAhmad's words, was not only confined toHanbali scholars,he points out that even some Imams, such as Ibn 'Abd al Barr of theMaliki School also misunderstood some of Ahmad's texts. See for example, Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatdwa, 22: 589.
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Hanbali scholars who did correctlyunderstand the statements and words attributed to Ahmad, nevertheless failed to correctlyapply them to the legal issues under consideration.31He furtheradds that internaldiscussions in the school were conflatedwith newly introducedmatters thatwere presumably ascribed to Ahmad ibn Hanbal but on later scrutinywere not entirely accurate32and conversely, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that there are some issues where it is claimed thatAhmad did not referto thembut the factwas thathe didmake such reference.33 After a scrutinyof Ibn Taymiyyah's discussions of jurisprudentialmatters it becomes evident that inmost cases he would follow a particularmethod to reach his jurisprudentialpreferences, or what is known as aUkhtiydratal fiqhiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah would investigate the various narrations and opinions of his school in a meticulous and comparativemanner and would thereafterprefer to a particularopinion. Ibn Taymiyyah's preferenceswithin Hanbali jurisprudenceprovided the scholars of his school with the platform upon which they could still be identified as Hanbalis and at the same time adhere to "the most correct opinion" in relation to thevarious jurisprudentialissues. Thus, on account of his extensiveknowledge inHadith andfiqh> Ibn Taymiyyah was ideallyplaced to critically examine conflicting reports and/pass judgements on internal conceptual andmethodological disputesof the school Ibn Taymiyyah's opinions with regard to taqltd and ijtihad also had a significantimpact on his jurisprudentialthought. This influence is evident in his position towards thedifferent schools of law. Ibn Taymiyyah had reservationsabout having excessive bias towardsone particular scholar, statingthat it is difficultto argue for one particular scholar as being "the best scholar" because every scholar has strengthswhere his opinion outweighs those of others.34Also, he mentions that any strict preferencefor a single scholar is no more than a generalisationwhich is often based on presumption if not mere caprice. This, according to him, leads to contentious disagreements in the Muslim community which is eipressly forbiddenin Islam.35 Instead of such preferencebetween scholars, Ibn Taymiyyah insistsupon tolerance between the various schools of law. He cites the example of the Prophet's Companions who accepted differentviews, declaring that the
31 See, for instance, ibid., 23: 280. 32 See, for instance, ibid., 23:278. 33 See for instance, ibid., 21:179, 300, 407, and 22: 588-590, 621,622, and 25: 241. 34 Ibid., 22: 293. 35 See, ibid., 22: 291-292.
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various parties would be rewarded for their independent reasoning.36 Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah concludes, the same principlemust be applied to the opinions of other scholars. Those who prefer to imitate al-Shafi'i, for instance, should not disapprove of thosewho prefer to follow Ahmad ibn Hanbal and vice versa?7He asserts thatno one can impose the opinions of his school on others.38Furthermore, he insists that partial conversion fromone school of law to another in some situations is even obligatory.For instance,if the imitator (muqallid) knows that certain opinions in his school are in opposition to clear texts and that correctopinions are held by another school of law, he must followwhat is correct even though it is not from his own school.39 Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that the existence of these "incorrect opinions" in a school of law should not be used as an excuse to attack those scholars. As he explains, this is because those scholarswere mujtahids. In reality,however, these scholarswere targetsof strongattacks from lay people some an to and even scholars. In attempt counter this antagonism, Ibn Taymiyyah composed Raf al-Malam in which he defends the mujtahid scholars and clarifiesthe reasons underlying theirrulings which were thought to be in opposition to the texts. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the leading scholars did not deliberately intend to oppose the sunnah of the Prophet (peace be on him) in anymanner. It is clear thathe is limitinghis assertion to those scholars whom he describes as "generally accepted by theMuslim ummah."40He justifieshis assertion in arguingfurther that the leading scholars did not deliberately oppose the sunnah of the Prophet (peace be on him) by the fact that "they are in definiteagreement on the obligation of following the Prophet (peace be on him),,while it is allowed that thewords of anyone other than theProphet can [either]be accepted or rejected."41 In his attempt to absolve a mujtahid from any blame of contravening direct textual evidences, Ibn Taymiyyah proposes threemost likely reasons which lead to disagreementand at times even conflict among jurists:the first restsupon themujtahid's belief in the non-existenceof a hadith text cited as evidence by his opponent. The second is that themujtahid may have thought that the implication of the hadith (textual or otherwise) had no connection
36 See, ibid., 22:292-293. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 27: 300. 39 See, ibid., 27: 210-216. Cf. also, al-Matroudi,The Hanbali School ofLaw, 84-9. 40 Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Halim Ibn Taymiyyah, Raf al-Malam 'an alA'immat al-A'lam (Riyadh: al Ri'asah al-'Ammah li Idarat al-Buhuth al-'flmiyyah,1413 ah), 8. 41 Ibid., 9.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 325 with that aspect of thequestion thathe was investigating.Finally, themujtahid may have thought that the ruling contained in the hadith had actually been abrogated.42 Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the firstreason for the conflict can exist in severalways. Firstly, itmay have been the case that the scholar had no knowledge of the hadith text. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this is the reason predominant for the divergencebetween the textand the rulingderived by a mujtahid. This, as he explains, is because of the vastness of the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyyah does not think that this reasonwas confined to the era before the canonical collections ofHadith as these collections do not contain all of the Sunnah.Moreover, it is difficultfor every scholar to know all the hadiths containedwithin these canonical collections, for theirnumber isvery large.43 Secondly, a scholarmay believe that the hadith thatwas citedwas not actually uttered by the Prophet (peace be on him) because themujtahid had received the hadith through an unreliable chain of transmission (isnad).This second case, as Ibn Taymiyyah observes, existedmore widely after the first generation of Islam, because during the firstcentury therewas no need for studyingchains of transmitterscontrary to the successive generationswhere the need for caution and rigorous evaluativemethods were required owing to extensive fabricationof the hadiths.4*Thirdly, it is possible that the hadithwas known to themujtahid but he did not base his rulingon it either because he forgotthe hadith itselfor did not consider it to be relevant.45 The second cause of disagreement,according to Ibn Taymiyyah, is that themujtahid may have failed to know the indicationsof the text relevant for the ruling. This may be because of the existence of some "strange'' and anomalous (gharib)words or complex and ambiguous terms in that textwhich prevented the mujtahid from comprehending the intendedmeaning. It may also be due to the fact that themujtahid might have concluded that there is in factno indication that exists in the textrelevant for the correspondingruling.46 The difference between this last point and the previous one, as Ibn Taymiyyah explains, is that in the lattercase the scholar did not extract the ruling on this text because of his understanding and his application of the principles of jurisprudence,whereas in the formercase what prevented the scholar from implementingthe relevant text is his failure to grasp the full
42 See, ibid. 43 See, ibid., 948. 44 See, ibid., 18-19. 45 See, ibid., 22-25. 46 See, ibid., 25-29.
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implicationof the textrequired foran informedextraction of a ruling.47 The thirdand finalcause for conflict,according to Ibn Taymiyyah, is that themujtahid did not act upon a hadith text because itwas in conflictwith something that led him to believe in itsweakness or thathe thought that the ruling it contained had been abrogated.48 Ibn Taymiyyah is aware that a mujtahid unquestionably has the right to apply his legal principles (usut)whereby all legal texts are cumulatively understood and assessedwithin a dynamic frameworkof interpretationand analysis as opposed to a staticapproach ofmerely taking thehadith textprima facie without any other consideration.This constitutesan additional cause for a hadith text to be discarded in favour of methodological principles. The additional factorsthat Ibn Taymiyyahmentions are, firstly,that one mujtahid may discard the hadith cited as evidence by another mujtahid on the consideration of the locality of transmitterswithin the corresponding isndd. Thus, some scholars fromHijaz reject transmittersor narrations fromparts of Iraq or Sham as legitimateevidence unless they initially originated from Hijaz. Ibn Taymiyyah comments that "mostpeople, however, do not use this as a basis for deeming such a hadith as weak (dallf).So whenever the chain of transmittersis sound, the hadith is authoritative,regardless of whether it is Hijazi, 'Iraqi, Shami or fromother regions."49 The second additional cause of disagreement is generatedby the different conditions stipulatedby differentscholars for the acceptance of the singular reportedhadith (khaharal-wahid).50 The third additional factorfor creating conflict iswhat Ibn Taymiyyah as as characterises "perceived consensuses." He defines this form of consensus "not being aware of any dissentingview." This, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, led to the reluctance of some scholars in following some of the textualproofs due to the fearof opposing this "perceivedconsensus."51 More importantly,Ibn Taymiyyah deals inRaf alMalam with the result of ijtihad and its link to thepromise of a rewardor the threatof a punishment. He asserts that evenwhen thereexist good reasons to necessitate that a person deserved that the threatof punishment be applied, itmight still not come about due to the existence of a legal or justifiableimpediment (mani), and there are various types of impedimentswhich he regards as unlikely to be lackingas far as themukallaf is concerned, such as repentance (tawbah),asking
47 See, ibid., 29. 48 See, ibid., 31. 49 Ibid., 21-22. 50 See, ibid., 22. 51 See, ibid., 31-33.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 327 for forgiveness(istighfar), good deeds that erase sins (alhasandt al-mahiyahli 7 sayyi'dtjytribulations (bald*al-dunyd) and calamities (masd'ib).52
Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the functionof a threat is to clarifythat the deed associated with the threat is a reason for the punishmentmentioned in the threat and thereforethe prohibition of that deed and its reprehensible nature could be inferredfrom the threat.However, he thinks that it is not justified to conclude that if the reason for the threatwas to be found in someone, then thiswould necessitate the occurrence of its effectwhich is the punishment.He relates this to the fact that the effectdepends on the existence of itsconditions and the removal of all of its impediments.53
These opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah regardingthe issues of ijtihdd,taqlld and jurisprudentialdisputes (ikhtildj)have undoubtedlyinfluenced his understanding of Islamic law as well as his relationwith theHanbali school and other schools. This can be seen clearly from his use of independent reasoning and his "corrections" of various rules and rulingswithin these schools, especially the Hanbali school. Also, these opinions led to Ibn Taymiyyah's readiness to acknowledge his own mistakes54 and to have a forgivingattitude towards his opponents.55It is likely that this consideration and sensitivitystems from the fact that Ibn Taymiyyah had studied under a greatnumber of scholarswho belonged to various schools and thus acquired a diverse legal trainingand education.56This cumulative experience,no doubt, shaped Ibn Taymiyyah's legacy on Islamic law, one which calls formore intellectualtolerance among juristsand one which is clearlymanifest from the following text. Raf( al-Maldm should, however be read in the context of the time in which Ibn Taymiyyah lived. This was an era of staunch taqlld in which entrenched allegiances and affiliationsand even a degree of fanaticismwere quite widespread, not only among the lay public but also in the circles of the learned.
in
52 See, ibid., 42. 53 See, ibid. 54 See, for instance, al-Ba'li, al-Ikhtiyarat,16, 22, 23-24, 107, 121; Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawd, 21: 512-518 and 22: 71-72. 55 See, al-Karmi,al-Kawdkib, 139, 174. 56 See,Henri Laoust, Naptriyydt Shaykhal-Isldm Ibn Taymiyyahft al-Siydsahwa 'l-Ijtima"(Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1977), 204.
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n
TRANSLATION of RapalMatam an al-A'immataUA'tarn
In theName ofAllah, theBeneficent, the Merciful
Praise is due toAllah forHis bounties. I testifythat there is no deity except Him; He has no associates in the heavens and the earth.And I testifythat Muhammad isHis slave andMessenger57 and the seal ofHis Prophets?peace be on him and his familyand Companions, continuous prayers and blessings untilwe meet him.
To proceed: It is obligatory upon Muslims, afterbeing loyal toAllah theExalted and His Messenger (peace be on him), to be loyal to the believers, as theQur'an declares, especially to the scholarswho are the inheritorsof the Prophets (peace be on them],whom Allah made like stars that serve as guides through the darkness of the land and the oceans. The Muslims are in agreement as regards their guidance and understanding.For prior to the advent of our ProphetMuhammad (peace be on him), the scholars of the earlier [Prophets'] communitieswere less inclined to good, whereas the scholars of theMuslim community (ummah)were deemed to be the finestas they carried themantle of knowledge bequeathed by theProphet (peace be on him) and they are the reviversof whatever was forgottenof his Sunnah. Through them theQur'an is established, and they act upon it; theQur'an speaks through them, and they articulate whatever the Qur'an contains. It should be known thatnone of the Imamswho are generally accepted by theMuslim ummahwould intentionallyoppose theProphet (peace be on
57 It should be indicated that the two terms (al-Nabi and al-Rasut),have been both rendered into English as "Prophet" due to the fact that inRaf al-Malam the author uses them interchangeably as inmost cases in the text they are both used in association with the Prophet Muhammad (peace be on him) and thereforethe discussion regarding the differencebetween al-nabl and al rasul among theologianswould not arise in this case. Also, the term (al-kitab) referringto the Qur'an has been rendered into English as theQur'an rather than 'theBook' as the lattermight lead to confusion especially if the reader isnot aware of such technical terminologies.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 329 him) in any aspect of his Sunnah,whether small or great.This is because they are in profound agreement regardingthe obligation of following theProphet (peace be on him).58They believe that thewords of anyone other than the Prophet (peace be on him) may be accepted or rejected. If any of their opinions was found to be in opposition to an authentichadith, then theremust be a just excuse for that and these excuses fall under one of the three categories:
Firstly,that the scholardid not believe that the Prophet (peace be on him) [actually]uttered the hadith. Secondly,that the scholardid not thinkthat the issue inquestion was [actually] intendedto be coveredby theProphetic hadith. Thirdly, that the scholarbelieved the ruling[contained in the hadith]to have been abrogated.
These three categories can be furtherdivided into a number ofmore specific reasons: The firstreason: that the hadithdid not reach the concerned scholar; and not aware a whoever is of hadith, is not held responsible fornot knowing its ruling. Thus, if the hadith did not reach him and he gaVe a jud|ement regardinga particularquestion on the basis of the apparentmeaning of a verse or another hadith or on the basis of analogy or the presumption of continuity (istishab),then his opinion might fortuitouslyagree with thehadith in one case while opposing it on another. This is themost likelyreason formost ofwhat is found in the opinions of thePious Predecessors (alsalaf alsalih) thatoppose certainhadith. Indeed, it is simply not possible for any singlemember of the ummah to know all the hadith of theProphet (peace be on him). The Prophet (peace be on him) used to speak, issue legal verdicts (fatawa),pass judgement,or perform an action which was heard or seen by thosewho were present at the time and they,or some of them,would convey it to otherswho would in turn convey it to othersuntil itwould reachwhomever Allah (theMost High) willed among the scholars from amongst theCompanions of the Prophet, theirFollowers and thosewho came afterthem. And in another assembly, suchmatters would be heard or seen by those who were absent from the firstgathering and they [too] would convey it to whomever theywere able to. As a result, the first group would know what was not known by the other and vice versa and so the scholars among the
58 See,Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi%al-Risalah (Cairo:Matba'at al-Halabi, 1939), 74,104.
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Companions and thosewho came afterthem would surpass each other in the relative levelsof the extentof theirknowledge or thequality of it.
[Aswe have said], it is absolutely impossible to claim that any one person could encompass all of the hadtthsof theProphet (peace be on him) and this can be illustratedthrough the example of theRighteous Caliphs, who were most knowledgeable regardingthe affairsof theProphet (peace be on him), his Sunnah and othermatters relatingto him, especially [Abu Bakr] al-Siddlq (may Allah be pleased with him), who was never far from the Prophet whether at home or on his travels.In facthe was with himmost of the time to the extent thathe used to staywith him at night to deal with theMuslims' affairs.59This is also true of cUmarb. al-Khattab (mayAllah be pleased with him) and you will findmany hadiths inwhich theProphet (peace be on him) said, "I entered with Abu Bakr and 'Umar" and "I went out with Abu Bakr and 'Umar."60 Despite this,when Abu Bakr (mayAllah be pleased with him) was asked about the grandmother's share of inheritance,he replied, "There is nothing prescribed foryou inAllah's Book, nor do I know anything for you in the Sunnah of theProphet ofAllah (peace be on him), but I will ask people [about it]." So he did ask them and al-Mughirah b. Shu'bah and Muhammad b. Maslamah came forwardand testifiedthat theProphet (peace be on him) had given her a sixth.61This sunnahwas also reported by 'Imran b. Husayn.62 Thus, even thoughnone of these threeCompanions was of the same statureas Abu Bakr and the other caliphs, theywere the only ones who knew this particular sunnah aboutwhose practice the ummahhas since agreedupon.63 Similarly, 'Umar b. al-Khattab (mayAllah be pleased with him) did not know the sunnah relatingto "seekingpermission" (isti'dhdn)[before entering a
59 Ahmad b. Muhammad al-TahawI, SharhMa'am 'l-Athdr(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'flmiyyah, 1399ah),4:330. 60 See for instance,Muhammad b. Isma'il al-Bukhari,Sahih al-Bukhdri [henceforthreferred to as "Sahib"], Kitab al-Sulh, Bab al-Sulh bayn al-Ghurama' and Kitab Fada'il al-Sahabah, Bab Manaqib 'Umar, as well as the testimonyof the caliph 'All regarding this in al-Bukhari,Sahih> Kitab Fada'il al-Sahabah, Bab Manaqib 'Umar. 61 Muhammad b. 'Isa al-Tirmidhi,al-Jami* al-Mukhtasar min al-Sunan [henceforthreferred to as "Sunan^ Kitab al-Fara'id, Bab ma Ja' fiMirath al-Jaddah;Muhammad b. Yazid Ibn Majah, Sunan IbnMajah, Kitab al-Fara'id,Bab Mirath al-Jaddah. 62 See, for a discussion about the authenticityof these reports,Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Shawkani, Nayl al-Awtarmin Ahadith Sayyid al-AkhyarSharh Muntaqd 'l-Akhbar(Beirut: Dar al-Jil,1973), 6:175-177. 63 See for the discussion about the share of the grandmother, 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughriift Fiqh al-ImdmAhmad b.Hanbal al-Shaybani (Beirut:Dar al-Fikr, 1405ah), 6:189; Muhammad b. Ahmad Ibn Rushd, Biddyat aUMujtahidwa Nihdyat al-Muqtasid (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr]n.d.), 2: 262-263 for.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 331 dwelling] until he was informedabout it by Abu Musa al-Ash'ariwho cited theAnsar in support of his narration,64and this iswhile 'Umar was more knowledgeable than the one who related this sunnah to him. Likewise, 'Umar did not know that thewife inheritsfrom the blood money of her deceased husband. Instead, he thought that the blood money belonged to the 'aqilah65 until al-Dahhak ibn Sufyan al-Kilabi,who was appointed by the Prophet (peace be on him) as a governor of certain regions,wrote to 'Umar informing him that the Prophet (peace be on him) gave thewife of Ashyam al-Dibibl (mayAllah be pleased with him) [a share] of her deceased husband's blood money. As a result, 'Umar abandoned his opinion in favourof thishadith and said: "If I had not heard thishadith, I would have judged contraryto it."66 'Umar also did not know the rulingof jizyah for theMagians [followers of a until he was informed 'Abd al-Rahman b. ' fire-worshippingreligion] by Awf (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) that the Prophet (peace be on him)said, "Treat them as you treat the People of the Book."67Moreover, when 'Umar reached Sargh [nearTabuk] and was informedthat a plague had strickenal Sham [the region of greater Syria], he consulted the earlyMuhajirun68 who were with him at the time.He then asked theAnsar,69 then he asked those who accepted Islam at the time of the conquest ofMakkah, and every one of them told himwhat they thoughtand none of themwas able to informhim of a sunnah from the Prophet (peace be on him) until 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Awf came and told him of the sunnahof theProphet (peace be on him) with regard to plagues,when he said: "If the plague appears in a landwhile you are in it,
64 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Isti'dhan,Bab al-Taslimwa '1-Isti'dhanThalathan; Muslim b. al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi [henceforthreferred to as "Muslim "1,Sahih Muslim [henceforthreferred to as "Sahi\f\Kitab al-Adab, Bab al-Isti'dhan. 65 There is a discussion about who ismeant by 'aqilah in Islamic law.One of the opinions is that it is the paternal uncles and theirchildren, however distant they are in descent.Another opinion states that 'aqilah includes the father,sons, brothers and every agnatic heir. Ibn Taymiyyah holds a differentopinion from these two.He asserts that 'dqilah is "every individualwho helps and supports the person at the time and the place." See, al-Matroudi,TheHanbali School ofLaw, 118-119. 66 See, Malik b. Anas al-Asbuhi,Muwatta* al-ImamMalik (Egypt:Dar Ihya' al-Turath, n.d.), 2: 866; Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imam Ahmad b.Hanbal (Cairo:Mu'assasat Qurtubah, n.d.), 3:452 and Sulayman b. al-Ash'athAbu Dawud al-Sijistani,Sunan Abi Dawud, Kitab al-Fara'io!,Bab fi1-Mar'ah Tarith min Diyat Zawjiha. 67 See,Malik, Muwatta\ 1: 278; also see, 'AbdAllah b. Yusuf al-Zayla'I,Nash alRayah liAhadith al-Hidayah (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1357), 3:448-449 and Muhammad b. Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al Hadi, Tanqih Tahqlq Ahadith al-Tatiq (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1998), 3: 364. 68 The emigrants fromMakkah toMadman. 69 The Madman followers of the Prophet (peace be on him) who granted him refugeafter the hijrah toMadinah.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 332 AHMAD IBN 'ABDAL-HALIM EBN TAYMIYYAH do not depart in flightfrom it and ifyou hear that ithas smittena land,do not go towards it."70 On another occasion, 'Umar discussedwith Ibn 'Abbas (mayAllah be pleased with both of them) the problem of one who has experienceddoubts concerninghis prayer [i.e.whether he had missed an element of it or not] and 'Umarwas not aware of any sunnab pertaining to thismatter. He was then informedby 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Awf that theProphet (peace be on him) said that "the one performing the prayer should ignore his doubt and base his action on whatever is certain to him."71Finally, 'Umarwas once travellingon us a particularlywindy day. He asked: "Who can tell [from the Prophet] somethingwith regard to thewind?" Abu Hurayrah (mayAllah be pleased with him) said: "I was informedof 'Umar's requestwhile I was at the back of the group so I spurredmy riding camel to hasten forwarduntil I reached him and narrated to him what the Prophet (peace be on him) ordered when the wind would rage."72 Thus, thesewere the issues thatwere not known to 'Umar until he was informedabout them by thosewho were not his equal in rank. Indeed, there were other issues inwhich 'Umar knew nothing from the sunnab as a resultof which he pronounced a judgement,or issued afatwd on them in a way that might not have been in [direct]conformity with the Sunnab. An example of this is his judgementon the blood money for fingers,namely that they are differentfrom one another based on theirdifferent functions, whereas both Abu Musa and Ibn 'Abbas (mayAllah be pleased with them), both ofwhom were lesser in degree of knowledge than 'Umar, knew the Prophet's saying, "This and this are equal,"73meaning the thumb and littlefinger. This sunnab reachedMu'awiyah (mayAllah be pleased with him) during the time of his rule, and he judged in accordancewith it and theMuslims felt that itwas incumbentupon them to follow it.The fact that 'Umarwas not aware of this hactithwas not considered a shortcomingon his part. Another example is 'Umar and his son 'AbdAllah (mayAllah be pleased with both of them) aswell as other notable scholarsprohibiting thewearing of perfume by the one who is about to enter into a state of ritual consecration (ihram) and by the one who is about to go toMakkah for circumambulation
70 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Tibb, Bab man Kharaja min Ard la Tulayimuh; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Salam,Bab al-Ta'un. 71 For the hadtths attributed to 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Awf regarding this, see,Muhammad b. Jariral-Tabari, Tahdhlb al-Athdr (Damascus: Dar al-Ma'mun li 1-Turath, 1995), 33. 72 See Ahmad, Musnad, 2: 267 and 'Abd al-Razzaq b. Hammam al-San'ani, al-Musannaf (Beirut: al-Maktab aUslaml, 1403ah), 11: 89. 73 See al-Bukhari,Sahlh, Kitab al-Diyat, Bab idha 'AddaRajulan faWaqa'at Thanayah.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREATIMAMS 333 of theKa'bah (tawdfiafter throwing the stones at Jamarat al-'Aqabah, not being aware of the hadithof A'ishah (mayAllah be pleasedwith her) inwhich she said: "I perfumed the Prophet (peace be on him) forhis ihrdmbefore he entered into the stateof ihrdm,and I also perfumedhim before performingthe hajj circumambulation (tawdfatifadah) (i.e. after the first state of ihrdm elapses)."74 'Umar used to allow the one who wears leather socks towipe over them until he takes them offwithout any restriction[as to time].This was adhered to by a group of the early pious predecessorsbecause the hadith regardingthe time restrictionon wiping thatwas authenticatedby some of thosewho were not theirequal in knowledge had not reached them.75This hadithwas narrated from the Prophet (peace be on him) throughvarious authentic channels of transmission.76 The same holds for 'Uthman (mayAllah be pleased with him) who did not know that a woman should spend thewaiting period following the death of her husband in the house where she livedbefore his death, until al-Furay'ah bintMalik?Abu Sa'ld al-Khudrfs sister (mayAllah be pleased with both of them)?related to him thatwhen her husband passed away theProphet (peace be on him) told her "Remain inyour house until you fulfilthe period stated in theQur'an for thismatter [fourmonths and ten days]." 'Uthman (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) then acted upon thishadith J7 He was also once givenmeat [i.e.while he was in a stateof ihrdm]from a huntwhich was hunted specially forhim as a giftand upon sittingdown to eat it 'All (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) informedhim that theProphet (peace a a be on him) rejected themeat [from hunt] given to him as present."78 And likewise 'Ah (mayAllah be pleased with him) who said: "When I used to hear a hadith from theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him), directly Allah made me benefit fromall thatHe desiredme to benefit from,whereas if anyone elsewould relate something tome, I would make him swear an oath and if he did, I would believe him. Abu Bakr told me?and he was being truthful?and he mentioned thewell-known hadith related to the Prayer of Repentance (saldtal-tawbah).79
74 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Hajj, Bab al-Tib *indal-Ihram; Muslim, ?ahih, Kitab al-Hajj, Bab al-Tib li 'l-Muhrim 'ind al-Ihram. 75 See, Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi, SahihMuslim bi Shark al-Nawawi (Beirut:Dar Ihya' al Turath, 1392), 3:176. 76 See for example,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Taharah,Bab al-Tawqit fil-Mash. 77 See,Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Talaq, Bab fil-Mutawaffa'Anha. 78 See,Ahmad, Musnad, 1:100. 79 See, Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Salah,Bab fi 1-Istighfar;Ibn Majah, Sunan, Kitab Iqamat al
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'All and Ibn 'Abbas (mayAllah be pleased with them), among others, issued a fatwa that thewoman whose husband died while shewas pregnant, must observe the longer of the two specifiedwaiting periods. The sunnahof theMessenger of Allah (peace be on him) regardingSubay'ah al-Aslamiyyah (mayAllah be pleased with her) had not reached them.Upon the death of her husband Sa'd b. Khawlah, the Prophet (peace be on him) told her that her waiting period continues to thepoint of the child's delivery.80 Finally, 'All, Zayd, Ibn 'Umar and others (mayAllah be pleased with them all) issued afatwa regardingthe woman who authorizes her husband to determineher dower (almufawwidah) that, "ifher husband passes away, she is not entitled to any dower." The sunnahof theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) pertaining to Barwa* bintWashiq (mayAllah be pleased with her) had however not reached them.81 This is a vast subject area inwhich a tremendousamount of narrations is related from theCompanions of the Prophet (peace be on him). As for that which is related from those other than the Companions it runs into the thousands.This was the position with regard to theCompanions who were the most knowledgeable, the most grounded in jurisprudence, the most mindful of Allah and the best among theMuslim community.As for those who came after them, they are lesser in rank and it goes without saying that some of the corpus of the Sunnah was hidden from each and every one of them. Therefore, whoever believes that every authentic hadith reached each one or one a and every of the Imams indeed any specific Imam, commits grave and abhorrent error. It should not be said that the hadiths have all been documented and compiled and thereforeit is unlikely that theywould have been unknown. This is because thewell-known collections ofHadith were compiled afterthe demise of the Imamswho are followed (mayAllah have mercy on them all). Also, it is not acceptable to claim that the hadithsof theProphet (peace be on him) are limited to those found in the specificcollections ofHadith. Moreover, even if thiswere to be the case, not everythingin these collectionswould be known by a single scholar, and this is highly unlikely to be the casewith any
Salah, Bab ma Ja' fi ann al-SalatKaffarah; al-Tirmidhi,Sunan, Kitab Abwab al-Salah,Bab ma Ja' fi 'l-Salat 'ind al-Tawbah; Ahmad, Musnad, 1:2. 80 See, al-Bukhari,Sahlh, Kitab al-Tafsir,Bab wa Ulat al-Ahmal;Muslim, Sabih, Kitab al-Talaq, Bab Inqida' al-Tddah. 81 man wa See,Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab fi Tazawwaja lamYusami Sidaqan hatta Mat; IbnMajah, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab al-RajulYatazawwaj wa laYafrid laha; al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab ma Ja' fi 1-Rajul Yatazawwaj al-Mara'ah faYamut 'Anha qabla an Yafrid laha. The ruling according to thesenarrations is that thewidow will be grantedher full dower.
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person; indeed it is possible that a scholarmight possess a large number of collections ofHadlth and yet not be aware of all of the hadiths contained within them. In fact, thosewho came before the emergence of theseHadlth collections were by farmore knowledgeable in the Sunnah than thosewho came after them.This is because a largepart of the Sunnah thathad reached them and had been authenticatedby themmight not have reached us except throughunknown transmittersor a severed chain of narration or might not have reached us at all. Thus, it can be said that their "Hadlth compilations" as were preserved in theirhearts, which contained several times asmuch that which is found in the physical collections and the one who iswell versed in this issuewill have no doubts about this [point]. Nor should it be said thatwhoever does not have knowledge of all of the hadiths should not be considered a mujtahid. This is because ifwe were to stipulate as a condition of themujtahid that he must be aware of all of the a Prophet's words and actions relevantto legal rulingsthen therewould not be singlemujtahid in theMuslim community.Rather, themujtahid's objective should be to know most of the hadiths so that only a few of the detailswill escape him and hence he might only contradict the fewdetails thathad [not]82 reached him. The second reason: that the hadlth had reached the mujtahid but its authenticity, in his opinion, was not established.This may be because the [direct] transmitterof the hadlth to him or the one before him or any one of the transmittersin thathadlth's chain of transmissionis considered by him to be unknown [or unidentifiable],or of doubtful reputation (muttaham),or deficient in memory. It may also be because the hadlth did not reach the a mujtahid with a continuous chain but rather with severed chain of was transmitters, or that the transmitter not precise when transmitting the was to wording of the hadlth even though the same hadlth transmitted other scholars by trustworthytransmitters with an uninterrupted isnad.This might be because the one whom themujtahid considered unknown was known by others to be trustworthyor that itwas narrated by other than thosewhom he or was considered to be impugned authorities (majriihun), that the hadlth or narrated through another uninterrupted chain, that some of the memorizers among scholars ofHadlth narrated the wording of the hadlth meticulously, or that therewere shawahid [i.e. otherCompanions transmitting supportingnarrations] andmutaha'dt [i.e. thehadlth being narrated by another chain of transmittersreaching back to one of the transmittersafter the Companion] indicatingthe authenticityof thatnarration.
82 ' The word (not) ismissing from the printed text of all available published editions of Raf al Maldm 'an al A Hmmat al-A 'lam.
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This [second reason] was also very common at the time of the first generation of Successors (tdbi'in) and the second generation of Successors (tdbi%%tdbi%ri) up to the time of thewell known Imams,more so than the firstgeneration. Indeed, it ismore common than the firstreason. Hadiths were widespread by then and well known but they reachedmany of the scholars through weak channels, even though they had reached others through comparatively authentic channels.Therefore, theywere considered to be an authoritative source (hujjah) because theywere transmitted through these authentic channels, and yet theywere not known to thosewho opposed them because of theweak transmissionsavailable to them.This iswhy we find that many scholars suspended judgement on account of a hadith until its authenticitywas properly established,so theywould say: "my opinion in this issue is such and such.However, if there is a hadith narratedwith regard to this [containing another ruling], and if its authenticitywas to be established, thenmy rulingwould be in accordancewith it."83 The third reason: that the hadithwas deemed to be weak on the basis of the ijtihdd of one scholar while others disagreed with him, regardless of whether the narration of the hadith arrived through another channel or whether the correctopinion was thatof thismujtahid, his opponents, or both of them,according to thosewho say that "everymujtahid is correct." There can be various causes for this: One of them is that one scholar believes that a transmitterof the concerned hadith is weak whereas the other believes him/her to be trustworthy.And the science related to identifyingtransmitters is a vast one. It is possible that the correctmujtahid is the one who believes that the transmitteris weak, because he was aware of an impugningfactor. Also, it is possible that the correct opinion iswith the othermujtahid because he knew that the cause was not an impugningfactor, either because it did not actually fall into a valid class of impugning factors or that the transmitterhad an exemptionwhich precludes the effectof the impugnmentupon him. This is another vast subject area and the scholars specialising in the transmittersand their conditions [i.e. the study of the reportersof Hadith] have their agreementsand disagreementswith regard to this issue, just as the scholars specialising in all of theother sciencesdo. Another reason is that themujtahid does not believe that the transmitter heard the hadith from the narrator on the authority of whom he is transmittingit whereas another mujtahid believes that the transmitterdid
83 Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabi, Siyar A'ldm al-Nubala" (Beirut:Mu'assasat al-Risalah, 1413ah), 10: 35 and 'Ali b. al-Hasan ibnHibat Allah Ibn 'Asakir,Ta'rikh Madinat Dimashq wa DhikrFadliha wa Tasmiyatman Hallaha min al-Amathil (Beirut:Dar al-Fikr, 1995), 51: 389.
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indeed hear the hadlth [from the narrator on the authority of whom he is transmittingit]. And the causes bringingthis about arewell-known. Yet another reason is that the transmitter has two states: a state of soundness and a state of confusion (idtirdb),e.g. when a transmitterbecomes confused orwhen his books are burntdown. Therefore, all thathe transmitted while in a sound state is [considered]correct and all thathe transmittedwhile in a state of confusion is [considered]weak. As a result, itmight not appear clear to one mujtahid as regardsthe state inwhich the hadlthwas transmitted whereas anothermujtahid was certain that the transmitterrelated that hadlth while inhis sound state. Another reason is that the transmitterforgets that he related the hadlth and is hence unable to remember it at a laterdate or he actually denies thathe ever related the hadlth.Hence, one mujtahidmight believe that this is a defect necessitating the abandonment of the hadlthwhereas anothermujtahid might believe that it is acceptable to cite that hadlth as evidence?and this topic of dispute [too] iswell-known. A furtherreason is thatmany of theHijazi scholars hold the view that the Iraqi or Sham! hadlth should not be cited as an evidence unless it originated inHijaz, to the point where some of them remarked: "Give the hadlthsof the people of Iraq the same statusas thenarrations of thePeople of theBook; neither affirmthem nor disbelieve them."And another [Hijazi] was asked: "Is the following chain of transmission authoritative: Sufyan from Mansur from Ibrahim from 'Alqamah on the authority of 'Abd Allah b. Mas'ud?" The replywas: "If itdid not originate inHijaz, thenno." This is due to the fact that they believed that the people ofHijaz had so none was mastered the Sunnah, that of it had escaped them, whereas there confusion regarding the hadlths of Iraq which necessitated a suspension of judgementon them. Some of the Iraqis, on the other hand, think the same about the hadlth of the people of Sham.Most people, however, do not use this as a basis forweakening a hadlth. So whenever the chain of transmittersis sound, the hadlth is authoritative,whether it isHijazi, Iraqi, Sham! or from other places. Abu Dawud al-Sijistanl (may Allah have mercy upon him) compiled a book on the narrations of hadlthsknown to be related only by individuals from certain regions (mafdrld),in which he clarified those hadlths which could only be foundwith continuous chains of transmission in those particular regions and not in other regions. This includes hadlths from Madlnah, Makkah, Ta'if, Dimashq, Hims, Kufah, Basrah and others.There are reasons other than these as well. The fourth reason: that the scholar stipulates some conditions for the acceptance of hadlthwhich was transmittedby one trustworthymemorizer
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but is opposed by others [who do not accept such conditions]. For instance, some stipulate that the hadithmust be compared towhat is in theQur'an and the established Sunnah?4 or that the transmittermust be a jurist if his narration happens to oppose that which can be deduced from textual principles (qiyasal-usul)?5 or the stipulationby some that the narration of the hadith needs to be widespread and known if it deals with an issue known to have occurred frequently at the time of the Prophet.86 There are other conditions,well-known within theirrespective places [ofdiscussion]. The fifth reason: that the hadith has reached the scholar and its authenticityhas been established to him, but he forgetsthe narration. This can occur with regard to theQur'an and the Sunnah. For instance, there is the well-known hadith related on the authorityof 'Umar (mayAllah be pleased with him) thathe was asked about the personwho is in a stateof major ritual impuritybut findsno water while he is traveling.'Umar said he must not pray until he findswater. 'Ammar b. Yasir (mayAllah be pleased with him) then said, "O Commander of theFaithful! Do you not rememberwhen you and I were [herding]camels andwe were both in statesof major ritual impurityand I rolled in the dust and performedprayer while you did not performyour prayer?And [do you not remember] that I mentioned this to the Prophet (peace be on him) and he replied, "Itwas enough foryou to do it in thisway" and then he struck the groundwith his hands and thenwiped his face and handswith his palms?" 'Umar then said: "O 'Ammar, fearAllah!" So 'Ammar said, "If you so wish, I will not narrate it," upon which 'Umar remarked, "We hold you responsible forwhat you claim."87 Thus, this is a sunnahwhich was witnessed by 'Umar (mayAllah be pleased with him) and one which he later forgot.Moreover, he even issued a fatwa opposing it and evenwhen Ammar (mayAllah be pleased with him) sought to remind him he failed to remember.Despite this,he did not accuse Ammar of lyingbut instead [implicitly]ordered him to narrate thishadith.
84 See, Ahmad b. al-Husayn al-Bayhaqi, al-Qird'ah Khalf allmam (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al 'Ilmiyyah, 1405 ah), 203; 'Umar b. 'All Ibn al-Mulaqqin, Tadhkirat al-Muhtdj ildAhddith al Minhdj (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1994), 27 and 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr al-Suyuti, Miftdh al-Jannahft 'l-Ihtijajbi 'l-Sunnah (al-Madinah al-Munawwarah: Madinah University, 1399ah), 10. 85 See, Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-Mujtahid,2: 216; al-Shawkani,Nayl, 5: 332. 86 See, for instance, 'Ali b.Muhammad al-Amidi,al-Ihkdm ft Usiilal-Fiqh (Beirut:Dar al-Kitab al 'Arabi, 1404ah), 2: 124; 'All b. Ahmad Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkdmft Usul alAhkdm (Cairo: Dar al Hadith, 1404 ah), 2: 151; Idem, al-Muhalld (Beirut:Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah,n.d.), 4: 117,Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi, al-Majmu":Sharh al-Muhadhdhab(Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1997), 5: 221. 87 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Hayd, Bab al-Tayammum.
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More illustrativeof this point is [the occasion] when 'Umar delivered a speech to the people inwhich he stated,"No one must exceed the dowry paid by theProphet (peace be on him) to hiswives and thedowry of his daughters [and ifhe does] I will returnit [to the payer]."A woman then said to him: "O Commander of the Faithful!Why do you deny us what was given to us by Allah?" Then she recited{... and you have given one of thema heap ofgold, then take notfrom it anything}}*Following this 'Umar retractedhis opinion and accepted hers for he had memorised the verse but had forgotten [its relevance].89 This is similar towhat was narrated about 'Allwho reminded al-Zubayr during the battle of al-Jamalabout somethingwhich theProphet (peace be on him) had entrusted to them; so al-Zubayr remembered and gave up the fightingbecause of it.90 Incidences of this kind [i.e. of learninga text and then forgettingit] are frequentamong both the early and laterscholars. The sixth reason: that the scholar does not know the implication of the concernedhadith. This can be due to the fact that a termmentioned in the hadithwas considered by him to be unfamiliar (gharib)ysuch as [the terms]:al muzabanahy almukhabarah, al-muhaqalah, al-muldmasah, al-mundbadhah, al gharar and other such unfamiliar terms about the interpretationof which scholars might disagree. An example is the hadith transmittedby a chain attributed back to the Prophet (peace be on him): "No divorce and manumission [of a slave] in a state of ighldq"91Ighldq was interpreted[by some] tomean 'coercion'while thosewho disagreedwere not [fully]aware of this [linguistic]interpretation. It may sometimes also be because themeaning [of the hadith"]in the scholar's dialect and customaryusage which was not [in conformitywith] that language employed by the Prophet (peace be on him), so the scholarwould
88 Qur'an 4: 20. 89 See, 'Abel al-Razzaq,Musannaf 6:180; Sa'id ibnMansur, Sunan Sa'id ibnMansur (India: al-Dar al-Salafiyyah, 1982), 1:195. It is also quoted byMuhammad b. Futuh al-Humaydi, al-Jam'bayn al-Sahihayn:al-Bukhdri wa Muslim (Beirut:Dar IbnHazm, 2002), 4: 324. See also, 'All b. 'Umar al-Daraqutni, al-'Ilal al-Waridahfi 'l-Ahadithal-Nabawiyyah (Riyadh:Dar Taybah, 1985), 2: 232; 'AbdAllah b. Yusuf al-Zayla'i, Takhrijal-Ahddithwa 'l-Athdral-Waqi'ahfiTafsir al-Kashshafli *l Zamakhshari (Riyadh:Dar IbnKhuzaymah, 1414ah), 1: 294-297. 90 See,Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah al-Hakim, al-Mustadrak 'aidal-Sahihayn (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1990), 3: 412-414. See also,Ma'mar b. Rashid al-Azdi, al-Jdmi*published with al Musannaf of 'Abd al-Razzaq (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1403 ah), 11: 241. 91 See, Ibn Majah, Sunan, Kitab al-Talaq, Bab Talaq al-Mukrahiwa al-Nasi; Ahmad, Musnad, 6: 276; 'AbdAllah b.Muhammad IbnAbi Shaybah, alKitdb al-Musannaffi i-Ahddithwa 'l-Athar (Riyadh:Maktabat al-Rushd, 1409 ah), 4: 83; 'All b. 'Umar al-Daraqutni, Sunan al-Daraqutni (Beirut:Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1966), 4: 36.
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correlate it to what he understood from the term in accordance with his tongue, basing this on the principle that a word retains its originalmeaning [untilproven otherwise]. This is like some of the scholarswho heard some reports (dthdr)which allow a concessionwith regard to nabidh, so they thought it referredto some types of intoxicants;due to the fact that this term (i.e. nabldh) was used for those [intoxicants]in theirnative tongue,whereas in reality this termrefers to thatwhich was left in thewater to sweeten it and was consumed before it attained any intoxicatingqualities. This meaning ismade clear through several authentichadiths92 Similarly, some scholars encountered the term 'khamr' in theQur'an and Sunnah and they thought it referredto intoxicantsmade fromgrapes only on the basis that thiswas themeaning of the term in theirdialect, but there are authentic hadithswhich confirm that the term khamr is a name for every intoxicatingdrink.93 Sometimes the scholardid not know the implicationof the hadithbecause the term [used in that text]was eithera homonym, ambivalent in itsmeaning, or one thathovered between the literaland metaphorical sense, so the scholar tookwhat he thought is thenearest [to the intendedmeaning] even though the intendedmeaning may turnout to be theother meaning of the term. Again, some of theCompanions understood the "white thread and the black thread" [in the verse dealing with the time for beginning the fast]94to to an verse refer actual rope (habl)95 Others also understood 'hands' in the [dealingwith dry ablution] {and rub therewithyour faces and hands}96to cover arm to the entire up the armpit.97 [The scholar] sometimes [did not know the implication of the hadith] because its import was obscure (khafi).This is due to the fact that the indications that can be drawn from a statement are often very diverse and so people naturally differin theirability to comprehend them and to grasp their meaning depending on what Allah has bestowed upon them. a Then personmight know the general implicationof a textbut he might not recognise that this specificcase is includedwithin thatgeneral context. It is
92 See, for instance,Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Hajj, Bab Wujub al-Mabit bi Mina; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Ashribah,Bab Sifat al-Nabidh. 93 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Ashribah,Bab Bayan annaKull Muskir Khamr. 94 Qur'an 2: 186. 95 versewas This revealed in the context of settingthe time forbeginning the fastingwhich is at dawn time. 96 Qur'an 4: 43. 97 This versewas revealed in the context of dry ablution (al-tayammum).
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possible that he might recognise that this specificcase is included under that general context but thenhe forgetsthis lateron. This is such a vast subject that can be encompassed by none but Allah. It is also possible that a person commits a mistake by deriving from a statementwhat is not conceivable within theArabic languagewhich the Prophet (peace .be on him) was sent with. The seventh reason: that the scholar thought that thehadith did not carry anyspecific implication (daldlah). The differencebetween this reason and the one before it is that in the previous [instance] the scholardid not know that specific implicationwhereas in this reason he knows the specificimplication but believes that it ought not to be applied based on some principles he had which invalidated that implication,regardless of whether he was in realityright or wrong. Examples of those principles include: that the scholar believes the specified general text (al- (dmmalmakhsus) is not a valid proof, or that the implication (al-mafhiim) is not a valid proof,98 or that a general ruling established for a specificcause is applied onlywhere that cause exists,or that a general imperativedoes not necessitateobligation or immediatecompliance, or that the alifznd 1dm[constituents of theArabic definite article]do not denote generality,or thatnegated verbs neithernegate its essencenor all of its rulings, or that the required meaning (alfnuqtada) does not necessitate a general import and as a resulthe would not claim the existenceof a general import in the omitted elements (al-mudmardt)and the effectivecause [al-ma'ani].99 And likewisewith other exampleswhich would need a lengthydiscussion were we to delve into them, as indeedhalf of the disputes thathave arisen in mid al-fiqh come within this field [i.e. the implications]; even though the absolute principles [i.e. Qur'an and Hadith] do not encompass all of the disputed implications.One of the questions in this topic iswhether certain sub-categoriesof classes of implicationsare included under themain class or not. For instance, a scholarmight believe that a certain term is ambivalent (mujmal) due to the fact that it is a homonym (mushtarak),and there is nothing to indicate the preferenceof one of its twomeanings over the other, or other [such] examples.
98 For details related to the discussion on the authorityof the implications, see, 'Abd atMaUk b. 'Abd Allah al-Juwayni,al-Burhdn fi Usul al-Fiqh (Cairo: al-Wafa', 1418 ah), 1:298; Idem, al Talkhisfi Usul al-Fiqh (Beirut:Dar al-Basha'ir al-Islamiyyah, 1996), 2:184; 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad Ibn Qudamah, Rawdat al-Nddirwa Junnat al-Munazir (Riyadh: The Imam University, 1399), 262; al-Amidl, al-lhkam, 3: 73. 99 See,Al Taymiyyah: 'Abd al-Salam b. 'AbdAllah, 'Abd al-Halim b. 'Abd al-Salam andAhmad b. 'Abd al-Halim, al-Musawwadahfi usul al-Fiqh, ed.Muhammad Muhyi '1-Dln 'Abd al-Hamid (Cairo:Matba' al-Madani, 1964), 81.
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The eighth reason: that the scholar deems that implicationof the text to be opposed by something indicatingthat it could not have been so intended. Examples include a general termbeing opposed by a specificone, an absolute term (al-mutlaq)by a qualified one (al-muqayyad),an absolute imperativeby thatwhich negates it, or the literal (al-haqiqah)one by thatwhich indicatesa metaphor (al-majaz), and so on. This is also a vast subject; for indeed the conflictbetween the numerous implicationsof a phrase and the task of giving preferenceto some of themover others is like awide ocean. The ninth reason: that the scholar thinks that the hadith is opposed by contrary evidencewhich is accepted by all scholars, such as a Qur'anic verse, another hadith, or consensus, thereby indicating the hadith's weakness, abrogation, or interpretation,if it is amenable to interpretation.This is of two types: First: that the scholar believes that the contrary evidence is preferable (rajih) in general, leading to one of the three possibilities [that is, the weakening of the hadith, its abrogation, or its interpretationaway from the undesirablemeaning] without specifyingany one of them. Second: that the scholar specifiesone of the three, so he believes that the proof is abrogated or interpretedaway. There is thepossibility, however, that he might commit a mistake regardingthe abrogation by considering the later evidence to be the earlierone. Alternatively,he might err in interpretationby understanding the hadith in a way which itswording does not permit, or where there is somethingextraneous which rulesout that interpretation. And if the new evidencewas to oppose the earlier evidence in general terms, theremight be a possibility that the opposing evidence does not give rise to themeaning which the scholar understood. It is also possible that the opposing hadith is not equal in strength to the firstone in terms of the authenticityof its chain of transmittersand the clarityof its text (matn).The same points and others apart from them could of course also be said for the firsthadith. In most cases the claim of a consensus is actually no more than the absence of knowledge about any opposing opinion. And we have found among the distinguishedscholars thosewho arrivedat certainopinions on the basis of the non-existence of any contraryopinion, even though the apparent meaning of the evidence necessitates, according to them, other than that opinion. Itwas unthinkable,however, for that scholar to espouse an opinion which was not known to have been held by any earlier scholar, despite knowing that the people disagreewith that view, to the extent that some scholars qualify theiropinion by saying, "If there is a consensus on this issue then it is themost deserving to be followed. If not, I think the rulingwith
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 343 regard to this issue is such and such."100 An example of this is the statementof the one who says, "I do not know anyonewho allowed the testimonyof a slave"whereas the acceptance of it is narrated from 'All,Anas, Shurayh, and others.101Another is the saying, "It is agreed that the partially freed slave does not inherit"whereas this right of inheritance is narrated fromAll and IbnMas'ud (mayAllah be pleased with them) and there is a hasan hadith from theProphet (peace be on him) to that effect.102And finally, "I do not know of anyone who made obligatory the prayer upon the Prophet (peace be on him) in the prayer" whereas its obligation isnarrated fromAbu Ja'faral-Baqir.103 This is due to the fact that theultimate aim formany scholars is to know the opinions of the scholarswho were their contemporarieswithin their regionwhile not knowing the opinions of other scholars.We also findmany of the early scholars who only knew the opinions of theMadinans and Kufans, and many later scholars only knew two or three opinions from amongst those of the reputed scholars,while anything outside this was considered by them to be opposed to the consensus because theydid not know of any statement to the contrary [from a reputed scholar] even though they always heard views opposingwhat theyknew. Itwill not be possible for such a person to use a hadith opposed to this alleged consensus, because of his fear that thiswill lead to opposing consensus or that he believes that it does actually oppose the consensus,whilst [in his mind] consensus is the greatestof evidences.This is the extenuatingreason of cases many people inmany where theydid not adhere to the obvious import of the evidence. Some of them in realitycan be excused,whereas others cannot be excused. This is also truewith regard to the aforementioned and later reasons. The tenth reason: [the scholar thought that] the hadithwas opposed by evidence indicating the hadith's weakness, abrogation, or contrary interpretation,whereas his view that this is a contraryevidence is not shared by other scholars, or even by thosewho belong to his group, or the contrary evidence is not in reality theprevalent one.
100 See,Muhammad ibnMuflih al-Maqdisi, al-Furu'fi 'l-Fiqhal-Hanbtt (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al as 'flmiyyah,1418 ah), 5: 447 andMuhammad ibnAbl Bakr b. Ayyub known Ibn al-Qayyim, Ahkam Abl al-Dhimmah (Dammam- Beirut:Ramadi, 1997), 2: 747,793. 101 See for example, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Shahadat,Bab Shahadat al-Ima*wa 'l-'Abid. 102 See, Ahmad b. Shu'ayb al-Nasa'I, al-Sunan al-Kubrd, Kitab al-Qisamah, Bab Diyat al Mukatab. 103 See, al-Tabari, Tahdhib al-Atbar, 257; Ismail b. 'Umar Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'Azim (Beirut:Dar al-Fikr, 1401 ah), 3: 509; al-Shawkani,Nayl alAwtar, 2: 321-326; al-Zayla'I,Nasb al Rayah, 1: 427.
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An example of this is of the approach ofmany of theKufans who, when a an authentic hadith is opposed by the apparentmeaning of Qur'anic text, believe that the apparentQur'anic text, such as one expressinggenerality, is a given preferenceover the explicitmeaning of hadith. A scholarmight consider somethingto be apparentwhich isnot in reality apparent; this is because there aremany potential implicationsof a statement. So, as a result, the hadith of "thewitness and the oath"104was rejectedby the Kufans [on the basis that itwas in opposition to an apparentQur'anic text], even though other scholars know that there is nothing in the apparent Qur'anic text to prevent giving judgement in favourof someone on the basis of one witness and the claimant's oath.And if it should be the case [i.e. even if an apparent Qur'anic text opposing this hadith was to be found], then, according to these scholars the Sunnah is the 'interpreter'of theQur'an. And there arewell known statementsfrom al-Shafi'i regarding this principle. Also, Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] has his well known book on the refutationof the opinion of thosewho claimed the sufficiencyof apparentQur'anic texts (zahir al'Qur'an) without the need to interpretsuch textswith the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be on him).He mentioned in it evidenceswhich the limitation of space preventsus frommentioning here. And another example of this is to reject the hadith (al-khabar)which specifiesthe generalmeaning of a Qur'anic text,or which qualifies an absolute Qur'anic text,or adds to theQur'anic ruling.The belief of thosewho say this is that adding to a text, as well as qualifying an absolute text, is a form of abrogation, and specifyinga general text is also [a formof] abrogation. Another example concerns a group of the Madinans who oppose authentic hadiths in preference to the practice of the people ofMadinah, on the basis that they (i.e. ahl al-Madinah)must have been in agreementnot to act upon those hadiths, and their agreement is a proofwhich is given preference over the hadith.For instance,they did not act upon the hadiths related to the rightof withdrawal from transactions(khiyar al-majlis)105 on the basis of this principle.Most scholars,however, affirmthe existenceof disagreementamong theMadinans on this issue [that is, regarding the right of withdrawal from transactions]but state that even if theMadinans were in agreementand they were opposed by other scholars [who are supportedby Hadith evidences], then themost authoritativesource would be theHadith.
104 See,Malik, Muwatta', 2: 721; Ahmad, Musnad, 3: 305; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Aqdiyah, Bab al-Qada' bi '1-Yaminwa l-Shahid; al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, Kitab al-Ahkam, Bab ma ja' fi '1 Yamin ma* al-Shahid; al-Nasa'i, al-Sunan al-Kubra,Kitab al-Qada', Bab al-Hukm bi al-Yamin wa 'l-Shahid. 105 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Buyu', Bab Thubut Khiyar al-Majlis.
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Another example is that of some people of the two cities (Madinah and Kufah) opposing some hadlthswith explicit analogy (qiyasjail) arguing that generalprinciples cannot be refutedby such hadiths. And so on with similarareas of dispute regardlessof whether the scholar opposing the hadith is rightor wrong. So, these ten reasons are clear. cases It is possible inmany that the scholar has a proof for not acting a we are not aware upon hadithwhich of because theways of comprehending knowledge aremanifold andwe cannot know all ofwhat is in thehearts of the scholars.The scholarmight have mentioned his proof or might not have, and ifhe were tomention it, itmay ormay not have reachedus; and even if itwas to reach us we may or may not comprehend the thrustof his argument, irrespectiveof whether his proofwas in realitycorrect or not. we However, if allow this possibility [that the proof supporting a mujtahid's argument is unknown to us], it isnot permittedfor us to turnaway from an opinion whose authority is establishedby an authentichadith and is some followed by people of knowledge for another opinion proclaimed by another scholarwho might possibly have an answer to thatproof, even ifhe was more knowledgeable [than the firstscholar]. This is due to the fact that the opinions of scholars aremore prone to error then the shar%evidence itself. The shar%evidences areAllah's proof against all of his servantsand this is not case the with regard to the opinion of the scholar. Indeed, it is impossible for the shar%evidences to contain error if they are not contradicted by other similarevidence and this cannot be said for theopinion of a scholar. And ifpracticing this [i.e. followingthe opinion of a scholar in the faceof an opposing shar%evidence] were to be allowed, then none of the evidences which accept thispossibility [i.e. being open to ijtihdd]will remain as such. However, the purpose [ofwhat we mentioned earlier] is that the scholar might have had a valid excuse fornot following the shar%evidence, andwe are excused for not following his opinion. And Allah (Glorified and Exalted is He!) says: {This isa people thathave passed away; theyshall have what theyearned and you shall have what you earn,and you shall not he called upon to answerfor what theydid.}106 And Allah (Glorifiedis He!) also said, (And ifyou have a dispute concerningany matter, referit toAllah and theMessenger ifyou are (in truth) believersin Allah and theLast Day.}107 It is not permitted for anyone to oppose an authentic hadith of the Prophet (peace be on him) and give preference to the opinion of any human being.On one occasion,when Ibn 'Abbas (mayAllah be pleasedwith him and
106 Qur'an 2:134. 107 Qur'an 4: 59.
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his father)was asked by a man about an issue,he answeredwith a hadith.The man responded, "[But]Abu Bakr and 'Umar said such and such [with regard to that issue]," IbnAbbas said: "You are about to be struckby stones from the sky! I say to you that the Prophet (peace be on him) said such and such, and you reply, "[But]Abu Bakr and 'Umar said such and such!""108 If it is accepted that some of the reasonsmentioned above could cause a scholar to not follow a shar%evidence, and if an authentic hadith is found which contains permissibility, prohibition or another ruling, it is not permissible to believe that a scholarwho did not adhere to it (whose reasons fordeparting from the texthave been given above) should be punished because he made the prohibited permissibleor vice versa, or thathe gave judgementon the basis of what was not revealed by Allah. Similarly, if a hadith contains a threat,by themention of a la'n,109anger or punishment,or somethingsimilar, then it is not permitted to say that the scholar,who permitted such an action or undertook it,would fallwithin thepurview of that threat.We know of no disagreement among the scholars of the ummah with regard to this issue except something narrated from some of the Baghdad! Mu'tazilites such as Bishr al-Marrisi110and his likewho alleged that those among themujtahids who make a mistake would be punished on account of thismistake. This is because the one who commits a prohibited action would be liable for the threatonly ifhe was aware of the prohibition or ifhe was able to obtain that knowledge and failed to do so.As for thosewho are broughtup in the badiyah [remoteplaces away fromcivilisation], or are new converts to Islam andwho commit a prohibited actionwithout being aware of itsprohibition, theywill not be sinning, and they cannot be punished with prescribed punishments (hudiid)even if theydid not base theiraction on shar%evidence. Therefore, a fortiori, thosewho were not aware of the prohibiting hadith and based the permissibility of an action upon shar% evidence are more deserving to be
108 See,Muhammad al-Amin b.Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shanqiti,Adwa* al-Bayan (Beirut:Dar al-Fikr li 1-Tiba'ah wa '1-Nashr,1995), 7: 328. 109 What ismeant by la'n here, according to the classicalMuslim literature,is to pray or state a that person be rejected from themercy ofGod permanently or temporarily.But it could also mean in some instances censure and condemnation of the action with which the la'n was associated. See, Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari,Jami' al-Bayan 'an Ta'wil Ayy akQur'an (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1405 ah), 1: 408; Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughnl,8: 39; al-NawawI, SahVpMuslim hi Sharh al-Nawawly 9:140-141; Muhammad b. Makram IbnManzur, Lisan al-'Arab (Beirut:Dar Sadir, n.d.), 13: 387;Muhammad ibnAbi Bakr al-Razi,Mukhiar al-Sihah (Beirut:Maktabat Lebanon, 1995), 250. 110 See,Ahmad b. 'All al-Khatib al-Baghdadi,Ta'rikh Baghdad (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, n.d.) 7: 56-66; Ahmad b. 'All Ibn Hajar, Lisan al-Mizdn (Beirut:Mu'assasat al-A'lami, 1986), 2: 29.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 347 excused. This iswhy such a scholar is rewarded and praised because of his independent reasoning.Allah (the Exalted) says: {And rememberDavid and Solomon,when theygave judgementin thematter of thefield intowhich thesheep of certainpeople had strayedby night:We did witness theirjudgement To SolomonWe inspiredthe (right) understanding of thematter: to each (of them)We gave Judgementand Knowledge} .U1 So Solomon was distinguishedfor his understanding [in this case] while both were praised for [having] sound judgementand knowledge. In the two Sahihs of al-Bukhari andMuslim it is narrated on the authorityof 'Amr b. al 'As (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) that the Prophet (peace be on him)said, "When a judge exercises independentreasoning and gives the right judgement, he will have two rewards, but ifhe errs in his judgement,he will stillhave earned one reward."112 Therefore, it is clear that the mujtahid, despite his error, is rewarded because of his ijtihadand hismistake is forgivendue to the fact that arrivingat the correct opinion on every occasion is either impossible or highly unlikely. And Allah theExalted says, {And Allah has not laidupon you inreligion any hardship} andHe said, {Allah desiresease for you, andHe does not desirefor youdifficulty}}14 In the two Sahibs of al-Bukharland Muslim it is narrated that theProphet (peace be on him) said to his Companions in theYear of theTrench, "None of you should pray the fAsrprayer until you reachBanu Qurayzah" and sowhen itwas time forAsr prayer and the companionswere still on theirway, some of them said. "We will not pray (Asr prayer) until we arrive at Banu Qurayzah [i.e. even if the time for fAsrprayer elapses]."Others said that this was not the intendedmeaning and theyprayed Asr prayerwhile on theway and theProphet foundno faultwith eitherof the two groups.115 The firstgroup held to the generality of the communication ('umum al-khitab) and thereforethey considered the lapse of the appointed time [for thePrayer] as being includedunder thatgenerality* The other group felt they had the evidence necessitatingthe exclusion of this [the lapse of the appointed time] from the general import of the communication. They understood the command to be an encouragement to them tomake haste in reaching those
111 Qur'an 21: 78-79. 112 Al-Bukhari, ?abihtKitab al-Ftisam,Bab Ajr al-Hakim idha Ijtahada;Muslim, Sahib, Kitab al Aqdiyah, Bab Bayan Ajr al-Hakim idha Ijtahad. 113 Qur'an 22: 78. 114 Qur'an 2:185. 115 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Jumu'ah,Bab $allt al-Talibwa 1-Matlub Rakiban wa Ima'an; Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Jihad,Bab al-Mubadarah bi 'l-Ghazw.
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that theProphet (peace be on him) had takenunder siege. This is an issue upon which there is a well known disagreement among the jurists,namely, "Can the general be particularised by analogy?" (hal on yukhassal-umum hi 'l-qiyds).However, [myview is that] thosewho prayed theway were more correct inwhat theydid. Similarly,when Bilal (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) sold two sd'of one type of dates for one sd' of another type of dates, the Prophet (peace be on him) ordered him to return it116[on the basis that thiswas a transaction involvingribd] but he did not indicate thatBilal camewithin the sphereof the rulings for consuming ribd such as depravity (tafsiq),condemnation (al-la'n) and sternness (taghliz);because Bilal had not been aware that this transaction was prohibited. Also, 'AdI b. Hatim and a group of the Companions (may Allah be pleasedwith them) thoughtthat theQur'anic verse {...untilyou can identifythe white threadfrom theblack thread)117referred to [the literalmeaning of the word al*khayt]i.e. thewhite rope and the black rope. So one of themwould leave two stringsnear his pillow, one white and theother black, andwould eat until he could identifyone from the other.Upon learningof this,the Prophet (peace be on him) said to 'Adi, "Your pillow seems to be very large!It is only thewhiteness of thedawn and theblackness of thenight."118 Therefore, theProphet (peace be on him) indicatedby this that 'Adi had not correctlycomprehended themeaning of theverse, yet theProphet did not attribute to him the censure of one who did not observe the fastingof Ramadan, even though it is one of themajor sins. In contrast [to this] are thosewho gave a fatwd to a man who had a head-injury (in the skull) thathe had towash thewhole of his body [i.e. due to being in a stateof major ritual impurity]so he did.He died as a result and the Prophet(peace be on him) said,"They killed him; may Allah kill them! Should not they have asked if they did not know? Indeed, the cure for ignorance is inquiry."119 Hence thesepeople committed amistake without [proper] ijtihddas they were not fromamong thepeople of knowledge.
116 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Wakalah,Bab idhaBa* al-Wakil Shay'an Fasid; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Musaqah, Bab Bay' al-Ta'amMithlan biMithl. 117 Qur'an 2:187. 118 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Tafsir,Bab wa Kulu wa'shrabu; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al Siyam, Bab Bayan ann al-Dukhul fi 'l-SawmYahsulu bi Tulu* al-Fajr. 119 See, 'Abd al-Razzaq,Musannaf, 1: 223; Ahmad, Musnad, 1: 330; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al Taharah, Bab fi 'l-MajruhYatayammam; IbnMajah, Sunan, Kitab al-Taharah, Bab fi '1-Majruh Tusibuh al-Janabah.
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Another example is that the Prophet (peace be on him) did not impose retaliation,blood money or expiation upon Usamah b. Zayd when he killed the personwho had testifiedthat "There is no God butAllah" in the battle of al-Huraqat.120Usamah believed that itwas permissible to kill him on the basis was thathis Islam invalid,even though it is clear thathis killingwas unlawful. The salaf and themajority of the juristsacted upon thiswhen they concluded that the rebelswould not be liable for retaliation,blood-money or expiation, as in cases such shedding theblood of innocentpeople, which they legitimated on grounds of some plausible reason (ta'wtl sa'igh), they [rebels]will not be held responsible even though the killing and fightingthey engaged inwere prohibited.121 The aforementionedcondition for the applicabilityof a threatdoes not need to be repeated in every communication because the knowledge of it is well known and established in thehearts.
This is just like the promise [of reward] for carryingout a good deed is prefacedupon itsbeing done with sincerityfor the sake ofAllah and that the deed was not rendered void by apostasy. This condition, also, is not mentioned in everyhaditb which promises a reward foran action. And evenwhen the conditions necessitatingthe applicability of a threat are present, the threatmight be removed through the existence of an are impediment (mdni). There various types of such impediments,including repentance,asking for forgiveness,good deeds that erase sins, tribulationsand calamities, the intercessionof someonewhose intercessionis accepted and the mercy of theMost Merciful. It is onlywhen all of these impedimentsare lacking?and thiswill not be the case exceptwith regard to the one who was arrogant,rebellious and fled fromAllah in a way similar to thatof a camel strayingfrom itspeople?that the threatwill be duly applicable to him. This is because themain functionof a threatis to emphasise that thedeed in question is a cause for thepunishment mentioned in the threat,thus creatingthe inferencethat thedeed is prohibited and reprehensible.However, to say that the existence of the reason for the threat in any personwould necessitate the occurrence of the consequence (i.e the punishment) is indeed an absolutely invalid conclusion. [As we have explained], the effectof a threatdepends upon the presence of its conditions and the removal of all of the impedimentsto it.
120 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Diyat, Bab Qawl Allah Ta'ala wa man Ahyaha; Muslim, SablhyKitab al-Iman, Bab Tahrim Qatl al-Kafirba'd anQal La Qah ilia 'Hah. 121 What Ibn Taymiyyah is discussing here is the issue of giving amnesty to rebels and, as he asserts somewhere else, non-belief is not a legitimatereason forkilling.
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To clarifythis further,there are threepossibilities with regard to the one who did not act upon a givenbadith: First: thathis leaving the hadith is permissibleaccording to the agreement of allMuslims. An example of this is theperson who did not act upon a badith because he was not aware of it, although he had sought to the best of his ability to findout about it in view of his need for afatwa or a judicial ruling, as we mentioned in the case of the rightlyguided Caliphs and others (may Allah be pleased with them).There is no doubt in anyMuslim's mind that such a personwill not be liable for the sin resultingfrom theneglect of a deed [due to ignoranceof the existenceof theobligation/prohibition]. Second: that the leaving of the badith is not permissible. It is highly unlikely thatwe will find the Imams not acting upon a hadithwithout a legitimatereason, God (theExalted) willing. [Third:]What might be possible, however, is that some scholarsmay sometimes give an opinion on an issue despite the fact that they did not fully comprehend the issue in question, so theywould give theiropinion without having fulfilledthe proper requirementsfor giving a rulingon that issue,even though theyhave some understandingand capacity for ijtihadon it. [It is also possible that] the scholar is deficient in his deduction, so he would conclude with an opinion without an evidence for such conclusion even thoughhe might have used some formof ijtihador he would arriveat his opinion before having taken his reasoning to its appropriate conclusion, even where he is basing his opinion on some evidence,or he might be influencedby a custom or predispositionwhich preventshim froman exhaustive treatment of the issuewhich would include a studyof thatwhich opposes his view, even ifhe based his opinion on some ijtihadand reasoning.This is due to the fact that the [precise] limit [or extent] towhich it is necessary to determine ijtihad might not be precisely identifiedby themujtahid. This is the reason that the scholarsused to fear that the recognised form of ijtihad (al-Ijtihadal-Mu'tabar)might not have been achieved on a given issue. a This is indeed sin but the punishment for the sin is only applicable if its not performer did repent.Moreover, the sin can be erased by asking for forgiveness,doing good to others, [undergoing]tribulation, intercession, and Allah's Mercy. However, not included under this [i.e. the one who is pardoned] is the one who is overcome and defeatedby his desire to the extent thathe supports what he knows to be false, or the one who asserts authoritatively the correctnessor error of an opinion without knowing the evidence forwhat he claims, either in affirmationor negation. Indeed, these two are in theHellfire, as the Prophet (peace be on him) said, "The judges are of three types: two in
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theHellfire and one in Paradise; as for the one inParadise, it is a personwho knew the truth so he judged according to it.As for those who are in the Hellfire: it is the one who gave judgementamong the people on the basis of ignorance and the one who knew the truthbut gave judgement contrary to it."122 This is also truewith regard to themuftis but there are impedimentsfor the applicabilityof a threatto a specificperson, aswe explained earlier. If the occurrence of something like thatwas theoreticallypossible from some of the distinguished scholarswho are praised by the ummah?even though it is remote (or even non-existent)?hewill [surely]not be shortof one of the aforementionedreasons [which nullify the threat].And even if such an occurrencewere to be found, thiswould not diminish their statureas Imams at all. This is because we do not believe that thesepeople are infallible;rather we accept that they are capable of sin, and at the same timewe wish for them thehighest of ranks inParadise because ofwhat theywere grantedby Allah of righteous deeds and high status, and that they were never persistent in committing sin.We say also that theywere not superior in rank to the Companions (mayAllah be pleased with them). Furthermore,we saywith regard [to the Companions] thatwhich we said regarding the Imams, in referenceto their ijtihddin fatwas, judgements,and the spillingof blood which occurred between them (may Allah be pleased with them all) and other matters [relatedto their ijtihad]. Having said that [the scholar]who did not act upon a given text is not only excused but even rewarded [i.e. forhis ijtihad],this does not preventus from following the authentic hadiths in respect of which we know of no us an opposing evidence, neither does it prevent from believing that it is obligation upon the ummah to act upon them [i.e. authentic hadiths] and to narrate no to them?and there is disagreement among the scholars with regard this.
Moreover, these hadiths are of two types: [The firstis the definitehadith]; the scholars are in agreementupon the obligation of knowing and actingupon them.This is because both the chains of transmissionand the contents (matan) of thesehadiths are of definite (qatty nature.We have certainty that theMessenger of God (peace be on him) uttered such a hadith aswell as thathe intendedby it that specificform. The second is a hadithof probable, ratherthan definite, proof. As for the firsttype, it is obligatory to believe in its implication in theory and in practice and there is no disagreement in general among the scholars
122 See, Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Aqdiyah, Bab fi '1-QadiYukhti; al-Nasa'I, al-Sunan al KubrdyKitab al-Qada', Bab Thawab al-Isabahfi 'l-Hukm.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 352 AHMADffiN 'ABDAL-HALIM EBN TAYMIYYAH with regard to this. They might of course differwith regard to some narrations (al-akhbar),as towhether theyhave definitechains of transmission or not and whether the implication of a narration is definite or not. An example of this is theirdisagreement over those solitaryhadiths which were either received by the ummahwith conviction and belief orwhich they agreed to act upon. According to themajority of juristsand most Muslim theologians (mutakallimun),this typeof hadith createscertainty, while some groups of the mutakallimun disagreed. Similarly, a hadith which is transmittedfrom various channels, each corroborating the other fromcertain specificauthorities, might lead to certain knowledge for the one who is aware of all those channels [of transmission], the status of the transmittersas well as circumstantial and supporting evidences that encompass the narrations;whereas this certaintymight be hidden from another scholarwho does not possess this information.This is why the leading scholarsof Hadith who possessed both a criticalmind and an exacting approach to knowledge (mayAllah be pleased with them)might to some reach absolute certainty with regard narrations whereas other scholars might not even believe in that authenticitylet alone the certaintyof such authenticity. This is based on the fact that thenarrations which lead to certaintydo so on occasions from themultiplicity of their reportersand at other times from status the of these narrators; through the act of narrating itself;through the or perception of the one who receives the narration from the content of the narration. So a narration transmittedby a few transmittersmight lead to certain knowledge because of thatwhich is known regardingtheir piety and strong memory, such that it preserved them frombeing implicatedwith lying and error.On the other hand, multiple numbers of the same figuresfrom other transmittersmight not lead to such certainty.This is no doubt the correct opinion, and it is the opinion of themajority of juristsand Hadith scholars as well as groups fromamong themutakallimun. On the other hand, some groups of themutakallimun and some jurists adhered to the opinion that ifa number of transmittersled to certaintyin one case, then this same number of other transmittersmust lead to certainty in every case. There can be no doubt that this is utterly incorrect,but this is not the rightplace to discuss this. As for the question of the influenceof circumstantialevidence that is not related to the transmittersof theHadith, we have not mentioned it because this circumstantialevidence might lead to certaintyby itself.And if itwas to to lead certaintyby itselfthen it should not be considered as dependent on the
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narrationwithout restriction,just as the narration is not dependent on the circumstantialevidence. Rather, both may lead to certainty at one time or probability at another, and sometimes theymay come together to create certaintywhile at other timescertainty may arise fromone of them and only probability from the other. A personwho has superiorknowledge in the fieldof narrationsmight be more certainwith regard to the authenticityof some narrations,whereas otherswho are not of his calibremight not attain that level of certainty. Sometimes the scholarsalso differwith regardto whether a given hadith is definitive or not because of their disagreement over whether the hadith is explicit (nass) or apparent (zdhir) in its implication, and if it is apparent whether it contains somethingwhich can exclude the less likelymeaning. This too is a vast subject, as some scholarsmight be convinced of the certainityof implicationof some hadiths,whereas othersdo not share thatview with them. The firstgroup might be certain that the given hadith can only admit that particular meaning, or that it is not allowed to interpret the hadith in or some accordance with the other meaning, because of other evidence that leads them to achieve certaintyof interpretation. With regard to the second type, that is the apparent (al-zahir) text, all recognised scholars subscribe to the opinion that it is obligatory to act upon it in legalmatters. If,on the other hand, it contains a rulingpertaining to belief, such as a threat [of chastisement] and similar notions, the scholars have differedover it: Some groups from amongst the juristsadhere to the opinion that if a threatof punishment is promised for the commission of an action contained in a the narration of trustworthy solitary transmitter, then it is obligatory to act upon it and to consider that deed as prohibited, but the hadithwill not actually be used to establish the threat itselfunless the narrationwas definite in import.The same applies if the contentof a hadithwas definite [in termsof its authenticity] but only apparent with regard to its implication. The following statement of 'A'ishah (may Allah be pleased with her) was understood according to thisprinciple. 'A'ishah said to thewife ofAbu Ishaq al-Sabn, "Tell Zayd b. Arqam that he has invalidated his jihad with the Prophet (peace be on him) unless he repents."123Thus they argued that 'A'ishah expressed this threatbecause shewas knowledgeable and certainof it. We, however, are obliged to act upon her narration in establishing the prohibition even thoughwe do not hold this threatof punishment due to the fact that the hadith has only reached us through a solitarynarration. These
123 See for the full text, 'Abel al-Razzaq,Musannaf, 8:185; al-Daraqutni, Sunan, 3: 52.
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scholarspoint out that the threatof punishment is a matter of belief and can only be affirmedthrough a definite (qattj text.Moreover, if the rulingon the action is the subject of ijtihdd, its doer will not be liable to the threat. According to the opinion of this group, the hadithspertaining to threatscan be used to establish the prohibition of deeds generally,but the punishment itselfis not establishedunless themeaning of thehadith isunequivocal. Another example is the reliance of most scholars upon the variant readingsof theQur'an, the authorityof which has been establishedfrom some of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) even though these readingswere not in the 'Uthmanic mushaf (may Allah be pleased with 'Uthman). These narrations contained practice and theoreticalknowledge and were solitary authentic hadiths. They cited these readings to affirm the practice,whilst they did not recognise them as part of theQur'an due to the fact that recognising them as part of theQur'an is a theoretical issuewhich cannot be established except throughcertainty. Most of the jurists,however, hold the opinion?and this is also the opinion of the generalityof the pious predecessors (salaf)?that thesehadiths are authoritativeproof in all that they contain of threatsbecause itwas the habit of the Companions of the Prophet (peace be on him) and their Successors to affirm threatson the basis of these hadiths, just as they also affirmedacting upon them.They would unequivocally declare in general that the threatcontained within thesehadiths is applicable to the one who commits such actions. This is widespread in their narrations and fatdwa. Their view is that the threat of punishment falls within those shar% rulings that can sometimes be established by probable evidence and other times by definite as evidence. It is not necessary that there be absolute certainty regards the threat,but only a belief that is grounded in certaintyor a high probability, and this is the casewith regardto theoreticalrulings. There is no differencebetween a person's belief thatAllah has prohibited an action and threatened its doer with a general punishment, and his belief thatAllah has prohibited an action and threatened its doer with a specific punishment; both of them are ascribed to Allah (the Exalted). Just as it is acceptable to attribute toHim the firstcategory by the use of unrestricted evidence, [i.e. unrestrictedin termsof the punishmentbeing unspecified], it is likewise acceptable to attributeto Him through the second type of evidence [which contains a threatof a specificpunishment]. Moreover, even if someone were to say that to act upon the threat is more deserving and appropriate,he would be correct.This iswhy theyused to show a degree of leniency in the acceptance of hadiths related to moral exhortation (al-targhibwa 'l-tarhib)that they did not show in the hadiths
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 355 related to legal rulings. [Itwas felt]that believing in the threatencourages the souls to abstain fromprohibited matters. If that threatwas true, the person would escape the threatenedpunishment, and if the threat turnedout not to be true, and the consequence of that action would be less severe than that which was threatened, then his mistaken belief that the punishment was greater [thanwhat itwas in reality]would not harm him, ifhe were to leave that action. This is due to the factthat ifhe had believed that the punishment was less than itwas [in reality],he could also have been mistaken. This could also be true ifhe neither affirmednor denied the extra punishment,he could stillbe mistaken. An erroneous limitationof the punishmentmight lead him to find it easier to commit the prohibited act and as a resultbecome liable for the extra punishment (if it is established)or itmight create a reason forhim to deserve such punishment. Therefore, thepossibility of an error in beliefusing either the existenceor non-existence of a punishment is identical;but escaping possible punishment through believing in the existence of a threat ismore likely, and so is given preference.It is on the basis of thisprinciple that themajority of scholarsgive preferenceto the evidence prohibitingan act over the one permittingthe same act.
Many jurists adopted the principle of precaution (aUhtiydt) in many rulingson the basis of this argument.Indeed, precautionwith regard to action is almost unanimously treated as meritorious among those possessed of wisdom in general.124 If an individual's fearof errorby denying a threatstands in opposition to his fearof error in the opposite belief, the residual evidence necessitatesbelief in the existence of the threat and that punishment could be avoided on the basis of that belief [affirmingthe threat]and these are two evidences freeof any opposition. It is not acceptable for one to say that the non-existence of a definite proof for the threat is an evidence for itsnon-existence; as it is in the case of thenon-existence of mutawdtir narration for the extra readingsnot included in the 'UthmanicMushaf. This is because the non-existence of evidence ('adam al-daltl) does not necessitate the non-existence of thatwhich is derived (al madlul (alayh). One who negates one of the theoreticalissues on the basis of the absence of definite evidence for its existence?as is themethodology of a group of the scholastic theologians (mutakallimun)--isin very clear error.However, when
124 more on For details Ibn Taymiyyah and precaution see,Matroudi, The Hanbali School of Law, 103-107.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 356 AHMAD IBN 'ABDAL-HALIM ffiN TAYMIYYAH we know that the existenceof somethingnecessitates the existenceof itsproof (dalit), and we are able to affirmnon-existence of the proof [whether it be definiteor indefinite],then we can assertwith certaintythe non-existenceof that thing.This is on theprinciple that the absence of the antecedent (lazim) is a proof for the absence of the consequent (malzum). Having learntthe motivating factorsbehind the transmissionof theBook ofAllah andHis religion,we know that it is not possible that the ummah has concealed thatwhich the people were in need of receiving as a general proof (Jpujjahdmmah). Thus, when there is no common narration about a sixth obligatory prayer or another surah [of theQur'an], we know for sure that it does not exist.Having said that, the categoryof threatsdoes not come under this rule, as it is not a condition for every threatenedpunishment that it be conveyed in a mutawdtirmanner, just as it is not a condition for establishing the rulingabout thataction. It has been established thathadiths containing threatsmust be acted upon in accordancewith what they indicate,with the conviction that the doer of that action is under the threat associatedwith the action. Liability for the punishment, however, depends on the existence of certain conditions and thereare impediments.This principle can be illustratedwith some examples: It is authenticallynarrated from theProphet (peace be on him) thathe said: "May Allah reject the receiverof interest,its payer, itswitnesses and its scribe."125It is also authenticallynarrated?through more than one authentic chain of transmission?that theProphet (peace be on him) said to theone who sold two sd426[of one quality] in exchange for one sd' [of another quality]: "Woe to you! This is usury ( ayn al-riba)"n7And he also said: "Andwheat for amounts to are on wheat interest unless they exchanged the spot ,.."128 This encapsulates both kinds of interest(riba)?both surplus interesting 'l-fadl)129and (riba 'l-nasa),uobut then thosewho were aware of theProphet's statement:"Interest is only in al-nasVah?m saw it as permissible to exchange two sd' for one sd' in a direct exchange (yadan bi-yadiri),such as IbnAbbas (mayAllah be pleased with him and his father)and his followers e.g. Abu
125 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Musaqah, Bab La*n Akil al-Ribawa Mukilih. 126 A measure of volume. 127 See, n. 116 above. 128 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Buyu', Bab Bay* al-Tamr bi al-Tamr;Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al Musaqah, Bab al-Sarf. 129 a Taking somethingof superior quality in exchange formore of the same kind of thingbut of poorer quality. 130 Taking intereston loanedmoney. 131 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Musaqah, Bab Bay* al-Ta'amMithlan biMithl.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE REMOVALOF BLAMEFROM THE GREAT IMAMS 357 al-Sha'tha', 'Ata\Tawus, Sa'id b. Jubayrand 'Ikramah aswell as others among the distinguishedMakkans who were among the best of this ummah in knowledge and practice. It is not permissible for aMuslim to believe that any of them specificallyor one who imitatesany of them?to the extent that such imitation is permissible?will be liable for the la'nmentioned for the one who consumes interest because they did this on the basis of a conceivable interpretationof the texts. Another example is that which is narrated from a group of the distinguishedMadinans regardingthe [matter]of having anal intercoursewith thewife despiteAbu Dawud's narration from theProphet (peace be on him) thathe said, "Whoever has anal intercoursewith hiswife, he has disbelieved in thatwhich was revealed to Muhammad."132Does anyone think that it is permissible for aMuslim to say that "So and sowere disbelievers in thatwhich was revealed toMuhammad?" Again, it is established from theProphet (peace be on him) thathe said: "Allah has rejected ten [categoriesof people] regardingintoxicants (khamr): the one who squeezes the juice, the one who asks for it to be squeezed, the one ... who drinks it [etc.]"133Moreover, it is also established through various channels that theProphet (peace be on him) said: "Every intoxicatingdrink is "m khamr" and he also said: "Every intoxicantis khamr Also, 'Umar (may Allah be pleasedwith him) said in a speechwhile on hispulpit in thepresence of theMuhajirun andAnsar: "Khamr is thatwhich befuddles themind."136 Allah revealed the prohibition of khamr, and the occasion for its revelation is that they [people] used to drink [it] inMadinah. They only used to have drinks made from dates, not from grapes at all. Yet there were some among themost eminentKufan scholars of this ummah?in terms of both practice and knowledge?who believed that khamrwas derived only from grapes, and that the nabtdh produced fromother than grapes and the nabidh produced from dates is not prohibited exceptwhere the quantity leads to a state of intoxication.They, therefore,drank what they believed to be within the permissible limit. It is not permissible to say: "These scholars fallwithin the threatof punishment [relatedto khamr]" because theyhad an extenuating
132 See, IbnMajah, SunanyKitab al-Taharah, Bab al-Nahi 'an Ityand-Ha'id; al-Tirmidhi,Sunan, Kitab Abwab al-Taharah, Bab ma Ja' flKarahat Ityan al-Ha'id. 133 See, Ahmad, Musnad, 1: 316; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Ashribah,Bab al-'Inab Yu'sar U '1 Khamr; IbnMajah, Sunan>Kitab al-Ashribah,Bab Lu'inat al-Khamr 'ala 'AshratAwjuh. 134 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Wudu', Bab laYajuz al-Wudu* bi al-Nabidh wa la l-Muskir; Muslim, SahihyKitSb al-Ashribah,Bab Bayan ann Kull Muskir Khamr [Every intoxicatingdrink is prohibited]. 135 See,Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Ashribah,Bab Bayan annKull Muskir Khamr. 136 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Ashribah,Bab al-Khamrmin al-'Asal.
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reasonwhich theyused to forman interpretation,or because of other possible extenuating circumstances.At the same time, it is not permissible to affirm that thedrink theyconsumed was not considered to be a typeof khamrwhere thedrinker is seriouslycensured.
The basis of the general statementmust incorporate thisdrinking; there was afterall no khamrmade fromgrapes inMadinah. The Prophet (peace be on him) had pronounced la'n against the one who sells khamr. Some of the Companions sold khamr [at the time of 'Umar] and the news of this reached 'Umar (mayAllah be pleasedwith him)who said: "MayAllah fightso and so! (qatalaAllah fuldnan). Does he not know that theProphet (peace be on him) said: 'Allah condemned [those] Jews to whom itwas made prohibited the sellingof the fatof the carcass but theymelted it and then sold it andmade use of its price.'"137That particularCompanion was not aware of the prohibition of sellingkhamr, yet thisdid not stop 'Umar (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) from outlining the punishment for this sinfulact even though he knew that the person in question was not aware of the prohibition. [He did it] so that that person and otherswould be discouraged from committing such an act afterbeing made aware of itsprohibition. Furthermore, theProphet (peace be on him) pronounced la'n against the one who squeezed the juice of khamr and the one who asked for it to be squeezed. Despite this,many juristspermit a person to squeeze grapes for someone else, even ifhe knew thathis intentionis tomake khamr from it.We have, therefore,an explicit text (nass) regardingthe la'n upon someone who squeezes grapes [for khamr], but it is also known that a person might be excused from the rulingbecause of the existenceof an impediment. Similarly, there are a number of hadithscontaining the la'n of thewdsilah (i.e. thewoman who connects extensions to another's hair) and al-mawsulah (i.e. thewoman who sits to have thisdone to her),138but some of the jurists considered it to be only disapproved. Another example is that the Prophet (peace be on him) said, "He who drinks from a silver vessel is in fact swallowing the fire ofHell down his belly."139Yet, again, some of the juristsmerely consider this to be strongly disapproved (kardhattanzlyhiyyah).
137 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Anbya', Bab ma Dhukira 'an Bam Isra'il; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Musaqah, Bab Tahrim Bay' al-Khamr. 138 See, al-Bukhari, Sahib, Kitab al-Libas, Bab al-Wasl fi 1-Sha'r;Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Libas, Bab Tahrim fi '1-Wasilahwa al-Mustawsilah. 139 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Ashribah, Bab Aniyat al-Fiddah; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al Libas, Bab Tahrim Isti'malAwani al-Dhahab wa l-Fiddah.
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Also it is necessary to act by his statement:"When twoMuslims fight each otherwith their swords,both thekiller aswell as the slainwill enter the Hell-fire"140when it comes to the prohibition of two believers fightingeach otherwithout just cause. Despite this,we know that the participants in [the battles of] al-Jamal and Siffin141are not people of the fire, as they had extenuatingreasons and interpretationsjustifying the fightingand good deeds which prevented the otherwise necessary cause (muqtadi) from taking its effect. The Prophet (peace be on him) said in an authentic hadith, "There are three kinds of people with whom Allah will neither speak on theDay of Resurrection, nor look at them,nor purify them [fromsins]. They will have a more water painful chastisement. A person who has than he needs and yet he refuses to give it to the traveller; so Allah will say to him on theDay of Judgement: 'Today I will deprive you ofMy grace, just as you withheld the surplus of thatwhich you did not create yourself;' a person who pledged allegiance to the Imam but for the sake ofworldly gain, so that if the Imam bestowed on him somethingout of thatworldly gain, he was satisfiedbut ifhe was not a swears a given it, he became discontent; and person who false oath to another person after [the startof the time of] (asr [prayer] that he was offered a higher price for a commodity than that offered by the second
party."142 a severe to one This is very threat the who withholds surplus water. Yet therewas a group of scholarswho permitted suchwithholding. The existence of such an opinion, however, does not prevent us from believing in the prohibition of this practice on the strengthof this hadith. Conversely, the existence of this hadithdoes not prevent us frombelieving that the one who has a reasonable interpretationfor the hadith [which led him not to act upon it] is excused and isnot liable for thepunishment stated in thathadith. The Prophet (peace be on him) said, "May Allah reject themuhallil and muhallal lahu."143This is an authentichadith narrated from theMessenger of
140 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Iman,Bab wa inTa'ifatan min al-Mu'minin Iqtatalu;Muslim, Sahib,Kitab al-Fitan,Bab idhaTawajah al-Musliman bi Sayfayhima. 141 See, Ahmad b. 'Ali IbnHajar, al-Isdbahft Tamyiz al-Sahabah (Beirut:Dar al-Jil,1992), 4: 566; 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun (Beirut:Dar al-Qalam, 1984), 213. 142 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih,Kitab al-Shahadat,Bab al-Yamin ba'd al-'Asr;Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al Iman, Bab Bayan Ghilaz Tahrim Isbal al-Izar. 143 See, Ibn Abi Shaybah,Musannaf, 7: 292; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab fi 1-Tahlil; IbnMajah, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab al-Muhallilwa 'l-Muhallal lahu;Ahmad b. al-Husayn al Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Bayhaqi alKubra (Makkah: Maktabat Dar al-Baz, 1994), 7: 208. Nikah al a a Tahiti is type ofmarriage performedby person (muhallil) for the purpose of legitimisingthe
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Allah (peace be on him) and fromhis Companions (mayAllah be pleasedwith them all) throughmany channels.However, a group of scholarsunreservedly validated the contract of marriage of the muhalliL144Others validated the contract if the intentionto legitimiseher remarriageto her previous husband was not stipulated in the contract itself,and theyhave well-known mitigating factorsfor concludingwith theseopinions. This is because the firstparty [i.e. thosewho unreservedlyvalidated the above-mentionedcontract ofmarriage], believes thatwhat is in accordance with the general principles is that the contractof marriage does not become invalidatedby incorrectconditions, just as it is not invalidated by not knowing one of the two remunerations ('iwadayn).Whereas the second party believes thatwhat is in accordancewith the general principles is that the conditionswhich are not stipulated in the contract itselfdo not affectits validity. It seems thishadtth did not reach those who held this opinion, as their earlyworks do not mention it. If it had reached them, theywould have mentioned it either to act upon it or in response to it.Alternatively, itmight have reached them but they interpreted it away, or they thought that it was abrogated or they had some other evidence thatopposed it. Therefore,we know that suchpeople are not liable for this threat,even if theywere to commit tahtilthemselves, believing it to be permissible in that form. This does not stop us from knowing that tahtil is the cause of such punishment [as a general rule], even if itwas not to apply with regard to particular individualsbecause of the absence of a condition or the presence of an impediment. Finally, there isMu'awiyah's (mayAllah be pleased with him) claim of kinshipwith Ziyad ibnAbih even thoughhe was born from thewedlock of al-Harith b. Kildah, becauseAbu Sufyanused to say thathe was fromhis own sperm.This was even though theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) said, "If somebody knowingly claims to be the son of any other thanhis real father, Paradise will be forbiddento him."145He also said, "If somebody claims to be the son of anyone other thanhis real father,or attributeshimself in patronage to other than the one who freedhim from slavery,upon him is the la'n of Allah and the angels and all people. Allah will neither accept repentancenor
remarriageof aman (muhallal lahu) to his formerwife, fromwhom she has been divorced thrice and thus irrevocablydivorced. 144 The muhallil is the man who marries the divorcee for the purpose of legitimisingher remarriageto her previous husband who had irrevocablydivorced her. 145 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Fara'id,Bab man Idda'a ilaGhayr Abih; Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab man Raghib 'anAbih.
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ransom fromhim."146 This is an authentichadltb. The Messenger ofAllah had, in any case, also ruled that the child is attributed to the husband of the mother, and this is agreedupon. We know that the one who attributeshimself to other than the husband of his mother fallswithin the threatsof punishment statedabove; but it is not permissible to single out an individual after the Companions, let alone the Companions themselves,and to say that the threatis incumbentupon him. It is possible that theywere not aware of the judgementof theMessenger of Allah (peace be on him) that the child is attributedto the husband, and that they thought that the child must be attributed to the one who caused the pregnancy, and they believed that Abu Sufyan was the one who made Sumayyah,Umm Ziyad, pregnant. Indeed this rulingmight not have been known tomany people, especially before the spread of the Sunnah, and because itwas contrary to thepractice in the pre-Islamic period. There might also be other impediments averting the applicabilityof the threatsuch as good deeds thaterase bad deeds and so on. This also is a vast subject area. It includes all prohibitedmatters derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, whenever some of the Imams were not aware of the prohibiting evidence and they saw an act as permissible,or that the prohibiting evidencewas opposed, according to them, by other evidence which they considered to be preponderant, and theyused their independent reasoning in giving preference to one over the other based on their intellect and knowledge. Prohibition has implications such as incurringsin, censure,punishment, iniquity [i.e. not meeting what is perceived to be the legal requirementsof righteousnessin Islam], and so on; but there are conditions and impediments to the applicability of these implications.Prohibitions might sometimes be established but these consequences cannot be applied due to the absence of theirconditions or the existenceof an impediment,or because theprohibition does not apply to thatparticular person even though it is established and can be applied to others. We have only repeated our statementson this issue because the scholars are divided into two camps on thispoint: The first:?which is theposition held by themajority of thesola/ and the jurists?is thatAllah has only one rulingwith regardto any given issue and the one who differs from that position on the basis of an acceptable piece of independentreasoning ismistaken, excused and rewarded.Therefore, the act itselfwhich was committed by the person who had this interpretationis
146 See,Muslim, Saklh,Kitab al-Hajj, Bab Fadl al-Madinah.
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are to to prohibited but the implicationsof prohibition not applicable him due Allah's attributeof forgivenessas He does not charge a soulwith more than it can bear. The second is that the prohibitedmatter is not considered prohibited for even that person, as the prohibiting evidence did not reach him, though it is considered to be prohibited for others; thus the action itselfof thatperson is not prohibited. more a The two opinions are in truth similar,and it is of differencein semantics. This then iswhat can be saidwith regardto thebaditbs containing threats where differencesexist [among the scholars], i.e. that the scholars are in agreementon the citationof thesebaditbs for the prohibition of the action to which the threat is related,regardless of whether they are in agreementor not as to the ruling itself.In fact, inmost cases, the need to cite the baditbs of threat is related to areas of disagreement. They differed, however, in was establishing the threaton the basis of such baditbswhere there nothing definitiveavailable, aswe have alreadymentioned earlier. And if itwas to be asked:why did you not say that baditbs containing threatscannot be foundwithin the area of dispute, but rather they lie only in the area of agreement, and for every action whose doer is censured or tomean an threatenedwith wrath or punishment,must be interpreted action so whose prohibition is agreed upon, that those mujtahids who acted upon what they thought to be permissiblewill not be includedwithin the threatof more punishment. In fact, the one who believes [in the permissibility] is serious than the doer; as the former is the one who ordered the latter to do that action, so he is the one who made him liable for the la'n or wrath by implication? We say that the answer can be given inmany ways: The first answer: the ruling of prohibition is either capable of being establishedwhere there is disagreementor it is not. If it cannot be established in the event of disagreement,then thisnecessitates that therebe no prohibited matter except one that is agreedupon. As a result every disputed prohibition would become permissible.This is evidently in opposition to the consensus of the ummah, and must of necessity be considered invalid in the religion of Islam. And if prohibitions were to be established despite the presence of disagreement, even if on only one issue, then themujtahid who considered that prohibited action to be permittedwould either be liable to the censure one and punishment of the one who permitswhat is prohibited or the who commits it, or he would not.
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Now, whether it is said thathe would be liable, or thathe would not be liable, then the samewill hold truewith regard to the establishedprohibition found in the hadith containing a threat,which is agreed upon as well as one which is disputed, as elaboratedupon earlier. In fact the threat is only related to the doer and the punishment for the one who permits what is prohibited is essentiallymore than that of the punishment for the one who did itwithout conviction or belief. Therefore, if it is possible that the prohibition be established, despite therebeing a dispute, and themujtahid who permitted the actionwill not be liable for the punishment ofmaking the prohibited permissible because of his an extenuatingreason, then it ismore appropriate that the doer of the action not be liable for the punishment resultingfrom that action.Also, as thisdoes not necessitate that the mujtahid is included under the effects of this as not prohibition?such censure, punishment, etc.?then it equally does necessitate his inclusion under the threat;a threat is afterall no more than a typeof censure and punishment. If the inclusionof threatunder this type (jins) [of censure and punishment] is acceptable, thenwhat was said as an answer for some of its categories is an answer to the others. There is also no benefit in differentiatingbetween the degrees of censure, or how heavy or light the punishment is, because mild censure and punishment in this context is just as problematic as a heavy one; themujtahid is liable to neither themild nor the heavy censure and punishment.Rather, he is deserving of their opposites, namely reward and recompense. The second answer: agreementor disagreementwith regard to the ruling of an action arematters external to the action itselfand its attributes;they are only incidentaland occur as a resultof lack of knowledge of the issue amongst some of the scholars. If the generalwording (allafz al-'amm) was actuallymeant to referto a specificmeaning (alkhass), then therehas to be evidence presented to support the specification.This evidence has to come simultaneouslywith [the general] communication, according to those who do not permit any delay in clarification(ta'khir al-bayan), or according to themajority of scholars itneeds not be chronologically simultaneous,being revealed instead at the time it is needed. There is no doubt that thosewho were addressedby a communication at the timeof theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) were inneed of knowing the ruling contained in that communication. If the generalmeaning conveyed by the la'n upon the one who receives riba and themuhallil and other similar caseswas intendedwhere there is an agreementupon itsprohibition, and yet this [agreement]could not be known except after the death of the Prophet
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(peace be on him), and the subsequentdiscussion of the ummah upon all the ramificationsof that general communication, then thatwould have meant a postponement in the clarificationof thewords of the Prophet (peace be on him) until such time.This is [clearly]not acceptable. The third answer: the ummahwas addressed by such communication so that itwould recognisewhat is prohibited and avoid it, and will use it as a basis for their consensus, and cite it as evidencewhen they disagree. If the intentionwas that prohibitionwould only be derived fromwhat is agreed upon, then knowledge of the intendedmeaning would have been dependent on consensus. Its use as evidence, then,would not be valid before the existence of the consensus, but thismeans it cannot form the basis for a consensus either. This is because the basis for a consensus must exist before it, and therefore it is impossible for the evidence to follow the consensus, as this would lead to an invalid circularargument. Since thepeople of consensus then will not be able to cite thehadith as evidence for anymeaning until theyknow that thismeaning is intended, and this cannot be achieved until they have agreement, so the citation depends on the occurrence of the consensus preceding it,whilst the consensus depends on the citation of the hadith, if indeed the hadithwas theirproof. Therefore, thematter becomes dependent upon itselfand thus its existence is impossible,and cannot be an authoritative evidence in the area of disagreement as that evidence simply does not exist. This creates a suspension of the use of hadith to indicate rulings in areas of agreementand disagreement.The [inevitable]consequence of this is thatnone of the textswhich referto the gravityof an action can also informus of the prohibition of that action, and thismust be absolutely invalid. The fourthanswer: this requires thatnone of these hadith can be relied upon unless it is known that the ummah agreed on a givenmeaning for them. Therefore, itwould not have been permissible for the firstgeneration (al-sadr alawwal) to have used thesehadith as evidence. In fact,those who heard these hadith directly from theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) would not be allowed to cite them as evidence. It would have been obligatory upon a person,who hears such a hadith and findsthat many scholarshad acted upon it and findsno opposition to it, not to act upon it until he is satisfiedthat there is nobody opposing it anywhere in theworld. It is also not allowed for him to cite consensus upon an issueuntil he carriesout a similarlythorough investigation. This will lead to the invalidityof the citationof a hadithof theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) by themere existenceof one mujtahid holding an opposing opinion. As a result, the opinion of one person validates and invalidatesthe words of theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him).
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If that person happened to be mistaken, then his mistake will have invalidated thewords of theMessenger of Allah (peace be on him). This is known to be void by necessity; because if itwere to be said that a hadith cannot be cited except afterknowing the existenceof a consensusupon it, then this leads to the implicationsof texts becoming dependent upon consensus, and yet this is in opposition to consensus! If itwere to be true, therewould be no meaning to be derived from texts,as only consensuswould have relevance, whereas textswould have no significance. If,on the other hand, itwere to be said that it should be cited as evidence solely on the basis that a conflictingopinion is not known, then thiswould still result in the opinion of one person within this ummah invalidatingthe implicationof a text,and this too is in opposition to consensus and is invalid by necessity in Islam. The fifthanswer: is that either the belief of the entire ummah in the prohibition is stipulated for a communication to be comprehensive, or the beliefof the scholars alone regardingthat prohibition is sufficient. If the firstwere correct, then itwould not be permissible to cite the hadiths on threats as evidence for prohibition until itwas known that the entire ummah?even thosewho were brought up in themost isolatedvalleys and those who recently converted to Islam?believed that the prohibition exists.No Muslim can claim this, nor indeed any sane person, because knowledge subjected to thiscondition ispractically impossible. If itwere to be said that the belief of all scholars in the prohibition is sufficient,the responsewould be that the consensus of the scholarswas made a condition out of fear that the threatof punishmentmight encompass some of themujtahids, evenwhere theywere onlymistaken. This is akin to the layman who did not hear the prohibiting evidence, as fear of this person's falling under the la (n is similarto the fearof a mujtahid fallingunder it. This argument cannot be dismissed by saying that the mujtahid \n question is among the loftiestand most righteousof thisummah, whereas that person is on the fringeof and one of the laymenof thisummah, the difference in their statusdoes not necessitate that theybe excluded from the ruling.This is because just as Allah (theExalted) forgivesthe mujtahid when he makes an honest mistake, He also forgivesthe mistake of an unlearned one who was unable to learn. In fact, themischief resultingfrom a layman committinga prohibited act,which he was not aware of and which itwas not possible for him to know, is far less than the harm resulting from some of the Imams permittingthat which has been prohibited by theLawgiver, through lack of awareness of the prohibition aswell as the incapabilityof knowing it.For this reason itwas said, "Beware of the lapse of the scholar, forwhen he slips a
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 366 AHMAD EBN 'ABD AL-HALIM ffiN TAYMIYYAH whole community sHpsas a result."147[On this subject] Ibn 'Abbas (mayAllah be pleased with them both) said, "Woe to the scholar from thosewho follow him."148 Thus, if themistake of a scholar can be pardoned, despite the enormityof the harm caused by his action, then it ismore appropriate that a layman be forgiven,since theharm caused by his action is less severe. Granted, they are differentfrom another aspect,namely that themujtahid has based his opinion on ijtihadand the harm caused by his mistake is buried within his account of good deeds accumulated through the dissemination of knowledge and revival of the Sunnah. Allah has differentiatedbetween them in this respect so he rewarded themujtahid forhis ijtihadand the scholar for his knowledge and this rewardwas not sharedwith the ignorant lay persons. Therefore, they are equal with regard to forgivenessbut dissimilarwith regard to reward. Punishing someone who does not deserve punishment is inconceivable, regardlessof whether he is noble or lowly. Therefore, ruling out this possibility of punishment in the context of a hadith should be understood in away that includesboth parties [i.e. both scholar and layman]. The sixth answer: among the hadiths on threat there are those that are explicit textson the disputed issue, such as "the la(n of themuhallal lahu.nW Some scholars say that thisperson could not possibly incur any sin as he was not an integralpart of the firstmarriage contract, so how is it possible to say thathe was condemned due to his beliefthat it is obligatory to fulfilthe tahlil contract? Hence, whoever believes that the contract of marriage for the first person (i.e. themuhallit) isvalid, even if the condition attached to it is invalid, then the remarriageby the second (i.e. themuhallal labu)must be permissible. This scholar, therefore,does not believe that the second person has committed a sin. And even themuhallil is either condemned because of the act of tahlilor because of his belief that it is obligatory to fulfilthe condition attached to the contract,or because of both reasons. If it is the firstor the third reason then the intentof the hadithhas been achieved. If it is the second, then thisbelief is the cause of the la'n regardlessof whether therewas a contractof tahlilor not. This would mean thatwhat ismentioned in thehadith would not be the actual reason for the la'n and the actual reason for the la'nwas not mentioned in the
147 'AbelAllah ibn al-Mubarak al-Marwizi, al-Zuhd (Beirut:Dar al-Kutub al-'flmiyyah,n.d.), 1:520. 148 See, Ahmad b. al-Husayn al-Bayhaqi, al-Madkhal ild alSunan al-Kubra (Kuwait: Dar al Khulafa' li 1-Kitab, 1404), 445. 149 Muhallal lahu is the husband of a woman who divorces her thrice,after which anotherman who marries her solely for the purpose of legitimisingher remarriageto him.
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not hadith and this is acceptable. If theperson who believed in thenecessity of fulfillingthe tahlil contractwas ignorant [of the law] there is no la'n upon him. If he knew that it is not obligatory, then he could not believe in its obligation, except ifhe was an opponent of theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) and he would then be a disbeliever, and then the hadith9sla'n would be related to the la'n upon disbelievers.But disbelief isnot linked to thedenial of thisminor ruling alone. This would be akin to saying: "Allah has rejected one the who disbelieves in theMessenger's ruling that the stipulation of divorce in a contractof marriage is invalid." a This is general statement in both wording and meaning and it is spontaneous generality ('umum al-mubtada). It is not permissible to link such to an generality unusual ramification, lest the statement be considered as including incorrect linguisticusage or suggest an incapability of expression similar to one who interpretsthe Prophet's saying,"Any woman who*marries without the permission of her guardian, then her marriage is invalid"150as being relatedonly to themukatabah.151 And to clarifythe unusual nature of this interpretation[in the contextof the hadith on tahlil] itwould mean that the ignorantMuslim would not be included within this hadith nor the Muslim who knows that it is not obligatory to fulfilthis condition152and he does not stipulate it in the contract believing that its [fulfilment]is an obligation except ifhe was a disbeliever,and the disbeliever does not marry in theway Muslims do, unless if he was a occur hypocrite. Marriages that in this manner are very rare occurrences. Indeed, itwould be right to suggestthat such a meaning is unlikely to have occurred in themind of the speakerwhen thehadith was uttered. We have citedmany evidences in other places on the fact that thishadith ismeant to address themuhallil who intendedhis action even ifhe did not stipulate it in the contract itself. The same is true also with regardto specifiedthreats, such as la'n and the were fire and the like, which explicitly stated in the texts even though disagreement clearly remains.For instance,there is the hadith of Ibn 'Abbas (mayAllah be pleased with him) from theProphet (peace be on him) thathe said, "May Allah reject the femalevisitors to the graves and thosewho build
150 See, 'Abd al-Razzaq, Musannaf, 6:195; Ibn Abi Shaybah,Musannaf, 3: 454; Ahmad, Musnad, 6: 66, Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab fi l-Wali; IbnMajah, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, BablaNikahiUabiWalL 151 The mukdtabah is a slavewho ratifiesa contract of emancipation to freeherself in returnfor instalments attaining complete freedom upon completion of the agreed payment. See, Ibn Manzur, Lisdn al- Arab> 1: 700. 152 e. to I. divorce the wife after ratifyingthe marriage to wave the way for her previous husband to remarryher afterdivorcing her triply.
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 368 AHMADffiN 'ABDAL-HALIM IBN TAYMIYYAH mosques and [place] lamps on graves."153Al-Tirmidhi said that this is a hasan hadith.15*Yet, the visitation of graves by women was allowed by some scholars,and disapproved?not prohibited?by others. Another example is thatof 'Uqbah b.Amir (mayAllah be pleased with him) on the authorityof theProphet (peace be on him) who said "MayAllah reject those who have anal intercourse with women."155 There is the hadxthof Anas (mayAllah be pleased with him) from the Prophet (peace be on him), inwhich he said, "The importer (of commodities) is blessed and themonopolist is rejected."156 We have alreadymentioned the followinghadith: "The threepersons to whom Allah would neither speak on theDay of Resurrection, nor look at them, nor purify them (from sins), and theywill have a painful chastise ment ..."157Among them is one who refusesto give the surpluswater in his possession to one who needs it. Similarly, "the one who sells khamr is rejected"158whereas some of the earlypeople sold it. Also, it is established as authentic frommore than one channel that the Prophet (peace be him) said: "Allah will not look at the one who trailshis garment on the ground out of pride."159The Prophet also said, "There are threewhom Allah will not speak to, look at, or praise on the Day of Judgementand theirswill be a painful punishment: the one who wears his garmentbelow his ankles, the one who remindsothers of his favours,and the one who sells his product by means ofmaking false oaths."160[This] despite some jurists'stating that wearing thegarment below the ankles and trailingthe garmenton the ground out of pride are disapproved and not prohibited.
153 See, Ibn Abi Shaybah,Musannaf, 2:151, Ahmad, Musnad, 1: 229; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Kharaj, Bab fi Ziyarat al-Nisa* li 1-Qubur; al-Tirmidhi,Sunan, Kitab Abwab al-Salat,Bab ma an Ja' fiKarahiyat Yutakhadh 'ala 'l-QabrMasjid; aI-Nasa% al-Sunan al-Kubra,Kitab al-Jana'iz, Bab al-Taghliz fi Itikhadh al-Suruj 'ala *1-Qubur. 154 Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, Kitab Abwab al-Salat,Bab ma Ja' fiKarahiyat an Yutakhadh 'ala 1-Qabr Masjid. 155 See, Ahmad, Musnad, 2: 479; Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab fi Jami' al-Nikah; al Nasa'i, al-Sunan al-Kubra,Kitab 'Ishrat al-Nisa', Bab Dhikr IkhtilafAlfaz al-Naqilin liKhabar Abi Hurayrah. 156 See, 'Abd al-Razzaq,Musannaf, 8: 204. 157 See n. 142 above. 158 See n. 133 above. 159 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab Fada'il al-Sahabah, Bab Qawl al-Nabi law kuntMuttakhidhan Khalila; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Libas, Bab Karahat ma Zad 'ala 'l-Hajah min al-Firashwa '1 Libas. 160 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab Bayan Ghilaz Tahrim Isbal al-Izar.
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Similarly, there ishis [i.e. theProphet's] saying (peace be on him), "Allah has rejectedal-wdsilah and d-mawsulatim and this is one of themost authentic hadiths.And there iswell-known disagreementover the extensionsof thehair. Finally, there is his [i.e. theProphet's] statement(peace be on him), "He who drinks out of silverutensils is only fillinghis abdomenwith Hell Fire"162 while some of the scholarsdid not deem this to be a prohibition. The seventhanswer: the reasonnecessitating generality is presentwhereas the aforementionedopposite is not deemed as acceptable because, taken to its logical conclusion, itwould mean its application in issues of agreement and disagreement and this will lead to the inclusion, within the threat of punishment,of somewho do not deserve to be included. The response to this is that if the particularisation[of a ruling] is against the norm, then itsmultiplication (takthiruhu)(i.e. by the inclusion of other than those who were intended to be included under it) stands against the norm. As a result the one who is excused for his ignorance, or ijtihad,or imitation (taqlid), he is exempt from the generalityof the text.On the other hand, the ruling includes thosewho were not excused, in theway that it includes the issues of agreement.This [type] of particularisation (i.e. the exemption of some people from the generalityof the textbecause theywere excused) is less and thereforeit ismore deserving to be accepted (awla). The eighth answer: ifwe were to understand the text in accordancewith this, then itwould have containedmention of the reason for the la'n and the rulingwould hence not apply to the exception because of the existenceof an impediment.There is no doubt that the one who promises or issues a threat, does not have to specificallymention thosewho are exempted because of the existence of an impediment. Therefore, the statement will continue to be consistentwith theproper methodology. If,however, we were to associate the rejection (la'n)with committingan act the prohibition ofwhich is agreedupon, orwe made theholding of a belief consensus as reason opposing the for the la'n, then that reason is not mentioned in the hadith.Moreover, that generality in the text has to be specified.If specificationis amust in both cases, then it ismore appropriate to apply it in the firstcase because of itsagreement with the correctmethodology and the absence of implicationof amissing syntacticalpart (idmar). The ninth answer: the reason behind this claim is to negate the inclusion in the la'n of the one who is excused.We have alreadymentioned that the intentionbehind thehadiths containing a threatis tomake clear that the act in question is a cause for that la'n, so the implicitstatement is as follows: "thisact
161 See n. 139 above. 162 See n. 139 above.
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is a reason for the la'n." This does not, however, necessitate the fulfilment of the rulingupon everyperson, although itdoes bring about the existenceof the causewithout its implicationand there isnothing objectionable in this. We have already established that there is no censure for themujtahid to the extent thatwe say: the one who permits theprohibited act incursmore sin than the doer of that act, but despite thiswe say that the one who has an reason extenuating is excused. And if itwere to be asked:who is to be punished seeingas thedoer of this prohibitedmatter is either a mujtahid or someonewho follows him (muqallid lahu) and neither of them are includedunder thepunishment? We will say: the answer has different aspects: The firstaspect: the aim of the text is to clarifythat this act necessitates punishment regardlessof whether someone actually commits thatact or not. If itwere assumed that every doer of that act is lacking the [requisite] conditions for the punishment or there is an impediment that prevents the application of the punishment, then thiswould not negate the forbidden quality of the act.Rather, we will know that it is prohibited and [it is hoped] thatwhoever knows of the prohibitionwill refrainfrom it.The existenceof excuses for the one who commits a prohibited act is somethingbestowed from Allah's Mercy. This is similar to the principle thatminor prohibited acts are prohibited even though they can be expiated for [by the commission of certain good deeds]?provided that themajor prohibited acts are avoided. This is the case with all acts on which there is dispute regardingtheir prohibition. When it is clear that they are prohibited, even though theone who does so on the basis of ijtihador imitationmight be excused, thisdoes not stop us frombelieving in theirprohibition. The second aspect: the clarificationof a ruling is a reason for the removal of any doubts which prevent the applicability of the punishment. This is because an excuse based on the [mistaken]belief is not meant to last forever; rather,the aim is fordoubts to be removed ifat all possible. If thiswas not the case then the clarificationof knowledge would not have been obligatory, it would have been better to leave the people in their ignorance,and itwould have been better for them to disregardthe evidence available in disputed issues ratherthan seek to clarifythem. The thirdaspect: the clarificationof the ruling and the threatsupport the one who has abstained fromcommitting the prohibited act in remainingwith firmresolve. If itwere not [for the clarificationof the ruling and the threat] acts the commission of such would become widespread.
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The fourth aspect: that an excuse cannot be considered as an excuse exceptwhere one isunable to remove it.Therefore, whenever it is possible for a person to know the truthand he fallsshort, he isnot to be excused. The fifthaspect: some people who commit the [prohibited] act might perhaps exercise an ijtihadwhich falls shortof the ijtihad thatwould permit that action to the person or an imitatorwhose imitationwas not of a standard that could make the action permissible for him. Therefore, this kind of example has within it a cause for the applicability of the threatwithout the existenceof this specificimpediment. As a result,he will be liable to the threat was and he will be subjected to it,unless another impediment to be found for him, such as repentanceor good deedswhich erase bad deeds, and so on. Then again, this is problematic, because the person might think thathis ijtihad or imitation permits him to do what he did and he could be right sometimes and mistaken at other times. If,however, he sought the truthand did not leave it to his desires, thenAllah does not charge a soul with more than it can bear. The tenthanswer: [i.e. to the claim that the hadithscontaining threatsare related to the issues of agreementonly]: Whilst understanding these hadiths some upon their requiredmeanings leads to the inclusion of mujtahidswithin the scope of the threat,giving some othermeaning may similarly lead to the inclusion of some mujtahids within it. Therefore, if the inclusion is unavoidable in both cases, then thehadith is freeof opposing evidence and as a result it is obligatory to implementit. a act To clarify this:many imams stated that the doer of disputed is blameworthy, among them being Abd Allah ibn 'Umar (may Allah be pleasedwith him).When he was asked about theone who marries awoman to legitimiseher subsequent remarriageto her previous husband, while she and her previous husband were not aware of [his intention],he said: "This is fornicationand not marriage.May Allah reject themuhallil and themuhallal lahu"163This is narrated fromhim throughmore than one channel. It is also narrated fromothers, among them ImamAhmad ibnHanbal (mayAllah have mercy upon him) who said, "Ifhe seeks to legitimiseremarriage to a previous husband, then he is a muhallil, and he is rejected."164This sort of opinion has been narrated fromgroups of the imams inmany issuesof disagreement,such as khamr,usury and the like.
163 See, Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab fi l-Tahlil; IbnMajah, Sunan, Kitab al-Nikah, Bab al-Muhallilwa al-Muhallal lah; Ibn Abl Shaybah,Musannaf, 7: 292; Yusuf b. 'AbdAllah Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Tamhid lima fi H-Mawatta'min Ma'arii wa 'l-Asariid(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al 'Ilmiyyah, 1999), 13: 235. 164 See, IbnQudamah, al-Mughni,7:138.
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If the shar% la'n and the other formsof threatdo not apply except in issues of agreement, then this would mean that these scholars have pronounced rejection (la'n) against someonewho is not permitted to have a la'n pronounced against them and consequently theydeserve the threatwhich was narrated in severalhadiths such as the statementof theProphet (peace be on him): "Pronouncing la'n against theMuslim is the same as killing him"165 and his statement(peace be on him) in thenarration of IbnMas'ud (mayAllah be pleased with him) that,"Insulting the Muslim is iniquityand fightinghim is disbelief."166These are agreedupon hadiths. It isnarrated fromAbu 'l-Darda' (mayAllah be pleasedwith him) thathe heard theMessenger of Allah (peace be on him) say: "Verily, insultersand thosewho pronounce la'n will not be given the rightof intercessionon the Day of Judgementnor will theybe accepted aswitnesses."167 And it is narrated fromAbu Hurayrah (mayAllah be pleased with him) that theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) said: "It is not appropriate for one who is very truthfulto pronounce la'n."16*[Imam] Muslim narrates both of these two hadiths. And it is narrated from 'Abd Allah ibnMas'ud (mayAllah be pleased with him) that theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him) said: "The believer is not an insulter, nor does he pronounce la'n, nor is he indecent, nor shameless."169This is narrated by al-Tirmidhi,who said that it is a hasan hadith.170
And in another narration [Prophet (peace be on him) said]: "No person pronounces la'n against somethingwhich does not deserve it except that the la 'nwill rebound upon him."171 So this is the threatwhich accompanies this type of la'n, to the extent that it is said thatwhoever pronounces la'n againstone who is undeservingof it,he will in turn receive la'n, and thiskind of la'n is an iniquity that takes away truthfulness,the rightof intercession,and being awitness [on theDay of Judgement].This [asmentioned earlier] applies to the one who pronounces la'n againstone who does not deserve it.
165 See, al-Bukhari, Sabih, Kitab al-Adab, Bab man Akfar Akhah bi Ghayr Ta'wil; Muslim, Sabih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab Ghilaz Tahrim Qatl al-InsanNafsah. 166 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Iman, Bab Khawf al-Mu'min min an Yahbata 'Amaluh; Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab Ghilaz Tahrim Qatl al-InsanNafsah. 167 See,Muslim, Sahih>Kitab al-Birrwa 'l-Silah,Bab al-Nahy 'anLa'n al-Dawab wa Ghayriha. 168 See, ibid. 169 See, IbnAbi Shaybah,Musannaf, 6: 162;Ahmad, Musnad, 1: 404. 170 See, al-Tirmidhi,Sunan, Kitab al-Birrwa 'l-Silah,Bab ma Ja' fi 'l-La'nah. 171 See,Abii Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Adab,Bab fi 'l-La'n.
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Therefore, if the one who commits a disputed act is not included in the purview of the source text, then he does not deserve it and the one who pronounces la'n against him will be liable to this other threat.This would mean that thosemujtahids who considered issuesof dispute to fallwithin the ambit of thehadith would be liable to this threat. Therefore, if thatwhich is fearedcan exist regardlessof the presence or otherwise of a dispute, then itwill be known that it is in factnot to be feared, and nothing can impede theuse of thehadith as evidence. However, if the feared possibility is not found in either of the two possibilities (i.e. thedisagreed upon issueor agreedupon issue) then thismeans that the fearedpossibility does not exist at all That is so because when inseparability(talazum) is established and it is known that they (i.e. themujtahids) are includedwithin the scope of a threat in issues of disagreement, it necessitates that they also fallwithin it in the absence of disagreement.Thus, one of twomatters must be affirmed,that is either the existenceof the cause and the effectwhich would mean they are all included or the non-existenceof the cause and effectwhich would mean their exclusion as a whole. This is becausewhenever the cause exists, so too does its effectand conversely,whenever the cause isnon-existent, so too is the effect. This is enough to refutethe counter-argument.Our belief, however, is that the reality is thatmujtahids are not included under either of the two possibilities aswe have justclarified. This is because to fallwithin the scope of a threat,there must be no mitigating factorspresent in the commission of an act. The one who has a shar%excuse is not includedwithin a threatunder any circumstances.Likewise, themujtahid is excused. Indeed, he is rewarded.A necessary condition for inclusionwithin a threatis thereforeabsent in his case and as a result he cannot fallwithin its ambitwhether he believes that the hadithmust be interpretedaccording to its apparentmeaning, or whether there is some dispute in this regard, forwhich he is excused. And this is a devastating implication (of their argument) (ilzammufhim) which cannot be avoided except throughone argument,which is to say: I accept thatamong the mujtahid scholars there are thosewho believe that issuesof dispute can stillbe includedwithin the textspertaining to threat,and they thereforeutilise threats in such issues of disputes on the basis of that belief, so theywould, for instance, pronounces la'n against the one who did the action in question. Nevertheless, they aremistaken in this belief, although this is a mistake for which theyare excused and [instead]rewarded [for their ijtibad]. As a result, theywould not be includedwithin thepurview of the threat regarding the one who pronounces la'n against anotherwithout legitimate a reason. This is because such threat,according tome, is related only to the
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 374 AHMAD IBN 'ABD AL-HALIMIBN TAYMIYYAH la'n, theprohibition ofwhich is agreedupon. Therefore,whoever utters a la'n the prohibition of which is agreed upon, he has exposed himself to the aforementioned threat.If the la'n is, however, a disputed issue, itwill not be included in the hadiths of threat just as an action which is the subject of dispute as to itspermissibility or thepermissibility of pronouncing la'n against itsdoer isnot includedwithin thehadiths containing such threats. Therefore, just as I exclude the issues of dispute from the firstthreat I should also exclude the issuesof dispute frombeing includedunder the second threat,and I also should believe that the badiths containing threats in both cases do not cover disputed issues,neither with regard to the permissibilityof the action nor the permissibilityof pronouncing la'n against itsdoer whether he held the action to be permissible or prohibited. In fact,I do not, in either case, permit pronouncing la'n against the doer of the action or pronouncing la'n against the one who pronounces la'n against the doer, nor do I believe that the doer or the imprecator fallswithin a hadith containing a threat. I would not be harsh on the one who pronounces la'n in themanner of one who thoughthe was liable to the threatof punishment; rather,I consider his la'n upon the doer of a disputed act to be an issue of ijtihad. I do, however, believe he was wrong in his imprecation just as I might believe that the one who permitted the disputed action is alsomistaken, as thereare threeopinions with regard to such disputed issues:
First: to hold that it is permissible. Second: tobelieve in theprohibition and theapplicability of thethreat. Third: to hold that it is prohibitedbut without such a strong threatof punishment being applicable.
I am inclined to favour this thirdopinion due to the existenceof evidence for the prohibition of the action, but also for theprohibition of pronouncing la'n against the one who commits a disputed action, coupled with my belief that the narrated badiths on threateningthe doer of an act and the imprecatordo not seem to two cases. imply these So it could be said to the interlocutor: if you were to allow the la'n directed at the one who commits thisact to be considered among the issuesof ijtihad,then itwould also be allowed to use the apparent text as evidence for this.There would thenbe no avoiding thepossibility thatdisputed issueswere intended to be includedwithin thehadiths of threat,and what necessitates it to be intended exists and thereforeit must be acted upon. If, however, you did not allow the la'n of thisdoer to be considered among the issuesof ijtihadthen this la'n is definitely prohibited. There is no doubt that the one who
This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 23:11:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE OF FROM IMAMS REMOVAL BLAME THE GREAT 375 pronounces la'n against a mujtahidwith a la'n that is prohibitedwith absolute certaintywould fallwithin thenarrated threatupon the imprecator,even ifhe did this on the basis of an interpretation,as is the case with the one who pronounced la'n against some of the righteoussalaf. Therefore, a circular argument is createdwhether you were convinced of the prohibition of pronouncing la'n against thedoer of a disputed act, or you allowed thedifference of opinion on this.Your aforementionedbelief does not prevent adducing textspertaining to threatsin either case, and this should be clear. And it can also be said to him (i.e. the objector): our purpose in this argument is not to affirm the applicability of such threats to issues of to disagreement,but merely allow for the use of such hadiths pertaining to threatas evidencewithin such issuesof disagreement.Such hadithscan indicate two rulings: (1) the prohibition of the act itself;and (2) the threat.What you have mentioned deals only with negating the hadiths9reference to the threat. Our aim here is to clarify its implications for the prohibition. Therefore, if were you to insist that the hadiths condemning the imprecatordo not treat those la'n that are disputed, then no evidence would remain for the we prohibition of such disputed la'n. As have mentioned, we are discussing are such disputed la'n, and if they not prohibited then they must be permissible. Or it could be said: if there is no evidence for its prohibition, it is not permissible to believe in its prohibition and yet thatwhich necessitates such to permissibility [i.e. believe in its prohibition] is established through the hadiths those who did the action. cursing Moreover, the scholars disagreed over no the permissibilityof cursing him, but there is evidence prohibiting such cursing according to this. Therefore it is obligatory to act upon the evidence indicatingthe permissibilityof cursinghim because there is nothing to oppose this evidence.This rendersthe question void. There is also circularity in the argumenton the part of the interlocutor from another perspective.This is that themajority of the texts prohibiting imprecation contain threats themselves.If the citation of a text containing a threat [of cursing] inmatters of disagreementis not permissible then it cannot be permissible to cite them as evidence for a la'n upon one who commits a disputed action, aswe have clarifiedearlier. were to If the interlocutor say, "I cite consensus for the prohibition of this la'n" itwill be said to him that consensus has only been established for the prohibition of pronouncing la'n against a specificindividual who isnamed from amongst those of outstanding virtue,whereas you are aware of the disagreementconcerning the la'n upon a generic attributeor characteristicthat
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may be found in some people [withoutnaming a particular individual].It was mentioned earlier thatcursing a characteristicdoes not mean its application to every individual case, unless the conditions for it are fulfilledand thereare no impediments,and this isnot the case here. It can also be said to him that all the evidences mentioned earlier indicating the impermissibilityof restrictingthese hadiths to issues upon which there is agreement can be used here, and they undermine this counter-argumentjust as theyundermine theoriginal question. This is not, however, an example of using evidence as a premise amongst the premises for another evidence, so that it could be argued that this is actually only one evidence despite the prolongation {altatwil)\ because the intentionis to clarifythat the fearedoutcome which they thoughtexisted, can be found in both cases (agreementand disagreement); thereforeit should not be considered a feared outcome and as a result it is one evidence that has indicated that issuesof dispute are included,and that there is no problemwith that.
It is not also objectionable that the evidence for one issue is used as a premise in evidence for another issue, even if the two issues are closely intertwined.
The eleventh answer: the scholars are in agreementon the obligation of acting upon the hadiths containing a threat to the extent that they imply a prohibition. Some of them only disagreed specificallywith regard to the establishmentof threatson the basis of hadithnarrated in isolated isndds(dhdd) containing such threats, whereas there is no credible or significant disagreementon affirmingprohibitions based on dhdd haditb. Indeed, itwas the habit of the scholars among theCompanions and their followers and the juristsafter them (mayAllah be pleased with them all) in their lettersand treatisesto cite dhddhadith in issuesof disagreementand other issues. In fact,if a hadith contains a threat,this is strongerin emphasising the prohibition, as thiswould normally be understood by the intellectfrom such statements. Also, we have already indicated the preference for the opinion of those who act upon them [dhdd hadiths] in rulings and believe in the threats containedwithin them,and that this is theopinion of themajority of scholars. No argument can, therefore,be acceptedwhich contradictsan opinion agreed upon by the scholars. The twelfthanswer: the textscontaining such threatswithin theQur'an and the Sunnah are abundant, and to base opinions upon themmust be considered obligatory in general and absolute terms without specifying individual culprits.Thus, it could be said that "this is rejected" or "the object ofwrath" or "liable for thehellfire," especially if the actual person in question
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were to possess virtue[s'] and good deeds. This is because all humans other than theProphets (peace be on them all) are capable of committingminor and major sins,whilst that person might remain a siddiq (an extremely truthful person) or shahid (amartyr) or righteousas a consequence of the effectsof a sin?as mentioned earlier?being nullified through repentance, seeking forgiveness,good deeds erasingbad ones, trialsand tribulationsexpiating sins, intercession,or simply throughthe Will andMercy ofAllah. So when we affirmwhat is necessitatedby the statementof Allah (The Exalted): {Those who unjustly consume theproperty of orphans, are actually swallowingFire into theirown bellies:They will be enduringa Blazing Fire!};172 and {But thosewho disobeyAllah andHis Messengerand transgressHis limitswill be admitted to a Fire, and therethey will stay:And theyshall have a humiliating punishment}',173and {O youwho believe!Do notwrongfully consume each other's wealth but trade by mutual consent:do not kill each other,for verilyAllah is Merciful to you! If any of you does thesethings, out of hostilityand injustice,we shall make him sufferthe Fire: that is easyfor Allah}174 and other verses containing a threat or when we speak about what is necessitated by the statementsof the Prophet (peace be on him), "May Allah reject the one who drinks khamr"175or "the one who is recalcitranttoward his parents,or changes the landmarksof the land"176or "MayAllah reject the thief"177or "mayAllah reject the one who takes riba, the one who gives it, and the twowitnesses and the scribe"178or "may Allah reject the one who does not pay his zakdt or exceeds the boundaries in this regard"179or "he who introduces any innovations [in religion] inMadinah, or gives a shelter to someone who committed a crime,Allah's la n is upon him, as well as thatof the angels and all the people"180or "the one who trailshis garment on the ground out of pride,Allah will not look at him on the day of judgement"181or "He who has
172 Qur'an 4:10. 173 Qur'an 4: 14. 174 Qur'an 4: 29-30. 175 See n. 133 above. 176 See,Muslim, Sahib,Kitab al-Adahi,Bab Tahrim al-Dhabh liGhayr Allah Ta'all. 177 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Hudud, Bab La'n al-Sariq idha lam Yusam; Muslim, Sahib, Kitab al-Hudud, Bab Hadd al-Sariqah. 178 See note 125 above. 179 See, 'Abd al-Razzaq,Musannaf, 6:269; Ibn Abi Shaybah,Musannaf, 2: 354; Ibn Khuzaymah, al-Sahih, 4: 8; al-Bayhaqi, alSunan al-Kubra, 4: 82. 130 See, al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-Hajj, Bib Haram al-Madinah;Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Hajj, Bab Fadl al-Madinah. 181 See n. 158 above.
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in his heart theweight of amustard seed of pridewill not enterParadise"182 or "He who acts dishonestly towardsus isnot of us"183or "If somebody claims to be the son of any other thanhis real father,or attributeshimself to other than the one who freedhim from slavery,will not enterParadise"184 or "He who swore a falseoath in order to entitlehimself [to possess] a property,will meet Allah in a state that [Allah] would be angrywith him"185or "He who appropriates the rightof aMuslim by swearinga falseoath, Allah would make Hell-fire necessary forhim and would declare Paradise forbidden forhim"186 or "The one who seversthe tiesof kinshipwill not enterParadise"187 and other such hadiths containing such threats, it is not permissible to single out a particular person from among thosewho committed these actions and to say that the relevant threat has befallen that person. This is because of the possibility of repentanceand otherways of removing thepunishment.
Itwould also not be permissible to say that this (i.e. the existenceof such hadiths) necessitates pronouncing rejection (la'n) againstMuslims or the ummah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be on him) or pronouncing la'n against the siddiqin or the upright ones. This is because itmight be that whenever theupright righteousone commits one of those prohibited actions, therewould no doubt be an impedimentpreventing the applicability of the punishment to him, despite the cause of thepunishment being present.
Hence, whoever did these actions thinking that theywere permissible? eitheron the basis of ijtihad,imitation or other similarreasons?the last resort is that he is from a class of the righteous fromwhom the threatwas lifted through an impediment, just as the threatmight be impeded by repentance, good deedswhich erase thebad ones, and other such reasons.
Note that this is the path thatmust be adopted [with regard to this matter], as thereare only two ugly alternativesto this: The first: to assert the applicability of the threat to each and every individual [committingthe act]with the argument that this ismerely acting upon what isnecessitated by the texts.
182 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab Tahrim al-Kibr. 183 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab Qawl al-Nabiman Ghashshana fa laysaMinna. 184 See n. 145 above. 185 See, al-Bukhari,Sahih, Kitab al-Shahadat,Bab Qawl Allah Ta'ala inna l-ladhin Yashtaruna bi 'Ahd Allah; Muslim, Sahih, Kitab al-Iman, Bab Wa'id Man Iqtat'a Haqq al-Muslim bi Yamin Fajiratin bi al-Nar. 186 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Iman,Bab Wa'id Man Iqtat'aHaqq al-Muslim bi Yamin Fajiratin bi al-Nar. 187 See,Muslim, Sahih,Kitab al-Birrwa '1-Silahwa 1-Adab, Bab SUat al-Rahim.
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This claim is uglier than the opinion of theKharijls who accused those who committed sinswith disbelief, theMu'tazilah and others.The invalidity of this opinion is known by necessity in the religionof Islam, and the proofs for this are confirmedin places other thanhere. The second: to abandon formingopinions and actions based upon what is required by thehadiths of theMessenger ofAllah (peace be on him), assuming that to argue according to them leads to the defamation of those who contravened those hadiths.Yet this abandonmentwould lead tomisguidance and following in the footstepsof thePeople of theBook who have taken their rabbis and theirmonks and theMessiah, the son ofMary (peace be on him and her), as lords besidesAllah, as theProphet (peace be on him) said, "They did not worship them, [meaning theirmonks and rabbis], but thesemonks and rabbismade lawful to themwhat Allah has forbidden,and prohibitedwhat Allah has made lawful, and they obeyed them in this."188Thus, this abandonment leads to obeying the createdones in disobedience to theCreator. It also leads to an ugly result and incorrect interpretations.This could be understood from the impliedmeaning of the statementof theExalted, {Obey Allah, and obey theMessenger, and thosecharged with authorityamong you. If you differin anythingamong yourselves,refer it toAllah andHis Messenger, ifyou do believe inAllah and theLast Day. That isbetter and fairer in theend)}*9 The scholars differ in various issues. If every tradition containing sternness (taghliz),which was opposed by someone meant that this taghliz would be abandoned or that the traditionwould not be acted upon, then the outcome necessitated by this (which is the abandonment of the hadithsof the Prophet) would be greater in enormity than to attribute someone with disbelief or abandonment of the religion. If this feared outcome (i.e. abandonment of the hadiths of the Prophet) was not greater thanwhat was before it (i.e. attributing someone with disbelief or abandonment of the religion), itwill certainlynot be inferiorto it. Therefore, it is a must forus to believe in the entireBook (theQur'an) and to follow all thatwas revealed byAllah to us. And we should not believe in a part of theBook and disbelieve in anotherpart. Our hearts should not be inclined to follow some of the Sunnah and avoid following some of it on the basis of customs and desires. This would indeed be an abandonment of the straightpath in preferenceto theway of thosewho have broughtwrath upon themselves,and thosewho have gone astray. May Allah guide us towhat He loves and is pleasing to Him in terms of speech and action in a state of
188 See, al-Tabari, Tafsir, 10:114; 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi Hatim, Tafiir al-Qur'an (Sayda: al Maktabat al-'Asriyyah,n.d.), 6:1784; al-Bayhaqi,Sunan, 10:116. 189 Qur'an 4: 59.
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goodness and well-being forus and allMuslims. And praise be to Allah the Lord of the worlds, and countless salutations and blessings be upon Muhammad, the seal of the Prophets, and upon his family and his righteous Companions and his wives, theMothers of the Believers, and thosewho follow them in goodness till theDay of Judgement.190 $ $ $
190 The translationof this textwas based on the edition ofRafal-Maldm 'an al'Aimmat al-A 'lam (Riyadh: al-Ri'asah al-'Amman li Idarat al-Buhiith al-'Ilmiyyah, 1413ah). The opinions expressed in the translated text are those of the author, Ibn Taymiyyah, and not necessarily those of the translator.
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