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Idps Camps in Dohuk Gov

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Idps Camps in Dohuk Gov Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Kurdistan contain and established many camps in different governorate which are:- 1- Erbil Governorate, Established 8 camps. 2- Sulaymaniea Governorate, Established 4 camps. 3- Dohuk Governorate, Established 28 camps. 4- Karkuk Governorate, Established 4 camps. Total Camps in all area (44 Camps) for IDPs, refugees and returnees. Department of Displacements and migration (DDM/BDM) in Dohuk Governorate 1991-2016 • The role of our department in Dohuk area start since 1991 as a committee dealing with returnees form Iran, Syria and Turkey, with these person who are runs away from policy during 1973-1975 and returnee on 1991. • After 2009 this committees became a department of displacement and Migration(DDM) also a bureau of displacement and migration(BDM) in KRG, working under supervision of Governor office and interior ministry. • Our mandate as DDM and BDM in KRG are dealing with three grope of (IDPs, Refugees and returnees) until this moment KRG receiving hundred families per month from Syria (Refugees) and Ninewa area (IDPs). • After Iraq situation on 2003 and internal conflicts, hundred thousand of families have been displaced in different area from Ninewa and Baghdad to Dohuk city, at this time our department start dealing with IDPs, coordination with governor office and related department in Dohuk governorate (Education, Health, Residency and mayors dis.) and UN agency. • From 2009-2013 thousands person from Iran and Turkey also from European countries returned to Dohuk area by their decision, by force or as voluntary return with IOM or AGF organization. • After middle east events on 2013 and Syrian situation and ISIS, thousands hundred of families crossed the border from Syria to KRG, and biggest operation of transportation in this decade happened on August 2013 in Dohuk area (Feshkhabur) 25,000 person in 3 days , within 22 days it reached more than 55,000 person, this operation was within coordination and support of IOM and UNHCR Iraq mission. • The worse humanitarian crisis act happened on July 2014 with our people in Shingle city, hundreds person have been killed, kidnapping, tortured and displaced to Dohuk governorate. Dohuk Governorate / K.R.G. Turkey side Syria side Dohuk Gov. Ninawa Gov. Erbil Gov. Total area 10927 km2 Its accounted 25% of the KRG area and 2.5% of raq IRAQ ( 36 N - 37 N ) ( 43 E – 44 E ) Dohuk Governorate and district population Zakho dis. 267379 Amedi dis. 100067 Dohuk Gov. Summel dis. 386239 128460 Shekhan dis. Akre dis. 61485 157591 Bardarash dis. 95761 Dohuk Governorate and district population Dohuk Governorate # District Family Individual 1 Dohuk 83282 386239 2 Summel 25207 128460 3 Amedi 21109 100067 4 Zakho 52309 267379 5 Shekhan 11597 61485 6 Bardarash 18207 95761 30646 157591 7 Akre GRAND TOTAL 242357 1196982 Dohuk Governorate area and old camps Zakho dis. Amedi dis. Dohuk Gov. Summel dis. Shekhan dis. Akre dis. Old Camps Bardarash dis. Total Grand (1055 Families / 5162 individual) IDPs and Refugees camps in Dahuk Gov. (2015) Refugees in Camps Refugees camps and population in Dohuk Governorate(2015) # District Camp Name Family Individual note 1 Doniz 1 5,451 24,529 And also 436 singles Summel 2 Domiz 2 1,210 5,945 And also 22 singles 3 Akre Akre castle 1,187 5,618 And also 123 singles 4 Amedi Gawelan 284 1,289 And also 38 singles GRAND TOTAL 8,132 37,381 619 singles Refugees in non-Camps Refugees non-camp and population in Dohuk Governorate(2015) District Duhok Semel Zakho Akre Amedi Shekhan Bardarash Total Family 2,009 4,105 2,768 70 427 175 180 9,734 Individual 9,572 18,719 12,522 321 1,921 795 820 44,670 Refugees Population (camps and non-camp) Refugees population (camps and non-camp) in Dohuk Governorate (2015) Group Families Individuals Inside Camps (camps) 8,132 37,381 Outside Camps ( non-comp) 9,734 44,670 Total in Duhok Governorate 17,866 82,051 Pho. Of Refugees from Syria to KRG(2013) Displacement families from areas to Dohuk Gov. IDPs in Camps IDPs camps and population in Dohuk Governorate(2015) # District Camp Name Family Individual camp Tents & cabinets Number 1 Bersev 1 (Afad) 1,927 11,086 2500 2 Bersev 2 Zakho 1,545 9,433 1820 3 Darkar 0 0 1000 4 cham meshko 4,280 25,663 4993 5 Kabarto 1 2,394 14,012 3000 6 Kabarto 2 2,372 13,952 3000 7 400 Bajed Kandal 1 1,109 6,167 162 Summel 8 Bajed Kandal 2 1,110 6,388 960 9 Khanki 2,824 16,115 3120 10 Rawanga (Qadia) 2,726 15,420 3000 11 Sharyia (Afad) 3,302 18,365 4000 12 Garmawa 532 2,564 1168 13 Esyan Shekhan 2,590 15,284 3003 14 Mam Rashan 365 1,764 480 15 shekhan 992 5,758 1004 16 Bardarash Bardarash 2,184 11,178 2898 17 Akre Mamlyan 2,226 12,004 3000 18 Amedi Dawodeya (cabinets) 785 4,546 900 GRAND TOTAL 33,263 189,699 40408 IDPs in non-camp IDPs non-camp and population in Dohuk Governorate(2015) District Duhok Semel Zakho Akre Amedi Shekhan Bardarash Total Family 10,154 18,127 12,287 3,153 3,704 8,308 3,028 58,761 Individual 50,770 90,635 61,435 15,765 18,520 41,540 15,140 293,805 IDPs Population (camps and non-camp) IDPs population (camps and non-camp) in Dohuk Governorate (2015) Group Families Individuals Inside Camps (camps) 33,263 189,263 Outside Camps ( non-comp) 58,761 293,805 Total in Duhok Governorate 92,024 483,068 Pho. Of IDPs from Shingal area to KRG(2014) Coordination and Collaboration According to our work and experience during 15 years, dealing with these waves of IDPs, returnees and refugees, we realized that the best way to avoided any kind of crises and decreasing risk of disaster is a good coordination and collaboration also exchange idea and knowledge between government departments and UN agency with international NGOs. The body of operation for Syrian refugees (2013). 1- Deputy of Dohuk governor 2- Mayor of Zakho distrect 3- Manager of Feshkhabur border 4- General of police station in Dahuk Gor. 5- Expert and adviser of KRG representative. 6- Head of IOM office in Dahuk Gor. Overall Population of Dohuk area # Group Family Individual 1 Dohuk 242357 1196982 2 IDPs 102638 582675 3 liberated area 75695 437594 4 Refugees 15090 70194 GRAND TOTAL 435780 2287445 Kurdistan Regional Governorate Ministry of interior Directorate of Displacement and Migration Questions Many Thanks Nazar R. Mousa Director of DDM in Dahuk Gov. Tell:- 00964 750 4221441 Email:- [email protected] Kurdistan, Dohuk, Shindokha Or., Qasrok street, 98St, 99422 .
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