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Sanctions for Drunk Driving Accidents Resulting in Serious Injuries And/Or Death

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Sanctions for Drunk Driving Accidents Resulting in Serious Injuries And/Or Death SANCTIONS FOR DRUNK DRIVING ACCIDENTS RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURIES AND/OR DEATH State Statutory Citation Description of Penalty Alabama Ala. Code § 13A-6-20 and Serious Bodily Injury: Driving under the influence that result in the serious bodily Ala. Code § 13A-5-6(a)(2) injury of another person is assault in the first degree, which is a Class B felony. These felonies are punishable by no more than 20 years and no less than 2 years incarceration. Ala. Code § 32-5A-192 Homicide by Vehicle/Vessel: if a person unlawfully or unintentionally causes the death of another person as a result of violating a state or local ordinance that applies to the operation of a vehicle, the person is guilty of homicide if he caused the deceased's death. If convicted, the person shall be fined no less than $500 and no more than $2,000, and shall be imprisoned no more than 5 years. Ala. Code § 13A-6-4 Criminally Negligent Homicide: A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide by causing the death of another through criminally negligent conduct. If the death is caused while operating a motor vehicle the punishment is increased to a Class C felony, which is punishable by a prison term of no more than 10 years or less than 1 year and a day. Alaska Alaska Stat. §§ Homicide by Vehicle: vehicular homicide can be second degree murder, 11.41.110(a)(2), manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide, depending on the facts 11.41.120(a), and surrounding the death (see Puzewicz v. State, 856 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Alaska App. 11.41.130(a). 1993)). Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-50-307 Negligent Homicide: If a death occurs as a result of a person's reckless or wanton and Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-10- disregard for other's safety the person is guilty of negligent homicide, which is a 105 Class A misdemeanor or Class C felony. A Class A misdemeanor is punishable by no more than one year in prison and no more than a $1,000 fine. A Class C felony is punishable by no less than 3 years and no more than 10 years in prison and no more than a $10,000 fine. California Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152 et Serious Bodily Injury: It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of seq. and Cal. Vehicle Code § alcohol or drug, or who has a blood alcohol content is 0.08 or higher to drive a 23536 et seq. vehicle and do an act forbidden by law, or neglect a duty imposed by law, which act or neglect proximately causes the bodily injury of another. If the first offense occurred without bodily injury to another person, the violation is punishable by imprisonment for no more than 96 hours, of which 48 have to be continuous, and a fine of no less than $390, and no more than $1,000. If the violation is the second within 10 years, or results in bodily injury then the violation is punishable by no less than 90 days, and no more than a year in jail, and a fine of no less than $390, and no more than $1,000. Cal. Penal Code §§ 17, 191.5, Homicide by Vehicle: Gross vehicular manslaughter requires the driving of a 192(c), and 193. vehicle while intoxicated, and the death of another was the proximate cause of driving while intoxicated, but does not amount to a felony, and with gross negligence. A person can also be convicted if their act might have produced death, with gross negligence. Gross vehicular manslaughter is punishable by 4, 6, or 10 years in state prison. Vehicular manslaughter is the same as the description above, but does not require gross negligence, and is punishable by one year in county jail, or 16 months, 2 or 4 years in state prison. Second degree murder can be imposed if the driver acted with implied malice. If the intoxicated driver causes more than one death, an enhanced prison term of one year is added for each victim (see Cal. Vehicle Code § 23558). Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-3-205, Serious Bodily Injury: If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of and 18-1.3-401 alcohol, drugs, or both, and this conduct is the proximate cause of serious bodily injury to another, the person is guilty of vehicular assault. Violation is a Class 4 felony, which is punishable by no less than two years and no more than six years imprisonment. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3- Homicide by Vehicle: : If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of 106(a) alcohol, drugs, or both, and this conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, the person is guilty of vehicular homicide. Violation is a Class 4 felony, which is punishable by no less than two years and no more than six years imprisonment. Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-60d, Serious Bodily Injury: If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of and 53a-35a alcohol, drugs, or both, and causes serious physical injury to another is guilty of second degree assault. Violation is a Class D felony, which is punishable by no less than two years and no more than five years imprisonment. Homicide by Vehicle: 2nd Degree Manslaughter with a Motor Vehicle: A person is guilty of this offense if he caused the death of another while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. Violation is a Class C felony, 1 to ten years. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: A person is guilty of this offense if he drives when criminally negligent. Violation is a Class D felony, which is punishable by no less than two years and no more than five years imprisonment. Negligent Homicide with a Vehicle: if a person negligent operation of a vehicle causes the death of another, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than six months or both. Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 628 Serious Bodily Injury: If a person operates a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or with a prohibited alcohol or drug content and his conduct causes physical injury to another is guilty of assault if the second degree. Violation is a Class B felony, which is punishable by no less than 2 years but no more 25 years imprisonment. If the injury is serious the violation is a Class F felony, which is punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 §§ Homicide by Vehicle: 630, 630A. Vehicular Homicide in the First Degree: If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and his criminally negligent conduct causes of the death of another, the person is guilty of vehicular homicide. Violation is a Class E felony, which the minimum sentence is 2 years imprisonment, and the person is not eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release or supervised custody during the first 18 months of his sentence. Vehicular Homicide in the Second Degree: If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and causes of the death of another, the person is guilty of vehicular homicide. Violation is a Class F felony, which is punishable by no less than one year imprisonment, and the person is not eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release or supervised custody for the duration of their sentence. Florida Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) Serious Bodily Injury: If a person operates a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or with a prohibited alcohol or drug content and his conduct causes serious physical injury, that is, a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious physical disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any body part or organ, is guilty of a felony in the third degree. The infraction is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years and a fine of $5,000. Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(3) Homicide by Vehicle: If a person operates a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or with a prohibited alcohol or drug content and his conduct causes the death of another person, or an unborn viable fetus, commits DUI manslaughter, if at the time of the accident the person knew or should have known the crash occurred. Punishment is a term of imprisonment not to exceed 15 years, and a term not to exceed 30 years if the person knew or should have known of that the crash occurred and failed to render aid to the injured and/or dying person. Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-393 Homicide by Vehicle: Homicide by Vehicle in the First Degree: If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, who causes the death of another person and acts without malice aforethought shall be punished by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 15 years. If that person is declared a habitual offender and the person's driver's license has been revoked, and causes the death of another by operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both without malice aforethought shall be punished by a term of imprisonment not less than 5 years and no more than 20 years. Homicide by Vehicle in the Second Degree: If a person operates a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and causes the death of another person without the intention do so shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or a prison term not to exceed 12 months.
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