NONVIOLENT CHANGE Journal of the Research/Action Team on Nonviolent Large Systems Change Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 Compiled, May 2, 2017 Spring 2017

Nonviolent Change helps to network the peace community: providing dialoguing, exchanges of ideas, articles, reviews, reports and announcements of the activities of peace related groups and meetings, reviews of world developments relating to nonviolent change and resource information concerning the development of human relations on the basis of mutual respect.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Editor's Comments p. 2 Nonviolent Change on the Web p. 2 Upcoming Events p. 3 Ongoing Activities p. 14 World Developments p. 27 DIALOGUING: Bill McKibben, "The Planet Can’t Stand This Presidency" p. 224 Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir, "Accelerating Sustainable Development Toward 2030" p. 226 Sam Ben-Meir, "Trumpism and the ethics of climate change denial" p. 228 Rene Wadlow, "Saudi Arabia: Still Lost in the Sands of War" p. 230 Stephen Zunes, "Trump’s Dangerous and Cynical Attack on Syria" p. 232 Stephen Zunes, "Erdogan Can Celebrate the Turkish Referendum—For Now" p. 233 Alon Ben-Meir, "Relocating The American Embassy To Jerusalem" p. 234 Alon Ben-Meir, "Israeli And Palestinian Women Must Raise The Banner Of Revolt" p. 237 Uri Avnery, "University of Terror" p. 239 Uri Avnery, "Perhaps the Messiah will Come" p. 242 Uri Avnery, "The Great Rift" p. 244 Stephen Zunes, "The Bipartisan Effort against Campaigns for Corporate Responsibility" p. 247 Uri Avnery, "Palestine's Nelson Mandela" p. 249 Sam Ben-Meir, "President Trump’s Moral Harm" p. 251 Sam Ben-Meir, "America’s Weimar Moment" p. 253 What We Readers Are About p. 255 ARTICLES: Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci and Ahmet S. Yayla "What to Expect Following a Military Defeat of ISIS in Syria and ?" p. 255 Alon Ben-Meir, "The Battle Over Syria's Future" p. 263 Alon Ben-Meir, "The Looming End To The Western-Turkish Alliance" p. 265 Alon Ben-Meir, "Erdogan: A Classic Case Of How Power Corrupts" p. 267 Alon Ben-Meir, "Can Israel Fight A War On Three Fronts? A Nightmarish Scenario" p. 270 Alon Ben-Meir, "Trump And Netanyahu: Embracing Illusions, Ignoring Reality" p. 272 Alon Ben-Meir, "There Will Be No Palestinian State Under Netanyahu's Watch" p. 273 Sam Ben-Meir, "Trumpism And Anti-Semitism" p. 275 Raúl Zibechi, "Latin America: Trump’s Walls and ’s Bridges" p. 277 Yossef Ben-Meir, "Moroccan Cultural Preservation and the Jewish Experience" p. 281 Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir, "Alternative Politics of Renewal" p. 284 Robert W. Hotes, "Strategies for Resilience in Face of Violence Behavior: Addressing Anxiety in Large and Small Systems" p. 286 Media Notes p. 289 Useful Web Sites p. 289 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ COEDITORS: Stephen M. Sachs, Albuquerque, NM (505)265-9388, [email protected], Coordinating Editor. Alon Ben-Meir, NYU (212)866-5998, [email protected]. Robert W. Hotes, Springfield, IL 62704 (217)726-6220, [email protected] Sam Ben-Meir, Eastern International College, [email protected] (212)600-4267 Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco, 94117 (415)422-6981, [email protected]. Leah Ingraham, Albuquerque, NM, [email protected]. Ruby Quail, Web Master, Albuquerque, NM, (505)400-0900, [email protected]. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

NONVIOLENT CHANGE JOURNAL (NCJ) ON THE WEB

Nonviolent Change is on the web at: http://www.nonviolentchangejournal.org, along with several years of back issues. To be notified by E-mail when new issues are posted, send a request to be added to the NCJ notification E-mail list to Steve Sachs at: [email protected]. Issues are usually posted: Fall, in late August or early September; Winter, in January or early February; Spring in mid-March to end of April. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Nonviolent Change journal - ISDOC Association Agreement

The International Society for Organization Development and Change (ISODC) and the Nonviolent Change journal agreed May 2, 2016 to associate, making members aware of each other's activities and announcing each other's events. Readers of Nonviolent Change are offered reduced a membership fee in ISODC, which provides access to the Organization Development Journal (ODJ). ISODC is the successor to the Organization Development Institute, whose former President, Don Cole, initiated the Research/Action Team on Nonviolent Large Systems Change, which launched NCJ, as an interorganizational vehicle for behavioral scientists to do their part in moving toward peace.

EDITORS COMMENTS

Wishing you a fine spring. The world continues to go through many shifts producing a great many developments in areas of our concern. Most of the reports in the Activities and Developments sections of NCJ are abbreviated or executive versions of longer reports that can be accessed at the web sites indicated. This is especially true of International Crisis Group (ICG) reports of which we only publish the executive summaries, which include the web addresses for accessing the full report. WE WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT ALL THAT IS IN PROGRESS. These pages serve as a networking and dialoguing vehicle. We strongly encourage you to contribute articles (up to 2500 words), news, announcements, comments, queries, responses and artwork. It would be very fine if we could develop ongoing discussion from issue to issue. WE ESPECIALLY INVITE YOU TO SEND US A BRIEF NOTE ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE DOING, YOUR CONCERNS AND QUERIES, RELATING TO NONVIOLENT CHANGE, FOR OUR "WHAT WE READERS ARE ABOUT" COLUMN." Whenever possible, please make submissions on disk or via e-mail ([email protected]).

Please SEND WRITINGS AND ART WORK FOR NONVIOLENT CHANGE electronically to Steve Sachs (E-mail address top of p. 2). Steve puts together a draft of each issue, then undertakes e-mailing, while Ruby Quail posts the issue on the web. (Unsigned writings are Steve's). We welcome additional editors and column writers to cover geographic or topic areas on an ongoing or one time basis. We would very much like to have additional people share in the compiling of information in each issue.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ DEADLINE FOR NEXT ISSUE IS August 8 ****************************************************

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UPCOMING EVENTS

The International Society for Organization Development Change (ISODC), (formerly the International Society for Organizational Development (ISOD) upcoming conferences, are at http://www.isodc.org: Crating Flourishing Organizations Through Trust and Collaboration is1 May17, 2017 at Champlain College, Burlington, VT; CCM 1008 Leading Teams and Collaboration (An innovative hybrid online course - including a live in-person or zoom webinar - conference workshop) May 19, 2017 (3-5 pm Eastern Time); Flourish Conference: IODA 2017 (Thriving Through Diversity) in Cape Town, South Africa, September 6-8, 2017; Asia Organization Development Network (AODN) Summit in Ice, BSD City - Tangerang Banten, Indonesia, November 15-17, 2017. The ISODC and Nexus4change put on occasional webinars, and the ISODC organizes occasional team interventions listed at: http://www.isodc.org. * * * *

The UN DPU-NGO (Department of Public Information – Non-Governmental Organizations), , DPI/NGO Resource Centre, Room L-1B-31, (212)963-7233, 7234, 7078, Fax: (212)963-2819, [email protected], www.un.org/dpi/ngosection, publishes a provisional briefings and events calendars, usually taking place at the UN in City.

The Institute of Peace (USIP) offers an ongoing series of short courses listed at: http://www.usip.org/academy/courses/date. USIP, 2301 Ave. NW, Washington, DC, puts on numerous events beyond those listed here. For details go to: http://www.usip.org/events.

The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in Notre Dame, IN puts on regular lectures and other events related to getting to peace. For information go to: http://kroc.nd.edu.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2301 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, DC, puts on numerous events beyond those listed here. For details go to: http://www.usip.org/events.

HREA - Education Association runs a series of workshops and on line trainings, in late 2016 including: Armed Conflict, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Children’s Rights, Child Development, Participation and Protection, Communications and Advocacy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Environment, Human Rights and Sustainable Development, Financial, People and Project Management, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, Governance and Human Rights, Human Rights Policy, Human Rights in Education, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice Human Rights, Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid, Migration and Asylum, and two annual training programs: Four Freedoms Summer Program and Advocacy Institute. For details go to: http://www.hrea.org/learn.

The National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation (NCDD) puts on monthly free Tech Tuesdays, a series of learning events from NCDD focused on technology for engagement. These 1-hour events are designed to help dialogue and deliberation practitioners get a better sense of the online engagement landscape and how they can take advantage of the myriad opportunities available to them. For information, visit: http://ncdd.org/events.

Monthly meetings of the Circles of Nonviolence/Community Collaborative and their adopted projects in Arizona into Texas: Circles of Nonviolence/Community Collaborative in Southern Arizona can be found through: Moji Agha ([email protected], (520)325-3545 http://mossadeghlegacyinstitute.blogspot.com/p/america-for-nonviolence-anv.html. ~~~

3 The Krock Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame, in Notre Dame, IN may hold the Carnegie Council of Ethics in International Affairs, session in, May 2017. For details go to: http://kroc.nd.edu/.

National Conference for Dialogue & Deliberation 5th International Conference may be in May 2018, in Boston, MA. For information visit: http://ncdd.org.

Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu Center for Peace Studies Professorial lecture: Climate Change, Environmental Security and Global Justice, Prof. Solomon Salako, is May 3, 2017, 4:00-6:00 pm, at Eden 130 Lecture Theatre, Hope Park Campus, Liverpool Hope University, Hope Park, Liverpool L16 9JD, Great Britain.

A Nation United for A Safer Future 2017 Gun Violence Prevention Summit is May 3-4, 2017 in Washington, DC. For information visit: www.responsiblesolutions.org.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) May 4, 2017 in Madison, Wisconsin, Film Screening: This Changes Everything - Special one-night-only documentary film screening & discussion with cast member, rancher, organizer, writer Alexis Bonogofsky and a live video appearance by Naomi Klein. Doors Open @ 6:30 pm, Majestic Theater, 115 King St. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) May 4, 2017 in Olympia, Washington: WA Coalition to Stop the New Nuclear Arms Race: Olympia Committee Meeting - Olympia Fellowship of Reconciliation and Washington PSR are forming a committee in Olympia to take action locally against the new nuclear arms race.7:00 - 9:00 pm at the United Churches, 110 11th Ave SE. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e-activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) May 6, 2017 in Seattle, Washington: Meaningful Movies in West Seattle: Command and Control - A screening of the documentary, a minute-by-minute account of a near catastrophic nuclear explosion at a Titan ll Missile complex, followed by discussion and action. Featured guest Mary Hanson of WPSR. 7:00 pm at High Point Neighborhood House, 6400 Sylvan Way SW. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) May 7, 2017 in Portland, Oregon: Havurah Shalom Climate Information & Action Fair - Climate information and action fair, featuring tables and speakers from Oregon PSR. 10:00 am - Noon at Havurah Shalom, 825 NW 18th Ave. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e-activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

Women in Peacebuilding: Enhancing Skills & Practices is in Bogota, Colombia, May 8-12, 2017. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/calendar/.

IIRP Europe Conference: Conflict in Europe, Meeting the Challenge, is May 9-10, 2017, in Dublin, Ireland (Citywest Hotel). For details visit: http://www.iirp.eu/2016/08/01/iirp-europe-conference/.

People's Climate Justice Forum is May 10, 2017, 6:30 pm, at the Boston, MA Public Library. For more information visit: http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=rAof3%2FFicHULdUOmulnh%2FosmyX8cGY%2F3.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) May 10, 2017: in Seattle, Washington: Fighting for Progress: An Activist Training. Join WPSR for a training for both student and community members where'll we lead sessions on key organizing skills, and describe how we plan to fight the new nuclear arms race. 6:00 - 8:30 pm, location TBD. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

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Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) May 11, 2017 in Olympia, Washington: Rally and Petition Drop at the State Capitol: No to Coal and Oil! Yes to Clean Energy! - Join WPSR and the Stand Up to Oil Coalition on the WA State Capitol steps for a rally, press event, and hand delivery to the Governor of over 1 million petitions and comments from citizens saying "no" to Big Coal and Dirty Oil in the Evergreen State. 11:00 am - 1:30 pm on the steps of the Washington State Capitol Building (416 Sid Snyder Ave SW). For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

The 66th annual (DPI)/Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Conference, “Education for Global Citizenship: Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals Together”, is in Gyeongju, South Korea, May 30—June 1 2017. For details go to: http://www.un.org.

IIRP Latinoamérica is hosting the 21st World Conference of the International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP), Restoring Connections: Justice, Education, Community, may be in June 2017. Details can be found at: http://www.iirp.edu.

Annual College and University Seminar: Developing and Enhancing Peace and Conflict Studies Programs may be in June 2017. For details go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/event/annual-college-and- university-seminar-developing-and-enhancing-peace-and-conflict-studies-programs/?instance_id=875.

Fifth Joint International Conference on Human Rights may be in June, 2017. For information visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

Fletcher Summer Institute for the Advanced Study of Nonviolent Conflict (FSI) may be in June 2017, at Tufts University, 419 Boston Ave, Medford, MA 02155. For information go to: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org.

National Conference on Dialogue & Deliberation 2017 Frontiers of Democracy conference may be in June 2017, at Tufts University in Boston. For details visit: http://ncdd.org.

INCORE Summer School 2017 on the dynamic and constantly changing field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding may be at INCORE University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK, may be in June 2017. Details can be found at: http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/courses/ss/.

Justice Studies Association Annual Conference: 2017 JSA Conference is in Detroit, MI, at Wayne State University, June 1 – 3, 2017. For details go to: www.justicestudies.org/justice-conf.html.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) June 3, 2017 in Troutdale, Oregon: Mosier Anniversary: One Year after the Oil Train Wreck - One year after the Mosier oil train disaster, activists gather in Mosier to make a statement against additional oil trains coming through the Columbia River Gorge. Noon - 2:00 pm at Mosier Community School, 1204 Historic Columbia River Highway (US-30 E). For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) June 5, 2017 in Spokane, Washington: WPSR Reception in Spokane - Join us at the home of WPSR members Diana and Don Storey for an informal discussion of WPSR's current priorities, including nuclear weapons and climate change; the ways we and our partners are working to address these challenges; and how you can help. 6:30 pm. Please RSVP to Laura Skelton at [email protected], or (206)547-2630. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e-activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

5 Positive Leadership Seminar: UPEACE Centre for Executive Education is June 5–7, 2017, University for Peace, San José, Cd Colón, Costa Rica. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org/event/positive-leadership-seminar-upeace-centre-executive-education/?instance_id=1179.

18th Annual Kingian Nonviolence Summer Institute is at The University of Rhode Island, June 5 – 16, 2017. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/calendar/.

Tenth Annual Global Studies Conference: is June 6-9, 2017, at National University of Singapore, Singapore. The Global Studies Conference is devoted to mapping and interpreting new trends and patterns in globalization, and serves as an open forum for exploring globalization from many perspectives. Scholars, researchers, and graduate students from all backgrounds, all over the world are joining this cross- disciplinary conference. For detail go to: http://onglobalisation.com.

Global Peace Research Summit is in New York, NY, June 8-9, 2017. For details go to: https://www.ipra.org/events-and-conferences/events/.

Civic Learning & Democratic Engagement Meeting, is in Baltimore, MD, June 8-10, 2017. For details visit: https://davidjsmithconsulting.com/2016/10/12/atlantic-promise-field-training-exercise-march-16-19- 2017-registration-now-open-closes-26/.

2017 Bologna Symposium on Conflict Prevention, Resolution, and Reconciliation is at Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center, Bologna, Italy, June 10–July 1, 2017. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org or http://ipsinstitute.org/symposiums/bologna-symposium-2017/.

Kennesaw State University Conflict Management Program at Kennesaw State University Center for Continuing Education 3333 Busbee Drive Kennesaw, GA 30144, Summer Institute on Conflict Management in Higher Education is June 11-15, 2017. For details visit: http://ccm.hss.kennesaw.edu/events- programs/.

Peace Education Course: EMU Summer Peacebuilding Institute is June 12–16, 2017, at Eastern Mennonite University, 1200 Park Rd., Harrisonburg, VA 22802. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

2017 Canadian School of Peacebuilding (CSOP) is at Canadian Mennonite University, Winnipeg, MB, Canada, June 12-16 and 19-23, 2017. Details are available at: http://csop.cmu.ca/.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) June 16, 2017 (New Date): in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Workshop on the Health Impacts of Air Quality - The effects of air quality on communities in the vicinity of Philadelphia's refineries. 12:30 - 4:30 at South Philadelphia Health and Literacy Center, 1700 S Broad St. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) June 17, 2017 in New York City, New York: Women's March to Ban the Bomb - Public march and rally in support of negotiations taking place at the United Nations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Noon - 4:00 pm; assemble outside of Bryant Park along W 40th Ave. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

The 12th Annual Global Solutions Lab is June 18-26, 2017, at the United Nations in New York and Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia, PA. Participants, from around the world, will be briefed by, interact with and question UN experts (from the UN Development Program, UN Environmental Program, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, FAO and other UN agencies) and then, working collaboratively in small teams, develop designs, programs and strategies that deal with one of the critical problems facing our world. The participants present their work to a group of UN corporate and foundation leaders. After this

6 their work is published in a book. This year's theme is Eliminating Extreme Poverty by 2030. The Global Solutions Lab is a structured learning experience that fosters creativity, disruptive innovations, global perspectives and local solutions. It is intense, fast-paced, and for many, transformative. For information visit: Global Solutions Lab: www.designsciencelab.com

Krock Institute for International Peace Studies Teaching Peace in the 21st Century: 9th Annual Summer Institute for Faculty is at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, June 19-23, 2017. For information contact: http://kroc.nd.edu/.

The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in Notre Dame, IN, June 19-23, 2017, Teaching Peace in the 21st Century: 9th Annual Summer Institute for Faculty. The Summer Institute is a week-long program for faculty in any field. For information go to: http://kroc.nd.edu.

9th Annual Summer Institute for Faculty in Peace Studies Program Development is at The University of Notre Dame Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame, IN, June 19–23, 2017. Details are available at: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/calendar/.

Higher Education In Emergencies & Crises, Summer School, University Of Geneva is at University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, June 19–29, 2017. Details are available at: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org/calendar/.

Summer Institute on Conflict Transformation Across Borders is June 26-July 14, 2017, at the FLASCO campus in Quito, Ecuador, Ave Diego de Almagro, Quito 170517, Ecuador. For information visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/event/summer-institute-conflict-transformation-across- borders/?instance_id=868.

UPEACE Summer Peace Institute – Session 2: International Law of the Sustainable Development Goals is at University for Peace, San Jose, Costa Rica, June 26-July 14, 2017. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org/calendar/.

Conflict Transformation Across Borders, 3 week graduate-level training in conflict and peacebuilding in border regions of Latin America, including host-migrant and refugee-related conflict, border disputes, transnational environmental conflicts, intergroup dialogue, and more, summer institute is June 26 - July 14, 2017. More details and applications are available online at http://www.umb.edu/academics/caps/international/conflict_transformation. 4th International Summer School Learning from the past – Exploring the Role of Transitional Justice in Rebuilding Trust in a Post-Conflict Society may be in June and/or July 2017, at International University of Sarajevo, Hrasnička cesta 15, Ilidža, Bosnia and Herzegovina. For details go to: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org.

Human Rights Education Associates, HREA FOUR FREEDOMS SUMMER PROGRAM 2017 may be in June and/or July 2017. HREA runs a series of human rights related trainings throughout the year. For details go to: http://www.hrea.org.

Caux Scholars Program: A multi-disciplinary approach to conflict transformation, transitional justice, and principled leadership may be in June and/or July 2017, at Initiatives of Change conference center, Rue du Panoram, 1824 Montreux, Switzerland. For details go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/.

Study Program Onboard Peace Boat: Peace Education and the Sustainable Development Goals in Latin America may be in June and/or July 2017, on the Peace Boat, in the Peace Studies Program Onboard Peace Boat’s 94th Global Voyage including programs in Panama, Guatemala, and El Salvador. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

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17th Melaka International Youth Dialogue: ‘Youth for Environmental Sustainability: Our Future, Our Care’ may be in June or July 2017, at World Assembly of Youth, World Youth Complex. For information go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/.

JEAN MONNET@CRONEM SUMMER SCHOOL 2017 may be in June and July 2017 at University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, UK. For details go to: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/cronem/.

Alternative Dispute Resolution Summer School may be in June and/or July 2017, at Central European University, Budapest, Nádor u. 9, 1051 Hungary. For information go to" http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org/.

The Fifth International Conference on Financing for Development may be in July 2017. For more information visit: http://www.un.org/.

Annual Conference 2017: Arts, Peace and Conflict may be at Archbishop Desmond Tutu Centre for War and Peace Studies, Liverpool Hope University, UK, may be in July 2017. For more information contact: [email protected], or visit: http://tutu.hope.ac.uk/newsevents/artspeaceandconflictconferencereport.html.

2017 Summer Peace Leadership Courses at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, CA, may be in July 2017. For details on this and other events go to: http://www.wagingpeace.org/programs/peace- leadership/.

A Residential Summer Institute for K-12 Educators: Journeys of Nonviolence: Gandhi and Mandela may be at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona (Cal Poly Pomona), may be in July 2017. For details visit: http://www.cpp.edu.

Human Rights Education – The Georg Arnhold International Summer School 2017 may be in July 2017, at Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Celler Str. 3, 38114 Braunschweig, Germany. For details go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/event/human-rights-education-the-georg-arnhold- international-summer-school-2016/?instance_id=884.

Fellowship of Reconciliation Centennial Conference/59th Regional FOR Seabeck Conference “Persevering FOR Peace” is in July 2017, at the scenic Seabeck Conference Center west of Seattle, WA/ For details, including scholarships, visit: forseabeck.org or www.forusa.org.

Teaching for Peace: An Indian Immersion Experience in Practical Nonviolence may be in July 2017 at the International School for Jain Studies (: Delhi, Jaipur & Pune). For information go to: http://www.peace- ed-campaign.org/event/teaching-for-peace-an-indian-immersion-experience-in-practical-nonviolence- 2/?instance_id=871.

2017 The Hague Symposium on Post-Conflict Transitions & International Justice is at Clingendael Institute for International Relations may be at The Hague, Netherlands, in July 2017. For details visit: http://ipsinstitute.org/, or http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

Mahatma Gandhi Summer Institute: Building Peaceful Communities, may be in July 2017 at Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, 11210 87 Ave NW, Edmonton, AB T6G 2T9, Canada. For details go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/event.

WCCI 18th World Conference in Education may be in July 2017. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org.

Global Youth Rising Peace Summer Camp may be in July 2017, at Somesul Rece, Cluj, Romania. For

8 information go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

The Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM), Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM), 13th Annual Conference 2017, is likely in June or July, 2017, likely at the University of Surrey, UK; details may become available in late January. For details go to: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/cronem/.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu Centre for War and Peace Studies, Conference “Restoring peace: building post- conflict societies” is July 3, 2017 at Liverpool Hope University, Creative Campus, Liverpool, England. For details go to: http://tutu.hope.ac.uk/newsevents/.

Venice Academy of Human Rights 2017 is at Monastery of San Nicolò, Venice Lido, Italy, is July 4-13 2017. The Academy and School run a number of programs and trainings. For details go to: http://www.eiuc.org/research/venice-academy-of-human-rights.html.

Mahatma Gandhi Summer Institute: Building Peaceful Communities @ Education Building, University of Alberta, 85 St NW & 116 Ave NW, Edmonton, AB T5B, Canada, July 4–13, 2017. For information go to" http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/.

A Summer Institute for K-12 Educators & Related Professionals: Teaching for Peace: An Indian Immersion Experience Into Practical Nonviolence is at Delhi, Jaipur, Pune, and Jalgaon, India is July 8-28, 2017. For details visit: http://isjs.in.

Sarajevo Symposium on Post Conflict Transitions is in Sarajevo, Bosnia, July 15–29, 2017. For information visit: http://ipsinstitute.org.

International Institute for Restorative Practice A Restorative Journey: Transforming Relational Harm is July 17-19, 2017 | IIRP's Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Campus - IIRP's 2017 Summer Symposium. For details visit: http://www.iirp.edu.

World Affairs Council, Leadership Academy, is in Washington, DC, July 19, 2017. For details visit: https://davidjsmithconsulting.com/2016/10/12/atlantic-promise-field-training-exercise-march-16-19- 2017-registration-now-open-closes-26/.

2017 Bologna, Italy Symposium on Conflict Prevention, Resolution, & Reconciliation may be at Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, Bologna, Italy, is July 23-August 13 2017. For information visit: http://ipsinstitute.org.

The Sixteenth International Conference on Diversity in Organizations, Communities & Nations will be held at the University of Granada, Granada, Spain, 27-29 July 2016. For more information visit: http://www.newsletter.illinois.mx3a.com/vo/diversity_D16a.html?&utm_source=D16PromoA&utm_mediu m=D16PromoA&utm_campaign=D16PromoA.

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) July 30, 2017 in Portland, Maine: Food for Good: A celebration of food and planet - 2nd Annual Climate Cake Competition, climate friendly foods, climate cash bar, cooking demos, silent auction, music and more. 1:00 - 4:00 pm at O'Maine Studio. Get tickets at: https://secure.psr.org/ea- action/action?ea.client.id=1898&ea.campaign.id=49414&ea.url.id=916679&forwarded=true. For more information on this and other PSR events go to: https://www.e- activist.com/page/message?mid=268f9840041244fda6c74d5bf45ce0a2.

WYSE International Learning Programme 2017 may be in July and/or August 2017 at VILLA BOCCELLA, Via Tramonte, 375, 55100 Lucca LU, Italy. For details go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

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IIPE 2017: International Institute on Peace Education may be at the University of Toledo, Toledo OH, in July and August 2017. For details go to: www. i-i-p-e.org.

Human Rights Education Associates, HREA ADVOCACY INSTITUTE 2017 may be in August 2017. For information visit: http://www.hrea.org/.

Women’s Human Rights Education Institute may be in August 2017 at University of Toronto; Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

Hiroshima and Peace 2017 program is in Hiroshima, , August 1-9, 2017. For details go to: http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/Hiroshima-and-Peace/index.htm.

The International Symposium on Strengthening Peace through Education is August 9–11, 2017 in Nagasaki, Japan. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org.

Institute for Peace and Dialogue, IPD, International Summer Academy in Peacebuilding, Mediation, Conflict Resolution & Intercultural Dialogue: Summer Academy VII is August 11-20, 2017, Summer Academy VIII is August 20-29, 3 Month CAS - Research Program is August11-November 8, 2017 all in Baar, Switzerland. For details visit: http://www.ipdinstitute.ch/.

Peace Boat: Building a Culture of World Peace, has a Voyage August 13 to November 24, 2018. For details go to: http://peaceboat.org/english/?menu=113.

International Institute on Peace Education (IIPE) 2017 is at Grillhof Seminar Center, Innsbruck, Austria, August 27-September 2, 2017. For details go to: http://www.i-i-p-e.org/iipe2017/ or http://us14.campaign- archive2.com/?u=b0a615e7d6c391299621dd013&id=acb596ad4e&e=3178c5b5f7.

The 19th Annual Yoder Dialogues on Nonviolence, Religion and Peace may be in September 2017, at the Hesburgh Center for International Studies Auditorium, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN. For information go to: http://kroc.nd.edu.

14th Culture of Peace Festival – Peace Network of San Carlos and Fundación CEPPA may be at San Carlos, Costa Rica in September and/or October, 2017. For information visit: http://ceppacr.org/html/evento.htm.

IIPT World Symposium on Peace through Tourism is September 18-19, 2017. For more information go to: http://www.iipt.org/.

International Day of Peace is September 21st

The 14th Annual Ikeda Forum for Intercultural Dialogue may be in October 2017. For details contact Ikeda Center for Peace, Learning, and Dialogue, 396 Harvard Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, phone (617)491- 1090, www.ikedacenter.org.

34th Annual Evening for Peace, Donald C. Brace Lecture Honoring Yoko Ono by Jessica Litman may be in October 2017. For details go to: https://www.wagingpeace.org.

The 2017 Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association Conference may be in October 2017. For details contact: [email protected], http://appra.net/.

10 Peacebuilding Workshops for faculty and Students are October 4, at Hood College, Frederick, MS. For details go to: https://davidjsmithconsulting.com/media-and-presentations-on-peacebuilding-in-community- colleges-a-teaching-resource/.

The 14th Annual Association for conflict Resolution (ACR) Conference: Professionalize Your Passion, is October 11-14, 2017 in Dallasm TX. For details go to: http://www.acrnet.org/.

6th Symposium of Relating Systems Thinking and Design: RSD6 Symposium: Relating Systems Thinking and Design 6, Environment, Economy, Democracy: Flourishing Together is at the Oslo School of Architecture and Design (AHO) Oslo, October 18-20, 2017. For information contact: http://systemic- design.net.

Peace History Association (PHS), Remembering Muted Voices: Conscience, Dissent, Resistance and Civil Liberties in World War I through Today is at National World War I Museum at Liberty Memorial, Kansas City, MO, October 19-21, 2017. For details visit: http://historicaldialogues.org/2015/02/19/cfp-remembering- muted-voices-conscience-dissent-resistance-and-civil-liberties-in-world-war-i-through-today-deadline- january-31-2017/.

5th Annual National Community College Peacebuilding Seminar, Northern Virginia Community College, October 20-23, 2017. For details visit: https://davidjsmithconsulting.com.

International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP) 21st World Conference is October 23-25 in Bethlehem, PA. For details visit: http://www.iirp.edu.

The Peace and Justice Studies Association 2017 annual conference, “Moving... From Civil Rights to Human Rights”, is October 25 - 29, 2017 University of Alabama in Birmingham, Birmingham, AL. For details go to: https://www.peacejusticestudies.org.

International Institute of Restorative Practice (IIRP), IIRP's 23rd world conference: "Learning in the 21st Century: A Restorative Vision" is October 23-25, 2017 in Bethlehem, PA. For details go to: http://www.iirp.edu/.

The 13th International MEDCOAST Congress on Coastal and Marine Sciences, Engineering, Management & Conservation is October 31–November 4, 2017, at Paradise Bay Resort Hotel (All-inclusive), Mellieha - Malta. For details go to: conference.medcoast.net.

8th International Conference on Human Rights Education is November 30–December 3, 2017, in Montreal, QC, Canada. For information go to: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/event/8th-international- conference-human-rights-education/?instance_id=1173.

4th Annual International Conference on Poverty and Sustainable Development (ICPSD 2017) is in , , December 5-6, 2017. For information go to: http://povertyconferences.com.

Peace Boat: Building a Culture of World Peace, will likely have a Voyage December 2017 to March 2018. For details go to: http://peaceboat.org/english/?menu=113.

The 14th International Conference on Environmental, Cultural, Economic, and Social Sustainability may be in January 2018. The On Sustainability knowledge community is brought together by a common concern for sustainability in a holistic perspective, where environmental, cultural, economic, and social concerns intersect. For details visit: http://onsustainability.com/.

The 7th World Sustainability Forum WSF2018 may be in January 2018. For information visit: http://sciforum.net/conference/wsf-5.

11 The 9th Annual Earth Care Summit Up may be in January or February 2018. For more information go to: http://www.emoregon.org/emo_events.php.

Institute for Peace and Dialogue, IPD International Winter Academy in Peacebuilding, Mediation, Conflict Resolution, Security and Intercultural Dialogue may be in Baar, Switzerland in February 2018 (with research period duration into 16 May, 2018). For details go to: http://www.ipdinstitute.ch.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 16th Annual Frank K. Kelly Lecture on Humanity’s Future will feature legendary Hollywood director Oliver Stone and Professor Peter Kuznick, co-authors of the internationally- acclaimed documentary The Untold History of the United States. The lecture, entitled “Untold History, Uncertain Future,” will take place on February 23, 2017 at 7:00 p.m. at the Lobero Theatre in Santa Barbara. For more information go to: https://www.wagingpeace.org.

J Street’s 2018 National Conference, Defending Our Values, Fighting For Our Future may be in February 2018 in Washington, DC. For information visit: http://conference.jstreet.org or http://jstreet.org.

2018 Jewish Voice for Peace National Membership Meeting may be in March 2018. For details visit: http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/campaigns/2015-national-membership-meeting.

13th Annual Education and Development Conference may be in March 2018. For details visit: http://www.ed-conference.org.

11th International Conference on Conflict Resolution Education may be in March 2018 at Columbus, Ohio (USA) & San Jose, Costa Rica. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/calendar/.

12th Int’l Conflict Resolution Education Conference may be in March 2018. For details go to: www.CREducation.org/cre/goto/creconf.

The Conference of the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA) may be in March 2018. For details visit: http://euprapeace.org/eupra/.

8 the International Conflict Management Conference may be at Kennesaw State University (Atlanta suburb), at KSU Center, in April 2018. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/calendar/. Jewish Voice for Peace 2018 National Member Meeting may be in March or April, 2018. For details go to: nmm.jvp.org.

78th Annual Meeting, Society for Applied Anthropology, is in 2018 meeting in Philadelphia, PA, April 3-7. For information go to: www.sfaa.net. The 7th International Conference on "Livelihoods, Sustainability and Conflict: Religion, Conflict, and Reconciliation,” may be in March 2017, hosted by Kennesaw State University Conflict Management Program at Kennesaw State University Center for Continuing Education 3333 Busbee Drive Kennesaw, GA 30144. For more information go to: http://ccm.hss.kennesaw.edu/events-programs/.

2018 Gandhi-King Conference may be in March or April 2018, at The University of Memphis, 3720 Alumni Ave, Memphis, TN, for details visit: http://www.gandhikingconference.org or http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org.

Peace Boat: Building a Culture of World Peace, will likely have a Voyage April to July 2018. For details go to: http://peaceboat.org/english/?menu=113.

12 The annual Atlantic Promise Field Training Exercise, sponsored by the Forage Center for Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Education, Inc., may be held March 16-19, 2018. The exercise is a full-immersion 3 1/2 day simulation for graduate students studying conflict resolution, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, and related fields. Universities in the past participating have included George Mason University, Kennesaw State University, Nova Southeastern University, University of North Carolina-Greensboro, and Tulane University. Registration is limited to students attending programs that are working with the Forage Center. For details visit: http://www.peacetrainers.org/Contact-Us.html.

10th International Conference of Museums for Peace, may be in April 2018. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/calendar.

The 10th International Conference on Climate: Impacts and Responses is at University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, April 20-21, 2018. The Climate Change Conference is for any person with an interest in, and concern for, scientific, policy and strategic perspectives in climate change. It will address a range of critically important themes relating to the vexing question of climate change. Plenary speakers will include some of the world’s leading thinkers in the fields of climatology and environmental science, as well as numerous paper, workshop and colloquium presentations by researchers and practitioners. For details go to: http://on-climate.com/the-conference. For details visit: http://www.peace-ed- campaign.org/calendar.

Summit Series: Cultivating the Globally Sustainable Self is April 27-30, 2017, at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, USA. For details visit: www.jmu.edu/summitseries.

350.org is sponsoring the People’s Climate Mobilization, a major march in Washington, D.C., when we will come together with hundreds of thousands of people to reject Trump’s attack on our communities and climate, and push forward with our vision of a clean energy economy that works for all, April 29, 2017. For more information go to: https://peoplesclimate.org/pledge/?source=350&utm_medium=email&utm_source=actionkit.

The 9th International Conference of Museums for Peace, is April 10-13, 2017, possibly in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Details are at: http://inmp.net.

The 6th annual workshop of Rising Voices: Collaborative Science with Indigenous Knowledge for Climate Solutions may be in April 2018. The workshop will be convened in partnership with Cultural Survival and the International Indian Treaty Council. For details go to: iitc.org.

International Institute for Restorative Practice (IIRP) Canada Conference is April 30-May 1, 2018 in Toronto, Ontario. For details visit: http://www.iirp.edu.

Earth Day is April 22, 2018.

8th National Conference on Restorative Justice, is likely in the summer of 2018. Details are at: www.restorativejusticenow.org.

The National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation biannual conference may be in September 2018. For information, visit: http://ncdd.org/events.

The Ahimsa Center in the College of Letters, Arts and Social Sciences at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona (in suburban Los Angeles) eighth biannual conference may be on campus, in November 2018. For details visit: http://www.cpp.edu/~ahimsacenter/ahimsa_home.shtml.

13

The Women Deliver conference, 2019 may be in May 2019. For more information go to: http://www.womendeliver.org/conferences/2016-conference/. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

ONGOING ACTIVITIES

Steve Sachs

350.org/, was deeply involved in the People's Climate March, April 29; the March for Science, April 22, various actions against the Keystone and Dakota Access Pipelines; and has continued its worldwide actions to reduce global warming caused climate change. For details go to: http://act.350.org).

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), has been very much involved in actions to get the Trump administration to respect, and act in accordance with, good science. Some recent efforts have included the April 22 March for Science; "Tell Congress to reject the attacks on science in President Trump's proposed budget;" and "Urge Congress to limit the president's power to start a nuclear war." "Science for a healthy planet and safer world" has recently included: "Oregon’s Clean Fuels Program Off to a Great Start;" "Oregon Legislature Can Boost Electric Car Sales;" "US Needs More Options than Yucca Mountain for Nuclear Waste;" and "Trump EPA Web Page Removal Doesn't Change Climate Reality." For more information visit: www.ucsusa.org.

"Labor Convergence on Climate being launched," stated via E-mail, http://uslaboragainstwar.org, "The climate change issue and our militarized foreign policy are inextricably linked. The Pentagon is the largest single consumer of fossil fuels, contributing 5% of the world's global warming emissions. Few entire countries use more oil than the Pentagon does. As Michael Eisenscher has said, there is not such thing as a sustainable planet run by the military-industrial complex. A new organization, The Labor Convergence on Climate, is being launched to bring together labor activists to fight the devastating effects of climate change and to ensure that the transition to a sustainable economy is not done at the expense of workers. At last week's USLAW Steering Committee conference call, we voted to endorse the Mission Statement of the Labor Convergence on Climate (click here to read the full statement.) Just as USLAW was formed to be the voice of labor within the peace movement and the voice for peace movement, we believe that the Labor Convergence on Climate can be the voice for workers within the climate justice movement and the voice for climate justice within the labor movement. Our Steering Committee is asking all USLAW affiliates to do two things: (1) Ask your union to endorse the Mission Statement of the Labor Convergence on Climate; and (2) Join the conference call on Wednesday, February 15 that will launch the organizing plan for the Labor Convergence on Climate. USLAW Co-Convener John Braxton and I are both on the Steering Committee of the Labor Convergence on Climate. John will be taking the lead on the climate change work within USLAW. If you have questions or comments, please contact John at [email protected] or at 215/796-4933. In Solidarity, Reece Chenault, National Coordinator, USLAW (U.S. Labor Against the War), US Labor Against the War, 1718 M St, NW #153, Washington DC 20036, (202)521-5265."

Carbonfund.org Foundation (carbonfund.org) ran an "Earth Day 2017 Eco Tour Vacation Sweepstakes with one chance for each $1 tree-planting donation made to it (https://carbonfund.org/earth-day-ecotour-vacation-sweepstakes/), while running programs for individuals and businesses to reduce and offset carbon emissions.

Nika Knight, "'We Exist, We Resist, We Rise': Thousands March for Native Nations: 'Standing Rock

14 was just the beginning'," Common Dreams, Friday, March 10, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/03/10/we-exist-we-resist-we-rise-thousands-march-native- nations, reported, "'Water is life!' was the cry heard throughout Washington, D.C., on Friday as thousands of people filled the streets and marched for Indigenous rights and the sovereignty of native nations, demonstrating that the fight against the Dakota Access Pipeline has sparked an ongoing movement. The Native Nations Rise march was the culmination of a week of workshops, actions, and prayers to battle for native rights in the face of the right-wing Trump administration and the ongoing #NoDAPL fight. The march began at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers headquarters and ended at Lafayette Square, in front of the White House. En route, demonstrators erected a tipi at the Trump Hotel to "reclaim stolen land": The march culminated in a rally at Lafayette Square. Indigenous people and protesters spoke, prayed, played music, and repeated calls for environmental justice, sovereignty, and a meeting between President Donald Trump and leaders of tribal nations. 'Standing Rock was just the beginning,' said a journalist with Indigenous Rising Media, speaking to a plaintiff in one of the multiple lawsuits against the U.S. government for permitting the Dakota Access Pipeline's construction. A live broadcast of the march and rally can be found at: https://www.facebook.com/actdottv/. Throughout the day, participants and journalists are also posting photos and videos of the action under the hashtag #NativeNationsRise."

Nika Knight, "'We Are Still Here': Water Protectors Remain in Prayer, Brace for Mass Arrests: Police will begin arresting all water protectors at 2pm CST," Common Dreams, February 22, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/02/22/we-are-still-here-water-protectors-remain-prayer- brace-mass-arrests, reported, "Water protectors standing against the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline are bracing for militarized police to descend on their protest camp near Cannon Ball, North Dakota, as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' evacuation deadline of 2pm CST Wednesday looms. Law enforcement has already surrounded the camp, preventing even members of the press from entering to cover the coming police raid. Chase Iron Eyes, a member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and civil rights advocate, said in a Facebook video that he was denied access to the Oceti Sakowin camp by "a host of law enforcement officers from a variety of jurisdictions." Iron Eyes also reported that the police force appears highly militarized, and that he witnessed 60 vehicles poised to encroach upon the camp. A police officer from the North Dakota Highway Patrol told Reveal reporter Jenni Monet that the Army Corps gave law enforcement the "authority" to use force. The Morton County Sheriff's Department, which will be enforcing the evacuation order, has come under harsh criticism for its past brutal treatment of water protectors. Despite the forces lined up against them, the water protectors—as well as U.S. military veterans who traveled to North Dakota to protect them—are remaining strong in their peaceful resistance to the pipeline, uniting for prayer ceremonies and a planned prayer march before the expected mass arrests. 'We are clearly in a historic and very spiritual time,' Iron Eyes said. 'Some would call it a time of prophecy.' Indigenous rights group Honor the Earth released a video of water protectors 'singing one last time,' hours before the evacuation deadline: Water protectors are also ceremonially burning sacred dwellings and ritual items, which police have reportedly thrown away or destroyed in the past, Indigenous Rising Media notes. '[I]t is best to burn these scared structures instead of having them desecrated by Morton County and North Dakota law enforcement,' the Indigenous outlet writes. While the protest camp faces destruction, the Standing Rock Sioux's lawsuit against the Army Corps for approving the final easement for the pipeline is still moving through the courts. A hearing in which a federal judge will consider an injunction against the Army Corps is scheduled for February 27. The Oglala Sioux of South Dakota filed a separate suit against the Army Corps last week."

15 Deirdre Fulton, " 'This Is the #NoDAPL Last Stand': Tribe to Sue as Actions Planned Nationwide: 'We are a sovereign nation and we will fight to protect our water and sacred places from the brazen private interests trying to push this pipeline through,' says Standing Rock Sioux tribe," Common Dreams, February 08, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/02/08/nodapl-last-stand-tribe-sue- actions-planned-nationwide, reported, "And with actions planned nationwide on Wednesday, the administration won't get off in the court of public opinion, either. 'The drinking water of millions of Americans is now at risk,' said Dave Archambault II, chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, following the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' announcement (pdf) that it would give the official go-ahead within 24 hours. 'We are a sovereign nation and we will fight to protect our water and sacred places from the brazen private interests trying to push this pipeline through to benefit a few wealthy Americans with financial ties to the Trump administration.' In granting the easement, the Army Corps halted (pdf) the preparation of an environmental review ordered by the Obama administration. The Standing Rock tribe, which says DAPL threatens its clean water supply and violates Indigenous treaty rights, pledged to 'challenge any easement decision on the grounds that the [environmental impact statement, or EIS] was wrongfully terminated.' 'Trump's reversal of that decision continues a historic pattern of broken promises to Indian tribes and unlawful violation of treaty rights,' added Jan Hasselman of Earthjustice, lead attorney for the tribe. 'They will be held accountable in court.' Other next steps, according to the Standing Rock statement, include asking the court for DAPL- operator Energy Transfer Partners ''to disclose its oil spill and risk assessment records for full transparency and review by the public,' and, "if DAPL is successful in constructing and operating the pipeline, the tribe will seek to shut the pipeline operations down.' 'The granting of an easement, without any environmental review or tribal consultation, is not the end of this fight—it is the new beginning." —Tom Goldtooth, Indigenous Environmental Network The tribe is not alone in its outrage. Multiple environmental groups voiced their opposition to the decision, while Democratic members of the House and Senate natural resources committees wrote a letter to President Donald Trump expressing their own dismay. 'This blatant disregard for federal law and our country's treaty and trust responsibilities to Native American tribes is unacceptable,' the lawmakers wrote. 'We strongly oppose this decision and any efforts to undermine tribal rights. We urge you to immediately reverse this decision and follow the appropriate procedures required for tribal consultation, environmental law, and due process.' Signatories included Sens. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), as well as Reps. Raúl Grijalva (D-Ariz.) and Donald Beyer (D-Va.). Grijalva, ranking member of the House Natural Resources Committee, also issued a separate statement: "Before the Women's March and before thousands of people protested at airports, the Standing Rock Sioux and their allies were camping in the freezing cold to defend their rights," he said. 'The Obama Administration heard those concerns and agreed to take a step back; this Administration is ignoring them. In his first few weeks in office our new president has built a resume of discrimination, falsehoods, and sloppy work, and now the decision to trample the sovereignty of our First Americans is the latest entry on a growing list of shameful actions.' A protest in front of the White House is planned for 5:00pm Wednesday, along with more than 30 actions taking place around the country on what the Indigenous Coalition at Standing Rock has dubbed 'an international day of emergency actions to disrupt business as usual and unleash a global intersectional resistance to fossil fuels and fascism' 'This is the #NoDAPL last stand,' the group declared online." "'Donald Trump will not build his Dakota Access Pipeline without a fight,' said Tom Goldtooth of the Indigenous Environmental Network. 'The granting of an easement, without any environmental review or tribal consultation, is not the end of this fight—it is the new beginning. Expect mass resistance far beyond what Trump has seen so far.' Goldtooth continued: The granting of this easement goes against protocol, it goes against legal process, it disregards more than 100,000 comments already submitted as part of the not-yet-completed environmental review

16 process—all for the sake of Donald Trump's billionaire big oil cronies. And, it goes against the treaty rights of the entire Seven Councils Fires of the Sioux Nations. Donald Trump has not met with a single Native nation since taking office. Our tribal nations and Indigenous grassroots peoples on the frontlines have had no input on this process. We support the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, and stand with them at this troubling time. In addition, a Native Nations March on Washington is in the works for March 10. 'Our fight is no longer at the North Dakota site itself," said Archambault. "Our fight is with Congress and the Trump administration. Meet us in Washington on March 10.' An energetic divestment campaign, urging banks to pull their funding for the controversial project, is also gaining steam. On that front, the Seattle City Council voted 9-0 on Tuesday to cut banking ties with Wells Fargo because of its role as a DAPL lender. 'People might argue that Seattle's $3 billion account is just a blip on the radar for Wells Fargo, but this movement is poised to scale up,' Hugh MacMillan, a senior researcher at Food & Water Watch, told YES! Magazine. "I think you'll see more cities following Seattle's lead.'"

Following the Trump administration's approval of the Keystone Pipeline, "Nebraskan Landowners Resist Keystone XL By Refusing to Sell Their Property to TransCanada," The RealNews Network, March 27, 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=1874 2, reported, "Retired school teacher and farmer Art Tanderup says he and nearly a hundred other landowners are pushing the Public Service Commission in Nebraska to deny permits for the pipeline."

Climate Truth.org, March4, 2017, reported, "Climate and EPA science are under attack. But, scientists, science advocates, and frontline communities will not sit idly by. We're raising our voices and resisting! On February 19, ClimateTruth.org joined The Natural History Museum, scientists, and others to organize a #StandUpForScience rally in Boston. The rally was timed with the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), one of the first major gatherings of scientists since Inauguration Day. Thousands of scientists, advocates, and community members joined to say it loud and clear: We must stand up for science. The New York Times live-streamed the rally, and hundreds of news outlets across the world covered it! Watch this short video to hear the inspiring voices from the #StandUpForScience rally, then share to keep growing the movement: http://act.climatetruth.org/sign/standupforscience_bostonrallyvideo/?t=1&akid=6308.53108.Fp5XUT."

Nicholas St. Fleur, "Scientists, Feeling Under Siege, March Against Trump Policies," The New York Times, April 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/science/march-for- science.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Thousands of scientists and their supporters, feeling increasingly threatened by the policies of President Trump, gathered Saturday in Washington under rainy skies for what they called the March for Science, abandoning a tradition of keeping the sciences out of politics and calling on the public to stand up for scientific enterprise." Hundreds of similar events demanding the government respect and act according to science were held around the U.S. in support of the D.C. March for Science, April 22.

350.org reported, April 29, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/350.org/posts/10155301358802708?utm_medium=email&utm_source=acti onkit, that on that day's People's Climate March in Washington D.C., 200,000 people took to the streets for climate, jobs and justice, while hundreds of climate Marches were held round the U.S. and across the world.

"Native American and Environmental Groups File Law Suit to Overturn President Trumps Keystone Pipeline Permit: First Suit Filed for an Injunction Against Trump’s Keystone XL Pipeline Permit by Indigenous Environmental Network, North Coast Rivers Alliance , Law Offices of Stephan C, Volker, March 29, 2017,

17 http://report.mynewsletterbuilder.com/t.js?s=58dd0353969fec9950001723&u=37961240&v=3&key=b c93&skey=30f0317c46&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ienearth.org%2Fwp- content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F03%2FPressRelease3-29- 17.pdf%3Futm_medium%3Demail%26utm_source%3DMyNewsletterBuilder%26utm_content%3D%23subs criber_id%23%26utm_campaign%3DIEN%2B%2BNCRA%2BFile%2BLawsuit%2Bto%2BOverturn%2BKXL%2 BPipeline%2BPermit%2B1412948638%26utm_term%3DClick%2Bhere%2Bfor%2Ba%2BPDF%2Bcopy%2B of%2Bthe%2Boriginal%2Bpress%2Brelease, stated, "The Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN) and North Coast Rivers Alliance (NCRA) have filed suit in Federal District Court in Great Falls, Montana, challenging the Presidential Permit issued by President Trump allowing construction and operation of the Keystone XL Pipeline. IEN’s and NCRA’s Complaint challenging the State Department’s approval of a Presidential Permit for the KXL Pipeline is available here: http://www.ienearth.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/03/Complaint_for_Declaratory_and_Injunctive_Relie f.pdf Stephan Volker, attorney for IEN and NCRA, filed the suit on Monday, March 27th. The suit alleges that the State Department's Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement ("FSEIS") fails to (1) provide a detailed and independent Project purpose and need, (2) analyze all reasonable alternatives to the Project, (3) study the Project's transboundary effects, (4) disclose and fully analyze many of the Project's adverse environmental impacts, (5) formulate adequate mitigation measures, and (6) respond adequately to comments. In addition, the FSEIS was irredeemably tainted because it was prepared by Environmental Resource Management ("ERM"), a company with a substantial conflict of interest. The suit also alleges that Trump’s permit violates the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. 'President Trump is breaking established environmental laws and treaties in his efforts to force through the Keystone XL Pipeline, that would bring carbon-intensive, toxic, and corrosive crude oil from the Canadian tar sands, but we are filing suit to fight back,' said Tom Goldtooth, Executive Director of the Indigenous Environmental Network. 'Indigenous peoples’ lands and waters are not here to be America’s environmental sacrifice zone. For too long, the US Government has pushed around Indigenous peoples and undervalued our inherent rights, sovereignty, culture, and our responsibilities as guardians of Mother Earth and all life while fueling catastrophic extreme weather and climate change with an addiction to fossil fuels. The time has come to keep fossil fuels in the ground and shut down risky extreme energy projects like the tar sands that are poisoning our families, wildlife, water sources and destroying our climate.' 'Oil, water and fish do not mix. KXL poses an unacceptable risk to the Missouri River and its fisheries, including the nearly extinct Arctic grayling,' said Frank Egger, President of The North Coast Rivers Alliance (NCRA). 'No oil pipeline is safe. One major oil spill, and the Missouri River and adjacent aquifers would be polluted for generations.' 'Because President Trump has turned his back on the Native American community and protection of our clean water, endangered fisheries, and indeed, survival of the Planet itself, we have asked the Federal Courts to order him to comply with our nation’s environmental laws,' said Volker. 'We are confident that the courts will apply and enforce the law fairly and faithfully, and protect our irreplaceable natural heritage from the risky and unneeded KXL Pipeline. Alternatives including renewable energy and conservation must be given full and fair consideration to protect future generations from the ravages of global warming.' Additional documents pertaining to the litigation can be obtained from the Volker Law Offices. The Indigenous Environmental Network was formed by grassroots Indigenous peoples and individuals in 1990 to address environmental and economic justice issues across Turtle Island, also known as North America. The North Coast Rivers Alliance (NCRA) is an association of conservation leaders from the western and northern United States and Canada which has advocated for decades on behalf of rivers and watersheds in jeopardy throughout North America."

Climate Nexus, EcoWatch, "17 States Raise Hell Over Clean Power Plan," April 9, 2017, http://www.ecowatch.com/states-challenge-clean-power-plan-2347483971.html, reported, "The group of 17 states which backed the Clean Power Plan filed a legal challenge Wednesday urging the DC Circuit Court of Appeals to ignore the Trump administration's request to stay legal proceedings in the Clean

18 Power Plan suit. The challenge alleges that the federal government has a responsibility to regulate emissions from power plants and that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's 'vague' plans to review the Clean Power Plan could cause an 'indefinite delay' in 'the process.' Environmental groups, including the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council, filed a similar brief Wednesday, saying the delay 'would have the effect of improperly suspending the rule without review by any court, without any explanation and without mandatory administrative process. The agency cannot be allowed to accomplish through abeyance something it cannot do on its own: an indefinite suspension of a duly promulgated rule without judicial review, without a notice and comment rulemaking and without any reasoned explanation.' The coalition of states includes attorneys general from California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington—along with the District of Columbia and other smaller localities."

Wild Earth Guardians, "Coexistence not Poisons on Public Lands," April 6, 2017, www.wildearthguardians.org, reported, "In the past few weeks alone, three tragedies involving use of indiscriminate poisons on our public lands should give pause to every American. A few weeks ago, a young boy was harmed and the family dog killed by a cyanide bomb placed on public land by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s animal damage control agency. Five days earlier, two families recreating on public lands in Wyoming watched two of their family dogs die after the animals detonated cyanide devices. And two weeks before those incidents, a wolf was killed in Oregon by the same type of device. These three recent incidents are exactly why extremely dangerous M-44 cyanide bombs, and other indiscriminate tools like traps and poisons that are deployed to kill wildlife, often targeting majestic native carnivores like wolves and coyotes, should not be placed on our public lands. It would be a mistake to call these tragedies accidents. It’s not an accident if federal employees are knowingly placing deadly devices where children and companion animals play; that’s extreme and inexcusable negligence. This should be, and I believe is, a bipartisan issue. While liberals and conservatives may disagree about wolves, can’t we all agree on public safety issues that affect our children and family companion animals? Is it going to take the death of a child before the public takes action to prevent the regular and reckless damage caused by these practices? Sadly, this very well could happen. The essential questions are these: how precise are these “cyanide bombs” and how effective are they at accomplishing their stated goals? Consider this—more than 50,000 non-target animals have been killed in this or similar ways. If the USDA has failed 50,000 times regarding animals, how long before an unsuspecting child is the victim? But we can make it stop. WildEarth Guardians is intensifying our End the War on Wildlife campaign to mobilize more popular support to secure local, state and federal action to end the barbaric, indiscriminate killing. Just last week Congressman Peter DeFazio introduced a bill in Congress to ban predator poisons on our public lands. And earlier this week we filed a lawsuit to force Wildlife Services to stop using cyanide bombs. Last week we filed a petition with the USDA seeking to prohibit their use in Idaho. I strongly believe that the American people firmly support an end to cruelty against our majestic wildlife, and I am absolutely convinced that every American is opposed to actions that threaten their children."

Occupy Wall Street action in resistance to Trump has included, "Since we released our #PuppetTrump print-out puppets and masks last week, we've loved watching people use them online from the comfort of their own homes and at protest marches around the country. Also, last week renowned activist and filmmaker Naomi Klein encouraged branding Trump as a puppet! (4/11/17); "Bethel: Transforming a Detroit Gem," (March 30, 2017), " Meet Pastor Aramis Hinds, a Detroit pastor who is bringing together Jews and blacks to restore a historic Jewish synagogue and rebuild relationships frayed by white flight and fear. We're supporting his Kickstarter campaign and matching the first $200 in donations from occupiers today. Weaving together past and future. It's no secret that the deep wounds of 1967 haven't healed yet: structural racism is alive and well, white fear lingers and

19 economic inequality has created a city-of-two-cities separated by 8 Mile Road. The Bethel Community Transformation Center (BCTC), led by Pastor Aramis D. Hinds, is doing transformative work to heal the divide that keeps Detroit from achieving its true potential as a city of tolerance and respect. For more information go to: http://occupywallst.org, http://www.moveon.org/r?r=264653&id=31653-1653571-02zugAx&t=1, http://us11.campaign- archive1.com/home/?u=e81768d548550945ca5d92ce4&id=debb6acdec and http://www.occupytogether.org/.

MoveOn.Org, continues to send out many member initiated petitions and calls for actions. Since January, 2017, most of these have involved resistance to Trump administration policy and personnel. For details go to: http://www.moveon.org/.

United for Peace & Justice continues to be involved in a wide spectrum of actions. In the first portion of 2017, many of these have involved resistance to the actions of the Trump administration. This has included supporting such protests as the People's Climate March. Among recent campaigns have been, "Stop Endless War;" "ACTION ALERT: Call Your Senators Now! Diplomacy, Not War on the Korean Peninsula;" "Stop US Military Action In Syria. Call the White House & Congress;" "Host or Attend a Rapid Response Action to Protest US Military Action in Syria;" and "Defund War! Join Global Days of Action on Military Spending in Your Community, April 18-28" For more information go to: www.unitedforpeace.org/.

CODEPINK's numerous activities have included: supporting the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, including opposing attacks on the Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement to boycott and have people divest from companies doing business with Israeli business and settlements in the Occupied Territories; Supporting diplomacy to uphold the Nuclear Agreement, and other actions to defuse the Iran nuclear dispute; Moving to have the U.S. Congress require government contractors to disclose their political contributions; and opposing the Trump Administration's increased military activity and blustering in Korea and the Middle East. For more information visit: http://codepink.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=ZwGiXtp6RvZc7%2F8R2JUxGJ6RpVR2vnYY.

Gush Shalom and other Israeli and Palestinian peace organizations, supported by internationals, have remained extremely active over the last three months. A list of links to many of these organizations is on the Gush Shalom web site: http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/links. "On the evening Memorial Day, April 30, 2017, Combatants for Peace Movement in coalition with Parents Circle - Families Forum, conducted the 11th Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony, "Sharing the Pain-Building Hope," at Shlomo Group Arena, Tel Aviv. The ceremony was screened in Beith Jala for the Palestinian audience that was not able to arrive to the main event." The broadcast of the ceremony, was screened at: http://Buildhopewith.us/. Gush Shalom reported (gush-shalom.org, accessed April 30, 2017), "As a part of the blockade on the Gaza Strip, the Israeli Navy prevents the Gaza fisherman from working for their livelihood and from providing food to the population. On Monday (16.6.08), 10 fishing boats went out to sea to protest, using their last fuel. Gush Shalom and dozens of activists from other organizations decided to organize a simultaneous Israeli action and hired a large vessel at the Herzliya marina." " Peace march and rally: Jerusalem Sat. April 1 [2017] - starting 7.30pm," "We`ll start at the end: We’re embarking on a struggle for Israeli society, for peace, and an end to the occupation. This struggle will start in Jerusalem on Saturday night, April 1. We`re going to march in Jerusalem, the city that the right wing claims is ‘united,’ that Mayor Nir Barkat is trying to make exclusively Jewish, and in which Bentzi Gopstein spreads hate and racism. But this is a city that can be tolerant, open, and free of hate. A city that will be home to two capitals for two independent nations. The March – which we`ll conclude with a rally precisely on the green line – is the beginning of our struggle that will culminate in a central event in June of 2017, marking exactly 50 years of occupation. Fifty years during which the State of Israel has had full control over another nation. Fifty years of violence

20 and harm to innocent civilians, of coffins and settlements. Fifty years during which Israeli society has paid intolerable social costs. And that’s exactly the point. Our struggle is for Palestinian people who live under occupation and military control, while also for Israeli society itself: Because a nation that controls another nation can never truly be free. And both of our nations can and need to be free and independent." Gush Shalom ads in Hareetz over the past 4 months have included, April 7, 2017: "The Arab Summit offers 'A historic reconciliation With Israel”. Hamas accepts The 1967 borders. Trump considers calling A peace conference. Netanyahu hopes It’s all fake news;"

For more information on the Israeli peace movement contact Gush Shalom, P.O. Box 3322, Tel- Aviv 61033, 972-3-5221732, [email protected], www.gush-shalom.org, Adam Keller of Gush Shalom launched a blog, at: http://adam-keller1.blogspot.com/ in Hebrew and http://adam-keller2.blogspot.com/ in English. See also www.gush-shalom.org.

Choe Sang-Hun, "Fearing Korean Nuclear War, Women of 40 Nations Urge Trump to Seek Peace," The New York Times, April 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/world/asia/north-korea- trump-nuclear-war.html?ref=todayspaper, "As the White House prepared to brief members of the Senate on North Korea on Wednesday, female activists from more than 40 countries, including North and South Korea, urged President Trump to defuse military tensions and start negotiating for peace to prevent war from erupting on the Korean Peninsula. They said they feared that the rapidly escalating tensions on the peninsula, if left unchecked, could engulf the region in nuclear war."

Deirdre Fulton, "Building "Feminism for the 99 Percent," Women's Strike Will Take Many Forms: 'March 8th will be the beginning of a new international feminist movement'," Common Dreams, March 02, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/03/02/building-feminism-99-percent-womens-strike- will-take-many-forms, reported, "Whether by walking off the job or boycotting "unseen" labor, women and allies around the world next week will stand up and speak out to say: Women's rights are human rights. Coinciding with International Women's Day, the March 8 day of action is being promoted in solidarity by those who organized January's Women's March as well as a grassroots movement known as the International Women's Strike (IWS). While both groups acknowledge that the election of President Donald Trump makes their call more urgent, their overlapping visions look beyond one administration—and reach further back into the past. 'March 8th will be the beginning of a new international feminist movement that organizes resistance not just against Trump and his misogynist policies, but also against the conditions that produced Trump, namely the decades long economic inequality, racial, and sexual violence, and imperial wars abroad,' IWS writes. Participation will take many forms. In addition to rallies, teach-ins, and protests happening nationwide (a list of international events can be found here), there are many ways to mobilize—including for those people whose positions at home or the workplace are too precarious to allow for striking, or who can't afford to do so. Women's March organizers wrote on their website Thursday that '[a]nyone, anywhere, can join by making March 8th A Day Without a Woman, in one or all of the following ways': Women take the day off, from paid and unpaid labor; Avoid shopping for one day (with exceptions for small, women- and minority-owned businesses); Wear RED in solidarity with A Day Without A Woman. Furthermore, the group adds: "We ask that our male allies lean into care-giving on March 8th, and use the day to call out decision-makers at the workplace and in the government to extend equal pay and adequate paid family leave for women." Groups have provided letters that can be given to employers as well as domestic partners, family members, or spouses to explain a woman's chosen absence. 'I hope you will stand in support of me, and any of my women colleagues who choose to participate, in observance of this day,' the letter to work supervisors reads. "Places of employment can participate by closing for the day or giving women workers the day off, whether paid or unpaid. Even more

21 important than the symbolism of standing with women on March 8, the Women's March is asking all employers to perform an audit of their policies impacting women and families. By ensuring that women have pay equity, a livable wage, and paid leave, businesses can demonstrate that their long-term actions align with the values we are standing up for on this day." The letter written for those planning to walk out of care-giving or housework reads in part: "We halt our work to highlight just how meager, how lackluster, and how dysfunctional the world would be without us. We strike to demand that both our paid and unpaid labor be valued and fairly compensated. We strike to demand that we be allowed to live, labor, and love with dignity." Speaking with The Nation, IWS planners Tithi Bhattacharya and Cinzia Arruzza listed eight ways for women and allies to get involved, including: Plug into existing struggles. Are domestic workers in your area organizing? Is there a Fight for $15 movement in your city? You can mark March 8 by supporting existing campaigns, labor negotiations, or controversies, especially if they involve working women. You can find groups you might want to connect with among the strike's endorsers, which includes the NYC bodega strikers and Restaurant Opportunities Centers United. This is in keeping with the day's larger goals of building a "feminism for the 99 percent," as Princeton University professor Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (an author of the initial call to strike) explained to journalist Sarah Jaffe this week: The traditional shackles on poor and working-class women are still in effect and actually have to be responded to and attended to. Feminism for the 99 percent is about rejecting the idea that women are only or primarily concerned with their role in the elite male world, but that there are still very basic issues; such as access to reproductive healthcare, access to abortion, and wage differentials. Black women make $0.63 for each dollar that white men make, for example. That, of course, is lower than the usual barometer that people use, the $0.78 to the dollar that white women make. Black women make substantially less than that. There is still the issue of child care; there is no access to public or state-funded child care. The attacks on public education, the attacks on the public infrastructure—all of these have disproportionate impact on the lives of women. On a very basic level, we need a feminist politics that responds to these issues as the most urgent. I think we saw that the outpouring around the Jan. 21 protest showed that there is actually quite vast support for a resurgent feminist movement. Part of our objective is to argue for a certain kind of radical politics within that and not for a political agenda that is quite limited and has these kind of narrow goals about the social mobility of women within corporate America as a sole objective."

Numerous protests have been in progress in resistance to the Trump administration on many issues. Among them, immigrants across the United States stayed home from work, February 16, 2017, protesting Trumps anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies, and demonstrating the importance of immigrants to the U.S. economy (Liz Robbins and Annie Correal, "Immigrants Stay Home, and Their Absence Reverberates," The New York Times, February 17, 2017).

Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR) stated, "Psychologists for Social Responsibility Statement on the Right to Rehabilitation for Survivors of ," February 6, 2017, http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/442001/8104f8b61c/1493529749/3346ca120f/, "Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR) is an organization that works extensively on social justice issues. One area of focus is anti-torture actions in the United States. These efforts include advocating for accountability and changes in policy on the part of governments and professional organizations, including the role of psychologists in national security settings such as Guantanamo Bay and CIA black sites. PsySR members actively oppose the use of torture at any time for any purpose. As a signatory to the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture, ratified in 1994, the United States has an obligation to prevent torture and to ensure the right to rehabilitation to victims of torture perpetrated by the State. Yet, the 2015-2016 annual report from documents 122 countries practicing torture and other forms of cruel and inhumane treatment and punishment — including the United States. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence study of the

22 CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program brings to light multiple human rights violations and concludes that 'The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and harsher than represented to policymakers and others.' With a failure to prevent torture, the United States now has an obligation to provide access to rehabilitation. Health providers understand the profound and long-term consequences of torture that include injury-related conditions, chronic pain, headaches, sleep disturbances, anxiety disorders, persistent feelings of fear, helplessness and hopelessness, and depression. Many victims of torture suffer from Post- traumatic Stress Disorder that can persist throughout a person’s lifetime and can be transmitted within families and across generations. Thus, access to comprehensive rehabilitative services is critical for victims of torture and other human right violations and their families. The consequences of torture are far reaching and extend to communities and societies. As a nation, we are faced with many challenges. One egregious issue is the history and ongoing abuse of detainees at Guantanamo, many who have been tortured. The vast majority have never been charged with a crime. Many were wrongfully picked up and detained. Regardless of the reasons for apprehension, torture violates international law. The torture and maltreatment of Guantanamo detainees has included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, isolation, extreme temperatures, painful positional shackling, threats and humiliation with dogs. We know that such treatment results in persistent, painful and disabling mental health consequences. Some victims have developed chronic medical conditions secondary to physical maltreatment. A case example is Mr. Mustafa al-Hawsawi, who was sodomized with foreign objects resulting in serious rectal damage and persistent health problems. Yet he remains at Guantanamo. As of January 2017, the great majority of detainees have been released, repatriated or resettled. Many have reported serious and chronic mental health complaints that are shrouded in shame, but they are without access to trauma-informed care. The lack of services for these survivors is damaging and unacceptable. Refugees and asylum seekers being resettled in the United States include torture survivors among their numbers. Sometimes their histories have not been identified until they present with serious health issues. Identification and access to specialized rehabilitative services is a right of refugees and asylum seekers who have suffered human right violations in the context of war, including sexual violence. It is a matter of sound medical and mental health practice, as well as social justice and international legal standards. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in December of 2005. Rehabilitation is an essential component of these guidelines, which state, “Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services.” The International Rehabilitation Council on Torture (IRCT), based in Denmark, and the National Consortium of Torture Treatment Programs (NCTTP) in the U.S. are member non-governmental organizations committed to providing multidisciplinary rehabilitative services to torture victims. Together they represent a global network of providers — with more than 40 years of experience — that stand together with the United Nations in calling for all countries to fulfill their obligations to prevent torture and provide reparations, including access to holistic rehabilitative services. In December 2016, the IRCT held its 10th Scientific Symposium in Mexico City with the theme of 'Delivering on the Right to Rehabilitation.' A session entitled 'Obstacles to providing services to survivors of Guantanamo Bay' exposed the complexities of meeting this legal obligation under these unique circumstances. Services to address medical, psychological, social and legal needs are mostly absent or inadequate for detainees who are released, repatriated or resettled in third countries. The condition of these former detainees is aggravated by the lack of legal reparations. In the absence of rehabilitation, their suffering is most likely chronic, even permanent. Detainees who have been tortured and are still imprisoned at Guantanamo face severe restrictions on communication with professionals, often depending only on their legal team for supportive human contact, with no access to independent and confidential medical and psychological treatment. Mr. Mustafa al-Hawsawi remains in Guantanamo without any formal rehabilitation, despite persistent advocacy by his legal team and widespread international notice of his case.

23 Among the human rights abuses and violations of international law committed by the United States at Guantanamo, the denial of the right to rehabilitation must be recognized as significant, and as remediable to at least some degree. In addition to calling for an end to the practice of torture and abuse, PsySR is committed to recognizing and advocating for the right to comprehensive rehabilitative services for torture survivors, including current and former Guantanamo detainees." For more information about PsySR, go to www.psysr.org.

Fortify Rights, "Malaysia: Investigate Human Trafficking and Deaths in Immigration Detention Centers: Prosecute Human Traffickers; End Protracted Detention of Refugee, Migrants, (Kuala Lumpur, April 4, 2017), http://us10.campaign- archive2.com/?u=f15b18127e37f74088063b773&id=4d64c9552a&e=24e6ca1455, stated, "The Government of Malaysia should investigate deaths in immigration detention centers without delay and re- open an investigation into the human trafficking of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar and Bangladeshis in recent years, Fortify Rights said today. In an ongoing investigation, Fortify Rights documented severe conditions in immigration detention centers in Malaysia as well as unchecked trafficking of Rohingya and Bangladeshi nationals to Malaysia from 2013 to 2015. The National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia—known as Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia (SUHAKAM)—published its annual report today, finding that a total of 118 foreigners died in Malaysia’s immigration detention centers in 2015 and 2016. 'A single death in immigration custody is unacceptable. More than 100 deaths is completely inexcusable,' said Amy Smith, Executive Director of Fortify Rights. 'SUHAKAM’s report should send shockwaves throughout the Malaysian government and elicit an immediate response.' SUHAKAM reported 83 deaths in 2015 and another 35 deaths up to December 20, 2016. The causes of death reportedly ranged from sepsis or septic shock, leptospirosis—a type of bacterial infection—pneumonia, lung infections, and heart-related conditions. In 50 of the reported cases, the authorities apparently failed to provide the specific cause of death. Fortify Rights called for the Malaysian authorities to conduct a criminal investigation into the deaths in immigration detention and for perpetrators to be held accountable, regardless of rank or position. These deaths can’t be swept under the rug, said Amy Smith. 'Those responsible must be held to account.' Former immigration detainees interviewed by Fortify Rights in Malaysia in 2016 described how Malaysian authorities detained them in overcrowded detention facilities for protracted periods of time with inadequate access to clean water, sufficient food, or healthcare. One former detainee from Myanmar—an ethnic Kachin man, 22—told Fortify Rights: 'The guards gave us pink water to drink at breakfast. If you wanted water at other times, then you had to drink the toilet water.' Malaysia’s Immigration Department implausibly claimed that detainees contracted illnesses prior to their detention. SUHAKAM’s report confirms that access to clean drinking water is a problem in Malaysia’s immigration detention facilities and contributes to preventable illnesses. In its report, the commission refers to 'untenable living conditions with little regard for the inmates’ basic human dignity.' SUHAKAM called for the Immigration Department to work with the Ministry of Health “to ensure that a medical officer is placed at all immigration detention centres and that medical facilities including medicine are adequately supplied to the centres.” Former immigration-detention detainees told Fortify Rights that detention guards beat them and subjected them to physical abuse. For instance, a Rohingya woman from Myanmar, 19, diagnosed with tuberculosis told Fortify Rights: 'I was beaten often by the guards because I asked for medicine. If I asked to see a doctor, then the guards would handcuff my hands above my head all day.' Speaking to , the Deputy Home Minister Datuk Nur Jazlan Mohamed acknowledged the overcrowding and poor conditions of the immigration detention centers as well the need to improve 'procedures, health conditions and management of these sites' but cited 'a budget brick wall' as the problem. 'The problems with Malaysia’s immigration detention practices extend well beyond budgetary concerns,' said Amy Smith. 'Malaysian authorities could begin tackling this by ending arbitrary and indefinite detention of migrants, including refugees and survivors of trafficking. No money is required to

24 uphold the right to liberty.' International law prohibits arbitrary, unlawful, or indefinite detention, including of non-nationals. A state may only restrict the right to liberty of migrants in exceptional cases following a detailed assessment of the individual concerned. Any detention must be necessary and proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim, according to the law. Malaysia also has a duty to ensure that the treatment and conditions for detainees in immigration detention centers are in line with international standards. This would include ensuring access to basic necessities, such as clean drinking water, adequate and nutritional foods, and access to appropriate medical treatment. More than half of those who died in Malaysian detention facilities during the past two years were from Myanmar, including Rohingya Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities fleeing ongoing persecution by Myanmar authorities. Moreover, 82 of the deaths in immigration detention occurred in 2015, the year in which human trafficking of Rohingya and Bangladeshis to Malaysia via Thailand reached its height. In 2016, Fortify Rights and the Burmese Rohingya Organization UK documented the protracted confinement and risk of indefinite detention of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. Malaysian authorities allowed several hundred Rohingya survivors of human trafficking to enter Malaysia after traffickers abandoned them in boats at sea. Malaysian authorities later detained the survivors. Rohingya women who survived the 'boat crisis' and were later detained in Malaysia’s Belantik immigration detention facilities told Fortify Rights that at least one person in the Belantik immigration facility died of tuberculosis after the guards refused to facilitate access to a doctor. Transnational criminal syndicates trafficked tens of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar to Thailand and Malaysia since 2012. Despite the discovery of more than 100 gravesites of suspected trafficking victims in Wang Kelian near the Thailand border, the Malaysian government’s investigation has failed to result in any notable accountability. SUHAKAM notes that the Malaysian government’s rate of prosecution of human traffickers with respect to the mass graves includes no government officials and is 'not convincing.' SUHAKAM is proceeding with an investigation into the human trafficking of Rohingya Muslims and others from Myanmar to Malaysia. Fortify Rights is cooperating with and contributing to SUHAKAM’s ongoing investigation. 'We’ve seen little accountability for the trafficking of tens of thousands of Rohingya and others into Malaysia,' said Amy Smith. 'Urgent action must be taken to end impunity for human traffickers and ensure protection for survivors. For More Information, Please Contact: Amy Smith, Executive Director, +66 (0) 87.795.5454 (in Bangkok), [email protected]; Twitter: @AmyAlexSmith, @FortifyRights; Matthew Smith, CEO, +66 (0) 85.028.0044 (in Yangon) [email protected]; Twitter: @matthewfsmith, @FortifyRights."

Fortify Rights, "Myanmar: Cooperate with U.N. Fact-Finding Mission: 23 International Groups Call on Governments to Engage Myanmar to Support U.N. Mission," April 27, 2017, http://www.fortifyrights.org, stated, "The Government of Myanmar should “fully cooperate” with a forthcoming United Nations Fact- Finding Mission into the human rights situation in at least Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states, Fortify Rights said today in an open letter with 22 other international organizations. 'This mission is in the interests of the authorities and the entire country,' said Matthew Smith, chief executive officer at Fortify Rights. 'It’s an opportunity for the government to demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and preventing atrocity crimes in ethnic states.' A U.N. Resolution passed at the 34th Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva in March established the mandate of the forthcoming Fact-Finding Mission. It calls for the U.N. Human Rights Council to 'dispatch urgently an independent international Fact Finding Mission . . . to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces . . . with a view to ensure full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims' The President of the Human Rights Council Mr. Joaquín Alexander Maza Martelli is expected to soon appoint members to the expert body.

25 'We believe the Fact-Finding Mission must be led by experts, including on international human rights and humanitarian law, who should receive free and unfettered access to ensure the process is thorough, equitable and capable of achieving its stated goals,' the open letter states. The Burma Human Rights Network initiated the open letter and signatories include Human Rights Watch, Refugees International, Amnesty International, the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, and others. The letter calls on various governments “to strongly encourage the Myanmar government to fully cooperate with the forthcoming Fact-Finding Mission.' Fortify Rights and other signatories to the letter have documented how Myanmar state security forces in northern Rakhine State committed extrajudicial killings of ethnic Rohingya Muslims, including infants and children, raped and gang-raped ethnic women and girls, looted property, and razed entire villages, including religious structures and food stocks. In testimony presented during a hearing before the U.S. Congress in March, Fortify Rights stated: 'State security forces carried out these violations in a consistent manner in disparate locations, indicating the systematic nature of the attacks. Fortify Rights believes this indicates that the soldiers’ actions were not spontaneous and were likely based on guidance or orders.' The Myanmar military’s '“clearance operation' in northern Rakhine State was led and directed by Major General Maung Maung Soe, the chief of the army’s Western Command, according to Reuters. The Western Command reports to the Bureau of Special Operations in Naypyidaw, which reports to Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Fortify Rights also documented how Myanmar Army soldiers targeted, attacked, and killed civilians with impunity in ongoing fighting against ethnic armed groups in Kachin State and northern Shan State since 2011. The Myanmar Army, Police, and Military Intelligence also arbitrarily detained and tortured civilians in Kachin State in a widespread and systematic manner in recent years, Fortify Rights said. Myanmar authorities, including the civilian-led government, continue to effectively restrict humanitarian aid groups and human rights monitors from operating freely in Kachin State and northern Shan State, resulting in avoidable deprivations of food, healthcare, and other humanitarian provisions for displaced communities. In January 2017, the Government of Myanmar denied U.N. Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee access to certain conflict-affected areas of Kachin and Shan states. 'This is a critical moment for Suu Kyi's government and military leadership,' said Matthew Smith. 'Any failure to cooperate with this mission could signal more atrocities and impunity.' For More Information, Please Contact: Matthew Smith, CEO, Fortify Rights, +66.85.028.0044 (Thailand), +1.202.503.8052 (U.S.), [email protected]; Twitter: @matthewfsmith, @FortifyRights David Baulk, Myanmar Human Rights Specialist, Fortify Rights, +95 979 3111 685 (Myanmar), +66 92 489 0106 (Thailand), [email protected]; Twitter: @davidbaulk; @FortifyRights."

The Economic Policy Institute stated, April 1, 2017, http://taxmarch.org/?utm_source=epi&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Economic+Policy+Institute&utm _campaign=891c65b441- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_31&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e7c5826c50-891c65b441- 58859645&mc_cid=891c65b441&mc_eid=e9bf4790c2, "The resistance to Donald Trump's policies is growing. And two weeks from today, you can make a major impact. Donald Trump and Paul Ryan are preparing to rewrite our tax code―providing massive tax breaks to the rich and to large corporations. These tax breaks for the rich will shrink resources for critical programs that aid working families. The Economic Policy Institute is joining with partners across the country to organize the Tax March―the next big march on Washington and in local communities across the country. On April 15, Tax Day, join EPI and our partners at the Tax March. Donald Trump’s tax plan, as outlined during the presidential campaign, would cost U.S. taxpayers $6.2 trillion! That’s at least three times the cost of George W. Bush’s tax plan, a plan which did nothing to boost the economy or job-growth. In fact, the economic recovery following the Bush tax cuts was the slowest on record, even when buoyed by an enormous bubble which eventually burst and caused the Great

26 Recession. How does Donald Trump plan to invest in America’s future when he’s handing that future over to the rich and big corporations? Join us on Saturday, April 15 at a Tax March in Washington DC or in your local community. Click here to RSVP! Together we must stand up to the failed trickledown policies of the past and remind taxpayers that Donald Trump’s and Paul Ryan’s tax plans will make the rich richer at the expense of working families."

Global Exchange, has been involved in: programs concerning: "People Power not Corporate Power," "Community Rights," "Corporate Human Rights Violators," "Economic Activism for Palestine," "Elect Democracy," End Dirty Energy," "Building Positive Alternatives," "Fair Trade," "Midwest Green Economy," "Peace, Democracy, Human Rights," "Freedom to Travel - Cuba," "Mexico and Human Rights," "What About Peace?" Green Festivals, including: Washington DC Green Festival May 13-14, New York Green Festival June 10-11, Los Angeles Green Festival Sept 23-24, San Francisco Green Festival Nov 11-12; Reality Tours concerning environmental, justice or cultural issues to: Cuba, Iran, Haiti, Ecuador, Chiapas, Oxaca, Costa Rica, Bolivea, Portugal and Spain. For information go to: http://www.globalexchange.org.

Following huge demonstrations, the Rumanian government, in early February, reversed its decision to weaken anti-corruption laws (Rick Lyman and Kit Gillet, "Rumania Reverses Decision to Weaken Corruption Law," The New York Times, February 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/europe/romania-protests- corruption.html?ref=todayspaper).

Slovak teenagers were leading a crusade against corruption in the country in April 2017, including an anti-corruption march in the capital in mid-April with more than 10,000 people (Rick Lyman, "Young and Idealistic, but Resolute," The New York Times, May 1, 2017).

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WORLD DEVELOPMENTS

Environmental Developments

Henry Fountain, "Arctic’s Winter Sea Ice Drops to Its Lowest Recorded Level," The New York Times, March 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/climate/arctic-winter-sea-ice-record-low- global-warming.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "After a season that saw temperatures soar at the North Pole, the Arctic has less sea ice at winter’s end than ever before in nearly four decades of satellite measurements. The extent of ice cover — a record low for the third straight year — is another indicator of the effects of global warming on the Arctic, a region that is among the hardest hit by climate change, scientists said."

The Center for Biological Diversity, Endangered Earth, February 2, 2017, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2017/trump-protection-rollback-01-30- 2017.php, reported, "Trump Orders Massive Rollback of Environmental Protections," "In a major effort to dismantle environmental protections, President Donald Trump this week signed an executive order requiring all federal agencies to repeal two regulations before implementing a new rule. This unprecedented, illegal restriction would hamstring every federal agency's efforts to implement laws and dramatically curtail the federal government's ability to protect human health, wildlife and the environment from emerging threats. " President Trump signed an order, March 29, 2017, ordering the EPA to roll back Obama Administration clean air rules, which would allow for more coal to be used in energy production (Coral

27 Davenport and Alissa J. Rubin, "Trump Signs Rule To Block Efforts on Aiding Climate," The New York Times, March 29, 2017.

President Trump, on April 25, 2017, was preparing a pair of executive orders to allow expanded offshore oil and gas drilling and to roll back conservation on public lands (Coral Davenport, "Trump to Sign Orders That Could Expand Access to Fossil Fuels," The New York Times, April 26, 2017). The New York Times, May 3, 2017 contained a list of 23 environmental rules rolled back by President Trump in the first 100 days of his administration.

Coral Davenport, "Trump Orders Easing Safety Rules Implemented After Gulf Oil Spill," The New York Times, April 27, 2017, ttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/us/politics/trump-offshore- drilling.html?ref=todayspaper, "Just past the seventh anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, President Trump on Friday directed the Interior Department to “reconsider” several safety regulations on offshore drilling implemented after one of the worst environmental disasters in the nation’s history. Friday’s executive order was aimed at rolling back the Obama administration’s attempts to ban oil drilling off the southeastern Atlantic and Alaskan coasts. It would erase or narrow the boundaries of some federally-protected marine sanctuaries, opening them up to commercial fishing and oil drilling."

Numerous members of the Trump administration, with its multiple connections to fossil fuel interests, are deniers of climate change and moving to weaken and destroy environmental regulations, while removing environmental information from U.S, government web sites and databases. This includes head of the EPA, Scott Pruitt, who says that carbon dioxide does not contribute to global warming (Coral Davenport, "E.P.A. Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change," The New York Times, March 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global- warming.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0). In line with that, a number of Republicans in Congress have been calling for the EPA and other agencies to make data underlying proposed new rules publicly available and to state how they pick scientists. While it can be very useful to have the ability to see that "the best science" is actually used in decision making, the intent appears to be to bog down the regulatory process (David Malakoff, "A battle over the "best science," The Christian Science Monitor Weekly, February 13, 2017).

Two thirds of the states in the United States and an increasing number of counties have decoupled energy usage from economic growth. This is being achieved largely in moving away from coal to other forms of energy, so that GNP is now increasing while carbon emissions are dropping, according to a report from the Brookings Institution. Beyond that report, it is clear that the more the move is made to clean renewable energy, the less economic growth will be linked to carbon emitting ("Growing Green and Still Seeing Growth," Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 2017).

Canada was moving to tax carbon emissions, in January 2017 ("Henry Gass, "Why Canada readies a 'carbon tax'," Science, January 2 and 9, 2017),

With the Trump administration backing away from environmental protection and clean energy production, nearly half the Fortune Five Hundred companies in the U.S. are planning to move to 100% renewable energy with varying time tables (Hiroko Tabuchi, "With Government in Retreat, Companies Step Up Efforts on Emissions," The New York Times, April 26, 2017).

Jugal K. Patel, "A Crack in an Antarctic Ice Shelf Grew 17 Miles in the Last Two Months," The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/07/science/earth/antarctic-crack.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A rapidly advancing crack in Antarctica’s fourth-largest ice shelf has scientists concerned that it is getting close to a full break. The rift has accelerated this year in an area already vulnerable to warming temperatures. Since December, the crack has grown by the length of about five football fields each day."

28 Henry Fountain, "Arctic’s Winter Sea Ice Drops to Its Lowest Recorded Level," The New York Times, March 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/climate/arctic-winter-sea-ice-record-low- global-warming.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "After a season that saw temperatures soar at the North Pole, the Arctic has less sea ice at winter’s end than ever before in nearly four decades of satellite measurements. The extent of ice cover — a record low for the third straight year — is another indicator of the effects of global warming on the Arctic, a region that is among the hardest hit by climate change, scientists said."

Many cities around the world are being seriously impacted by climate change. One is Mexico City, whose sinking and water shortage has been greatly increased. Built over what was once flat land, alternatively volcanic or clay soil, parts of the city are sinking at different rates as increased heat and drought dry the land and increase demand for water from the aquifer beneath the city. With more pumping of water, the subsidence increases, opening sinkholes, tilting and damaging thousands of buildings. It is also bringing a huge water crisis, with insufficient water in many, mostly poorer, areas, and in worsening an inadequate sewer system. For many residents, water has to be trucked in. Deliveries for ordered water may be only once a week, and will be canceled if no one is home to receive them, pinning many women at home waiting. The water crisis is made worse by corruption, as ordered water may be sold enroute and never arrive (Michael Kimmelman, "Mexico City, Parched and Sinking, Faces a Water Crisis: Climate change is threatening to push a crowded capital toward a breaking point," The New York Times, February 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/17/world/americas/mexico-city- sinking.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0).

Nika Knight, "This Is What It Will Look Like When New Orleans, New York City, and Mar-A-Lago Disappear Under Rising Seas: New research finds that most previous estimates for sea level rise were too conservative, while visualizations show what U.S. cities may look like by 2100, Common Dreams, April 27, 2017, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/04/27/what-it-will-look-when-new-orleans-new-york- city-and-mar-lago-disappear-under-rising, reported,

President Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort would be completely drowned in the most extreme scenario

29 for sea level rise. (Image: Climate Central) "A new report shows that many previous estimates of global sea level rise by 2100 were far too conservative, the Washington Post reported Thursday, and the research comes as new maps and graphics from Climate Central vividly show how disastrous that flooding will be for U.S. cities. The report, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, found that previous estimates of sea level rise didn't account enough for the fast pace of melting ice in the Arctic and Greenland. The Post writes: 'The assessment found that under a relatively moderate global warming scenario—one that slightly exceeds the temperature targets contained in the Paris climate agreement—seas could be expected to rise 'at least' 52 centimeters, or 1.7 feet, by the year 2100. Under a more extreme, 'business as usual' warming scenario, meanwhile, the minimum rise would be 74 centimeters, or 2.4 feet. The report explored a minimum rise scenario, but not a maximum or worst-case scenario. However, a separate report (pdf) published at the end of the Obama administration by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) did just that, and found that in the most extreme case, the sea in some locations will rise a stunning eight feet by the century's end. Illustrating how devastating this would be, Climate Central created 3D visualizations of what U.S. cities will look like in NOAA's most extreme scenario. Some cities, such as New Orleans, would simply be uninhabitable, the images show:

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Rising seas alone may displace over 13 million people in the U.S., dispersing climate refugees and reshaping inland cities, as Common Dreams reported last week. See more examples of Climate Central's visualizations at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iiA_FValKPA and http://search.myway.com/home/index.jhtml?p2=^BNH^xdm439^S14595^us&ptb=DDB4DAE9-6F3B- 4B97-A1B4-E5665CF7305C&n=781c2ba5&si=245051_TG-B-US-AM-Safari&st=tab, and find a 2D map of sea level rise projections here. The ominous new research come as President Donald Trump continues to dismantle climate policies, boosts the fossil fuel industry, and considers pulling out of the Paris climate accord. But even Trump won't be spared from the looming disaster, Climate Central observes, showing that the projected sea level rise will completely flood the president's Mar-a-Lago resort."

Lauren McCauley, “Wilder Fires and Rising Waters, Climate Impacts Coming to America's Door: Pair of new studies show how American climate refugees will 'reshape' population landscape of the nation," Common Dreams, April 18, 2017, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/04/18/wilder-fires-and- rising-waters-climate-impacts-coming-americas-door, reported, "Americans in many cases have been slow to acknowledge the real threats posed by global warming. But two new studies out Monday found that people living throughout the United States could soon see their communities forever altered by higher seas

33 and raging forest fires. While the United States has lagged in taking dramatic action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or transform its power grid to accommodate renewable energy sources, other nations have taken the lead. Further, studies have historically shown (pdf) that Americans are generally reluctant to perceive climate change as anything more than a moderate risk, seeing it as something that impacts people in more vulnerable, developing nations. The idea of a person becoming a climate change refugee seems similarly foreign. However, Mathew Hauer, a demographer at the University of Georgia, estimates that by the end of the century as many as 13.1 million Americans could too find themselves displaced due to rising sea levels. His research is published in the journal Nature Climate Change and suggests those migrants will be forced to move to inland cities, ultimately "reshaping" the population landscape. The report notes that unmitigated sea-level rise (SLR)—primarily seen as 'a coastal issue'—is 'expected to reshape the U.S. population distribution, potentially stressing landlocked areas unprepared to accommodate this wave of coastal migrants.' For instance, if seas rise the expected 1.8 meters by 2100, Texas could see a surge of nearly 1.5 million additional residents. Specifically, inland cities including Austin and Houston, Texas; Orlando, Florida; and Atlanta, Georgia could each see more than 250,000 people migrating from the imperiled coasts. Meanwhile, Miami and New Orleans are expected to lose more than 2 million people each due to flooding, while nine states could experience declining populations: Virginia, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Georgia, North Carolina, New Jersey, Louisiana, California, and New York. At the same time, residents who live near the sun-scorched valleys and drought-wracked forests of the western U.S. are going to increasingly see larger, more devastating forest fires—and researchers are beginning to recognize that the only way to deal with them is to get out of the way. A study published at the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences says that typical methods of wildfire suppression and management are inadequate to address the threat posed by the 'new era of western wildfires' prompted by human-induced global warming. 'Neither suppression nor current approaches to fuels management adequately reduce vulnerability of communities to increasing wildfire,' said the study's lead author, Tania Schoennagel, a research scientist at the University of Colorado-Boulder's Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research. 'We've been very effective with fire suppression for many years, but wildfires are increasing beyond our capacity to control, especially with more people in fire's way.' Alternately, the report recommends that affected states take steps to adapt by discouraging development in wildfire-prone areas and, in some cases, letting the fires rage with controlled burns. InsideClimate News reported further on the study: The report notes that a century of suppressing wildfires in the West has created a tinderbox because trees aren't being removed naturally by fire. 'Most people recognize that our forest systems have not had the fire they need,' Schoennagel said [...] The concept of allowing fires to burn is controversial, in part because of the risk it poses to people and structures, but also because of the carbon released into the atmosphere. Schoennagel argues, though, that prescribed burns ultimately could help ecosystems and species adapt to warming. 'Fire can be used as a tool for ecosystems to adapt to a changing climate,' she explained. 'It can allow species to migrate and help species keep pace with climate change.' Park Williams, a bioclimatologist the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University who was unaffiliated with the study, told Climate Central, 'We now know that continued increases in fire activity are inevitable, but we've been able to come up with no other way forward other than to fight fires as hard as we can. All we're doing is paying huge amounts of money to deliver an even worse problem onto the next generation.' And Schoennagel added, 'The first step is to expect that wildfire will come to your door rather than assume it will not.' One could say the same for the seas."

Eduardo Porter, "To Curb Global Warming, Science Fiction May Become Fact," The New York Times,

34 April 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/business/economy/geoengineering-climate- change.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "News about the climate has become alarming over the last few months. In December, startled scientists revealed that temperatures in some parts of the Arctic had spiked more than 35 degrees Fahrenheit above their historical averages. In March, others reported that sea ice in the Arctic had dropped to its lowest level on record. A warming ocean has already killed large chunks of ’s Great Barrier Reef. Let’s get real. The odds that these processes could be slowed, let alone stopped, by deploying more solar panels and wind turbines seemed unrealistic even before President Trump’s election. It is even less likely now that Mr. Trump has gone to work undermining President ’s strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. That is where engineering the climate comes in. Last month, scholars from the physical and social sciences who are interested in climate change gathered in Washington to discuss approaches like cooling the planet by shooting aerosols into the stratosphere or whitening clouds to reflect sunlight back into space, which may prove indispensable to prevent the disastrous consequences of warming. The world’s immediate priority may be to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to meet and hopefully exceed the promises made at the climate summit meeting in Paris in December 2015. But as Janos Pasztor, who heads the Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative, told me, 'The reality is that we may need more tools even if we achieve these goals.' The carbon dioxide that humanity has pumped into the atmosphere is already producing faster, deeper changes to the world’s climate and ecosystems than were expected not long ago. [And methane entering the atmosphere, often the result of underestimated positive feedbacks of warming, has contributed greatly also, and may be a critical aspect of the ever increasing warming]. Barring some technology that could pull it out at a reasonable cost — a long shot for the foreseeable future, according to many scientists — it will stay there for a long time, warming the atmosphere further for decades to come." Such engineering approaches are inherently dangerous, as they often have great unexpected and unwanted side effects. But as the global warming situation gets bad enough, there is an increasing temptation to use them.

Damian Carrington and Jelmer Mommers, "'Shell Knew': Oil Giant's 1991 Film Warned of Climate Change Danger," Guardia, March 1, 2017, reported, "The oil giant Shell issued a stark warning of the catastrophic risks of climate change more than a quarter of century ago in a prescient 1991 film that has been rediscovered. However, since then the company has invested heavily in highly polluting oil reserves and helped lobby against climate action, leading to accusations that Shell knew the grave risks of global warming but did not act accordingly."

Nika Knight, "Cities Worldwide Take on Climate Fight—And See Pushback From National Governments: Many cities are outpacing national governments in the climate fight, setting the stage for power battles," Common Dreams, March 13, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/03/13/cities-worldwide-take-climate-fight-and-see- pushback-national-governments, reported, "Cities worldwide are setting climate goals that are far more ambitious than the targets agreed upon by national governments, leading to clashes between urban leaders and national ones, Reuters reported Monday. 'Just over half the world's population lives in urban areas, meaning municipalities will help to determine whether the historic shift from fossil fuels to cleaner energy agreed in Paris succeeds or fails,' Reuters notes. 'But as many cities become more assertive, governments are reluctant to cede control.' Oslo, for example, is battling Norway's right-wing coalition government to enact an aggressive plan to cut the city's carbon emissions. The city is pushing 'to more than halve the capital's greenhouse gas emissions within four years to about 600,000 tons," Reuters reports. 'The plan for the city of 640,000 people includes car-free zones, 'fossil-fuel-free building sites,' high road tolls, and capturing greenhouse gases from the city's waste incinerator.'

35 Yet the national government's 'Transport Ministry is dragging its feet' on the plan, introducing delays that have slowed the introduction of new tolls and car-free zones for months, Oslo's deputy mayor told Reuters. It so happens that supporters of the far-right Progress Party, which together with the Conservative Party forms the ruling coalition, are deeply opposed to climate change policies. In Denmark, meanwhile, Copenhagen's mayor is accusing the national government of levying unfairly high fees on the city for using the national grid to power its fleet of electric buses. And on the other side of the world, Sydney officials are battling the conservative Australian government for the city's right to power itself with its own solar panels without paying hefty fees. And in the U.S., green-minded city leaders are taking to the frontlines of the climate fight in the face of a right-wing, climate change-denying Trump administration. Cities are powerful players in the global effort to combat climate change. Urban dwellers consume 75 percent of the world's resources and are responsible for 60 to 80 percent of the planet's greenhouse gas emissions, according to Columbia University's Earth Institute. Because of their large and dense populations, locations, and infrastructure, cities are also most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 'Cities are on the front line of both the cause and effect of climate change,' said Somayya Ali Ibrahim, program manager for the Urban Climate Change Research Network at the Earth Institute. 'Cause— because if there are so many people gathered in one spot, there are more emissions and more energy is used. And on the converse side, they will be most affected by climate change because of coastal flooding, heat waves, urban heat island effects, epidemics, [and impacts on] water and sanitation systems, and transport systems. So most of the people affected [by climate change] will be in cities.'"

While agriculture accounts for about 25% of global warming (through livestock emissions, tilling practices, and deforestation) and farming around the world is being negatively impacted by global warming initiated climate change, to date only a few countries have done much to assist farmers in adapting to climate change or to use agricultural practices to counter global warming. One of the nations that has is . There the government has supported a number of projects, including assisting cooperatives plant argan trees in further drying arid areas. The trees absorb carbon dioxide, are extremely drought resistant, and produce a nut with an oil in high demand, bringing a good price. There are a range of practices that are essential to adapt agriculture in most of the world to climate change and help it counter global warming. The particulars of what these are depend on the circumstance of each location. In general, they consist of reducing water use, switching to and diversifying climate appropriate crops, improving soil and land management, and working with natural landscapes to develop "green infrastructure", which is also important for pollinators, discussed below. As of the beginning of 2017, only 2% of the $331 billion in global climate financing has been going to agriculture. Much more is needed. But a number of nations have taken steps that are good examples of what can be done. Mongolia, for example, is switching to growing crops in greenhouses and stopping grazing on disappearing grass lands. Similarly, has introduced new rice seeds that sprout earlier in germination, making them more resistant to drought. In Sub-Saharan Africa, numerous governments and aid agencies are promoting plating appropriate fruit and other trees that are drought resistant and increase carbon absorbsion. [There is much that private farmers can do on their own, if they have the information and funding to do so. For example, many California farmers have met extreme drought, reducing water use, by watering through feed lines, often technologically controlled, rather than by spraying into the air which wastes a great deal of water through evaporation and putting water where it is not needed. But too many still water by spraying, and too often during the day where there is high evaporation loss] (Zac Coleman, "Climate: A Small Nut's Big Secret," Christian Science Monitor Weekly, February 13, 2017).

John Schwartz, "Climate Change Reroutes a Yukon River in a Geological Instant," The New York Times, April 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/science/climate-change-glacier-yukon- river.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "In the blink of a geological eye, climate change has helped reverse the flow of water melting from a glacier in Canada’s Yukon, a hijacking that scientists call “river piracy.”

36 This engaging term refers to one river capturing and diverting the flow of another. It occurred last spring at the Kaskawulsh Glacier, one of Canada’s largest, with a suddenness that startled scientists. A process that would ordinarily take thousands of years — or more — happened in just a few months in 2016. Much of the meltwater from the glacier normally flows to the north into the Bering Sea via the Slims and Yukon Rivers. A rapidly retreating and thinning glacier — accelerated by global warming — caused the water to redirect to the south, and into the Pacific Ocean."

Along the entire coast of Tasmania, and on its offshore islands, oceans rising from global warming are devouring significant amounts of land (Justin Gillis, As Rising Seas Erode Shorelines, Tasmania Shows What Can Be Lost," The New York Times, ,April 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/climate/tasmania-global-warming-shoreline- erosion.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0).

"How to keep cool without costing the Earth: A film worth watching," The Economist, February 11, 2017, http://www.economist.com/sections/science-technology, reported, "About 6% of the electricity generated in America is used to power air-conditioning systems that cool homes and offices. As countries such as Brazil, China and India grow richer, they will surely do likewise. Not only is that expensive for customers, it also raises emissions of greenhouse gases in the form both of carbon dioxide from burning power-station fuel and of the hydrofluorocarbons air conditioners use as refrigerants. As they describe in a paper in this week’s Science, Ronggui Yang and Xiaobo Yin of the University of Colorado, in Boulder, have a possible alternative to all this. They have invented a film that can cool buildings without the use of refrigerants and, remarkably, without drawing any power to do so. Better yet, this film can be made using standard roll-to-roll manufacturing methods at a cost of around 50 cents a square meter. The new film works by a process called radiative cooling. This takes advantage of that fact that Earth’s atmosphere allows certain wavelengths of heat-carrying infrared radiation to escape into space unimpeded. Convert unwanted heat into infrared of the correct wavelength, then, and you can dump it into the cosmos with no come back."

Choe Sang-Hun, "China Suspends All Coal Imports From North Korea," The New York Times, February, 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-korea-china-coal-imports- suspended.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "China said on Saturday that it was suspending all imports of coal from North Korea as part of its effort to enact United Nations Security Council sanctions aimed at stopping the country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile program. The ban takes effect on Sunday and will last until the end of the year, the Chinese Commerce Ministry said in a brief statement posted on its website on Saturday. Chinese trade and aid have long been a vital economic crutch for North Korea, and the decision strips North Korea of one of its most important sources of foreign currency."

As part of the move away from coal because of its relatively higher cost, in New Mexico, Kevin Robinson-Avila, "PNM plan calls for eliminating coal generation," Albuquerque Journal, April 21, 2017, reported, "Public Service Company of New Mexico is proposing to shed all of its coal-fired electricity in the next 14 years and replace it with solar, wind, natural gas and nuclear power. The company’s latest integrated resource plan – which looks out over 20 years to determine the cheapest, most reliable and environmentally friendly mix of resources – has found that shutting down the coal-fired San Juan Generating Station near Farmington in 2022 and relinquishing the utility’s 13 percent share in the nearby Four Corners Generating Station in 2031 would save consumers money in the long term. The company published a first draft of the resource plan late Thursday. It’s now open for public comment before a final version is filed with New Mexico Public Regulation Commission in July." The question is what the new mix of natural gas, nuclear, wind and solar power will be. Environmentalists, including the intergroup energy committee that meets in Albuquerque at the Sierra Club (of which Stephen Sachs is a member) has been pushing for no nuclear, little natural gas, and as much wind and solar as possible.

37

While jobs in the coal industry continued to decline, renewable energy jobs have continued to rise. In 2016, 373,807 were employed in solar, 130,877 in bioenergy, 101,738 in wind, 65,554 in hydroelectric, 76,771 in nuclear energy, whole 160,119 worked in coal, 515,518 in oil, and 308,235 in natural gas (Nadia Popovich, "Solar and Wind, But Not Coal: Where Energy Jobs Are Growing," The New York Times, April 26, 2017).

Jonathan Marshall, Coal Miners' Futures in Renewable Energy," Consortium News, April 26, 2017, https://consortiumnews.com/2017/04/22/coal-miners-futures-in-renewable-energy/ "If President Trump wants to earn a rare legislative victory and take political credit for reviving hard-hit regions of rural America, he should take a close look at how one Kentucky coal company is creating jobs. Berkeley Energy Group this month announced plans to put coal miners back to work by building the largest solar project in Appalachia on top of a closed mountaintop strip mine near the town of Pikeville. The Eastern Kentucky coal company is partnering with the Environmental Defense Fund, which has helped develop 9,000 megawatts of renewable energy, to bring jobs and clean energy to the region."

Deforestation has been increasing greatly in Brazil and Bolivia, especially by giant agriculture firms, including Cargill, according to recent reports. In Bolivia estimate are that in the 1990s deforestation averages some 266,000 acres a year. In the 2000's it rose to about 667,000 acres annually. As of 2016, reports are that deforestation had reached 865,000 acres a year. The number of acres deforested a year were not available for Brazil, but there were reports that there too, deforestation is greatly on the rise (Hiroko Tabuchi and Clare Rigby, "Deforestation Roars Back," The New York Times, February 26, 2017).

The Sierra Club reported, February 7, 2017, "The Trump administration just issued the final approval for the Dakota Access Pipeline, putting corporate profits above the safety and sovereignty of the Standing Rock Sioux. Trump is blatantly ignoring the environmental review and public comment period that the Army Corps of Engineers already started under the Obama administration. The Standing Rock Sioux recently stated, 'We stand ready to fight this battle against corporate interest superseding government procedure and the health and well-being of millions of Americans.' We continue to stand with them."

The Lakota People's Law Project reported, February 2, 2017, http://lakotalaw.org/dapl-action, "Yesterday, as many of you already know, Chase Iron Eyes—Lakota People’s Law Project lead counsel and one of the most important spokespersons for our NoDAPL movement—was arrested along with 75 other Water Protectors. He was seized from Last Child’s Camp after militarized police conducted a raid on treaty land. " "The authorities are up to their usual nasty tricks. Chase reports from inside jail that law enforcement has unfairly delayed the hearing process for the Water Protectors, allowing many to suffer in inhumane conditions—some left for too long in locked vehicles without access to restrooms."

Clifford Krauss, "U.S., in Reversal, Issues Permit for Keystone Oil Pipeline," The New York Times, March 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/business/energy-environment/keystone-oil- pipeline.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, “During his presidential campaign, Donald J. Trump repeatedly hailed the Keystone XL pipeline as a vital jobs program and one that sharply contrasted his vision for the economy with that of Hillary Clinton. “Today we begin to make things right,” President Trump said Friday morning shortly after the State Department granted the pipeline giant TransCanada a permit for Keystone construction, a reversal of Obama administration policy. The pipeline would link oil producers in Canada and North Dakota with refiners and export terminals on the Gulf Coast. It has long been an object of contention, with environmentalists saying it would contribute to climate change and the project’s proponents — Republicans, some labor unions and the oil industry — contending that it would help guarantee national energy security for decades to come."

38 Coral Davenport, "Trump Orders Easing Safety Rules Implemented After Gulf Oil Spill," The New York Times, April 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/us/politics/trump-offshore- drilling.html?ref=todayspaper, Reported, "Just past the seventh anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, President Trump on Friday directed the Interior Department to “reconsider” several safety regulations on offshore drilling implemented after one of the worst environmental disasters in the nation’s history. Friday’s executive order was aimed at rolling back the Obama administration’s attempts to ban oil drilling off the southeastern Atlantic and Alaskan coasts. It would erase or narrow the boundaries of some federally-protected marine sanctuaries, opening them up to commercial fishing and oil drilling. But Mr. Trump also took aim at regulations on oil-rig safety. In the final years of the Obama administration, the Interior Department implemented several new rules aimed at improving the safety of specific pieces of offshore drilling equipment that had failed during the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and were found to have been responsible for the deadly BP oil rig explosion that caused that spill."

Shusini Raj, "Oil Spill Near Chennai, India, Threatens Wildlife," The New York Times, February 3, 2017, ttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/india-chennai-oil-spill.html?ref=todayspaper, "Thousands of volunteers and Indian Coast Guard personnel were working on Friday to clean sludge from shores near the southern city of Chennai nearly a week after an oil spill that activists said could have dire repercussions for wildlife and fishery. Officials disagreed about who was to blame for the failure to contain the spill. Commandant Rahul Dev Sharma, a local spokesman for the Coast Guard, said on Friday that at least 20 tons of oil had leaked into the Bay of Bengal. The spill occurred before dawn last Saturday after two tankers, one empty and the other carrying petroleum, collided near Chennai, Commandant Sharma said."

A rise in oil prices has brought increased production in Texas, but with increased automation there has not been a corresponding increase in jobs. [Expansion of wind and solar power, in contrast, has been, and is expected to continue to, greatly increase employment](Clifford Krauss, "Texas Oil Fields Rebound From Price Lull, but Jobs Are Left Behind: The industry is embracing technology, and finding new ways to pare the labor force. But as jobs go away, what of presidential promises to bring them back?" The New York Times, February 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/business/energy- environment/oil-jobs-technology.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0).

The Sierra Club reported via E-mail, March 3, 2017, "Friends, If you've been paying attention to the EPA methane rules you'll remember that the rules that were enacted only cover new and modified sources. The agency had begun gathering data to deal with existing sources. Yesterday the EPA cancelled the information request of operators. http://m.santafenewmexican.com/news/epa-halts-inquiry-into-oil- gas-industry-emissions-of-methane/article_6213a54e-68f2-5174-859c-5dd4070b7f35.html?mode=jqm" "The Environmental Protection Agency on Thursday announced it was withdrawing a request that operators of existing oil and gas wells provide the agency with extensive information about their equipment and its emissions of methane, undermining a last-ditch Obama administration climate change initiative. The EPA announcement was a first step toward reversing an Obama administration effort — which only got underway two days after Donald Trump’s election — to gather information about methane, a short-lived but extremely powerful climate pollutant which is responsible for about a quarter of global warming to date. The agency cited a letter sent by the attorneys general of several conservative and oil-producing states complaining that the information request 'furthers the previous administration’s climate agenda and supports … the imposition of burdensome climate rules on existing sites, the cost and expense of which will be enormous.' Edf statement here: https://www.edf.org/media/epa-head-pruitt-tells-oil-gas-industry-its-ok- withhold-pollution-data-move-leaves-communities?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=energyex_epa- methane_upd_ngas&utm_medium=social-media&utm_id=1488498698&utm_content=edfenergyex."

39 Clifford Kraus, "BP Struggles to Control Damaged Well in Alaskan Arctic," The New York Times, April16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/business/bp-damaged-oil-well-alaskan- arctic.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The British oil giant BP worked through the weekend to control a damaged oil well on Alaska’s remote North Slope that had started spewing natural gas vapors on Friday morning, the company and Alaska officials said. `There have been no injuries or reports of damage to wildlife, but crews trying to secure the well have failed amid frigid winds gusting to 38 miles an hour."

Kelsey J. Pieper, Min Tang, and Marc A. Edwards, "Flint Water Crisis Caused By Interrupted Corrosion Control: Investigating “Ground Zero” Home," ACS Publications, February 1, 2017, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.est.6b04034, reported, Flint, Michigan switched to the Flint River as a temporary drinking water source without implementing corrosion control in April 2014. Ten months later, water samples collected from a Flint residence revealed progressively rising water lead levels (104, 397, and 707 μg/L) coinciding with increasing water discoloration. An intensive follow-up monitoring event at this home investigated patterns of lead release by flow rate–all water samples contained lead above 15 μg/L and several exceeded hazardous waste levels (>5000 μg/L). Forensic evaluation of exhumed service line pipes compared to water contamination 'fingerprint' analysis of trace elements, revealed that the immediate cause of the high water lead levels was the destabilization of lead-bearing corrosion rust layers that accumulated over decades on a galvanized iron pipe downstream of a lead pipe. After analysis of blood lead data revealed spiking lead in blood of Flint children in September 2015, a state of emergency was declared and public health interventions (distribution of filters and bottled water) likely averted an even worse exposure event due to rising water lead levels." Ben Panko, "Scientists Now Know Exactly How Lead Got Into Flint's Water: New report points blames corrosion and warns that fixing lead poisoning nationwide will require more work than we hoped," Smithsonian.com, February 3, 2017, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/chemical-study- ground-zero-house-flint-water-crisis- 180962030/?utm_source=smithsoniantopic&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20170205- Weekender&spMailingID=27750822&spUserID=NzY1MjY2NzA4MTkS1&spJobID=980569374&spReportId= OTgwNTY5Mzc0S0, reported further, "This suspicion isn’t limited to Flint. Guyette says that on his travels across the country, he's encountered many Americans who now know and worry about lead in their own drinking water. 'What this study does is only add to the evidence of how widespread the concern should be,' he says. Edwards is now working to study the efficacy of Flint's citywide efforts to replace lead pipes, and says this study is just the first step in getting the full picture. 'A lot of work still needs to be done to better understand the origins of this manmade disaster,' Edwards says. While Flint is also planning to replace galvanized iron pipes as well as lead pipes, Guyette says, there are thousands of cities across America where lead and iron pipes have been and are still being used together. While Walters had plastic pipes inside of her house, many older homes have galvanized iron pipes in their walls, meaning that removing any chance of lead contamination would take costly renovations."

Westinghouse Electric filed for bankruptcy, in March 2017, as a result of financial troubles in its massive nuclear construction projects in the U.S. South, raising questions about the soundness of the world's nuclear industry (Diane Cardwell and Jonathan Soble, "Bankruptcy Rocks Nuclear Industry," The New York Times, March 30, 2017).

Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, "Radioactive Boars in Fukushima Thwart Residents’ Plans to Return Home," The New York Times, March 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/radioactive-boars-in-fukushima-thwart-residents- plans-to-return-home.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Hundreds of toxic wild boars have been roaming across northern Japan, where the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear plant six years ago forced thousands of residents to desert their homes, pets and livestock. Some animals, like cattle, were left to rot in their pens. As Japan prepares to lift some evacuation orders on four towns within the more than 12-mile

40 exclusion zone around the Fukushima plant later this month, officials are struggling to clear out the contaminated boars. Wild boar meat is a delicacy in northern Japan, but animals slaughtered since the disaster are too contaminated to eat. According to tests conducted by the Japanese government, some of the boars have shown levels of radioactive element cesium-137 that are 300 times higher than safety standards."

Japan continues to struggle with the remnants of the Fukashima nuclear disaster. Among the ongoing problems are enormous amounts of highly radioactive waste. This encompasses: 400 tons of highly radioactive water produced every day, currently 3,519 containers of radioactive sludge, radioactive branches and logs from 220 acres of deforested land, 200,400 cubic meters of radioactive rubble (which may increase), 3.5 billion gallons of radioactive Soil, 1,573 Nuclear Fuel Rods that have to be kept cool, and an increasing amount of continually being discarded protective plothing - as of March 2017 having reached 64,700 cubic meters (Motoko Rich, "Struggling With Japan’s Nuclear Waste, Six Years After Disaster," The New York Times, March 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/struggling-with--nuclear-waste-six-years-after- disaster.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0).

Tatiana Schlossberg, "Trillions of Plastic Bits, Swept Up by Current, Are Littering Arctic Waters," The New York Times, April 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/climate/arctic- plastics-pollution.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0world’s oceans are littered with trillions of pieces of plastic — bottles, bags, toys, fishing nets and more, mostly in tiny particles — and now this seaborne junk is making its way into the Arctic. In a study published Wednesday in Science Advances, a group of researchers from the University of Cádiz in Spain and several other institutions show that a major ocean current is carrying bits of plastic, mainly from the North Atlantic, to the Greenland and Barents seas, and leaving them there — in surface waters, in sea ice and possibly on the ocean floor. Because climate change is already shrinking the Arctic sea ice cover, more human activity in this still-isolated part of the world is increasingly likely as navigation becomes easier. As a result, plastic pollution, which has grown significantly around the world since 1980, could spread more widely in the Arctic in decades to come, the researchers say."

The current government of Myanmar, at the beginning of April 2017, was faced with a difficult decision about whether or not to cancel the $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project, for which China has already dispersed $800 million. It is among the largest of many Chinese-financed energy and mining projects approved by the military government that ruled Myanmar until 2011. If completed, it would be first dam on the Irrawaddy River, the mythic cradle of civilization for Myanmar’s ethnic Burman majority. The project would force thousands of people to move and would cause serious environmental and economic damage as it disrupted river ecosystems and fish reproduction, an important source of food and livelihood. China would likely be angry about the cancelation of the dam, with 90% of its electric power generation scheduled to be exported to it. This would likely have repercussions on economic and diplomatic relations, including making it more difficult for the government to conclude peace agreements with ethnic groups in the North of Myanmar. One possible alternative is for the government of Myanmar to offer to have China build dams elsewhere in the country. But such projects would offer similar ecological, economic and hence political difficulties for the country and the government, while complicating relations with the ethnic groups in whose lands the projects would be developed (Mike Ives, "A Chinese-Backed Dam Project Leaves Myanmar in a Bind," The New York Times, March 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/myanmar-china-myitsone-dam- project.html?ref=todayspaper).

Danny Hakim, "Monsanto Weed Killer Roundup Faces New Doubts on Safety in Unsealed Documents," The New York Times, March 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/business/monsanto-roundup-safety- lawsuit.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The reputation of Roundup, whose active ingredient is the

41 world’s most widely used weed killer, took a hit on Tuesday when a federal court unsealed documents raising questions about its safety and the research practices of its manufacturer, the chemical giant Monsanto." "The court documents included Monsanto’s internal emails and email traffic between the company and federal regulators. The records suggested that Monsanto had ghostwritten research that was later attributed to academics and indicated that a senior official at the Environmental Protection Agency had worked to quash a review of Roundup’s main ingredient, glyphosate, that was to have been conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The documents also revealed that there was some disagreement within the E.P.A. over its own safety assessment."

Nika Knight, "EPA Rejects Own Science to Greenlight Brain-Damaging Pesticide: 'EPA chief Pruitt's move rejecting his scientists' advice to ban a pesticide? That's exactly what the pesticide maker, DowChem, asked for, “Common Dreams, March 30, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/03/30/epa-rejects-own-science-greenlight-brain-damaging- pesticidebyCommon Dreams, reported, "Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) head Scott Pruitt denied a 10-year-old petition late Wednesday to ban the use of chlorpyrifos, a widely-used pesticide that harms children's brains, in a decision that outraged public health advocates and environmentalists. In greenlighting the dangerous chemical, the EPA defied its own research—and acquiesced to Dow Chemical, the maker of chlorpyrifos, which has been lobbying the agency for years to allow the pesticide's continued use. 'Without the ban, farmworkers, their children, and others can't escape exposure because the poison is in [the] air they breathe, in the food they eat, the soil where children play.' —Erik Nicholson, United Farm Workers As the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) observed: 'The Trump EPA's denial of the NRDC and Pesticide Action Network 2007 petition to ban chlorpyrifos contradicts EPA's own analysis from November 2016 (just five months ago!) that found widespread risk to children from residues of the pesticide on food, in drinking water, and in the air in agricultural communities. Up until last night, EPA explained that because of these risks a ban was needed to protect children's health.' Environmental law group Earthjustice listed the risks the EPA discovered through its own research into chlorpyrifos: All exposure to chlorpyrifos through food exceeds safe levels of the chemical. The most exposed population is children between one and two years of age. On average, this vulnerable group is exposed to 140 times the level of chlorpyrifos the EPA deems safe. Chlorpyrifos contaminates drinking water. Chlorpyrifos drifts to schools, homes, and fields in toxic amounts at more than 300 feet from the fields. Workers face unacceptable risks from exposures when they mix and apply chlorpyrifos and when they enter fields to tend to crops. There is little doubt about the science. Mother Jones' Tom Philpott reported that 'Stephanie Engel, an epidemiologist at the University of North Carolina and a co-author of [a major study on chlorpyrifos at Mount Sinai], says the evidence that chlorpyrifos exposure causes harm is 'compelling'—and is 'much stronger' even than the case against BPA (bisphenol A), the controversial plastic additive. She says babies and fetuses are particularly susceptible to damage from chlorpyrifos because they metabolize toxic chemicals more slowly than adults do. And 'many adults' are susceptible, too, because they lack a gene that allows for metabolizing the chemical efficiently, Engel adds.' And The New York Times reported that 'Jim Jones, who ran the chemical safety unit at the EPA for five years, and spent more than 20 years working there until he left the agency in January when President Trump took office, said he was disappointed by Mr. Pruitt's action. 'They are ignoring the science that is pretty solid,' Mr. Jones said.' The decision is in line with Pruitt's anti-science, pro-corporate stance. Yet advocates and researchers who have followed the years-long campaign to end the use of chlorpyrifos were still shocked by Pruitt's outrageous move.

42 As a result of Pruitt's decision, children and farmworkers nationwide are endangered, rights advocates and environmental groups charge. 'Without the ban, farmworkers, their children, and others can't escape exposure because the poison is in [the] air they breathe, in the food they eat, the soil where children play,' observed Erik Nicholson, national vice president of United Farm Workers. 'We all have a basic right to a healthy life.' Some further argued that the decision breaks the law. 'We have a law that requires the EPA to ban pesticides that it cannot determine are safe, and the EPA has repeatedly said this pesticide is not safe," Patti Goldman, managing attorney at Earthjustice, told the New York Times. Earthjustice has vowed to fight Pruitt's decision in court, reported NPR.'"

The Tennessee Valley Authority's Gallatin Fossil Fuel Plant produces a good deal of electricity from burning coal, with an annual residue of 200,000 tons of coal ash. The toxic ash is mixed with water and stored in pits and ponds. It has been leaking into ground water and the river, potentially threatening water supplies, according to two law suits. over all, more than 100 million tons of coal ash is produced in the U.S. each year, creating a huge hazardous waste problem (Natania Schlossberg, "Hidden Peril of Coal Ash To Water Many Drink," The New York Times, April 16, 2017).

Aurora Almendral, " Moves to Shut Mines Accused of Polluting," The New York Times, April 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/asia/philippines-mining- environment.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "In February, Gina Lopez, the acting secretary of the environment, said she was shutting down the operations of 28 of the country’s 41 mining companies. Those companies, which account for about half of Philippine nickel production, have been accused of leaving rivers, rice fields and watersheds stained red with nickel laterite. And on Thursday, she said she would soon issue an order banning open-pit mines, calling the pollution of rivers with heavy metals 'a perpetual liability.'”

A move to switch from gasoline to diesel powered vehicles, together with the burning of wood in private homes, has caused record levels of pollution during the winter in London. Unlike the great smog of 1952, and other previous years of "London fog", the current pollution is largely by toxic nitrogen-dioxide, estimated to kill 23,500 people in Britain a year (Kimoko de Feyatas-Tamura, "A Push for Diesel Leaves London Gasping Amid Record Air Pollution," The New York Times, February 18, 2017).

Climate Change appears to be increasing the terrible smog in China, that the government has been trying to decrease. Studies show that winds have been lessening in Northern China that reduce the amount of smog over urban areas as they blow some of it away (Javier C. Hernandez, "Climate Change May Be Intensifying China’s Smog Crisis," The New York Times, March 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/asia/china-air-pollution-smog-climate- change.html?ref=todayspaper).

An increase in steel pollution in China - despite promises to reduce it - is reported by Greenpeace to have significantly increased sickening air pollution in northern China, especially around Beijing (Edward Wong, "Greenpeace Links Beijing Pollution to Steel Plants," The New York Times, February 17, 2017).

Dan Levin, "Ice Roads Ease Isolation in Canada’s North, but They’re Melting Too Soon," The New York Times, April19, 2017, "In Canada’s northern latitudes, the frigid winter means freedom. That is when lakes and rivers freeze into pavements of marbled blue ice. For a few months, trucks can haul fuel or lumber or diamonds or a moose carcass to the region’s remote communities and mines that are cut off by water and wilderness, reachable for most of the year only by barge or by air. But Canada’s ice roads — more than 3,300 miles of them — have been freezing later and melting earlier, drastically reducing the precious window of time that isolated residents rely on to restock a year’s worth of vital supplies, or to simply take a road trip."

43 An unusually fast and intense (by previous standards) snow storm accompanied by previously rare thunder, dumped up to 18" of snow in parts of New England and 14" in New York City, accompanied by 35 mile and hour winds caused some transportation problems and power outages, February 9-10, 2017 ("Snowstorm Hits the Northeast," The New York Times, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/winter-storm-nyc-niko-weather.html?ref=todayspaper).

In what is likely another example of climate change, Nicholas Fandos, "Cherry Blossoms in Washington Could Peak Early," The New York Times, March 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics/cherry-blossoms-washington.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The iconic blossoming cherry trees that ring the Tidal Basin here have symbolized the arrival of spring for nearly a century. This year, they will be one more sign of wacky and warming weather. The National Park Service, which maintains the trees, said on Wednesday that the pink and white blossoms could reach their peak as soon as March 14, a full three weeks earlier than normal. If the flowers indeed pop on that date, it will be the earliest bloom on record." Also an example of climate change is, by previous standards, an unusual late winter storm and cold snap that could bring East Coast temperatures below freezing as far south as Northern Florida, among other things threatening to kill the DC Cherry blossoms just as they are reaching their height (The weather section of The New York Times, March 15, 2017).

Several days of heavy rain resulted in flash flooding across the Carolinas during the week of April 23, 2017, closing roads and raising river levels that were still rising on April 23 (Acuweather.com, April 23, 2017, http://www.accuweather.com). The same set of severe storms continued across the central U.S. over April 25, causing flooding and damaging buildings in Arkansas, with flooding expected in Oklahoma, as strong winds, and possible tornados were expected from Texas and Louisiana north to Missouri and Illinois (Ashley Williams, "Reports: Arkansas roads flooded, buildings damaged as severe storms pummel central US," AccuWeather, April 26, 2017, http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/reports-storms-capable-of-spawning-tornadoes- bear-down-on-arkansas/70001503). The continuing set of storms caused flooding, destruction and at least nine deaths from tornados and flooding across the Midwest and South, while Kansas suffered a late season blizzard, closing roads. In Texas four tornados swept an area 35 miles long and 15 wide, and one tornado may have been on the ground for 40 miles! There was flooding or wind damage in Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama ("Tornadoes and Flooding in South and Midwest Kill at Least 9," The New York Times, April 30,2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/deadly-tornadoes-floods-south- midwest.html?ref=todayspaper).

About 70 percent of the 2017 Texas peach crop was lost, as early hot weather brought the peach trees into bloom early, with a freeze following killing many of the flowers ("Texas peach crop nipped in the bud by too warm weather," Albuquerque Journal, April 23, 2017).

Jack Healy, "Burying Their Cattle, Ranchers Call Wildfires ‘Our Hurricane Katrina’ The New York Times, March 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/us/burying-their-cattle-ranchers-call- wildfires-our-hurricane-katrina.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "Death comes with raising cattle: coyotes, blizzards and the inevitable trip to the slaughterhouse and dinner plate. But after 30 years of ranching, Mark and Mary Kaltzenbach were not ready for what met them after a wildfire charred their land and more than one million acres of rain-starved range this month. Dozens of their Angus cows lay dead on the blackened ground, hooves jutting in the air. Others staggered around like broken toys, unable to see or breathe, their black fur and dark eyes burned, plastic identification tags melted to their ears. Young calves lay dying. Ranching families across this countryside are now facing an existential threat to a way of life that has sustained them since homesteading days: years of cleanup and crippling losses after wind-driven wildfires across Kansas, Oklahoma and the Texas panhandle killed seven people and devoured homes, miles of fences and as much as 80 percent of some families’ cattle herds."

44

Global warming induced climate change continues to bring more extreme weather, sometimes in pairs of opposites as hit the U.S. west coast in January when somewhat eased severe long term drought, especially in California, was broken by a series of storms with tremendous rains and snow bringing floods from Southern California to Portland Oregon. On one day, Long Beach, CA received a record 1.54" while record snows brought many feet snow pack to the Sierra Nevada, quickly going from very little to 1.63% of normal. 12 feet of snow fell at the ski area at Taho, while Crater Lake in Oregon received some 8 feet of snow, and a foot fell in southwest Washington, that normally receives precipitation as rain. There was severe flooding, evacuations and rescues in some areas, including near Sacramento, CA (Adam Nagourney, "It Never Rains in California (It Pours," The New York Times, January 14, 2017; and Marcio J. Sanchez and Janie Har, "Drought-ending storms swamp Northwest," Albuquerque Journal, January 12, 2017). With the continued switch of extremes, drought to flood, the Oroville Dam, in Oroville, CA went from perhaps record low to record high, necessitating emergency water release to keep the reservoir from overflowing. That brought: Mike McPhail and Jess Bidgood, "In Shadow of California Dam, Water Turns From Wish to Woe," The New York Times, February 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/oroville-dam-california-spillway.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "It wasn’t so long ago that residents here had to drag their houseboats into a dusty field from the barren banks of Lake Oroville, which had almost no water left to keep them afloat. Now after weeks of rain, that dusty field is swelling with water and nearly 200,000 people had to evacuate the area when the state’s second-largest reservoir developed a hole in its auxiliary spillway and threatened to catastrophically flood nearby towns." Thomas Fuller, "California, Parched for 5 Years, Is Now Battered by Water," The New York Times, February 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/us/california-storms.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A powerful storm with near hurricane-force winds swept through Southern California on Saturday, killing at least two people and causing widespread disruptions, but providing a definitive respite from five years of drought. Amid one of the wettest winters in decades, more heavy rainfall was due to strike Northern California starting on Sunday. 'I’ve been a meteorologist here for 25 years and I personally can’t remember a storm that had that much wind with it,' said David Sweet in the Los Angeles office of the National Weather Service. “It was a very impressive storm.” Parched for the past five years, California now finds itself in some areas with too much water. Workers have rushed to fix the damaged embankment of the Oroville Dam north of Sacramento, which this past week was weakened by water discharged from an emergency spillway. Some forecasts said that the area could be hardest hit by the new round of rainfall on Sunday. At the Port of Los Angeles, winds reached 75 miles an hour on Friday, just above the threshold to be considered a hurricane, Mr. Sweet said. Rainfall on some inland mountain slopes reached nine inches, the same amount of precipitation that would normally fall during an entire winter month. Mr. Sweet described a plume of moisture extending from Hawaii to Southern California, bringing with it tropical moisture. 'It was an atmospheric river,' he said. The combination of wind and rain knocked down trees across the Los Angeles area, prompted mudslides, flooded freeways and opened up a sink hole in the San Fernando Valley large enough to almost swallow two cars. Tens of thousands of Southern California residents lost power during the storm, portions of Amtrak train service were suspended and dozens of flights were canceled or delayed."

Russell Goldman, "Mudslide in Colombia: Death Toll Surges to More Than 230," The New York Times, April 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/americas/colombia-flood-mudslide- mocoa.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "More than 230 people were killed, many of them asleep in their beds, when a giant wall of water carrying tons of mud and debris surged through a city in southwest Colombia on Saturday after heavy rains caused a nearby river to overflow, officials said." The Columbia mudslide was one of many caused by widespread far from what has been normal very heavy rains. Nicholas Casey and Andrea Zarate, "Mud Erased a Village in Peru, a Sign of Larger Perils in

45 South America," The New York Times, April 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/americas/peru-floods-mudslides-south- america.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A catastrophic mudslide essentially erased Barba Blanca from the map last month. Yet somehow all 150 people who lived here in this Peruvian village managed to escape." "Large parts of South America have been pummeled for weeks by torrential rains that are wreaking havoc throughout the western region of the continent. Floods and destructive mudslides in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia have killed hundreds and displaced thousands more."

Jonathan Watts, and Mauricio Weibel, "Deadly wildfire razes entire town in : 'Literally like Dante's Inferno': One body found in smoldering ruins of Santa Olga, the worst-hit of several smaller communities, as hot, dry weather fuels fiercest fires in recent history," The Guardian, January 26, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/26/chile-wildfires-destroy-town-santa-olga, reported, "An entire town has been consumed by flames in Chile as unusually hot, dry weather undermined efforts to combat the worst forest fires in the country’s recent history. More than 1,000 buildings, including schools, nurseries, shops and a post office were destroyed in Santa Olga, the biggest of several communities to be reduced to ashes in the Maule region."

Pascale Bonnepoy, "Flooding Leaves Millions Without Water in Santiago, Chile," The New York Times, February 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/world/americas/santiago-chile- flooding-mudslides.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Rapid runoff of rainfall near Santiago, Chile, has paradoxically left millions of the capital city’s residents without water. The rains caused flooding and destructive mudslides on vulnerable mountainsides near the city over the weekend, killing at least three people, with 19 more reported missing. The mudslides and floods in turn contaminated the Maipo River, a main source of drinking water for much of Santiago and the surrounding metropolitan region. The water utility Aguas Andinas, whose plants draw from the river, suspended service on Sunday for about 1.5 million customers, affecting a total of about five million residents."

Thomas Erdbrink, "Protests in Iranian City Where ‘Everything Is Covered in Brown Dust’," The New York Times, February 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/world/middleeast/iran-ahvaz- pollution-protests.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Days of protests over dust storms, power failures and government mismanagement in one of Iran’s most oil-rich cities subsided on Sunday after security forces declared all demonstrations illegal. Residents of Ahvaz, a city with a majority Arab population near the border with Iraq, had been protesting for five days in increasingly large gatherings, shown in cellphone video clips shared on social media. The region around Ahvaz is a center of oil production in Iran, and since economic sanctions were lifted, Iran’s government has been hoping for foreign investment in the area to update refineries and power stations and fix deepening ecological problems." "Demonstrators can also be heard shouting, 'Unemployment, unemployment,' another big problem in the region, and urging their countrymen to offer assistance." Oil production was also affected, with the Ministry of Petroleum reporting that production had temporarily fallen by 700,000 barrels a day. In addition to the short-term effects of the dust storm, the city is wrestling with long-term environmental challenges. Ahvaz, home to around one million people, is surrounded by petrochemical factories that emit pollutants on a large scale. A 15-year drought, in combination with poorly planned dam building, has caused local marshes to dry up, increasing the level of dust particles in the air to record highs. "The World Health Organization said in 2015 that Ahvaz was the most polluted city in the world."

Henry Fountain, "Sydney’s Swelter Has a Climate Change Link, Scientists Say." The New York Times, March 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/science/australia-heat-climate-

46 change.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, Australia has suffered through a series of brutal heat waves over the past two months, with temperatures reaching a scorching 113 degrees Fahrenheit in some parts of the state of New South Wales." "Her analysis, conducted with a loose-knit group of researchers called World Weather Attribution, was made public on Thursday. Their conclusion was that climate change made maximum temperatures like those seen in January and February at least 10 times more likely than a century ago, before significant greenhouse gas emissions from human activity started warming the planet. Looked at another way, that means that the kind of soaring temperatures expected to occur in New South Wales once every 500 years on average now may occur once every 50 years. What is more, the researchers found that if climate change continued unabated, such maximum temperatures may occur on average every five years."

Jacqueline Williams, "Cyclone Debbie Strikes Queensland in Australia With Full Fury," The New York Times, March 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/australia/cyclone-debbie- queensland-evacuation.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, " A powerful cyclone packing wind gusts as high as 160 miles per hour struck the northeastern coast of Australia on Tuesday, forcing tens of thousands of people to flee, leaving 48,000 homes without power and drenching Queensland with heavy rains. The Category 4 storm, named Cyclone Debbie, battered the tourist islands off the coast before hitting the mainland with its full fury, gathering enough force that officials feared the potential for widespread damage. Aggravating the situation was the storm’s slow, potent march onto the coastline. 'Debbie is a very large, slow-moving system,' said John Fowler, a spokesman for Ergon Energy, noting that 48,000 customers were without power in the Bowen, Whitsunday and Mackay areas. “This one is actually taking its time, so the longer it takes, the more damage it will do — not just to our network but obviously to property as well.'”

Cambodia's lime stone karsts are home to unique plants and animals, as well as small temples and shrines, but the karsts are being destroyed to use the limestone to make cement and the entire habitat and the cultural sites are being destroyed in the process (Julia Wallace, "Ground to Dust," The New York Times, April 30, 2017).

Lynn V. Dicks, et al, "Ten policies for pollinators: What governments can do to safeguard pollination services," Science, November 2016, discusses the following "Ten pollinator policies" to protect bees and other pollinators: 1. Raise pesticide regulatory standards; 2. Promote integrated management (IPM); 3. Include indirect and subleathal effects in GM crop assessments; 4. Regulate movement of managed pollinators; 5. Develop incentives, such as insurance schemes, to help farmers benefit from ecosystem services instead of agrochemicals; 6. Recognize pollination as an agricultural input in extension services; 7. Support diversified farming systems; 8. Conserve and restore "green infrastructure" (a network of habitats that pollinators can move between) in agricultural and urban landscapes; 9. Developing team monitoring of pollinators and pollinating; 10. Fund participatory research on improving yields in organic, diversified and ecologically intensified farming.

As the Chinese middle class grows and demands more protein, including fish, China's worldwide fishing fleet contributes to diminishing fish stocks around the world. 90% of the world's fisheries are fully exploited or facing collapse (Andrew, "China’s Appetite Pushes Fisheries to the Brink," The New York Times, April 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/chinas-appetite-pushes- fisheries-to-the-brink.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0).

Tatania Shlossberg, "Mass Die-Off of Whales in Atlantic Is Being Investigated," The New York Times, April 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/climate/whales-atlantic-mass-dieoff- noaa.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "Humpback whales have been dying in extraordinary numbers along the Eastern Seaboard since the beginning of last year. Marine biologists have a term for it — an “unusual mortality event” — but they have no firm idea why it is happening. Forty-one whales have died in the past 15 months along the Atlantic coast from North Carolina to Maine. In a news conference on Thursday, officials from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

47 Administration Fisheries said that they had not identified the underlying reason for the mass death, but that 10 of the whales are known to have been killed by collisions with ships."

Jeffrey Gettleman, "Elephants Get a Reprieve as Price of Ivory Falls," The New York Times, March 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/africa/ivory-elephants- china.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Finally, there’s some good news for elephants. The price of ivory in China, the world’s biggest market for elephant tusks, has fallen sharply, which may spell a reprieve from the intense poaching of the past decade. According to a report released on Wednesday by Save the Elephants, a respected wildlife group in , the price of ivory is less than half of what it was just three years ago, showing that demand is plummeting. Tougher economic times, a sustained advocacy campaign and China’s apparent commitment to shutting down its domestic ivory trade this year were the drivers of the change, elephant experts said."

A variety of new tools have begun to be employed against invasive species. Among them are a robots that traps lion fish in the waters of Bermuda, a helicopter that drops poison bated dead mice on trees in Guam to rid them of brown tree snakes, and boats with very large outstretched nets that stun and capture Asian carp in the U.S. Midwest (Beth Borenstein, "New tools deployed against invasive species, Albuquerque Journal, April 29, 2017).

A court in South Africa has overturned the nation's ban on selling rhinoceros horns (Russell Goldman, "Court Says Rhino Horns May be Sold," The New York Times, April 6, 2017).

World Overview

International Crisis Group (ICG), Watch List 2017, No. 3, From Early Warning to Early Action, February 24, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/3-watch-list-2017, Crisis Group’s Watch List 2017 includes the Lake Chad basin, Libya, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sahel, , Syria, , Venezuela and . This annual early-warning report identifies conflict situations in which prompt action by the and its member states would generate stronger prospects for peace. Global Overview Whether unprecedented or not, the challenges currently facing our global security are immense and cause for considerable alarm. It is difficult to think of a time in recent history when there has been such a confluence of destabilizing factors – local, regional and global – hindering collective capacity to better manage violence. These overlapping risks, unchecked, could coalesce into a major crisis – indeed we are currently experiencing a spike in global conflict violence – without the safety net of solid structures to deal with it. When Crisis Group was founded, its premise was that bringing field-based expert analysis to the attention of (principally) Western policymakers could effect positive change in both preventing and ending situations of deadly conflict. Much of that premise still holds, but for us, as for others, it is no longer sufficient: the West can no longer be viewed either as homogenous or an oasis of tranquility. Increasingly, too, its self- projected image as an unalloyed force for good is becoming exposed. Greater efforts are needed, and urgently, both to understand better the growing dangers of conflict seeping from one arena to another; and to engage a broader array of actors with the capacity to effect positive change. This document seeks to do two things. First, it aims to highlight those conflicts which Crisis Group believes threaten to worsen significantly unless remedial action is taken. Inevitably perhaps, the countries selected represent a partial snapshot. For that reason we place them explicitly in their regional contexts. But even so, strong arguments can be made for the inclusion of others: examples include , Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the South China Sea and Democratic Republic of Congo. A case could be made, too, for the Western Balkans, perhaps, or Central Asian states. That we could provide a rival, equally valid list is itself cause for concern. For each conflict, we seek to indicate the contours of possible policy responses based on ground- up analysis. In putting forward tentative prescriptions, our principal target is the European Union (EU), its institutions and member states, whether working directly or in conjunction with others. An underlying

48 premise of this report is our belief that the EU has the potential – indeed faces an imperative – to bring to bear all the tools at its disposal fully to do its bit, in concert with others, to preserve the threatened field of conflict prevention. Second, the list can be read as one document. Percolating through it are the range of interlinked dangers and stresses that makes this era so perilous. Essentially, these can be distilled down to three. First, an increasing fusion of the domestic with the international. Second, a sense of crisis overload. And third, growing uncertainty about hitherto assumed structures and institutions to collectively manage danger. All ten conflicts possess international dimensions, in many instances overwhelmingly so. In such crowded landscapes – with a multitude of actors and equally broad range of motivations – navigating a route to peace becomes immeasurably more difficult. The growing prevalence of non-state armed groups and in some instances their propensity to fracture, together with the blending of licit and illicit economies, churns yet more this complex terrain. This increasing fusion of local and global is reflected further in heightened nationalism and ideological dogmatism, with – as things stand – the triumph of policies designed to cater to short-term tactical imperatives as much if not more than preserving or ensuring long-term stability. This can be seen in burgeoning intolerance to the mass movement of people, as actions are taken to stem or push back the flow without trying adequately to address the reasons why such movement is underway on such an unprecedented scale. It can be witnessed in the resort to muscular security responses that can neither fully contain the threat nor address its underlying causes. And it is manifested in some actors resorting too readily to the rallying cry of ­counter-, with its playbook of repressive measures and eschewing the very inclusivity invariably essential to sustained peace. In the balance between soft and hard power, the latter currently is dominant. All this, of course, is playing out against – and in part driven by – a growing diffusion of power globally. This in and of itself is not a bad thing, but the uncertainties such a shift throws up are cause for concern. Further, the stresses to which Europe is currently exposed; the revival of geopolitics; and uncertainty about the future direction of the trans-Atlantic alliance and the underlying commitment to the UN of its traditional power-brokers, represent significant challenges to hitherto durable assumptions about the role of international institutions and law, and the web of alliances built up in the past 70 years. So far so gloomy (and without touching on climate change or demographic trends). But this report also, we believe, contains within it ideas which might contribute to a needed course correction. In essence, it constitutes a call to learn old lessons amid these new dynamics. What, in particular, might this mean for the EU? We posit two broad obser­vations, outlined in more detail in the following pages. They sit on top of an underlying imperative to ensure that through their actions the EU and its member states do not contribute to generating further harm. In many instances where room for positive change is currently heavily circumscribed, avoiding worse constitutes progress. First, we seek to identify what Europe’s leverage is with regards to specific conflicts and regions. Often it is indirect, but no less important for that. Frequently, too, we suggest it will involve maximizing opportunities presented by dialogues with other regional organisations to develop an understanding of shared interests and a division of responsibilities in their pursuit. In this regard, as in all others, speaking with as unified a voice as possible is imperative: dissonance can be exploited. Providing maximum support to the new UN Secretary-General in his efforts to revive that organization’s work in conflict prevention must also be a priority. Second, in virtually every crisis we cite, a better balance is required between the desire for quick impact and the need to put in place sustainable solutions. The two need not be at odds with each other – we should reject the notion that it is a binary choice. But it will require Europe to speak out more clearly in defense of core values – in deed, not simply rhetoric; to make clear that its humanitarian and development assistance is for those most in need, not solely for the pursuit of political ends; to nudge conflict parties toward pursuing peace through inclusive dialogue, not simply force; and to priorities the pursuit of better models of governance, the absence of which is at the root of so many of today’s conflicts. To some these may appear as thin reeds on which to float notions of charting a more positive course. But in the current atmosphere of uncertainty, through articulating clear, principled and strategic goals and how, tactically, it will seek to work toward them in conjunction with others, Europe has the

49 opportunity to make a significant contribution toward a more stable and peaceful future. Africa The threat of jihadist and other violent non-state groups, particularly in the Sahel, Lake Chad basin and Somalia, will remain top of Africa’s security agenda. The absence or slow return of government administration to 'liberated' areas and other neglected hinterlands, and the weak and slow response to the fallout from these conflicts, such as displacement and social tensions, may allow militants to regroup. That Nigeria faces, in addition to this challenge, the resurgence of Niger Delta militancy puts extra strain on a country pivotal to Africa’s stability. It is particularly important that African governments respond in ways that avoid deepening the problem or aggravating other sources of fragility through heavy-handed counter- tactics, stigmatizing communities or worsening tensions between political leaders and military hierarchies. African powers recently negotiated a peaceful transition in Gambia, but leadership issues will continue to be a destabilizing factor. Unclear succession mechanisms for aging autocrats (Zimbabwe and Angola) and the refusal of leaders to exit as scheduled despite risks of urban protest (such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo) or, worse, renewed insurgency () look set to remain part of the landscape. Contested and fraught electoral processes (Kenya) alongside authoritarian drift () drive the continued closure of democratic space, as power too often remains overly centralized and politics zero-sum. But citizens, particularly young people, with strong democratic aspirations but who in places are reeling under pressures of economic slowdown () and continued rising unemployment, will continue to push back or launch anti-government protests often through social media (). Stronger coordination between Africa’s regional bodies and their international partners in response to conflict would be welcome, though it is becoming more difficult. While the impact of a new UN Secretary-General and U.S. administration remains uncertain, the leverage of the UN and other traditional partners is growing weaker. Political dynamics are also becoming considerably more complex, regionalized (as in ) and multipolar as other actors (China, Gulf states and Turkey) increasingly seek to influence Africa’s geopolitics. In this context, 2017 provides a critical opportunity for reshaping European Union (EU)-Africa relations. The EU is currently identifying its strategic interests in Africa and discussing the future of the Cotonou Agreement after 2020, including the European Development Fund and the Africa Peace Facility, as well as its financing for development worldwide. Meanwhile, the (AU) is beginning to take steps toward financial self-sufficiency and has embarked on a wholesale reform of the Union that will open it up to further scrutiny and reveal the extent of member states’ commitment to the body. The fifth ­EU- Africa summit scheduled for November 2017 in Côte d’Ivoire offers a platform to continue discussing priorities and cooperation between the two continents, in particular on migration and youth. But whether the EU and Africa are able to agree on mutual priorities and commit to renewed cooperation depends on the extent to which the two sides are willing to listen and engage outside their respective narratives. The EU’s deals with some states to curb people-smuggling are problematic and may have limited impact if not focused on the drivers of migration: repression, war, poverty, the youth bulge and poor governance. The EU needs to better balance its attempts to thwart migration northwards with its important work in promoting good governance, democratization and rule of law. Crucially, it needs to better understand the collusion between state officials and institutions, local power brokers and smugglers. The EU has an important role to play in addressing the humanitarian fallout from conflict in sub- Saharan Africa, which hosts 29 per cent of the world’s displaced. It should work closely with the AU to reduce the destabilizing impact of refugees on countries and regions too weak to absorb them; this needs to involve greater efforts on the part of Europe at burden sharing. Refugee flight within Africa has serious security ramifications for countries and regions under extreme pressure, particularly Kenya (notably due to the Dadaab camps), the Great Lakes region, the Lake Chad basin, northern Uganda and Sudan’s Darfur and Two Areas, as well as the wider Horn of Africa as it receives refugees from Yemen. A. Lake Chad Basin: Controlling the Cost of Counter-insurgency In the Lake Chad basin, the insurgency has hugely exacerbated pre-existing violence and underdevelopment. Despite recent military setbacks the jihadist group remains a significant regional threat, recruiting members and attacking civilians and security forces in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and

50 Niger, and has brought in its wake a humanitarian catastrophe. Failure to bring security, other basic public goods and visible socio-economic dividends to affected areas risks derailing recent progress. That would have severe consequences for the security and long-term stability of the four countries bordering the lake. 1. Divided, but still deadly Boko Haram faces strong pushback due to falling societal support, the mobilization of vigilante units and pressure from relatively well-coordinated regional security forces. This pressure has precipitated a wave of surrenders, mainly by women and children, and exacerbated internal tensions leading to a rift between two factions. One remains loyal to the group’s erstwhile overall leader, Abubakar Shekau, and is mostly present to the south of Lake Chad and along the ­Nigeria-Cameroon border. The second claims allegiance to Abu Musa al-Barnawi (Habib Yusuf), is based in the north of Nigeria’s Borno state along the border with Niger and mostly operates on the lake. But Boko Haram, though torn, remains a significant threat. In the region’s border areas and the swampy, heavily vegetated and inaccessible Lake Chad it has found ideal areas to seek refuge, resupply and regroup. Over the last three months the dry season has allowed fighters to move more freely, which may explain the recent small increase in attacks. The spike may also be intended to prove, in response to military pressure, that the movement is far from down and out. Nigeria and Cameroon launched a joint military operation in late 2016, but there are signs that Shekau and his core units had dispersed beforehand. They are now regrouping and have increased suicide bomber attacks (deploying a notable number of female assailants) against soft targets, including in the city of Maiduguri in northern Nigeria. The faction led by Barnawi is less active. It seems to be trying to rebuild connections with the local population and is focusing on military targets. However, it appears to be suffering significant losses as members surrender to national security forces. Al-Qaeda’s release of a statement on the Boko Haram conflict in January 2017 – the first in a long time – suggests that it may be trying to use the current rift within Boko Haram to regain influence in the area. But its traction on the ground remains unclear. 2. A deepening humanitarian emergency The severe humanitarian fallout is getting worse. Across the region, over 10 million people are in need of assistance and about 2.3 million are displaced, of which an overwhelming majority are women and girls. Food insecurity has increased significantly over the last twelve months due to displacement; over a third of the 1.5 million displaced children suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Aid workers are only now gaining a clearer sense of the deeper damage to agriculture and trade. Despite a steady increase in international assistance, the response remains under-funded, lacks gender-sensitive assistance and is still hampered by insecurity. In 2016, donors provided only 53 per cent of the $739 million needed that year. That the cost of the response plan for 2017 has risen to $1.5 billion reflects the deteriorating situation. While more funding is only part of the solution, donors do need to finance adequately the 2017 plan as part of efforts to halt a further worsening of the crisis. 3. The cost of a militarized approach Lake Chad countries and their international partners need to be aware that the social and economic costs of continued military operations carry risks for the region’s political future and security. They should balance gains made by the region’s armies against the displacement caused by their operations and the negative impact on livelihoods, including on cross-border trade. This is exacerbated by a military ban on trade in some local goods, for fear Boko Haram could tax it, which is only slowly being lifted. If the negative impact on livelihoods is not mitigated quickly, it could increase resentment against authorities, make it harder for displaced people to return home (if farmers miss the upcoming sowing season they could become more dependent on humanitarian aid) and possibly make people more susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram or violent criminal groups. The militarization of much of the area previously under Boko Haram’s influence risks generating a cycle of alienation and exclusion. 4. Peeling away Boko Haram

51 Many fighters, both male and female, have surrendered or been captured in recent months, although evidence suggests very few of the hard core are among them. It is vital to encourage this trend to peel away the outer circle of Boko Haram support, increase intelligence gathering through debriefing defectors and exploit the movement’s declining social legitimacy. To do so, it is necessary to deal with captives quickly and decently, according to their role in the organization and in strict compliance with international human rights standards. Quick and fair processing could significantly lighten the burden on prisons and justice systems in all four countries. The European Union (EU) and its international partners should assist in encouraging more Boko Haram members to surrender by ensuring the Lake Chad countries deal appropriately with captured suspects, including by avoiding keeping them in lengthy pre-trial detention and taking into account gender- specific needs. They should also support the four countries to differentiate between hardliners and others, establish community restorative justice programs where appropriate and start to build acceptable penitentiary services. 5. Planning for the aftermath While Boko Haram continues to pose a security threat, the temptation is to allow military tactical demands to dominate thinking. This would be a mistake as only by paying early attention to the economic and social consequences of the violence can national and international actors prevent Boko Haram from regrouping or stop a similar group emerging. To deal with the consequences of displacement, the EU and member states should encourage countries of the region to ensure civilians handle much of the response, invest more in creating livelihoods, establish quick-impact youth employment projects and stimulate the longer-term recovery of agriculture and trade. The EU should support better coordination between the military and civilian branches of the state, particularly problematic in Nigeria, including through its program “Strengthening the management and governance of migration and return and long-term resettlement in Nigeria”. Re-establishing markets and securing cross-border trade routes should be a priority of the EU’s Lake Chad Inclusive Economic and Social Recovery Programme (RESILAC). In partnership with civil society, the EU and its member states should strengthen programs to tackle gender stereotypes and raise awareness about women’s roles including in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. They should develop and support programs to increase women’s recruitment in local police forces and deploy them in camps for the internally displaced as soon as possible. The EU should also be cognizant of the longer-term risks of over-reliance on vigilante committees; member states supporting security efforts should press regional governments to formulate plans for winding them down as and when the Boko Haram threat recedes. B. The Sahel: Mali’s Crumbling Peace Process and the Spreading Jihadist Threat Despite significant international sweat, the Sahel remains on a trajectory toward greater violence and widening instability. Jihadists, armed groups and entrenched criminal networks – sometimes linked to national and local authorities – continue to expand and threaten the stability of already weak states. Across the region, citizens remain deeply disenchanted with their governments. International actors must review their current strategies, which tackle the symptoms of the Sahel’s problems without addressing their underlying cause: central governments’ long-term neglect of their states. In particular, they should act urgently to prevent the collapse of the peace process in Mali – a genuine danger this year that would have serious implications for security across the Sahel. 1. Widening cracks in Mali’s peace process At the heart of the Sahel’s instability is Mali’s long-running crisis. It is spilling over into and spreading to fragile Niger and more stable Senegal. Twenty months since the government and armed groups signed the Algeria-brokered Bamako peace agreement in June 2015, implementation is faltering and the deal’s collapse is a real possibility. Despite publicly claiming to support the process, Malian parties lack confidence in a deal that was signed under international pressure and has serious shortcomings. It does little to tackle the violent war economy in which prominent businessmen rely on small private armies to protect trafficking routes. It also fails to restore a viable balance of power between northern

52 communities and leaders who compete for resources, influence and territory. The recent fracturing of the main rebel coalition, the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), has seen the creation of new community-based armed groups, such as the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad and the Congrès pour la Justice dans l’Azawad, and may further aggravate insecurity. More worryingly, the appointment of interim local authorities and the launch of mixed patrols comprising army soldiers and former rebels in the north have failed to demonstrate much positive impact at the local level. Meanwhile, jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Eddine and al- Mourabitoun, remain active. Having been chased out of major towns, rather than trying to hold urban areas they are striking provincial and district centres from rural bases. Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the bombing on 18 January that killed 61 personnel of the mixed unit in Gao region. At the same time, insecurity is rising in areas long neglected by the state such as central Mali, which is not included in the northern Mali peace process. Jihadists and other violent non-state groups are filling the security vacuum as the army retreats and local authorities and the central government abandon immense rural areas. Bamako still has no effective response to the jihadists’ strategy of threatening or killing local authorities or civil society members that stand against them. In addition, the rise of a new group, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and the possible influx from Libya of defeated Islamic State (IS) fighters are further sources of concern. 2. Jihad sans frontières Despite international military intervention including by UN peacekeepers, jihadists are making inroads into other Sahelian countries. In late 2016, jihadist fighters based in central and northern Mali launched attacks in western Niger and northern Burkina Faso, underscoring the region’s vulnerability and the serious risks of overlapping conflicts across the greater Sahel. On 6 February, the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) met in Bamako to announce the creation of a regional force to tackle terrorism and transnational crime. It remains to be seen how effective this ambitious project will prove. Mali’s neighbors are right to point out that Bamako is responsible for failing to prevent radical groups using its territory. However, they should also pay closer attention to their own internal dynamics. These include years of state neglect and poor political representation of certain communities – especially nomadic Fulanis in the region of Djibo in Burkina Faso and Tillabery in Niger. Chronic resource limitations hobble Sahelian states’ ability to respond effectively: Niger’s state revenue, for example, is €1.7 billion, about as much as France invested in stadiums to host the 2016 European football competition. In 2016, Burkina Faso suffered eight attacks originating in Mali and it remains the most vulnerable of Mali’s neighbors. The ousting of former President Blaise Compaoré in 2014 left the security apparatus in disarray. National authorities have been slow to rebuild the intelligence system and they lack a defense strategy to help security forces adjust to rapidly evolving threats. Despite recurring attacks, military posts in the country’s northern Sahel region remain poorly protected. With limited resources the government will struggle to meet demands for significant social development, which partly drove the October 2014 uprising, and, at the same time, increase spending to revamp the security forces. Should Burkina be tempted to use the social welfare budget to plug security holes, it could face new protests. 3. Reviving the Malian peace process International forces have been slow to adjust to changing ground realities and for now there is little appetite in Bamako or the region for a major course correction. However, further deterioration – such as jihadist groups expanding westwards into Ségou region in the center – would require a response. The European Union (EU) and its member states should anticipate this and encourage Malian parties and the Algeria-led mediation team to meet again before the process loses all credibility. New talks would offer all parties an opportunity to express their concerns about the implementation of the Bamako agreement and reenergize it. They should agree on additional appendices that include a new timetable and mechanisms to ensure that each party respects its commitments. To limit the risk of further armed group fragmentation, discussions should also focus on ways to bring splinter groups into the process. This could mostly be done by integrating them into one of the existing coalitions, the CMA or Platform.

53 To avoid the further spread of violence in Mali, the EU and its member states should encourage and support central government and local authorities to mediate local conflicts. They should also assist local authorities, through training and direct support, to provide public services and ensure the equitable sharing of natural resources. Such peacebuilding support should not be framed as preventing or countering “violent extremism” (P/CVE) as these concepts lack clarity, mask the complex dynamics of jihadist recruitment and risk stigmatizing communities that receive such assistance. Vital too is the need for a shift in international development strategies. The focus should be as much on helping the state provide services to the population, including justice and security, as on economic projects or infrastructure. The EU and member states should pay particular attention to assisting the state’s local-level redeployment through programs that support public services. They should encourage and assist the government to improve its draft 'Plan for Central Mali' and make it a useful tool to coordinate government efforts. They should also ensure that the EU’s capacity-building mission, EUCAP Mali, closely collaborates with authorities at both central and regional levels to make Mopti region in the center a pilot site to test policies aimed at improving local security, and specifically reforming the local police. Lessons drawn from here could be applied in northern Mali and other Sahelian regions. 4. Halting jihadists’ cross-border spread The EU and its member states should pay more attention to Burkina Faso, which faces a real threat from armed groups. In particular, member states with a military presence in Mali should deploy forces near its border with Burkina Faso, and provide the Burkinabè security forces with helicopters so that they can conduct aerial surveillance of the long shared border. Although the link between underdevelopment and radicalization is complex and indirect, increasing aid in health, education and professional training particularly in areas affected by attacks, could potentially improve relations between state authorities and communities and therefore undercut an important grievance that extremist groups often exploit. C. Somalia: New Leadership, Persistent Problems Somalia finally has a new leadership but faces a slew of longstanding problems, moving forward. The country’s course in the next year will depend in particular on how the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) handles the fallout from a fraudulent and fractious electoral process and the country’s multiple security threats. If left unaddressed, these challenges combined with others such as illicit foreign funding of politicians, divisions over the country’s regional and international relations and persistent clashes driven by clan-based interests will create opportunities for armed actors – including Al-Shabaab and an emerging Islamic State (IS) – to continue to operate and expand. 1. The day after divisive elections The FGS and federal member states have come through a delayed, chaotic and divisive election process to select a new president and two houses of parliament. Newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo secured unprecedented cross-clan support but expectations are high and a backlash against him is probable unless he moves quickly to fulfil his pledge to rebuild the security forces and state institutions, tackle corruption and unify the country. Furthermore, Farmajo’s intention to reshape Somalia’s foreign policy could prove unsettling for the country and the region. He won partly thanks to his campaign image as a staunch nationalist, opposed to foreign meddling, but he will need to move cautiously to manage tricky regional politics and ease the anxieties of powerful neighbors. In turn, the African Union (AU) and other partners need to be aware of the destabilizing potential of the perceived resurgent Somali nationalism embodied in Farmajo and should encourage discreet diplomacy between Somalia and its neighbors to promote dialogue and accommodation. The indirect election process made positive steps toward improving representation at clan-based level and could pave the way for direct elections. But the absence of transparency and accountability among electoral bodies undermined the polls’ legitimacy and increased the chances that the results will be contested. There are credible allegations of foreign states (mostly in the Gulf) supporting their favored candidates financially. Gender balance in the new parliament will improve but the proportion of women will

54 still fall short of the 30 per cent quota. 2. Conflicts between and within federal member states President Farmajo will have to navigate Somalia’s dysfunctional politics, including its contentious federalism project. The lack of agreed policies or framework to tackle disputes among federal member states or between them and central government makes his work particularly tricky. The most intractable of the conflicts between federal states remains that between the Interim Administration (GIA) and over the city of which straddles their common border. Clashes in November and December 2016 saw hundreds killed and thousands displaced. Tensions subsided following a ceasefire agreement in late December, but the violence highlights the ferocity of competition between clans for territorial control. Disputes within federal states also hamper efforts to rebuild the country. On 10 January, local Galmudug state parliamentarians passed a no-confidence motion against GIA President Abdikarim Guled, which he rejected on the grounds that it fell short of the required two-thirds threshold and was passed while parliament was closed. The GIA also faces resistance from the Sufi-aligned, anti-Al-Shabaab militia, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), which continues to control Galmudug state capital, Dhusamareeb. In Somaliland, which does not recognize the FGS’s authority, elections planned for March 2017 have been pushed back until October due to drought. Since clan tensions have risen significantly there, the process could be more violent than in the past. 3. Al-Shabaab adapts as Islamic State looks for a foothold Al-Shabaab remains resilient and continues to launch strikes against civilian and military targets across Somalia, especially in ’s heavily guarded center. Though weakened, it has adapted and become versatile in using both urban and rural guerrilla tactics. Effective counter-insurgency will require concerted action by both military and civilian actors. While U.S. and ground operations have degraded the group’s military strength and eliminated high-profile figures, they do not constitute a long- term solution. Al-Shabaab still holds territory in the south and center but discontent is rife among the population, especially in the Juba valley, where the group’s coercive collection of zakat tax has angered residents. In Middle Shabelle and Hiraan regions in the center, local clan militias have mobilized and had some success in disrupting Al-Shabaab’s operations. Deep fragmentation among Somali clans makes them incapable of an organized large-scale revolt. Some could ally against Al-Shabaab but they would have to use great care as arming clans hastily and indiscriminately would risk more instability. The emergence of IS after one of Al-Shabaab’s spiritual leaders pledged allegiance to the group in October 2015 is a further potentially serious threat to stability. Despite attempts by both Al-Shabaab and government troops to isolate pro-IS factions in the south and center, IS briefly seized control of Qandala on Puntland’s Gulf of Aden coastline in the north in October 2016. The Puntland administration claims to have flushed IS from the town, but militants reportedly still control its peripheries. While IS has so far failed to break Al-Shabaab’s partnership with al-Qaeda, the local faction will try to exploit Al-Shabaab’s internal weaknesses to gain influence in the coming months. 4. Cracks in the security forces play into Al-Shabaab’s hands The Somali National Army (SNA) is undermined by infighting over control of checkpoints (where soldiers can extort money) which has given Al-Shabaab opportunities to retake territory, most recently in Buulo Gaduud in the south west and War-Sheekh in the south east on 7 January. A wave of SNA defections to Al-Shabaab, lured by the group’s money and reassured by its pledge not to kill defectors, has buoyed the jihadists’ numbers and morale. Unless the Somali leadership gives priority to reforming its security forces, external initiatives to help on this front will fail. Present rates of corruption – in Transparency International’s 2016 ranking corruption was perceived to be worse in Somalia than in any other country – not only call into question the leadership’s priorities but also fuel insecurity. Military reform need not be expensive, but troops must be committed: motivated groups like ASWJ have shown that with limited external support, Al-Shabaab can be defeated.

55 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has had some significant successes against Al- Shabaab but is still struggling to fight a non-conventional war for which it is ill-suited and inadequately resourced. The SNA’s and FGS’s failure to secure and govern areas liberated by AMISOM has sapped peacekeepers’ morale and led some troop contributing countries to plan to leave the mission in the next two years. A hasty withdrawal would be disastrous, but AMISOM must plan to progressively hand over responsibility for security to effective Somali forces. 5. Refocusing support on state administrations and clan-level reconciliation To help stabilize Somali politics and reduce violence, the European Union (EU) and its member states should continue to encourage the federal government to priorities a bottom-up, national reconciliation process and to seek lasting political settlements with and between federal member states. In tandem, federal states, supported by the FGS, should launch grassroots efforts to reconcile clans and make local governance more inclusive. The EU and its member states should accompany this process by shifting the focus of their support from the federal government to state administrations to boost their role in intra- and inter-clan reconciliation and help reinforce local security forces. If sub-national governance remains weak and dysfunctional and clans at loggerheads, there will likely be more conflict for Al-Shabaab to exploit. Donors – including the EU and its member states in part through the EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) – should adopt a strategy of decentralizing their counter- insurgency support, currently focused overwhelmingly on Mogadishu, by increasing investment in federal states’ security forces and coordination structures. The EU, having recently reduced its funding for AMISOM by 20 per cent, should maintain the current level while assisting the AU to secure additional funding from other donors. It should also agree with the AU and AMISOM on a new, more feasible force structure, help them work toward greater cooperation with state security forces, and plan a credible exit schedule. II. Asia The security agendas of China, Japan, South and North Korea, India and , as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, are in flux. Driven by a complex, shifting matrix of priorities and relationships, and increasingly dominated by nationalist forces, these countries find themselves in a rapidly evolving strategic environment. Traditional alliances are uncertain and overt or tacitly accepted rules of engagement are breaking down. Friction and disagreements in the South China Sea, on the Korean Peninsula, between China and Japan, and Pakistan and India could escalate dangerously in the absence of dispute resolution mechanisms and effective talks, in a regional security architecture that is losing legitimacy. Across South and South East Asia, trends point to the ascendancy of ethno-nationalist majoritarian, ill- advised or counterproductive government strategies to deal with grievances, and a related growth of radicalization. These risk creating the conditions for, inter alia, an unravelling of democratic transitions in Myanmar and Sri Lanka and renewed militant attacks and violence; the opening of space for returning Islamic State (IS) fighters or the space for new forms of radicalization caused by this return and the related changed dynamic between local jihadists and global jihadist groups in the Philippines and Bangladesh; and the strengthening of a jihadist nexus between groups and individuals in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Afghanistan faces a constellation of challenges that encourage the spread of insurgency, criminal violence and the IS franchise: flawed power-sharing arrangements, resistance to reform from entrenched patronage networks, a collapsing economy, growing political fragmentation along ethnic, tribal and regional lines, and the armed forces’ inability to fill security gaps left by the 2014 international military drawdown. The drive to repatriate Afghan refugees – both by neighbors, particularly Pakistan, and European countries – adds unwelcome stress to this fragility. Coordinated efforts to bring peace and stability need to include a comprehensive approach to an escalating humanitarian crisis. Democratic space is narrowing across the board as authorities shun the politics of inclusion. Governments – particularly those facing elections in the next twelve-to-eighteen months, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Cambodia and Pakistan – are increasingly turning to a selective reading of national security legislation to suppress political competition, dissent and independent opinion. The lack of

56 effective, legitimate or united opposition further erodes the accountability of those in authority. In Thailand, even when elections are held under the new constitution, rules are being instituted to limit popular representation for a generation, while prospects for peace in the south are dim even amid fears of IS-style radicalization. Beyond trade, Europe’s interests and motivations in Asia have not always been clear. In light of current uncertainties, this needs to change. The EU and its member states should now prioritize being a part of strategic discussions in Asia, particularly with Beijing and Canberra. Overall, the European Union (EU) will need to tread a fine line between ensuring its economic and security interests in the region are upheld, while also adhering to the soft power and values at the core of the European project. In concrete terms this could include quiet diplomacy to reinforce the importance of human rights; supporting peace and transition efforts; engaging with ASEAN to shore up that body’s legitimacy; and exploring how it might contribute to dialing down tensions on the Korean peninsula. This will help build European legitimacy, reinforce its predictability, and ultimately strengthen Asian stability. A. Myanmar: Diverting Rakhine State’s Alarming Trajectory Key conflict concerns in Myanmar remain Rakhine state and the peace process with ethnic armed groups. This note focuses on the former. The 9 October attacks on the security forces have rendered an already volatile situation in northern Rakhine state that much more fraught. The government’s heavy-handed security response has led to widespread reports of serious abuses and a shutdown in humanitarian access. Some 69,000 Rohingya Muslims have recently sought refuge in Bangladesh. The risk of further attacks by the al-Yaqin armed group remains significant, and based on the military’s previous behavior would likely trigger a further escalation in the security response – with human rights and political ramifications. In central Rakhine state, more than 120,000 Muslims – mostly Rohingya – remain segregated in displacement camps following an outbreak of intercommunal violence in 2012. Several hundred thousand more who remain in their villages are reliant on humanitarian assistance due to government restrictions on their basic freedoms, including movement. These developments risk intensifying longstanding negative trends in Rakhine state. Marginalization of the Rohingya minority, oppressive state security and al-Yaqin’s incipient – but surprisingly sophisticated – armed response threaten to dominate the international narrative on Myanmar. Alongside this, the state’s majority Rakhine Buddhist population, itself a minority at the national level, is acutely concerned about being sidelined, facing discrimination by the state and economic and political marginalization. Failure by the authorities, and Aung San Suu Kyi personally, to take control of the crisis by developing and implementing an overarching political and development strategy, could result in the situation spiraling further out of control. The consequences would be unpredictable, including for other complex transition processes in the country, and generate ever increasing international opprobrium. 1. The government’s response: limitations and risks So far, the government has not set out any overarching political strategy for addressing either the underlying problems in Rakhine state as a whole, or the recent related violence in northern Rakhine. Rather, it has appointed two commissions to look into them both. The first, headed by former UN ­Secretary- General Kofi Annan, was appointed before the 9 October attacks, with a mandate to advise on possible solutions to the root causes of the situation in Rakhine state. The second, headed by Vice President-1 Myint Swe, was established to look at the attacks themselves, the security response, and ways to prevent further violence. The second commission released a preliminary report in early January, essentially denying most allegations of abuse; its final report has been delayed indefinitely after a damning UN report released on 3 February found evidence of grave and widespread abuses that it says may amount to crimes against humanity. Suu Kyi was reportedly shocked by these claims and has undertaken to investigate them – but has assigned this task to the already-discredited vice president-1 commission. (The Myanmar military and police have also recently announced separate internal inquiries into these allegations.) Meanwhile, the Annan Commission is due to issue interim recommendations in March, before its final report in August. These recommendations will focus on steps that the government can take in the immediate future that

57 could have a meaningful and timely impact on the underlying situation of Muslims in Rakhine state. Suu Kyi is under pressure to investigate credibly the evidence of grave human rights abuses, and to move quickly on implementing the Annan Commission’s recommendations – both to address current volatility, and to give a clear signal of the government’s political will to tackle the underlying problems. The possibility, in the absence of clear signs of movement, that Annan might reconsider his involvement in the commission, will provide additional impetus to the government. However, the government’s political space for maneuver in Rakhine state, and hence prospects for real progress, will depend partly on events outside its control: in particular, any further attacks by al-Yaqin, the popular pressures for and discipline of the military’s security response, and an even more febrile political environment. 2. Addressing underlying problems in Rakhine state The Muslim population in Rakhine state numbers more than a million people, the vast majority of whom have long been denied citizenship and basic rights. Myanmar has two choices. The government can continue to allow this population to live in limbo – abused, marginalized and with no hope for the future. This would perpetuate policy failures of the last decades, which have directly led to the current crisis and represent an ongoing security and political threat. Alternatively, the government can use the inflection point that this crisis offers to change track and give this population a place in the life of the country as citizens with access to rights, social services and economic opportunities. To that end, the government must ensure that its announced ending of the security operation on 15 February translates into a cessation of abuses. To find long-term solutions for Rakhine state, it will need to think beyond individual recommendations, and craft a comprehensive political strategy that integrates citizenship and rights for the Muslim population with development initiatives including health and education, improved policing and security. Alongside this, steps are needed to reassure the Buddhist Rakhine population that their concerns will be taken into account. This will not be an easy needle to thread, and the government should not wait for the final August 2017 recommendations from the Annan Commission to begin developing such an approach. Following such a path would encounter considerable political obstacles given strong anti-Rohingya sentiments in Rakhine state and across Myanmar. Assuming the government is willing and able to overcome these, the challenge will be to define a strategy that can be progressively implemented. Any such solution will require the cooperation of the security forces, police and government officials, including teachers and medical staff. 3. The role of the EU and its member states The European Union (EU) is one of the largest providers of humanitarian and development assistance to Myanmar. The EU and its member states should use this leverage to push the government and military, at the highest level and through all available channels, to end abuses in northern Rakhine, allow unfettered access for humanitarian agencies and the media, and ensure a credible investigation, with appropriate international involvement and support, into the evidence of grave human rights abuses committed by the security forces. They should also encourage Suu Kyi and her government to develop a detailed political response to the current crisis and underlying issues, including through the newly-appointed national security adviser. This political response will need to be coordinated with the military to ensure a coherent approach less focused on hard-edged security. The EU has taken a lead in Western military-to-military ties, and should use this to influence the commander-in-chief on this issue, alongside diplomatic engagement with him. The EU and its member states should urge the government to prioritize the timely implementation of the Annan Commission’s interim recommendations when they are released in March, and encourage the government to incorporate these into its broader plan; they should also offer to provide technical support to assist in this. They should further encourage the government to take greater ownership of the humanitarian and development response in Rakhine state. This is vital to ensure that the international humanitarian and development community is not held hostage to intercommunal or state-society tensions or seen as an intrusive outside actor, as has been the case in the past. Finally, they should encourage Suu Kyi to visit Rakhine state and personally outline the government’s approach, which the international aid and donor community can then support. A clear

58 government plan could provide the trigger for provision of the significant technical and funding resources that will be needed over several years to improve conditions in Rakhine for all communities. III. Europe and Central Asia Significant challenges beset Europe. The European Union (EU) – grappling with Brexit, the stability of the Euro, the migrant/refugee crisis, terror attacks, and the rise of nationalism and/or extremism – is seeing its powers of attraction weaken. These forces have created strong pressures for policymakers to compromise on core European values. Russia – reestablishing itself as a player with global aspirations – has violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia and pushed against sovereign choices of other states. President Trump’s criticism of NATO as obsolete further stokes a sense that core European institutions are in doubt, and a sense of insecurity on a scale not experienced on the continent since the , further exacerbated by mounting risks to existing arms control agreements. The most imminent challenges lie in the peripheries. As EU members and NATO allies, the Baltic states are secure but fears of Russian subversion and cyber threats run high. The Western Balkans are witnessing a resurgence of crises; and Russian interests are pressing hard against EU accession aspirations. In the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, conflict is affecting five of the six EU partner countries. Taken together, these conflicts – some protracted – have claimed thousands of casualties, displaced several million, and produced six breakaway territories. Two situations present particular concern: increasing risks of an escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and ongoing fighting in eastern Ukraine. Moscow plays an important role in the formal conflict settlement process in all, even as its strong political, military and economic backing of most of the breakaway entities – some of which it has recognized – allows it to pressure the affected countries. Amid speculation about the direction of U.S.- Russia relations, and questions about how the EU can maintain its influence, uncertainty in these regions is heightened. Turkey, meanwhile, faces major challenges: Islamic State (IS), spillover from Syria, hosting nearly three million refugees, the PKK conflict, and increasingly heavy-handed governance. Traditionally anchored in the Western institutional system (primarily through NATO), Turkey may find itself pulled in conflicting directions in light of its increased cooperation with Moscow, the new regional fault lines opened by the Syria crisis, the Council of Europe questioning Ankara’s commitments to that institution’s values, and the lack of momentum in EU accession talks. Keeping the relationship with Ankara on an even keel is important for Europe’s long-term interests and security, while Turkey’s stability is vital not least given the strategic role it plays in the Syria crisis. Equally, the EU’s commitment to a value-based relationship should not be overshadowed by concerns over the management of refugee flows. Central Asia’s states struggle with stalled transitions, notably the failure to provide just, accountable governance and to approach inter-ethnic issues even-handedly, while succession issues continue to bring risks of instability. Radicalization is also a challenge in the region – at least two thousand Central Asians are known to have joined the ranks of IS or other jihadists in Syria – alongside security risks stemming from the porous Afghan border. The EU has placed stability and reform at the core of its European Neighbourhood Policy, its policies toward the Western Balkans and also its strategy for Central Asia, employing different instruments for each. Despite internal distractions, and precisely because of increasing external uncertainties, it should make good on its commitments. Alongside this, a renewed focus on Europe’s traditional strengths – upholding multilateralism and its substantive commitment to European values – will serve the continent well. A. Nagorno-Karabakh: Risks of a New Escalation A flare-up up of hostilities in April 2016 left no doubt that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, located between Russia, Turkey and Iran and at the heart of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, is a dangerous tinderbox. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces clashed in the most extensive confrontation since the end of the 1992-1994 war. Up to 200 people lost their lives; Azerbaijan seized two small pieces of territory, changing the status quo on the ground for the first time since the 1994 ceasefire; and the public mood hardened on both sides. The episode re-galvanised efforts, led by the OSCE Minsk Group, to resolve the conflict peacefully, but amid higher stakes: a stalled process now carries the risk of fighting breaking

59 out on a deadlier scale. 1. Spiraling tensions and deadlocked negotiations Though April 2016 was a wake-up call, the risks of escalation have been high for some time. Since 2006, both sides have built up their military capacities. In 2015, Azerbaijan spent $3 billion on its military, more than Armenia’s entire national budget. It has purchased hardware including attack helicopters, fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-tank artillery systems. Armenia has similarly increased its defense spending, and though its 2015 total of $447 million was far below Baku’s, Moscow is said to have given Yerevan heavy discounts on armaments. The frequency and intensity of security incidents at the Line of Contact (LoC) has increased. From sniper deployment in 2012 and special diversionary groups in 2013, starting in 2014 Armenia and Azerbaijan began exchanging heavier mortar fire, and in 2015 deployed tanks. Regular exchanges of fire also take place along the Armenia-Azerbaijan international border. Dozens of military casualties are reported every year along the increasingly weaponized front line. Meanwhile, talks have dragged on without real traction or confidence in their ability to deliver a settlement. After April 2016, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Russia, the U.S. and France – stepped up diplomatic efforts. The resulting summits between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents reconfirmed their commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully. They agreed both to finalize an OSCE investigative mechanism to establish responsibility for ceasefire violations and expand the office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. These measures sought to reduce risks of further violence and instil a modicum of confidence. But both sides harbor deep distrust reinforced by repeat failures in the peace process and recurrent escalations along the LoC and even, in December, the international border. Yerevan says it cannot negotiate under duress or if Baku uses force; Baku suspects that Yerevan is not engaging in earnest and fears negotiations will cement the status quo. Since mid-2016, progress has stalled, with no movement on the agreed confidence and security building measures and thus little progress in broader negotiations about the substantive issues in the settlement process. These include, most prominently, the return under Baku’s control of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh controlled by ethnic Armenian forces; the future status of Nagorno- Karabakh (and the way it will be determined); return of displaced persons; and security guarantees. First formulated as the Madrid Principles in 2007, these issues, their iterations and sequencing, remain at the core of the ongoing confidential negotiations. 2. Impossible concessions? A settlement based on mutual compromise is the only option for sustainable peace while upholding territorial integrity and self-determination. This would also benefit a region where closed borders between Armenia, and Azerbaijan and Turkey hinder connectivity and development. So why have concessions been so difficult? Since Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s independence, their national identities have developed in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The first generation of Armenians and Azerbaijanis who have no direct experience of each other is coming of age, shaped by hostile rhetoric. Following the April 2016 clashes, youth spontaneously marched in Baku to celebrate their army’s success. In Yerevan, speculation about possible concessions provoked Karabakh war veterans to storm and occupy a police station, killing two officers; the events sparked off demonstrations against unaccountable governance and economic stagnation, showing how the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute can catalyze broader public anger. Moreover, there have been few attempts to bridge the disconnect between the peace talks and the rhetoric of leaders that fuels pro-war public sentiment. Both leaderships have failed to explain what peace could realistically look like, the benefits it would bring, and what concessions are needed. 3. The regional dimension Russia, Turkey and Iran could all potentially become embroiled in an escalation in Nagorno- Karabakh. Russia and Turkey have military commitments to Yerevan and Baku, respectively, while Russia has supplied arms to both. Moscow now has an informal lead role in the Minsk Group and brokered the April 2016 ceasefire, but there are limits to its leverage over both sides. It is also not clear if Moscow views it

60 as in its interests to see the conflict entirely resolved. The U.S. and France, as the other Minsk Group co- chairs, support Moscow’s lead in negotiations and are unlikely to suggest more themselves. The new U.S. administration has not signaled an appetite for greater engagement, while the upcoming French presidential elections augur a period of distraction in Paris. The EU’s support to the Minsk Group through HR/VP Mogherini and the EU special representative has been strong but has had limited impact. As the EU places stability at the core of its European Neighbourhood Policy, more engagement is needed along with political pressure against the use of force and for the compromise needed to find a settlement. The political dialogue around the “new agreements” between Brussels and Yerevan and Baku give an opportunity to stress these messages. 4. Possible escalation scenarios Without movement on the diplomatic front, the risk of new hostilities in 2017 is high; this would likely lead to civilian casualties and significant displacement and have the potential to escalate beyond Nagorno-Karabakh. After April 2016, the situation on the ground has seen intensified movement of heavy combat vehicles into the conflict zone and use of kamikaze drones as well as deployment of more troops. Both sides have ballistic missiles that could reach deep into the other’s territory; both showed new lethal weapons at military parades in 2016 and spoke about imminent plans for additional procurement. The recent flare-up at the international border demonstrated their readiness to engage in direct confrontation. Baku and Yerevan are aware they would face strong regional pressure to rein in an escalation: their neighbors have no interest in a resumption of hostilities that could potentially provoke a war with regional implications. But both sides may also believe hostilities will play in their favor. Baku portrays last April as proof that it can change the status quo on the ground in its favor; it may be tempted to reach for more if it loses faith in the diplomatic process. Yerevan may be determined to demonstrate that April’s setback was a blip rather than the start of a trend. 5. A role for the EU The EU needs to keep an active focus on the risks of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In addition to supporting the OSCE mechanisms, it should use bilateral channels with Azerbaijan and Armenia, and political processes linked to new agreements with both countries, to emphasize the need to avoid escalation and pursue a settlement by peaceful means. The EU should push the two capitals to proceed with implementation of the mid-2016 agreements reached under the auspices of the Minsk Group, and publicly commit to a full-fledged settlement process. The EU is well placed to support a broad public debate in both Azerbaijan and Armenia about the benefits of peace, such as economic development, trade and potential opening of borders, and should also look for ways to promote such a discussion within Nagorno-Karabakh. B. The PKK Conflict in the Context of EU-Turkey Relations The relationship between EU and Turkey is in flux, while Turkey – amid shifting strategic fault lines in the region – faces multiple challenges: Islamic State (IS) attacks, the pressures of hosting three million Syrian refugees, a deteriorating economy, and domestic upheaval exacerbated by the failed coup attempt and increasing social and political polarization, all feature alongside a dramatic intensification of conflict between the state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Reflective of deep-seated animosities, the increasingly febrile domestic scene, and spillover from fighting in Syria, the renewed PKK conflict has killed some 2,500 and displaced up to 300,000 since July 2015. Bringing the violence under control and back on the path of a sustainable settlement will be crucial to restoring stability. In this fraught environment, the EU – whose relations with Ankara have suffered amid mutual feelings of disappointment and betrayal – has options to refine and better coordinate its strategy toward Turkey, with a view both to helping calm the conflict in the south east, and halting strategic drift in relations. 1. A worsening conflict Alongside fatalities and displacement, intense fighting between the security forces and the PKK between December 2015 and June 2016 led to the destruction of some towns and districts in Turkey’s south east. In the last few months, PKK militants have increased improvised explosive device (IED) attacks

61 in big cities around the country. Fighting in the south east, which subsided with the onset of winter, is expected to pick up in the spring. Ankara’s crackdown against the Kurdish political movement has intensified. Twelve MPs from the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) including the party’s co-chairs, more than 60 elected co-mayors and thousands of party members and supporters are under arrest for broadly-defined charges of support to or membership of a terrorist organization or making terrorist propaganda. More than 150 journalists have been arrested on the basis of the anti-terror law, some for alleged links with the PKK. In northern Syria, Ankara’s Euphrates Shield military operation aims, among other goals, to block gains by PKK-affiliated People’s Protection Units (YPG), in particular PKK/YPG ambitions of creating a contiguous corridor of Kurdish territory along the Turkey-Syria border. Ankara has threatened to push into YPG-held Manbij, which would lead to armed confrontation between the Turkish military and Kurdish fighters in northern Syria. All these dynamics have severely reduced the chances of a return to peace talks between the government and the PKK – even as this remains the only way to a lasting solution. In the short term, the focus needs to be on preventing further escalation of violence, de-escalation in the south east, and laying the groundwork for a new political process. 2. An approach for the EU to mitigate the conflict Against this backdrop, growing anti-Western rhetoric and mounting mistrust between Turkey and the EU are narrowing avenues for cooperation, including for the EU to play a meaningful role in helping Turkey find a sustainable path out of the PKK conflict. Yet these twin imperatives – improving relations and an end to the conflict – form part of a mutually reinforcing loop, one unlikely without the other. At the same time, in the context of the Syria crisis the EU urgently needs to better integrate its Syria, Turkey and Russia policies. In this context the EU, in addition to supporting a political solution to the PKK conflict, should focus on measures aimed at dialing down tensions between it and Ankara. This means delivering on its commitments, for example on visa liberalization, as soon as feasible, while maintaining a principled stance on international human rights norms. EU institutions and member states should continue to support civil initiatives in favor of a political solution to the PKK conflict. European support for local media and civil society platforms conducting independent/impartial reporting on the Kurdish issue is also important if these organisations are to be able to continue to function. Human rights violations and the stifling of freedom of expression on Kurdish demands such as for decentralization and mother tongue education must inevitably be addressed in any lasting peaceful settlement. However, European support for such reforms is often decried by the Turkish political leadership and nationalist circles as support to the PKK. These criticisms, alongside seeking to balance out other strategic interests with Ankara (such as on refugee/migration issues, counter-terrorism, investment and trade), have rendered EU member states increasingly reluctant to raise such issues. However, recent legal measures taken by the Turkish government following the Council of Europe Venice Commission’s opinion on emergency decree laws, which calls for stronger human rights protections, shows there are ways to positively influence human rights through existing international mechanisms to which Ankara is a party. 3. Overcoming the impasse on anti-terror laws Now that accession talks have stalled, visa liberalization is the most enticing prospect Brussels has to offer to help re-energize the relationship. However, it hinges primarily on Turkey amending its anti-terror legislation. The EU sees this as a key element in finding a long-term solution to the Kurdish issue, but would also like to see the reform of legislation which is draconian and also qualifies more Turkish citizens to receive asylum in EU states – Germany alone received over 5,000 applications from Turks in 2016, four fifths of them of Kurdish origin. Ankara has claimed the legislation is a proportionate response to the threat faced. Despite the publicly reported standoff, Turkey is, according to officials, considering adjustments to current anti-terror laws in line with EU requirements in the spring. Once the EU’s conditions are met, Brussels should move to grant visa liberalization quickly. EU institutions and capitals need to better explain that the expected reforms to anti-terror laws will not hamper legitimate measures to restore public order and combat terrorism, but are meant to help

62 Turkey abide by its own commitments on fundamental rights and freedoms. To address the widespread agitation within Turkey over perceived European interference in domestic anti-terror legislation, they need to make it clear to the Turkish public how it is that the anti-terror laws in their current form allow Turkish citizens to qualify as ­asylum-seekers in Europe. EU member states should also communicate more explicitly their position on the PKK – which the EU lists as a terror organization –both to the Turkish public and to Ankara. This will help overcome a widespread perception in Turkey that EU states harbor PKK activists and permit financial flows to the organization. EU states should publicize measures they currently take against the PKK but about which the Turkish public remain largely unaware – for example Germany’s current investigation of around 4,000 names allegedly linked to the PKK for a range of alleged offences, and the UK’s effective curbing of funding channels to the PKK through its UK-based affiliates. 4. Making the refugee deal work Ensuring the March 2016 refugee deal remains in place and functions well will also be vital to stabilizing relations, complemented by strengthening recognition of the refugee burden Turkey is bearing in large part in Europe’s stead. As controversial as the refugee deal is, its unravelling would be a disaster. As well as damaging EU-Turkey relations and undermining the EU’s internal cohesion, it would – most importantly – create additional insecurity for the refugee community. While the flow of EU funding for Syrian refugees has reduced negative rhetoric coming out of Ankara, the perception that EU countries prioritize stemming the flow of refugees from Turkey has undoubtedly given Ankara a sense of leverage over European counterparts. EU member states need to continue to support refugee integration in Turkey’s labor market and education system, also focusing on social cohesion by supporting NGOs working at the local/community level to foster social dialogue and defuse tensions between host and refugee communities. This should be in addition to the ongoing imperative to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk through resettlement as a clear demonstration of a greater commitment to equitable burden-sharing. IV. Latin America and Caribbean Latin America faces old dilemmas and stark new challenges at a time when protracted economic slowdown, imperiling the status of newly established middle classes, has fostered public discontent and intensified political polarization. Public preferences have shifted away from the left-leaning governments that dominated the region from 2002, toward center-right administrations. But the weakness of newly-elected governments in Argentina and Peru, the entrenchment of a militarized chavista regime in Venezuela, and the ­elite-driven impeachment of former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, point to major difficulties in achieving peaceful and democratic handovers of power. Venezuela is Latin America’s most urgent crisis, combining hyperinflation, public impoverishment, scarcity of basic goods and a political standoff that to date defies resolution. Divisions in the Organization of American States, the suspension of Venezuela from Mercosur, and the continued support for President Maduro’s government from traditional allies (Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and various Caribbean states) have fragmented and undermined regional cohesion at a time when the risk of a humanitarian emergency in that country is heightening. In contrast, support from the region and further afield for the Colombian peace process is unanimous. But peace in Colombia’s far-flung regions faces challenges from multiple armed spoilers, including criminal groups, jostling to control the country’s valuable and expanding coca crop. In Bogotá, opposition to the peace accord’s wide-ranging reforms at a time of fiscal retrenchment is set to loom large over elections in 2018. The fear of multiple armed groups substituting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is rooted in the experience of post-conflict Central America. In that region’s Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, as in Mexico, drug trafficking and extortion represent major revenue streams for gangs and cartels diversifying and seizing control over ­micro-territories. Epidemic violence is responsible for an increasing share of Central American migration north; in one Mexican state alone, Veracruz, the number of people disappeared is likely much higher than official estimates of 2,750.

63 Prospects of a development-driven, long-term approach to reducing violent crime and forced displacement have dimmed as the new U.S. administration appears set to push through a defensive policy of border fortification, economic protectionism and, potentially, mass deportations. The EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean (CELAC) summit this year should consider how commitments to promote migrants’ rights in its previous action plan can now be met. Crime and violence remain core concerns for much of the region, requiring responses that avoid excessive militarization, and instead focus, as Guatemala has sought to do, on strengthening judicial prosecution and police investigation. High-level corruption, the transnational reach of which has been demonstrated by the recent Petrobras, Panama Papers and Odebrecht scandals, needs to be addressed as a priority. Strong regional organisations and support and partnership from the U.S. are nevertheless both absent, and the risk is high of nationalism and populism propagating through Mexico and Latin America. A. Venezuela: A Regional Solution to the Political Standoff The dismantling of Venezuelan democracy, together with the country’s acute social, economic and humanitarian crisis, represents South America’s biggest challenge for regional institutions and the wider international community in 2017. The failure, thus far, to achieve a peaceful, democratic solution to Venezuela’s political conflict risks provoking severe civil unrest and possible divisions in the armed forces, with uncertain consequences. Venezuela’s neighbors – especially Colombia, only now emerging from decades of guerrilla war – have good reason to fear possible spillover in the form of mass emigration and the proliferation of non-state armed groups on their borders, as well as uncontrolled epidemics as Venezuela’s health services break down. 1. A political standoff The presidency of Nicolás Maduro, an elected civilian whose cabinet is nevertheless packed with military officers, has entered its final two years amid widespread unpopularity. By using its control of the judiciary and the electoral authority (CNE) to block a presidential recall referendum in 2016, the administration has ensured that there is no constitutional means of removing it from power ahead of presidential elections scheduled for December 2018. Ruling by decree, Maduro has stripped the opposition- led National Assembly of its powers and threatened to close it down. Parliament has responded by declaring that Maduro has “abandoned” the presidency in constitutional terms by failing to fulfil his duties. The appointment in early January of Aragua state governor (and former Interior Minister) Tareck el Aissami as vice-president is perhaps the clearest sign that hardliners now have the upper hand within the government. Charged by Maduro with heading a so-called “Anti-Coup Command”, Aissami immediately deployed the national intelligence service, SEBIN, to pursue and arrest opposition politicians, picking up six of them in the first week alone. He has also hinted at banning opposition parties. In short, the new vice president’s interest in a negotiated transition appears slim. Talks which began at the end of October between the government and the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance, brokered by the Vatican and a team from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), quickly broke down, and there seems little prospect of reviving them in the short term. For the MUD the talks proved costly in terms of popular support and exacerbated deep divisions within the alliance over the way forward: one very vocal wing favors mass direct action while others advocate dialogue or the electoral route. The government, having lost its electoral base (Maduro’s popularity stands at around 10 per cent, the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) around 25 per cent), shows little interest in appealing to voters, perhaps in the belief it can bypass them at least in the short term. Elections for state governors due in December 2016 were postponed on a promise to hold them in mid-2017, but the CNE has yet to set a date. Political parties have been ordered to renew their registration, in a complex process which may be used as a pretext for further delay and/or to proscribe some parties. 2. Economic and humanitarian meltdown Venezuela’s economy shrank considerably in 2016 – some estimates suggest by as much as 18 per cent – with annual inflation running at several hundred per cent and real wages shrinking fast. Imports have collapsed from over $60 billion in 2012 to under $18 billion in 2016, which combined with the slump

64 in domestic production means acute shortages of food, medicines and other basic goods. About a fifth of the population eats only one meal a day. Malnutrition and preventable diseases have risen sharply, and the health service is close to collapse. In mid-2016 shortages, particularly of food, led to rioting and looting in a number of cities. The government responded by replacing a large part of the retail food distribution network with Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAPs), using both the military and political organisations affiliated to the PSUV. The private sector is now legally obliged to sell 50 per cent of its production to the government for distribution through this network. The scheme appears to have reduced looting, not because it has satisfied demand (the CLAPs are plagued by corruption and inefficiency) but because it reduced the number and length of queues, a frequent trigger for riots. The scheme also enables the government to use food as a political weapon, favoring its supporters and the politically docile. 3. Getting out of the mess: the elements for long-term stability The broad contours of a lasting solution will require negotiations between the government and opposition, facilitated by external actors, and will probably involve a transitional phase with a degree of power-sharing and economic reforms, leading to free and fair presidential elections under international supervision. High-profile civilian and military leaders, probably including the president, will need to be offered credible guarantees regarding their physical and financial well-being should they lose these elections, possibly including offers of exile. Such an arrangement would offer the best hope of restoring democracy and also stability. To avoid talks for talks’ sake, these negotiations will need to quickly establish a clear calendar for the way forward. Toward this end, the European Union (EU) should work with regional governments to encourage the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, especially its procedures for taking “diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy” where this has broken down. They should reserve as a last resort sanctions such as the suspension of Venezuela’s membership of the Organization of American States (OAS). In forging regional and international cooperation, particular attention should be paid to securing the support of Caribbean nations currently receiving subsidized Venezuelan energy. They will need to be reassured that they will be offered international financial assistance to make up for any loss of access to cheap oil that may accompany a transition in Caracas. In particular Cuba, Venezuela’s closest ally, plays an important role in shoring up the Maduro government through the provision of intelligence and other advisory services, and could potentially contribute to a solution. Economically reliant on dwindling shipments of cheap Venezuelan oil, Havana is unlikely to support a political transition unless its interests are protected. Looking north, meanwhile, it remains unclear whether the new U.S. administration will be willing to continue its predecessor’s approach to working in a multilateral fashion. The transition process is likely to be protracted, and donors need to identify creative means of alleviating the suffering of ordinary Venezuelans, both in terms of hunger and lack of medical supplies and facilities. EU member states are among the largest contributors to the UN’s humanitarian and specialist agencies, and should encourage them to scale up their response to the crisis commensurate with its severity, and explore with partners ways of overcoming government resistance to outside aid. The presidential elections scheduled for December 2018 will be crucial, and it will be important to apply early and sustained pressure for the government to relax its current ban on professional observation missions. If the EU is unable to obtain permission for its own observers it should seek to work with those from credible regional organisations, in particular the OAS. V. Middle East and North Africa If 2016 was bad for the Middle East and North Africa, 2017 promises little better. Policymakers will be hard-pressed to bring peace to the region, but through their choices they could make matters worse. The priority should be: do no (further) harm. The wars in Syria and Yemen look set to continue, further amplifying humanitarian catastrophes, sucking in neighbors and pumping oxygen to jihadists. The fight against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq is proceeding, but slowly, and is aggravating other conflicts, including between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates. Amid U.S. hesitation, Russia has asserted itself as a Syrian

65 dealmaker, though the prospects for sustained peace remain elusive with the potential of worse to come if basic governance issues are not adequately addressed. Although the nuclear deal is clearly a net positive, and should be protected from efforts to undermine it, Iran’s increasing assertiveness across the region has raised tensions that could also end up jeopardizing the accord. In North Africa, the conflict in Libya is escalating as the UN-led effort to create a unity government has yet to bear fruit. Egypt looks increasingly shaky, Algeria faces an uncertain succession on top of an economic crisis, and Tunisia is struggling to keep its unity government afloat amid multiple internal and external threats. Overall, wars in the Middle East increasingly intersect, inflamed by a sectarian discourse reflecting a dangerous power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. All this against a backdrop of uncertainty surrounding the U.S.’s posture toward the region and the rapidly receding (and already distant) prospects of progress in Israeli-Palestinian talks toward a two-state solution. While the European Union (EU) and its member states have critical interests in the region, they have largely been bystanders in the shadow of more powerful actors. Yet Europe cannot afford to be passive nor to undermine unified approaches to the region’s conflicts, as happened in Yemen. This means it will need to work with peace processes, whether the UN’s in Yemen or Moscow’s putative efforts with regards to Syria. It also necessitates encouraging Saudi Arabia and Iran to find a way to coexist and agree on principles of conduct in the region. Of paramount importance will be working to maximize the continent’s soft power. The EU should continue to play (and build on) its leading role in responding to the region’s burgeoning and likely longstanding humanitarian crises, in Syria offering reconstruction aid conditionally and only as part of a credible, inclusive political process leading to a settlement. It should also adopt more principled approaches to arms sales in the region and speak out more clearly on the importance of upholding international law. Economic collapse is a pressing concern in Egypt and Libya: preventing financial collapse and its attendant risks – of resurgent jihadist violence and increased migrant flows – must be priorities, while in Egypt refraining from unconditional support to an increasingly repressive government. A. Libya: Amid Political Limbo, Time to Rescue the Economy The Libyan conflict will most likely continue without a decisive political and military settlement in 2017. Various political actors contest the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord, but a lack of consensus – among Libyans, neighboring states and international stakeholders – on what should replace it suggests it will remain in place even as its effectiveness deteriorates and its opponents consolidate their positions. In this state of suspended animation, the European Union (EU) and its member states should make it their top priority to help stabilize Libya’s economic situation. The country’s financial collapse would cripple its few functioning and critically important institutions, precipitate a humanitarian crisis, fuel the war economy, complicate efforts to tackle migrant and refugee flows and, more broadly, further hinder international attempts to put the country on a more stable political footing. 1. Stalemate, but for how long? The interim government created by the Libyan Political Agreement on 17 December 2015 has had limited success in imposing its authority since its arrival in Tripoli in April 2016 and is unlikely to survive in its current form. But what will replace it? And how? A best-case scenario would see its composition, organization and responsibilities renegotiated – and Prime Minister Fayez Serraj and other core Presidency Council members replaced – to meet the approval of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, whose endorsement is required to implement the agreement in both letter and spirit. This is not a silver bullet; it would need to be accompanied by a bottom-up process based on local governance where possible, with the aim of linking the urgent need to rebuild the central state with the reality of diffuse local power. At the very least, stabilizing the center offers opportunities to build institutional capacity and improve service delivery until solutions to thornier issues, such as demobilizing militias and restructuring the security sector, can be found. The worst-case scenario is that forces under General Khalifa Haftar, bolstered by recent military successes in Benghazi, the Gulf of Sirte 'oil crescent' and southern Libya, make good on his pledge to try to retake Tripoli. This would lead them into a major military confrontation with Tripoli-based Islamist

66 militias and forces from Misrata that have been fighting the Islamic State. The more likely scenario is that Libya remains in limbo. This is because Haftar’s forces are unlikely to advance significantly toward Tripoli, even with Egyptian, Emirati and perhaps Russian backing, as they lack sufficient support in western Libya. At the same time, in the absence of concerted international pressure on Libyan factions to negotiate a new political deal, a breakthrough is unlikely. The question then becomes how to stop the economic situation from deteriorating further until an opportunity for a political breakthrough arises. 2. The oil must flow Whatever its ideological and geopolitical dimensions, the conflict is largely about control of hydrocarbon resources and access to state funds. According to the National Oil Corporation (NOC), oil sector closures have cumulatively cost over $100 billion in lost revenues from oil exports since 2013, resulting, according to the Central Bank of Libya, in a fiscal deficit of 56 per cent of GDP for both 2015 and 2016. The Bank’s foreign-currency reserves are estimated to have fallen below $40 billion, compared to $75 billion in March 2015. Oil production has increased since September 2016 – when Haftar-aligned forces seized most oil facilities in the Gulf of Sirte – from around 250,000 barrels per day (b/d) to 700,000 (still far below the 1.8 million b/d of 2010). Even if production reaches 1 million b/d by the end of March 2017, as the NOC projects, the economic outlook remains bleak. With crude oil prices at $50 a barrel, production increases will not cover expected government expenditure of around $40 billion in 2017. Libya could be bankrupt by the end of the year. Even before then, without careful economic stewardship and proactive government measures, the economy is likely to worsen and hardships increase for a population mainly dependent on government salaries. The liquidity crisis (with banks unable to dispense much cash) could worsen, the dinar could come under further pressure, and basic services such as electricity could face severe constraints due to poor management and cash-flow problems. Political factors make the outlook even grimmer. Rifts and rival claims for control of the NOC, Central Bank and Libyan Investment Authority (LIA, the sovereign wealth fund, with over $60 billion of assets) could limit the activities of these key institutions, constraining public spending. Moreover, the Central Bank appears unwilling to authorize transfers to the government because the latter lacks parliamentary recognition. The government’s consequent inability to access and use state funds could undermine the loyalty of security forces, whose salaries it pays, and stimulate the illegal economy, including trafficking of migrants and subsidized goods. 3. Focus on the economy (and security forces) Europe has two strategic priorities in Libya: ensuring that the country is not a source of regional instability and finding a partner able to reduce the migrant flow. For both objectives, a political settlement is key. It may seem elusive now but will be far more difficult to accomplish in a collapsing economy, as warlordism and zero-sum calculations intensify. Such deterioration would not only increase the flow of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa but also see the number of Libyans trying to cross the Mediterranean continue to rise, a trend that started in 2016. Economic troubles are negatively affecting the security forces, including those tasked with countering illegal migration. Some units are suspected of taking bribes to look the other way or even becoming party to the people-smuggling. This in part enabled over 160,000 migrants to cross the Mediterranean from Libya in 2016 – a record high, alongside a record number of deaths. Seeking agreements from the government on migration control, as the EU and its member states are doing, is a fool’s errand as long as it has no effective control over the security forces (even leaving aside human rights concerns). The government will not be able to exercise that control without a peace settlement based on a political process accompanied by a security track that involves key military actors and addresses disputes on security forces’ structure and chain of command. While the EU and its member states should not walk away from the overarching goal of a comprehensive solution to the conflict, they should at the same time, and urgently, channel their energy toward addressing the economy. In particular, they should intensify efforts to broker an agreement on the disbursement of the 2017 budget between the government, House of Representatives and Central Bank.

67 To resolve the internal rifts within the Central Bank and NOC, they should urge Prime Minister Serraj to promote talks between the rival chains of command in these institutions, as he did in 2016. The EU and its member states should continue to make clear that they will not tolerate oil sales or related contracts outside official channels and ensure, through more careful vetting and improved monitoring, that Libyan security forces participating in EU anti-migration efforts are not involved in, or profiting from, people-smuggling or maritime trade of subsidized fuels. They should also ensure that any greater reliance on Libyan authorities for anti-migration measures does not result in migrants being denied the protection to which they are entitled under both international and European law. B. Syria: The Promise of Worse to Come and How to Avoid It The fall of eastern Aleppo to regime and allied forces is a potentially pivotal moment in the Syrian war. Employing familiar tools–including massive collective punishment of the civilian population and reliance on foreign militiamen–the capture of Aleppo removed a uniquely valuable card from the opposition’s hand. It also dealt a staggering blow to non-jihadist factions, which had dominated the city’s rebel-held neighborhoods and whose defeat has long been a priority for Damascus. Having achieved such a significant gain at manageable cost, the regime will be tempted to push on with additional offensives employing a similar playbook. If Damascus and its allies do so against other well-populated opposition strongholds – such as Eastern Ghouta, the western Aleppo countryside, and parts of Idlib province – casualty and displacement levels will soar. Under this scenario, options for a meaningful settlement or negotiated de- escalation will constrict further. Preventing it calls for a clear understanding of what points of leverage exist to influence the decision-making of the regime and its allies. 1. The regime’s limitations Even as it notched up a coveted win in Aleppo, the regime’s limitations and vulnerabilities remain on full display. Regime forces defending the city of Palmyra proved no match for a December attack by the Islamic State (IS), which quickly seized the city for a second time – less than nine months after Damascus and its allies had hailed its recapture as a signature achievement. The lesson was clear: while the regime, Russia and Iran are capable of employing sufficient violence and resources to gain ground against opposition forces on top-priority fronts, these campaigns leave them vulnerable to attacks elsewhere. The regime seeks to eventually retake all Syrian territory, and Bashar al-Assad has depicted victory in Aleppo as a springboard for further offensives against rebel strongholds. Yet, he cannot dictate priorities on his own; taking and holding additional ground in the north west would require significant help from Iran-backed militias, and even that support might prove insufficient if not accompanied by Russian airpower. Much is in the hands of Tehran and Moscow, who each have their own agendas in Syria. 2. Iran and Russia’s differing agendas While Iran has tended to share the regime’s enthusiasm for targeting remaining opposition territory in western Syria – the most strategically valuable swath of the country – Russia’s priorities are more ambiguous. It has often appeared more concerned than its allies about overstretch of pro-regime forces – a significant risk that will increase if they attempt to advance into Idlib. The dominant rebel factions controlling Idlib (Ahrar al-Sham and the al-Qaeda-linked Fatah al-Sham), though riven by divisions, are likely to prove more capable than their Aleppo counterparts. Moscow’s maneuvering in the immediate aftermath of the Aleppo victory suggests it is in no rush to test the waters in Idlib, choosing to focus on an expanded diplomatic track with Turkey rather than additional military offensives. It seems to want a political process amenable to its interests and preserving (and eventually rebuilding) regime structures; it may be less concerned about the regime restoring its authority over all of Syria, especially if this would mean further regime exhaustion and fragmentation. Moscow has also signaled more openness to a decentralized post-conflict Syria than is currently evident in Tehran or Damascus. 3. Russia and Turkey: Prospects for a ceasefire? Russian-Turkish engagement produced a ceasefire agreement in late December which has lowered violence in parts of the country – in particular the north west – but which appears unsustainable. As in previous “Cessations of Hostilities” negotiated by Moscow and Washington, prospects are limited by the

68 fact that key players on each side – the regime and Iran on one hand, and Fatah al-Sham and a smattering of other opposition hardliners on the other – appear to view adherence to the ceasefire as detrimental to their own interests. The fact that Fatah al-Sham is expressly excluded from the ceasefire, and that its forces in some areas fight alongside rebels who have joined the truce, leaves room for maneuver for those on either side who want to continue military operations. Regime and Iran-backed forces have done just that against opposition-held pockets outside Damascus. Here they have arguably benefitted from the decline in rebel activity immediately resulting from the ceasefire, while virtually guaranteeing that the truce (and whatever constraints it imposes on regime ambitions) will be short-lived. And as long as pro-regime offensives against opposition forces elsewhere continue, Turkey’s willingness and capacity to restrain its rebel allies in the north will erode. Indeed, a pair of rebel attacks on regime forces in Lattakia and Hama provinces on 9 February, launched following an uptick in regime airstrikes in central and northern Syria, suggests that what remains of the ceasefire is crumbling. The same dynamic limits the prospects of talks between regime and opposition delegations, including those that took place in Astana in late January – another product of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement – and scheduled for Geneva in late February. Even if Moscow and Ankara are serious about using talks to reinforce the ceasefire and pave the way for a meaningful political track, their means of achieving either are limited. There is no indication that Russia on its own has the will and capacity to deliver sustained ceasefire compliance from Damascus, much less meaningful political concessions. Forcing the regime’s hand would likely require Iranian help, which is unlikely so long as Tehran prefers to focus on pursuing battlefield gains in areas it deems critical to its interests. Uncertainty regarding the new U.S. administration’s stance on Syria further muddies the waters; actors on both sides of the conflict are keen to create favorable facts on the ground while U.S. engagement is minimal, but are unlikely to make fundamental shifts until they have a sense of Washington’s intent. The regime, as witnessed with Palmyra, lacks the capacity to reliably hold much of the territory currently outside its control once it has seized it (let alone stabilize or govern those areas). Yet it can achieve gains in the short run as long as Iran-backed militias and Russia are willing to provide the necessary manpower and air support. The result could be a harrowing continuation of civilian casualties and displacement. This may also render non-jihadist portions of the opposition politically irrelevant, and remove any prospect of their asserting the upper hand over jihadist rivals. That, in turn, would reduce whatever opportunity remains for a meaningful settlement or negotiated de-escalation. It would shift the main conflict to an eroded regime’s counter-insurgency campaign against well-entrenched jihadists, backed by foreign firepower and reliant on collective punishment. 4. Limiting further catastrophe Preventing that grim scenario should take priority. Though the European Union (EU) and its member states have played only marginal roles in the conflict’s military and political dynamics, their potential to help fund stabilization and reconstruction provides leverage – all the more so because the regime’s backers are unlikely to be willing or able to do so. They should employ this to discourage the belligerents’ maximalist objectives and incentivize compromise within the pro-regime camp. Toward that end, they should reaffirm, and unite behind, the credo no reconstruction without credible transition, clarifying that they will provide reconstruction funding only within the context of a political settlement which has buy-in from the conflict’s regional players and a critical mass of the non-jihadist opposition. European governments eager to minimize the displacement and radicalization resulting from the conflict must resist the allure of wishful thinking. Bashar al-Assad will not negotiate his own departure, Moscow and Tehran have shown no willingness to push him toward the door, and current momentum suggests neither of those realities will change in the foreseeable future. However, accepting that the pro- regime camp has the upper hand, and providing reconstruction funding in absence of a credible settlement, does not offer plausible means of addressing Europe’s primary concerns. Due to the regime’s weaknesses, and the depth and breadth of animosity toward it, a robust insurgency is likely to continue. The regime would combat it with the same collective punishment tactics and militias it has employed throughout the conflict, fuelling additional displacement and radicalization. The regime would also resist meaningful reform, encouraged by its military victories and the fact that it won’t be able to rule huge chunks of the country and population except through threat of overwhelming brutality.

69 Europe by itself cannot address these problems solely by applying conditionality to reconstruction funding, as the regime’s will and capacity to evade commitments far exceeds Europe’s will and capacity to enforce them. Instead, funding for reconstruction in government-controlled areas would likely be diverted toward the regime’s war effort. This, in turn, would further erode Western credibility, and provide dangerous incentives to authoritarians embroiled in conflicts elsewhere. Escaping Syria’s vicious cycles requires a settlement agreed among and facilitated by the conflict’s main external players – Iran, Russia, Turkey and the U.S. – and tolerable to a critical mass of Syrian combatants on both sides. It must take into account not only the current battlefield power balance, but also Syria’s geopolitical and demographic realities; otherwise the remaining insurgency may prove uncontainable. The EU and member states should make clear that reconstruction funding will await such a settlement, and is contingent upon its continued implementation. In the meantime, European diplomacy can further explore potential components of such a settlement, including decentralization allowing local governance in areas currently outside regime control. C. Yemen: A Humanitarian Catastrophe; A Failing State disasters; between 70 and 80 per cent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance and over half of its 26 million people face food insecurity. Localized fighting escalated into full blown war in March 2015 when a Saudi Arabia-led coalition intervened on behalf of the internationally recognized government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against an alliance of Huthi militias and fighters aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The conflict has fragmented a weak state, destroyed the country’s meagre infrastructure and opened vast opportunities for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (IS) to grow and seize territory. Continued fighting, especially the Saudi-led coalition’s attempt to capture the Red Sea port of Hodeida (northern Yemen’s economic lifeline), stifling blockades and unilateral moves such as the relocation of the Central Bank from to Aden will deepen intra-Yemeni divisions and increase the risk of famine. The conflict is likely to continue to expand into the region with growing refugee flows, violence by AQAP and IS outside Yemen and more attacks by Huthi/Saleh forces inside Saudi Arabia. Continued fighting will further fuel tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, also a contributory factor in other conflicts in the region. International efforts to press the two sides to a ceasefire have been woefully inadequate. Insufficient media attention hasn’t helped either. 1. Incoherent international approaches The approach that the U.S. and UK, in particular, have taken in Yemen has been muddled. They have supported UN efforts to end the conflict, but at the same time continued to supply weapons to Saudi Arabia despite evidence that it has repeatedly violated the laws of war. In April 2015, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2216, a one-sided document that essentially called for the Huthi/Saleh alliance to surrender and which the Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition have used repeatedly to obstruct efforts to achieve peace. In August 2016, a fresh initiative by then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to revive the peace process proved too little too late. Nonetheless, while it exposed the Obama administration’s inability to bring along Saudi Arabia, it did present a more balanced solution. Current UN-led diplomatic efforts are complicated by uncertainties surrounding the position of the new Trump administration. It appears to favor more aggressive military action against AQAP and possibly against the Huthis, whom it seems to view as an Iranian proxy, to the detriment of prioritizing a negotiated settlement. Further, after three rounds of peace talks and multiple failed ceasefires, the UN has lost credibility with all sides, especially the Huthi/Saleh bloc, which sees UN mediation efforts as biased toward Saudi Arabia. 2. The EU’s peace-making potential Enter the European Union (EU). The EU – through its delegation to Yemen and in coordination with Brussels – is well qualified to help rebuild the credibility of UN-sponsored talks and prod the sides toward a ceasefire and settlement. Throughout the conflict, it has been a consistent advocate of a ceasefire and political solution under UN auspices, a position that has not been compromised by active participation or partisan support in the war. The EU’s neutrality, despite the UK’s and France’s bilateral positions in support

70 of the Saudi-led coalition’s military campaign, has allowed it to maintain credibility and contacts with the principal belligerents, including the Huthis. The EU delegation to Yemen has done much to encourage the Huthis to engage with the UN peace process. The delegation and Ms. Mogherini, among other EU actors, have consistently called attention to parties’ dangerous unilateral moves, condemned war crimes and supplied technical support to UN ceasefire monitoring committees. In 2017, the EU with its member states should build on these efforts by focusing on two priorities: 1) securing a durable ceasefire and political settlement to end the war; 2) mitigating the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. Ending the war will require a two-pronged approach: first, securing a UN-backed ceasefire and agreement that will end Saudi Arabia’s military intervention by addressing its security concerns and allowing it to make a face-saving exit; and second, launching inclusive UN-sponsored intra-Yemeni negotiations to chart the country’s political future. To achieve a ceasefire, the EU, leveraging its credibility with the Huthis and Saleh’s party, and in coordination with the UK and France, both of which may have Saudi Arabia’s ear because they support it militarily, should encourage backchannel talks between the antagonists to lay the foundations for a UN-backed deal. In addition, the UK, as penholder, and France should push for a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, both inside Yemen and along the Yemeni-Saudi border, and outlining parameters of a compromise solution consistent with the UN roadmap and requiring concessions from both sides. They should also limit arms sales to Saudi Arabia expressly and only for defense (including defense of Saudi territory from cross-border attacks by Huthi-Saleh forces) and condition sales of arms for offensive purposes on Riyadh’s express support for an immediate ceasefire. To promote a durable settlement, the EU and its member states should champion broadly inclusive intra-Yemeni negotiations that address unresolved issues, especially decentralization and the status of the south. They could work toward these talks through track II initiatives and sustained diplomatic engagement with actors beyond the Hadi government and the Huthi/Saleh bloc, including the Sunni Islamist party Islah, southern separatists, tribal groupings, Salafi groups and civil society organisations including women’s groups. 3. Increasing humanitarian relief and upholding international law The EU and its member states should continue efforts to mitigate the war’s humanitarian toll and prevent further deterioration. Specifically, they should urgently discourage, both privately and publicly, the Saudi-led coalition’s attempts to capture Hodeida, a move that would likely worsen the humanitarian crisis and set back prospects for a negotiated settlement. More generally, they should call on the Saudi-led coalition to relax the air and sea blockade on Huthi/Saleh-controlled areas (including by allowing civilian flights in and out of Sanaa, the capital), and call on the Huthis to ease the blockade of Taiz. In each case, they should encourage the blockading side to facilitate the free movement of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and civilians. They should also encourage the Yemeni antagonists to reach a compromise that allows basic Central Bank functioning throughout the country, including especially the payment of public-sector salaries and enabling importers to secure letters of credit for essential foodstuffs. Finally, the EU and its member states should speak with one voice in consistently and explicitly condemning violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all sides. They should bring to bear concerted diplomatic pressure and, where relevant, threaten to suspend all weapons sales. The EU could go further by advocating for an independent inquiry into alleged violations on the grounds that not holding perpetrators accountable breeds impunity, a recipe for further conflict. Yet given internal rifts within the UN Human Rights Council on this issue, including among EU member states, the EU will have more impact at this stage by focusing on promoting a ceasefire. Ultimately, however, a lasting settlement will need to include a mechanism for addressing transitional justice and accountability."

International Crisis group (ICG), "Watch List 2017 – First Update, EU Watchlist 7/From Eary Warning to Early Action, April 27, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/watch-list-2017-first- update?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=3e363e9482- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_27&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-3e363e9482- 359871089, commented," Crisis Group’s first update to our Watch List 2017 includes entries on counter-

71 terrorism, Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia and the Western Balkans. These early-warning publications identify conflict situations in which prompt action by the European Union and its member states would generate stronger prospects for peace. Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union Over the past few months, military operations have eaten deep into the Iraqi and Syrian heartlands of the Islamic State (ISIS). Much of Mosul, the group’s last urban stronghold in Iraq, has been recaptured; Raqqa, its capital in Syria, is encircled. Its Libyan branch, with closest ties to the Iraqi leadership, has been ousted from the Mediterranean coastal strip it once held. Boko Haram, whose leaders pledged allegiance to ISIS, menaces the African states around Lake Chad but has split and lost much of the territory it held a year ago. Though smaller branches exist from the Sinai to Yemen and Somalia, the movement has struggled to make major inroads or hold territory elsewhere. ISIS’s decisive defeat remains a remote prospect while the Syrian war rages and Sunnis’ place in Iraqi politics is uncertain. It will adapt and the threat it poses will evolve. But it is on the back foot, its brand diminished. For many adherents, its allure was its self-proclaimed caliphate and territorial expansion. With those in decline, its leaders are struggling to redefine success. Fewer local groups are signing up. Fewer foreigners are travelling to join; the main danger they represent now is their return to countries of origin or escape elsewhere. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, is increasingly potent. It, too, has evolved. Its affiliates, particularly its Sahel, Somalia, Syria and Yemen branches, are more influential than the leadership in South Asia. ’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, inspires loyalty and offers guidance but has little say in daily operations. Al-Qaeda’s strategy – embedding within popular uprisings, allying with other armed groups and displaying pragmatism and sensitivity to local norms – may make it a more durable threat than ISIS. Its strategy also means that affiliates’ identities are more local than transnational, a shift that has sparked debate among jihadists. Although Western intelligence officials assert that cells within affiliates plot against the West, for the most part they fight locally and have recruited large numbers of fighters motivated by diverse local concerns. U.S. national security policy looks set to change too. Much about new President Donald Trump’s approach remains uncertain, but aggressive counter-terrorism operations for now dominate his administration’s policy across the Muslim world. Protecting U.S. citizens from groups that want to kill them must, of course, be an imperative for American leaders. But since the 9/11 attacks a decade and a half ago, too narrow a focus on counter-terrorism has often distorted U.S. policy and at times made the problem worse. Past months have seen a spike in civilian casualties resulting from U.S. drone and other airstrikes. Some early signs are troubling. Past months have seen a spike in civilian casualties resulting from U.S. drone and other airstrikes. The degree to which the administration will factor in the potential geopolitical fallout of operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda is unclear. U.S. allies could misuse counter- terrorism support against rivals and deepen chaos in the region. Nor it is clear that the U.S. will invest in diplomacy to either end the wars from which jihadists profit or nudge regional leaders toward reforms that can avert further crises. The new administration may also escalate against Iran while fighting jihadists, creating an unnecessary and dangerous distraction. Though the influence of European leaders and the European Union (EU) on Arab politics and U.S. counter-terrorism policy has limits, they are likely to be asked to bankroll reconstruction efforts across affected regions. They could use this leverage to: Promote a judicious and legal use of force: Campaigns against jihadists hinge on winning over the population in which they operate. “Targeted” strikes that kill civilians and alienate communities are counterproductive, regardless of immediate yield. Indiscriminate military action can play into extremists’ hands or leave communities caught between their harsh rule and brutal operations against them. European leaders should press for tactical restraint and respect for international humanitarian law, which conflict parties of all stripes increasingly have abandoned. Promote plans for the day after military operations: Offensives against Mosul, Raqqa or elsewhere need plans to preserve military gains, prevent reprisals and stabilize liberated cities. As yet, no such plan for Raqqa seems to exist – it would need to involve local Sunni forces providing security, at least inside the

72 city. As operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda linked groups escalate, the EU could seek clarity on what comes next and how operations fit into a wider political strategy. Identify counter-terrorism’s geopolitical side effects: The fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda intersects a tinderbox of wars and regional rivalries. Frank discussion of the potential consequences of military operations could reduce risks that they provoke a wider escalation. The Raqqa campaign, for example, should seek to avoid stimulating fighting elsewhere among Turkish and Kurdish forces and their respective allies. Success in Mosul hinges on preventing the forces involved battling for territory after they have ousted ISIS. European powers’ own counter-terrorism support should not result in allies being more resistant to compromise. Reinforce diplomatic efforts to end crises: From Libya to Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, no country where ISIS or al-Qaeda branches hold territory has a single force strong enough to secure the whole country. Unless the main non-jihadist armed factions in each country can arrive at some form of political accommodation among each other, there is a risk they either ally with jihadists against rivals or misuse counter-terrorism support for other ends. European powers should step up support for UN-led diplomacy if the U.S. neglects such efforts. Protect space for political engagement: Over recent years, as jihadists have gathered force on today’s battlefields, Western powers have tended to draw a line between groups they see as beyond the pale and those whom they envisage as part of settlements. The EU should keep the door open to engagement with all conflict parties – whether to secure humanitarian access or reduce violence. It should be made clear to groups on the wrong side of the line how they eventually can cross it. Al-Qaeda affiliates’ increasingly local focus makes this all the more vital. Warn against confronting Iran: Such a confrontation would be perilous. Militarily battling Tehran in Iraq, Yemen or Syria, questioning the nuclear deal’s validity or imposing sanctions that flout its spirit could provoke asymmetric responses via non-state allies. Iran’s behavior across the region is often destabilizing and reinforces the sectarian currents that buoy jihadists. But the answer lies in dampening the rivalry between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, not stimulating it, with the attendant risk of escalating proxy wars. This will mean resuming a tough but professional senior-level U.S.-Iranian channel of communication, something the U.S. administration seems reluctant to do but that Europe could encourage. And, for the EU and its members states (notably France, Germany and the UK), it means clearly signaling to the U.S. administration that any step to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – in the absence of an Iranian violation of the deal – will leave Washington isolated and unable to recreate an international consensus to sanction Iran. The roots of ISIS’s rise and al-Qaeda’s resurgence are complex and varied. Patterns of radicalization vary from country to country, village to village and individual to individual. Clearly, though, war and state collapse are huge boons for both movements. Both groups have grown less because their ideology inspires wide appeal than by offering protection or firepower against enemies, or rough law and order where no one else can; or by occupying a power vacuum and forcing communities to acquiesce. Rarely can either group recruit large numbers or seize territory outside a war zone. The EU’s investment in peacebuilding and shoring up vulnerable states is, therefore, among its most valuable contributions against jihadists. European leaders must do everything within their power to disrupt attacks, but they should also put conflict prevention at the center of their counter-terrorism policy. Afghanistan: Growing Challenges Rising insurgency and a fraught political transition are exacerbating an already pervasive sense of insecurity about Afghanistan’s future. Since the 2014 international military drawdown, the resurgent has fast expanded its presence countrywide. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), an affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also has a foothold, albeit limited and mainly in some eastern districts. Two-and-a-half years after it was created to prevent the bitterly contested 2014 presidential election from plunging the country into turmoil, the National Unity Government (NUG) is beset with internal disagreements and dysfunction that undermine the capacity of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to counter the insurgency. The government’s ability to confront significant governance, economic and humanitarian challenges also is weak. Civilian and military casualties as well as the numbers of conflict-displaced and those in need of urgent humanitarian assistance continue to grow. Rising insurgency

73 After the transition to Afghan security forces in 2014, the thinly stretched ANDSF has been battling a growing insurgency on several fronts. According to the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) only 57.2 per cent of 375 districts were under government control or influence by 1 February 2017, an almost 15 per cent decline since end-2015. According to the Special Inspector General, 6,785 Afghan forces were killed and another 11,777 wounded from January to November 2016, significant losses at a time when security forces are struggling with personnel retention. The UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also reported a 3 per cent increase in civilian casualties (3,498 killed 7,920 wounded) in 2016 over the previous year. The number of high profile attacks in Kabul also was higher during the first three months of 2017 as compared to equivalent periods in previous years. On 21 April, Taliban gunmen and suicide bombers attacked an Afghan army base in the northern Balkh province, killing over 100 military and other personnel and injuring scores more. The army chief and defense minister both resigned the following day. Two attacks in March targeted police stations and a military hospital, killing 73 and wounding over 240 people. Preventing the loss of more territory to insurgents, particularly during the anticipated spring offensive, is an urgent priority, notably in order to limit the scope of ungoverned spaces that could be exploited by regional extremists and transnational terror groups. With 8,400 troops already based in Afghanistan, the U.S. military leadership has requested a few thousand additional troops, a step that – if approved – would boost ANDSF morale and potentially could help blunt the insurgents’ offensive. But countering the growing insurgency also will depend on continued robust international financial and technical support, including honoring commitments made at NATO’s July 2016 Warsaw summit to advise, assist and train Afghan forces and provide them with annual funding of up to $4.5 billion until 2020. Tackling the security situation also will require addressing widening internal disagreements and political partisanship that permeate all levels of the security apparatus and have undermined ANDSF command and control structures. Intra-governmental divisions likewise have impeded implementation of reforms necessary to mitigate the effects of corruption, nepotism and factionalism in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and particularly the Afghan National Police (ANP). Such weaknesses and overall government dysfunction played a major part in the 2016 Taliban advances in Kunduz city in the north, the siege of Lashkargah and Tirin Kot cities in the south, and, in March 2017, the Taliban capture of Helmand’s Sangin district. Regional neighbors Amid ambiguity about the Western will to remain engaged, Afghanistan’s neighbors are more aggressively promoting what they perceive to be their own national security interests. This most notably is the case of Pakistan, whose relations with Afghanistan continue to be strained. Islamabad remains unwilling to facilitate talks between the Taliban and Kabul, and continues supporting its Afghan proxies, allowing them to recruit, fundraise, as well as plan and conduct operations from safe havens inside Pakistan. Pakistan in turn accuses Kabul of at best turning a blind eye, if not actively supporting, Pakistani tribal militants conducting cross-border attacks from Afghan territory. Deteriorating bilateral relations have had other consequences. In 2016, Islamabad forcibly repatriated more than 550,000 Afghans (including 380,000 registered refugees) as relations with Kabul deteriorated because of heightened Taliban attacks in Afghanistan and cross-border attacks by Afghanistan-based Pakistani tribal militants. In February 2017, after a major terror attack on a Sufi shrine in southern Pakistan which was claimed by a Pakistani Taliban faction reportedly based in eastern Afghanistan, Pakistan closed its two main border crossings with Afghanistan – Torkham and Chaman – for over a month. It also conducted mortar and other military strikes on the bordering provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar. Though it has since reopened the crossings, Pakistan has begun to fence the border, a move certain to aggravate tensions insofar as Kabul does not recognize the Durand Line as the international boundary. There are further complicating regional factors. Closer ties between Kabul and New Delhi, which has offered a $1 billion aid package and MI-25 combat helicopters to Afghanistan, are viewed as provocative by Islamabad. Iran long has been suspected of providing military hardware to some Taliban factions, a stance motivated partly by animosity toward the U.S. and more recently by the desire to counter IS-K. Russia also recently has upped its involvement, reaching out to the Taliban and, according to

74 senior U.S military officials providing them with some military support, and proposing to lead a new negotiation process which could further complicate Afghanistan’s security dynamics. Peace negotiations No internationally-led negotiations will work unless there is a consensus among Afghans, both those backing and opposing the government, to pursue a negotiated peace rather than continued conflict. External actors can lend a hand, through facilitation and other support, but the impetus has to come from within. In this context, the European Union (EU) and its member states should continue their technical and financial support to an Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process in its upcoming 2017-2020 EU Strategy for Afghanistan. The EU should continue providing technical support to a negotiating process that has broad Afghan support A second precondition for successful negotiations is for the U.S., still the most powerful and influential foreign actor in Afghanistan, to settle on a comprehensive political strategy. While the Trump administration’s Afghan policy remains a work in progress, there are clear indications it will maintain its presence in Afghanistan and likely enhance its military support. But it still must address the question of the optimal format and composition of the talks. The Quadrilateral Consultation Group comprising Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the U.S. has been dormant since the May 2016 U.S. drone attack that killed Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor. Russia’s efforts to bring together Pakistan, China, Iran, India, and most recently Afghanistan, are more promising insofar as they include all regional stakeholders. But Washington declined Moscow’s invitation to participate in the process, concerned that Russia’s outreach to the Taliban, including some military support, could endanger U.S. stabilization efforts and endanger the lives of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Given the U.S.’s key role, its absence clearly would be to the detriment of the process. The EU should continue providing technical support to a negotiating process that has broad Afghan support, which the Moscow-led process currently lacks even with one of the principal stakeholders, the Taliban. A third essential element is for Pakistan to become convinced that its interests would be better served by a political settlement in Afghanistan than by continued Taliban insurgency. This will require international efforts both to pressure Pakistan to shift course and to facilitate constructive dialogue between Islamabad and Kabul. The U.S. role will be central, including by conditioning continued military support to Islamabad on Pakistan working with Kabul to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table and rethinking its support to the Taliban’s Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network, now fully integrated into the insurgency’s command structure. While the U.S. is best placed to pressure Pakistan to reverse its support for Afghan proxies, the EU and member states should use trade and diplomatic ties with Pakistan and financial assistance to Afghanistan as leverage to persuade them to peacefully resolve their differences. The humanitarian situation Afghanistan suffers from one of the most protracted humanitarian crises in the world. In 2016, which witnessed some of the worst fighting since the U.S.-led intervention in October 2001, 646,698 persons were internally displaced due to conflict, compared to 70,000 in 2010; this added to the roughly one million conflict-displaced in previous years. 2016 also saw one million Afghan refugees and migrants forced to return home from Pakistan and Iran. The EU’s plan to deport back home some 80,000 Afghans whose request for asylum was rejected will further strain Afghanistan’s capacity. More broadly, both Kabul and the humanitarian community, including UN agencies, estimate that 9.3 million people, or almost one-third of Afghanistan’s population, will be in need of humanitarian assistance this year. As security continues to deteriorate and both Pakistan and Iran force more refugees and migrants to return, the humanitarian crisis likely will worsen. The overall humanitarian crisis is putting enormous pressure on Afghanistan’s already stretched public services and infrastructure, especially in urban centres, where 70-80 per cent of internally displaced and returning refugees tend to settle; most are jobless or under-employed, with little or no access to health care or education. Countrywide, as many as 1.57 million face severe food insecurity. Women and girls are often the worst off given the country’s socially conservative nature. Addressing the humanitarian emergency will require continued, robust and long-term international, including EU, economic assistance. While the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) should persuade Pakistan and Iran to end the forcible

75 deportation of Afghan refugees and migrants, the EU and member states also should at the very least slow down deportations as security continues to deteriorate in Afghanistan. Keeping Egypt’s Politics on the Agenda Europe’s approach to Egypt has focused on accompanying economic reform, a massive challenge for a country of 90 million still reeling from the effects of post-2011 political instability. However, doing this at the expense of addressing the troubling and dangerous state of Egypt’s domestic politics would be self- defeating. Egypt’s economy under stress Egypt’s economy, under severe stress, is arguably the country’s single greatest source of potential instability. Six months into the three-year, $12 billion deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) inked in November 2016, its reforms are already taking a toll. The decision to free float the Egyptian pound (EGP) has diminished the currency’s value against the dollar (USD) by over 50 per cent, and inflation has skyrocketed. In February 2016, CAPMAS, the government’s statistics agency, found that food-price inflation reached 41 per cent year-on-year. Though the government also reduced fuel and energy subsidies in November 2016, the devaluation cancelled out much of the savings, since in EGP terms imports are now much more expensive. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s economic decision-making has at times been decisive but often imprudent. He has invested scarce resources in prestige projects with uncertain returns, such as a costly widening of the Suez Canal, and significantly boosted arms imports. He has postponed important decisions, including the EGP’s free-float, a delay that many experts say exacerbated the currency’s fall. Overall, Sisi’s behavior suggests a reactive approach to economic reform, moving ahead only when under duress, such as when he needed to quickly secure the IMF loan. A $12.9 billion debt repayment scheduled for 2018 (even if some of it, owed to Gulf countries, is likely to be quietly written off) and a public debt that has officially reached 98 per cent of GDP (though many experts believe it is higher) present other looming crises. More importantly, the government appears to be pursuing economic reforms – many of which are likely to cause short-term pain and be contested by large segments of society – in an exclusively top- down, dirigiste manner. On the economy as in other matters, important decisions are often made with little to no consultation among stakeholders, without transparency or an adequate communications strategy. Even Sisi’s supporters among Egypt’s business elite appear sidelined, while the military has taken on an outsized role in implementing certain major economic projects, often without coordinating with private sector partners: the government announced a promising industrial zone in the Suez Canal zone but without consulting potential investors about their needs. Simultaneously, the military and security services have tended to micromanage the use of foreign aid, the result often being either long delays in the implementation of projects or the blocking of those they do not like. The economy is relatively advanced, and the country enjoys both extremely successful private sector personalities and talented technocrats. Yet, as part of the wider reversal of the democratic opening of 2011-2013, the government is turning its back on consensus-building on major socio-economic issues. It often appears more concerned about securing foreign aid, especially direct budget support, than genuinely thinking through what its reform plan should be and how to implement donor agendas. The top-down model notwithstanding, some major reforms have been avoided or blocked because of political resistance from within state institutions. This may seem paradoxical in light of the regime’s generally undemocratic nature, yet Egypt’s state is both authoritarian and plural. The European Union (EU) should keep this in mind as it seeks to accompany Egypt’s economic reforms; it cannot simply rely on a partnership with the executive. Examples abound. For instance, parliament, despite being overwhelmingly supportive of Sisi, for the past year obstructed and ultimately watered down a civil service reform that sought to address the problem of a bloated bureaucracy. Although the private sector supported the reform, and the presidency sought to impose it, parliamentarians (most of whom have no party affiliation and were elected as independents) had to take into account the seven million civil servants (and voters) whose salaries amount to a quarter of the annual budget. That many of these parliamentarians themselves are former civil servants is another reason for their obstructionism. A proposed new investment law is likely to suffer the same fate. The judiciary, too, is battling attempts at executive encroachment. The presidency’s resort to

76 emergency law to bypass the ordinary judiciary, as well as direct pressure on judges, can have a negative impact on the rule of law and the investment environment. The EU’s dilemma: stability over reform? Egypt presents a difficult dilemma. Since the 3 July 2013 coup that deposed President Mohamed Morsi, the EU, after an initial period of caution, largely normalized relations with the military-led regime. Several member states publicly embraced Sisi despite his regime’s repressive rule, judging that the priority was to help strengthen Egypt so it could better withstand domestic and external turmoil. This approach has been reinforced by the strong view among several key countries – notably Israel, Saudi Arabia, the and, more recently, the U.S. under the Trump administration – that stabilizing Egypt is more important than reforming it. EU-Egypt relations are beginning to bear a striking resemblance to what they were during President Hosni Mubarak’s era. In this sense, EU-Egypt relations are beginning to bear a striking resemblance to what they were during President Hosni Mubarak’s era. This could well be a mistake: the country’s polarized politics and resurgent authoritarianism are at the core of its inability to defuse the threat of extremism and embark on a sustainable path to reform of sclerotic state institutions. The 9 April twin bombings of Coptic Orthodox churches and their aftermath are tragic but telling symptoms. Despite three years of counter-insurgency in Sinai and ever more draconian counter-terrorism legislation, the Islamic State (ISIS, whose main local branch is called Sinai Province) now appears more confident and daring in its efforts to stir up sectarianism. The security services are widely perceived as inefficient, even as the Sisi regime has doubled down on an all-security approach by declaring a state of emergency and threatening to shut down critical media. This bodes ill for Egypt’s appeal to tourists and investors and risks deepening a vicious cycle of repression and extremist violence without addressing underlying political factors, all against the backdrop of rising socio-economic tensions. Growing polarization Ultimately, stabilizing Egypt in a sustainable manner will not be achievable without a government willing to address the widening chasm between the regime’s defense of an ersatz secularism and its Islamist opponents’ increasing radicalization. While the former remains rigid and autocratic in the name of defending the “prestige of the state”, the latter has embraced an irresponsible “revolutionary” discourse that, in essence, is banking on state failure. Voices calling for conciliation on both sides are marginalized; to date the EU and some of its members unfortunately appear, by and large, to have relinquished their early efforts at mediation. One result is the government’s growing rejection of human rights and rule of law and resurgence of an ugly sectarianism on the part of the opposition, particularly among members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies. Allowing this polarization to fester has consequences beyond Egypt’s borders. This is especially true in areas where Cairo tends to project its own domestic brand of politics, as in Libya. There, Egypt’s stridently anti-Islamist approach and unconditional backing for General Khalifa Haftar inevitably may complicate resolution of the conflict and managing its consequences, including the central Mediterranean migration crisis. Supporting economic reform and more inclusive politics Egypt and the EU will adopt their partnership priorities for 2017-2020 at the next Association Council in June 2017. These are expected to include support for Egypt’s sustainable economic and social development, as well as strengthened cooperation on foreign policy, in particular in the fields of democratic governance, security and migration. The EU will also implement a new assistance program to support these jointly agreed priorities. In the past few months of negotiations, Egypt has resisted what it sees as political interference in its domestic affairs, especially on questions of human rights, civil society and political pluralism – even though these issues are covered under the Egypt-EU Association Agreement. Moreover, many European officials believe they have little leverage over Egypt given its rulers’ determination to maintain their current approach at all costs. Both the EU and its member states appear inclined to revert to the pre-2011 status quo despite facing a very different Egypt. This could well amount to an ostrich strategy. The alternative for the EU, with the support of member states, would be to place far more emphasis on Egypt’s broken politics. A presidential election is due in 2018, with parliamentary elections

77 following in 2020; for their part, municipal elections are long overdue. Sisi supporters are pushing through constitutional amendments to remove term limits and otherwise strengthen an already extremely powerful presidency. All of these represent potential political flashpoints. It would be unwise and unrealistic to support Egyptian economic reforms – or partner on issues such as migration control or counter-terrorism – without taking this context into account and push for a more inclusive environment that could help defuse these potential crises. Several broad principles could be followed. First, European governments ought to press for progress on issues that have been taken up by Egyptian political parties and civil society, such as pushing back on restrictions on civil society funding (especially foreign but also local) and organizing, a draconian protest law, or suspension of the rule of law under the state of emergency. As a corollary, they should ensure continued engagement with segments of Egyptian society other than the state and insist that political parties and civil society organisations be able to operate with some degree of safety. Second, Europe should keep channels of communication (even discreet ones) open with the more intransigent opposition, including elements toward which it has little affinity – and that the Egyptian regime has labelled terrorist groups – such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as members of the “anti- coup alliance” it leads. It should use those channels to push those elements toward moderation and an eventual reconciliation with the regime, however implausible that might seem today. These groups continue to enjoy sizable local support. To ignore or, worse, adopt the regime’s stance toward them, would be both short-sighted and counterproductive. In this sense, Europe should seek to use its financial support to persuade Egypt to move in a more constructive political direction. The idea that it has little leverage over Egypt is an untested proposition; unlike in 2013-2014, Egypt can no longer expect automatic financial support from Arab Gulf states. At a minimum, Europe should ensure that core political issues remain at the top of its agenda, and that it maintains contacts with the full spectrum of Egyptian actors. Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability Somalia is at a tipping point. The election of a new president with cross-clan support, the emergence of a youthful and reform-minded parliament, and renewed international interest present a genuine opportunity to promote needed political and security reforms to combat Al-Shabaab and stabilize more areas. The London Conference on Somalia in May coincides with this moment and should be seized upon to mobilize international support. However, because the new federal cabinet was only approved in early March, conference organizers should be realistic about how detailed the government’s plans can or should be. More broadly, key international actors – the European Union (EU), African Union, Arab League, UK, Turkey and the U.S. – will need to coordinate and achieve consensus on realistic strategic goals, including creating an environment in which the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) can begin to draw down. If the new president fails to deliver on promised key reforms – including to rebuild the national army, revamp the constitution, curb corruption and strengthen federalism – both domestic and external support for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) will inevitably wane and Al-Shabaab will be in a stronger position to rebuild its forces and support. Al-Shabaab exploits humanitarian needs Although international aid has picked up, its geographic coverage remains limited, not least because insecurity is rampant and the UN has so far managed to raise only 30 per cent of the $825 million it asked for in early March. As a result, the threat of famine is unlikely to diminish in the next six to twelve months and 5.5 million people (nearly half the population) will require emergency aid. The immediate priority is to mobilize more funds, prevent a repeat of the large-scale graft that marred past relief efforts and assist the hardest hit communities in remote regions which are increasingly turning to Al-Shabaab for assistance. Al-Shabaab is exploiting these needs to improve its image and attract public support, allowing people to move to relief centres run by local and international agencies, even as it gives no indication of its willingness to grant aid agencies access to areas it controls. Al-Shabaab struggles to demonize diaspora ’ crowd-funding campaign (collecting small amounts of money from a large number of people) and especially the Caawi Walaal campaign organized by youth volunteers to provide water and food to remote villages. International actors should therefore support such initiatives, given their potential to extend the reach of the relief effort to remote areas inaccessible to Western aid agencies.

78 Harnessing the diaspora The recent elections produced Somalia’s most demographically diverse and youthful parliament ever. Nearly half its 283 members are younger than 50; over 90 hail from the diaspora; and 63 are female. President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo campaigned on reform and owes his victory to younger and well- educated diaspora MPs. However, efforts to push through needed reforms and national reconciliation will be complicated by the poor delineation of roles and authorities among the president, prime minister and speakers of the upper and lower houses, as well as by powerful vested interests that will want to maintain the 4.5 formula that apportions FGS positions among the four major and smaller minority clans. The president will not be able to rely solely on the diaspora bloc but will need to work with politicians more closely tied to the traditional clan leadership. In the same vein, the new administration will need to avoid giving too many positions to diaspora Somalis, which could aggravate deep societal divisions. Mogadishu’s acute land crisis is fueled by poorly planned investment exploiting local regulatory loopholes. Economic regeneration (symbolized by upmarket hotels, restaurants and homes in Mogadishu) is largely underwritten by remittances from some two million diaspora Somalis, worth some $1.4 billion each year. The FGS has held meetings to mobilize more effective diaspora support for reconstruction, yet there is neither an agency entrusted with policy formulation nor a proper regulatory environment, a gap that could prove risky. For example, Mogadishu’s acute land crisis is fueled by poorly planned investment exploiting local regulatory loopholes. One idea would be for the Somali Economic Forum, a donor-funded organization fostering private sector development and economic growth, to use its upcoming conference in Dubai that will bring together diverse stakeholders to help the new administration create a rules-based regulatory environment to promote sensible investment. Fostering peaceful federalism Strengthening and broadening the fragile administrations of federal member states should be a priority for the government in order to stabilize areas far from Mogadishu. So far, the protracted and ad hoc devolution of power from the weak FGS to federal states has resulted in de facto blocs dominated by powerful clans which tend to monopolize power and resources. Minority clans, including smaller sub-clans within major ones, often feel sidelined, with dangerous implications: in Puntland, for example, successive mutinies by security forces occurred in February and March over unpaid wages, and several armed clan- based militias operate largely outside the control of Puntland President . Equally problematic are increasing Al-Shabaab attacks and targeted assassinations, as well as a growing, albeit small, Islamic State faction operating in Puntland. Elsewhere, the ousting of Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA) President Abdikarim Guled by the state parliament has created a power vacuum and elections planned for late March were postponed due to the severe drought. A similar no confidence motion was initiated against Interim South West Administration (ISWA) President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan in March. Pushing for genuine and viable political settlements at the intra- and inter-federal state levels must remain a priority. To that end, the FGS and international actors should focus on the following: Setting up a permanent mechanism to help resolve disputes among federal states, such as Puntland, Galmudug Interim Administration, Juba Interim Authority and Interim South West Administration. In so doing, the government in Mogadishu and state presidents would address the reality that several inter- state borders are contested and, in almost all states, minority clans feel aggrieved by local power sharing, with the risk that such discontent could trigger wider violence within and between states; Supporting the Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IBRC) to first demarcate contested state borders and then define their boundaries more generally; Supporting efforts to finalize currently vague and unaddressed issues in the provisional constitution, including especially by clarifying legislation on resource and power sharing among federal states and the FGS; Supporting constructive dialogue between Somaliland, which continues to seek independence, and the FGS. In this respect, Somaliland’s agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to manage Berbera port and host a military base is likely to exacerbate simmering tensions between Somaliland and the FGS. Security after AMISOM?

79 Al-Shabaab remains a resilient force that undertakes suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, ambushes and sweeps across south-central Somalia. After AMISOM played a key role in pushing Al- Shabaab’s conventional forces from most urban centres, most troop contributing countries (TCCs) are seeking to depart; at a March meeting in , the TCCs began crafting a plan for the mission’s drawdown. AMISOM Commander General Soubagleh now says the withdrawal could start as early as 2018. But to make this possible, the FGS and federal states will need to improve governance dramatically and end local conflicts in liberated areas. Indeed, without a clearer and more institutionalized division of power, resources and security responsibilities between the FGS and federal states, as well as among federal state administrations, current security gains against Al-Shabaab will be difficult to sustain. In addition, the plan to draw down AMISOM needs a coherent framework to establish a sustainable national force that can take over responsibility for security and mitigate the negative effects of regional competition. The new administration’s further development of a national security architecture is a positive step, but the roles and responsibilities of the National Security Council and the president, notably in terms of command and control authority, will need to be clarified and institutionalized. Moreover, efforts to build the Somali National Army (SNA) could be improved through much better international coordination among the EU, U.S., UK, Turkey and Gulf states, which are all involved in troop training. There are growing indications that the U.S., under the Trump administration, is determined to up its direct military involvement. This carries risks. Although enhanced training and equipment would help, increased airstrikes could inflame public opinion and unwittingly drive communities into Al-Shabaab’s arms – especially if they cause civilian deaths. Pursuing electoral reform Somalia still has a long way to go before shifting from the 4.5 quota system to one-person-one- vote elections; in particular, it is unlikely that the requisite level of security will be achieved in the next four years. Recent elections were also marred by lack of transparency and accountability, which generated both corruption and electoral manipulation. Therefore, rather than focusing on the overly ambitious goal of one- person-one-vote, the London Conference ought to consider some of the inherited challenges, principally the 4.5 clan system. In particular, Somalis and international actors should: Encourage the FGS to finalize the process of establishing functioning political parties; Provide technical support to register citizens across the country; Strengthen the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to organize and oversee future elections; and Help the IEC organize smaller scale (e.g. municipal) elections. The Western Balkans: Fragile Majorities Mounting political instability in the Western Balkans has the potential to spark new crises on the EU’s immediate borders. Political tensions are particularly high in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. Many EU policymakers are concerned that Russia aims to exacerbate this disorder, a worry that has intensified since elements of the Russian intelligence service were implicated in a failed coup in Montenegro last year. But the region’s crises are rooted in a prevalent winner-takes-all party politics and flaws inherent in the political settlements forged to end the Yugoslav wars. While Russia has deep-seated interests in the Balkans, its interventions are more opportunistic than strategic. The Balkans are a part of the ongoing geopolitical contest, but local sensitivities are much stronger drivers of events and risks in the region than geopolitics: the EU therefore should concentrate on local sources of instability, which often are linked to ruling parties’ refusal to give up power despite losing elections. Regional states – including those discussed below – have endured on-and-off political tensions since the 1990s, so far without sliding back into secessionist wars. But the political space for avoiding more serious crises is narrowing, and the EU must engage intensively to ensure it does not entirely vanish. This will play out differently in each context but at its core the EU should seek to impose meaningful financial costs on, and slow down the pace of EU accession for actors who violate basic norms, and in particular on parties that obstruct a peaceful transfer of power. Macedonia The risk of a serious crisis is highest in Macedonia. National elections in 2016 failed to restore stability after a period of political turmoil and sporadic violence. The incumbent right to far-right VMRO- DPMNE party has refused to cede power to a majority coalition of parties led by the Social Democratic

80 SDSM party. A central point of contention is the SDSM’s willingness to make some political concessions to the Albanian minority, which VMRO claims threaten the state’s existence. This invalid claim has resulted in daily anti-Albanian rallies in the capital, Skopje, as well as in growing alienation among ethnic Albanians. While the Macedonian Albanian minority’s leaders generally have remained committed to working within Macedonia’s political structures since the country came close to civil war in 2001, the current crisis could undermine this uneasy bargain. The EU should use the threat of possible sanctions to press the VMRO to accept its electoral defeat. Civil society groups have called for targeted sanctions against senior VMRO officials, and the European Parliament’s rapporteur has echoed these calls. The EU should use the threat of possible sanctions to press the VMRO to accept its electoral defeat and play the role of responsible opposition. Leaders of the European People’s Party (EPP), of which VMRO is a member, should use their contacts in Skopje to insist that VMRO stop blocking the transfer of power; if it does not the EPP should consider suspending VMRO. Kosovo The political climate in Kosovo has been poisonous since the ruling PDK party refused to cede power after losing elections in 2014. The nationalist opposition party – VV – has responded with public protests and accusations that the PDK is too generous to the ethnic Serb minority. The PDK subsequently reached a power-sharing arrangement with another part of the opposition, the centrist LDK, though this political deal failed to bridge deeper societal divides. While the EU previously coaxed Belgrade and Pristina into constructive talks, relations have worsened and there were tensions this winter over a Kosovo Serb plan to build a wall in the divided city of Mitrovica. Although EU officials keep a close watch on the situation, inter-ethnic tensions are liable to recur if the PDK and opposition exploit them as part of their standoff. Domestic and international civil society groups have launched a dialogue between the PDK and opposition, and the EU should continue to support this. In particular, it should encourage these civil society efforts to bring ethnic Serb minority parties and representatives into the dialogue, while using its leverage with Belgrade to persuade Serbia not to obstruct the process. Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH potentially faces a decisive test of its sustainability as a state in 2018-2019. The country could be unable to replace the current legislature and executive when their terms expire in October 2018. The constitutional court has struck down elements of the electoral law, and all major Bosniak, Croat and Serb parties will have to agree on amendments to the law if state-wide polls are to take place next year. Given the polarization of BiH politics, there is a significant danger that this will prove impossible. Failure to hold elections in 2018 would result in the state’s gradual paralysis. In a worst-case scenario this would allow Republika Srpska to press anew for its secession from the federal state. The EU, supported by BiH’s neighbors Croatia and Serbia, should use the leverage of the accession process and related assistance to push all sides to amend the electoral law as quickly as possible, and emphasize its long-term focus on the country by, for example, committing to keep in place EUFOR, the small EU-led peacekeeping force, for as long as necessary."

The International Crisis Group (ICG), CrisisWatch Tracking Conflict World Wide, May 2, 2017 https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&ut m_campaign=29bdb060f0- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_05_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-29bdb060f0- 359871089, Found: Global Overview APRIL 2017 Syria’s conflict intensified further, and could take another violent turn as the offensive on Raqqa, the stronghold of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), becomes imminent. In Egypt, ISIS stepped up attacks, particularly against Coptic Christians, and May could see both jihadists and security forces increasingly resort to violence. In South Asia, the Taliban claimed deadly attacks against the military and civilians throughout Afghanistan, killing at least 140 soldiers in reportedly the deadliest Taliban attack on armed forces since 2001, while violence escalated in Kashmir. In Venezuela and Macedonia political

81 tensions continued to mount, while in Paraguay, popular anger sparked by a move to lift a one-term limit on the presidency was defused after President Cartes announced he would no longer seek re-election. Trends for Last Month April 2017 Trends and Outlook In Syria, an escalation in violence by Syrian and outside actors eroded prospects for a political settlement and, with an offensive on ISIS’s stronghold Raqqa imminent, fighting in May could be worse still. The U.S., among others, held President Assad’s regime responsible for a chemical weapons attack on a rebel-held town on 4 April that killed at least 80. Three days later the U.S. launched a missile strike on the air base from which it believes the attack was launched, straining its relations with Russia, Assad’s backer, whose support for the peace process is critical. In late April, Turkey bombed Kurdish fighters of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in north-east Syria, and the U.S.-backed YPG edged closer to an assault on the city of Raqqa. As Crisis Group has warned, while the Kurdish fighters are an important U.S. ally in the fight against ISIS, Washington should take steps to mitigate the damage this partnership may cause to its relationship with Ankara and prepare to overcome local governance challenges after ISIS is dislodged from Raqqa. In Egypt, ISIS ramped up attacks particularly against Coptic Christians, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency and fighting between security forces and jihadists intensified in the Sinai Peninsula. On 9 April, two separate suicide attacks at Coptic churches killed 48 people. Following firefights and airstrikes on ISIS positions in Sinai, another suicide bombing on 25 April in North Sinai killed at least 40. This worrying escalation could lead to further attacks on churches in May and the risk that the government, under the state of emergency, employs yet more heavy-handed tactics to suppress dissent. As Crisis Group explained, addressing the country’s polarized politics and resurgent authoritarianism is critical to defusing the jihadist threat and reforming sclerotic state institutions. In South Asia, the Taliban claimed a number of attacks against the military and civilians throughout Afghanistan, and on 21 April infiltrated an army base in Mazar-e-Sharif city in Balkh province, killing at least 140 soldiers. As we have warned, preventing the loss of more territory to insurgents, particularly during the Taliban’s new spring offensive, is an urgent priority which will require, among other steps, robust international assistance and addressing widening internal disagreements and political partisanship that permeate all levels of the security apparatus. Elsewhere in the region, tensions worsened between Indian security forces and Kashmiriseparatists and protesters around a by-election in Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir’s capital. On 9 April, the day of the by-election, Indian security forces opened fire on protesters throwing stones and attacking polling stations, killing seven. Overall, eight people were killed and over 200 injured in election-day clashes. Meanwhile, in India’s Chhattisgarh state, Maoists ambushed a Central Reserve Police Force patrol on 21 April killing at least 25, reportedly the worst attack on security forces since 2010. Macedonia’s political standoff turned violent in late April as protesters opposed to the formation of a new Social Democrat (SDSM)-led coalition government stormed parliament and attacked MPs after they elected a new ethnic Albanian speaker. Over 100 were injured, including SDSM leader Zoran Zaev as well as other politicians, journalists and police. In a new Commentary on the Western Balkans, Crisis Group has warned that the new majority coalition must be allowed to take office and govern, or Macedonia risks ethnic conflict. Almost 30 people were killed in Venezuela as security forces and government supporters cracked down on protestors in the capital and elsewhere demanding elections and the dismissal of Supreme Court justices behind a March ruling to assume the National Assembly’s legislative powers. As growing opposition to the government drew hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets, the government deployed the National Guard and police to disperse them with tear gas, water-cannon and plastic bullets, often fired at close range. On 1 May, President Maduro announced the government would appoint a new body to rewrite the constitution, drawing further opposition ire. Meanwhile, in a positive move, Paraguay’s President Cartes announced he would no longer seek re-election in 2018, defusing tensions in the wake of violent protests in late March against a move to lift a one-term limit on the presidency. Africa Burundi APRIL 2017

82 Govt 4 April suspended opposition party Movement for Solidarity and Democracy for six months on grounds that it was violating constitution and forming rebel group. Govt 11 April rejected Feb request by mediator of inter-Burundian dialogue, former Tanzanian President Mkapa, that it grant provisional amnesty to alleged plotters of May 2015 coup so they can take part in talks. Students at Ecole normale supérieure du Burundi 19 April ended strike protesting against govt’s decision to replace scholarships with loans; other students ended strike 25 April. Cameroon APRIL 2017 Boko Haram (BH) continued attacks in Far North and Anglophone minority in North West and South West regions maintained calls for dialogue with govt to resolve standoff, despite some technical concessions by govt. Two girls, estimated aged sixteen to eighteen, under BH orders detonated explosives strapped to them 3 April at Mora, Mayo Sava department, killing only themselves. Military 4 April repelled BH attack on Gouzda-Vreket post, Mayo Moskota area. In Mayo Sava department, suicide bombing 8 April killed bomber and three others at Kolofata; BH same day attacked Ganai killing six and Sandawadjiri killing one; suicide bombing at Kolofata 19 April killed bomber and four others including a gendarme; and BH same day attacked Mbereche killing one person and kidnapping three girls. IED 24 April hit military vehicle in Homeka, Mayo Sava department killing at least three soldiers. BH fought vigilante community defense group in Achigachia, Mayo Tsanaga department killing five members 26 April; suicide bombing in Tchakarmari, Mayo Sava department 28 April killed only bomber; security forces same day fought BH in Ndaba, Mayo Sava department, several BH and one civilian killed. About 100 BH members including men, women and children surrendered during month in several villages in Mayo Moskota and Kolofata areas. Govt end March detailed measures it would take to address claims of marginalization by minority Anglophones in NW and SW regions, including to promote use of Common Law and increase Anglophones in judicial system. Govt 20 April restored internet in NW and SW regions after three-month cut. General strike eased in SW, remained strong in NW. APRIL 2017 Violence involving ex-Seleka rebel factions, anti-balaka and Fulani militias continued, in particular in north, center and east. In NW, ex-Seleka faction Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and Revolution and Justice (RJ) militia 4 April captured Ngaoundaye; UN mission (MINUSCA) next day forced them out; MPC 10 April denied involvement. Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) Fulani-protection militia reportedly committed abuses against civilians in NW and Cameroon from early April. In center, ex-Seleka factions Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance (FPRC) and Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) continued to clash and FPRC and anti-balaka reportedly clashed with Fulani herders near Bria in east. U.S. 12 April imposed financial sanctions on ex-Seleka faction leader Abdoulaye Hissène and anti-balaka leader Maxime Mokom. World Bank 13 April approved $30mn and MINUSCA and govt $15mn funding for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Repatriation (DDRR) program. DDRR stakeholders including govt, representatives of fourteen armed groups and international partners met 20- 21 April in Bangui; armed groups agreed with govt and MINUSCA on pilot project to reintegrate ex- combatants into civilian life or army but FPRC imposed several conditions, including participation in govt. Uganda 12 April said it had begun withdrawing troops who have since 2009 been pursuing rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in east, planned to complete withdrawal by end May; U.S. 26 April began to withdraw its troops supporting mission. CAR Defense Minister Joseph Yakété 4 April said army would replace Ugandan and U.S. troops in Obo in SE, and deploy in Am Dafhok at border with Sudan under border security agreement with Sudan and Chad, and in Boali, near Bangui. Chad APRIL 2017 Violent incidents spiked early month, especially in N’Djamena area. Dispute among soldiers left three dead in Farcha, western suburb of capital 1 April. Police same day found three civilians shot dead in Gaoui, 10km NE of N’Djamena. Four assailants 2 April killed senior official of national water utility in N’Djamena. In Massaguet, about 90km NE of capital, assailants 11 April intercepted convoy moving prisoners from N’Djamena to Koro Toro in north, killing two guards and ten prisoners; security forces arrested army personnel allegedly involved. Police arrested civil society leaders Nadjo Kaina 6 April,

83 Bertrand Sollo 15 April and activist Dingamnayel Nelly Versinis 12 April without giving reasons or place of detention. EU commissioner for international development 10 April pledged €100mn to govt, signed two additional financial agreements together worth €43.3mn. Democratic Republic of Congo A PRIL 2017 resident Kabila 7 April named as new PM Bruno Tshibala, former member of leading opposition party Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) but expelled in March for dissenting over party leadership. Main opposition coalition Rassemblement led by Felix Tshisekedi same day said Kabila violated Dec 2016 agreement by not appointing candidate selected by opposition. Rassemblement refused to take part in presidency-managed talks, 3 April staged countrywide strike and called for protest 10 April. Protest, banned by govt, attracted small numbers of people. EU, France, , U.S. and Catholic Church (CENCO) criticized Kabila’s failure to adhere to Dec 2016 agreement; govt 14 April suspended military cooperation with Belgium. African Union 15 April said it was ready to work with new govt but asked for more inclusiveness. Kamuina Nsapu insurgency continued in Kasai Central province in center. Militia 8 April attacked Bakwa Tshibumba village, near provincial capital Mbuji Mayi, kidnapping five people and burning 50 houses; militia 12 April captured from army Kamako border post on DRC-Angola border; over 9,000 people fled fighting into Angola 1-21 April, bringing total number of refugees from Kasai Central to over 11,000. As demanded by Kamuina Nsapu family, govt 16 April handed over body of former chief killed Aug 2016. UN 19 April confirmed existence of at least seventeen additional mass graves in Kasai Central, bringing to 40 number of mass graves documented by UN in Kasai Central and Oriental since Aug 2016. In S Kivu in east, Mai Mai Blaise militia 1 April attacked Kalonge village, near provincial capital Bukavu; two militiamen killed. Four people killed 4 April in clashes between Hutu and Nande communities in Kishishe village, N Kivu. Mai Mai Nyatura and Rwandan Hutu rebel group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 8 April attacked Rutshuru and Masisi towns, N Kivu. Fighting erupted 26 April between Mai Mai Nyatura militia and FDLR splinter group National Council for Renewal and Democracy (CNRD) for control of Bweru village, N Kivu, 29 people killed including at least eleven militants. In Munigi refugee camp near Goma, N Kivu, 100 S Sudanese rebels refusing repatriation 18 April took hostage sixteen UN staff, released them same day. APRIL 2017 Govt 3 April criticized U.S. decision 30 March to place sanctions on navy following UN report of “arms-related cooperation” between Eritrea and North Korea. Ethiopia APRIL 2017 Presidents of Oromia and Somali regions 19 April agreed to resolve dispute over status of some 400 districts along common border, driver of low-level conflict since 2005. FM Gebeyehu and Egyptian president met in Cairo 19 April and recommitted to resolve issues over use of Nile water and Grand Renaissance Dam, agreed officials would meet every two months. Kenya APRIL 2017 Party primaries ahead of Aug general elections marred by small-scale violent protests, clashes between candidates’ supporters and logistical issues mid-April in many areas especially in west and north, forcing several parties including ruling Jubilee Party to postpone voting to late April. Opposition coalition National Super Alliance 27 April announced Raila Odinga, leader of Orange Democratic Movement, its presidential candidate. Ethnic conflict and raids by armed herders in north declined slightly: cattle rustling reported on border between Isiolo and Meru counties during month; Gabra and Borana communities 7-12 April clashed in Marsabit county, seven people killed; suspected Pokot gunmen 23 April shot and wounded ranch owner and renowned conservationist in Laikipia county. Somalia APRIL 2017 Al-Shabaab continued attacks against military and govt officials in capital Mogadishu and rural areas. In Mogadishu, suicide bombing 9 April killed at least seventeen people but failed to kill new army chief Gen Mohamed Jimale; suicide bombing 10 April killed at least nine soldiers at army academy;

84 suspected Al-Shabaab 7 April fired mortars on homes killing three and near International Airport 16 April killing at least two, security forces same day reportedly killed two perpetrators. In Mogadishu, unclaimed car bomb 5 April killed at least seven. Elsewhere, Al-Shabaab 3 April took control of El Bur town, Galmudug region, following retreat of African Union mission (AMISOM) troops. Al-Shabaab 4 April kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers in Gedo region in south. Alleged Al-Shabaab landmine 6 April killed at least nineteen minibus passengers near Golweyn village, Lower Shabelle region. Al-Shabaab claimed 16 April attack on World Food Programme convoy and suspected Al-Shabaab militants attacked Emirates Red Crescent aid convoy 20 April, no casualties reported. Kenyan AMISOM troops 21 April destroyed Al- Shabaab camp in Badhadhe district, Lower Juba region, reportedly killing 52 militants. Roadside bomb 23 April hit army vehicle in Puntland, killing at least six soldiers. President Farmajo 6 April told army to prepare for new offensive against Al-Shabaab and offered 60-day amnesty to militants. Maritime hijacking continued. Pirates 3 April seized Indian cargo ship off Puntland coast, took crew ashore 11 April, said they would exchange crew for pirates detained in India; security forces 12 April rescued hostages near Hoboyo town. Pirates 8 April boarded cargo ship in Gulf of Aden, fled before Chinese navy boarded ship next day. Somaliland APRIL 2017 Despite attempts at reconciliation by Sool region governor 2 April, Dhulbahante sub-clans, Baharsame and Qayaad, clashed 9 April, ten killed. Mobilization of militiamen by both sub-clans prompted traditional leaders and interior ministry to negotiate ceasefire. South Sudan APRIL 2017 Following rebel attacks around Wau in west, govt forces launched campaign against rebels SW of Wau early April. In ambush, rebels 9 April killed two senior Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) officers. Ethnic Dinka retaliated, attacking civilians from ethnic groups they associate with rebels in Wau town, killing at least sixteen. Rebels briefly overran Raja town, Lol state capital in west 14 April. Govt forces and rebels clashed early April around Pajok in south and Waat and Tonga regions in east. Govt forces late April moved into rebel-held areas around Kodok in NE, following failed negotiations with rebels and offensive by Aguelek and Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) rebels in Jan. President Kiir, responding to calls from churches, civil society and donors, late April appointed more diverse range of leaders to national dialogue steering committee, including former political detainees, Kenyan General Sumbeiywo and Kenyan religious leaders as advisers. UN mission (UNMISS) 29 April said Regional Protection Force had started to arrive in Juba and deployment would continue in coming months. Sudan APRIL 2017 Rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Sec Gen Yassir Arman 22 April said that process to review U.S. partial sanctions repeal should be delayed by six months to allow more time to assess progress on key issues. SPLM-N 24 April said it agreed with African Union mediator Thabo Mbeki to postpone next round of peace talks to July to allow time for it to resolve issues resulting from resignation of its Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Al-Hilu in March. Armed forces chief 17 April attended U.S. Africa Command meeting at its HQ in Germany. Uganda APRIL 2017 Army 12 April said it had begun withdrawing troops from Central African Republic where since 2009 it has been conducting operations against rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), planned to complete withdrawal by end May. U.S. 26 April began withdrawing its forces supporting mission. Angola APRIL 2017 Govt 24 April said it would hold general elections 23 Aug. UN Refugee Agency 21 April said fighting in DRC between govt forces and Kamuina Nsapu militia has forced over 11,000 people to cross border into Angola, arriving mainly in Dundo, capital of Luanda Norte Province. Mozambique APRIL 2017

85 As closed-door peace talks continued between armed opposition Renamo and govt, Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama 19 April said he was ready to declare indefinite ceasefire if govt maintains its side of deal. Zambia APRIL 2017 Leader of main opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) Hakainde Hichilema arrested for treason 11 April, having allegedly obstructed motorcade of President Lungu. Govt ban on protests led to confrontations between security forces and protestors early April; protestor shot dead 2 April in Lusaka. Zimbabwe APRIL 2017 Ruling party Zanu-PF 9 April won landslide victory in by-election in Mwenezi East constituency of Masvingo, opposition boycotted vote and accused Zanu-PF of electoral abuses including voter intimidation. Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of opposition Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), 19 April signed MoU with opposition National People’s Party leader and former VP Joice Mujuru, and 20 April with MDC leader Welshman Ncube in steps toward building opposition coalition to contest 2018 elections. Burkina Faso APRIL 2017 French, Burkinabè and Malian troops 27 March-10 April carried out joint Operation Panga in Fhero forest on border between Sahel region in north and Mali to eliminate jihadists especially Malam Ibrahim Dicko’s faction; French forces mid-April said operation killed two jihadists, captured eight and transferred about ten suspects to Burkinabè authorities; one French soldier killed 5 April. French forces 29-30 April killed or captured over twenty suspected militants near Burkina Faso-Mali border. In 28 March-6 April trial of former presidential guards accused of carrying out Jan 2016 attack against Yimdi arms depot, two sergeants sentenced to seventeen years’ prison and thirteen others to ten years. President Kaboré 27 April appointed six new high-ranking military officials, including army chief of staff and land army chief of staff. Côte d’Ivoire APRIL 2017 Parliamentary groups formed at National Assembly 5 April; main parties in ruling coalition, Rally of Republicans (RDR) and Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), failed to form single parliamentary group despite stated intention to merge. Six ex-military officers, supporters of former President Gbagbo, sentenced to six to twenty years’ prison 13 April for roles in of four foreigners abducted from Novotel hotel in Abidjan in April 2011. Gambia APRIL 2017 In legislative elections 6 April, President Barrow’s United Democratic Party (UDP) won 31 of 53 available seats in National Assembly. Former ruling party Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) won five. Following APRC victory in Sibanor, Foni Bintang-Karenai district, APRC and UDP supporters clashed 6 April. Guinea APRIL 2017 President Condé 7 April refused to enact electoral code, amended by National Assembly Feb to align it with Oct 2016 agreement between govt and opposition; Condé sent it back to assembly with further amendments. Opposition led by Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) 15 April threatened to call for new strikes and break away from Oct 2016 agreement on mayoral and community elections if govt failed to organize local elections before July 2017; 20 April said it would appeal to UN, African Union and International Organization of La Francophonie to demand agreement be implemented. Govt 21 April denied opposition accusations that it had banned UFDG rally in N’zérékoré same day. Guinea-Bissau APRIL 2017 President Vaz 24 April accused military of plotting coup against him. ECOWAS regional bloc 25 April said it would impose sanctions on those impeding progress if Oct 2016 Conakry agreement between

86 ruling coalition and opposition not implemented within one month, same day announced it would begin withdrawing its 500-strong peacekeeping mission (ECOMIB) 28 April, but late month postponed withdrawal until early May. Mali APRIL 2017 Conference of National Understanding intended to foster reconciliation 27 March-2 April in Bamako highlighted need to open talks with jihadists including Ansar Dine’s leader Iyad Ag Ghaly and Macina Liberation Front’s leader Amadou Kouffa. French and German FMs 7 April in Bamako opposed negotiating with “terrorists”. Implementation of June 2015 peace agreement continued to generate tensions: rebel Coalition of Azawad Movements (CMA) splinter Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA) continued to obstruct establishment of interim authorities in Timbuktu and Taoudeni regions. Govt forces (FAMA), pro- national unity Self-Defense Group of Imrad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA) and CMA splinter Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) 12 April launched joint patrols in Ménaka city and surroundings, claiming they constituted joint operational mechanism foreseen in agreement, but CMA forces absent. Violence and banditry persisted in north and center. Drug traffickers repeatedly clashed in Kidal and Ménaka regions: rival groups 15-17 April attacked at least three convoys; groups clashed in Ménaka region 20 April. Officer of rebel group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) killed in Kidal city 5 April. Unidentified gunmen 7 April attacked Platform coalition of armed groups that favor national unity in Anéfis, killing three; Platform accused pro-CMA Ifoghas Tuaregs. Unidentified gunmen attacked Gargando village, Timbuktu region 8 April killing five CJA combatants and local official; CJA accused al-Qaeda. Jihadists 18 April attacked FAMA in Tagharouste, Timbuktu region, killing at least four, French forces killed about ten jihadists fleeing scene; jihadist coalition Group to Defend Islam and Muslims allegedly claimed responsibility. French, Malian and Burkinabè forces carried out joint Operation Panga on Mali-Burkina Faso border 27 March-10 April to eliminate jihadists, especially Malam Ibrahim Dicko’s faction (see Burkina Faso). President Keita appointed Defense Minister Abdoulaye Idrissa Maiga as PM 8 April. Maiga formed new govt 11 April, including eleven new ministers. Govt 16 April negotiated agreement with striking health workers, but many teachers continued strike. Niger APRIL 2017 After lull in Boko Haram (BH) attacks in Diffa region in SE since end-2016, BH 29 March ambushed Nigerien-Chadian military in Boulatoungour, three BH and one soldier killed; BH 9 April attacked army position in Gueskerou, govt said security forces killed at least 57 militants including “emir”. Ethnic tensions threatened to rise again in Agadez region in north: Ibrahim Ag Alambo, arms smuggler and relative of leader of former Tuareg rebel group Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ), 6 April announced creation of militia to protect Tuareg from bandits. In response, alleged Toubou representative said move would prompt creation of Toubou self-defense group. Dissident journalist Baba Alpha and civil society activist Maikoul Zodi, accused of fraud in separate cases, arrested 3 and 5 April respectively; Amnesty International said arrests “arbitrary”. Students 10 April protested in several cities against studying conditions; one killed in Niamey in clashes with security forces; students 17 April declared open-ended strike. After deal struck 21 April, classes resumed 26 April. Nigeria APRIL 2017 Security forces continued operations against Boko Haram (BH) in Borno state (NE) but insurgents hit more civilian and military targets. Army and Multinational Joint Task Force 10 April killed at least 57 BH in Arege area. Intelligence services 12 April said they had thwarted BH plot to attack UK and U.S. embassies in Abuja, arresting six suspects 25-26 March. Troops and vigilantes 15-17 April overran BH camps between Kawuri and Kayamla villages, arresting commander. Army 17 April killed 21 BH around Jarawa area, and six around Dissa and Patawe villages. Air force 28 April destroyed BH artillery piece in Sambisa forest. BH 8 April ambushed travelers along Maiduguri-Damboa road, killing about fifteen. Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated BH faction led by al-Barnawi intensified raids in NE of Borno state near Lake Chad, killing civilians accused of aiding military. BH 17 April killed five soldiers at Sabon Garin Kimba village; 24 April killed at least eight in two suicide attacks in Mammanti and Mainari villages; 26 April killed vigilante in suicide attacks near Maiduguri; 27 April rammed van into military convoy at Manguzum village, killing five

87 soldiers and wounding 40. In Niger Delta, no attacks on oil installations but previously unknown group, Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders, threatened hostilities, and criminal violence continued. Gunmen 9 April kidnapped two Turkish nationals in Eket, Akwa Ibom state and demanded ransom; police rescued abductees 19 April, arrested five suspected kidnappers. Gunmen 9 April kidnapped senior local official in Calabar, Cross River state, demanded N100mn ($323,000) ransom. Pirates 12 April killed two soldiers in southern Ijaw local govt area (LGA), Bayelsa state. Incidents of deadly communal and criminal violence reported in Lagos, Niger, Yobe, Rivers and Kaduna states notably: gunmen 15 April killed twelve in Aso community in Jema’a LGA, Kaduna state; two gangs, Dey Gbam and Icelanders, 30 April clashed in Omudioga, Rivers state, killing five. President Buhari 19 April suspended secretary to federal govt Babachir Lawal and director general of external intelligence agency (NIA) Ambassador Ayo Oke both over allegations of corruption. Asia China/Japan APRIL 2017 Japanese Ministry of Defense 13 April reported its air force had scrambled jets against foreign aircraft approaching its airspace a record 1,168 times April 2016-March 2017, 295 more than the previous year; 70% of incidents were in response to Chinese military jets in East China Sea (ECS). Foreign and defense ministers of Japan and Australia met 20 April, agreed to “powerfully promote” trilateral defense cooperation involving U.S. Japanese govt late March announced plan to populate disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in ECS and designate them inhabited border territories, important in defining size of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); plan includes building civic facilities, purchasing land, improving ports and preventing foreign vessels from illegally visiting; will similarly designate further 143 remote islands around its archipelago. Taiwan 2 April stated it has right to conduct oceanographic research within EEZ that both it and Japan claim. Korean Peninsula APRIL 2017 Tensions mounted between North Korea (DPRK) and U.S. amid concerns DPRK could conduct sixth nuclear test at any time; U.S. rhetoric sharpened late month while China made repeated calls for restraint. U.S. President Trump and Chinese President Xi discussed DPRK during their first bilateral summit 6-7 April. Pyongyang launched possibly unsuccessful missile tests 5, 16 and 29 April; South Korea (ROK) 6 April tested ballistic missile with 800km range. U.S. 9 April announced U.S. carrier strike group Carl Vinson had been sent near Korean peninsula, prompting concern in Pyongyang; announcement later revealed to be false. DPRK 15 April revealed new missile mock-ups in parade marking 105th anniversary of birth of Kim Il- sung; 25 April held large-scale artillery drills near Wonsan. U.S. and ROK conducted military maneuvers NE of Seoul the following day. U.S. and ROK reported Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) will soon be operational. Satellite imagery of Punggye-re nuclear test site posted 21 April appeared to show ability to conduct sixth nuclear test “at any time”. In 27 April interview Trump warned “major, major conflict” with DPRK is possible, said he was seeking diplomatic solution. U.S. Sec State Tillerson 27 April said U.S. open to negotiating with DPRK; addressing special session of UNSC 28 April called for tougher sanctions, said “all options for responding to future provocations must remain on the table”. China said willing to work with U.S. on finding lasting peaceful resolution to tensions on peninsula. Trump’s 27 April remarks that he wants Seoul to pay for THAAD system and wants to renegotiate “horrible” trade agreement caused anger in ROK, where cooperation with U.S. is subject of debate ahead of 9 May presidential election. Reports emerged late April of possible fuel shortages in DPRK including Pyongyang. Taiwan Strait APRIL 2017 Media 12 April reported Taiwan’s navy issued tender for locally-built amphibious ship, $207 million landing platform dock; part of indigenous shipbuilding plan announced in 2016 including new submarines and destroyers within military expansion and modernization strategy. In sign of warming Taiwan-Japan ties, foreign ministry 19 April said govt will rename its representative office in Japan to Association of Taiwan- Japan Relations; follows similar move by Japan in Jan, after which China said it was “extremely dissatisfied”. U.S. President Trump 27 April said he would not repeat Dec 2016 phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai without first consulting with Chinese President Xi.

88 Afghanistan APRIL 2017 Taliban claimed attacks against military and civilians throughout country, including 21 April attack in Mazar-e-Sharif city, Balkh province, in which gunmen in military uniforms infiltrated army base killing at least 140 soldiers in deadliest Taliban attack on armed forces since 2001; defense minister and army chief of staff resigned following incident. Taliban 28 April announced start of spring offensive “Operation Mansouri”. Taliban also carried out 1 April suicide car bombing killing regional army commander and two soldiers in Khost province; govt blamed Taliban for 15 April roadside bomb that killed at least eleven civilians in Helmand province; in Zabul province, Taliban 18 April killed Shenkay district police chief. In Baghlan province, NATO and govt forces in joint operation 18 April killed fifteen Taliban militants, including shadow provincial governor. Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) claimed 12 April suicide bombing that killed at least five civilians near president’s administration office in Kabul. Operations against IS-K in Achin district, Nangarhar province saw one U.S. soldier killed 8 April, two killed 26 April. U.S. military dropped 22,000- pound bomb, most powerful conventional explosive in its arsenal, on IS-K position in Achin district 13 April, killing at least 94 suspected militants and prompting criticism from some Afghan politicians. Govt 26 April reported IS-K attacked Taliban in N Jowzjan province taking control of two districts, 76 Taliban and fifteen IS-K fighters killed. U.S. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster visiting Kabul 16 April reiterated U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, urged Pakistan to pursue terrorists “less selectively” than in past. Russia 14 April hosted conference on resolving Afghanistan conflict with diplomats from Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Pakistan and five Central Asian states; U.S. declined invitation saying unilateral initiative not constructive, Taliban also rejected process. Govt 5 April called on Pakistan to stop constructing border fence along disputed stretch of Afghanistan-Pakistan border; 7 April told UNSC fence is illegal. Amid ongoing tensions in unity govt, President Ghani 16 April dismissed special advisor for reforms and good governance Ahmad Zia Masoud, allegedly for incompetence; Masoud warned dismissal could lead to political instability. Bangladesh APRIL 2017 Leading rights campaigners 10 April urged govt to develop binding and comprehensive workplan to implement recommendations of UN Human Rights Council (HRC), which published report 28 March on Bangladesh’s compliance with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expressed concern inter alia at reported extrajudicial killings by security forces and enforced disappearances, excessive use of force by state actors, lack of investigations and accountability of perpetrators. Other concerns included restrictions on free speech, including arrest of at least 35 journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders in 2016 under Information and Communications Technology Act, and “undue limitations” on ability of rights defenders and NGOs to operate, through 2016 Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Bill. Three suspected militants found dead 1 April inside alleged hideout in Sylhet division, Moulvibazar district, ending two-day standoff with security forces; four suspected militants blew themselves up in Shibganj in NW 27 April, ending standoff with police; believed to be members of Jamaat-ul-. Govt 14 April issued circular recognizing top certificates awarded by privately run madrasas as equivalent to master’s degree in Islamic studies or , following meeting between PM Hasina and madrasa administrators/clerics led by chief of radical Islamist coalition Hefazat-e-Islam. Dhaka court 16 April acquitted Tahmid Hasib Khan of involvement in July 2016 Dhaka café attack. International Crimes Tribunal 19 April sentenced two men to death for committing atrocities during 1971 liberation war. India (non-Kashmir) APRIL 2017 25 Central Reserve Police Force personnel killed and several injured in ambush by several hundred Maoists in Sukma district in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region 24 April, reportedly worst attack on security forces in state since 2010; ten Maoists also reported killed. Troops had been providing security to road construction workers. Two villagers reported killed by Maoists in Odisha’s Malgangiri district 1 April. Kashmir APRIL 2017 Tensions worsened between Indian security forces and protesters around by-elections in Srinagar 9 April, with nine killed in clashes during month. Protesters 9 April stormed polling stations and threw

89 stones at security forces in Budgam district; eight civilians dead and over 200 injured after security forces opened fire on protesters, prompting calls for further protests. Voter turnout reportedly 7%, lowest in 27 years, 70 polling stations forced to shut down. Polling repeated in 38 polling stations 13 April; reported 2% turnout lowest in Jammu and Kashmir’s history. Authorities postponed polling in Anantnag, scheduled 12 April, to 25 May due to security concerns. Security forces 15 April killed seventeen-year old boy as youths threw stones at convoy in Batamaloo, Srinagar; clashed with students in Pulwama town same day, injuring at least 50. Indian soldiers 13 April reportedly tied civilian to a military vehicle as they patrolled in Budgam district before releasing him; police filed criminal complaint against army; army chief vowed action against perpetrators, but said “relentless operations” against Kashmiri separatists and protesters would continue. Clashes across Line of Control (LoC) continued. In Kupwara district, security forces 10 April killed four suspected militants during gunfight after they attempted to cross LoC into Keran sector from Pakistan-administered Kashmir; killed two Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) militants in anti-militancy operation in Hayatapora village, Budgam district. At least three Indian soldiers and two militants killed as suspected Jaish-e-Mohammad militants attacked military camp near LoC in Panzgam village, Kupwara district, 27 April. Pakistani military 10 April sentenced Indian naval officer arrested March 2016 to death on charges of espionage and sabotage. India filed formal protest to Pakistani high commissioner claiming defendant not a spy, declaring execution would be considered “premeditated murder”. Nepal APRIL 2017 Despite some forward momentum toward local elections due to start in May, impeachment motion filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Sushila Karki 30 April by Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN (Maoist Centre) MPs created fresh uncertainty regarding polls and future of ruling coalition. Following motion, which claims Karki interfered in govt’s appointment of police chief, senior NC leader and Deputy PM Bimalendra Nidhi resigned in protest; ruling coalition partner Rastriya Prajatantra Party also regarded as likely to withdraw support from govt. Prospect of holding polls in May had previously improved with 22 April agreement between govt and dissenting Madhesi parties to hold elections in two phases and to address most Madhesi demands through constitutional amendments increasing electoral constituencies in Tarai plains and creating federal commission to resolve issue of provincial boundaries; initial election phase to be held 14 May in three of seven provinces and second phase – under new NC-led govt following handover of power – to be conducted 14 June in remaining four provinces which include key Tarai constituencies. Six of seven dissenting Madhesi parties unified to form Rastriya Janata Party 21 April and, following agreement with govt, cancelled month-long protests planned to disrupt elections. However, postponement until 4 May of parliamentary discussions on govt’s new 11 April constitution amendment proposal – which mandates forming a commission to recommend provincial boundary revisions within three months – created further doubts about election timing; opposition UML party strongly opposed new proposal; parties have until 2 May to announce candidates. Three ex-army officers convicted 16 April of 2004 killing of fifteen-year old girl detained for supposed links to rebels. Supreme Court 30 April sentenced several former senior police officials including three former chiefs to prison for misuse of state funds. Pakistan APRIL 2017 Pakistani Taliban (TTP) suicide bomber targeting army census team 5 April killed four soldiers and two civilians in Lahore. TTP faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar 25 April planted roadside bomb that killed at least ten people near Parachinar, Kurram Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas; said targets were Shia community and census workers. In Lahore, counter-terrorism operation 8 April left ten suspected TTP and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar militants dead, allegedly including perpetrators of 13 Feb deadly Lahore blast. Military 17 April announced prominent Jamaat-ul-Ahrar leader Ehsanullah Ehsan surrendered to security forces. Two members of Ahmadiyya religious community, considered non-Muslim under constitution and previously target of violent attacks in Punjab, killed in Lahore during month. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, student mob 13 April killed fellow student they accused of posting blasphemous comments online; police charged at least twenty suspects. In Karachi, paramilitary rangers 1 April detained two university professors ahead of press conference where professors had planned to appeal for release of third professor, Dr. Hassan Zafar Arif, arrested Oct 2016 for links to banned Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM); judge 7 April

90 released Dr. Zafar Arif on bail. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) accused Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of instigating abductions of three associates of PPP co-chair Asif Zardari who disappeared 4-9 April. Military 17 April announced army began construction of 2,500km border fence along disputed stretch of Pakistan-Afghanistan border, said aimed at containing movement of terrorists. Supreme Court 20 April ruled evidence insufficient to remove PM Sharif from office in Panama Papers offshore holdings case; called for further investigations under its supervision into family’s offshore holdings. Sri Lanka APRIL 2017 Public discontent with national unity govt rising amid serious drought and administrative inefficiencies. Collapse of large garbage dump in Colombo suburb on New Year’s day 14 April, killing over 30 and destroying over 100 houses, prompted widespread criticism of govt for ignoring warnings. Hopes for constitutional reform remained dim: reports emerged 11 April saying (SLFP) informed Constitutional Assembly steering committee that it opposed any changes to constitution requiring referendum, suggesting President Sirisena has made little progress in persuading SLFP ministers to support new constitution. Protests on land and disappearances continued in Tamil majority north, with military agreeing to further modest land releases. Army 7 April returned 29 acres to owners in Valikamam, Jaffna; officials reportedly claimed another 5,250 acres still held by military in Jaffna alone. At 24 April meeting with govt ministers and Tamil politicians, Navy agreed initial release of 40 acres surrounding Catholic church in Mullikulam; 600 additional acres of agricultural land expected to be released in coming months. European Parliament 27 April defeated resolution to block Sri Lanka regaining EU GSP+ tariff benefits, virtually guaranteeing GSP+ renewal on 15 May. Following mid-April visit to Sri Lanka of EU MPs and letter from delegation to PM outlining steps still needed to meet human rights requirements before 15 May deadline, cabinet 25 April approved framework for Counter Terrorism Act, designed to replace Prevention of Terrorism Act, and amendment to Criminal Procedure Code. Human rights advocates criticized draft laws for broad definition of terrorism and range of clauses liable to abuse, and for being shared with EU but not with local population. Indonesia APRIL 2017 In ethnically and religiously charged second round of Jakarta gubernatorial election 19 April, incumbent Chinese-descent Christian Basuki Tjahaka Purnama “Ahok” lost to his main challenger Anies Baswedan, former education minister under President Widodo, with unofficial count giving him 42% of vote to Baswedan’s 58%; official results to be released early May. Purnama’s trial on blasphemy charges resumed 20 April, with recommending probation. Police said they killed six suspected militants in E Java 8 April, day after arrest of three suspected members of Jemaah Anshorut Daulah, group which has pledged allegiance to Islamic State (ISIS). State news agency 12 April reported National Agency for Countering Terrorism (BNPT) and Financial Transactions Analysis and Reporting Center (PPATK) signed memorandum of agreement to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Myanmar APRIL 2017 Some 16,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) reported to have returned to their home villages in Maungdaw, northern Rakhine, following end of military operations; around 4,000 IDPs remain, some 74,000 still seeking refuge in Bangladesh. Amid ongoing investigations into alleged abuses by military against Rohingya Muslims, Aung San Suu Kyi 5 April told BBC ethnic cleansing “too strong an expression to use for what is happening”. UN Refugee Agency 25 April criticized govt plan to resettle Rohingya in “camp- like” villages, which it said could create further tensions. Ethnic peace process remained mired in difficulty ahead of next “Panglong-21” Peace Conference set to take place 24 May. Suu Kyi 28 March visited Kachin state capital Myitkyina and nearby IDP camps, urged Kachin Independence Organization to sign Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA); visit viewed unfavorably by many Kachin. Suu Kyi State Counsellor Office issued press release 30 March coinciding with one-year anniversary of her govt, announcing that five small United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) armed group members would sign NCA; groups next day said they had not yet decided to sign. No groups involved in serious fighting in NE appear likely to sign, and summit of seven armed groups convened by Wa 15-19 April rejected NCA as basis for peace, established new joint negotiating team. Although clashes eased over Myanmar’s New Year in April, renewed fighting

91 seen as likely. Suu Kyi noted 30 March progress on legislative reform and health care, promised new focus on job creation, transport and electricity. U.S. Navy vessel made goodwill visit to Yangon 21-25 March, first official stop by U.S. Navy for decades. President Htin Kyaw paid state visit to China 6-11 April; two sides agreed terms for shipment of oil through pipeline from Kyaukpyu port on Indian Ocean to China. Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won only nine of nineteen seats in 1 April by-election, although many seats were in ethnic or conflict-affected areas where party is not strong. Philippines APRIL 2017 Military 11 April launched operation against around a dozen militants in central resort island Bohol, suspected of planning to kidnap tourists and launch attack on ASEAN summit; five suspected militants including leading figure Muamar Askali reported killed, plus three soldiers and a policeman. Militants reportedly suspected of belonging to at least three groups that had pledged allegiance to Islamic State (ISIS), including Abu Sayyaf. President Duterte 19 April offered reward for capture of escaped militants, threatened to invade Abu Sayyaf stronghold in Jolo island, Sulu. Military 23 April reported it had killed three Abu Sayyaf militants in Bohol, still pursuing two or three. Over ten Abu Sayyaf reported killed and 32 soldiers wounded in attempt to free Vietnamese hostages in Talipao town 2 April. Abu Sayyaf beheaded fisherman and soldier in Sulu province during month. Military 22-25 April killed 36 suspected ISIS-linked rebels, including from Maute group and Indonesian group , in Lanao del Sur, reported capture of main base; reportedly killed leading Abu Sayyaf militant and kidnapper in Sulu 28 April. Duterte 2 April announced peace talks with Moro National Liberation Front under Nur Misuari may start in May; Misuari’s six-month temporary liberty granted by court ended 27 April. Peace negotiations between govt and Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front, which collapsed in Feb, resumed in Netherlands 2 April despite absence of bilateral ceasefire; 5 April agreed on temporary joint ceasefire and to release prisoners. Duterte 3 April threatened “full power of the state” if conditions set out in March are not respected and talks fail. Mohainmen Abo (brother of senior Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) figure and chair of Bangsamoro Transition Commission Ghadzali Jaafar) killed 11 April during police raid in Barangay Linangcob. Police claimed Abo was resisting arrest and firing at police officers; Jaafar denied, said police had not respected coordination mechanism contained in 1997 ceasefire agreement. MILF 17 April urged govt to investigate alleged unilateral police operations against rebels. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters suspected of several bombs in Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato, including in Tacurong City 17 April injuring at least eight. South China Sea APRIL 2017 During visit to military base on Palawan Island 6 April, Philippines President Duterte ordered military to occupy islands and reefs that Manila claims in disputed Spratly Islands’ Kalayaan group; also called for repairing runway on disputed Thitu Island. Following expression of concern from Beijing, Philippines defense minister 8 April said Duterte’s comments applied only to nine features in SCS that Philippines already controls, not calling for construction of military structures. Duterte 12 April said that on China’s request he would not visit Thitu as previously stated. Duterte 15 April reportedly said Philippines must “act fast” in occupying uninhabited islands in chain before it loses them to other claimants. Philippine FM 4 April reported ASEAN and China have made progress since Jan on framework for Code of Conduct (COC) in SCS, which would serve as a basis of negotiations on COC; final draft could be approved ahead of Aug meeting of ASEAN FMs. Philippines-hosted ASEAN Summit 26-29 April discussed draft framework. Chairman’s statement released 30 April made no reference to July 2016 Hague arbitration ruling, militarization or land reclamation in area, referred to need to show “full respect for legal and diplomatic processes” in resolving disputes and noted “improving cooperation between ASEAN and China”. Followed reports of disagreement between member states over whether to include such a reference, reported Chinese lobbying of Philippines officials to leave it out, and skepticism in some quarters over China’s sincerity in suggesting it will commit to code; China has not agreed on making code legally binding. Ahead of summit, Indonesian President Widodo said rival SCS claimants should cooperate on issues such as research and fishing. Vietnam condemned 29-31 March live-fire drills by Taiwan’s military at Taiping Island/Itu Aba, disputed feature in Spratly Islands, calling them serious violation of its sovereignty and threat to maritime security. China

92 reportedly deployed J-11 fighter jets to Paracel Islands late March. China 26 April launched its first domestically-built aircraft carrier, to enter active service circa 2020, meaning it will have two. Thailand APRIL 2017 King Vajiralongkorn 6 April signed draft constitution, important step toward general election; Constitution Drafting Commission now has until 2 Dec to complete ten organic laws, four governing parties and elections. Changes to draft constitution requested by king were revealed following promulgation: in most significant, Article 5 revised to return to past formula giving king – rather than Constitutional Court and committee of state-agency chiefs – authority to resolve political disputes not covered elsewhere in constitution; other changes give king complete control over appointment of regent during his absence and rescind requirement for parliamentary counter-signature to royal orders. Marked uptick in insurgent attacks in deep south from late March, including 3 April attack on police station in Krong Pinang district, Yala, wounding at least nine police; over twenty bomb attacks across three southernmost provinces and SE Songkhla on night of 6-7 April targeting electricity poles, causing power cuts but no casualties; thirteen attacks across Narathiwat, Pattani and Songkhla provinces 19 April, wounding eight people; ambush in Narathiwat 27 April killing five rangers and wounding one. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 10 April issued statement reiterating points from Oct 2015 statement, setting out conditions for participation in dialogue with Bangkok: called for “participation of third parties (international community) as witnesses and observers”, credible and impartial mediator and process “designed clearly by the negotiating parties and agreed upon before the start of negotiation”; govt dismissed statement. Europe & Central Asia Kosovo APRIL 2017 President Thaci 4 April announced he was attempting to ensure support from all Kosovo’s communities for constitutional changes to broaden powers and responsibilities of Kosovo Security Force, rather than attempting to bypass them as previously planned. Thaci 20 April urged parliament to ratify controversial agreement on border demarcation with Montenegro, precondition for EU visa liberalization. French court 27 April refused to grant Serbian request for extradition of former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj; ruling prompted protest from Serbia, where he is wanted on war crimes charges. Macedonia APRIL 2017 Political standoff turned violent late month as protesters opposed to new opposition Social Democrat (SDSM)-led coalition govt stormed parliament after new ethnic Albanian speaker was voted in, injuring scores. Visiting Skopje 3 April, EU President Tusk 3 April urged President Ivanov to award mandate to form govt to SDSM leader Zoran Zaev, urged country to “avoid anything that could further fuel ethnic tensions”; Ivanov said his position unchanged. VMRO DPMNE MPs (who won 51 of 120 parliament seats in Dec 2016 election) continued to filibuster parliament to block effort to elect new speaker and establish new opposition-led coalition govt, continued to call for fresh elections; street protests by VMRO DPMNE supporters against new govt continued. 67 MPs (out of 120 seats) voted 27 April to elect new parliament speaker, ethnic Albanian Talat Xhaferi; VMRO DPMNE called election “coup attempt”. Violence broke out as protesters stormed parliament and attacked MPs; over 100 people reportedly injured including Zaev and three MPs from majority parties and several journalists. EU, NATO and U.S. condemned violence and called for dialogue. Provisional interior minister Agim Nuhiu accused police of failing to do their job, tendered his resignation citing his failure to eliminate political influence in police. Armenia APRIL 2017 Ruling Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) won 48.15% of vote in 2 April parliamentary elections, gaining 58 of 105 seats in parliament. Opposition claimed “large-scale and systematic violations of the electoral process”, international observers said vote “tainted by credible information about vote-buying, and pressure on civil servants and employees of private companies”. Constitutional Court 28 April declined appeal by opposition “Armenian National Congress-National Party of Armenia” to annual election results. HHK engaged in talks with Armenian Revolutionary Federation/Dashnaktsutyun, which came in fourth with 6.58% of vote, about political coalition. New govt will be in place during one-year transitional period,

93 overseeing move from semi-presidential to parliamentary republic. Former Chief of Staff Yuri Khachaturov named new Sec Gen of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 14 April. Defense minister 20 April announced two new programs to promote education among military recruits; programs are part of state “Army-Nation” policy launched November 2016. Azerbaijan APRIL 2017 Defense minister visited Saudi Arabia 4-5 April and Iran 16 April to discuss military cooperation. Opposition National Council 8 April held rare street protest against corruption in Baku, some 2,000 reportedly attended with no incidents; protest was sanctioned by govt. Georgia APRIL 2017 Breakaway republic South Ossetia (SO) 9 April elected new de facto President Anatoliy Bibilov, who campaigned for closer links with Russia, with 54.8% of vote; incumbent Leonid Tibilov, supported by Moscow, gained only 33.7%. In parallel vote 80% agreed to add “State of Alania” to previous official name “Republic of South Ossetia”. Local observers and activists said elections were first providing free choice to people since Russia’s recognition of SO in 2008, including with opposition rallies and televised debates. Tbilisi, U.S. and EU said vote illegitimate; Kremlin envoy attended Bibilov’s inauguration 21 April. Bibilov 12 April said he would promote local citizens to main govt offices, currently occupied by Russians. Russian FM Lavrov 18-19 April visited breakaway republic Abkhazia to open new “embassy” and meet with de facto president. Lavrov said his country favored opening of trade routes with Georgia through Abkhazia; Abkhaz de facto leadership reiterated readiness to promote transit, providing Georgia recognizes Abkhaz authority in issue. Tbilisi called Lavrov’s visit violation of Georgian sovereignty, expressed deep disappointment in light of two countries’ regular talks, moves to reestablish cooperation. Parliament constitution commission 22 April finalized its work on constitution project. Proposed amendments, which provoked protest from opposition, President Margvelashvili and civil society, include president being elected by delegates rather than by direct vote, and shift to proportional electoral system. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) APRIL 2017 Month saw relative stability in conflict zone with occasional exchange of fire, mainly at NE and south of Line of Contact (LoC). Three Armenian soldiers reported killed 20, 25 and 28 April. Azerbaijan conducted military exercises close to LoC 16-21 April; Armenia complained of lack of advance notice. Mediators continued attempts to bring sides together for political talks. During 27 March press-conference, U.S. interim Minsk Group co-chair Richard Hoagland revealed plan to organize meeting of foreign ministers (FMs) in Moscow or elsewhere, followed by talks at presidential level. FMs’ meeting 28 April finished with agreement to continue dialogue but no date set for high-level talks. Leaders on both sides spoke about readiness to engage in war on anniversary of April 2016 escalation. Russia/North Caucasus APRIL 2017 Novaya Gazeta newspaper 1 April broke story on organized detentions, torture and killings of gay men by authorities in Chechnya in recent weeks, producing international outcry. At least three gay men reported killed in round-up and up to 200 suffered abuse, torture and illegal detention; dozens still being held in illegal detention facilities throughout republic. Republic President Kadyrov’s press secretary called report “absolute lie”, claiming gay people “do not exist in the republic”, if there were any “their family would handle the issue themselves by sending them to a place from where no one comes back”. Kadyrov complained to Putin about “media provocation”; during 19 April meeting, Putin reportedly called on Kadyrov to stop persecution. Novaya Gazeta appealed to authorities for protection and investigation into death threats it received over reports. Chechen authorities 25 March sent demolition equipment accompanied by armed police to Davydenko village, Achkhoy-Martan district, aimed at destroying houses after locals reportedly refused to pay authorities bribes; officials claimed buildings illegally constructed. Police reportedly beat villagers and fired into air; one woman suffered gunshot wound. Around twenty people detained, charges filed against three for attempts on policeman’s life. Chechen state TV 29 March broadcast meeting between Chechen parliament speaker and outspoken protester who was forced to rescind criticisms and apologize. Conflict-related violence in NC continued, including death of Makhachkala

94 group leader Ilyas Khalilov and two other suspected fighters at police/Special Forces checkpoint 11 April; two police shot dead in Malgobek, Ingushetia 8 April. Russian investigators identified ethnic Uzbek Kyrgyz national as suicide bomber who killed fourteen and injured 60 in attack on St. Petersburg metro 3 April (see Kyrgyzstan). Belarus APRIL 2017 State media 11 April reported twenty people charged with organizing illegal armed group amid protests over controversial tax on unemployed. Opposition leader Mikalay Statkevich reportedly arrested ahead of planned anti-govt protests 1 May. President Lukashenka and Russian President Putin meeting in St. Petersburg 3 April agreed on resolution of energy dispute, roadmap for cooperation. Moldova APRIL 2017 President Dodon 3 April signed memorandum of cooperation with Eurasian Economic Union, prompting criticism from PM Filip who said it aimed to undermine relations with EU. Senior EU official 19 April said bloc expects Moldova to “fully comply with its obligations” under its association and trade agreements with EU. Ukraine APRIL 2017 New ceasefire between Kyiv and Russian-backed separatists went into effect 1 April resulting in reduced fighting; over a dozen Ukrainian soldiers reported killed during month including two killed in clashes with separatists near Avdiivka 21 April; separatists reported two fighters killed during previous week. OSCE launched investigation after one of its monitors, a U.S. national, was killed and two wounded when their car drove over landmine in separatist-controlled Luhansk region 23 April; Kyiv and Russian-backed separatists blamed each other. Ukraine 25 April cut electricity supply to separatist-controlled parts of Luhansk region citing non-payment; Russia said move politically motivated and violated Minsk peace accord, said it would help provide electricity. President Poroshenko 18 April held phone call with German, French and Russian leaders; sides confirmed commitment to implementation of Minsk agreements, urged intensification of efforts to liberate prisoners. International Criminal Court 19 April refused request by Ukraine as part of its case against Russia to impose provisional measures to stop Russia funding and equipping separatists; issued provisional ruling calling for stop to racial discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea. Kyiv called court’s ruling and recognition of its jurisdiction “very promising”. PM Hroysman 11 April reiterated govt’s commitment to reforms; central bank Governor Valeria Hontareva resigned previous day citing political pressure. IMF 3 April approved disbursement of $1bn loan tranche to Ukraine, previously postponed due to trade embargo on separatist-controlled areas, citing signs of economic improvement. EU parliament and EU ambassadors gave approval for EU visa liberalization, expected to enter into force in June. Kyiv court 7 April convicted twelve former members of Tornado battalion of committing crimes against civilians in Luhansk region in early 2015. Cyprus APRIL 2017 Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı 2 April discussed resuming talks after two-month hiatus; 11 April resumed negotiations and agreed to enter new phase of talks with four meetings starting 20 April. UN Special Envoy Eide 10 April reiterated UN mandate was only to facilitate Cypriot-owned process; in 13 April interview said UN had helped develop compromise proposal on security guarantees after consultations with Cypriot leaders, EU and guarantor powers Greece, Turkey and UK. Greek Cypriot parliament 7 April reversed most controversial provision of Feb “Enosis law” that made annual celebration in schools of 1950 referendum which approved union with Greece compulsory; Anastasiades denied Turkish Cypriot protest triggered decision. Akıncı 11 April warned extraction of hydrocarbons in Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) scheduled for summer by Greek-Cypriot side could derail talks if Cyprus settlement not reached beforehand; Anastasiades said he would not negotiate “sovereignty of the Republic”. Ankara 19 April said it would conduct “seismic surveys” in Cyprus’s EEZ from 30 April-30 June in continued row over gas fields. Turkey APRIL 2017

95 Constitutional referendum 16 April saw 51.4% of electorate approve changes that will centralize executive power in hands of president following general elections scheduled for Nov 2019. Three largest cities and most of SE voted against changes; result prompted widespread criticism among opponents and internationally over govt’s possible authoritarian direction. Allegations of electoral misconduct and evidence including video of irregularities sparked opposition criticism and protests against fraud; Supreme Election Board 19 April and Council of State 25 April rejected request by main opposition parties to annul results. Main opposition party 26 April announced decision to take bid to European Court of Human Rights. OSCE 17 April criticized “uneven playing field” in campaign and lack of transparency; Erdoğan denounced report as “politically motivated”. Govt 18 April extended state of emergency, imposed following July 2016 coup attempt, for additional three months; continued crackdown on state-christened FETÖ/PDY it blames for coup attempt, detaining over 1,000 alleged members late April. Security forces continued operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency in SE; several members of security forces killed in attacks and clashes during month, including six soldiers reportedly killed in separate operations against PKK in Şırnak 21-23 April. Suspected PKK rocket attack against ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) referendum campaign bus killed one village guard in Van’s Muradiye district 15 April. PKK senior leadership Cemil Bayık 9 April warned “war” would intensify if “Yes” campaign won referendum, adding to concerns that fighting may worsen in coming months. Govt continued crackdown on Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (HDP) representatives, arresting regional representative Fahrettin Kiraz and MP Burcu Çelik Özkan on terror charges mid-April. Two HDP MPs, Meral Danış Beştaş and Nursel Aydoğan, were released 21 April. EU-Turkey relations deteriorated further in run-up to referendum; Ankara 14 April said it would suspend EU-Turkey refugee deal if not granted visa-free travel. Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe 25 April voted to reopen monitoring procedures in Turkey. Turkish military conducted airstrikes against Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG)/PKK targets in N Syria and N Iraq 25 April, retaliated against YPG after latter launched rocket attacks on SE Hatay and Şanlıurfa provinces from areas it controls across border in Syria 25-27 April (see Syria and Iraq). Kazakhstan APRIL 2017 Trial in abstentia of opposition leader Mukhtar Ablyazov on charges of embezzlement began 3 April in Almaty; France released Ablyazov 9 Dec 2016, cancelled his extradition to Russia citing political motivation behind request. Kyrgyzstan APRIL 2017 Bishkek court 17 April handed lengthy prison sentences to three opposition politicians and shorter sentence for a fourth after finding them guilty of plotting to seize power by force in March 2016. Russian investigators identified 22-year-old ethnic Uzbek from Osh Akbarjon Djalilov as suicide bomber who killed fourteen and injured 60 in attack on St. Petersburg metro 3 April; Djalilov became naturalized Russian citizen in 2011; Russian security services 17 April arrested another Kyrgyz national, Abror Azimov, who they said may have supervised Djalilov, in addition to several other suspects of Central Asian origin. Tajikistan APRIL 2017 Media mid-April reported former Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov, Tajik police commander who defected to Islamic State (ISIS) in 2015 and was reportedly their “minister of war”, killed in Mosul, Iraq; authorities early April arrested Khalimov’s eighteen-year-old son. Flights between Tashkent and Dushanbe resumed 11 April after 25-year gap. Tajik border guard reported Uzbek border guards 15 April illegally crossed border and shot Tajik man; Uzbek authorities claimed self-defense, saying Uzbek border guards were attacked by three Tajik shepherds. President Rahmon 25 April met with visiting U.S. Central Command commander, discussed military cooperation. Media reported ten top Anticorruption Agency investigators and officials arrested late month, suspected of corruption and fraud. Uzbekistan APRIL 2017 Swedish authorities arrested 39-year-old Uzbek man Rakhmat Akilov, originally from Samarkand and living in Sweden since 2014, over 7 April truck attack in Stockholm in which four were killed and fifteen injured; Akilov, whose request for political asylum was rejected in 2016, confessed to attack and

96 expressed support for Islamic State (ISIS). Uzbek authorities opened separate criminal case against Akilov in Feb on extremism charges; FM Abdulaziz Kamilov 14 April said govt had warned Sweden of Akilov’s activities. Akilov’s brother reportedly detained in Uzbekistan 23 April. President Mirziyoyev signed commercial and investment contracts worth $15.8bn during meetings with Russian President Putin in Moscow 4-5 April; presidents also promised to cooperate closely on security issues. Latin America & Caribbean Colombia APRIL 2017 FARC-govt peace process implementation continued on different fronts. FARC 4 April handed over list of all fighters in cantonments, totaling 6,804 full-time guerrilla fighters and 1,541 urban militia guerrilla fighters, though other list(s) with all militia fighters still pending. President Santos 5 April signed decree creating Truth Commission and Search Unit for Victims of Forced Disappearance. Select committee met in Bogotá 18-20 April to begin identifying judges for Special Jurisdiction for Peace and outline process for selecting Truth Commission. FARC dissident groups continue to expand on local/sub-regional level, mainly in south and east. In Guaviare, First Front (FF) 8 April attacked military vehicle, killing one soldier and wounding three; FF also continued activities in Caquetá, despite March demobilization of group’s leader there, alias Mojoso. FF March and April distributed communiqué naming other commanders who have joined dissident groups, called on FARC fighters to join as well. Violence by ELN guerrilla group and Gaitan Self- Defense Forces (AGC) continued at high levels in Chocó. Govt human rights ombudsman reported at least eight people kidnapped in Chocó by AGC 8-16 April, National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group abducted two in same period. In NE Catatumbo region, eight ELN fighters killed in military operation 2 April; two soldiers died in ELN attack in Arauca 28 March. ELN on Twitter justified its use of kidnapping, saying it “has the right” to continue to finance its activities, International Humanitarian Law does not prohibit “kidnapping”; late April freed two hostages in Chocó. Govt and ELN 6 April announced limited progress in peace talks, said they will work on humanitarian demining agreement in next round of talks starting 3 May. Venezuela APRIL 2017 Almost thirty people killed during month as security forces cracked down on growing anti-govt protests in capital and elsewhere, amid continuing deterioration in living conditions. Supreme Court (TSJ) 1 April reversed its 29 March decision to assume legislative power of National Assembly following condemnation from neighboring countries and declaration by attorney general Luisa Ortega Díaz, former govt loyalist, that constitutional rule had been interrupted; Ortega’s stance marked unprecedented crack in regime unity. Despite measure’s reversal, nineteen Organization of American States (OAS) members voted 3 April for resolution declaring TSJ’s actions violation of constitutional order and urging Venezuela to restore democracy and separation of powers, and committing OAS to continue monitoring situation and seeking diplomatic solution. Comptroller general 9 April banned key opposition leader, Miranda state Governor and former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles, from holding office for fifteen years. Opposition Democratic Unity alliance (MUD) began series of mass rallies in capital and elsewhere, demanding dismissal of TSJ justices and holding of elections; some spontaneous protests also broke out, including 12 April in San Félix, Bolívar state, where crowd hurled objects at Maduro as he took part in commemorative act in street. Govt continued to react to demonstrations with force, using National Guard and police to disperse them with tear gas, water-cannon and plastic bullets, often fired at close range; also deployed were armed civilian para-police groups (colectivos) on motorcycles. MUD 19 April staged “mother of all marches”, calling hundreds of thousands onto streets of Caracas and provincial cities; 28 people reportedly killed in protests by end-month, reportedly mostly at hands of police and govt supporters, hundreds detained. Among the dead, at least eleven people reported killed 20 April in looting in Caracas as govt grip on poor barrios appeared to weaken. Maduro 23 April called for talks with opposition to resume; however, MUD declined to meet with international facilitator Leonel Fernández after he met with Maduro 24 April. OAS Permanent Council 26 April agreed to convene extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers to discuss Venezuela; in response, Venezuela announced moves to withdraw from OAS. Govt paid out almost $3bn to service foreign debt during month as imports continued to shrink, must pay around $800m more in May.

97 Guatemala APRIL 2017 High-level captures in fight against corruption continued, including 31 March arrest of former congressmen Manuel Barquín and Jaime Martínez Lohayza; 20% of current congressional deputies under investigation, charged or captured. U.S. Congress Foreign Affairs Committee 29 March unanimously approved bipartisan resolution in support of fight against corruption in Central America. Honduras APRIL 2017 Juan Jiménez Mayor, head of Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), 25 March announced that investigations may include any relevant corruption cases from 2006, meaning former presidents Manuel Zelaya and Porfirio Lobo could face further charges. MACCIH pushing Congress to pass “Efficient Collaboration Law”, intended to facilitate prosecution of high-level politicians by offering privileges and protection to suspects who collaborate with investigations into organized crime. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Honduras office 22 March published report urging govt to demilitarize internal security and strengthen transparency and civilian oversight. El Salvador APRIL 2017 Police 4 April arrested José Adán Salazar Umaña, aka “Chepe Diablo”, alleged leader of Texis Cartel, country’s most important drug trafficking and money laundering organization. Police conducted raids on over 50 properties and companies owned by Umaña and associates, allegedly used to evade taxes and launder money; attorney general’s office claimed group laundered over $215 million over past twelve years. Haiti APRIL 2017 UNSC 13 April adopted new resolution on transformation of UN presence in Haiti, approving extension of MINUSTAH for final six months and gradual withdrawal of 2,370 military personnel; also approved creation of new peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSJUSTH) for initial period of six months starting 16 Oct 2017; functions to focus on strengthening rule of law and police force. Haiti’s Permanent Representative to UN Denis Regis voiced support for resolution, however some critics argue role of new mission unclear. Last 250 Uruguayan peacekeepers left Haiti 15 April. Trial began in U.S. 24 April of Senator of Grand’Anse Guy Philippe, who finally pleaded guilty to money laundering charge. Mexico APRIL 2017 Amid ongoing violence, officials 23 April reported at least 35 people killed in gang-related violence in single weekend, including twelve in Sinaloa state, nine in gun battle in Michoacán state. In Guerrero, authorities registered 21 8 and 9 April alone, while Democratic Revolution Party leader Demetrio Saldivar was killed by unknown persons in Chilpancingo 19 April. Authorities recorded 2,020 murders in March, highest monthly figure since peak year 2011. In Morelos state, attorney general’s office stated they had found 57 human remains in Jojutla mass grave 4 April. National Commission on Human Rights in 6 April report revealed local attorney offices officially recognized 855 mass graves and disinterred remains of 1,548 corpses 2007-2016; also reported official number of disappeared persons has reached 30,000. Human Rights NGOs 4 April reported that since 2009 at least 310,000 people have been forcibly displaced because of violence. Legislative period ended 30 April without conclusive discussion on Internal Security Law due to criticisms over lack of check and balances for armed forces in their proposed public security responsibilities; followed further incident of alleged involvement of armed forces in extrajudicial killings of two U.S. tourists in Tamaulipas 4 April; Navy denied allegations it was involved in killings. Violence against Central American immigrants, women, journalists and human rights/indigenous defenders continued. Six immigrants from Honduras kidnapped, tortured and mutilated in Veracruz 3 April. Norte newspaper from Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, 5 April announced it was closing, citing impossible working conditions for independent journalists as result of criminal violence. Journalist Max Rodríguez Palacios, from La Paz, Baja California, killed 14 April. Former Veracruz Governor Javier Duarte, wanted on corruption and organized crime charges, arrested in Guatemala 15 April; former Tamaulipas Governor Tomás Yarrington, wanted on corruption and organized crime charges in Mexico and U.S., arrested in Italy 9 April.

98 Paraguay APRIL 2017 Following 31 March violent protests against proposed bill amending constitution to lift one-term limit on presidency, President Cartes 2 April called for dialogue to reduce tensions, however opposition said it would not attend unless amendment is withdrawn; Cartes 17 April announced he would no longer seek re-election in 2018, defusing tensions. Chamber of Deputies 26 April rejected bill. Middle East & North Africa Israel/Palestine APRIL 2017 Some 700 Palestinian prisoners in Israel began open-ended hunger strike on commemoration day for prisoners in Israel, 17 April, to demand changes in prison policies; strike led by Fatah and in particular Marwan Barghouti, but prisoners from other factions took part; crowds same day demonstrated in West Bank in solidarity with detainees. By end month number of strikers had risen to about 1,000. Israel refused to negotiate with prisoners. Only functioning power plant in Gaza exhausted fuel causing severe reduction in electricity supply mid-April. Hamas refused to pay Palestinian Authority (PA) tax on fuel from PA; PA 27 April told Israel it would no longer pay for electricity that Israel supplies to Gaza. Following Hamas’s creation of administrative committee to govern Gaza in March, President Abbas cut March compensation to PA employees in Gaza by 30-70%, citing fall in aid, prompting thousands to protest in Gaza. PA 24 April called on Hamas to hand over Gaza as precondition for reconciliation; Hamas 25 April said it was ready to dissolve administrative committee once PA assumes governance role in Gaza. After lull of almost a year in “lone wolf” attacks in Jerusalem, stabbings resumed: Palestinian woman stabbed and wounded Israeli soldier at checkpoint 24 April. Israel 10 April closed border with Egypt to Israeli tourists citing intelligence that Islamic State (ISIS) would target attacks on Israelis in Sinai. Unclaimed rocket fired from Sinai into southern Israel 10 April, no casualties. Lebanon APRIL 2017 Clashes in Aïn el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in south erupted again 7 April when jihadist group led by Bilal Badr tried to prevent Palestinian joint security force deploying across camp and into Badr’s stronghold al-Tiri neighbourhood and launched counteroffensive against Fatah militants; at least ten killed, most militants; ceasefire reached 12 April as Badr relocated to different area of camp under protection of jihadist group Fatah al-Islam. President Aoun 12 April, day before parliament intended to extend its mandate for another year for third time, suspended parliamentary session for one month to allow time for MPs to reach agreement on electoral reform. Syria APRIL 2017 Chemical weapon attack on rebel-held town prompted U.S. strike on regime air base and fighting spiked between Turkey and Kurdish forces; with offensive on Islamic State (ISIS)-stronghold Raqqa imminent, May could see worse violence. Chemical weapon attack on rebel-held Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib province in NW 4 April killed over 80 people; Western countries including U.S., UK, France and Germany held regime responsible, President Assad denied accusations, Russia denied regime responsible. In response, U.S. 7 April launched missile strike on regime’s Shayrat air base from which it believes 4 April attack was launched. Regime or Russian warplanes dropped incendiary bombs over towns of Saraqeb in Idlib and al-Latamenah in Hama 8-9 April and reportedly hit two medical centres in Idlib 27 April. Regime forces and allies took back territory from rebels near Hama city in west throughout April, captured Soran 16 April and Halfaya 23 April. Alleged U.S.-led coalition airstrikes reportedly killed at least 30 civilians in Deir al-Zour province in east 17 April. ISIS reportedly launched two suicide attacks on rebels near Tanf, near Iraq border 9 April. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) said new phase in campaign against ISIS, launched 13 April, would clear areas north of ISIS stronghold Raqqa and pave way for attack on city; SDF 27 April advanced into old city of ISIS-held Tabqa 40km west of Raqqa, 18 April said they had been setting up civilian council to govern Raqqa after ISIS pushed out. Evacuation of rebels and civilians from regime- besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya near Damascus to rebel-held NW began mid-April in exchange for evacuation of civilians and pro-regime fighters from two rebel-besieged Shia villages in Idlib, Foua and Kafraya, to Aleppo. Bombing of evacuees from Foua and Kafraya 15 April reportedly killed 126 people;

99 evacuation completed 21 April. Turkish airstrikes 25-27 April hit Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in NE and other Kurdish forces in Sinjar region, Iraq, killing at least twenty. YPG 26 April attacked four Turkish army posts along border (see Turkey). Israeli airstrikes 27 April hit arms depot near Damascus airport operated by Hizbollah, allegedly targeting arms sent from Iran. Fighting between Jaish al-Islam and Failaq al-Rahman rebels broke out in besieged rebel-held Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus 27 April, at least 95 fighters and civilians killed; during fighting regime and allied forces attacked rebel-held Qaboun district, NW of Eastern Ghouta. Bahrain APRIL 2017 Following votes in lower and upper houses of parliament in Feb and March, King Khalifa 3 April approved constitutional amendment that would allow govt to try civilians in military courts. Court of Cassation same day overturned nine-year sentence for opposition al-Wefaq movement leader Sheikh Ali Salman, restored original four-year sentence for inciting unrest and sectarianism. Iran APRIL 2017 Of 1,636 registered candidates for 19 May presidential election, Guardian Council 20 April approved six; most prominent contenders are President Rouhani, head of religious shrine Ebrahim Raisi and mayor of Tehran Mohammad Ghalibaf. Campaigning began 24 April. Nine border guards killed 26 April near Mirjaveh in east in clashes with Balochi insurgent group Army of Justice, which reportedly escaped into Pakistan. U.S. administration 19 April reported to Congress that Iran was in full compliance with its obligations under 2015 nuclear agreement, noting Iran’s “sponsorship of terrorism” and that it was reviewing extension of sanctions relief. U.S. senator 4 April said new sanctions bill, Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, introduced in Senate 23 March with bipartisan support, delayed due to concern over Iran’s May presidential election. U.S. Treasury 13 April said it was placing sanctions on Tehran Prisons Organization and its former leader Sohrab Soleimani over human rights abuses and EU 11 April extended sanctions on Iran for one year for “serious human rights violations”. State media 4 April reported U.S. aircraft maker Boeing had signed tentative deal with Iran’s Aseman Airlines for at least 30 jets. Iraq APRIL 2017 U.S.-backed govt forces and allied militias made small advances against Islamic State (ISIS) in western part of Mosul in north; govt forces 18 April said they had retaken twelve of Mosul’s twenty districts, 20 April declared al-Thawra and Nasr neighborhoods “liberated”, army chief of staff 30 April said he expected to completely dislodge ISIS from Mosul in May. Govt-allied Shia Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) 27 April captured Hatra province in north, blocking ISIS’s routes between Iraq and Syria. ISIS launched several suicide attacks targeting police in north, 4-5 April killed at least 31 people including fourteen police in Tikrit 170km north of Baghdad, 23 April killed three police in Hamam al-Alil 30km south of Mosul. Tensions between Baghdad and Erbil-based Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) rose early April: governor of Kirkuk city (not in Kurdistan Region, KRI) late March ordered Kurdish flags to be raised on government buildings in city alongside Iraqi flags; Baghdad parliament 1 April condemned decision. Kurdish-dominated Kirkuk Provincial Council 4 April said that Baghdad should commit to organizing referendum, in accordance with constitution, on whether Kirkuk province should be part of KRI; Turkmen and Arab councilors reportedly boycotted vote. Main Kurdish parties Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 6 April agreed that Iraqi Kurdistan should hold referendum on its self- determination before end of 2017; PM Abadi and ruling Shiite coalition condemned decision. Turkey 25 April apologized after it “mistakenly” killed five KRG peshmerga fighters in strikes on Sinjar in NW, said it killed fourteen members of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in north 29 April, six around Sinat-Haftan and eight around Adiyaman (see Turkey). Yemen APRIL 2017 Following warnings from international community of likely humanitarian impact of its intervention, Saudi-led coalition held off offensive on rebel-held port city of Hodeida but fighting continued along Red Sea coast and border with Saudi Arabia. Saudi-led coalition 12 April said its priority was securing road from

100 Mokha port eastward to Taiz city; fighting raged in area, over 40 fighters and civilians killed in 24 hours 9- 10 April. PM 26 April said govt had proposed that UN administer Hodeida port to ensure no arms smuggled through; UN rejected appeal. Saudi security forces 25 April destroyed remote-controlled explosives-laden boat 1.5 nautical miles from Saudi Aramco fuel terminal off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, govt blamed Huthi rebels for attack. Drone strike allegedly launched by U.S. 23 April in al-Saeed area of Shabwa province reportedly killed four suspected al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants and three civilians. U.S. drone attack 30 April reportedly killed five suspected AQAP members east of Sanaa in Marib province. UN envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed 26 April said he hoped to begin new round of talks before Ramadan begins end May. Algeria APRIL 2017 Parties 9 April began campaigning for 4 May parliamentary elections. Two minor opposition parties Jil Jadid and Talaiyet el Houria said they would boycott, but leading opposition coalition National Coordination for Democratic Liberties and Transition said it would compete. Govt 15 April said Facebook user who mocked campaign posters arrested for trying to “undermine the legislative process”. French PM in Algiers 5 April signed ten bilateral agreements with govt. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini 8 April visited Algiers for second time in two years to intensify dialogue, including on Libya, Mali, Sahel and Western Sahara. Army 4 April arrested four people in Jijel city (NE) for suspected terrorist links. Military 14 April killed three armed drug traffickers near Mauritanian border (SW). Egypt APRIL 2017 Islamic State (ISIS) stepped up attacks, particularly against Coptic Christians, and May could see further attacks on churches and heightened insecurity as govt implements state of emergency. Suicide bombers 9 April detonated explosives in church in Tanta, Gharbeya governorate some 100km north of Cairo and outside church in Alexandria, killing 48 people; ISIS claimed responsibility without specifying which branch. Police same day dismantled two explosive devices at mosque in Tanta. President Sisi immediately sacked Gharbeya governorate security chief and declared three-month state of emergency. Govt 11 April said security forces killed seven alleged ISIS sympathizers suspected of planning attacks against Coptic Christians in Assiut and Sohag provinces in south, and against police and courts. ISIS militants 18 April attacked security forces around St. Catherine’s monastery in S Sinai, killing police officer; military responded with airstrikes in N Sinai, killing two suspected militants. Army 20 April said airstrikes killed nineteen ISIS militants in N Sinai, including three leaders. ISIS militant 25 April killed at least 40 army- allied tribesmen in in al-Barth village in N Sinai; tribesmen subsequently reportedly burned alive suspected ISIS militant. Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated TV channel 20 April broadcast video allegedly showing extrajudicial killings by military in Sinai Peninsula. Sisi in Washington DC 3-7 April met U.S. President Trump, cabinet and lawmakers; discussions focused on Sinai security, economy, foreign aid and terrorism. Cairo court 30 April sentenced Muslim Brotherhood leader and radical preacher Wagdy Ghoneim to death in absentia, with two others in detention, for allegedly setting up terror group after 2013 overthrow of former President Morsi; five others sentenced to life, including two in absentia. Libya APRIL 2017 In south, forces loyal to eastern-based strongman General Haftar continued to clash with forces led by factions from Misrata in west, nominally loyal to UN-backed Presidency Council (PC). Forces aligned with Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) early April tried to seize Tamenhint air base on outskirts of Sabha town from Misratan-led militias. Unclaimed on prison in Sabha 25 April reportedly killed two guards and three prisoners. Crude oil production and exports fell again due to closures of oil and gas pipelines in west, causing value of Libyan dinar to fall and prices of consumer goods to rise. International Criminal Court 24 April unsealed arrest warrant issued in 2013 for former head of Internal Security Agency Al- Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled for crimes against humanity and war crimes during crackdown on anti-govt protests in 2011. In eastern Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) some 30 MPs including those supportive of current Central Bank governor 25 April reportedly blocked vote to replace him. Representatives of southern tribes 2 April in Rome discussed stabilization of south and possible border control. Rival presidents of HoR and State Council (advisory body loyal to PC and formed under

101 Libyan Political Agreement) 21 April met in Rome. After offshore gun battle coastguard 27 April seized Congolese and Ukrainian-flagged tankers and detained crews for allegedly smuggling oil. Mauritania APRIL 2017 Govt 20 April said referendum on constitutional amendments that would replace parliament’s upper house with regional councils will take place 15 July. Morocco APRIL 2017 Govt 12 April said security forces had dismantled seven-member cell linked to Islamic State (ISIS) in Fez and Moulay Yacoub in north. King Mohammed VI 5 April named six-party coalition govt led by PM Saad-Eddine El Othmani from Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD); PJD lost key ministries including justice, despite winning Oct parliamentary elections. Tunisia APRIL 2017 Govt 3 April said local elections would take place 17 Dec; protests same day flared across country, especially in marginalised regions such as Tataouine governorate in south, expressing multiple grievances including to demand job creation and development. Security forces mid-April noted rise in jihadists crossing from Libya into Tunisia in SE and reinforcement of groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State (ISIS) in Chaambi, Semmama, Salloum and Mghilla mountains on border with Algeria in west. Security forces 30 April launched operation against alleged terrorist group linked to AQIM in Sidi Bouzid (centre); one suspected militant blew himself up, another killed and three arrested. Western Sahara APRIL 2017 Armed independence movement Polisario Front mid-April approved proposal of UNSG Guterres to appoint former German President Horst Köhler as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara following March resignation of Christopher Ross. Guterres 10 April called on Morocco and Polisario Front to restart peace talks, UNSC 28 April adopted resolution renewing mandate of MINURSO peacekeeping mission until 30 April 2018 and calling on Morocco and Polisario Front to restart peace talks. UN same day welcomed withdrawal of Polisario Front elements from Guerguerat area near Mauritanian border."

Going back over the previous two months, International Crisis Group (ICG), Crisis Watch, March1, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&ut m_campaign=529a8fb78f- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-529a8fb78f- 359871089, found, "Global Overview Jihadist insurgents in Pakistan unleashed a new wave of attacks in February prompting the government to launch a deadly crackdown, while the military’s targeting of alleged Taliban camps across the border in Afghanistan escalated tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict saw intensified fighting along the Line of Contact (LoC). North Korea’s announcement of another missile test and the assassination of its leader’s estranged half-brother drew international condemnation. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), old security threats re-emerged and in the Central African Republic (CAR) fighting between rebel factions spiked and could worsen in March.None Trends and Outlook In Pakistan, jihadist networks, which the military claimed had been disrupted in recent counter- terrorism operations, renewed attacks on state, sectarian and other targets, including a suicide bombing at one of the country’s most prominent Sufi shrines in Sehwan Sharif, Sindh province on 16 February that killed at least 88 people and injured more than 200. The military vowed revenge and accused “hostile powers” of directing the attacks and using sanctuaries in Afghanistan. It enforced an indefinite closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and shelled targets in Afghanistan that it claimed were Pakistani Taliban camps, particularly in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. As well as escalating tensions with Afghanistan, these attacks dampened hopes that Pakistan will help bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. On 22 February, Pakistan’s military announced a new nationwide counter-terrorism operation, named Radd-

102 ul-Fasaad (End to Chaos), with a particular focus on Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province. However, as Crisis Group has argued, over-reliance on a heavy-handed militarised response to security problems can undermine the rule of law and fuel alienation, and thus be counterproductive. The government must address the drivers of instability including political and economic exclusion and governance failures, and restore the rule of law. Exchanges of fire between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces along the LoC around Nagorno- Karabakh intensified, producing the deadliest six weeks for both sides since the April 2016 escalation. Azerbaijan reported six of its soldiers killed during an exchange of fire on the southern section of the LoC on 25 February, the most serious incident this year. At least eight Armenian soldiers have been reported killed in mortar and sniper attacks since the start of 2017. As Crisis Group argued in our Watch List 2017, increasingly frequent and intense incidents at the LoC, stalled negotiations to resolve the conflict, and growing military capacity and distrust on both sides, all heighten the risk of fighting breaking out on a deadlier scale. Both sides need to implement the mid-2016 agreements reached under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group and publicly commit to a full-fledged settlement process. Leaders need to cease all forms of violence along the LoC and their shared international border, stop fuelling pro-war public sentiment and explain to their constituencies the benefits of peace and what concessions are needed. North Korea announced it had successfully tested a new medium- to long-range missile on 12 February, in a further violation of UN sanctions. The next day, leader Kim Jong-un’s estranged half-brother was assassinated, reportedly with a highly toxic nerve agent, at Malaysia’s Kuala Lumpur international airport. His killing is believed to have been commissioned by North Korean agents. South Korean intelligence reported a further purge in Pyongyang at the end of the month with the execution of at least five senior officials from the Ministry of State Security. Old security threats re-emerged in DRC amid heightened uncertainty over the country’s political future. Security forces clashed with followers of the decades-old Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) politico-religious movement in the western province of Kongo Central and, in an unsuccessful attempt to arrest its leader, police in the capital Kinshasa stormed his home, killing four supporters. In the east, as ethnic violence continued, the army clashed with a group of M23 rebels, reportedly killing sixteen. The rebel movement was roundly defeated in 2013 but its members, since then living in camps in Uganda and Rwanda, have recently been slipping back across the border. Meanwhile, in Kasai Central province in the centre of the country, at least 100 people were killed in clashes between soldiers and the Kamwina Nsapu militia. In CAR, fighting escalated between rival factions which had previously been fighting side by side in the Seleka rebel alliance. One group repelled an attempt by others to take over Bambari, the country’s second biggest town, and militiamen clashed in several other areas in the centre and east, including gold mining zones. A UN attack helicopter fired on rebels as they approached Bambari to prevent more bloodshed. The situation remains febrile and the alignment of communities behind opposed groups could fuel further deterioration in March. Latest Updates Africa Burundi East African Community (EAC) mediator former Tanzanian President Mkapa convened fourth session of inter-Burundian dialogue in Arusha, 16-19 Feb but govt boycotted citing “irregularities” including that some invitees were sought for role in “disrupting Burundi’s security”; main opposition coalition CNARED (National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement, Restoration of the Rule of Law) and representatives of ruling party CNDD-FDD and other pro-govt parties attended; govt 17 Feb asked Tanzania to arrest some opposition attendees. After talks three CNARED members switched support to govt and returned to Burundi. Rotation of Burundian troops in AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) began mid-Feb even though EU, AU and govt had not yet agreed on how to resume payment of soldiers. Insecurity persisted: unidentified assailants attacked civilians and police on four occasions in western regions bordering DRC 5-14 Feb. Cameroon Boko Haram (BH) continued attacks on civilians and military in Far North region as govt continued to take hard-line stance against protests by Anglophone minority in North West and South West regions. In Mayo Sava department, Far North, two BH suicide bombings in Kerawa 3 Feb killed only bombers and

103 suicide bombing in Amchidé 22 Feb killed two civilians; BH fought with army in Garkara 5 Feb, six soldiers injured; vigilante community defence force killed one BH in Warawake 6 Feb; army clashed with BH in Guebero 9 Feb, killing two BH members. BH 26 Feb killed civilian in Waza, Logone and Chari department and one vigilante in Kouyapé, Mayo Sava department. Army vehicle detonated landmine in Gouzda Vreket, Mayo Tsanaga department 16 Feb, three soldiers killed. Some ten CPDM ruling party senators and MPs 15 Feb called on President Biya to release leaders of Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) arrested in response to protests by Anglophone minority; call unheeded. CACSC, formerly main federalist movement, 16 Feb changed its goal to secession of North West and South West regions. Residents in both regions widely heeded call for general strike 27 Feb to protest marginalisation of Anglophones. Central African Republic Fighting among ex-Seleka factions escalated in centre and east with further deterioration likely in March. Nourredine Adam’s ex-Seleka faction Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance (FPRC) and allied groups, supported by Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries, 11 Feb launched unsuccessful offensive to retake Bambari (centre) from Ali Darassa’s ex-Seleka faction, Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC). Ex-Seleka factions continued to fight each other around gold mines near Bambari, in Bria (east), Ippy (east) and Kaga Bandoro (centre). UN mission (MINUSCA) helicopter 11 Feb fired on vehicles advancing on Bambari from Ippy after they crossed UN-designated “red line” killing four FPRC fighters including Gen Zoundeko, former Seleka chief of staff; MINUSCA helicopter 26 Feb “dispersed” some 40 FPRC fighters in same area. Following talks with MINUSCA aimed at ending violence, UPC leader Ali Darassa reportedly left Bambari 21 Feb allegedly for Maloum 63km away; in following days Gen Gaëtan of anti- balaka and Gen Tarzan of ex-Seleka faction Patriotic Rally for the Renewal of Central Africa (RPRC) reportedly left Bambari. Country’s main international partners (G5) – UN, AU, EU, Economic Community of Central African States and International Organization of La Francophonie – 19 Feb condemned upsurge of violence in Ouaka and Haute-Kotto prefectures and demanded immediate ceasefire. Govt 15 Feb appointed Toussaint Muntazini Mukimapa from DRC as of Special Criminal Court to prosecute those responsible for war crimes since 2003. Defence Minister Yaketé 25 Feb condemned threat by soldiers to mutiny in protest against forced retirement. Chad President Déby discussed fight against jihadists with UN delegation led by Executive Director of Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate Jean-Paul Laborde, Special Rep for West Africa Mohamed Ibn Chambas and acting head of Central Africa regional office François Louncény Fall 15 Feb, amid concerns that instability in Libya could spill over into Chad; former Minister Hassan Soukaya Youssouf mid-Feb said closure of border with Libya and military checkpoints negatively impacting livelihoods. Heads of state of G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad) in Bamako 6-7 Feb pledged to create joint task force to fight terrorism. In continued standoff between govt and unions over working conditions, govt failed to meet 13 Feb deadline to address major unions’ demands; govt late Feb introduced new austerity measures prompting unions to call for strike to resume 6 March. Déby 2 Feb postponed legislative elections initially scheduled for 2016 sine die citing economic problems; 6 Feb reshuffled govt. French minister for development and Francophonie in N’Djamena 14 Feb signed two funding agreements together worth €20mn. Democratic Republic of Congo As insecurity persisted in multiple areas, politico-religious movement in Kongo Central province and M23 rebels in east re-emerged. Death 1 Feb of Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of opposition party Union of Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and main opposition coalition Rassemblement, led to suspension of talks between ruling majority and opposition on implementation of 31 Dec 2016 agreement on arrangements until elections. Disagreement focused on PM nomination procedure: Rassemblement claimed Etienne Tshisekedi, in letter delivered to Kabila 20 Feb, proposed his son Felix for PM, while Kabila argued to Catholic Church (CENCO) that future Rassemblement leader should present him with list of candidates. Electoral commission (CENI) by late Feb had registered 15mn voters, having covered about half of national territory. In east, security situation remained volatile due to recurring ethnic violence and re-emergence of M23 rebels. In N Kivu province, ethnic Nande Mai Mai Mazembe militias attacked Hutu villages including Kikuku village 3 Feb, killing nine people, and Kyaghala village 18 Feb, killing at least 25; authorities 7 Feb arrested self-proclaimed leader of Mai Mai Corps du Christ militia in Butembo. Army clashed with M23

104 rebels 20-22 Feb close to Bunagana, Rutshuru territory, N Kivu, claimed it killed sixteen rebels; Ugandan army 23 Feb said it was holding 44 M23 rebels who fled clashes in camp at Kisoro in SW. In Ituri province, Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) militiamen attacked army position in Kaswara village, killing two soldiers. In Kasai Central province in centre, army clashed with Kamwina Nsapu militia 9 and 13 Feb in Tshimbulu village, Dibaya territory, killing 101 rebels; Kamwina Nsapu followers 16 Feb burnt down govt buildings and authorities’ private properties in Tshitadi village, near Kazumba town. In south, fighting between Pygmy and Bantu militias continued: Bantu militia 5 Feb attacked Mondé village, Tanganyika province, killing 30. In west, following clashes late Jan between security forces and Bundu Dia Mayala (BDM) and Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) politico-religious movements in Kongo Central province, security forces 13 Feb raided home of BDM leader MP Ne Mwando Nsemi in Kinshasa, killing at least four BDM followers but failing to arrest Nsemi; standoff at residence continued end-month. Ethiopia Govt 3 Feb said it would release additional 11,352 of more than 23,000 people arrested since state of emergency imposed Oct 2016 in response to violent anti-govt protests, said it released some 9,800 in Dec. Govt held talks with Kenya in Nairobi 15-17 Feb to resolve dispute over Ethiopia’s use of water from rivers that feed Lake Turkana in Kenya (see Kenya). PM Desalegn and S Sudan President Kiir 24 Feb signed eight agreements to enhance economic cooperation and border security; Desalegn said Ethiopia building road to enable S Sudan to export oil. Kenya Ethnic Pokot and Tugen clashed 17-25 Feb in Baringo county, over fifteen people killed; suspected armed Pokot 24 Feb killed local official from Ngorora in Baringo North. Tugen set up roadblocks and 25 Feb turned back Kenya Red Cross aid convoy on way to Kapedo and Lomelo areas in Turkana county, forcing organisation to suspend operations in Baringo county. Govt held talks with Ethiopia in Nairobi 15-17 Feb to resolve dispute over Ethiopia’s use of water from rivers that feed Lake Turkana in Kenya, on whose water local communities depend. Somalia Parliament elected new president, former PM Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmajo, as Al-Shabaab continued to launch attacks on national and international forces in capital Mogadishu and rural areas. Delayed electoral process concluded 8 Feb when Farmajo won four-year presidential term, beating incumbent Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud 184 votes to 97. Al-Shabaab senior official 18 Feb said group would target anyone who collaborates with new president. In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab fired mortars on presidential palace 16 Feb, day of presidential handover, killing two children; suspected Al-Shabaab gunmen 16 Feb killed traditional elder; Al-Shabaab assassinated National Intelligence and Security Agency general 18 Feb; officials blamed Al-Shabaab for 19 Feb suicide bombing at central market that killed at least 39 people. In rural areas, Al-Shabaab 7 Feb ambushed AU mission (AMISOM) convoy near Mahaday town, Middle Shabelle region, claimed it killed several Burundian troops. Al-Shabaab attacked Somali National Army (SNA) checkpoint in El-Wak town, Gedo region 8 Feb, killing two soldiers; overran two SNA camps in Tihsile and Warmahan villages outside Mogadishu 12 Feb, killing at least two soldiers; reinforcements en route to villages hit by roadside blast same day near Walanweyn, Lower Shabelle region, four military personnel killed. In Galmudug state, Al-Shabaab clashed with SNA in Adaley village near Amara 14 Feb, at least seven people killed; group took control of Amara 15 Feb. Al-Shabaab attacked AMISOM convoy outside Mogadishu 18 Feb. In Puntland, pro-Islamic State militants 1 Feb beheaded three of five civilians abducted late Jan in ; abducted and beheaded five Puntland soldiers in Af Karin, SE of Qandala; claimed 8 Feb attack on hotel in Bosaso, two guards killed. In Galkayo, which straddles contested border between Puntland and Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA), skirmishes between militia from each side resumed 10 Feb. UN warned country is on brink of new famine due to persistent drought in north. Somaliland Parliament 12 Feb approved motion to grant United Arab Emirates permission to build naval base in Berbera town. South Sudan Clashes continued between ethnic Shilluk rebels under Johnson Olony, part of Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), and govt forces on west bank of Nile, former Upper Nile state. SPLA-IO’s unsuccessful offensives coinciding with AU summit late Jan generated tensions between

105 Machar and his military leadership. SPLA-IO 22 Feb clashed with govt forces in Kuek area, northern former Upper Nile state and Yuai, former in east. Govt and UN 20 Feb declared famine in parts of Unity state in north centre, said nearly 100,000 people face starvation. Sudan Killing of seven cattle herders from Hawazma tribe in S Kordofan state 10 Feb by unidentified gunmen reportedly led to clashes mid-Feb between govt forces and rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). SPLM-N 21 Feb claimed govt had started new dry season offensive in S Kordofan and violated its unilateral ceasefire, 22 Feb said clashes had stopped and reiterated commitment to ceasefire. Govt forces 21 Feb clashed with alleged people smugglers in Midessisa area, Kassala state, arrested three and freed 28 captives. President Bashir 22 Feb said that new PM position, whose creation was recommended by Oct 2016 National Dialogue (ND) conference, would be filled by member of ruling National Congress Party rather than, as previously agreed, opposition representative. Uganda Police 16 Feb reportedly arrested four M23 rebels from DRC in Kisoro district and identified them as among 750 who in Jan escaped from Bihanga military camp in west. Army 23 Feb said it was holding 44 M23 rebels in camp at Kisoro in SW who fled following clashes with Congolese soldiers in DRC 20-22 Feb (see DRC). Mozambique President Nyusi and leader of Renamo armed opposition Afonso Dhlakama 3 Feb said internationally mediated talks had ended and new phase would begin soon; both sides subsequently named new representatives to conduct talks in two working groups on military issues and decentralisation respectively. Zimbabwe Protest movement leader Pastor Evans Mawarire arrested at Harare airport 1 Feb on return from U.S., charged with “subverting constitutional government”, released on bail 8 Feb. Opposition party Zimbabwe People First split 8 Feb when leader Joice Mujuru expelled seven members who later claimed to have expelled Mujuru. Authorities charged former ruling party ZANU-PF Mashonaland Central youth chairperson Godfrey Tsenengamu, ally of VP Mnangagwa, 23 Feb with “undermining the authority of the President”. Armed police beat people protesting against President Mugabe in Harare 25 Feb. Burkina Faso Insecurity in Sahel region in north continued. Municipal councillor from Nassoumbou town and his five-year-old son killed 4 Feb in Yorsala village, , where they had fled following threats by alleged jihadists. Military 2 Feb found cache of weapons, food and petrol in Nassoumbou area. Assailants 27 Feb attacked police posts in villages of Tongomayel and Baraboule in Sahel region, injuring police officer. Attempt by Koglweogo civilian community defence group to operate in , in west 11 Feb raised tensions with traditional Dozo hunters. Heads of state of G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad) in Bamako 6-7 Feb pledged to create joint task force to fight terrorism. In limited govt reshuffle 20 Feb security and territorial administration ministry split into two; Security Minister Simon Compaoré kept security portfolio and Jean-Claude Bouda named defence minister. Côte d’Ivoire Following mutinies in Jan, security forces continued to protest. Special Forces in Adiaké (90km east of Abidjan) 7-8 Feb left barracks and shot in air to demand inclusion in govt’s Jan deal with other mutineers, paralysing city and wounding two civilians; govt 9 Feb said no deal reached and that mutineers had apologised. Six journalists arrested 12 Feb for writing that all Special Forces each received FCFA 17mn (about €26,000), denied by govt; all six released 14 Feb but indicted for spreading false news and inciting revolt. Cocoa planters 15 Feb began open-ended strike to protest govt’s fixed price which impedes exports as it is higher than international market price; police dispersed their protest in Abidjan 16 Feb with tear gas, injured six. UN mission started withdrawal mid-Feb. Gambia New President Adama Barrow 18 Feb said he had ordered release of 171 prisoners detained without trial and would make constitutional and legal reforms. Police said they arrested 51 people in western town Kafenda, stronghold of ex-President Jammeh, 18-19 Feb for harassing Barrow supporters. Finance minister 20 Feb accused former govt of embezzling more than $5mn in 2014, leaving economy “completely destroyed”. Barrow late Feb replaced head of armed forces Gen Ousman Badjie with Gen

106 Masanneh Kinteh, removed intelligence agency chief Yankuba Badjie and head of national prison system David Colley as part of clear-out of senior officials from Jammeh’s administration. UN 10 Feb received govt’s notice reversing withdrawal from ICC. Barrow 14 Feb said during visit of UK FM Boris Johnson that country will rejoin Commonwealth within months. EU 9 Feb pledged aid worth €225mn. Electoral commission scheduled National Assembly elections for 6 April. Guinea Main teachers’ unions 1 Feb went on strike to protest salary cuts till making deal with govt 20 Feb but internal differences remained. New protests erupted in following days; police clashed with protestors 20-21 Feb in several districts of capital, Conakry, at least seven protestors reportedly killed; schools reopened 22 Feb. President Condé late-Feb fired ministers of pre-university education, civil service and environment. Local and communal elections scheduled for Feb delayed due to disagreements on electoral process between govt and opposition; National Assembly 9 Feb began extraordinary session to overcome political deadlock, 23 Feb passed changes to electoral code to align it with Oct 2016 political agreement. Opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo 9 Feb warned that opposition parties would unite in challenging Condé if latter sought third term through constitutional reform. Guinea-Bissau PM Embalo 8 Feb accused mediator of political crisis, Guinean President Condé, of bias toward President Vaz and threatened to request ECOWAS regional bloc to provide new mediator. Permanent committee of National People’s Assembly (ANP) 23 Feb refused to consider govt’s program on grounds that PM Embalo’s govt was illegal because it did not conform with Oct 2016 Conakry agreement between ruling majority and opposition; several hundred protested next day demanding Vaz step down. In response to request by attorney general investigating corruption allegations, ANP board 10 Feb refused to lift parliamentary immunity of former PM Pereira. UNSC 23 Feb extended mandate of UN peacebuilding office (UNIOGBIS) for additional year. Mali Implementation of peace agreement in north inched forward and intercommunal fighting worsened in centre. Peace agreement signatories and international mediation 10 Feb issued joint statement identifying main contentious issues and setting new calendar for implementation, including plan to establish interim authorities in north 13-20 Feb. Govt 16 Feb appointed interim presidents of regional councils: two from main separatist rebel alliance Coalition of Azawad Movements (CMA) in Kidal and Timbuktu, and one from each of Platform coalition that favours national unity in Gao, from CMA splinter group Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) in Ménaka and from govt in Taoudenni. Pro-CMA Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) same day rejected appointment of interim authorities in Taoudenni. Govt 17 Feb appointed new governor of Kidal close to Platform but subsequent tensions delayed official instalment of interim authorities in Kidal until 28 Feb. Dissatisfied armed groups briefly occupied regional councils in Gao 27 Feb and Timbuktu 28 Feb. Army and armed group joint patrols, envisioned in peace agreement, started in Gao 23 Feb. Intercommunal violence rose in centre. Fulani and Bambara armed groups clashed near town of Ké-Macina, Ségou region 12 Feb killing at least 21, reportedly after unidentified gunmen killed trader 11 Feb in Ké-Macina. Govt forces (FAMA) 16 Feb said they had arrested four jihadists suspected of involvement in intercommunal clashes. Armed assailants continued to attack Malian, UN and French forces and civilians in several areas. Attacks on FAMA outposts near Andéranboukane, Ménaka region and Tongorongo, Mopti region 4 Feb killed several soldiers; IED 8 Feb killed soldier near Alafia, Timbuktu region. MINUSMA convoy 5 Feb triggered IED in Aguelhok, Kidal region, four injured. Unidentified gunmen 7 Feb kidnapped Colombian nun in Karangasso, Sikasso region. FAMA arrested twenty alleged jihadists and killed one person who resisted arrest 11 Feb in Dialoubé, Mopti region. French defence ministry 14 Feb said Barkhane forces had thwarted “terrorist attack” in Kidal region. Heads of state of G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad) in Bamako 6-7 Feb pledged to create joint task force to fight terrorism. Niger Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) regional force continued to prepare offensive against Boko Haram (BH) bases on Lake Chad islands in Niger and Nigeria. Security forces 3 Feb dismantled presumed BH cell in Baban Rafi, Maradi region in south centre. Heads of state of G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad) in Bamako, Mali’s capital 6-7 Feb pledged to create joint task force to fight terrorism. Following call of civil society groups and opposition parties, thousands 4 Feb protested in Niamey against govt’s

107 alleged poor governance, high cost of living and presence of Western military bases. Suspected jihadists 22 Feb ambushed military patrol 200km N of Niamey near border with Mali killing sixteen soldiers; France 25 Feb said it would send counter-terror contingent to support armed forces. Nigeria Clashes between army and Boko Haram (BH) continued in NE. In Borno state, army killed several insurgents and seized arms including anti-aircraft guns 1 Feb around Damboa, three soldiers killed; BH 9 Feb ambushed military convoy near Mafa, killed seven soldiers and captured female soldier, army reportedly killed several insurgents; BH 22 Feb attacked army post in Gajiram, killed at least seven soldiers. In Yobe state, army 24 Feb repelled BH attack on Kumuya village, killed eighteen insurgents. BH 15 Feb shot at Nigerian Air Force (NAF) helicopter flying from Maiduguri to Gwoza, injuring airman; NAF said subsequent airstrike “neutralised” insurgents. BH also continued attacks on civilians: security forces repelled attacks by suicide bombers in Maiduguri 16 Feb, at least eleven killed including nine bombers and two civilians; BH attacked Yaza-Kumaza village, southern Borno state 19 Feb, killed at least four. Govt 10 Feb said Muslim Brotherhood, hitherto unknown BH affiliate group based in Lokoja, Kogi state in centre, was planning attacks on banks, arms depots and prisons in several cities. BH factional leader Shekau, in audio recording released 24 Feb, disclosed he had killed group’s spokesman Tasiu (aka Abu Zinnira), confirming earlier-reported internal disputes. Situation in Niger Delta remained fragile but stable. Acting President Yemi Osinbajo stepped up talks with delta ethnic and political leaders, led federal govt delegation visit to Bayelsa state 9 Feb and Rivers state 13 Feb; delta leaders encouraged govt to act. Communal violence continued in Kaduna state: at least 26 people killed when armed men attacked four villages in Kaura and Jema’a local govt areas 19-20 Feb. Also about twenty people reportedly killed mid-Feb in three- day clashes between residents of Oku Iboku, Akwa Ibom state and Ikot Offiong, Cross River state over long-running boundary dispute. President Buhari early Feb extended two-week medical leave in UK indefinitely. Asia China (internal) Five people reported killed and ten injured by three assailants in knife attack in Pishan county, S Xinjiang 14 Feb; police shot suspects dead. Parades involving thousands of troops staged in Hotan 16 Feb, Kashgar 17 Feb and Urumqi 18 Feb, and in several cities 27 Feb. Police 21 Feb reported all vehicles in Xinjiang must be installed with satellite tracking devices. State media reported Xinjiang authorities offering rewards of up to 5mn yuan for information on terrorism. China/Japan China responded negatively to U.S. show of support for Japan during month. During visit to Japan U.S. Sec Defence Mattis 4 Feb reaffirmed commitment to defence treaty with Japan, reiterated that it covers disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; also praised Japan’s increased military spending. China responded 4 Feb reaffirming its sovereignty over islands, accused U.S. of risking stability of region with its stance on islands. Three Chinese coast guard vessels sailed near disputed islands 6 Feb, fourth such patrol in 2017, prompting Japan to issue official protest. Japanese PM Abe visited U.S. 10-12 Feb; at joint press conference 12 Feb President Trump said U.S. “100%” behind “great ally” Japan; leaders issued joint statement confirming that Article 5 of U.S.-Japan security treaty covers disputed islands. Beijing 13 Feb expressed concern over statement, reaffirming that islands were China’s “inherent territory”. On sidelines of G20 meeting 17 Feb Chinese FM Wang Yi told Japanese counterpart Tokyo’s “negative” moves are preventing improvement in bilateral ties. Media 17 Feb reported undisclosed sources saying Japan plans to accelerate warship-building program to produce two additional frigates annually to patrol ECS. Japanese govt sources 26 Feb said Tokyo has doubled from two to four number of fighter jets it scrambles in response to incursions by foreign planes into its airspace. Korean Peninsula New DPRK missile test and assassination of ruler’s estranged half-brother in Malaysia prompted widespread international condemnation. Pyongyang announced successful test of new medium- to long- range missile capable of carrying nuclear warhead 12 Feb, in further violation of UN sanctions. Kim Jong- nam, estranged half-brother of DPRK leader Kim Jong-un, murdered in Kuala Lumpur airport, Malaysia 13 Feb reportedly using highly toxic nerve agent. Malaysian police arrested two women directly involved, nationals of Vietnam and Indonesia, later arrested N Korean man, said four other N Korean suspects had

108 fled country. U.S. Sec State Tillerson at first meeting with Chinese FM Wang 17 Feb urged China to “use all available tools” to moderate Pyongyang’s “destabilizing” behaviour. Chinese FM Wang 17 Feb supported resuming six-party talks; DPRK pulled out in 2009. China 18 Feb announced suspension of coal imports from DPRK until end 2017; later said year’s imports had already approached upper limits specified in Nov 2016 UNSC resolution. China 23 Feb denied reports it had increased troop presence on border with DPRK after Kim Jong-nam’s killing. U.S. denied visa for top DPRK envoy late Feb, reportedly forcing cancellation of planned track 1.5 talks with U.S. experts; Washington denied talks were scheduled. U.S. Sec Defense Jim Mattis, visiting Seoul 3 Feb, warned DPRK of “effective and overwhelming” response to attack on U.S. or allies, any use of nuclear weapons. South Korea 3 Feb reported DPRK’s minister of state security Kim Won- hong had been dismissed mid-Jan on charges of corruption, abuse of power and human rights abuses. ROK 27 Feb reported Pyongyang had executed at least five Ministry of State Security senior officials. Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Russia/Japan) Japan sent formal protest to Moscow 23 Feb after Russian defence minister said Russia plans to deploy additional forces to disputed Kuril islands/Northern Territories in 2017; earlier in month protested Russian move to name five uninhabited islands in archipelago. Taiwan Strait Speaking with Chinese President Xi for first time 9 Feb, U.S. President Trump said that he would honour One China policy, in reverse of his previous actions and statements questioning doctrine, which had caused increased tensions in cross-straits relations and between U.S. and China. Move calmed fears among some Taiwanese of possible U.S.-China trade war with economic ramifications for Taiwan. U.S. official 16 Feb said uniformed Marine guards would be posted at American Institute in Taiwan once it is completed. Afghanistan Tensions with Pakistan rose after Islamabad accused Afghanistan of harbouring terrorists responsible for series of deadly attacks in Pakistan including 16 Feb Islamic State (IS)-claimed Sufi shrine bombing in Sindh province (see Pakistan). Pakistani military 17 Feb shelled targets in Afghanistan it claimed were Pakistani Taliban camps, reportedly displacing at least 150 families in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces, and enforced indefinite closure of shared border; also summoned Afghan diplomats and demanded immediate handover of over 76 terrorists allegedly hiding in Afghanistan. Kabul reportedly responded by summoning Pakistani ambassador and submitting list of 85 Afghan insurgent leaders and 32 training camps located in Pakistan. Afghan govt and U.S. military enhanced operations against so-called IS- Khorasan (IS-K) targets in east: NATO 2 Feb confirmed U.S. military had killed Qari Munib and Shahid Omar, two top IS-K leaders in Nangarhar. Insurgents continued to carry out high profile attacks, including 7 Feb suicide bombing outside Supreme Court that killed at least twenty people and injured 40; and 17 Feb attack against army outposts in Dih Bala district, Nangarhar province, which left at least eighteen soldiers dead and twelve injured, claimed by IS-K. ICRC temporarily suspended operations in Afghanistan after suspected IS-K 8 Feb killed six ICRC workers and kidnapped two in Shibergan town, Jowzjan province. Taliban claimed responsibility for blast killing five soldiers and seven civilians in Helmand provincial capital Lashkargah 11 Feb; and ambush killing ten police and civilian in Darzab district, Jowzjan province 25 Feb. Officials claimed 11 Feb U.S. airstrikes in Helmand’s Sangin district killed at least 60 Taliban and foiled plan for major offensive. NATO opened investigation into allegations that U.S. airstrikes killed at least 22 civilians 10 Feb. Russia 15 Feb hosted second Afghanistan peace conference in Moscow aimed at finding political settlement and containing IS-K: India, Pakistan, Iran, China and Afghanistan participated. Testifying before U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee 9 Feb, NATO and U.S. forces commander Gen John Nicholson said Russia and Iran supporting Taliban, trying to legitimise it by claiming it was fighting IS-K and aiming to undermine U.S. and NATO; also called for deployment of few thousand more troops to train and advise Afghan army. Bangladesh Search committee appointed late Jan to appoint next election commission 6 Feb sent President Hamid list of ten candidates, including suggestions from ruling Awami League (AL), opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and civil society groups. Hamid 6 Feb appointed new commission: new Chief Election Commissioner KM Nurul Hada, former senior bureaucrat and “freedom fighter” during 1971 liberation war. BNP-led 20-party opposition alliance described Hada as controversial, partisan, and unable to oversee free and fair national polls (due Jan 2019); Hada said he has no connection with any political party. Security

109 forces 1 Feb announced arrest of four further suspects in July 2016 Gulshan café attack, 14 Feb shot dead suspected militant commander linked to attack. Five Islamists sentenced to death 28 Feb for Oct 2015 murder of Japanese citizen. Police 10 Feb arrested nine union organisers calling for higher minimum wage, bringing total number of known arrests since labour strikes in mid-Dec to 34 – most on vague and arbitrary grounds, including under draconian police Special Powers Act, many without warrants. Three- member Myanmar delegation of advisory commission on Rakhine State arrived in Dhaka 28 Jan to hold discussions with authorities on Rohingya issue, and visit shelters and slums in Cox’s Bazar where several thousand Rohingyas from Myanmar took shelter to escape security operations across border. FM 20 Feb called on international community to do more to stem flow of Myanmar Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh. Asian Centre for Human Rights NGO 20 Feb accused Bangladesh govt of pushing members of country’s Buddhist Jumma minority out of Chittagong Hill Tracts area to make way for Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. India (non-Kashmir) Maoist attacks and clashes between security forces and Maoists during month included: at least seven suspected Maoists killed in clash with police in Narayanpur district, Chhattisgarh 21 Feb; Maoist commander killed in clash with police in Bihar state 21 Feb. Eight police killed in landmine blast in Koraput district, Odisha state 1 Feb. Auditor General report found significant problems with govt development initiatives in areas affected by Maoist insurgency over past five years. Kashmir Deadly encounters between security forces and separatist militants continued in Indian- administered Jammu and Kashmir, leaving at least ten alleged militants and nine soldiers dead. Police and security forces 4 Feb killed two suspected members of near Sopore in north; claimed operation thwarted major terrorist attack. Gunfight between alleged Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e- Tayyaba (LeT) militants and security forces in Kulgam district in south 11-12 Feb left four alleged militants, two soldiers and two civilians dead; incident provoked major protests and clashes between demonstrators and security forces same day, one protester reported killed and at least 30 injured. Four Indian soldiers and four alleged militants killed in separate security raids 14 Feb. Alleged militants 23 Feb ambushed army patrol in Shopian, killing three soldiers and injuring five; one civilian killed by stray bullet. Indian army chief Bipin Rawat 17 Feb claimed those who obstruct or do not support anti-militancy operations will be considered “overground workers of terrorists”; remarks triggered violent protests throughout Jammu and Kashmir same day. Pakistani army accused India of violating ceasefire along LoC after three Pakistani soldiers were killed in 13 Feb exchange of fire in Bhimber district in south of Pakistan- administered Kashmir. Nepal Govt 20 Feb announced first post-conflict local elections to be held 14 May despite unresolved disputes over amendments to 2015 constitution; last local polls held in 1997. After claiming PM Dahal should resign if govt fails to hold elections by June, opposition UML party welcomed announcement but continued to oppose endorsement of amendment bill registered in parliament Nov 2016 that partially addresses dissenting Madhesi parties’ demands. Coalition of Madhesi parties criticised govt for “betraying” assurances that constitution would be amended prior to election-date decision, unveiled month-long protests throughout Tarai plains. Coalition activists clashed 22 Feb with UML cadres in Dhanusha district during coalition-enforced eastern Tarai strike; coalition supporters clashed with police 26 Feb in Rautahat district while attempting to disrupt UML gathering. Coalition discussing withdrawing support from ruling coalition. Controversial activist and proponent of “independent Madhes” CK Raut arrested 2 Feb in Rupandehi district; seventeen Raut supporters arrested 18 Feb in ensuing clashes with police. Govt 9 Feb extended terms of two transitional justice mechanisms on truth and reconciliation and disappearances one year until Feb 2018; new complaint registration period began 15 Feb; over 61,000 total complaints already received by both bodies. Pakistan Wave of attacks on state, sectarian and other targets cast doubt over efficacy of military’s recent counter-terrorism operations against jihadist networks, while govt’s accusations that Afghanistan was harbouring attackers and launch of cross-border attacks on alleged sanctuaries of militants further exacerbated tensions with Kabul. Islamic State (IS) 16 Feb carried out suicide bombing at prominent Sufi

110 shrine in Sehwan Sharif, Sindh province, killing at least 88 and injuring more than 200; security forces claimed to have killed over 100 alleged terrorists in security crackdown day after attack. Pakistani Taliban (TTP) faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar 14 Feb carried out suicide attack on protest outside Punjab Assembly in Lahore, killing at least fifteen including six police. At least six killed in 21 Feb suicide attack outside court in Charsadda, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa province. TTP claimed suicide bombing targeting administrative tribal HQ in Ghalanai in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)’s Mohmand agency 15 Feb killing five; one killed in suicide attack targeting judges in Peshawar same day. Several police and soldiers killed by IEDs in Balochistan’s Quetta and Awaran district and in S Waziristan mid-month. As terror attacks escalated military vowed revenge, accusing “hostile powers” of directing them. Govt 17 Feb accused Afghanistan of harbouring terrorist groups including IS, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and TTP, demanded arrest of over 76 terrorists allegedly hiding in Afghanistan and closed border indefinitely. Military carried out airstrikes in FATA and shelled alleged Pakistani militant positions in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. In “sweep operation” in Punjab 18-19 Feb law enforcement agencies reportedly arrested over 200, mostly Afghans. Punjab’s civil-military provincial Apex Committee 19 Feb agreed to requisition assistance of paramilitary Punjab Rangers to provide security. Govt launched new military-led nationwide counter-terrorism operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (End to Chaos) 22 Feb, with particular focus on Punjab. Sri Lanka President Sirisena continued to struggle to win support of his own Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) on constitutional reform; requested Constitutional Assembly (CA) steering committee draft new, shorter version of its interim report containing key elements of new constitution. After meeting consultation task force on reconciliation mechanisms 30 Jan, Sirisena reportedly confirmed transitional justice will not be pursued until after completion of constitutional reforms process. FM 7 Feb argued new constitution would be “most potent weapon for non-recurrence” of conflict and will be prioritised over accountability. FM 28 Feb told UN Human Rights Council a draft law for “Truth-Seeking Commission” would be presented to cabinet within next two months. European Parliament’s international trade committee began consideration of European Commission’s recommendation to grant GSP+ trade benefits to Sri Lankan; decision due by mid-May. Govt took some potentially positive steps on repeal of controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), including Right to Information Act, which became operational 3 Feb, and formally gazetting draft law criminalising enforced disappearances 9 Feb. Police 18-19 Feb arrested five military intelligence officers for 2008 abduction and beating of journalist; later told court same hit squad responsible for 2009 murder of editor Lasantha Wickrematunga, with police reported to believe they acted under orders of then-defence secretary . Tamil majority north and east saw wave of protest, including demanding return of land built on by army in Kepapilavu and action on missing persons, and “Tamils, Rise” demonstration demanding inter alia federal constitution. Under increasing pressure, Tamil National Alliance (TNA) leader 23 Feb told parliament issues of land, detainees, missing persons and reparation needed to be addressed urgently if current peace to last. Indonesia Tense Jakarta governor election went to second round after neither of the two leading candidates – incumbent Basuki Tjahaka Purnama, Chinese-descent Christian backed by President Widodo and currently on trial for alleged blasphemy, and former Education Minister Anies Baswedan – won outright majority in 15 Feb vote. Next vote scheduled for April. Islamists who staged rallies against Purnama late 2016 protested again 21 Feb demanding he be suspended as mayor and convicted. Indonesia and Australia 26 Feb restored full military ties, partially suspended in Jan. Police shot dead man with alleged links to IS following small explosion in Bandung 27 Feb. Myanmar UN-OHCHR 3 Feb released report on human rights abuses by security forces in N Rakhine state following Oct attacks on police posts by al-Yaqin armed group. Report, which found “very likely commission of crimes against humanity” including mass killings and gang rapes, significantly increased momentum behind calls for international commission of inquiry, to be discussed at UN Human Rights Council session in March. 73,000 Rohingya now reported to have fled to Bangladesh since 9 Oct, 24,000 internally displaced. Having previously denied similar allegations, govt 8 Feb said it would investigate allegations, however, gave task to commission headed by VP-1 Myint Swe, whose credibility was undermined when it issued preliminary report in Jan finding no evidence of abuses. Military and police set up separate, internal

111 investigations 9 and 11 Feb; military chief of general staff Gen Mya Tun Oo in 28 Feb press conference said military had so far not been able to substantiate OHCHR accusations of rape and other atrocities, denied general allegations of Rohingya persecution. New National Security Adviser 15 Feb told diplomats military “clearance operations” had now ended; humanitarian and media access remain restricted. Curfew restrictions in Maungdaw district since 2012 anti-Muslim violence, which had been tightened following Oct attacks, were relaxed 10 Feb. Speaking at Annual Union Day celebrations marking 70th anniversary of signing of Panglong Agreement on inclusion of ethnic borderlands in independent Burma 12 Feb, Aung San Suu Kyi focused on new “Panglong-21” peace process, urged ethnic armed groups to have “courage” and “self-confidence” to sign Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Govt postponed next Panglong-21 peace conference from 28 Feb to late March, as preparatory meetings started late and with little apparent success in convincing any additional groups to sign NCA. Fighting in Kachin and N Shan states subsided since late-Jan as military has eased offensives against ethnic armed group positions. Motive and ultimate responsibility remained unclear in 29 Jan assassination of leading constitutional lawyer and ruling NLD party adviser Ko Ni. Philippines President Duterte 4 Feb announced govt withdrawal from peace talks with Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) insurgents, resumed since Aug 2016 with Norwegian facilitation. Move came amid increased clashes and as govt refused communist demand to released 400 imprisoned insurgents. Communist insurgents 1 Feb declared end to ceasefire and reportedly killed three unarmed soldiers; govt 3 Feb lifted its unilateral ceasefire. Senior military officer 26 Feb reported at least fourteen rebels killed in clashes following ceasefire collapse; seven govt soldiers also reported killed. Communists called for continuation of talks, 19 Feb offered to free six POWs; presidential palace 20 Feb listed ceasefire conditions communists needed to meet before Duterte would reopen talks, including, inter alia, end to extortion and ambushes on military personnel. Duterte early Feb named expanded 21-member Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) to draft new enabling law for proposed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, agreed in March 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro; BTC includes eleven MILF figures. Presidential adviser on peace process Jesus Dureza also said Bangsamoro Basic Law drafted under Aquino govt could be basis for new law; BTC, officially launched in Davao City 24 Feb, must submit draft to Congress by July. Defence Minister Delfin Lorenzana 9 Feb said links between IS and Philippines militants “very strong”; senior military office 26 Feb said some 50 IS cells operating in Mindanao. Several Abu Sayyaf fighters reported killed in ongoing operations during month; Abu Sayyaf attacks and bombings also continued. FM Perfecto Yasay said Abu Sayyaf likely behind 19 Feb attack on Vietnamese cargo ship near Baguan island in which one crew member killed. Govt reported Abu Sayyaf beheaded German hostage in Sulu 26 Feb after ransom deadline lapsed. South China Sea New U.S. administration moderated previous statements signalling tougher stance on China in SCS and engaged in first contacts with Beijing and regional allies, dialling down tensions. President Trump spoke to Chinese President Xi 9 Feb agreed to honour 'One China' policy. U.S. Sec State Tillerson’s controversial remarks at his confirmation hearing early Jan appeared toned down in written responses leaked early Feb. After meeting with Tillerson 17 Feb Chinese FM Wang said countries’ common interested far outweigh their differences. Tillerson reportedly affirmed importance of constructive bilateral relationship in conversation with China’s state councillor Yang Jiechi 22 Feb. During early Feb visit to South Korea and Japan, U.S. Sec Defence Jim Matthis emphasised commitment to allies, criticised Beijing for 'shredding the trust of nations in the region'; also said focus should be on diplomacy, not 'dramatic military moves'. Three Chinese warships conducted naval exercises in SCS 10-17 Feb; U.S. aircraft carrier strike group began 'routine operations' in SCS 18 Feb, despite call by Beijing 15 Feb 'not to take actions that challenge China’s sovereignty and security'. Beijing said it respects freedom of navigation and overflight but called for U.S. to respect sovereignty and security of countries in region and their efforts to maintain peace and stability. Philippines FM Perfecto Yasay reported meeting of ASEAN FMs 21 Feb had expressed 'grave concerns' over China’s militarisation in SCS; after Chinese commerce minister subsequently cancelled planned trip to Philippines, President Duterte said Beijing had misunderstood Yasay’s remarks. U.S. officials 22 Feb told Reuters China has almost finished building over twenty structures on its artificial islands in SCS, apparently to house long range surface-to-air missiles; China said it has right to deploy defensive

112 facilities on its territory. Reports apparently confirmed by satellite imagery showing facilities on three artificial islands in Spratly archipelago. Thailand Draft constitution returned to king 18 Feb following amendment of provisions concerning royal prerogatives; king has 90 days to sign. National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) instituted national reconciliation process with appointment of four committees on national strategy, reform, reconciliation, and strategic administration 6 Feb, and series of meetings hosted by defence ministry to canvas views of politicians starting 14 Feb; major political parties expressed scepticism over process. PM Prayuth Chan- ocha 15 Feb invoked Article 44 of interim constitution, which grants him unreviewable authority in matters of national security, to declare Wat Dhammakaya temple in Pathumthani “controlled area”, part of efforts to arrest Buddhist monk Dhammachayo on charges of money laundering. Dhammachayo widely seen as sympathetic to exiled former PM Thaksin Shinawatra and Red Shirt movement. Thai and Indonesian defence ministers met in Bangkok 2 Feb, reportedly discussed counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation. U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris launched annual combined military exercise Cobra Gold in Chonburi 14 Feb; most senior U.S. official to visit Thailand since May 2014 coup. In southern insurgency, suspected militants killed several people in attacks in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat during month. MARA Patani, umbrella group of five separatist groups in exile, issued statement 20 Feb in support of communities protesting against coal power plants in Krabi and Songkhla provinces. Member of Thai dialogue team 22 Feb said agreement reached with MARA Patani on establishment of safety zone, or limited ceasefire; main militant group BRN is not a party to MARA Patani. Europe & Central Asia Bosnia And Herzegovina Bosniak member of tripartite presidency Bakir Izetbegović 17 Feb said country will lodge appeal to ICJ to revise its 2007 ruling which exonerated Serbia of direct responsibility for 1995 Srebrenica genocide. Bosnian Serb member of presidency Mladen Ivanić warned such a move would exacerbate ethnic tensions, could provoke crisis; MPs from country’s two largest Serb parties 16 Feb boycotted parliament in protest. Ivanić and President of Republika Srpska (RS) entity Milorad Dodik met with Serbian PM Vučić and President Nikolić in Belgrade 22 Feb; Nikolić said Belgrade “will always stand by the Serbs in Bosnia”, Dodik called ICJ appeal “act of hatred” toward Serbs. Speaking day after official filing of request with ICJ 23 Feb, Ivanic spoke of “serious crisis” and said he will tell ICJ that presidency did not agree on move. RS National Assembly special session late month voted to “reject and strongly condemn” appeal bid, invited Serb representatives in state-level bodies to prevent decision-making. Russian ambassador 12 Feb said RS authorities “fully committed to implementing the Dayton agreement”, reiterated Russian support for Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kosovo EU-brokered meeting between Kosovo and Serbian PMs and presidents in Brussels 1 Feb failed to calm tensions. EU foreign policy chief Mogherini reported “constructive engagement” with both sides reconfirming commitment to dialogue, however anonymous diplomatic sources said no results. NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 3 Feb urged Pristina and Belgrade to ease tensions, move from rhetoric to dialogue and move forward normalisation process. Kosovo Serbs 5 Feb demolished unauthorised concrete wall they constructed in Dec 2016 dividing Mitrovica, following meeting previous day between local Kosovo Serb leaders and Pristina officials, facilitated by EU and U.S. officials, resulting in agreement to ease tensions. President Thaci 13 Feb announced new Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with alleged atrocities during 1998-99 war and improve relations between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. Govt-appointed commission 21 Feb found that 2015 border deal with Montenegro did not result in loss of Kosovo territory as claimed by opposition parties who refuse to ratify deal, thus blocking its ratification in parliament, which is a condition of EU visa liberalisation. Macedonia After failure of former ruling party VMRO DPMNE to form new govt by late Jan deadline following 11 Dec elections, President Ivanov 2 Feb said he would give mandate for forming new govt to party which can demonstrate proof of majority in parliament. VMRO DPMNE called for new elections, accused opposition of sacrificing national interest by making too many concessions to ethnic Albanian parties to win their support for coalition. Opposition Social Democratic Union (SDSM) leader Zoran Zaev 27 Feb

113 claimed mandate to form govt after main ethnic Albanian party DUI and two other ethnic Albanian parties said they would back SDSM, giving him majority support in parliament; conditions for their support included passage of new language law extending use of Albanian as second official language throughout country. Former PM Gruevski 26 Feb said deal unconstitutional and jeopardised state interests. Protests led by VMRO DPMNE broke out in Skopje 27 Feb, drawing thousands and spreading to other towns next day; protesters criticising deal with Albanian parties and calling for protection of ethnic Macedonian interests. Two journalists covering protests in Skopje assaulted 28 Feb. Armenia European Council President Donald Tusk 27 Feb announced conclusion of negotiations on EU- Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. President Sargsyan 27 Feb visited EU and NATO institutions in Brussels. Central Elections Commission 17 Feb registered five political parties and three blocks for Parliamentary elections 2 April. OSCE/ODIHR 21 Feb started election observation mission in Armenia. Azerbaijan President Aliyev 21 Feb announced appointment of his wife Mehibran Aliyeva, deputy chair of ruling New Azerbaijan Party, as first VP. Belarus 7 Feb extradited Russian/Ukrainian/Israeli blogger charged with supporting NK independence and making public calls aimed to “destroy state’s unity”; case condemned by Amnesty International. Russia said it was “deeply disappointed” about extradition, Armenia said it represented “gross violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of speech and movement”. President Aliyev visited Brussels 6 Feb to discuss inter alia new cooperation agreement between Azerbaijan and EU; cancelled planned meeting with European parliament president. Two Azerbaijani nationals arrested 20 Feb for high treason, accused of collecting information about Azerbaijan’s strategic objects, secret service agents and military personnel. Authorities reportedly killed four alleged extremists and captured one during 31 Jan search operation. Georgia European Parliament 2 Feb voted to grant visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to EU, expected to enter into force later March after it was approved by EU Council 27 Feb. Residents of conflict regions can make use of visa free travel provided they apply for Georgian passports. Georgia and Russia 7 Feb discussed prospects for trade through Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with intention to implement 2011 agreement signed before Georgia gave Russia green light to join WTO. Former Abkhaz leader Alexander Ankvab returned to Abkhazia 13 Feb after two years of absence to run as candidate in de facto parliamentary elections 12 March. Perceived Russian interference ahead of April de facto presidential election in breakaway republic South Ossetia, including reported pressure from Russian envoy on local elections commission to issue public statement against former leader Eduard Kokoity, prompted anger among residents. De facto President Tibilov 6 Feb signed decree scheduling referendum to change name of entity to “Republic of South Ossetia – the State of Alania”. Georgian FM Mikheil Janelidze met U.S. counterpart Rex Tillerson in Washington DC 10 Feb, reported Tillerson expressed “full support” for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) Exchange of fire intensified on different sections of Line of Contact (LoC), with reports of mortars and anti-tank guns on NE and Central sections, in deadliest month for both sides since April 2016 escalation. At least eight Armenian soldiers reported killed in mortar and sniper attacks 15 Jan-28 Feb. Azerbaijani side reported at least six casualties including six soldiers killed during 25 Feb exchange of fire on southern section of LoC, in most serious incident since start of 2017; OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs 26 Feb called on sides to cease movement of heavy military equipment and to allow collection of the dead. Escalation accompanied by calls within NK to escalate military response, comes amid signs of military build- up on both sides on central section of LoC. Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs met in Munich 17 Feb for talks mediated by OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, intending to urge resumption of negotiations suspended in Dec. Final statement included warning that any use of force might lead to “devastating” results. FMs agreed on further meetings, no mention of presidential-level talks. One Azerbaijani soldier 1 Feb deserted to de facto NK. NK 20 Feb conducted de facto referendum on new constitution adopting presidential system, abolishing position of de facto PM and transferring some responsibilities to de facto parliament. De facto electoral commission reported 87.6% of voters supported change, turnout 76%. New constitution also

114 permits current de facto President Bako Sahakyan, expected to finish his second term in July, to stay for three-year transitional period, allows him to run again in 2020. Azerbaijan and international community declared referendum illegal; Minsk Group co-chairs said referendum needed to improve public life in NK, but would not define final status. Azerbaijan 23 Feb added three members of European Parliament to its international wanted list for observing de facto referendum. Russia/North Caucasus Counter Terrorist Operations (CTOs) conducted in Dagestani villages of Kvanada and Gimerso, Tsumadinsky district 31 Jan-4 Feb, and in Andi village 7-17 Feb; no casualties reported. Chair of National Anti-Terrorism Committee Andrei Przhezdomsky 31 Jan said special forces prevented over 40 planned terrorist attacks in 2016; also said number of Russian recruits to Islamic State (IS) in decline, terrorist activity in N Caucasus decreased. Authorities continue to prevent outflow of fighters from NC to IS; court in Krasnodar in south 14 Feb found three Dagestani men guilty of planning to join IS. Dagestan interior ministry 31 Jan claimed more than 1,200 persons from Dagestan have joined IS. Moscow court 14 Feb sentenced three men from North Caucasus to between three and fourteen years’ jail for having links with IS in Syria and plotting attack in Moscow. Russia continued to increase presence of North Caucasian troops in Syria, sending 300-strong military police battalion from Ingushetia 13 Feb to protect Russian air force military base in Khmeymim and maintain public order in Aleppo. Belarus EU 27 Feb extended arms embargo on Belarus for another year, retained visa ban and asset freezes for four individuals. Ukraine Late Jan escalation in clashes along front line around Avdiivka in east continued early Feb, with at least 35 soldiers and civilians reported killed and scores wounded in period 29 Jan-6 Feb. Fighting subsided somewhat 4 Feb, permitting repairs to power lines and restoration of water supplies in area. Efforts continued to restore ceasefire with limited success; Ukrainian military 17 Feb reported three soldiers killed, ten injured previous day. Ukrainian, Russian, German and French FMs 18 Feb agreed to renewed ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons in east taking effect 20 Feb, however OSCE 21 Feb reported continued ceasefire violations, 22 Feb said neither side honouring commitments to withdraw heavy weapons; Ukrainian military 25 Feb said sixteen soldiers wounded in clashes over previous 24 hours. President Poroshenko accused Moscow of violating Feb 2015 Minsk accord after Russia 18 Feb announced it would recognise identification documents issued by separatist entities; France, Germany and EU also criticised Russia. Moscow defended move on humanitarian grounds, said it complied with international law. Poroshenko expressed confidence in continued U.S. support following contacts and statements from senior U.S. officials including 4 Feb phone call with President Trump; 2 Feb statement by U.S. ambassador to UN who affirmed U.S. sanctions against Russia to remain in place until it returns Crimea; and White House spokesperson’s 14 Feb statement that Trump expects Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine. European Commission President Juncker 11 Feb said EU will give Ukraine €600mn to support govt finances; European Parliament 13 Feb approved new rules to waive visa regime for Ukrainians. Kyiv 15 Feb declared partial state of emergency due to nationalist blockade of rail lines delivering coal from separatist entities in east since 25 Jan; clashes broke out in Kyiv 19 Feb between ultra-nationalist demonstrators and police over blockade; separatists 27 Feb threatened to seize Ukrainian-run businesses if blockade not lifted. Several thousand joined protests in Kyiv organised by right-wing parties including far-right Right Sector 22 Feb demanding reform, change of govt. UNICEF 17 Feb reported 1 million children in east in urgent need of humanitarian aid, doubling over past year. Cyprus Greek Cypriot parliament 10 Feb approved proposal by far-right National Popular Front Party (ELAM) for yearly celebration in schools of 1950 referendum which approved Union with Greece (“Enosis Day”). Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades 13 Feb said parliament’s approval of ELAM proposal, which he called “unfortunate”, did not constitute change of policy, should not undermine sincere Greek Cypriot intentions of reunification. Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı 15 Feb demanded Enosis law be repealed. Russian ambassador to Cyprus early Feb attended seminar in Nicosia convened by hard-line Greek Cypriot politicians opposing deal, prompting concerns over Russian involvement in talks and criticism from Anastasiades. Meeting scheduled for early March cancelled, not clear when/if new round of talks will

115 resume. Turkey State security forces continued operations against Kurdish PKK insurgency in SE, though number of casualties and attacks again lower than previous month. Security forces detained 26 people after car bomb attack attributed to PKK 17 Feb that killed two in Viranşehir district, Şanlıurfa province; 18 Feb two alleged PKK militants killed in Nusaybin district, where Kurdish politicians protested lockdown in Koruköy village amid unconfirmed allegations on social media of torture of civilians by security forces. Unclaimed rocket attacks in Istanbul’s Fatih district 20 Feb targeted police station and ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) office; no casualties reported. Number of arrested Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (HDP) MPs rose to thirteen. HDP 20 Feb filed complaint at European Court of Human Rights over Nov 2016 arrest and detention of co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ; Yüksekdağ stripped of seat in Parliament and Demirtaş sentenced to five months’ jail next day. President Erdoğan 10 Feb approved constitutional reform bill which would bring in presidential system, with referendum on change scheduled for 16 April. In ongoing purges following July 2016 coup attempt, govt 8 Feb dismissed 4,400 additional academics, security services, economy and foreign affairs ministry personnel. Security forces 5- 6 Feb arrested over 800 alleged Islamic State (IS)-linked individuals in coordinated raids in at least 29 provinces. Ankara continued push into N Syria and offensive on Al-Bab (see Syria). Three Turkish soldiers killed in Russian airstrike near Al-Bab 9 Feb; Moscow said it was mistake and blamed poor coordination. Ankara continued to push new U.S. administration for Turkish role in Raqqa operation, condemning continued U.S. support to Kurdish YPG/PYD fighters. Tensions continue with Greece with series of standoffs over disputed islets in Aegean Sea. Kazakhstan Govt hosted further talks backed by Russia, Turkey and Iran on Syrian conflict during month. President Nazarbayev 30 Jan instructed National Security Committee and govt to create “Cyber Shield” to prevent dissemination of extremist propaganda on internet and social networks, prompting criticism from rights groups. Russian President Putin during late month tour of region met with President Nazarbayev 27 Feb, consolidating ties. Kyrgyzstan Several parties named their candidates for Nov presidential election including former PM Temir Sariev (Ak Shumkar party), former PM Omurbek Babanov (Republika – Ata-Jurt) and Bakyt Torobaev (Onuguu-Progress). Opposition Ata-Meken party leader Omurbek Tekebayev arrested 26 Feb upon arrival from Vienna, court 27 Feb ordered two-month custody while fraud and corruption investigation conducted; Ata-Meken supporters protested in Bishkek. President Atambayev met with European Council President Donald Tusk and EU foreign policy chief Mogherini in Brussels 17 Feb. Atambayev called on EU to invest in Kyrgyzstan’s democracy arguing it is under pressure. Russian President Putin visited Bishkek 28 Feb to discuss ties. Tajikistan Interior Minister Ramazon Rakhimzoda 20 Jan said 36 terrorist attacks were prevented in Tajikistan in 2016; also said there are some 10,000-15,000 militants gathered along Tajik-Afghan border – higher than estimates from other analysts. Anti-corruption agency 27 Jan launched investigation into former Dushanbe mayor Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, accused of embezzling state funds; investigation reportedly opened at request of current mayor Rustam Emomali, son of President Rahmon, following complaints from city residents. Russian President Putin 27 Feb agreed with President Rahmon to jointly bolster Tajik-Afghan border security. Turkmenistan President Berdymukhamedov re-elected to third seven-year term 12 Feb with 97.69% of vote: turnout reported at 97.28%. Eight other candidates received less than 3% of vote between them. Amid worsening economic situation and shortages, reports emerged ahead of vote of officials forcing traders in Ashgabat to reduce prices. Media watchdog Reporters Without Borders 10 Feb spoke out against “unprecedented crackdown” on independent journalists in country. OSCE sent first ever limited election observation mission. Uzbekistan President Mirziyoyev 8 Feb approved wide-ranging 2017-2021 development strategy promising political,

116 judicial and economic reforms. Govt late Jan announced it will spend $2.6bn over five years to develop area around Aral Sea. Latin America & Caribbean Colombia FARC completed its movements into cantonments 19 Feb, with 6,900 FARC fighters in 26 zones throughout country, many of which still lack infrastructure. Arms handover to begin 1 March, though public spat between UN mission, govt and FARC, as well as lack of progress, may lead to delays. Approval of new legislation to implement peace agreement continued, with law to create Special Jurisdiction for Peace presented to Congress and sent through required committees throughout Feb. Formal peace talks with ELN guerrilla group began 8 Feb. Govt and ELN 16 Feb announced they had decided to create two commissions at peace talks: one will discuss mechanisms for wider social participation in talks; second will discuss humanitarian issues, with aim of reducing effects of ELN conflict on population. ELN carried out attack 14 Feb along Bogotá-Villavicencio road which left four soldiers injured, and bombing in Bogotá 19 Feb which killed one policemen and wounded at least 25; allegedly carried out attack against governor’s motorcade in NE. Group also stated it would fill power vacuums left by FARC, supposedly at behest of communities and to prevent “paramilitary groups” from doing same. Social leaders continued to be killed at heightened levels, bringing total to at least thirteen in 2017, and 40 since Oct plebiscite. Govt’s coca eradication program met resistance; community in southern department Caquetá 2 Feb detained fourteen policemen to prevent them from eradicating, released next day; violent protests against eradication in SW town Tumaco continue. Some pre-agreements for coca substitution signed in Caquetá, Vichada and Putumayo. Venezuela After rejecting 21 Jan proposal by Vatican-sponsored dialogue facilitators to relaunch talks as plan for “democratic coexistence”, opposition MUD alliance 10 Feb reiterated that return to talks only possible if govt fulfilled its first round commitments; govt reiterated its commitment to dialogue. National Assembly President Julio Borges 10 Feb said MUD had declined proposal by Pope for two sides to meet at Vatican late Jan; papal nuncio said no formal request to reopen talks had been made. OAS Sec Gen Luis Almagro 8 Feb said OAS Permanent Council would not take further action until dialogue was declared over. Contacts continued behind scenes: MUD 10 Feb presented more detailed proposal for renewing talks; facilitators returned to Caracas mid-Feb but without apparently producing any breakthrough. Elections for state governors, due Dec 2016, on hold indefinitely, despite Oct 2016 promise by electoral authority (CNE) President Tibisay Lucena that they would be held mid-2017: CNE board member Tania D’Amelio 10 Feb said elections could not take place until political parties renewed their legal registration, as demanded by Supreme Court (TSJ). CNE 7 Feb required 59 of country’s 62 political parties to re-register by gathering signatures of 5% of voters in at least twelve states within fourteen hours using 390 fingerprint machines provided by CNE, to begin 4 March; many parties complained conditions impossible to fulfil. Ruling PSUV and MUD not required to re-register, however MUD facing possible ban over case before TSJ alleging it committed fraud in 2016 recall referendum process. MUD 17 Feb announced long-awaited internal restructuring, including expansion of its executive from four to nine parties, creating civil society consultative body. U.S. Treasury 13 Feb announced it was blacklisting VP Aissami as alleged drugs “kingpin”; govt condemned move as politically motivated persecution. Guatemala Three-pronged institutional crisis affecting judiciary, legislature and executive resulting from corruption scandals continued, together with heightened tensions between conservatives partially opposing constitutional reforms and activists in favour. Congress late Feb discussed proposals to reform constitution in five respects, including official recognition of indigenous legal systems and separation of administrative from judicial functions of Supreme Court; reforms would significantly bolster judiciary’s independence from political authorities. Critics of reforms decried international meddling in internal affairs, called for expulsion of International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) Commissioner Iván Velásquez, who 11 Feb complained about absence of “official voices” condemning attacks against CICIG. VP Cabrera 14 Feb attributed Jan increase in homicides and series of brutal acts of violence to destabilisation scheme against govt. Haiti

117 Speaking at his inauguration 7 Feb, President Moïse declared his goal of strengthening state institutions including Provisional Electoral Council. EU delegation met Moïse 7 Feb to discuss €35mn package to address post-Hurricane Matthew reconstruction; Canada same day pledged $91mn to health and welfare aid; govt and UN 13 Feb launched appeal for $291.5mn to cover humanitarian needs in 2017. UN Under Sec Gen for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous 13 Feb declared military component of MINUSTAH would soon end; Brazil 1 Feb announced it would withdraw completely from mission before 15 April. UNSG to submit recommendations for future of MINUSTAH to UNSC by 15 March. U.S. judge set trial on drug trafficking charges of Senator-elect Guy Philippe, arrested and extradited to U.S. in Jan, for 3 April; pleading not guilty, Philippe 14 Feb accused Senate President Youri Latortue and four Senators of involvement in his arrest. Mexico Inter- and intra- criminal organisation killings intensified following Jan extradition of Joaquín “el Chapo” Guzmán to U.S. Dámaso “El Licenciado” López and Guzmán’s sons Iván Archivaldo and Alfredo reportedly fighting to gain control of Sinaloa, while fighting continues between Sinaloa and Beltrán Leyva and other criminal organisations for control of Sinaloa illegal drug production and Pacific trafficking routes to U.S. Over 200 murders reported since 1 Jan in Sinaloa alone. Marines 9 Feb killed twelve suspected members of Beltrán Leyva, including their reputed leader in Nayarit and parts of Jalisco. U.S. 12 Feb leaked information on growing power of Jalisco New Generation Cartel in battle to control trafficking through Ciudad Juárez and U.S. drugs trade. Defence Minister Salvador Cienfuegos 12 Feb announced more military deployments for Sinaloa security strategy, despite recent evidence showing military strategies increase violence rates. PRI deputies 13 Feb tried to fast-track new Internal Security Law to provide legal framework for military use of force and involvement in public security and prosecutorial activities; National Commission for Human Rights, scholars and civil society organisations 14 Feb made successful call for further discussion of bill. Official crime data showed 2016 violence involving organised criminal groups and federal operations fighting them reached levels comparable to worst years of govt’s “war” on drugs and crime launched in 2006. Human rights organisations 5 Feb denounced Marines’ alleged kidnapping of five members of community police force in indigenous town Santa María Ostula before handing them over to Knight Templars; two more kidnapped two days later, released in exchange for weapons. Attacks on press and human rights advocates continued; indigenous Choréachi community in Chihuahua 1 Feb revealed murder of indigenous rights defender Juan Ontiveros Ramos. FM Luis Videgaray voiced concerns to his visiting U.S. counterpart Rex Tillerson late Feb over new U.S. policies, including to expel to Mexico all illegal immigrants crossing border regardless of nationality. Middle East & North Africa Israel/Palestine U.S. President Trump at joint press conference with PM Netanyahu 15 Feb said he was open to both two-state and one-state solutions; Palestine Liberation Organization affirmed its support for two- state solution. Netanyahu supported 6 Feb passage of controversial “regularisation law” that gives legal immunity to settlements and outposts built on seized private Palestinian land in West Bank. Netanyahu 2 Feb promised govt would establish new settlement as compensation for dismantlement, in accordance with Supreme Court decision, of small unauthorised Amona settlement; dismantlement began 6 Feb, sparked limited violence. Following cancellation in Sept 2016 of municipal elections in West Bank and Gaza set for Oct, Palestinian Authority (PA) early Feb said it would hold them 13 May; Hamas rejected schedule saying municipal elections should come after implementation of Palestinian reconciliation agreements. Hamas 16 Feb at meeting with Central Elections Commission rejected recent changes to electoral law. Mahmoud Alloul appointed Fatah deputy leader 15 Feb. Internal Hamas elections continued in Gaza: Yehya Sinwar, a military wing leader, elected head of Gaza political bureau. Unidentified Salafi-jihadist group 6 Feb launched rocket from Gaza toward Ashkelon in Israel; Israel retaliated by striking many Hamas targets. Another rocket fired from Gaza at Israel 26 Feb. Islamic State (IS) claimed to have fired four rockets from Egypt 8 Feb on Eilat city in southern Israel, Israel’s missile defence system intercepted three and one landed in open area, causing no damage; said Israeli unmanned aircraft 18 Feb killed five IS fighters in Sinai; IS 20 Feb fired two more rockets into southern Israel. Lebanon Hizbollah and Israel exchanged threats mid-month: Hizbollah 16 Feb threatened to target Dimona

118 nuclear reactor in Negev desert, Israel warned it would “hit all of Lebanon” in response to any such attack; President Aoun 18 Feb cautioned Israel’s actions would be met with appropriate response, Hizbollah 20 Feb reportedly said there would be no “red lines” in future confrontations. PM Hariri expressed disagreement after Aoun 12 Feb issued controversial statement characterising Hizbollah’s weaponry as complementary to army’s and needed to counter Israel; Hariri called weaponry illegitimate. Aoun met with Egyptian President Sisi in Cairo 13 Feb; leaders agreed to bolster anti-terrorism cooperation. U.S. 15 Feb issued travel advisory for its citizens to avoid Lebanon due to “threats of terrorism, armed clashes, kidnapping, and outbreaks of violence”. Authorities 10 Feb said they would waive $200 annual residency fee for Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR. Syria Ceasefire between regime and some armed opposition groups in place since 30 Dec nominally remained in effect but violence continued in several areas in run-up to Geneva talks late month. Following clashes between non-jihadist and Salafi-jihadist rebel groups late Jan, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), new alliance dominated by Salafi-jihadist Fath al-Sham, early Feb took territory and materiel from rival rebels west of Aleppo. Turkey-backed rebels and pro-regime forces (both advancing toward al-Bab, NE of Aleppo) clashed early Feb. After lull since start of ceasefire, regime early Feb resumed airstrikes in parts of Homs and Idlib provinces and efforts to gain ground in Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus. Non-jihadist rebel umbrella group Ahrar al-Sham and allies mid-month launched raids in rural areas around Lattakia and Hama, and diverse rebel groups including Ahrar al-Sham, HTS and local factions 12 Feb launched offensive in Daraa city in south next to Jordan border. Islamic State (IS)-linked group 20 Feb expanded territory seizing several towns in south near borders with Israel and Jordan. Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and fellow members of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) took territory around IS-held Raqqa in NE during month to cut IS supply lines in run-up to attack on city. Turkey-backed rebels 23 Feb took complete control of al- Bab in north from IS, 26 Feb clashed with govt forces south of al-Bab. UN-led talks between govt and opposition groups opened in Geneva 23 Feb, ongoing end-month. Gunmen and suicide bombers 25 Feb attacked two security services bases in Homs city killing at least 30, HTS claimed attacks; govt launched airstrikes on various rebel-held areas including al-Waer, last rebel enclave in Homs. Govt advances in north late month opened route between Aleppo and SDF-controlled Manbij. Russia and China 28 Feb vetoed UNSC resolution drafted by France, UK and U.S. to ban supply of helicopters to govt and blacklist Syrian military commanders over accusations of toxic gas attacks. Bahrain Demonstrators clashed with police 14 Feb, sixth anniversary of 2011 uprising. Security forces mid-Feb arrested twenty alleged terrorists in Shiite villages, triggering protests. Police 21 Feb allegedly killed man evading arrest, sparking protest in Nuwaidrat village, 15km south of Manama. Govt reported unclaimed bombings in and around Manama 5, 14, 23 Feb causing no casualties; 26 Feb said unclaimed blast injured five police. Court of Cassation 6 Feb reportedly denied appeal by main Shiite opposition group al-Wefaq against its dissolution for terrorism-related charges. Council of Representatives, parliament’s lower house, 21 Feb approved constitutional amendment that would allow govt to try civilians in military courts. Iran Then U.S. National Security Advisor Michael Flynn 1 Feb accused Iran of “provocative” ballistic missile launch and attack against Saudi Arabian navy ship “by Iran-supported Houthi militants”. U.S. 3 Feb put sanctions on 25 people and entities involved in Iran’s ballistic missile tests. In response Tehran threatened sanctions on U.S. individuals and entities and 4 Feb held military drill. Navy 26 Feb launched drills in Persian Gulf; govt 27 Feb said it had successfully tested new marine cruise missile as part of drills. Govt 20 Feb summoned Turkish ambassador over Turkish president and PM’s comments that Iran was destabilising Middle East, said its patience “had limits”. Iraq PM Abadi 19 Feb said U.S.-backed govt forces and allied militias starting campaign to retake western half of Mosul in north from Islamic State (IS). Fighting continued south of Mosul: govt forces 19 Feb said they had seized seventeen villages from IS around Mosul airport (30km south of Mosul), allegedly cutting one of IS’s supply and escape routes, between Mosul and Tal Afar (75km west); govt forces 23 Feb took Mosul airport and Ghazlani military base from IS, 24 Feb pushed into south-eastern districts. Shia Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) 19 Feb pushed back IS SW of Tal Afar, seized several villages. IS claimed

119 twin suicide bombings 10 Feb that killed fourteen in Zuhour district, eastern Mosul, retaken from IS over two months previously. Army 27 Feb said security forces had seized al-Jawsaq district in western half of Mosul and fourth bridge across Tigris River. One Kurdish soldier killed 25 Feb in unclaimed bombing of pipeline in Bai Hassan oil field near Kirkuk. IS claimed multiple bombings mid-Feb in Baghdad’s Shia districts: blasts in Bayaa district 14 and 16 Feb killed 58, suicide bomber 15 Feb killed fifteen near Sadr City district. Police 11 Feb crushed protests in Baghdad called by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to demand overhaul of election commission, which Sadr supporters believe would favour former PM Maliki in provincial elections scheduled for Sept; five protesters and two policemen reportedly killed. Unclaimed rocket attacks targeting Green Zone in Baghdad later same day caused no casualties. Unclaimed bombing in S Baghdad 27 Feb reportedly killed three civilians. Saudi Arabia FM 21 Feb reportedly said govt is prepared to send ground troops to Syria to fight alongside U.S. Special Forces assisting rebel Syrian Democratic Forces. Govt 16 Feb said it had arrested eighteen people including fifteen Saudis from four Islamic State cells suspected of providing shelter to wanted militants and recruiting fighters in capital Riyadh and eastern and northern regions. Yemen Saudi Arabia-led coalition continued offensive toward Hodeida from south and north along Red Sea coast. Saudi-led coalition forces around Midi north of Hodeida remained largely static while UAE-assisted Yemeni forces pushing northward made progress and mid-Feb appeared to have captured Mokha city, Taiz governorate. Huthi rebels and forces aligned with former President Saleh put up strong resistance, 22 Feb killed army’s second in command near Mokha. Huthi-Saleh forces increased raids across Yemeni-Saudi border and ballistic missile attacks into Saudi Arabia; 6 Feb said they had launched missile capable of striking Saudi capital Riyadh. U.S. increased in-flight refuelling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft and worked to reverse Obama administration’s decisions to limit weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Infighting plagued govt- controlled areas: supporters of UAE-aligned Salafi faction clashed repeatedly in Taiz city with Saudi-backed group aligned with Sunni Islamist party, Islah; President Hadi-aligned fighters 12 Feb tried, unsuccessfully, to forcibly take Aden airport from commander who had fallen out with president; during offensive UAE gunship exchanged fire with Hadi-aligned fighters. Algeria Protests including against light austerity measures in 2017 budget continued. Police 15 Feb dispersed pharmacy and dental surgery students in central Algiers as they tried to protest for better training and employment. Relations with Saudi Arabia continued to thaw; eight MoUs on phosphates, mining and tourism signed at Algeria-Saudi Arabia business council in Algiers 15 Feb. Two French women arrested 1 Feb at Algerian husbands’ houses near Boumerdes in north for belonging to terrorist groups. Army 15 Feb said it had killed five “terrorists” in Bouira, 125km from Algiers. Army found two significant arms caches 24 Feb in Adrar governorate in south, near border with Mali and Niger. Govt 28 Feb said army same day “neutralised” nine suspected Islamist militants in Kabylie region in north, seizing weapons and ammunition. Islamic State claimed 26 Feb suicide bombing at police station in Constantine in north, two officers injured. Egypt PM Sherif Ismail 14 Feb announced he had changed heads of nine ministries including investment and international cooperation (now merged), supply and international trade, legal and parliamentary affairs, planning, and agriculture. Govt 9 Feb shut down prominent NGO Nadeem Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture for allegedly violating NGO law and its licence; centre filed lawsuit. In central Sinai, army 6 Feb killed fourteen suspected militants of Islamic State (IS)-affiliate Sinai Province (SP) and arrested ten others. IS reportedly claimed responsibility for firing rockets from Sinai into Israel 8 Feb; Israel’s missile defence system intercepted three and at least one landed in open area, causing no damage. Two other rockets fired from Egypt into southern Israel 20 Feb, no casualties reported. Israel 14 Feb said it had withdrawn its ambassador to Egypt several weeks previously out of safety concerns. IS (apparently central command rather than SP) 19 Feb released video vowing to target Coptic Christians. Security officials said suspected IS militants 22 Feb killed two Christians in N Sinai. Suspected Islamist militants 23 Feb gunned down Coptic Christian inside his home in al-Arish. Govt 26 Feb said it rehoused in four governorates 118 Coptic families who fled N Sinai after spate of killings there. Parliament 27 Feb

120 stripped MP and Reform and Development Party chair Mohamed Anwar Sadat of parliamentary membership following investigations into accusations that he leaked confidential documents and forged MPs’ signatures. Pro-regime politicians 4 Feb initiated hostile takeover of second largest party in parliament Free Egyptians Party; party leader Essam Khalil unilaterally dissolved board of trustees, ousting party’s founder, telecom mogul Naguib Sawiris and expelling dozens of party members. Libya Algeria’s diplomatic initiative, launched mid-Jan to find common ground with Tunisia and Egypt on Libyan crisis, continued after FMs of three countries met in Tunis 19 Feb. Egypt was supposed to host meeting between UN-backed Tripoli-based PM Faez Serraj and east-based strongman Gen Khalifa Haftar mid-Feb, but instead Haftar and Serraj met separately with Gen Mahmoud Hegazy, Egyptian army chief of staff and Cairo’s point man on Libya. Serraj and Italian PM Paolo Gentiloni 2 Feb signed MoU aimed at stemming flow of migrants to Europe; Italy offered to train and equip security forces and coast guard, build migrant holding centres and help put in place technology to secure Libya’s southern border. Anti- Serraj factions in Tripoli said Serraj did not have authority to sign MoU and appealed against it in court. Military factions tied to Serraj’s rival Tripoli-based PM Khalifa Ghwel 9 Feb said they had created Libyan National Guard, umbrella force that explicitly challenges UN-backed Presidential Guard. Serraj-led Presidency Council 12 Feb declared Libyan National Guard illegal, but latter continued to patrol in Tripoli. Rival armed groups clashed in Tripoli 23-24 Feb after one accused other of kidnapping four members, nine people injured in eastern Abu Slim district; Govt of National Accord-brokered ceasefire went into force 25 Feb. Unidentified gunmen 20 Feb opened fire on convoy of Serraj and two allied high-level politicians in Tripoli, no casualty. Security chief of Benghazi in east Salah al-Hewidi, who refused to leave his post after being sacked, reportedly wounded in car bomb attack in Benghazi 22 Feb. Car bomb targeting military convoy 26 Feb exploded in Benghazi’s Al-Hawari district, reportedly killing two. Authorities in east 21 Feb temporarily froze their own 16 Feb directive barring women under 60 from travelling abroad without male guardian, 23 Feb imposed travel restrictions on all citizens under 45. UNICEF 28 Feb reported that women and children migrants trying to reach Europe had been abused and arbitrarily detained including in Libya. Morocco Hundreds of migrants 17 Feb crossed border from Morocco into Ceuta, Spain’s North African enclave, after Moroccan govt said it would no longer control migration into enclave because of Dec 2016 European Court of Justice ruling on Morocco-EU trade agreement that said deal did not include Western Sahara. Interior ministry 9 Feb filed lawsuit against Independent Party (PI) Sec Gen Hamid Chabat following his accusations that “deep state” murdered two politicians. Tunisia As part of limited cabinet reshuffle, PM Youssef Chahed 25 Feb replaced Civil Service Minister Abid el-Briki, former UGTT labour union leader, with Khalil Ghariani, member of UTICA business association. UGTT denounced move as provocative, accused National Unity Govt of seeking to impose IMF-backed austerity measures, called for strikes. Western Sahara Morocco’s deputy FM 5 Feb said Morocco would 'never recognise' Western Sahara’s independence. Armed independence movement Polisario Front’s UN representative Ahmed Boukhari 14 Feb said Morocco must recognise Western Sahara’s independence or face sanctions or requests to leave AU, which Morocco rejoined in Jan and which recognises Saharawi people’s right to self-determination. Morocco 26 Feb unilaterally withdrew troops from Guerguerat region near Mauritania border after months-long standoff; Polisario troops remained."

Internatiobal Crisis Group (ICG), CrisisWatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, April 3, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&ut m_campaign=76c6dcf2dd- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_03&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-76c6dcf2dd- 359871089, found: "Global Overview

121 Amid global geopolitical uncertainties, fighting intensified in Libya over oil installations and in the capital Tripoli, where clashes could flare up in April, while in Yemen an assault on Hodeida city by the Saudi- led coalition and allied Yemeni forces looks imminent. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), violence spiked in Kasai Central province and uncertainty grew over talks to establish interim governing arrangements. Ethnic fighting worsened in Kenya driven partly by drought. Macedonia and Paraguay witnessed heightened political tensions, while Venezuela’s political standoff took another dangerous turn." "In Libya, the Benghazi Defence Brigade (BDB), a coalition comprising mostly fighters from Benghazi opposed to strongman General Khalifa Haftar and including members of jihadist group Ansar Sharia, took over key oil terminals at Sidra and Ras Lanuf in early March. But by mid-month General Haftar’s Libyan National Army had taken them back and pushed the BDB back to Jufra to the south west. Meanwhile, in Tripoli in the west, rival armed factions clashed in several neighbourhoods and fighting could escalate if forces from Misrata step in to confront local groups. As Crisis Group warned, fighting over oil facilities risks reducing oil exports at a time when the country is in dire need of cash flow. It also threatens to undermine efforts to knit back together the western and eastern halves of Libya around the internationally recognised Government of National Accord. Making agreements on who is in charge of securing oil fields and terminals will be a crucial first step to stabilise the frail economy. In Yemen, intense fighting continued on several fronts between the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and allied Yemeni forces on one side and Huthi rebels alongside supporters of former President Saleh on the other. There is a risk of yet worse violence in April as an offensive by the Saudi-led coalition on the Red Sea port city of Hodeida looks imminent. In DRC, violence involving the Kamuina Nsapu militia in Kasai Central province spiked. Militants clashed with government forces and allegedly decapitated 39 police officers caught in an ambush. Three people who went missing early March, including two UN experts investigating the violence, were found dead two weeks later. Meanwhile, after a new round of talks between the ruling majority and opposition failed to reach agreement on critical aspects of governing arrangements until national elections, the Catholic Church withdrew from its mediating role. The presidency said talks would continue, but without the religious leaders their chances of achieving a consensual way forward are still more uncertain. In Kenya, ethnic conflicts and raids by herders rose in the north where drought is heightening tensions over resources. Borana raiders attacked Samburu herders on the border between Isiolo and Samburu counties, leaving ten people dead, while Pokot bandits in Baringo county killed ten. In Laikipia county, thousands of herders continued to drive their livestock onto private ranches in search of pasture and armed herders shot dead a ranch director. Macedonia’s political crisis deepened on 1 March after President Ivanov refused to hand opposition Social Democrat party leader Zoran Zaev a mandate to form a new government, despite his majority support in parliament. Ivanov claimed that Zaev’s acceptance of demands from ethnic Albanian parties – including a new law extending the use of Albanian as a second official language – in return for their support could 'destroy' the country. Zaev accused Ivanov of pushing Macedonia into a 'constitutional and national crisis', while EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini urged the country’s political leaders not to 'turn this into an inter-ethnic confrontation that would ruin the country and probably spread further'. In Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenka’s government cracked down on protesters calling on it to scrap a controversial tax on people working less than six months a year. Hundreds of people were detained as protests continued during the month. In Latin America, violent protests broke out in Paraguay’s capital Asunción on 31 March, with protesters storming and setting fire to the parliament building, after senators voted to approve a bill amending the constitution to lift the one-term limit on the presidency. Opponents say the bill, which would allow President Cartes to run for re-election next year, would weaken democratic institutions. Tensions spiralled in Venezuela at the end of the month after the pro-government Supreme Court assumed the legislative powers of the opposition-controlled National Assembly, claiming it was in contempt of court for failing to suspend three legislators accused of electoral fraud. The opposition accused the court of attempting to impose a dictatorship, and Venezuela’s neighbours rushed to condemn the move. The Supreme Court reversed its decision on 1 April following a public request by President Maduro’s government, prompting observers to speculate about internal divisions within the regime. The episode came amid acrimonious debate within the Organization of American States over whether to invoke the

122 Inter-American Democratic Charter and suspend Venezuela’s membership. As we have repeatedly warned, given the seriousness of the political and humanitarian situation, the region – including the U.S. – needs to sustain pressure on the government to find a solution to the political standoff. Latest Updates Burundi Main opposition coalition CNARED (National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement, Restoration of the Rule of Law) late Feb elected Charles Nditije as president. UNSC 9 March considered new UNSG report that says govt’s planned constitutional review to scrap presidential two-term limit would threaten regional security; govt rejected report. East African Community (EAC) mediator former Tanzanian President Mkapa 9 March told UNSC that he could not bring together irreconcilable positions of govt and opposition. Police colonel found dead in capital Bujumbura 20 March. Security services 29 March in Bujumbura arrested several students leading strike to protest govt’s scrapping of scholarships. Unidentified gunmen 12 March attacked Kabuga village, Rusizi district in western Rwanda killing two people before allegedly crossing into Burundi; Burundian army 13 March said no armed groups seen crossing between countries. Govt 26 March accused Rwanda of wanting to 'export' genocide to Burundi. Cameroon Boko Haram (BH) slightly increased operations in Far North and tensions between govt and Anglophone minority remained high. Dozens of BH fighters 1 March reportedly entered Waza national park, Logone-et-Chari department with heavy weapons. BH 9 March attacked Goulouzouvini near Waza killing one person. Vigilantes 11 March repelled BH at Zamga, Mayo Moskota area, killing six, one vigilante killed. In Fotokol area in Far North BH 17 March attacked military at Soueram, three BH killed; vigilantes same day repelled BH at Sanda-Wadjiri, killing two; five BH suicide bombers 5-19 March at Boudoua, Magdemé and Kolofata only killed themselves or were shot before detonating explosives. Vigilante groups from Zamga and Ashigashia near Cameroon-Nigeria border 16 March launched joint operation against BH camp between Zeleved, Mayo Tsanaga department and Atagara, near Gwoza in Nigeria killing eighteen BH, one vigilante killed. In minority Anglophone regions, North West and South West, general strikes and school closures continued in protest against govt marginalisation. Trial of 25 Anglophone leaders and activists opened 23 March in Yaoundé, adjourned till April. Central African Republic Fighting between ex-Seleka factions continued in centre and east, and ex-Seleka clashed with anti- balaka militias in north. In east, Ali Darassa’s ex-Seleka faction Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) reportedly involved in killings on Ippy-Ndassima axis early March; Noureddine Adam’s ex- Seleka faction Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance (FPRC) and allied militias clashed with UPC in Bakouma 20 March. Unidentified armed assailants reportedly killed some 50 civilians in Bambari region in centre 21-24 March. Unidentified assailants reportedly launched attack in Bria in east 24 March killing three civilians. Clashes between ex-Seleka faction Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) and anti- balaka militias resumed in Kaga Bandoro in north mid-March. Anti-balaka targeted Fulani herdsmen for perceived links with ex-Seleka and for their livestock; anti-balaka 11 March killed several cattle breeders near Sibut in centre and stole cattle. Following Feb departure of armed group chiefs from Bambari in centre, UN mission (MINUSCA) early March asked remaining fighters to make city “weapons free”. President Touadéra visited Bambari 12 March with World Bank official and promised to bring back state authority, investment and justice. FPRC and Maxime Mokom’s anti-balaka group mid-month joined national committee on disarmament. UNSC 13 March held informal dialogue with African Union (AU) Representative in CAR on AU-led mediation initiative. Touadéra 16 March briefed UNSC on security situation, called for strong political support and resources to maintain robust peacekeeping mission. Chad Violent incidents between Kamuina Nsapu militia and govt forces intensified in Kasai Central province in central DRC while withdrawal of Catholic Church (CENCO) from mediating negotiations between ruling majority and opposition over political arrangements until elections increased uncertainty. Main opposition coalition Rassemblement 3 March chose Felix Tshisekedi, son of former coalition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, as new leader, making him their candidate for PM position according to terms of Dec 2016 agreement between ruling majority and opposition. EU 7 March threatened to place sanctions on political or military leaders who block agreement’s implementation or commit human rights violations. In CENCO-

123 mediated talks 16-27 March ruling majority and opposition failed to agree on selection procedure for next PM, on who will hold presidency of Dec agreement’s follow-up body, and implementation timeline. CENCO 27 March relinquished mediating role citing parties’ reluctance to compromise; presidency next day said talks would continue. Police 28 March fired shots and tear gas to break up protests in Kinshasa, while tensions also rose in several other cities. Kamuina Nsapu militants 10 March vandalised Catholic school and convent in Kananga. Militants fought govt forces 11 March in Mwene-Ditu town, Lomami province, two soldiers and eighteen militants killed. Six people, including two UN experts, disappeared 12 March near Tshimbulu town; bodies of three including two UN experts found 27 March. Parliamentary delegation including interior and security minister visited area 12-17 March and met family of late traditional ruler known as Kamuina Nsapu to defuse tensions, 17 March govt announced concessions including measures relating to burial of Kamuina Nsapu, detainees and procedure to select new chief. Army 18 March arrested seven soldiers allegedly linked to videos posted online in Feb reportedly showing govt forces violently repressing Kamuina Nsapu fighters. Govt 19 March said 60 militants had surrendered in Kananga. Kamuina Nsapu 24 March ambushed police convoy between Tshikapa and Kananga and allegedly decapitated 39 officers. In N Kivu province, violence hindered voter registration as armed groups attacked registration centres in Nyamilima, Birundele and Nyanzale villages, reportedly killing three police. Ugandan army 9 March said it arrested 40 members of Congolese rebel group M23 as they crossed from DRC into Uganda. In Kinshasa, after two-week standoff, security forces 3 March arrested MP Ne Mwando Nsemi, leader of Bundu Dia Kongo politico-religious movement. UNSG Guterres 10 March asked UNSC to increase MONUSCO police by 320 to protect civilians in cities vulnerable to electoral violence. UNSC 31 March extended MONUSCO’s mandate for additional year but reduced military and police authorised to deploy from 22,016 to 18,316. Republic of Congo Security forces 17 March clashed with suspected Ninja militants in operation near Renéville village, Pool region, killing fifteen. Govt 18 March claimed group planned to carry out attacks along railway between capital Brazzaville and Pool. Eritrea Ethiopian govt 1 March said security forces had prevented twenty members of Eritrea-based rebel Benishangul Gumuz People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) from attacking Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 28 Feb; reportedly killed thirteen BPLM. Ethiopian govt 2 March accused Eritrea of training, arming and directing BPLM rebels, Asmara denied involvement. Following early March visit to Eritrea by Egyptian govt delegation, FM 19 March met Egyptian counterpart in Cairo, agreed to cooperate in counter-piracy operations in Red Sea. Ethiopia Govt 1 March said security forces had prevented twenty members of Eritrea-based rebel Benishangul Gumuz People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) from attacking Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 28 Feb; reportedly killed thirteen BPLM, said seven escaped to Sudan where they were arrested and handed over to Ethiopia. Govt 2 March accused Eritrea of supporting BPLM rebels, Asmara denied involvement. Four ethnic Oromo parties 19 March demanded involvement in resolving dispute over city administration and compensation for displacement of Oromos from over last 25 years. Court 28 March sentenced sixteen members of outlawed Oromo Liberation Front to four to thirteen years in prison for trying to create separate state in Oromia region. Parliament 30 March extended state of emergency begun in Oct for four months. Gunmen from S Sudan 12-13 March reportedly killed 28 people and abducted 43 children in Gambella region in west. KenyaMARCH 2017 Ethnic conflicts and raids by herders spiked in north. Borana raiders 20 March attacked Samburu herders at Kom area on border between Isiolo and Samburu counties, ten people killed. Fighting in Baringo county continued: after three Pokot women killed 16 March, Pokot bandits same day attacked Illchamus community in Makutani area, ten people killed, govt deployed police and army. Police 25 March shot dead four armed Pokot who tried to block burial of ten killed in bandit attacks. As drought forces thousands of herders into private ranches in Laikipia county in search of pasture, armed herders 5 March killed ranch director; army deployed to improve security. Security forces 27 March shot dead about 100 cattle in

124 efforts to drive herders out of Laikipia area, Pokot warriors 29 March burnt down safari lodge in neighbouring ranch and shot at owners. Somalia Federal parliament approved Hassan Ali Kheyre, former oil company director, as new PM 1 March. Al-Shabaab continued to attack Somali and AU mission (AMISOM) troops and civilians in capital Mogadishu and rural areas. In Mogadishu, suspected Al-Shabaab 9 March assassinated local official; Al-Shabaab claimed 13 March car bombing outside hotel that killed at least thirteen and attacked defence ministry 21 March, injuring at least two civilians. Unclaimed car bombing 24 March killed at least one. National Intelligence and Security Agency forces 16 March killed senior Al-Shabaab commander. Elsewhere, militants 4 March claimed bombing of AMISOM convoy that killed at least three soldiers near Burhakaba town in south. Suspected Al-Shabaab launched grenade attack outside military courthouse in Bosaso, Puntland 5 March, injuring five civilians; 8 March set off radio controlled bomb in Galkayo, region that killed MP. Al-Shabaab attacked AMISOM base in Gedo region 9 March, claimed to have killed several Ethiopian soldiers; killed three soldiers 23 March in raid on military barracks in Barawe port city in south. Suspected Al-Shabaab killed Red Cross worker in Bardhere town, Gedo region 21 March. Group suffered setbacks: Kenyan and Somali troops 2 March overran Al-Shabaab base in Afmadow, Lower Juba, allegedly killing 57 militants. Senior Al-Shabaab commander Hussein Salad Mukhtar 7 March surrendered in Baidoa, Bay region. Kenyan forces 26 March launched assault on Al-Shabaab bases in Badhadhe district in south, reportedly killing 31 militants. In Puntland, soldiers temporarily took control of federal parliament late Feb and seized checkpoint in Garowe 8 March, protesting unpaid wages and poor working conditions. Pirates 14 March seized tanker off coast in first hijacking of large vessel in region since 2012; released vessel 16 March. UN and aid agencies called for global response in face of looming famine across Somalia. Somaliland Govt 19 March granted UAE permission to build naval base in Berbera town. South Sudan President Kiir advanced National Dialogue process, umbrella for local negotiations; 10 March pardoned former governor and deputy arrested June 2016. Govt 3 March increased price of visa for foreign workers including aid workers from $100 to $10,000; some donors suspended funding for govt until it reverses decision; govt halted move and formed review committee. Former army deputy chief of staff Lt. Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who resigned in Feb, 6 March formed new rebel group, National Salvation Front/Army, and was joined by some members of existing rebel groups including former VP Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO). SPLA-IO kidnapped two foreign oil workers 8 March and another 18 March in former Upper Nile state in attempt to force company to leave; all three released 30 March in Khartoum but SPLA-IO 31 March said it would try to stop oil production. Unidentified attackers killed six aid workers north of Juba 26 March. Gunmen from S Sudan 12-13 March reportedly killed 28 people and abducted 43 children in Gambella region in western Ethiopia. Sudan As goodwill gesture rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) 4 March released to govt 130 prisoners from S Kordofan; release mediated by Ugandan and S Sudan govt officials. Govt praised move, President Bashir 7 March pardoned 259 members of Darfuri rebel group Justice and Equality Movement and commuted 44 death sentences. SPLM-N 18 March announced resignation of Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, who cited his disagreements with lead negotiator and Chairman Yassir Arman over group’s position on autonomy for S Kordofan in post-conflict settlement. Bashir 1 March said first VP Bakri Hasan Saleh would become PM in new govt expected in April, first PM since 1989. Uganda Unidentified assailants 17 March shot dead Assistant Inspector General of Police and two police guards in . President Museveni helped mediate Sudanese rebels’ release of 130 prisoners (see Sudan). Army 9 March said it arrested 40 members of Congolese rebel group M23 who escaped military camps in Uganda in Feb as they crossed back from DRC into Uganda with firearms. Govt and UNHCR 23 March appealed for international support for over 800,000 S Sudanese refugees in Uganda. U.S. army 24 March said its operations supporting Ugandan pursuit of Lord’s Resistance Army rebels in CAR and DRC are “coming to an end”. Angola

125 Separatist rebel faction Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) early March said it had attacked govt forces (FAA) 28 Feb at Munenga killing eight FAA, and on 1 March at Chinganga killing two FAA. Luanda court sentenced eight out of 35 accused members of opposition party National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to between four and ten years in prison for plotting coup against President dos Santos. Lesotho Parliament 1 March passed vote of no confidence in govt of PM Mosisili, prompting King Letsie III to dissolve parliament 7 March and call legislative elections. Voter registration closed 19 March for 3 June vote. Mozambique Switzerland 1 March announced it would co-chair contact group also comprising U.S. (co-chair), Botswana, China, Norway, UK and EU, to support new phase of talks between govt and armed opposition Renamo and provide two specialists to advise parties. Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama 3 March extended ceasefire for two months. Talks resumed 6 March.

South Africa President Zuma 31 March replaced five cabinet ministers and nine deputy ministers; Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and other high-ranking members of ruling African National Congress criticised move, particularly sacking of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Opposition parties same day requested parliament speaker to hold “no confidence” vote on Zuma. Zimbabwe Supporters of opposition coalition National Electoral Reform Agenda (NERA) 22 March protested in Harare accusing Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) of bias, calling for its dissolution and creation of independent tripartite election body run by AU, UN and Southern African Development Community (SADC). NERA 30 March reaffirmed call for ZEC’s disbandment. Rival factions of ruling ZANU-PF party 5 March clashed in Bulawayo ahead of provincial coordinating committee meeting. Two senior ZANU-PF women’s league members accused of corruption, fanning factionalism and undermining First Lady Grace Mugabe 30 March. Opposition and NGOs accused ZANU-PF members, traditional leaders and war veterans of violence and intimidation during month in Mwenezi East ahead of 8 April by-election. Burkina Faso Insecurity continued to worsen in Sahel region in north: in , teachers 1 March left schools in Diguel to demand better security; unidentified assailants attacked school in Kourfayel 3 March, teacher and one other killed; attackers 14 March burned down school in Baraboulé. Armed men 3-4 March threatened schools in neighbouring in Centre-North region. Sahel region governor 6 March banned vehicle traffic along border with Mali from 5pm to 6am daily for security reasons. Military 23 March killed Harouna Dicko, member of jihadist group Ansarul Islam, and arrested eighteen others in Petega, Soum province. At ruling party Movement of People for Progress (MPP) congress 11-12 March, assembly speaker Salif Diallo elected party president. Army 24 March said emir of jihadist group al-Murabitun Malian Ould Nouiny, known as El Hassan, was behind Jan 2016 Ouagadougou terror attacks. Côte d’Ivoire MARCH 2017 Murder of student 7 March in Bouaké in centre prompted protests against insecurity next day. Former First Lady Simone Gbagbo acquitted in trial for crimes against humanity 28 March. Gambia Govt 10 March said it would investigate finances of ex-President Jammeh including his personal use of charity bank account. Trial of former intelligence agents allegedly involved in beating to death opposition activist Solo Sandeng in April 2016 adjourned 20 March for re-examination of body. Govt 23 March said it would set up Truth and Reconciliation Commission within six months to look into crimes committed under Jammeh. Seven parties of ruling coalition decided early March to run separately in 6 April parliamentary elections; campaigning started 15 March. Govt end-March requested extradition of former interior minister, Ousman Sonko, from Switzerland. During President Barrow’s visit to Paris mid-March, France agreed to train security forces. Guinea

126 Court decision against opposition member sparked protest in Guéckédou in south 14 March; during protest police reportedly killed two by-standers. Senegal 12 March extradited former head of presidential guard Abubakar “Toumba” Diakite to Guinea to face trial for Sept 2009 stadium massacre that left over 150 dead; court 14 March indicted him. Guinea-Bissau Supreme Court 3 March approved Code of Conduct bill, signed into law by President Sirleaf in 2014, which could bar some candidates from contesting presidential election in Oct as it stipulates govt officials must resign at least two years before vote to be eligible candidates. Mali Partial establishment of interim authorities in north during month – key provision of June 2015 peace agreement – did little to decrease tensions as attacks on security forces continued in north and centre. Govt 2 March established interim authorities in Ménaka and Gao regions but mandate, budget and length of terms remained unclear. Violent protests by armed groups prevented establishment of interim authorities in Taoudenni and Timbuktu regions: Arab Movement of Azawad factions from ex-rebel Coalition of Azawad Movements (MAA-CMA) and from militia in favour of national unity (MAA-Platform) 5 March jointly confirmed they had taken checkpoints from govt armed forces (FAMA) in Timbuktu city after deadly skirmishes, rejecting interim president for Taoudenni region; 10 March yielded several checkpoints to FAMA and French Barkhane forces. CMA splinter group Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA) 3 March mobilised forces around Timbuktu city to protest appointment of pro-CMA Berabish Arab as interim president of Timbuktu region. In video released 2 March leaders from jihadist groups Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitun pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and announced merger into Group to Defend Islam and Muslims. New group 10 March reportedly claimed 5 March attack on FAMA outpost in Boulkessi, Mopti region in centre, in which eleven soldiers were killed; al-Qaeda central command 18 March acknowledged group’s creation. Unidentified gunmen 29 March attacked checkpoint in Boulkessi, reportedly killing two gendarmes and one civilian. Attacks targeting FAMA, UN mission MINUSMA and Barkhane forces and banditry remained high in several regions. Unidentified attackers fired mortar shells at MINUSMA and Barkhane camp in Amachach, Kidal region 5 March, no casualties reported. Six assailants 11 March stole arms and motorbikes from police station in Djenné, Mopti region before burning it down. FAMA clashed with alleged jihadists in Ansongo, Gao region 13 March, two civilians and two FAMA killed. Unidentified assailants same day burned down two schools in Taga and Koumaga, Mopti region. Fulani herders clashed with Bambara farmers 22 March near Diabaly, Ségou region, at least eight people killed. Group to Defend Islam and Muslims said it clashed with Bambara farmers and army 25 March in Macina, Ségou region and “killed or wounded dozens”. Govt 10 March accepted proposed amendments to constitution to align it with June 2015 peace agreement; national assembly to vote on amendments before July referendum. Conference of national understanding intended to foster reconciliation opened 27 March in Bamako; CMA 28 March decided to participate, political opposition remained absent. Niger In response to rise in cross-border attacks from Mali by suspected jihadists in previous months, govt 3 March declared state of emergency in some departments in Tillabéri and Tahoua regions in west. Unidentified gunmen 6 March killed at least five gendarmes in Wanzarbe village, Tillabéri region. During visit of UNSC delegation to Niger, President Issoufou 4 March advocated SC resolution endorsing planned counter-terrorism joint task force of G5 Sahel countries. Boko Haram (BH) attacks in SE continued to fall. Trials of about 1,000 suspected BH fighters began 2 March. Diffa region governor 1 March convened meeting to address intercommunal tensions following clashes between farmers and herders late Feb. Opposition supporters 4 March protested in capital Niamey against alleged govt corruption, poor living conditions and foreign military bases in country, called for release of “political prisoners”, including people arrested in connection with Dec 2015 alleged military coup plot. Govt 24 March released several people suspected of involvement in 2015 coup plot. Parliament 17 March voted to establish parliamentary commission of inquiry into alleged involvement of Finance Minister Hassoumi Massaoudou in possible embezzlement of $320mn linked to sale of uranium in 2011; commission started hearings 27 March. Nigeria Boko Haram (BH) continued attacks in Borno state in NE despite ongoing military operations, and communal violence broke out in south west and north central. Army mid-March raided BH camps in Kala

127 Balge Local Govt Area (LGA), reported 455 hostages rescued and several insurgents killed. BH 15 March raided Magumeri, 50km NW of Maiduguri, five soldiers reportedly killed and three missing. BH attacked army post on Biu-Damboa road, 24 March, but were repelled. Three suicide bombers 3 March blew themselves up outside Maiduguri, no other casualties reported. Troops 11 March shot dead two female teenagers wearing explosive vests in Maiduguri. BH 14 March released video showing execution of three men accused of spying for military. Four female teenagers 15 March detonated explosive devices strapped to them near Mina Garage in Maiduguri killing themselves and two other people. Woman with her two children 18 March detonated explosives strapped to all three killing vigilante in Umarari village near Maiduguri. Five male suicide bombers struck displaced persons’ camp outside Maiduguri 22 March killing four people. Suspected BH raided Kalari village 25 March, killing three. BH factional leader Abubakar Shekau 17 March claimed responsibility for recent bombings in Maiduguri, vowed to create Islamic caliphate and establish Sharia law across West Africa. Suspected BH 30-31 March abducted 22 women and girls in two raids in north east. Army end-March killed BH member along Ajiri-Dikwa road. Suspected BH end-March attacked communities in Konduga LGA, reportedly kidnapping ten. In Niger Delta, then Acting President Yemi Osinbajo 2 March held talks with local leaders in Uyo, Akwa Ibom state, ordered oil companies to relocate HQs from Lagos to Niger Delta, as demanded by local groups. Communal clashes broke out in several states. Hausa and Yoruba people 8 March clashed in Ile-Ife, Osun state (SW), 46 killed and 81 injured. Suspected herdsmen 10 March attacked Mkgovur in Buruku LGA, Benue state (north central), killing ten. Unidentified gunmen 20 March stormed Zaki Biam in Ukum LGA, Benue state, killing about 30; also attacked Tse-Achia near Zaki Biam 24 March, killing three. Local authorities 20 March said clash between Fulani herdsmen and residents of Yaskira in Baruten LGA, Kwara state (north central) killed four. President Buhari 10 March returned from 50-day “medical vacation” in UK, said he would go back to UK “within some weeks” but did not identify sickness. Asia China Increased show of force and security measures in Xinjiang following Feb attacks continued. Authorities on heightened alert after Islamic State (ISIS) released propaganda video apparently featuring ethnic Uighur Chinese late Feb, threatening attacks in China. Addressing national people’s congress 10 March, President Xi urged security forces to erect “Great Wall of Steel” around Xinjiang. Xinjiang lawmakers late March passed legislation widening rules aimed at combatting religious extremism, including ban on “abnormal” beards, wearing of veil in public places, taking effect 1 April. Law Institute of state-run Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 21 March published report warning that despite recorded decline in terrorist acts with tougher security, situation in Xinjiang could worsen due to growing links with foreign terror groups. China (internal) Increased show of force and security measures in Xinjiang following Feb attacks continued. Authorities on heightened alert after Islamic State (ISIS) released propaganda video apparently featuring ethnic Uighur Chinese late Feb, threatening attacks in China. Addressing national people’s congress 10 March, President Xi urged security forces to erect “Great Wall of Steel” around Xinjiang. Xinjiang lawmakers late March passed legislation widening rules aimed at combatting religious extremism, including ban on “abnormal” beards, wearing of veil in public places, taking effect 1 April. Law Institute of state-run Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 21 March published report warning that despite recorded decline in terrorist acts with tougher security, situation in Xinjiang could worsen due to growing links with foreign terror groups. China/Japan China 23 March warned U.S bomber it was flying illegally inside its East China Sea (ECS) air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and said U.S. should respect zone; U.S. rejected Chinese position, said flight operations in region would continue. U.S. and Japan early March conducted joint military exercises in ECS. Korean Peninsula DPRK continued ballistic missile tests in violation of UNSC resolutions, with 6 March test from Dongchang-ri launch site of four ballistic missiles that landed in Sea of Japan within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone; 18 March ground test of new high-thrust missile engine; and 22 March attempt at third missile launch that reportedly failed. DPRK 21 March said it is in final stages of preparing intercontinental ballistic missile test, is seeking “pre-emptive first strike capability”; ROK and U.S. military officials 24 March

128 warned sixth nuclear test could happen “at any time”. U.S. and ROK 1 March began largest ever annual joint military exercises running to 30 April; Pyongyang said it would continue tests in response. U.S. Pacific Command 6 March began rolling out Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile and radar system to ROK’s Osan air base; UN Panel of Experts late Feb issued report criticising insufficient and inconsistent implementation of sanctions and documenting DPRK’s efforts to evade them. Unnamed U.S. officials mid-March told media Trump administration considering secondary sanctions on Chinese companies that enable DPRK’s weapons programs; Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security 17 March released study indicating China had allowed DPRK to import large quantities of mercury and lithium hydroxide in violation of sanctions. U.S. Sec State Tillerson 17 March said in Seoul that “strategic patience” policy was over and U.S. would not begin negotiations without prior denuclearisation, might make pre-emptive strike if DPRK elevated nuclear threat to unacceptable level. Visiting Beijing 28 Feb-4 March, DPRK Deputy FM reportedly discussed bilateral relations with senior Chinese officials including FM Wang Yi, first known high-level meeting since June 2016. During month Chinese FM Wang Yi and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Xiao Qiang both called on DPRK to suspend nuclear weapon and missile tests while in parallel U.S. and ROK would halt military exercises; U.S. dismissed idea. Malaysia 31 March allowed body of Kim Jong-nam, half-brother of DPRK leader who was killed in Kuala Lumpur airport in Feb, to return to Pyongyang along with three suspected DPRK agents thought to have assassinated him, in return for nine Malaysians who had been prevented from leaving DPRK during episode. Taiwan Strait MARCH 2017 China lodged complaint with Tokyo after senior Japanese official Jiro Akama visited Taipei to attend tourism promotion event, in highest-level meeting since severing of diplomatic ties; Beijing said visit contrary to Tokyo’s pledge to have only unofficial and local relations with Taipei. Anonymous U.S. officials mid-March told Reuters that U.S. is planning significant new arms package for Taiwan possibly including advanced rocket systems and anti-ship missiles. Afghanistan Ahead of start of annual spring offensive, Taliban continued to carry out high profile attacks at greater frequency compared with same period in 2016. Taliban 1 March attacked two police districts in Kabul, one involving suicide vehicle bomb killing 23 people and injuring over 100; same day attacked National Directorate of Security killing one official and injuring eighteen. Gunmen 8 March stormed Kabul’s Mohammad Daud Khan military hospital in heavily guarded diplomatic enclave Wazir Akbar Khan, killing at least 50 and injuring over 100; Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) claimed attack but authorities questioned group’s capacity to carry out operation, suspect involvement of Haqqani network. Unclaimed explosion 13 March hit van carrying govt employees killing at least one. In Zabul province, Taliban insider attack 11 March left eight policemen dead. Suicide bomber 19 March wounded four police in Nesh district, Kandahar province; Afghan soldier opened fire on U.S. troops same day at Camp Shorab air base, Helmand province, wounding three. Taliban 23 March captured strategically important town of Sangin, Helmand province. Defence ministry claimed security forces killed more than 100 insurgents in operations 3-4 and 10-11 March. U.S. reported it killed al-Qaeda militant Qari Yasin, blamed for two high-profile attacks in Pakistan in 2008 and 2009, in 19 March airstrike in Paktika province. Officials 29 March said govt plans to double number of special forces, currently 17,000. Relations with Pakistan remained tense following Islamabad’s accusations that Afghanistan harboured terrorists responsible for string of deadly attacks in Feb; Afghanistan 11 March complained to UNSC about Pakistani territorial violations and cross-border artillery shelling. UK 15 March hosted bilateral talks that reportedly led to agreement on mechanism for cooperation against terrorism. Pakistani PM Sharif 20 March ordered immediate reopening of Torkham and Chamman border crossings, closed since mid Feb, on humanitarian grounds. Tensions within Jamiat-i Islami party escalated further as Balkh Governor Atta Mohammad Noor continued negotiations with President Ghani over joining national govt; Noor 13 March announced end of his political support for Chief Executive Abdullah, accusing him of failing responsibilities of office. Bangladesh Month saw several attacks targeting security forces: suicide bomber detonated bomb at Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) barrack in Dhaka during Friday prayers 17 March. Police shot dead suspected militant attempting to cross security checkpoint on explosive-laden motorcycle in Dhaka 18 March. Man

129 detonated bomb at police checkpoint near Dhaka airport 24 March in attack claimed by Islamic State (ISIS). Security forces 24 March began raid of militant hideout in Sylhet district, NE; six people killed including two police and dozens wounded in two bombs near hideout 25 March; another senior army officer later died of wounds; security forces 27 March killed four suspected militants in Sylhet raid, ending four-day standoff; up to eight people killed 30 March when suspected militants blew themselves up ending standoff with police in Nasirpur. Sufi spiritual leader and his attendant stabbed and shot dead at shrine in Dinajpur district 14 March. Crackdown continued against Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and offshoot authorities referred to as “neo-JMB”, allegedly responsible for July 2016 Dhaka café attack. Counter- terrorism officials 1 March claimed to have arrested local “neo-JMB” commander who allegedly led syndicate that supplied grenades and arms used in attack; 2 March arrested spiritual leader believed to have inspired attack. Home ministry 5 March banned al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar-ul-Islam, allegedly responsible for murders of several secular bloggers. Ruling Awami League spokesperson 23 Feb claimed opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had “turned into a terrorist organisation”, referring to late Jan Canadian court ruling that it was reasonable for immigration officer to define BNP as terrorist organisation in rejecting asylum request of BNP-affiliated Bangladeshi national; basis for decision was party’s use of hartals (strikes) that frequently resulted in violence. Supreme Court 12 March cleared way for lower court to continue trial of 2011 corruption case against BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia, upholding high court order that rejected her petition for stay on proceedings. India (non-Kashmir) Four Maoists reported killed in clash with police in Bihar 8 March. Eleven police reported killed in suspected Maoist ambush on patrol in Sukma forest, Chhattisgarh state 11 March. Home minister warned of “heavy retaliation”. Two suspected Maoists killed by police in S Chhattisgarh 16 March; eight suspected Maoists reported killed and two police injured in clash in Dantewada district, Bastar region 18 March. Three suspected Maoists reported killed in intra-Maoist gunfight in Jharkhand 24 March. Kashmir Clashes and firing across Line of Control (LoC) continued, both sides accusing other of violating ceasefire. One Indian soldier killed 10 March; Pakistani army 18 March reported Indian fire killed one civilian and injured two children in Kotli district. In Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, security operations against alleged insurgents continued to spark protests, including gunfight in Tral town, Pulwama district 5 March in which two suspected insurgents and one policeman were killed. In Padgampora village, Pulwama district, Indian security forces 9 March killed two suspected militants in raid; allegedly used live ammunition during clashes with ensuing protests, killing one boy and injuring three. Police reported three Lashkar-e- Tayyaba (LeT) militants killed in 15 March Kupwara district security operation, one boy injured and one girl killed by stray bullets; subsequent clashes between security forces and protesters left one boy dead, protesters clashed with police in Srinagar next day. Police 29 March killed suspected militant in Budgam district; three civilians died in subsequent clashes with police. Militants 3 March threw grenade at police in Pulwama district, killing one civilian and injuring policeman. Separatist leaders Syed Ali Gilani and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, both from All Parties Hurriyat Conference political alliance, and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front leader Muhammad Yasin Malik, urged Kashmiris to boycott early April Indian by-elections in central and S Kashmir and observe shutdown during polling. Police 16 March arrested the three leaders, allegedly to prevent them from holding joint press conference in Srinagar; arrests prompted anti-India protest at press conference venue; Kashmir Editor’s Guild 19 March claimed police assaulted journalists during protest. Indian and Pakistani military leaders spoke on phone 9 March: Pakistani military said it had “strongly rejected Indian concerns over the movement of terrorists along the LoC”, “asked India to look inward”. India and Pakistan resumed talks under 1960 Indus Water Treaty in Lahore 20-21 March, first such meeting since May 2015. Nepal Preparations for 14 May local elections continued despite clashes and deaths in Tarai plains over unaddressed constitutional demands, boycott threats from disgruntled Madhesi parties and Election Commission concerns over lack of consensus between parties. Opposition Communist Party of Nepal (UML) launched electoral campaign across most of southern belt; four died and several injured in police firing after Madhesi coalition obstructed UML’s 6 March Saptari district campaign event. Several protestors shot above waist, reigniting criticism of govt response to 2015 Tarai constitutional protests. Madhesi coalition

130 enforced strikes across several Tarai districts and 15 March withdrew support from govt. PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal 15 March proposed amending constitution to address most Madhesi demands but deferring decision on contentious provincial boundaries. Monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) — opposed to proposed constitutional amendments — joined govt 9 March, further aggravating Madhesi coalition. RPP renewed calls for restoration of Hinduism as state religion. Govt decided to deploy 226,000 security personnel for election security; heavy security presence likely in eight Tarai districts categorised as “sensitive” due to potential disruptions. Foreign Ministry called on India to investigate 9 March killing of Nepali citizen in SW Kanchanpur district allegedly by Indian border security forces during dispute over construction on border. Pakistan Wave of terrorist attacks against civilians subsided, while Pakistani Taliban (TTP) struck military targets in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). TTP faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar 6 March attacked three border posts in Mohmand agency, leaving five soldiers dead; launched assault from Afghan soil against border post in Khyber agency 17 March, killing two soldiers. Security forces 22 March killed two militants, including senior TTP commander, in raid on militant hideout in Orakzai agency. U.S. drone strike 2 March killed two suspected Taliban in Sara Khwa area, Kurram agency. Car bombing outside mosque 31 March killed at least 24 people and injured scores in predominantly Shia Parachinar, Kurram agency. National Assembly 21 March passed 28th constitutional amendment renewing mandate for military courts to try civilians charged with terrorism, amid concerns over implications for rule of law and civilian authority despite govt accepting four of nine proposals by opposition Pakistan Peoples Party. Three men convicted by military courts system executed 15 March. Tensions with Afghanistan continued following Islamabad’s accusations that Kabul harboured terrorists responsible for wave of attacks in Feb. Govt reopened border crossings closed after 16 Feb Sehwan Sharif shrine bombing. UK 15 March hosted bilateral talks that reportedly led to agreement on mechanism for cooperation against terrorism. Balochistan assembly 4 March passed resolution protesting alleged racial profiling and harassment of ethnic Pashtuns in Punjab and Sindh; followed 27 Feb protest by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial assembly members against “racial policies” of Punjab govt and “victimisation” of Pashtuns in counter-terrorism crackdown. Govt 2 March approved in principle reforms for FATA including proposed merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in order to foster development in troubled region. Five FATA tribal elders 10 March filed petition against proposal, calling it illegal and unconstitutional, since it delays FATA’s incorporation into constitutional, legal and political mainstream and denies residents access to justice. Authorities 15 March commenced first national census in nineteen years. SPECIAL REPORT: Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid Sri Lanka UN human rights chief 3 March issued report on Sri Lanka’s implementation of Oct 2015 UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution 30/1, criticised slow progress on post-war reconciliation and justice; repeated call for hybrid court and argument for specialised court to deal with system crimes, supported by international practitioners. President Sirisena 4 March said he had “backbone” to reject UN requests to invite foreign judges for investigation. HRC session 22-24 March passed resolution giving govt additional two years to fulfil its commitments; imposed no additional requirements that rights groups had called for. Tamil groups particularly angry, many calling for referral to International Criminal Court. Pro- reform civil society groups began campaigning in support of new constitution despite lack of agreement among negotiators. Ex-President Rajapaksa 13 March denounced govt plans for new constitution as “traitorous” and “anti-Sinhala”; FM 15 March criticised Rajapaksa’s text as deliberately inaccurate, defended govt’s plans for transitional justice and constitutional and legal reforms as in national interest, not product of international pressure. Police 20 March reported to court testimony from former army commander alleging then-Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa oversaw military death squad responsible for 2009 murder of editor Lasantha Wickrematunge and other attacks on journalists; Rajapaksa denies charges. Protests on land and disappearances continued throughout Tamil-majority north, adding to pressure on Tamil National Alliance (TNA) leadership. In Kepapilavu division, families remain camped outside army base built on their land, despite return of some 40 acres 4 March following direct appeal to president by TNA leader Sampanthan. TNA announced govt promise more land would be released over next few months. Following country visit by delegation, IMF 7 March reported “mixed” macroeconomic

131 performance, with uptick in inflation and worrying fall in international currency reserves, uneven progress on implementing reforms; visit came amid severe drought causing rising food prices. Indonesia Ahead of second round of Jakarta gubernatorial election 19 April, blasphemy trial of incumbent candidate Chinese-descent Christian Basuki Tjahaka Purnama “Ahok” continued. Saudi Arabian King Salman met Ahok to show support during visit early March, did not meet his hard-line Islamic detractors. Amid rising tensions, President Widodo in 24 March speech urged tolerance. Thousands joined anti-Ahok protest in Jakarta 31 March; earlier in day, police arrested several hard-line protest leaders for suspected treason. Anti-terror police Densus 88 early March arrested nine men in Central Sulawesi province suspected of being members of new terrorist group with links to Islamic State (ISIS) and reportedly seized bomb-making material; 23 March killed one suspected terrorist and arrested three in Banten province, W Java. Group of seven Pacific island states 2 March requested UN Human Rights Council investigate alleged human rights abuses in Papua and West Papua provinces; govt rejected allegations. Myanmar Amid continued focus on crisis in Rakhine state, Kofi Annan-led Rakhine Commission 16 March released interim report with 29 recommendations covering issues from Rohingya citizenship, freedom of movement and birth registration to humanitarian and media access, and improving bilateral relations with Bangladesh. Govt released statement fully endorsing Commission’s recommendations and undertaking to quickly implement most; stated that a few would first require improvements in situation on ground. UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 24 March adopted resolution calling for international panel of experts to conduct “fact-finding mission” to Myanmar; falls short of international Commission of Inquiry many called for; govt said HRC move “not acceptable”. UNSC discussed Rakhine state crisis 17 March, Russia and China blocked press statement. Situation in N Rakhine remains largely unchanged: no further significant attacks by al-Yaqin, but continued killings of Rohingya with links to govt that may be work of group. Military operations largely over, far fewer reported abuses. A couple of thousand internally displaced persons returned to homes, estimated 20,000 remain in Maungdaw, 74,550 confirmed to have fled to Bangladesh. Domestic “investigation commission” looking into allegations of rights abuses visited Bangladesh. Al-Yaqin 28 March issued press release rebranding itself “Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army”, reaffirming no links to terrorist groups, assuring safety of civilians from all communities; also issued twenty-point demands, mostly relating to Rohingya civil and political rights. Ethnic peace process remained stalled: next “Panglong-21” peace process postponed until at least May; date, which armed groups will attend and what will be discussed unclear. Govt negotiators met with negotiating team of United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), umbrella group of many non-signatory groups) in Naypyitaw 1 March, reached ad referendum agreement in principle on nine points that UNFC has said are prerequisite for signing National Ceasefire Agreement; however, no agreement among UNFC leaders to endorse agreement. Fighting escalated 6 March when Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army attacked capital of Kokang Self- Administered Zone Laukkai, abducted over 250 workers, engaged in dozens of battles with military. Chinese authorities said at least 20,000 had arrived after 6 March attack. Philippines Following informal Norwegian-mediated talks in the Netherlands, govt and Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) 11 March agreed to restore ceasefires and resume peace talks suspended early Feb. President Duterte 19 March affirmed conditions for talks, set for 2-6 April; NPA must agree to bilateral ceasefire, stop demanding army leave areas they claim, release police and military hostages and stop collecting “revolutionary taxes”. Violence continued, including four police and one soldier killed by NPA 8 March in Davao del Sur; eight rebels and two soldiers reported killed in 30 March clash in Quezon province. NDF 31 March said they would not restore unilateral ceasefire by end-month as previously planned, following govt refusal to reciprocate. Expanded Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which includes Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) representatives and other Mindanao stakeholders, 6 March held first plenary session in Cotabato to revise Bangsamoro Basic Law, make it more inclusive. Govt and MILF 21 March signed Terms of Reference for implementing panels for Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and extended mandate for International Monitoring Team. Military reported 21 Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) killed in clashes with security forces in Maguindanao 13-16 March, said BIFF were sheltering foreign terrorists; BIFF

132 denied claims. Clashes between military and Abu Sayyaf group continued; military 1 March reportedly killed five believed responsible for late Feb killing of German hostage. Duterte 9 March urged Muslim area mayors to help fight Abu Sayyaf, threatened to impose martial law if they did not. Police 21 March said Islamic State (ISIS)-linked Maute Group were present in capital region Metro Manila, claimed interception of IED intended for terrorist attack in Quezon City; army said it had not detected presence of group in capital. South China Sea Despite relative lull in incidents and statements, competition over disputed features and water in SCS continued, as did Chinese construction on features it controls. In disputed Paracel islands, satellite images from 6 March indicated China clearing land, possibly preparing for harbour on North Island. Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 27 March reported satellite imagery showing China has completed over twenty structures apparently designed to house long-range surface-to-air missiles, plus radar antennae, on three islands in Spratly archipelago. China early March denied reported plans to build monitoring station on disputed Scarborough Shoal; Philippine President Duterte 23 March said Beijing had given “word of honour” it would not build there. Chinese Premier Li 23 March said China’s new facilities and defensive equipment don’t constitute militarisation. China and ASEAN member states reportedly completed draft framework for Code of Conduct for SCS. Philippine President Duterte 6 March reportedly rejected U.S. plans to build facilities at Bautista air base, previously used to launch U.S.-Philippines joint exercises; later said he agreed to allow Chinese surveying vessels into area around Benham Rise, in reversal of statement by defence minister; 23 March accused U.S. of taking provocative stance on SCS. Japan 22 March launched second large helicopter carrier Kaga, further extending its naval force projection capacity; other carrier Izumo reportedly scheduled to patrol through SCS before joining joint exercise with U.S. and Indian ships in July. U.S. observers expressed concern over China’s draft new Maritime Traffic Safety Law that would tighten control over territorial waters. Thailand UN Human Rights Committee monitoring compliance with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Geneva 14 March questioned Thai delegation on dictatorial powers of interim constitution’s Article 44 and lèse-majesté law; expressed concern over issues including freedoms of expression and assembly. Constitution Drafting Committee, now charged with drafting organic laws, early March suggested election may not be held until Sept/Oct 2018. Govt’s siege of Buddhist temple Wat Dhammakaya ended 11 March after 23 days, without arrest of temple’s former abbot Dhammachayo on charges of money laundering. Police and soldiers 18 March raided house north of Bangkok, allegedly belonging to Red Shirt activist Wutthiphong “Kotee” Kotchammakhun, in exile since 2014 coup, discovered cache of weapons; nine Red Shirts arrested in central and NE regions on suspicion of plotting terrorism, with many seeing arrests as politically motivated. Soldier 17 March shot dead Lahu activist Chaiyapoom Pasae near checkpoint in Chiang Mai province (north), prompting demands for investigation. Army says killing was in self-defence. Secretary of Thai dialogue team 16 March gave briefing on late Feb agreement with MARA Patani (umbrella group of five Malay-Muslim separatist groups in exile) to establish five safety zones, or ceasefire areas, in three southernmost provinces before year-end: said agreement would allow up three killings in each district per month before sanctions would be introduced; assessment team including state officials, MARA Patani representatives and local residents will be formed for each safety zone and help determine who is responsible for any violence; govt expects agreement on which five districts will be designated safety zones by mid-April. Main insurgent group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) not participating in dialogue. Soon after announcement of agreement, series of attacks took place killing eleven people, including Buddhist couple killed in Thepa district, Songkhla province, 1 March; Buddhist deputy village headman and three of his family killed by gunmen 2 March in Reusoh district, Narathiwat. Govt 16 March extended the Emergency Decree in southernmost provinces for 45th consecutive time since 2005. Europe & Central Asia Bosnia And Herzegovina International Court of Justice 9 March rejected Feb request for review of its 2007 ruling which cleared Serbia of direct responsibility for 1995 Srebrenica genocide, saying request had not come from Bosnian state. Bosnian Serb party National Democratic Movement 13 March said it would file criminal complaint against Bosniak member of presidency and legal counsel who submitted request to ICJ. Appeal

133 hearing opened 20 March for six Bosnian Croat wartime leaders convicted by Hague Tribunal in 2013 of committing war crimes in joint criminal enterprise led by Croatian wartime leadership, link refuted by Croatia. Kosovo President Thaci 7 March submitted bill to parliament speaker proposing changes to Law on Kosovo Security Force (KSF) that would broaden its powers and responsibilities without need for approval from Kosovo Serb MPs. Kosovo Serb MPs late March ended six-month boycott of parliament, citing in part need to oppose transformation of KSF. NATO Sec Gen Stoltenberg expressed “serious concern” about move to transform KSF into an army without constitutional changes or obtaining consent from all communities in Kosovo. Reopening of newly-renovated bridge across Ibar river in Mitrovica delayed until May, reportedly due to ethnic tensions. France again postponed extradition hearing of former PM Ramush Haradinaj, wanted in Serbia on war crimes charges; thousands protested in Pristina 4 March calling for his release. Retrial began late March of prominent Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanović, sentenced by EULEX judges Jan 2016 to nine years’ jail for war crimes. Politician and lawyer Azem Vllasi wounded by gunman in Pristina 20 March; “People’s Eye” organisation 22 March claimed responsibility. Macedonia Political crisis deepened as President Ivanov 1 March refused to give opposition Social Democratic Union (SDSM) party leader Zoran Zaev mandate to form govt, despite Zaev’s claim to have formed majority in parliament, saying that ethnic Albanian parties’ conditions for supporting Zaev could “destroy” country. Zaev called Ivanov’s refusal to award him mandate “coup”, said Ivanov “has pushed Macedonia into a constitutional and national crisis”. EU foreign policy chief Mogherini visited Macedonia 2 March in bid to resolve crisis, reportedly urged Ivanov to give Zaev mandate; U.S. and OSCE expressed similar concerns, while Moscow voiced support for Ivanov and former ruling party Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO DPMNE). Main ethnic Albanian party DUI 4 March said it would join govt led by Zaev. Zaev 10 March presented platform in detail in attempt to allay Ivanov’s concerns, said it would “strictly abide” by terms of constitution. Former PM Gruevski continued to call for fresh election; his supporters continued daily protests. Mogherini 6 March urged political leaders not to “turn this into an inter-ethnic confrontation that would ruin the country and probably spread further”. Four masked people threw Molotov cocktail at Albanian museum in Bitola 7 March. EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn 21 March visited Skopje in effort to help resolve crisis. Parliament convened 27 March to elect new speaker; VMRO DPMNE MPs attempted to prevent vote with filibuster. Armenia As campaigning began for 2 April parliamentary elections, local NGOs alleged incidents of electoral violations, including use of state resources, officials campaigning for ruling party. Former top commander in Nagorno-Karabakh Samvel Babayan and two others arrested 22 March on suspicion of smuggling weapons; opposition claimed arrests politically motivated. 16 March death of Artur Sarkisian, NK war veteran sentenced for role in July 2016 siege of Yerevan police station and who was released after 6 March after staging hunger strike, provoked several days of protest demanding investigation. Azerbaijan Court 3 March sentenced blogger Mehman Huseynov, known for investigating corruption, to two years’ jail for libel over allegations he made that police beat him; Huseynov said verdict politically motivated. Azerbaijan quit Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) following its suspension over concerns about its treatment of civil society and govt critics. Parliament 10 March passed bill tightening rules for internet use. Georgia Breakaway republic Abkhazia held election for 35-seat de facto parliament in two rounds 12 and 26 March, in vote criticised by Tbilisi, EU and U.S. as illegal. Victors included former leader Aleksandr Ankvab; several govt figures lost seats, one seat still to be decided in repeat elections. During campaign one candidate reportedly shot and another had car set on fire; perpetrators unknown. Ahead of 9 April de facto presidential election in breakaway republic South Ossetia (SO), former SO leader Eduard Kokoity failed to receive registration, prompting hundreds of protesters to march in his support in Tskhinvali; Kokoity 30 March announced he would cease street rallies and support Anatoliy Bibilov candidacy. Russian

134 President Putin 14 March gave approval for agreement allowing some SO troops to serve with Russian armed forces. Local civil society organisations and activists protested 2 March court-ordered transfer of popular independent Rustavi-2 TV channel to new owners loyal to current govt. Crisis resolved after unprecedented urgent ruling of European Court of Human Rights next day to suspend enforcement of court order and investigate case. EU visa-liberalisation deal for Georgia entered into force 28 March. UN Human Rights Council 17 March adopted resolution on Georgia demanding immediate access to Abkhazia and SO for UN rights chief and other international and regional human rights mechanisms. UNSC 29 March discussed situation in Abkhazia and SO. During 39th round of Geneva international discussions 29 March, participants continued talks over non-use of force agreement and humanitarian problems in conflict regions; next round scheduled June. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) Number of incidents along the Line of Contact (LoC) down on previous month, though mortar strikes and use of grenade launchers continued. Azerbaijan 11 March reported one soldier dead; Armenian side 28 March reported one of its soldiers killed, another on 31 March. After weeks of increasing tensions, military on both sides appeared to relax amid Novruz Bayrami holidays in Azerbaijan and preparation for April parliamentary elections in Armenia. OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs toured region 11-28 March, while OSCE monitors 1 and 15 March conducted trips to conflict zone. NK-based military 22-25 March conducted exercises led by Armenia and de facto leadership. Armenian President Sargsyan visited Paris 8 March, while Azerbaijani FM met with his counterpart in Moscow same day: French President Hollande also called for mechanisms to investigate the incidents, which would help “prevent the incidents and punish the acts that are against peace”; Russian FM continued to propose his formula for NK peace settlement, discussed since late 2015 but opposed by both sides, involving control of certain areas in NK conflict zone being transferred from Armenian to Azerbaijani side in exchange for agreed status for rest of breakaway region. Russia/North Caucasus Low intensity armed conflict continued and several Counter Terrorist Operations introduced in Ingushetia and Dagestan. Federal Security Service (FSB) building in Ingushetia’s Malgobek district reportedly came under fire from rocket-propelled grenade 16-17 March, no casualties. In Dagestan, police 27 Feb shot dead local resident of Buinakskiy district after he opened fire on policemen who found weapons and ammunition cache; three unidentified persons 11 March opened fire on highway police patrol in Khasavyurt district, injuring one policeman. National Anti-Terror Committee reported four suspected militants with alleged links to Islamic State (ISIS) detained in Derbent 5 March. In Chechnya, eight attackers opened fire on National Guard servicemen at military checkpoint in Naursky district 24 March; six servicemen and six attackers killed, independent forensic experts claim subsequent examination of attackers’ bodies suggests they were apprehended alive and shot at point-blank range. Police conducted mass arrests throughout Chechnya following attack, which was claimed by ISIS. Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta 13 March reported over 200 people, many teenagers, released from illegal captivity in Chechnya after being detained following clashes in Dec and Jan. Several detainees suspected of having links to ISIS, majority reportedly detained for discussing events in Syria; most were members of private messaging chats or students of madrasas/other religious institutions. Novaya Gazeta also reported increase in underage youth suspected of joining insurgency and sympathising with ISIS in Chechnya. Kabardino-Balkaria court handed down jail sentences to two men 13 March for attempting to leave for Syria to join jihadist group; man detained in Ingushetia 21 March returning from fighting with ISIS in Syria; Chechen resident arrested at Turkish border 23 March trying to cross into Syria. Belarus Anti-govt protests which began in Feb over controversial tax on people working less than six months per year gained momentum, with thousands taking to streets in capital and elsewhere. President Lukashenka said tax, introduced in 2015, was needed to fight “social parasitism”; 9 March announced tax collection would be suspended until 2018, however protests continued. More than 150 people reportedly arrested 1-20 March, including opposition politicians and journalists; dozens handed jail sentences of up to fifteen days. U.S., UN and EU March called for release of those detained, expressed concern for freedom of association and assembly. Lukashenka 20 March called opposition figures “fifth column” supported by West, next day said twenty militants planning “armed provocation” had been detained. Authorities

135 reportedly detained hundreds of people during protests in Minsk 25 and 26 March, many reportedly beaten by police. Opposition leader Uladzimir Nyaklyaeu arrested in Brest (west) 24 March. Ukraine In response to rail blockade on east imposed by Ukrainian nationalist activists since late Jan, Russian-backed separatists 1 March began seizing control of enterprises in their territory. Govt 13-14 March attempted to break up blockade, prompting heavy criticism from politicians and activists; 15 March suspended transportation links with separatist-held areas, formalising blockade in order to prevent “destabilising” of situation by activists; said suspension to remain until separatists return control over enterprises and comply with Feb 2015 Minsk agreement. Russia called on Kyiv to cancel blockade to avert “humanitarian catastrophe”. As power shortages continued, Central Bank warned blockade could cut economic growth for 2017 by almost half; IMF 19 March postponed planned $1bn loan disbursement, citing need to assess impact of blockade. OSCE reported continued ceasefire violations, 24 March reported govt and separatist forces had moved closer to each other in several places along front line, increasing risk of flare-ups. President Poroshenko 30 March announced ceasefire and weapons pull-back to start 1 April. Ukraine 31 March reported top regional security officer killed in car bomb in Mariupol, SE. Reuters 24 March reported Russia deploying dozens of tanks near border with Ukraine. Amid ongoing pressure on govt to tackle corruption, Kyiv court 7 March ordered pretrial detention of tax and customs service chief Roman Nasirov pending investigation into allegations he defrauded state of $74mn. EU 16 March agreed to transfer €600mn loan to govt; 13 March extended sanctions against dozens of Russian individuals and entities. U.S. 16 March reaffirmed its condemnation of Russia’s seizure of Crimea and commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Former Russian lawmaker Denis Voronenkov, vocal govt critic who fled to Ukraine in Oct 2016, shot dead in central Kyiv 23 March; Poroshenko called killing “act of state terrorism” by Russia, Moscow denied involvement. Kyiv also said it suspected Russian/separatist involvement in fire at munitions depot in NE 23 March. Ukraine 6 March launched case against Russia at International Court of Justice over Moscow's support for separatists in E Ukraine and Crimea. Cyprus Security forces continued crackdown on Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency in SE, launching large scale operations involving 7,000 soldiers and curfews in Diyarbakır’s Lice district and Bingöl 5 March; ten security force members, at least eleven PKK militants and two civilians reported killed during month. Govt denounced “biased” UN report released 10 March condemning rights violations by security forces and use of counter-terrorism legislation to remove democratically elected officials of Democratic People’s Party (HDP)/Democratic Regions Party (DBP) from office, among other concerns. Ahead of 16 April constitutional referendum set to increase presidential powers, crackdown on alleged members of state-christened FETÖ/PDY it blames for July 2016 coup attempt continued; govt 6 March reported it had arrested 920 suspects previous week. EU-Turkey relations deteriorated further as Ankara increased anti- Western rhetoric and rowed with several EU countries, particularly Netherlands and Germany, over issues including cancellation of appearances by Turkish ministers at referendum campaign rallies in their countries. Ankara 15 March warned it may cancel EU-Turkey refugee deal, accused EU of “wasting time” on visa liberalisation; later said Turkey may hold referendum on EU accession bid. Following Turkey’s 23 Feb capture of Syrian town al-Bab from Islamic State (ISIS), FM Cavuşoğlu 9 March announced Manbij was next target for Turkish troops and rebel allies (see Syria). PM Yıldırım 29 March announced end of “successful” Euphrates Shield military operation in N Syria, said may launch follow-up operation; Turkish troops remain in Syrian areas they secured. Visiting U.S. Sec State Tillerson 30 March met with president and PM in attempt to revitalise relations. Kazakhstan Parliament 6 March approved new constitutional amendments transferring 40 presidential powers to govt and parliament. Parliament will appoint members of govt; president will remain arbiter of all branches of power, appoint governors and maintain foreign policy, national security and military. President Nazarbayev 10 March signed amendments into law, day after they were approved by Constitutional Council. Kyrgyzstan Protests continued over 26 Feb arrest of opposition Ata-Meken party leader Omurbek Tekebayev on allegations of fraud and corruption; Tekebayev’s supporters say his arrest politically motivated to

136 prevent him running in Nov presidential election. Ata-Meken said he was arrested to suppress evidence linking President Atambayev to cargo of plane which crashed outside Bishkek in Jan; Atambayev rejected allegations he was linked to plane, accused RFE/RL and Zanoza.kg independent news website of slander in reporting of Tekebayev’s arrest. Perceived intimidation of media and threat to arrest former editor of major newspaper prompted protests in support of free speech. Ata-Meken 5 March named Tekebayev its candidate for Nov election. State Committee for National Security (GKNB) 14 March reported former prosecutor-general and Ata-Meken MP Aida Salyanova suspected of illegally prolonging licence of lawyer with alleged links to son of former President Bakiyev; Salyanova rejected accusations, was ordered not to leave country pending investigation. GKNB 27 March reported it had also charged leading Ata-Meken figure Almambet Shykmamatov with corruption. Police 25 March detained former MP Sadyr Japarov upon his return to country after three years’ exile, charged with taking govt official hostage in 2013; same day arrested 68 people and fired warning shots to disperse crowd as hundreds rallied in his support. Latin America & Caribbean Colombia FARC-govt peace process implementation continued on different fronts. Senate 14 March finally approved Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), transitional justice mechanism to try those accused of committing war crimes. FARC early March handed over child fighters to Red Cross (ICRC) in Antioquia and Norte de Santander to enter special reintegration program. UN mission completed inventory of FARC weapons, registering some 14,000 weapons including 11,000 guns; by mid-month FARC had handed over at least 140 arms to UN. Govt and FARC met in Cartagena 26 March to finalise overarching implementation plan and take steps to move faster. FARC and govt also began implementing crop substitution programs by signing pre-agreements with regional authorities, community organisations and local leaders in areas including Guaviare and Caquetá. Former heads of govt of Spain and Uruguay appointed to international monitoring mechanism for peace accord. Military pressure continued on dissident FARC factions: army 10 March bombed camp belonging to First Front in rural area of Guaviare; alias “Mojoso”, leader of dissident group in Caquetá, handed himself into authorities 18 March with eight others. FARC dissident faction in Tumaco began demobilisation 27 March, however only 117 of anticipated 333 appeared. Violence against social leaders continued: two killed in Meta department 6 March, possibly by FARC deserters who left peace process; ICRC and UN Refugee Agency voiced concern over continuing violence and displacement. ELN guerrilla group continued to carry out violent attacks, fuelling doubts about its desire for peace, including burning buses of transportation company that apparently refused to honour extortion demands; reportedly killing five people in Chocó 26 March; and clashes with neo-paramilitary Gaitan Self-defence Forces (AGC or Gulf Clan) 25-26 March, also in Chocó. Several hundred people displaced by ELN-AGC clashes in west. Police 16 March killed alias “Ramiro Bigotes”, allegedly security chief for AGC leader Otoniel, in NW Córdoba. Tensions increased with Venezuela over border incursion by Venezuelan soldiers (see Venezuela). Venezuela Opposition accused pro-govt Supreme Court (TSJ) of imposing dictatorship after TSJ 29 March assumed legislative powers of opposition-controlled National Assembly (AN), raising fears of violent confrontation within Venezuela and defying calls by neighbouring countries to resolve political crisis through democratic means. TSJ’s ruling claimed AN in contempt of court for failing to suspend three MPs accused of electoral fraud; stripped deputies of immunity from prosecution. Regional powers strongly condemned move, several recalled ambassadors (Peru “definitively”) and U.S. criticised “rupture of democratic and constitutional norms” and “serious setback for democracy”. Move followed Organization of American States (OAS) Sec Gen Luis Almagro’s 14 March report calling for OAS to apply Inter-American Democratic Charter and suspend country’s membership if it fails to hold prompt elections, release political prisoners, restore autonomy of TSJ and electoral commission, and lift restrictions on AN. 14 March report said Venezuela in breach of every article of Democratic Charter, rule of law ceased to exist and humanitarian crisis on scale “unprecedented for the western hemisphere”. OAS Permanent Council had met 28 March in acrimonious session which ended without resolution; Venezuela’s attempt to block session backed by ten countries, including Bolivia and Nicaragua. After TSJ move Almagro called for emergency Council meeting 3 April. Mercosur also to meet in emergency session. But in response to 31 March declaration by Venezuelan Attorney General Luisa Ortega that “constitutional order” had broken down,

137 govt convened National Security Council and “exhorted” TSJ to correct decision. Govt continued with controversial TSJ-ordered “re-legitimisation” of political parties; so far, four important opposition parties have apparently met conditions. Tensions also increased with Colombia, which 23 March called “unacceptable” incursion of some 70 Venezuelan soldiers, reportedly combatting criminal acts near border, into Colombian territory; Venezuela blamed change in path of river, withdrew troops. Faced with shortages of bread due to lack of flour, Maduro mid-March decreed any bakery not using 90% of its flour for bread would be taken over. Reports emerged of motor fuel shortages 22 March. Maduro 24 March said he had asked UN for help normalising supply and distribution of medicines. Guatemala Amid ongoing opposition from private sector and conservatives, package of constitutional reforms including modifications to justice system and official acknowledgement of indigenous judicial systems (Article 203) stalled in Congress. Ancestral and indigenous authorities 8 March announced they would accept withdrawal of Article 203 modification to ease way for other proposed reforms. U.S. made show of support for reforms and fight against corruption in response to conservative campaign against International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and attorney general’s office, with several senior officials and politicians visiting late Feb/early March, meeting with President Morales, CICIG Commissioner Iván Velásquez and Attorney General Thelma Aldana. Deadly fire in state-controlled home for young people killing 40 girls and riot in youth detention centre killing four guards prompted outrage and drew attention to serious defects in social services’ penitentiary system. Honduras Congress late Feb approved “Strengthening and Effectiveness of Political Security” law to reform country’s penal code, launched by President Hernández in effort to give more power to security forces in fight against gang members by increasing prison sentences and changing definition of terrorism; reforms condemned as repressive by opposition and questioned by UN Human Rights Council. Member of Los Cachiros drug cartel testifying in U.S. court claimed former President Porfirio Lobo (2010-2014), Security Minister Julián Pacheco, and brother of President Hernández part of his criminal enterprise. El Salvador Increase in murders during month signalled possible reversal of 2016 trend of decreasing homicides, with 30 people reported killed in country in less than 24 hours on 15 March, most linked to gang violence according to police; included shootout between alleged MS-13 gang members and private security personnel from central market in San Salvador leaving six dead, reportedly linked to extortion payments. Judge 15 March reopened case into 1981 El Mozote massacre in which 1,000 civilians were killed, after Supreme Court in July 2016 overturned 1993 amnesty for crimes and human rights abuses committed during civil war; judge cited twenty military suspects, including former defence minister and high-ranking generals, to appear in court. Haiti New PM Jack Guy Lafontant, previously sec gen of Party of Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Haiti (MODELH-PRDH), took office 21 March after Chamber of Deputies gave vote of confidence despite resistance of some deputies from president’s PHTK (Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale) party. Senate 15 March approved resolution demanding return of Senator of Grand’Anse Guy Philippe, currently awaiting trial in U.S. after being extradited on drug trafficking charges, and all other Haitians extradited to U.S.. Annual U.S. govt narcotics control strategy report highlighted corruption and money laundering in Haiti, weakness of judicial system. Transformation of UN Stabilization Mission, in Haiti since 2004 and supposed to end 15 April, continued to prompt debate: civil society organisations 14 March released international petition calling for MINUSTAH withdrawal; UNSG Guterres 19 March proposed additional mission for period of six months, to focus on strengthening Haitian National Police and judicial system, no military personnel; UNSC to vote mid-April. Govt 18 March expressed its opposition to renewal of UN human rights expert Gustavo Gallón’s mandate, citing need for Haiti to regain its independence. UN 6 March launched $2.72bn plan to improve disaster risk management in Haiti. Paraguay Violent protests broke out in capital Asunción 31 March after senators voted to approve bill amending constitution to lift one-term limit on presidency. Protesters stormed and set fire to parliament, one shot dead during police raid on opposition party HQ, dozens including three lawmakers and a senator

138 injured. Opponents say bill, which was proposed by President Cartes and would allow him to run in 2018 elections, would weaken democratic institutions, some referring to it as 'coup'. Bill still awaits approval in chamber of deputies. Middle East & North Africa Israel/Palestine Israeli soldiers 6 March killed youth activist Basel al-Araj, in hiding from Palestinian Authority (PA) in West Bank, sparking protests against suspected cooperation between PA and Israel. PA security forces 12 March assaulted people protesting against PA’s trial of six activists arrested in 2016, including deceased al-Araj. Rate of rockets launched from Gaza into Israel continued to rise: non-Hamas factions launched five rockets 1-18 March, Israel retaliated against Hamas positions. Hamas blamed Israel for killing of senior militant 24 March in Gaza, Israel declined to comment. U.S. President Trump 10 March invited Palestinian President Abbas to White House “soon” to discuss peace process. U.S. representative for international negotiations Jason Greenblatt 13-16 March made first visit to Israel and West Bank, meeting Abbas. Abbas met Egyptian President Sisi 20 March ahead of Arab League summit 29 March and upcoming Abbas and Sisi meetings with Trump. Summit closing statement 29 March said Arab League members would “work to relaunch serious Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations”. Talks between U.S. and Israel 20- 23 March in Washington D.C. failed to produce agreement on restricting settlement building in occupied territories. UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 15 March published report accusing Israel of imposing “apartheid regime” on Palestinians; following pressure from U.S. and Israel, UNSG Guterres withdrew report, ESCWA chief 17 March resigned in protest. UN envoy 24 March told UNSC Israel had not stopped building settlements as demanded in Dec 2016 SC resolution. Following PM Netanyahu’s Feb pledge to house Jewish families evicted from illegal settlement Amona, govt 30 March approved plan to build new settlement in West Bank at Emek Shilo, 25km north of Jerusalem, first new settlement in over twenty years; UN, EU, UK, France, Germany condemned move. Lebanon Amid escalating war of words between Hizbollah and Israel, Israeli army chief 19 March warned that Israel would target Lebanese state institutions in any war with Hizbollah; 21 March denied Israel was involved in killing Hizbollah commander Mustafa Badreddine in Syria in 2016, as previously reported in Lebanese media, and accused Hizbollah of ordering killing, denied by Hizbollah. Parliament speaker 23 March said Israeli bill claiming 860km2 contested maritime zone was “new attack on Lebanon’s sovereignty”. Several thousand protested in Beirut 19 March against proposed tax hikes intended to fund increase in public sector wages amid economic slowdown, and denouncing govt corruption. Fatah militants clashed with hard-line Islamists in Aïn el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in south late Feb and 23 March when two people were reported killed. REPORT: Hizbollah’s Syria Conundrum Syria Fighting continued on multiple fronts, most intensely in east Damascus and near Hama in west, as talks failed to make progress. Rebels besieged by regime forces in al-Waer, last rebel bastion in Homs city, 13 March struck deal with regime allowing them to leave for north with light weapons and families; evacuation ongoing end-month. Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), rebel alliance dominated by Salafi-jihadist group Fath al-Sham, claimed 11 March twin suicide bombings in Damascus Old City that killed 74, reportedly including 43 Iraqi Shiite pilgrims and twenty members of pro-govt forces. Two as yet unclaimed suicide bombings struck Palace of Justice and restaurant in Damascus 15 March reportedly killing more than 30. U.S. airstrikes 16 March allegedly hit mosque west of Aleppo city, reportedly killing over 50 mostly civilians; Pentagon denied it destroyed mosque, said it targeted and hit al-Qaeda gathering across street. Rebels including Free Syrian Army (FSA) and HTS 19 March launched offensive to take territory in Jobar and Abbasiyin districts in E Damascus, however regime forces reportedly took back captured territory in following days. Rebels including HTS and FSA groups 21 March launched major offensive against regime-held areas near Hama city, capturing at least eleven villages and towns and advancing to within kilometres of city. Regime counter-attack supported by Russian warplanes, stalled advance. In run-up to offensive on Islamic State (ISIS) stronghold Raqqa, U.S. aircraft 21 March for first time airdropped members of Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tabqa, about 40km west of Raqqa; SDF 24 March reached ISIS-held Tabqa dam on Euphrates River. Turkey

139 29 March said it had ended Operation Euphrates Shield in north begun Aug 2016 aimed at pushing ISIS away from border and prevent YPG advance westwards across Euphrates, Turkish troops remained in captured territory. FSA groups late March pushed ISIS fighters out of sparsely populated areas in south east. Regime and some rebel groups took part in procedural talks 23 Feb-3 March in Geneva; rebels boycotted talks in Kazakh capital Astana mid-month citing regime ceasefire violations. Next round of talks in Geneva 24-31 March made no progress toward peace agreements. U.S. 30 March said priority was no longer 'getting Assad out'. Bahrain Police 3 March said it had arrested 25 members of '“terrorist cell” reportedly responsible for bombings in and around capital Manama in Feb including senior member of opposition group al-Wefaq Hassan Isa; 29 March two alleged members sentenced to death. In separate case, court sentenced three alleged terrorists to death 23 March. Justice ministry 6 March filed lawsuit to dissolve opposition group Waad accusing it of 'supporting terrorism'; group accused govt of undermining opposition. Police 20 March charged former head of Waad, Ebrahim Sharif, with 'inciting hatred' against govt. Iran Several fast-attack Revolutionary Guards’ vessels reportedly approached within 600 yards of U.S. navy ship in Persian Gulf 4 March, forcing it and three British ships accompanying it to change course; Revolutionary Guards claim U.S. ship entered Iran’s territorial waters. U.S. imposed sanctions on eleven companies or individuals from China, North Korea or UAE 24 March for transferring technology to Iran that could support its ballistic missile program. Iran 26 March imposed sanctions on fifteen U.S. companies because they had “violated human rights” and cooperated with Israel. Govt 28 March said Russia could use its military bases to launch airstrikes in Syria on “case by case basis”. Iraq U.S.-backed govt forces and allied militias continued to make gains in campaign to retake western half of Mosul in north from Islamic State (ISIS). Govt forces 6 March said they had captured “al Hurriya” bridge that leads to ISIS-held city centre, and 12 March said they had retaken seventeen of 40 districts in western half from ISIS and surrounded remainder. Govt forces 14 March killed ISIS commander of Old City, Abdul Rahman al-Ansary, and 18 March captured two additional neighbourhoods al-Kur and al-Tawafa. ISIS fighters 20 March captured nine govt officers in western Mosul. U.S. airstrike in western Mosul 17 March reportedly killed over 150 civilians. Iraqi ambassador to UN 10 March denied reports by medical workers and World Health Organisation that ISIS had likely used chemical weapons in Mosul, said “really no evidence”. Govt airstrike 31 March reportedly killed several ISIS commanders in al-Qaim, W Anbar province, including Ayad al-Jumaili believed to be second-in-command. Unclaimed bombings 9 March killed at least 26 people in village 20km north of Tikrit in centre, 20 March killed 21 people in Baghdad’s Shiite Hay al- Amel suburb and 29 March killed seventeen people at police checkpoint in southern Baghdad. Intra-Kurdish tensions rose sharply in Sinjar in NW as relations between Turkey-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Iran-backed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued to deteriorate: KDP-trained Syrian peshmerga forces 3 March tried to expel PKK-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) from Sinjar, seven people killed; 14 March killed one woman at anti-KDP protest organised by PKK-affiliated factions in neighbouring Khanasor district. In show of force against KDP, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party early March tried to seize KDP-affiliated North Gas Company refinery in NW. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr 24 March said he would call for boycott of elections unless electoral law is changed; provincial elections are planned for later in 2017. Yemen Intense fighting continued along Red Sea coast as Saudi-led coalition and allied Yemeni forces tried to advance on Hodeida northwards from Mokha; offensive on city appears imminent. U.S. continued to increase support for Saudi-led coalition’s military efforts, is considering support for potential fight for Hodeida. Unidentified helicopter gunship reportedly fired on boat leaving Hodeida killing 42 Somali refugees 16 March; Saudi-led coalition denied responsibility, called on UN to take control of Hodeida port. Saudi-led coalition launched air and ground attacks on positions of Huthi rebels and allied supporters of former President Saleh in Nehm and Sirwah, strategic access points to rebel-held capital Sanaa. Huthi/Saleh forces increased rocket fire into Narjan province in Saudi Arabia, 18 March claimed to have launched long-range ballistic missile at military air base in Riyadh. Pro-Huthi court 25 March sentenced President Hadi and six

140 officials to death for “high treason”. UN envoy began preparations to restart direct talks: 13 March met ambassadors from Quad (U.S., UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia) and Oman, 14 March said warring parties reluctant to talk. U.S. launched over 40 airstrikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in south and east 2-6 March killing some AQAP fighters. Yemeni troops 28 March reportedly captured senior AQAP leader Abu Ali al-Sayari in Hadramout governorate in SE, killed two and detained three others. Drone strike night of 30-31 March in Mozno, Abyan governorate killed three suspected AQAP members. Algeria Army 6 March killed two suspected Islamist militants and arrested two others in Dellys, east of Algiers; 11 March killed two suspected Islamist militants and arrested two others in Bordj Bou Arreridj, also east of Algiers; 20 March arrested suspected Islamist militant in Bordj Badji Mokhtar in south; 25 March killed two suspected Islamist militants, including head of Algerian branch of Islamic State, al Ghoraba squadron, in Constantine province in east; suspected Islamist militant 23 March surrendered in Tamanrasset in south. Scheduled visit by Iranian President Rouhani postponed sine die, raising further concern about President Bouteflika’s health. Egypt Islamic State (ISIS) Sinai Province (SP) claimed responsibility for killing army colonel 8 March and two police officers 9 March, both in al-Arish city, N Sinai. Army 23 March killed fifteen SP combatants and arrested another seven in raid in Sinai, ten soldiers and two police killed. Army 26 March killed five SP militants, including leading figure in N Sinai; 27 March killed eight suspected SP militants in N Sinai; gunmen same day opened fire on military checkpoint in Sheikh Zuweid, N Sinai, killing soldier. SP 28 March posted video on Telegram social media platform showing beheading of two men for “sorcery”. Militant group known as Hassm, reportedly Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, 8 March claimed it had killed Mohamed Zaini, whom Islamists accused of killing one of their own in 2013, outside his home in Damietta governorate, NE. Roadside bomb in central Sinai 20 March killed three civilians; explosive device same day blew up police vehicle in al-Arish city, injuring nine. Explosive devices 24 March killed one civilian in Cairo’s Maadi suburb; 26 March injured five officers on Cairo Ring Road, Hassm claimed attack. Former President Mubarak acquitted 2 March of ordering killing of over 300 protesters during 2011 uprising, final charge against him; released from military hospital 24 March. President Sisi 14 March approved release of 203 prisoners, mostly university students whom Sisi’s pardoning committee found to be unfairly imprisoned. Libya Fighting intensified over oil installations in Gulf of Sirte and in capital Tripoli where violence risks escalating in April between local forces and factions from Misrata. Armed coalition Benghazi Defence Brigade (BDB), comprising mostly fighters from Benghazi opposed to east-based strongman Gen Khalifa Haftar and including members of jihadist group Ansar Sharia, 3 March took over key oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf, ousting Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). LNA re-took terminals and pushed BDB back to Jufra by 13 March. Eastern Tobruk-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) condemned attack by BDB, which it considers terrorist group and which enjoys informal backing by some members of rival internationally-recognised Presidency Council (PC) in Tripoli. Several dozen HoR members 7 March voted to withdraw from UN-backed dialogue intended to bridge rift between PC and HoR, however votes insufficient to pass withdrawal from dialogue. Sidra oil terminal 25 March prepared to resume exports. Haftar’s LNA 18 March made advances in Benghazi, reportedly taking over Ganfuda neighbourhood from Benghazi Revolutionaries’ Shura Council coalition of Islamist militias. In several neighbourhoods in Tripoli rival armed groups clashed early March: fighting reported between pro- and anti-PC forces allied to rival Tripoli-based govt of Khalifa Ghwel; between Tripoli and Misratan militias, including pro-PC Misratan forces; and between pro- and anti-Haftar forces. Quartet (UN, EU, AU and Arab League) in Cairo 18 March underscored commitment to Dec 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. Mauritania National assembly 9 March passed constitutional amendment that would replace parliament’s upper house with regional councils; Senators 17 March rejected amendment. President Ould Abdel Aziz 22 March said amendment will be put to referendum “as quickly as possible” to overcome impasse. Morocco King Mohammed VI 17 March dismissed incumbent PM Benkirane after five months of post-election deadlock over creation of new govt, and tasked Saad-Eddine El Othmani, former FM and head of Islamist

141 Justice and Development Party (PJD)’s parliamentary group, to form new govt. Othmani 21 March started negotiations, 25 March said agreement reached to form six-party coalition; new govt expected to take office early April. MP from Constitutional Union (UC) liberal party killed in 7 March; suspect arrested next day. AU expressed “regret” that Morocco did not attend AU’s Peace and Security Council meeting on Western Sahara 20 March. Conference of African finance ministers due to start 27 March in Senegal co-hosted by AU and UN Economic Commission for Africa postponed 25 March after Morocco demanded exclusion of Western Sahara, AU member, but not UN member state. Tunisia Jihadist attack on police patrol in Kebili in south 12 March killed police officer and wounded another. Recordings posted online early March of president’s son Hafedh Caid Essebsi, who leads faction in Nida Tounes party, criticising fellow Nida Tounes member PM Youssef Chahed. Western Sahara UN envoy Christopher Ross resigned early March having made little progress in resolving conflict since 2009; UNSG Guterres to appoint new envoy in April. AU expressed “regret” that Morocco did not attend AU’s Peace and Security Council meeting on Western Sahara 20 March. Conference of African finance ministers due to start 27 March in Senegal, co-hosted by AU and UN Economic Commission for Africa, postponed 25 March after Morocco demanded exclusion of Western Sahara, AU member, but not UN member state."

Amnesty International, "Where Are Syrians Going?" February 1, 201 7, reported 95% of the Syrians who have fled the country have gone to 5 countries: 2,854,968 to Turkey, 1,011,366 to Lebanon, 655,895 to Jordan, 233,224 to Iraq and 116,013 to Egypt. Worldwide, there were 21.3 million refugees, 90% of whom were being hosted by 10 countries, many of whom did not have adequate resources for doing so.

Niki Kitsantonis, "Greece Pressured to Improve Migrants’ Living Conditions," The New York Times, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/europe/greece-migrant- crisis.html?ref=todayspaper, "Human rights groups stepped up their warnings on Thursday about the living conditions for migrants in Greece after three people died during a recent cold snap on the Aegean island of Lesbos, and as dozens of asylum seekers near Athens threatened to resume a hunger strike if the situation did not improve. The European Commission criticized Greece last month for an 'untenable' situation at its refugee camps amid worsening weather, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Amnesty International and other aid groups have previously expressed alarm about sites across Greece, including those at Elliniko, a camp near Athens, and on Lesbos." A major part of the problem is that international funding has been insufficient to help cash strapped Greece in dealing with the problem. More rapid moving of refugees to other countries would be a help.

Jeffrey Gettleman, "Drought and War Heighten Threat of Not Just 1 Famine, but 4," The New York Times, March 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/africa/famine-somalia-nigeria- south-sudan-yemen-water.html?ref=todayspaper, reported that climate change combined with war are having a deadly impact, "Another famine is about to tighten its grip on Somalia. And it’s not the only crisis that aid agencies are scrambling to address. For the first time since anyone can remember, there is a very real possibility of four famines — in Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria and Yemen — breaking out at once, endangering more than 20 million lives."

Somini Sengupta, "U.N.’s Famine Appeal Is Billions Shy of Goal," The New York Times, March 23, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/world/africa/un-famine-nigeria-somalia-south-sudan- yemen.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A month ago, the secretary general of the United Nations, António Guterres, warned that 20 million people would fall into famine if his aid agencies could not corral $4.4 billion by the end of March. It is almost the end of March, and so far, the United Nations has received less than a tenth of the

142 money — $423 million, according to its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The funding appeal, and the paltry response, comes as the Trump administration is poised to make sharp cuts to its foreign aid budget, including for the United Nations. Historically, the United States has been the agency’s largest single donor for humanitarian aid. For all four countries at risk — Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen — the United States has given $277 million so far this year, not all of it for famine relief."

With the Trump administration considering cutting funding for UN peace keeping forces, the UN may need to cut its efforts (Somini Sengupta, "U.N. Peacekeeping Faces Overhaul Amid U.S. Threat to Cut Funding," The New York Times, March 26, 2017).

The United States and several of its allies declined to participate in U.N, negotiations, in March 2017, to frame a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, saying the time was not ripe for that (Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladsrone, "United States and AlliescBoycott U.N. Talks for a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons," The New York Times, March 28, 2017).

Nahdlatul Ulama, the world's largest mass Islamic organization, in Indonesia, has been seeking to move many of the world's Muslims to move from a Middle Ages to a contemporary vision of Islam, updating Shiria Law to the present. With a myriad of approaches to Islam in numerous counties and regions, with different cultures, obtaining anywhere near unity on the application of Islam to life is likely impossible. But bringing a strong voice to the discussion may have a significant impact, especially as there are others within Islam around the world who share a similar perspective (Joe Cochrane, "An Indonesian Group Seeks to Export Its Modernized Vision of Islam," The New York Times, May 2, 2017).

Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Mark Landler and Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran Is Threatened With U.S. Reprisals Over Missile Test," The New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/iran- missile-test.html?ref=todayspaper, "The Trump administration on Wednesday fired a warning shot at a perennial adversary, declaring that it was 'putting Iran on notice' after a recent ballistic missile launch, and threatening the Iranian government with unspecified reprisals." The Trump administration followed up on its warning with, David E. Sanger, "U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Iran Over Missile Test," The New York Times, February 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/politics/iran-sanctions-trump.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "New sanctions that the Trump administration imposed on Friday to punish Tehran’s latest ballistic missile test marked the beginning of what officials called the end of an era in which the United States was “too tolerant of Iran’s bad behavior.” In what was described as the first in a series of efforts to confront Iran around the globe, the ban on banking transfers was levied against 25 Iranians and companies that officials said assisted in Tehran’s ballistic missile program and support of terrorist groups."

As ISIS continued kill, injure and terrorize civilians in government recaptured Eastern Mosul, with sniping, bombing, drone strikes, and mortar shellings, in late February, as the Iraqi government and allied forces began an offensive to retake Western Mosul from ISIS (Rukmini Callimachi and Falih Hassan, "Iraq Starts Offensive to Retake Western Mosul From ISIS," The New York Times, February 19, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/world/middleeast/iraq-starts-offensive-to-retake-western-mosul- from-isis.html?ref=todayspaper).

There have been increased civilian deaths in Mosul and Syria from U.S. air strikes since Trump came into office. In Mosul, some of the deaths may be resulting from ISIS forces being in close proximity to civilians. But the combined increase raises questions as to whether under the Trump administration rules of engagement for the U.S. Military have been relaxed. Tim Arango and Helene Cooper, "U.S. Investigating Mosul Strikes Said to Have Killed Up to 200 Civilians," The New York Times, March 24, 2017,

143 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/middleeast/us-iraq-mosul-investigation-airstrike-civilian- deaths.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The American-led military coalition in Iraq said Friday that it was investigating reports that scores of civilians — perhaps as many as 200, residents said — had been killed in recent American airstrikes in Mosul, the northern Iraqi city at the center of an offensive to drive out the Islamic State. If confirmed, the series of airstrikes would rank among the highest civilian death tolls in an American air mission since the United States went to war in Iraq in 2003. And the reports of civilian deaths in Mosul came immediately after two recent incidents in Syria, where the coalition is also battling the Islamic State from the air, in which activists and local residents said dozens of civilians had been killed. Taken together, the surge of reported civilian deaths raised questions about whether once-strict rules of engagement meant to minimize civilian casualties were being relaxed under the Trump administration, which has vowed to fight the Islamic State more aggressively."

To punish Iraqis for joining the Islamic State, local Iraqi authorities in Salahuddin Province, as of end of January, had been evicting their families from their homes and holding family members, even if they had strongly opposed their relative joining ISIS. At least 345 families had been evicted and detained (David Zucchino, "Iraqi Local Authorities Evict and Hold Members of ISIS Fighters' Families," The New York Times, January 30, 2017).

As the security situation continued to worsen in Afghanistan, Taimoor Shah and Rod Nordland, "Taliban Take an Afghan District, Sangin, That Many Marines Died to Keep," The New York Times, March 23, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-helmand- sangin.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The Taliban captured the strategic district of Sangin in the southern province of Helmand on Thursday, according to local officials. It was the culmination of a yearslong offensive that took the lives of more combatants than any other fight for territory in Afghanistan." In late April, 300 U.S. marines returned to Helomand Province at Camp Letherneck in Lashkar Gah (Mujib Mashalo, "Marines Return to Helmand Province for a Job They Thought Was Done," The New York Times, April 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/world/asia/marines-return-to-helmand- province-for-a-job-they-thought-was-done.html?ref=todayspaper).

Mujib Mashal and Najim Rahim, "Taliban Attack Afghan Army Base, Killing Dozens," The New York Times, April 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/asia/taliban-attack- afghanistan.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, " Dozens of soldiers were killed on Friday when Taliban gunmen and suicide bombers in military uniforms stormed an Afghan Army base in northern Afghanistan, Afghan and Western officials said." Mujib Mashal, "Afghan Base Massacre Adds New Uncertainty to Fight Against Taliban," The New York Times, April 23, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/world/middleeast/afghan-base- massacre-taliban-fight-uncertainty.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported on the assault on northern Afghanistan's camp Shaheen, "The fresh-faced, impoverished Afghan recruits killed and maimed in the Taliban’s sneak attack here on Friday, some of them just teenagers, are the latest targets of the insurgent group’s campaign to subvert and demoralize the armed forces, already struggling with corruption, desertion and mistrust between soldiers and officers. The psychological impact of the assault, one of the deadliest in the 16-year war, may now prove more devastating than the number of victims. While some survivors have vowed revenge, the assault has sown fear and rage not only among many recruits but also among their families, further threatening enlistment and making the government’s fight against the Taliban that much harder."

In mid-April the United States dropped a 22,000 bomb, the largest explosive dropped since the Nagasaki A-Bomb in 1945, on a cave complex of the Taliban in Afghanistan, to attempt to collapse the cave, and perhaps warn North Korea. But as of April 18, it was unclear what effect the bomb had, leaving questions as to whether it was able to collapse the cave ("Mujib Mashal and Fahim Abed, "U.S. Isn’t Saying How Much Damage ‘Mother of All Bombs’ Did in Afghanistan," The New York Times, April 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/middleeast/us-isnt-saying-how-much-damage-the-mother-

144 of-all-bombs-did.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0).

Violence continued in Pakistan in the last several months, as exemplified by the suicide bombing of a Sufi shrine during a ceremony, in Sehwan, in mid-February, that killed at least 70 people (Salman Masood, "At Least 70 Are Killed In Pakistan Shrine Blast," The New York Times, February 17, 2017).

International Crisis Group (IGP), "Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi," Asia Report 284, February 15, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/284-pakistan-stoking-fire-karachi, commented, "Ethnic, political and sectarian rivalries, jihadist groups, criminality and heavy-handed security policies are turning Pakistan's biggest city into a pressure cooker of tensions. Feuding politicians must set aside their conflicts or Karachi's law-and-order crisis may further worsen. politicians must set aside their conflicts or Karachi's law-and-order crisis may further worsen. Executive Summary Decades of neglect and mismanagement have turned Karachi, Pakistan’s largest and wealthiest city, into a pressure cooker. Ethno-political and sectarian interests and competition, intensified by internal migration, jihadist influx and unchecked movement of weapons, drugs and black money, have created an explosive mix. A heavy-handed, politicized crackdown by paramilitary Rangers is aggravating the problems. To address complex conflict drivers, the state must restore the Sindh police’s authority and operational autonomy while also holding it accountable. Over the longer term, it must redress political and economic exclusion, including unequal access to justice, jobs and basic goods and services, which criminal and jihadist groups tap for recruits and support. It must become again a provider to citizens, not a largely absentee regulator of a marketplace skewed toward the elite and those who can mobilize force. Sindh’s ruling party and Karachi’s largest must also agree on basic political behavior, including respect for each other’s mandate, and reverse politicization of provincial and municipal institutions that has eroded impartial governance. The megacity’s demographics are at the root of its many conflicts. Every major ethnic group has a sizeable presence; economically-driven waves of rural Sindhis, Pashtuns, southern Punjabis, those displaced by conflict and natural disasters and refugees and illegal immigrants from all over South Asia continue to add to the population. While long term these waves could reconfigure its politics, today’s primary divide dates to British India’s 1947 partition and the influx into Karachi of millions of Mohajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India and their descendants) that reduced Sindhis to a minority. In Pakistan’s early years, a predominantly Mohajir Muslim League leadership stacked government institutions with its constituents, creating Sindhi resentment. In turn, the policies of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government, including quotas for under-represented Sindhis in government jobs and other institutions, were resented by Mohajirs in the 1970s and resulted in violent clashes during the 1980s and 1990s that destabilized provincial and national politics. With Sindhis now fewer than 10 per cent of Karachi’s population, less than Mohajirs, Pashtuns and Southern Punjabi Seraiki speakers, the contest between the PPP, Sindh’s largest party, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Karachi’s largest, is not primarily electoral but over the nature of the city’s governance. The Sindhi-dominated PPP has sought to centralize authority in the provincial government as a way to control Karachi’s considerable resources; dominant in that city but with limited electoral prospects beyond the province’s urban centres, the MQM has advocated decentralized authority in municipal institutions for the same reason. With both parties politicizing the state institutions they control and providing services on partisan grounds, Karachi’s citizens lack reliable access to health care, water and affordable transport and accommodation. This politicization has also aggravated ethno-political conflict. The growing informal economy and privatization of basic services have opened opportunities for exploitive middlemen and mafias. Criminal gangs, to varying degrees in collusion with political parties and state authorities, have flourished, including MQM-linked extortion groups and a Baloch-dominated outfit that had PPP patronage. Jihadist groups have benefited from a combination of lax law enforcement and state support. With sectarian violence again threatening Karachi’s peace, some of the country’s most dangerous religious and sectarian groups are actively contesting turf and resources, compounding law and order challenges. The predominately Pashtun Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taliban Movement of Pakistan), which established a base in the city after military operations against it in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

145 (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), is targeting the anti-militant Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) and using force to assert its writ. The state’s September 2013 response to escalating violence – empowering the paramilitary Rangers, who are nominally under the federal interior ministry but in practice answer to the military leadership, to operate against jihadist and criminal networks – is unlikely to restore peace. Characterized by heavy-handedness and human rights violations, including extra-judicial killings, torture and enforced disappearances, it instead breeds ethnic tensions and could boost recruitment to criminal, including jihadist, networks. The MQM sees it as a partisan attempt to suppress the party and pit its Mohajir constituents against each other and competing ethnicities. The PPP, the military’s historic foe, is also in the Rangers’ sights, and its provincial government faces rising pressure to expand the paramilitary unit’s policing powers to the rest of Sindh, the party’s political lifeline. Meanwhile, anti-India outfits like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JD) and Jaish-e-Mohammed continue to operate madrasas and charity fronts with scant reaction from the Rangers or police. Tensions are escalating fast, and failure to defuse the impending ethno-political crisis and rein in criminal and jihadist networks threatens to sink Pakistan’s most important economic center further into conflict. The PPP and MQM leaderships should recognize that their governance failures have opened opportunities for the military’s counterproductive intervention in Karachi’s political affairs on the pretext of restoring stability. Reversing the military’s impositions on civilian authority gives them a mutual interest in depoliticizing and strengthening the police. Sindh’s superior judiciary must also assume its primary responsibility of dispensing justice and protecting citizens’ rights. Recommendations To achieve the political reconciliation needed so that technical fixes are achievable and gains are sustainable To Karachi’s political parties: The PPP, MQM and Awami National Party (ANP) should restart a comprehensive dialogue to address Karachi’s political and security challenges, recognizing shared interests in reviving civilian political space and credibility and creating the conditions in which institutional reforms can be debated, agreed on and implemented. Reestablish as basic rules of the game respect for each other’s mandate; separation of provincial and municipal functions by credible and accountable devolution of power; and commitment to deliver provincial and local governance equitably rather than on the basis of patronage and exclusion. Renounce the practice of collaborating with the military to counter political rivals and refrain from appealing for military intervention in the city’s internal affairs. Renounce any current or future alliance with criminal gangs and armed activist wings. To demonstrate the political will to restore civilian authority, redress the adverse consequences of the Rangers’ operation, enforce the rule of law in Karachi and prevent renewed criminal and jihadist violence To the federal and provincial Sindh governments: Replace selective counter-terrorism with an approach that targets jihadist groups using violence within or from Pakistani territory; regulate the madrasa sector; and act comprehensively against those with jihadist links. End the Rangers’ operation and commit to a law enforcement policy rooted in a reformed criminal justice system, including an operationally autonomous but accountable police force. Resist military pressure to renew the Protection of Pakistan Act or grant wide powers to military and law enforcement agencies that lend themselves to abuse, including 90-day remand without charge; and repeal the 90-day remand provision in the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act. Resist military pressure to renew military courts, the authority of which under the 21st constitutional amendment expired in January 2017. Replace, for the Sindh government, the 1861 Police Act with a new police order, using the 2002 Police Order as a template, to guarantee operational autonomy and robust internal and external accountability; and abandon plans to give police recruits military training, instead committing to fundamental reorientation of policing toward intelligence gathering, investigation and building court cases.

146 Investigate all allegations of custodial killings, torture, illegal detention and other human rights abuses by any law enforcement/security agency and hold individuals to account. To the Sindh High Court: Uphold the constitutional right to fair trial by: prioritizing petitions and cases involving alleged human rights abuses and denial of due process by law enforcement agencies, including the Rangers; and establishing and mandating implementation of practicable investigation procedures and fixing individual responsibility in those cases; and ordering release of anyone detained in violation of basic due process; and using such cases as an opportunity to review and strike down any legal provisions that contradict the right to due process and fair trial. To the political parties: Establish funds to support female dependents of party members who have been detained, killed, gone missing or are otherwise unable to return to normal life, including material and psychological support; and facilitate unimpeded access to human rights and other civil society organisations for female dependents and family members affected by an operation. To address the drivers of conflict, including extreme inequality that criminal and jihadist organisations exploit to expand their influence To the provincial Sindh government: Revive and properly resource public housing and public transport projects and ensure they benefit lower income groups rather than speculators, mafias and other elites, thus reconceiving the concept of land and transportation as a foundation of a peaceful body politic, not simply a market-provided good. Ensure equal access to basic services, including water and power, for all residents, and prevent the Defense Housing Authority (DHA) and elite private real estate schemes from unfairly acquiring a disproportionate share. End illegal regularization and sale of public land and sale of valuable public agricultural and legally protected property to DHA and any similar public or private schemes. Revive moribund state-run polytechnics, create additional ones and give the private sector incentives to establish vocational training institutions."

Slaman Masood and Ben Hubbard, "Pakistan Approves Military Hero to Head Tricky Saudi-Led Alliancem: The New York Times, April 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/world/asia/pakistan-general-saudi-alliance-raheel- sharif.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The appointment of a popular Pakistani general to head a Saudi- led alliance of Muslim countries has set off a furor in Pakistan, amid fears that the move could exacerbate sectarian tensions at home. Pakistan’s government last week approved the appointment of a former army chief, Raheel Sharif, to lead the Islamic Military Alliance, a posting announced by Saudi Arabia in January. The alliance includes several dozen mainly Muslim countries with the professed aim of countering terrorism, although it has taken no significant military actions, least of all fighting the Islamic State in Syria or Iraq. Saudi officials have argued that the alliance’s Muslim identity will make it more effective in combating Islamic extremists, while sending a powerful message that Muslim countries reject their ideology. But critics note that the alliance does not include predominately Shiite states like Iran and Iraq, making it more of a Sunni military alliance than an “Islamic” one. Still, the appointment of Mr. Sharif would give the Saudi-led alliance a more international sheen. Saudi Arabia has also been seeking support from Pakistan for its campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen and may be hoping Mr. Sharif’s appointment could bolster that effort."

Asian (including Middle East) Developments

Anne Baranrd, "Battle to Retake Syrian City Turns Into a Geopolitical Test of the War," The New York Times, February 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/middleeast/battle-al-bab-

147 syria-geopolitical-test.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "A northern Syrian city that is one of the Islamic State’s last enclaves in the country is under assault by military forces bearing down from all sides. The complication is that the advancing forces — the Syrian Army and pro-government militias backed by Russia, and Syrian rebels backed by Turkey — are sworn enemies. Their simultaneous race to seize the city, Al Bab, has turned into a test of how a global realignment of powers supporting Syria’s antagonists could help reshape or end the nearly six-year-old conflict. Al Bab, which had roughly 100,000 people when the war began in 2011, is the last urban area held by the Islamic State west of its de facto capital, Raqqa, where the group remains entrenched."

All of Syria remained dangerous, in mid-MarchBen Hubbard, "Damascus Bombings Near Pilgrimage Sites Kill Dozens," The New York Times, March 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/middleeast/damascus-syria-suicide- bombings.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "A double bombing near Shiite shrines often visited by foreign pilgrims in Damascus, Syria, killed at least 40 people on Saturday, shattering the capital’s efforts to isolate itself from the war raging elsewhere in the country. Many of the dead were from neighboring Iraq."

Michael R. Gordon, "White House Accepts ‘Political Reality’ of Assad’s Grip on Power in Syria," The New York Times, March 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/politics/trump-bashar- assad-syria.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "President Trump has abandoned the goal of pressing President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to leave power, marking a sharp departure from the Middle East policy that guided the Obama administration for more than five years, the White House said on Friday. 'With respect to Assad, there is a political reality that we have to accept,' said Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary."

While not focusing on getting rid of Assad may be realistic, removing the threat of doing so appears to have consequences. Anne Barnard and Michael R. Gordon, "Worst Chemical Attack in Years in Syria; U.S. Blames Assad," The New York Times, April 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "One of the worst chemical bombings in Syria turned a northern rebel-held area into a toxic kill zone on Tuesday, inciting international outrage over the ever-increasing government impunity shown in the country’s six-year war. Western leaders including President Trump blamed the Syrian government of President Bashar al- Assad and called on its patrons, Russia and Iran, to prevent a recurrence of what many described as a war crime. Dozens of people, including children, died — some writhing, choking, gasping or foaming at the mouth — after breathing in poison that possibly contained a nerve agent or other banned chemicals, according to witnesses, doctors and rescue workers. They said the toxic substance spread after warplanes dropped bombs in the early morning hours. Some rescue workers grew ill and collapsed from proximity to the dead." Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, "Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria," The New York Times, April 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us- said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, President Trump said Thursday night that the United States had carried out a missile strike in Syria in response to the Syrian government’s chemical weapons attack this week, which killed more than 80 civilians. 'Tonight, I ordered a targeted military strike on the air base in Syria from where the chemical attack was launched,' Mr. Trump said."

ICG, "Syria after the U.S. Strike: What Should Come Next," Middle East & North Africa Statement, April 11, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/syria- after-us-strike-what-should-come- next?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=807c0f0a34- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-807c0f0a34-

148 359871089, commented, "Poison gas and missile response have heightened tensions over the Syria conflict. Washington and Moscow should respond to the new risks by pursuing their stated common interest: sufficient de-escalation of the war's violence to establish a meaningful political track toward settlement. Whether one believes they were the long-overdue response to the Syrian regime’s brutality, a one- off event that will not affect the conflict’s trajectory, a risky step that could prompt military escalation or all of the above, the 7 April U.S. missile strikes on Syria’s Shayrat air base in response to the regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons should be seized upon as an opportunity to jumpstart diplomatic efforts. The strikes have heightened tension between Moscow and Washington. Yet, this added volatility and the risks attached to it could and should prompt more serious pursuit by the two countries of their purportedly common interest: de-escalating violence sufficiently to establish a meaningful political track. This can be best achieved by deepening rather than breaking off U.S.-Russian cooperation. The Trump administration framed its strikes, involving 59 Tomahawk missiles fired from two U.S. Navy destroyers in the Mediterranean, as a proportional response to what both the U.S. and such independent on-the-ground observers as the group Médecins sans Frontières concluded was a sarin attack near the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun on the Damascus-Aleppo highway on 4 April. It identified the target as the air base from which it said the aircraft that carried out the attack had taken off. It highlighted efforts to alert Moscow beforehand and avoid casualties among both Russian and Syrian personnel. And it noted that while the decision to punish the regime militarily for chemical attacks was new, its broader policy of prioritizing the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and pinning the hoped-for departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on the results of a political process remains in place. In other words, the military action appeared intended to be narrow in scope, an attempt at limiting risk but offering correspondingly relatively modest rewards: deterrence of further chemical attacks. In the U.S. and Europe, as well as in many Middle East countries, the Trump administration’s decision brought relief to those who had bemoaned President Obama’s reluctance to order more forceful U.S. military action to protect Syrian civilians from regime atrocities and, for some, even oust the regime. Others deemed it a risky gambit, taken impulsively and outside the framework of a forward-looking strategy, that would not change the fundamental course of the war and inadvertently could trigger an escalation, if not a direct military confrontation, with Russia or Iran. Some saw it as a bit of both: a welcome response that only would make sense – and avoid unintended consequences – if immediately accompanied by efforts to put Syria’s collapsed ceasefire and faltering political talks back on track. The risks are indeed significant. If, for example, regime chemical attacks were to continue (perhaps employing chlorine instead of the much deadlier nerve agent sarin), the U.S. might find itself compelled to launch additional, more significant strikes and accept the increased risks, or forfeit whatever deterrent effect and credibility boost it had hoped to achieve. High-casualty regime attacks employing other weapons, such as barrel bombs, likewise may generate pressure on Washington to decide whether to expand its deterrence or be seen as signaling that atrocities that do not involve poison gas are tolerable. There also is the related challenge of managing U.S. allies in Syria and the broader region, whose expectations may now rise disproportionately to what the White House is willing to do in their support. The biggest risk, direct escalation with the regime’s principal backers, Russia and Iran, can be expected to grow in the event of additional U.S. strikes. Iran’s militia network has the capacity to retaliate against U.S. interests throughout the region. Moscow presents an even bigger and more immediate concern: Russian and U.S. jets share the Syrian skies, and Russian personnel and equipment are integral components of the regime’s air-defense systems. This means not only that Moscow can severely constrain Washington’s capacity to carry out airstrikes crucial to its efforts against ISIS in eastern Syria, but also that an accident or miscommunication involving aircraft or ground personnel could set off an extremely dangerous escalatory spiral. Underlining this concern is the fact that Moscow has already announced its intentions to suspend participation in the de-confliction channel its forces and those of the U.S. use and beef up the regime’s air defenses. It also has dispatched a frigate carrying cruise missiles to the Eastern Mediterranean. Now that both sides have made their largely symbolic moves, the moment has arrived to return to diplomacy and de-escalate tensions, lest an opportunity be wasted and the situation spin out of control. Despite the brief display of U.S. military muscle, Russia remains in the driver’s seat in the Syrian conflict,

149 given its assets on the ground and in the air, as well as its alliance with the regime, Iran, Hizbollah and associated militias. While Washington can hope to influence Moscow’s behavior, Russia doubtless will take the lead in shaping the course of events. During a visit to Moscow that coincided with the Khan Sheikhoun attack and the U.S. missile strike, Crisis Group encountered deep frustration about the presumed lack of U.S. appreciation for what Moscow considers to be its constructive effort to end the war and prevent the country’s dissolution. Despite the public bluster, Russia is also clearly weary of further escalation and a complete unravelling of its diplomatic efforts at effecting a ceasefire and jumpstarting political talks, and apprehensive about the soundness of its Syrian ally. Some Russian analysts also expressed concern about the damage Russia’s reputation might suffer from what they considered the regime’s graphic and blatant breach of an agreement on the regime’s chemical arsenal and chemical weapons use that Moscow itself initiated. (This is the 2013 U.S.- Russian agreement to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons program, and UN Security Council Resolution 2118 endorsing that agreement.) Whatever wisdom one might assign to the latest U.S.-Russian tit-for-tat, it has potential to advance a better way forward. Rather than merely seeking to restore the pre-2013 status quo concerning non-use of chemical weapons, the U.S. and Russia should take steps jointly to prevent a direct confrontation and pursue what both have identified as an immediate interest: reducing violence between the regime and its non-jihadist opponents. This is essential to save lives but also could enable a shift of resources toward the fight against ISIS; obstruct efforts by Tahrir al-Sham (a jihadist coalition led by a former al-Qaeda affiliate previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra) to assert hegemony over the opposition’s non-jihadist factions; and, over time, pave the way for a credible political process. The first step should be to define the terms of a viable ceasefire between the regime and non- jihadist opposition. Elements of truces attempted in 2016 and early 2017 could provide starting points. Trading U.S. counter-terror coordination with Moscow in exchange for an end to regime air attacks outside ISIS-held areas merits renewed discussion. Including Turkey, Iran and Jordan as co-guarantors alongside Moscow and Washington would be necessary to achieve a critical mass of leverage over the warring Syrian parties. Recognizing spheres of influence held by the conflict’s many players is nobody’s idea of a perfect peace, but currently it offers the most realistic path to a sustained de-escalation that could create space for a political process addressing Syria’s governance and geopolitical dilemmas. For a new ceasefire to succeed where others have failed, however, Russia, the U.S. and their regional partners will have to be more realistic in addressing the challenges posed by Tahrir al-Sham, which dominates much of the rebel-held north west and holds territory close to non-jihadist forces. Its exclusion from previous truces has increased its incentives to act as a spoiler and provided a loophole through which the regime and its allies have continued to pummel opposition-held areas (using its presence, real or fabricated, as a pretext). To have any chance of success, a ceasefire must include – at least for a defined period – areas in which Tahrir al-Sham is present but does not exert unilateral control. This would provide time, space and political capital for the U.S. and Turkey to work with rebel allies to address the Tahrir al- Sham problem before it strangles them. Though they support opposing sides, Washington and Moscow appear more realistic about the need for eventual compromise than their respective Syrian and regional allies. Russia is pinched between an unreliable ally in the Assad regime, which, for all its brutality, is incapable of winning the war; an all too capable ally in Iran, able to defend its interests in Syria even when they diverge from Moscow’s; an adversary in Turkey which, nominal rapprochement notwithstanding, has little incentive at present to do Moscow favors; a formidable military power across the occupied Golan in Israel, which is skeptical of Russia’s intentions and ability to rein in Hizbollah and acts against it even in proximity to Russian forces; and an unpredictable rival in the Trump administration, which, for all its professed desire to avoid foreign entanglements, may find stoking crisis to its political benefit. Russia for the most part has successfully balanced among these competing forces, but it cannot do so forever. The chemical weapon attack and U.S. response are examples of destabilizing events that are bound to increase and at some point slip out of Moscow’s control. Ultimately, U.S. and Russian realism will be needed to seriously begin a process that could lead to an end of the conflict. What happened in Khan Sheikhoun points to the horrors ahead and of their dangerous regional and perhaps even wider international ramifications if the situation is left adrift. Whether

150 the U.S. attack on 7 April was prudent or reckless is beside the point: what matters now is to turn it into an opportunity to initiate steps that reduce the violence in Syria, so that the unspeakable civilian suffering eases and a political process finally has a chance."

ICG, "Hizbollah’s Syria Conundrum," Middle East & North Africa Report Npo. 14, March 14, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/lebanon/175-hizbollah-s- syria- conundrum?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=0902e3cab7- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-0902e3cab7- 359871089, commented, "Four years after plunging into Syria’s civil war, Hizbollah has achieved its core aim of preserving the Assad regime. Yet with no clear exit strategy, the Lebanese “Party of God” faces ever greater costs unless it can lower the sectarian flames, open dialogue with non-jihadist rebel groups and help pave the way for a negotiated settlement. Executive Summary When Hizbollah – the Lebanese 'Party of God' – threw its fighters into Syria in 2013, it sought primarily to save itself. Had the Assad regime collapsed or been defeated by U.S.-backed regional powers, it could have faced a hostile Sunni successor in Damascus and lost its essential arms channel from Iran. Today, its core objective of preserving the regime has been met, but there is no end in sight to the war. If Iran and Hizbollah continue to provide unconditional military support to the regime without a realistic exit strategy, they will be dragged deeper into what can only become a quagmire, even as their armed strength grows in the wider region. At the same time, they will have to contend with a potentially more hostile U.S. administration that has said it wants to push back Iranian influence even as it also pursues a more aggressive approach against the Islamic State (IS), an enemy it has in common with Hizbollah and Iran. Avoiding being sucked into a quagmire requires negotiating a settlement that has buy-in from key countries that back the opposition, as well as (with Russia) imposing the requisite compromises on Damascus. This report proposes preliminary steps Iran and Hizbollah could take in that direction, including recognising non-jihadist rebels; initiating talks with them on whatever common ground they can find; lowering sectarian rhetoric; and refraining from new offensives against opposition-held areas so as to preserve a non-jihadist foe capable of enforcing a deal, if and when one is reached. Hizbollah cannot change course in Syria without Iran’s agreement, yet pays high and mounting costs for its intervention. Once dependent on the late President Hafez Assad’s regime to protect its military status in Lebanon, it has become instrumental to the survival of his son’s rule in Syria. Yet, alliance with the Assads has become a liability, draining resources, empowering the jihadist groups it has tried to vanquish and provoking hostility from much of the Syrian population and regional players such as Qatar and Hamas with which it once enjoyed good ties.A more difficult to measure cost is the harm to its image and self-identity. From a 'party of the oppressed' and a Lebanon-based and centred 'resistance' movement standing up to Israel, it has projected itself across the border and morphed into a powerful regional force. Once acclaimed by for struggle against a common enemy, most recently in the 2006 Lebanon war, it is widely viewed as a sectarian Shiite militia and, in parts of Syria, a ruthless occupier. Hizbollah has benefitted from its intervention beyond regime survival. Its full-throated effort to keep the regime alive helped consolidate it as Iran’s most effective partner. The war has displayed and deepened mutual dependence. Hizbollah long has given Iran strategic depth vis-à-vis Israel. Escalating involvement in Syria has elevated it to an indispensable partner in a high-stakes, increasingly sectarian- tinged regional confrontation, whose principal exponents are Iran and Saudi Arabia. In turn, Iran gives arms and other support that allow Hizbollah to fight Israel and leverage military strength into political dominance in a country that always denied it to Shiites. Hizbollah has also gained from its relationship with Russia, which arose from the latter’s 2015 intervention. It has been a vital partner on the ground, an elite fighting force without which Russian airstrikes would have been much less effective. It has been able to enhance its military and tactical expertise by a combat alliance, for the first time, with a global power. Yet, the relationship is fraught, as Moscow, a secular power wary of Islamist radicalism and favouring a strong Syrian state and army, has its own agenda in Syria, which is starting to diverge from Iran’s and Hizbollah’s, now that the regime’s immediate survival seems assured.

151 Hizbollah has its own agenda, so needs its own political strategy. Along with most other players, it continues to bank on hard power. This can only prolong the conflict and encourage radicalisation on all sides. Defeat of non-jihadist rebels would help swell jihadist ranks and remove a credible opponent that could negotiate a settlement and enforce a deal. Hizbollah may feel emboldened by Iranian and Russian support and their joint 2016 victory in Aleppo and favour efforts to gain more ground. Taking and holding territory in the face of a morphing insurgency and a hostile population will become increasingly costly in blood and treasure, however, and may prevent the party from extricating itself at all. To loosen the trap and create the possibility of an eventual drawdown, Hizbollah, together with Iran, should urgently take steps to lower tensions. As part of the process Russia, Turkey and Iran launched in Astana in January 2017, they should help enforce the nationwide ceasefire. They should also open communication lines with non-jihadist foes in order to discuss mutually acceptable decentralisation to enable local governance in opposition-controlled areas without paving the way for Syria’s breakup; and to ease tit-for-tat restrictions on the besieged villages of Madaya, Zabadani, Fouaa and Kefraya. Likewise, they should press President Bashar Assad to negotiate a political settlement and should refrain from new offensives and collective punishment of civilians. In return, a negotiated settlement must take into account the party’s vital interests, over which it shows neither willingness nor need to compromise given its fighting prowess. These include its arms channel, protecting Shiite shrines in Syria and preventing attacks against both the Shiite community and its fighters in Lebanon. Though the party’s arsenal has long posed serious concerns inside and outside Lebanon, its disarmament cannot be linked to a negotiated Syria settlement if a deal is to have a chance. At the same time, Hizbollah should work to dispel domestic rivals’ fears by agreeing to resume dialogue on a defensive strategy – stalled by its Syria intervention – that would regulate its arsenal’s use, including its stated commitment not to use it against domestic foes or provoke war with Israel. None of this will be easy, but the alternative would be worse, for Hizbollah and much of the region: a prolonged, ever costlier engagement in an unwinnable war of attrition. Beyond the human costs, Hizbollah would have to permanently mobilise a Shiite community whose patience and support may have limits, and recruit youths who lack the commitment and discipline that have made Hizbollah a formidable fighting force. It cannot relish that prospect."

Michael R. Gordon and Kamil Kakol, "Turkish Strikes Target Kurdish Allies of U.S. in Iraq and Syria," The New York Times, April 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/middleeast/turkey- kurds-airstrikes-iraq-syria.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Turkish warplanes bombed Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria on Tuesday in an unusually intense operation that presented a new complication for the United States’ military campaign against the Islamic State. The Turkish military’s targets included the Y.P.G., a Kurdish militia that has played an important role in the American-backed operations in Syria against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. Adding to the tensions in the region, Kurdish officials said one Turkish airstrike had mistakenly struck Kurdish pesh merga troops on Mount Sinjar in northwestern Iraq, killing at least five and wounding more, some critically. The pesh merga in Iraq’s autonomous region carried out the opening attacks in the offensive to retake Mosul from the Islamic State, and they have been an American ally in operations against the militants."

ICG, "Managing Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Case of Nusaybin," Europe & Central Asia Report 243, May 2, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/243- managing-turkeys-pkk-conflict-case- nusaybin?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=d15b219cde- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_05_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-d15b219cde- 359871089, commented, "With one quarter of its inhabitants’ homes destroyed in the past year, Nusaybin is a victim of Turkey’s 33-year conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The state has taken economic steps to help the town, but outreach and Kurdish rights must be improved to prevent new flare ups. Executive Summary

152 Nusaybin, a political stronghold of the Kurdish movement bordering Syria, is among Turkey’s urban south-eastern districts that saw unprecedented levels of violence in 2016. Particularly in the wake of the failed July coup attempt and in the run-up to the 2017 presidential system referendum, emergency rule conditions resulted in the arrest and/or removal from office of elected representatives of the legal Kurdish political movement. While conflict fatigue can be observed in this town where 30,000 lost their homes, so can a distinct sense that a political solution is not in sight. Ankara’s effort to meet residents’ basic needs and compensate their material losses is notable, but managing the conflict’s social/political fallout and addressing grievances of Kurdish movement supporters will be crucial if that marginalised constituency is not to be left more susceptible to mobilisation by the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and drawn toward violence. Since violence resumed in July 2015, the 33-year conflict with the PKK, which Turkey, the U.S. and European Union (EU) consider a terrorist organisation, has devastated neighbourhoods and livelihoods across urban districts of the majority-Kurdish south east. In twenty-one months, at least 2,748 died, around 100,000 lost their homes, and up to 400,000 were temporarily displaced. Turkish security forces conducted hundreds of operations in urban and rural areas of the south east, while the PKK – after a period of intense clashes in urban centres and attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) also in western cities of Turkey – returned to fighting in rural areas in June 2016. With the rise to dominance of nationalist cadres and hardline policies in Ankara, the state’s approach is to weaken the PKK as much as possible; marginalise the main legal Kurdish political entity, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP); win over locals via better services and infrastructure,; and nurture other Kurdish political actors that might serve as an alternative to the HDP. Residents in the conflict-torn south east are fed contradictory narratives as to why the escalation reached such levels. Government affiliates retroactively blame cadres linked to what they call the Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation (FETÖ) – also blamed for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt – for the PKK mobilisation in south-eastern urban districts during the peace process (2013-2015). Conversely, hardline Kurdish movement representatives assert that elements in Ankara favouring nationalist policies, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, orchestrated the escalation to justify the crackdown on the legal Kurdish political movement. Residents are bitter toward the state but also blame the PKK for being ready to sacrifice its social base in Turkey to pursue the unrealistic ambition of carving out autonomous neighbourhoods with trenches and barricades. State initiatives to rebuild Nusaybin’s neighbourhoods and compensate residents for material losses have taken time to develop, and transparency is lagging. The government is making diligent efforts to compensate for the true value of destroyed property, but administrative gaffes and delays exacerbate longstanding mistrust of state authorities. Clearing explosives from neighbourhoods where fighting occurred, the authorities say, required flattening buildings that were still standing, but it fuelled speculation that the destruction was intended to allow new construction that would facilitate security measures against renewed urban warfare. Despite genuine progress, the physical reconstruction of houses will not be sufficient to restore trust between the state and the local population or to rejuvenate fully the town’s social dynamism any time soon. The government needs to meet expectations regarding revitalising small businesses, which may require allowing controlled border trade, and adequately address the psycho- social needs of people traumatised by the conflict. More broadly, the central authorities’ removal of elected representatives and purge of locally- trusted municipality personnel have consolidated a sense among Kurdish movement supporters that their political orientation and culture is not recognised. That, plus the stifling of public debate, ban on mass protests in some areas and strong security force presence also has strengthened the perception that there is no outlet for democratic politics. For some, it has left armed struggle as a legitimate response. In the wake of the 16 April referendum, in which 79 per cent of Nusaybin residents voted “no”, the government extended for three months the emergency rule that has been in place since the failed coup. This is hardly the best way to suggest a shift toward the inclusive, pluralistic policies required to win hearts and minds. At a minimum, state officials should engage with local residents by hiring staff that is more attuned to the social fabric, and proactively try to address the trust deficit. Ideally, President Erdoğan – having now secured an executive presidency – would focus on healing social divides, including with respect to the ideological diversity among Turkey’s Kurds. With no elections

153 scheduled for two years, he may be less intent on mobilising nationalist constituencies. That would be the right choice. The alternative – impeding channels for the legitimate representation of the Kurdish movement and ignoring longstanding political demands and grievances – would ensure that adversity festers and segments of the population radicalise. By the same token, if the government continues to broadly apply anti-terror legislation so as to criminalise the mere fact of contradicting official accounts, there will be no hope for the resumption of more constructive, peaceful public debate on resolving Turkey’s PKK conflict. That is the key. With the coming of spring, mutual escalation of that confrontation is likely; the Syrian war, in which Ankara and Kurdish affiliates of the PKK are at odds, further magnifies the danger. The only way to durable peace remains new talks between Turkey and the PKK, accompanied – on a separate track – by an effort to satisfy Turkey’s Kurdish population on core issues such as mother-tongue education, de-centralisation, a lower electoral threshold, reform of anti-terror laws and an ethnically neutral constitution."

Numerous serious questions have arisen about the legitimacy of the referendum that Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says passed, giving him greatly increased power under an amended constitution. 8 of the 11 judges on the panel overseeing the election were appointed at the last minute by Erdogan, filling slots made vacant in the President's purge of the judiciary, along with government employees across the government and army, following the failed coups attempt of summer 2017. Particularly questionable is that the judges allowed millions of votes that lacked an official stamp proving their authenticity to be counted, a violation of Turkish election law. In addition, there were numerous reports of alleged ballot box stuffing and voter intimidation around the country. Prior to the voting, polling indicated that the referendum would not pass (Patrick Kingsley, "Critics in Turkey Question Credibility of Judges Who Oversaw Vote," The New York Times, April 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/europe/turkey-referendum-judges.html?ref=todayspaper).

"Raid in Yemen: Risky From the Start and Costly," The New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/donald-trump-yemen-commando-raid- questions.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "Just five days after taking office, over dinner with his newly installed secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Trump was presented with the first of what will be many life-or-death decisions: whether to approve a commando raid that risked the lives of American Special Operations forces and foreign civilians alike." "With two of his closest advisers, Jared Kushner and Stephen K. Bannon, joining the dinner at the White House along with Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Mr. Trump approved sending in the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, hoping the raid early last Sunday would scoop up cellphones and laptop computers that could yield valuable clues about one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist groups. Vice President Mike Pence and Michael T. Flynn, the national security adviser, also attended the dinner. As it turned out, almost everything that could go wrong did. And on Wednesday, Mr. Trump flew to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware to be present as the body of the American commando killed in the raid was returned home, the first military death on the new commander in chief’s watch. The death of Chief Petty Officer William Owens came after a chain of mishaps and misjudgments that plunged the elite commandos into a ferocious 50-minute firefight that also left three others wounded and a $75 million aircraft deliberately destroyed. There are allegations — which the Pentagon acknowledged on Wednesday night are most likely correct — that the mission also killed several civilians, including some children. The dead include, by the account of Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, the 8-year-old daughter of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born Qaeda leader who was killed in a targeted drone strike in 2011." "The missions casualties raise doubts about the months of detailed planning that went into the operation during the Obama administration and whether the right questions were raised before its approval. Typically, the president’s advisers lay out the risks, but Pentagon officials declined to characterize any discussions with Mr. Trump."

David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Yemen Withdraws Permission for U.S. Antiterror Ground

154 Missions," The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/middleeast/yemen-special-operations- missions.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "Angry at the civilian casualties incurred last month in the first commando raid authorized by President Trump, Yemen has withdrawn permission for the United States to run Special Operations ground missions against suspected terrorist groups in the country, according to American officials."

Yemen remained in the midst of violence mostly against civilians, in mid-March 2017. Shuaib Almosawa and Ben Hubbard, "Yemen Market Airstrike Kills at Least 16 People," The New York Times, March 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/middleeast/yemen-market- airstrike.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "An airstrike by a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia on an open market in western Yemen killed at least 16 people, United Nations and local officials said Saturday. The attack late Friday hit a market selling khat, a mild stimulant common in Yemen, setting off a fire and leaving the dead and wounded scattered in the wreckage."

"Time Short to Avert Starvation in Yemen and Somalia, Red Cross Says," The New York Times, March 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/world/africa/famine-yemen-somalia-red-cross- relief.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The world has only three to four months to save millions of people in Yemen and Somalia from starvation, as war and drought wreck crops and block deliveries of food and medical care, the International Committee of the Red Cross said Wednesday."

ICG, "Instruments of Pain (I): Conflict and Famine in Yemen," Middle East & North Africa Briefing No. 52, April 13, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian- peninsula/yemen/b052-instruments-pain-i-conflict-and-famine- yemen?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=807c0f0a34- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-807c0f0a34- 359871089, commented, "War is denying Yemenis food to eat. This special briefing, the first of four examining the famine threats there and in South Sudan, Nigeria and Somalia, urges the Saudi-led coalition not to assault Yemen’s most important port, Hodeida, and both sides to immediately resolve deadlock over the Central Bank. I. Overview Yemenis are starving because of war. No natural disaster is responsible. No amount of humanitarian aid can solve the underlying problem. Without an immediate, significant course change, portions of the country, in the 21st century and under the watch of the Security Council, will likely tip into famine. The projected disaster is a direct consequence of decisions by all belligerents to weaponise the economy, coupled with indifference and at times a facilitating role played by the international community, including key members of the Security Council such as the U.S., UK and France. Avoiding famine, if this is still possible, requires the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, supporting the government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against Huthi rebels and fighters aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, to halt what promises to be a bloody battle for Yemen’s most important port, Hodeida. It also requires immediate action by both sides to put aside differences and enable central bank technocrats to address the liquidity problem, pay public-sector salaries nationally and regulate the riyal. For this to be sustainable, Yemenis need a ceasefire and a durable political settlement to have a chance at rebuilding the shattered economy. II. Famine and Conflict By numbers, Yemen is suffering from the largest food crisis in the world. According to the UN, an estimated seventeen million persons, 60 per cent of the population and three million more than were so afflicted at the start of the year, are food insecure and require urgent humanitarian assistance to save lives. Seven of the country’s 22 governorates are at a phase four emergency food insecurity level, one step away from phase five: famine. Areas affected include both government and Huthi/Saleh controlled governorates. UNICEF reports that 460,000 children suffer from severe acute malnutrition. The evolving hunger crisis has both a supply and demand side, with an underlying motif of combatants pursuing war by any means with little to no regard for the population. According to a

155 prominent Yemeni entrepreneur, “the real story of the humanitarian crisis is that Huthi/Saleh forces and the corrupt people around President Hadi are all benefitting from the war economy while the people of Yemen suffer”. Saudi-led coalition allies repeatedly have hindered the movement of aid and commercial goods to the population. Huthi/Saleh violations are most egregious in the city of Taiz, where their fighters have enforced a full or partial blockade since 2015, with devastating humanitarian consequences. They routinely interfere with the work of humanitarians, at times demanding the diversion of aid to themselves or denying aid workers access to populations in need, revoking visas or even detaining them.They heavily tax all imports into their areas in part to finance the war effort and also run a black market in fuel, enriching military elites while driving prices up for transport of vital commodities. The Saudi-led coalition has strangled the flow of commodities into the country’s largest and most important port, Hodeida, which is under Huthi/Saleh control. Yemen is over 90 per cent dependent on imports for staple commodities such as wheat and rice; the UN estimates that 80 per cent of all imports for the north currently pass through Hodeida. Under the cover of UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which called for an arms embargo against Huthi/Saleh forces, the Saudi-led coalition aggressively imposed a naval blockade for the first year of the war. Three months after their military intervention, only 15 per cent of pre-war imports were entering the country, prompting UN humanitarian agencies to issue initial famine warnings. Following bureaucratic delays on the part of the Security Council, the coalition and the Yemeni government, the problem was partially resolved in May 2016 through a UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) that led to an easing of restrictions, but by then coalition airstrikes had already damaged the port’s throughput capacity, contributing to long queues and delays. The situation is about to become much worse, as the coalition appears determined to break a military stalemate that has largely held since September 2015 by attempting to capture the Red Sea coast, including Hodeida. It says that taking the port is necessary to stem the flow of weapons to Huthi/Saleh fighters and to bring them to the bargaining table. This reasoning is questionable, since the Saudi-backed Hadi government, not the Huthi/Saleh bloc, officially rejected the latest peace initiative of the UN special envoy, and the coalition’s navy and the UNVIM already monitor, albeit not perfectly, the port. In any case, the campaign’s humanitarian risks are clear. Unlike Aden and areas in the south, coalition forces would not be greeted as liberators, and Huthi/Saleh fighters have had ample time to prepare defensive positions. The battle would likely be protracted and could close and further damage this vital entrepôt. Even if the coalition is able to secure the city, it is far from clear it would have the will or capacity to ensure imports cross battle lines into Huthi/Saleh-controlled areas of the north, where the bulk of Yemen’s population resides. Indeed, there is widespread agreement among Yemenis that the Hadi government would use control of the port to further squeeze Huthi/Saleh-controlled areas economically in an attempt to break that alliance or engender an internal uprising against it, an outcome the Saudi-led coalition has long predicted. The costs of such a strategy would fall disproportionately on the civilian population, with Huthi/Saleh fighters being the last to starve. Humanitarians argue that even at its reduced capacity, there is no alternative to using Hodeida in terms of location and infrastructure. If the city is attacked and the port closed, it will become the most important choke point in what already is a massive hunger challenge. The more acute current problem, however, is on the demand side. Notwithstanding mounting challenges, food is still widely available in the markets, including Sanaa. Yet, Yemenis throughout the country increasingly are unable to purchase it. After two years of ground fighting and air bombardment, the economy is in tatters. Families and communities are approaching a breaking point, having sold their assets, spent their savings and exhausted extended networks of support. The situation is most severe for the more than three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and residents of governorates like Hodeida, who were the poorest before the conflict. It also takes a particularly harsh toll on women and girls, who are typically the last to eat and in December 2016 made up 62 per cent of the four million people suffering from acute malnutrition. A critical component of the purchasing power crisis is the inability of the central bank to consistently pay public-sector salaries since August 2016. This is a product of shrinking state finances, an acute liquidity crisis and the bank’s inability to move financial resources between areas controlled by

156 conflict parties. The issue has become deeply politicised. Prior to President Hadi’s 19 September decision to move the central bank from Sanaa to Aden, there had been a tacit agreement between the warring sides to allow the institution to function relatively free of interference. Diplomats and economists widely agreed that the bank had remained largely impartial, facilitating the import of an increasingly limited list of basic commodities, protecting the value of the riyal and paying public-sector salaries nationally under increasingly difficult economic circumstances. But this did not last. Without revenues from hydrocarbons, which accounted for approximately half the government’s budget in 2014, or donor support, both solvency and immediate liquidity came under immense strain. By moving the bank, the government argued, it could prevent the Huthi/Saleh bloc from using central bank funds for its war effort, while allowing the bank to dispense public-sector salaries nationally and stabilise the economy. The bank in Aden has printed much-needed currency to address the liquidity crisis (a move that was blocked by the Hadi government when the bank was in Sanaa); at least 160 billion Yemeni riyals (approximately $640 million) have been delivered to Aden as part of a 400-billion riyal ($1.6 billion) order from a printing company in Russia. However, there is little transparency as to how the money has been disbursed. Moreover, since the relocation, some salaries have been paid in the south but far fewer in the north, and the banking system has all but collapsed, putting additional pressures on the supply side, as commodity importers can no longer access letters of credit. More worrying yet, the government has not received a much-needed injection of foreign currency Hadi supporters expected would come from Gulf backers once the bank moved. The small amount of domestic revenue that is generated is not being deposited in central bank accounts, as the country’s various administrative centres are acting autonomously. Neither Huthi/Saleh-controlled territories nor Marib governorate, which is technically controlled by the Hadi government and is the main producer of oil and gas for Yemeni consumption, are making revenues available to the central bank in Aden. The Hadi government is also not depositing oil export revenues from the Masila basin in Hadramout, which came back online in August 2016, and is instead using an external account in Saudi Arabia with no oversight of expenditures. In the absence of access to foreign exchange, pumping additional riyals into the market would create inflationary pressures. Each side blames the other for the economic disaster. The government says it cannot pay salaries in Huthi/Saleh-controlled territories until these remit tax and other import revenues to the bank in Aden (nationally these revenues accounted for around 30 per cent of pre-war government income). The Huthi/Saleh authorities accuse the government of trying to starve the north and refuse to recognise or share accounts with Aden. As the two sides bicker, Yemenis across the country are slowly starving. III. What Is Needed Addressing the looming famine is a complex challenge that requires immediate action to prevent a worsening of the situation and to deliver lifesaving assistance to those most in need. Yemenis are set to starve as a result of the financial consequences of the war, but this trend can still be arrested and even reversed if political actors choose to do so. The following steps are urgent: The Saudi-led coalition should halt plans to invade the port of Hodeida. The Huthi/Saleh authorities, the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition should work with the UN envoy to reach a deal that allows technocrats in the central bank in Aden and Sanaa to devise a plan for the resumption of public-sector salaries nationally, disbursement of social-welfare cash transfers to the poorest Yemenis and performance of basic banking functions free of political interference until a comprehensive political settlement is reached. This compromise should contain several elements, including: cooperation between the central bank in Aden and the branch in Sanaa, where the majority of bank technocrats and infrastructure are still located; agreement by the Huthi/Saleh forces and the government not to interfere with decisions made by technocrats in the central bank, nor to divert the bank’s injections of liquidity for other purposes; commitment by all parties to ensure that hydrocarbon, customs and tax revenues are accurately deposited/reflected in the national central bank system; and that the central bank has access to at least some commercial banks and to foreign central banks where it has reserves on deposit. (Currently its accounts are blocked, in part as a result of uncertainties on the part of foreign central banks regarding the move from Sanaa to Aden and the appointment of a new bank management by President Hadi.)

157 agreement to pay public-sector salaries nationally based on 2014 pay lists (these exclude any additions made by the Huthi authorities since the February 2015 coup); and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates should agree to help finance, along with the World Bank and other donors, the approximately $500 million needed to fund emergency cash transfers to the poorest Yemenis for one year using 2014 social-welfare lists. To be successful, these stopgap measures ultimately must be supplemented and supported by a ceasefire and peace agreement that allow Yemenis the chance to rebuild state institutions and the economy. To this end: the Huthi/Saleh authorities and the government should reengage immediately with the UN special envoy to secure a ceasefire and resumption of talks based on the UN envoy’s roadmap; and the UN Security Council should take prompt action to rejuvenate the political track by passing a long-overdue new resolution under its mandatory Chapter VII authority demanding an immediate ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access and a return to talks based on the existing UN roadmap, which requires compromises from both sides."

Declan Walsh and Nour Youssef, "Widening Crackdown, Egypt Shutters Group That Treats Torture Victims Gear," The New York Times, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/middleeast/widening-crackdown-egypt-shutters-group- that-treats-torture-victims.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The Egyptian police on Thursday shut down the offices of an organization that treats victims of torture and violence in the latest escalation of a harsh government crackdown against human rights defenders and civil liberties groups."

ICG, "Instruments of Pain (II): Conflict and Famine in South Sudan, Africa Briering #124, April 26, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/b124-instruments-pain-ii-conflict-and- famine-south- sudan?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=0df0d5aac6- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_26&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-0df0d5aac6- 359871089, commented, "War in South Sudan led the UN to declare 100,000 people are suffering famine, with a further 5.5 million at risk. This special briefing urges the country to work harder to establish parameters for a ceasefire. At the same time, humanitarian corridors from Sudan should be kept open and donors must fully fund the UN aid appeal. Overview As South Sudan’s conflicts, which began in December 2013, have fragmented and expanded, the hunger crisis has deepened and widened. Over 40 per cent of the population is severely food insecure, 60 per cent higher than at this time last year. On 20 February, the UN declared that some 100,000 people are already living in famine conditions in Leer and Mayendit counties. But some 5.5 million are at risk unless urgent measures are taken to reduce conflict and enable humanitarians to deliver more aid safely. Conflict among various factions has prompted massive displacement that in turn has prevented farming, while looting and cattle rustling have destroyed many people’s assets. Some 1.9 million civilians are internally displaced persons (IDPs), 224,000 of whom have fled to UN peacekeeping bases. Another 1.6 million have found refuge in neighbouring countries. Currency depreciation, hyperinflation and insecurity have led to declining trade and soaring food prices. Addressing the humanitarian crisis is hugely expensive. In its 2017 appeal, the UN requested $1.6 billion; so far, only $439 million has been pledged. Helping starving people also is perilous; 82 humanitarian workers have been killed. In the absence of bolder policy decisions to reduce fighting, humanitarian actors will remain at the forefront of the myriad internal conflicts and, with their lives at risks and budgets under pressure, be able to do less as needs continue to grow. To mitigate the worst effects of the conflicts, the peace process oversight body – the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) – and its partners need to support ceasefire implementation, as well as local dialogue and negotiations between the government and warring factions. To prevent famine in the meantime, however, the humanitarian appeal needs to be fully funded. To ensure that the aid reaches those most in need, all actors should avoid politicising it. Finally, the two existing and third needed humanitarian corridors through Sudan must be kept consistently open.

158 II. Civil War in South Sudan The origins and dynamics of the conflicts that are occurring across South Sudan differ dramatically. At the war’s outset, there were two main warring parties: the government and its allies on the one hand, and on the other, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and affiliated groups. Despite the signing in August 2015 of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the disputes continue to evolve, with opposition groups simultaneously factionalising and localising. The government has offered amnesty to some armed groups, while maintaining military pressure on others. Though external policymakers have struggled to respond to these nuances, international political inertia prevails. Fortunately, relatively few locations have experienced sustained warfare, as military dynamics tend to suspend fighting for months or years at a time. This means most IDPs and other civilians are in relatively stable camps or other refuges, and humanitarian actors can provide basic services. However, many of the worst humanitarian situations occur in areas with ongoing conflict, where civilians are often deliberately targeted, thus creating the conditions for famine. Warring parties tend to view civilians as integral elements of their enemy’s economic, political and social support system. This is particularly evident during incidents of revenge violence, when civilians are likely to be treated not as distinct and protected but as part of an armed group. Following government combat operations or ambushes against government vehicles, it is common for soldiers to turn on local civilians. Rebels have also attacked civilians belonging to different ethnic communities. The proliferation and fracturing of rebel groups give many of these conflicts increasingly local characteristics. The government’s strategy is to militarily pressure the disparate groups into political accommodation. Its own experience, during the two-decade liberation struggle with the government in Khartoum, leads it to believe that attrition will eventually create conditions for a political resolution. It is prepared to play a long game with what is seen as a predictable conflict trajectory, though one with an uncertain timeline. As opposition groups fracture and multiply, there is often no higher rebel authority than the commander on the ground. The government’s co-option of some former rebel leaders often divides communities, leading to a yet more chaotic situation, as in the ongoing conflict in Mayendit, one of the counties now experiencing famine. III. The Man-made Crisis in Southern Leich State Civilians in Leer, Mayendit and Koch counties in Southern Leich State (the former Unity state) have experienced extensive depredations since the civil war began. At its outset, the trigger to the humanitarian crisis was mistreatment by the armies of both sides, as well as their respective allies. Over the past year or so, the number of warring factions has multiplied, as the government has sought to peel off factions from the rebel coalition. The result is a host of armed groups, most nominally aligned with either the government army (the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army, SPLA) or an SPLA-In Opposition faction. In the absence of tactical command and control, pillage and raiding is common, devastating communities and further complicating the search for local political solutions. Armed groups repeatedly attack civilians, leaving them without productive assets; towns are not safe; and food markets are devastated. The insecurity constrains aid groups’ ability to sustain operations. The gender dynamics of violence confront families and communities with impossible choices for feeding themselves and their children, over 30 per cent of whom in these counties are severely malnourished. Men face considerable risk from armed groups if they travel to seek food, as they are often shot if they encounter opposing forces. This has forced women to take enormous risks for their families. When they encounter opposing forces, they are often subject to horrific sexual violence, but their chances of survival are higher. Women were raped by fighters from several different armed groups – including fighters belonging to factions they supported – as they fled fighting in Southern Unity en route to safety at the UN base in Bentiu. Violence in Southern Leich state has pushed many far into the southern swamps along the Nile River, where food is unavailable and leaving to seek it is to risk attack. IV. War-exacerbated Drought and Economic Challenges Beyond Southern Leich, even peaceful areas such as the Aweil region on the Sudanese border in the north are at risk of famine. This is the outcome not only of drought (in both South Sudan and neighbouring countries) and other climatic challenges, but also of fighting elsewhere in the country. South

159 Sudan’s economy deteriorated dramatically in 2016, as the government struggled to respond to the global drop in oil prices and borrowed heavily to fight the war. This triggered hyperinflation, even as spreading conflicts in places such as the formerly peaceful Equatorias contributed to 2017’s 40 per cent national decline in food production from the same February-April period in the previous year. More broadly, insecurity has increased costs for both traders and humanitarian actors. Poor people already living on the edge now face low food production due to erratic rainfall and far higher prices for what food there is in the markets. After extensive negotiations with Khartoum, aid agencies opened two of three proposed humanitarian corridors through Sudan in an attempt to increase available imported food and reduce the cost of moving food aid to South Sudanese border areas. Sudan’s cooperation is a tangible, welcome outcome of its ongoing negotiations with the U.S. over sanctions relief. A priority now is to open a third corridor, to carry food into Aweil. V. Humanitarian Access The warring parties at times have sought to use humanitarian assistance as leverage over civilian populations by pressuring aid agencies to provide food for civilians in areas they control. At others, they have refused to halt fighting to enable access to those populations. Many combatants believe aid inevitably will support not only civilians, but also the opposing side’s fighting forces. Accordingly, both government and opposition groups have presented aid agencies with bureaucratic impediments. Still, South Sudan is one of the only conflict countries where humanitarian organisations are able to negotiate access directly and mostly successfully. It is not easy. In addition to the government, the negotiations must involve neighbouring countries and dozens of rebel leaders. Yet, in part thanks to joint pressure from neighbours – Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – as well as from the U.S., China, the African Union (AU) and UN, all warring parties endorse the principle of impartial humanitarian access. This further illustrates that the primary access constraint, as well as cause of the famine, is the conflict. Where active fighting takes place, humanitarian workers face looting and harassment. They must frequently evacuate staff who do not receive the special protection from warring groups to which they are entitled and which they negotiate with the government and rebel leaders. Sometimes they are directly prohibited access to locations during and immediately after fighting. As a result, assistance can be inadequate or delayed. Some civilians fleeing constant violence are unable to remain in one place long enough to receive sustained assistance. There are other challenges as well. Food cannot be pre-positioned in conflict areas lest it be stolen. Humanitarian groups are the only international contacts some rebels have. In a handful of cases, humanitarian workers have brokered unpublicised local ceasefires in order to deliver aid. Negotiations take time and money, but more costly options can usually guarantee aid workers’ security. In some cases credible security guarantees cannot be made to enable access across front lines, for example, so expensive airdrops are necessary. At a time of shrinking budgets, however, trade-offs directly impact how many people will receive assistance. It is thus imperative that the UN’s humanitarian appeal be fully funded. VI. International Political Paralysis Following the bitter July 2016 fighting in Juba, international actors struggled to influence internal peace and conflict dynamics. While the overall policy is to support the government, there has been little tangible engagement other than with the international institutions related to the 2015 peace agreement. Most donor funding goes to international peace and ceasefire monitoring bodies which have relatively little impact, while that for South Sudanese institutions, such as the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission, is almost non-existent. There are no simple solutions in South Sudan, and moves toward genuine peace require compromises both among South Sudanese and between international actors and the government. Given the multiplicity of factions, peace is more likely to be a local affair, in which progress in some areas may occur at the same time as stagnation in others. There is little appetite beyond South Sudan’s immediate neighbours to support local dialogue, however, whether to promote peace, reconciliation or humanitarian access. Recent statements from President Salva Kiir and the government in support of dialogue and a unilateral ceasefire are a welcome change in rhetoric. The modalities required for implementation are technically complex, however, and require direct international assistance as well as political will. Greater

160 political support and ceasefire-oriented technical assistance could help mitigate the impact of the current crisis, provided they do not come at the expense of the funding and effort needed for humanitarian operations. UN officials and diplomats outside South Sudan have made high-level calls for a ceasefire. Yet, they have not put forward realistic ideas on how it might be negotiated among the government and multiple opposition factions, and no tangible work on a ceasefire is being done in-country. Such focus as there is has been on how a ceasefire might enable temporary humanitarian access. That would be welcome but by definition have limited utility. Any ceasefire, whether national or local, should be developed in such a way as to create conditions for dialogue and with an aim of achieving sustainability. VII. What Is Needed To prevent further famine and related humanitarian catastrophe in South Sudan, the following steps are urgently needed: Donors should fully fund the UN’s humanitarian appeal. Sudan and South Sudan should keep open, and increase, humanitarian corridors from Sudan. Domestic and international actors should avoid politicising humanitarian assistance and support aid agencies in their efforts to deliver assistance to civilians in locations where civilians feel safe receiving aid, based on impartial negotiated access, and refrain from using the humanitarian situation for political leverage. To support President Kiir’s commitment to announce a unilateral ceasefire soon and hold the government to its word, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC) and its partners should provide technical assistance to the government to develop the modalities, with the aim of expanding that ceasefire to include opposition groups and become permanent. South Sudan’s partners should support local dialogue and negotiations between the government and warring factions."

Ian Fisher and Isabel Kershner, "Israel Defiantly Cranks West Bank Settlement Plans Into High Gear," The New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/israel-3000-homes-west- bank.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "In a major acceleration of new settlement construction plans, Israel has approved thousands more housing units in the occupied West Bank and, for the first time in years, has called for the establishment of an entire new settlement there. Together, the moves intensified Israel’s defiance of international pressure, and opened a forceful new phase of Israeli expansion into land the Palestinians claim for a future state."

Mark Landler, "Israel May Offer Only a General Commitment to Slow Settlement Building," The New York Times, March 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/us/politics/israel-settlements- trump-netanyahu.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The Trump administration’s negotiations with the Israeli government are expected to yield only a general commitment — and not a specific pledge — to slow the building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, an administration official briefed on the talks said on Friday."

Isabel Kershner, "Israel Approves First New Settlement in Decades," The New York Times, March 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/middleeast/israeli-settlements- netanyahu.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FIsrael&action=click&contentCollection=world®ion=str eam&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection, reported, "Israel’s government on Thursday approved the establishment of a new settlement in the West Bank for the first time in more than two decades, and also laid the groundwork for further expansion despite a request from President Trump to hold off on settlement activity." Isabel Kershner, "Israel Says It Will Rein In ‘Footprint’ of West Bank Settlements," The New York Times, March 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/middleeast/israel-settlements- west-bank.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A day after approving the construction of a new settlement in the West Bank for the first time in more than 20 years, Israel announced a new, if ambiguous, settlement policy on Friday “out of consideration for the positions of President Trump” and, it said, to enable progress in the peace process with Palestinians.

161 Israel said it was taking steps to “significantly rein in the footprint” of the settlements, allowing construction within all its existing settlements in the occupied West Bank but limiting, “wherever possible,” their expansion into new territory. How the new policy might translate on the ground was largely left open to interpretation. The Palestinians, like most of the rest of the world, oppose any Israeli construction in the occupied territories."

Ian Fisher, "Over 1,000 Palestinian Prisoners in Israel Stage Hunger Strike," The New York Times, April 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/world/middleeast/marwan-barghouti-hunger- strike-israel.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "More than 1,000 Palestinians in Israeli prisons joined in a hunger strike on Monday, demanding better conditions in an unusually large protest led by Marwan Barghouti, the most prominent prisoner and a figure often seen as a future Palestinian leader. Later Monday, there were unconfirmed reports by both Israeli and Palestinian news outlets that Mr. Barghouti had been moved from his usual prison, Hadarim, near Haifa, and placed in solitary confinement at another prison. The reports said his offenses were the strike and the act of smuggling out of prison an essay that he wrote, which was published as an Op-Ed article on Sunday in The New York Times."

Isabel Kershner, "Challenging Hamas, Palestinian Authority Cuts Electricity Payments for Gaza," The New York Times, April 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/middleeast/palestinian-authority-hamas-gaza- electricity.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The Palestinian Authority informed Israel on Thursday that it would no longer pay for the electricity that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, in an extraordinary push by the authority to reassert some control after years of rule in Gaza by the militant group Hamas. The schism between the Palestinian Authority, which is based in the West Bank and led by President Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas, which seized full control of Gaza in 2007, has left Palestinians deeply divided and has hurt efforts to reach a peace deal with Israel. Palestinian analysts speculated that Mr. Abbas was trying to flex his muscles before an expected meeting with President Trump in the White House, possibly in early May." "The two million residents of Gaza already suffer from acute power shortages, with electricity rationed to about four hours a day. With its own power station out of commission, Gaza is dependent on the electricity lines from Israel, and a smaller, less reliable supply from Egypt."

Ian Fisher, "In Palestinian Power Struggle, Hamas Moderates Talk on Israel," The New York Times, May 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/world/middleeast/hamas-fatah-palestinians- document.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "Hamas, the militant group built around violent resistance to Israel, sought on Monday to present a more moderate public face, taking its next shot in an intensifying struggle for leadership of the Palestinian cause and international recognition. Released by Hamas just days before its chief rival, the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas, was to meet President Trump, a new document of principles for the group calls for closer ties to Egypt, waters down the anti-Semitic language from its charter, and accepts at least a provisional Palestinian state — though it still does not formally recognize Israel. With its statement, Hamas is trying to offer a more mainstream-friendly version of its vision for the Palestinian cause, and to gain ground against Mr. Abbas, whose influence is growing more tenuous."

For a considerable time, leaders in Israel's peace movement have been calling on Israel and nations involved in working for an Israeli-Palestinian peace to include the Arab League's peace proposal in their work for a resolution. In February, and potentially interesting, Peter Baker and Mark Landler, "Trump May Turn to Arab Allies for Help With Israeli-Palestinian Relations," The New York Times, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/middleeast/trump-arabs-palestinians- israel.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "President Trump and his advisers, venturing for the first time into the fraught world of Middle East peacemaking, are developing a strategy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would enlist Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to break years of deadlock.

162 The emerging approach mirrors the thinking of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who will visit the United States next week, and would build on his de facto alignment with Sunni Muslim countries in trying to counter the rise of Shiite-led Iran. But Arab officials have warned Mr. Trump and his advisers that if they want cooperation, the United States cannot make life harder for them with provocative pro-Israel moves."

Majd al Wadeidi and Isabel Kershner, "Killing of a Hamas Leader Could Signal a New Conflict With Israel," The New York Times, March 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/middleeast/mazen-fuqaha-hamas-killing- israel.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The mysterious killing of a leader of Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades, has raised tensions with Israel and threatened to undermine the fragile cease-fire that ended 50 days of deadly fighting in Gaza in the summer of 2014. The assassination of Mr. Fuqaha could herald a new kind of shadow war between bitter foes — a message from Israel to Hamas’s new, hard-line leader, Yehya Sinwar. Or Mr. Fuqaha’s death could be an ominous sign of internecine rivalries among Palestinian factions and even within Hamas under Mr. Sinwar, who carries a reputation as a harsh enforcer of loyalty in the group."

Edward Wong, "U.N. Human Rights Experts Unite to Condemn China Over Expulsions of Tibetans," The New York Times, February 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/world/asia/china-tibet- buddhists-larung-gar.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A half-dozen United Nations experts who investigate human rights abuses have taken the rare step of banding together to condemn China for expulsions of monks and nuns from major religious enclaves in a Tibetan region. In a sharply worded statement, the experts expressed alarm about 'severe restrictions of religious freedom' in the area. Most of the expulsions mentioned by the experts have taken place at Larung Gar, the world’s largest Buddhist institute and one of the most influential centers of learning in the Tibetan world. Officials have been demolishing some of the homes of the 20,000 monks and nuns living around the institute, in a high valley in Sichuan Province. The statement also cited accusations of evictions at Yachen Gar, sometimes known as Yarchen Gar, an enclave largely of nuns that is also in Sichuan and has a population of about 10,000."

Choe Sun=Hun, "North Korea’s Launch of Ballistic Missiles Raises New Worries," The New York Times, March 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/world/north-korea-ballistic- missiles.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported. "North Korea launched four ballistic missiles from its long- range rocket launch site on Monday morning, the South Korean military said. The launch prompted South Korean security officials to call for the early deployment of an advanced American missile defense system that has provoked China."

In the wake of new test missile launchings by North Korea, the United States has begun to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense missile system in South Korea. This has upset the Chinese, who attempted but failed to broker a compromise between the U.S. and North Korea over this issue. It seems likely that China's main concern is that the radar in the anti missile system would expose the limits in the Chinese nuclear missile system and weaken its deterrent effect (Chris Buckley "Why U.S. Antimissile System in South Korea Worries China," The New York Times, March 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system- china.html?ref=todayspaper). Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea Fires Ballistic Missile a Day Before U.S.-China Summit," The New York Times, April 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missile- test-xi-trump.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "North Korea fired a ballistic missile off its east coast on Wednesday, a day before President Trump was to host his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida for their first summit meeting. The missile test is likely to intensify differences between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi over how to deal with the recalcitrant government in North Korea."

163 Davis E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "As North Korea Speeds Its Nuclear Program, U.S. Fears Time Will Run Out," The New York Times, April 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile- program.html?ref=todayspaper, "Behind the Trump administration’s sudden urgency in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis lies a stark calculus: a growing body of expert studies and classified intelligence reports that conclude the country is capable of producing a nuclear bomb every six or seven weeks." Mark Lanler, "The Drumbeats Don’t Add Up to Imminent War With North Korea," The New York Times, April 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/world/asia/trump-administration-north- korea.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The drumbeat of bellicose threats and military muscle- flexing on both sides overstates the danger of a clash between the United States and North Korea, senior Trump administration officials and experts who have followed the Korean crisis for decades said. While Mr. Trump regards the rogue government in the North as his most pressing international problem, he told the senators he was pursuing a strategy that relied heavily on using China’s economic leverage to curb its neighbor’s provocative behavior. Recent American military moves — like deploying the submarine Michigan and the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to the waters off the Korean Peninsula — were aimed less at preparing for a pre-emptive strike, officials said, than at discouraging the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, from conducting further nuclear or ballistic missile tests."

Paul Mozur and Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea’s Rising Ambition Seen in Bid to Breach Global Banks," The New York Times, March 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/technology/north-korea-hackers-global- banks.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, When hackers associated with North Korea tried to break into Polish banks late last year they left a trail of information about their apparent intentions to steal money from more than 100 organizations around the world, according to security researchers. A list of internet protocol addresses, which was supplied by the security researchers and analyzed by The New York Times, showed that the hacking targets included institutions like the World Bank, the European Central Bank and big American companies including Bank of America. While some of the Polish banks took the hackers’ bait, the scheme was detected fairly quickly, and there is no evidence that any money was stolen from the intended targets. Yet security researchers said the hit list, found embedded in the code of the attack on more than 20 Polish banks, underlines how sophisticated the capabilities of North Korean hackers have become. Their goals have now turned financial, along with efforts to spread propaganda and heist data and to disrupt government and news websites in countries considered enemies."

Choe Sang-Hun, "As Economy Grows, North Korea’s Grip on Society Is Tested," The New York Times, April 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-economy- marketplace.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0 , "Despite decades of sanctions and international isolation, the economy in North Korea is showing surprising signs of life. Scores of marketplaces have opened in cities across the country since the North Korean leader, Kim Jong- un, took power five years ago. A growing class of merchants and entrepreneurs is thriving under the protection of ruling party officials. Pyongyang, the capital, has seen a construction boom, and there are now enough cars on its once-empty streets for some residents to make a living washing them. Reliable economic data is scarce. But recent defectors, regular visitors and economists who study the country say nascent market forces are beginning to reshape North Korea — a development that complicates efforts to curb Mr. Kim’s nuclear ambitions. Even as President Trump bets on tougher sanctions, especially by China, to stop the North from developing nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the United States, the country’s improving economic health has made it easier for it to withstand such pressure and to acquire funds for its nuclear program."

Max Fisher, "India, Long at Odds With Pakistan, May Be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes," The New York Times, 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-at-odds-with-pakistan-may-be-

164 rethinking-nuclear-first-strikes.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "India may be reinterpreting its nuclear weapons doctrine, circumstantial evidence suggests, with potentially significant ramifications for the already tenuous nuclear balance in South Asia. New assessments suggest that India is considering allowing for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against Pakistan’s arsenal in the event of a war. This would not formally change India’s nuclear doctrine, which bars it from launching a first strike, but would loosen its interpretation to deem pre-emptive strikes as defensive."

Hari Kumar and Nida Najar, "5 Police Officers in India Are Killed in Ambush by Maoist Rebels," The New York Times, April 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/world/asia/india-chhattisgarh- maoist-rebels.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Maoist rebels attacked a police patrol in a remote part of eastern India on Monday, leaving at least 25 security officers dead and seven more injured, officials said. The attack was one of the deadliest in the region in recent years. The security forces, members of the Central Reserve Police Force, were guarding the construction of a new road and bridge in the Sukma district, a hilly and thickly forested part of Chhattisgarh State. The Maoist rebels in the region, known as Naxalites, often single out government road projects for attack."

The government of Bangladesh, in February 2017, decided to move Rohingya refugees in its country from Myanmar to the remote island of Thengar Char, that is underwater during monsoon season. The decision received strong criticism from around the world (Maher Sattar, "Bangladesh To Relocate Rohingya To and Island," The New York Times, February 4, 2017).

Kimiko de Freytas-Tanura, "Pope Francis Rebukes Myanmar Over Treatment of Rohingya," The New York Times, February 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/asia/pope-francis-rohingya- muslims.html?ref=todayspaperm, reported, "Pope Francis on Wednesday issued a fresh rebuke against Myanmar over its repression of the Rohingya minority group, just days after a United Nations report concluded that security forces had slaughtered and raped hundreds of men, women and children in a 'campaign of terror.'”

Ei Shwe Phyu, "Primary school curriculum to include human rights subject," Myanmar Times, March 27, 2017, reported that in Myanmar, "Education on human rights will be included in the new school curriculum for Grade 2 students next year, said a spokesperson for the Ministry of Education."

Felipe Villamor, "Communist Rebels in Philippines Say They’ll End Cease-Fire," The New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/asia/philippines-cpp-npa-communist- ceasefire.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Communist rebels engaged in peace talks with the Philippine government said on Wednesday that they were ending a six-month cease-fire, accusing the armed forces of “encroaching” on rebel territory and the government of reneging on a promise to release jailed comrades. The cease-fire has been credited with curbing the violence from 40 years of a rebellion that has left vast areas of the countryside mired in poverty and has killed at least 35,000 soldiers, rebels and civilians." "Mr. Dureza credited the cease-fire with making 'small but significant steps for sustainable peace.' 'We do not wish to unnecessarily squander those gains that even saw President Duterte exercising strong political will to move the peace process forward,' he added." "The National People’s Army said that while it was ending the truce, it continued to support peace talks. 'It is possible to negotiate while fighting until the substantive agreements are forged to address the roots of the armed conflict and lay the basis for a just and lasting peace,' it said."

ICG, Deirdre Tynan, Project Director, Central Asia, "Warning Signs on the Road to Elections in Kyrgyzstan," Commentary/Europe and Central Asia, March 3, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe- central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/warning-signs-road-elections- kyrgyzstan?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=91c0568f25-

165 KYRGYZSTAN_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_03&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea- 91c0568f25-359871089, commented, "Recent political protests in Kyrgyzstan signal the possibility of deeper trouble ahead of presidential elections in November. For the first time in the country’s pro- independence history, there is real competition for leadership in Central Asia’s only semi-functioning democracy. On 26 February, authorities arrested Omurbek Tekebayev, the leader of the opposition party Ata- Meken, on charges of fraud and corruption. That incident sparked peaceful protests in Bishkek, including at the capital’s Ala-Too Square, the site of earlier demonstrations that ultimately led to the ouster of two presidents. The past week’s demonstrations were modest, however protests in Kyrgyzstan have previously started small and then snowballed. President Almazbek Atambayev’s government – and especially the judiciary – should ensure that its actions ahead of the November ballot are above reproach in order not to aggravate the already tense situation. Kyrgyzstan’s constitution limits the president to a single term in office, preventing Atambayev from running for re-election. All eyes are now on how the government and opposition conduct themselves. Tekebayev has not declared interest in contesting the election, yet he was clearly an irritant to the president as in recent months he claimed the president’s wealth was hidden off-shore. Nevertheless, the manner of his arrest was an ill-advised demonstration of power bound to garner an angry reaction from the opposition. Tekebayev was reportedly detained at Bishkek’s international airport, at around 3 a.m. by officers in plainclothes. The next day, a court ordered him to be held for two months for alleged corruption. Two other members of Ata-Meken were detained in recent weeks as part of an alleged corruption investigation. Ata-Meken, established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been a permanent fixture on the political scene since with varying degrees of power and popularity. Tekebayev has held a series of high profile posts under previous administrations and has never been far from the headlines. Tekebayev’s detention seems to fit a familiar pattern in Kyrgyzstan: arrests of opposition figures, lack of due process, allegations of corruption on both sides, dubious documents purporting to prove wrongdoing, and the apparent use of criminal investigations to settle political scores. Much of this is possible because political reform in Kyrgyzstan, while ahead of its authoritarian neighbours, has been superficially and selectively implemented. Do you believe that the protests could spark a nationwide political crisis or trigger violence, as in 2005 and 2010? The successive ousters of President Askar Akayev in 2005 and President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010 were traumatic events for the country. Some of the factors present then are absent today, such as widespread popular discontent with the head of state and his family. Yet President Atambayev’s strategy is risky. Popular opinion can turn if injustices are perceived. Atambayev needs to make sure there is a definitive marker between his administration and that of his predecessors. The arrests of opposition figures in an election year should be carefully weighed up against the perception that they are politically motivated and an abuse of power. The judiciary should ensure due process and impartiality. The overthrow of two presidents never really revolutionized politics in Kyrgyzstan. Even after the spate of ethnic violence in Osh in 2010, Kyrgyzstan did not see the emergence of a new political elite less tainted by corruption. The country remains divided ethnically between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and geographically between the north and south. For many politicians and officials, it has been business as usual. Kyrgyzstan’s regions remain poor and underfunded, services are patchy at best, and corruption is rife at all levels of society. High unemployment is masked by migration, and there has been little economic development to speak of. The government attempts to paper over the cracks but has not mustered the political will to address difficult issues such as ethnic tensions, marginalization and exclusion. As a result, Kyrgyzstan remains politically fragile and prone to potential unrest. What are the regional and geopolitical implications of uncertainty in Kyrgyzstan? Kyrgyzstan is, in its own way, a democratic model in Central Asia, a region dominated by authoritarian states. Its neighbours often point to Kyrgyzstan as a chaotic place when in reality it is the only Central Asian republic that has attempted to dismantle the post-Soviet legacy of strong-man rule. Although the journey to democracy will continue to be a difficult one, the effort is laudable.

166 Russian influence continues to grow as the Kyrgyz government depends on Moscow for financial aid and security assistance. During a visit to Kyrgyzstan this week, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed the importance of maintaining an air base in the country to ensure stability and security in the region. China is also a key strategic partner, and considers the country a useful gateway to Central Asia. Both Moscow and Beijing are concerned about any potential for wider unrest, the rise of Islamist groups and the threat of radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan. In August 2016, the Chinese embassy was targeted by a suicide car bomber – an attack that the government blamed on groups fighting in Syria. The success or failure of Kyrgyzstan will have important regional implications. Kyrgyzstan’s legacy of violent upheaval should serve as a cautionary tale. The fear that it could happen again acts as a deterrent for some domestic actors, however the underlying causes that sparked previous electoral violence have not been addressed. In the past, Kyrgyzstan’s problems have been contained within its borders, but that can no longer be guaranteed. Neighbours Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should be mindful that an orderly Presidential election is in their interests too. What are the chances for a peaceful transition of power in 2017? A peaceful transition is still possible, but much will depend on the actions of the government and opposition parties between now and November. The election should be an opportunity to strengthen democracy and stability, and could mark a milestone on Kyrgyzstan’s road towards political maturity. All political actors, and the government particularly, should be careful not to squander this opportunity for the sake of settling political scores. The European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe can play important roles by pushing for meaningful reforms now and over the longer term. In part, this means offering continued support for institution building. It will also require frank and timely discussions with the Kyrgyz government and political parties about how the upcoming presidential ballot – and the behavior of the government and the opposition during the run-up to the election – will affect Kyrgyzstan’s credibility as a state moving, albeit tentatively, toward democracy."

ICG, "Uzbekistan: The Hundred Days," Europe & Central Asia Report, No. 242, March 15, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/242-uzbekistan-hundred- days?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=68de509b21- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_15&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-68de509b21- 359871089, commented, "Uzbekistan’s first new president in more than a quarter century has taken some positive steps in the early days of his administration. In order to encourage more sustained progress, western partners and regional powers will need to balance conditional support with tactical pressure. Executive Summary The first 100 days of Uzbekistan’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, hint at the possibility of much-overdue change in one of Central Asia’s most repressive states. But as its long-time prime minister, Mirziyoyev was a key player in the 25-year rule of his predecessor, Islam Karimov, and he inherits a system designed to protect those in power at the expense of the population. It would be premature to conclude that release of a few political prisoners, an early focus on urgent economic issues and a thaw in relations with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, welcome departures from past practice though they are, promise an intention for systemic reform policies of the sort needed to cope with rising pressures over social and economic issues. Uzbekistan’s Western partners share an interest with Russia and China in the country’s sustainable stability, however, so should cautiously work with the new administration to encourage change while being prepared to call out any backsliding. A cabinet re-shuffle in January appears to have done much to consolidate the president’s position. Numerous visits to Uzbekistan’s regions are allowing the population a degree of interaction with the head of state that was unthinkable under Karimov. Steps like that and acknowledgement of the economic hardship in rural areas have created some genuine popular support for him and a degree of optimism in the national mood. He has a complicated relationship with Rustam Azimov, an ex-finance minister, and Rustam Inoyatov, the head of the National Security Service (SNB), though the former has been somewhat sidelined. Mirziyoyev needs to cultivate their continued support and that of others, including rich Uzbeks living in Russia and elsewhere, who may have a limited interest in significant changes to the system they know so well.

167 Uzbekistan has pressing domestic issues, unpredictable neighbours and a jihadist extremism threat. Though its border with Afghanistan is one of the region’s most secure, it looks to the south with nervousness. Citizens need economic and social policies that improve their living standard. Pensioners and public sector workers exist on meagre benefits and salaries, often not paid on time. According to Russian authorities, as many as 3.35 million Uzbeks have felt obliged to find work in that country. Though Mirziyoyev has made a point about creating dialogue between citizens and the state, discontent finds no expression through civil society or in the narrow political space. Uzbekistan’s partners need to find a balance between building a relationship with the new administration and providing a critique of Karimov’s institutional legacy."

ICG, Magdalena Grono, Program Director, Europe & Central Asia, "Looming Dangers One Year after Nagorno-Karabakh Escalation, Commentary/Europe & Central Asia, March 31, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/looming-dangers- one-year-after-nagorno-karabakh- escalation?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=c11b67cc47- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-c11b67cc47- 359871089, commented, "One year after Nagorno-Karabakh’s violent flare-up in April 2016, the danger of even more perilous fighting remains real. Further hostilities risk a larger regional conflagration with far- reaching humanitarian consequences. Crisis Group’s Europe and Central Asia Program Director, Magdalena Grono, assesses risks in the region. The room housing refugees in the former Soviet sanatorium just outside Baku was getting a much- needed facelift: new black-and-silver floral wallpaper 'to make it more attractive to the future in-laws of my daughter who are not displaced like us', said Bayram, an Azeri veteran of the 1988-1994 Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. Bayram remained steadfast in his support for Azerbaijan’s role in last spring’s violent clash with Armenia. 'Of course I know what war is and what the consequences can be', he explained. He pointed to his leg, maimed by artillery fire almost 25 years ago, and to the poor conditions of the refugee shelter where his family has lived for over twenty years. 'But I have sent my eldest son to the army anyhow. He is an officer, and I have told him to fight – to take care, but to fight for his homeland.' Last year’s escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in the early hours of 2 April, killed up to 200 people. However, like many Azerbaijanis whose families have been displaced by the conflict, Bayram’s patriotic pride overtook his concern for lost lives. Bayram had hoped the fighting would result in the return to Baku’s control of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding districts – held by ethnic Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire – so he could go back home. Across the Line of Contact (LoC), the militarised zone that has separated Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since 1994, conversations in Armenia’s capital Yerevan were like stepping through a mirror. 'Don’t you understand that Baku lost last April?' a prominent Armenian expert remarked, challenging the mainstream analysis that Baku’s gaining control over two strategic heights was a significant first since 1994, if not in military terms, then certainly in terms of Azerbaijan’s posture. 'We are now prepared and ready to inflict major harm on the Azerbaijanis if they attack, so they do not feel they can get away with this', another Armenian analyst said. Such sentiments are even more sharply expressed in Nagorno-Karabakh itself, where people are deeply concerned for their security. Conversations on both sides of the divide reveal a new and dangerous situation: that renewed appetite for confrontation has engulfed a conflict once considered frozen but which – with clashes escalating since at least 2012 – is particularly dangerous now given both countries’ more powerfully equipped armies, and Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s respective military commitments with Russia and Turkey. In 2015, Azerbaijan spent $3 billion on its military, strategically diversifying acquisitions, with weapons systems purchased from Russia, Turkey, Israel and Pakistan, among others. This sum was more than Armenia’s entire national budget that year, yet Yerevan still sought to catch up, benefiting from more advantageous tariffs and a credit from Russia. Armenia and Azerbaijan each finds the current status quo unacceptable for different reasons. Before committing to talks, Yerevan urgently wishes to see improved security, including for people whose daily lives are severely impacted by ongoing escalations along the LoC and the international border between the two countries. Baku wants to have guarantees that there will be substantive progress in

168 settlement talks, including the return of districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as a first step. The prevailing dynamic, compounded by an absence of confidence between the sides or in the settlement process, lends itself to further violent flare-ups that contain grave local and regional risks. There is a long-standing conflict settlement mechanism, the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But in the absence of a re-invigorated process with high-level backing from the three Minsk Group co-chairs – Russia, the United States and France – the conflict will remain a dangerous tinderbox in the heart of the South Caucasus, between Russia, Turkey, Iran and what the EU considers its Eastern Neighbourhood. The Frozen Settlement Process Bayram, the Azeri veteran, said he was disappointed when a ceasefire was brokered by Moscow four days into the April 2016 fighting. Like many displaced people and other ordinary citizens in Azerbaijan, he felt elated that some small but strategically significant land fell into Baku’s hands as a result of the fighting, and that the widespread post-1994 myth of Armenian forces’ invincibility was broken. But he and others in Azerbaijan were also frustrated not to see “more progress”, even if it were to come with a much higher death toll and other costs. The high pain threshold of both parties in the quest for their desired outcome in the settlement of the conflict bodes ill for finding a political solution. Russia-led attempts to broker a deal last year revealed that a zero-sum logic continues to dictate not only the approach to the substance of the settlement process but also to the process itself. The gulf between Azerbaijani society on the one hand, and the Armenian and Armenian-Karabakh societies on the other, is widened by the lack of contact between parties. Only isolated civil society actors seek the construction of cultural or political bridges. In the year that has elapsed since April 2016, space for discussing mutual concessions has by and large closed. Yet last year’s conflict did briefly revive the all but moribund settlement process, as detailed in Crisis Group’s July report, “New Opening, or More Peril?”. Summits in Vienna last May and St. Petersburg in June agreed on an investigative mechanism and an increase in the number of OSCE monitors, as well as on proceeding with substantive talks. Yet by late summer, the process ground to a halt and deadly incidents have recurred with varying degrees of intensity. 'We cannot talk when we are being attacked', explained an official in Yerevan. 'The only way to get to substantive talks is to have months of quiet on the Line of Contact'. Beyond the security imperative, Yerevan is reluctant to return lands around Karabakh unless other aspects of the settlement – including Nagorno-Karabakh’s future status – are clarified, guided by a principle of 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'. Armenians fear losing strategic advantage if they do not secure their desired political outcome on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, namely its self-determination outside of Azerbaijan. Indeed, the return of even some of the districts around the contested heartland would make Karabakh much harder to defend for the Armenians. For its part, Baku resents the current status quo on the ground and fears that any security arrangements insisted upon by Yerevan would only cement it. Officials in Baku say the increased number of monitors and the investigative mechanism agreed upon last summer are only acceptable if linked to broader substantive progress in the talks. With frustrations mounting on both sides and the process stalled, incidents along the LoC will likely intensify. Baku in particular shows public readiness to use force to achieve its goals. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials explain that Baku has renounced the use of force if the conflict is settled within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Failing that, Azerbaijani analysts say, the threat of violence continues to be a legitimate means to put pressure on the adversary. Meanwhile, Armenian and de facto Armenian-Karabakh forces – two intertwined structures – have focused on new fortifications systems on the Armenian-controlled side of the LoC, as well as on an internal overhaul of command structures. Some Armenian voices, including inside Nagorno-Karabakh, even speak of seizing more territories if they are attacked, in order to increase the security belt and have more to trade in future negotiations. With both sides now poised to retaliate quickly to any escalation, and without the element of surprise, renewed fighting would likely exceed the unprecedented levels seen last year. Moscow’s Uncertain Role On the international diplomatic front, for the last decade, Moscow has de facto been the prima

169 inter pares in the Minsk Group, and it was Moscow that brought about a cessation of hostilities in April 2016. Moscow is the only one of the three co-chair countries which currently seems to have the bandwidth and interest to invest high-level political capital into the conflict. Diplomats talk about another push for progress in the talks, which Moscow is ostensibly preparing in the foreseeable future. A meeting of Foreign Ministers after the Armenian parliamentary elections on 2 April – coincidentally, the first anniversary of the escalation – should ideally lay the groundwork for a summit of the two Presidents. One desirable approach that is apparently being considered by the Minsk Group co-chair countries would include a combination of a possible declaration of both parties; an expression of support by the Minsk Group co-chairs; and a potential UN Security Council Resolution, according to diplomats based in the region. However, agreement on the details would still be needed at the Presidential level. With Russia’s long history of rule over the Caucasus region, and a continued sense that the South Caucasus is a sphere of privileged Russian interest, Moscow’s influence has many facets. Russia is the leading supplier of weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia also has close cooperation with Armenia through the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Armenia is a member. While Moscow has not formally said it is interested in having peacekeepers in the region, a Russian official informally said that 'of course [sending peacekeepers is in] our interest and we are pursuing it'. According to a gentlemen’s agreement in the context of the settlement process no co- chair or neighbouring country should provide peacekeepers. Baku and Yerevan share a deep reluctance to accept Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh. Both see this scenario as the ultimate loss of sovereignty and a return to their once subservient role within the Soviet Empire. 'We have been able to keep Russia out of our domestic politics', a former Azerbaijani politician said. 'Having their boots in Karabakh would mean they would have a very different say over our internal issues'. Likewise, an opposition-minded figure in Yerevan pointed out it was a paradox that while Armenia hosts a Russian military base, no one in Armenia wants to see Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh itself. A decade or more ago, Armenian analysts often referred to the Balkans – where Operation Storm restored Croat control over Srpska Krajina though it violated the mandate of the UN peacekeepers deployed on the ceasefire line – as an example for why international security arrangements may not be reliable. Today, notwithstanding the role of Russia as Armenia’s primary strategic partner, Crimea’s 2014 annexation by Russia is causing concern that the use of force cannot be excluded, even if international guarantees are in place. Baku, on the other hand, has seized on the biting sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its European partners on Russia to pursue in various international fora Azerbaijan’s de jure claim to the territory it sees as occupied, referring also to UN Security Council resolutions of the early 1990s. 'After Crimea, the international community’s reluctance to use the term occupation and impose sanctions against Armenia is becoming untenable,' a pro-government Azerbaijani analyst said. No Alternative to Political and Diplomatic Solutions A year on from the April 2016 flare-up, positions have significantly hardened. Both sides seem prepared to engage only on their own terms and neither society is ready to consider mutual concessions. Any discussion in Baku of the settlement process and its basic principles automatically assumes the determination of the future political status of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan – something Armenians say is unacceptable. On the other hand, discussions in Armenia over the return of lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan have been difficult and, since last April, have become a non-starter. Although, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in the past has said this remained a negotiating chip. In fact, the distinction between Nagorno-Karabakh proper and the surrounding districts held by Armenians has been largely effaced in the discourse, especially in the months since April 2016. Armenia’s former president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, remains a lone voice urging Armenians to proceed with the return of the districts around Nagorno-Karabakh, but few agree with him. The Karabakhi activist living in Yerevan explained simply: 'This would lead to civil war'. Against the backdrop of political deadlock, risks of escalation on the battlefront are growing dangerously. Most Western diplomats agree that the risks are high, yet they also stress that none of the regional powers are interested in a conflict that could ultimately ensnare them. Russia and Turkey's current

170 geopolitical cooperation regarding the war in Syria increases the chances that they would work to minimise any misunderstandings that might lead to a wider conflagration in the Caucasus theatre. Even a medium-scale intensity conflict between Baku and Yerevan is likely to have disastrous humanitarian consequences. Given the close proximity of civilians to the front lines, heavy casualties would be likely from shelling or other military deployments. Both sides alleged that the other engaged in atrocities during the April 2016 escalation, which Minsk Group co-chairs condemned in their December 2016 statement. Humanitarian agencies in the region are beefing up their capacities and developing contingency plans. The destructive potential of renewed conflict should compel both parties back to the negotiating table. If the mooted new meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan materialises, it could help inject new impetus into the stalled process. Baku and Yerevan have already, in theory at least, committed to the basic principles for the settlement developed by the OSCE Minsk Group. The elements, as formulated by Minsk Group co-chairs countries, include: 'the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation'. In spite of divergent interpretations of a number of those elements by each party, the OSCE Minsk Group should redouble its efforts to galvanise substantive talks while pushing for implementation of the measures agreed in Vienna. Russia will likely play a leading role in this, but needs the support of the U.S. and France. Washington and Paris should back up these efforts at highest levels, despite the Trump presidency’s apparent disengagement from the region and France’s electoral preoccupations. The EU should use its bilateral relations with each of the countries to reiterate not only the unacceptability of the status quo, but also the unacceptability of a repeat of last April’s hostilities. The EU has long sought to support pro-peace discourses in both societies. This kind of investment should be a renewed priority so that people like Bayram, as well as his Armenian counterparts, do not depersonalise each other. A lasting settlement will mean living side by side, taking into account the needs of both parties. For now though, there is a wide gap between what outside mediators see as a fair formula and what seems acceptable to local communities. Until this gap closes, the risks of war will remain very high."

European Developments

Patrick Kingsley, "Turkey and Greece Trade Jabs in Island Dispute," The New York Times, February 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/europe/turkey-and-greece-trade-jabs-in-island- dispute.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Turkey and Greece have reignited a decades-old disagreement over the sovereignty of a pair of uninhabited Aegean Islands, in a spat that analysts say risks aggravating other diplomatic disputes between the two countries."

Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, "In Protests, Kremlin Fears a Young Generation Stirring," The New York Times, March 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/europe/in- protests-kremlin-fears-a-young-generation-stirring.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The weekend anticorruption protests that roiled Moscow and nearly 100 Russian towns clearly rattled the Kremlin, unprepared for their size and seeming spontaneity. But perhaps the biggest surprise, even to protest leaders themselves, was the youthfulness of the crowds. A previously apathetic generation of people in their teens and 20s, most of them knowing nothing but 17 years of rule by Vladimir V. Putin, was the most striking face of the demonstrations, the biggest in years. It is far from clear whether their enthusiasm for challenging the authorities, which has suddenly provided adrenaline to Russia’s beaten-down opposition, will be short-lived or points to a new era. Nor is it clear whether the object of the anger — blatant and unabashed corruption — will infect the popularity of Mr. Putin."

In smaller demonstrations than in March, Neil MacFarquhar, "Thousands of Russians Present Letters

171 of Protest in Demonstrations," The New York Times, April 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/world/europe/russia-protests-anticorruption-open- russia.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Thousands of Russians lined up in cities across their country on Saturday to present letters of protest at government offices, the second widespread show of public discontent in two months. The protests, initiated by the Open Russia organization founded by Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, an exiled former oil tycoon, centered on the right of all Russians to present letters listing grievances to the government."

Andrew E. Kramer, "Chechen Authorities Arresting and Killing Gay Men, Russian Paper Says," The New York Times, April 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/europe/chechen- authorities-arresting-and-killing-gay-men-russian-paper-says.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "First, two television reporters vanished. Then a waiter went missing. Over the past week, men ranging in age from 16 to 50 have disappeared from the streets of Chechnya. On Saturday, a leading Russian opposition newspaper confirmed a story already circulating among human rights activists: The Chechen authorities were arresting and killing gay men. While abuses by security services in the region, where Russia fought a two-decade war against Islamic insurgents, have long been a stain on President Vladimir V. Putin’s human rights record, gay people had not previously been targeted on a wide scale."

After a quiet period, the heartland of Russia again experienced a major terror attack in early April 2017. Ivan Nechepurenko and Neil Farquhar, "Explosion in St. Petersburg, Russia, Kills 11 as Vladimir Putin Visits," The New York Times, April 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/europe/st- petersburg-russia-explosion.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "It was 2:40 p.m. on Monday, a lull before the evening rush hour in Russia’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg, where the subway normally carries two million people a day. The train had just entered a tunnel between stations, on its way out of a sprawling downtown hub, when the bomb exploded. The homemade device, filled with shrapnel, tore through the third car. It killed 11 people; wounded more than 40, including children; and spread bloody mayhem as the train limped into the Technology Institute station with smoke filling the air." "With the attack, Russia once again appeared to have found itself a target of terrorism, shattering a respite in its main urban centers. Law enforcement agencies initially said they were seeking two people suspected of planting explosive devices, according to Russian news reports, but later indicated that the attack might have been carried out by a suicide bomber from a militant Islamic group. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but speculation turned toward militants from southern Russia, who fled the shoot-to-kill law enforcement policy in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Caucasus, joined the Islamic State by the thousands and have repeatedly threatened attacks."

ICG, Magdalena Grono, Program Director, Europe & Central Asia, "Ukraine Flare-Up Lays Bare Fears in Europe’s East," Commentary/Europe & Central Asia, February 3, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/ukraine-flare-lays-bare-fears- europes-east?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=63fd0bb3c4- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_06&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-63fd0bb3c4- 359871089, commented, "Renewed fighting in eastern Ukraine is quickly turning into a litmus test of Russia’s intentions in backing Ukrainian separatist rebels, and the real willingness of the West, in particular the United States, to support Kyiv. Fears over Washington’s wavering may also cause positions to harden in the protracted conflicts in Europe’s East, most immediately in Georgia. Renewed fighting in eastern Ukraine in the first weeks of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has laid bare fears in Europe's East about Russia’s declared intent to restore its former dominance in the region – and about whether or not the U.S. will continue to provide a counterweight to Moscow’s assertiveness. Fighting that broke out on 29 January in eastern Ukraine, around the Kyiv government-controlled industrial town of Avdiivka and separatist-controlled railway hub of Yasynuvata, has continued for six days.

172 Violence has also swept from this traditional hotspot across the whole Donetsk region: the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has registered more than 7,000 ceasefire violations in the area on 1 February alone. Some things seem clear for now: most of the fighting is being carried out at a distance, using artillery and rockets. But neither side has crossed the front line and tried to seize territory, which could fatefully undermine the Minsk peace process. As they have done in the past, both sides seem to be testing their adversaries’ resolve. Kyiv probably hopes that the fighting will once again convince their U.S. and European backers that any reduction of support would be disastrous. Moscow is probably trying to remind Kyiv that it is not going to give up the separatist entities. As usual, however, politicians are scoring points at the price of civilian deaths and further destruction of vital infrastructure in the war zone. The current fighting has destroyed power lines and water systems, producing a new humanitarian emergency. People in and around Avdiivka, long among the most directly affected by the conflict, are without electricity. Around 1 million people in the region have suffered from disrupted water supplies or lack of heating in temperatures that are well below freezing. More water infrastructure damage could lead to an environmental disaster if chlorine supplies were to leak. The two sides trade accusations on who is to blame for the new violence in the nearly three-year- old conflict, which has killed almost 10,000 people and pits Ukrainian government forces against Russian- backed separatists in a band of territory across eastern Ukraine. Rebels, and their backers in Moscow, may simply be testing how far they can go and how much Western support the Ukrainians have. Kyiv’s positions are bound to get more entrenched if U.S. support weakens. If the U.S. were to lift sanctions on Moscow relating to its actions since 2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, some in Kyiv have informally told Crisis Group that Ukraine’s only choice may be to escalate. An official close to the Minsk talks said, and many commentators agree, that the escalation is directly linked to shifts in the geostrategic environment since the election of President Trump in November. The local, regional and geostrategic levels at which conflicts in Europe’s east play out are all directly linked, as must be any resolution. Ukraine, which seeks to integrate into Euro-Atlantic political and economic institutions, was concerned about lessening support from Washington even before the new U.S. administration took office. The European Union’s reach is weakening as its own challenges grow, and Russia is seen as undermining Western unity on sanctions by multiple means, including both open and covert support to populist and nationalist parties ahead of key 2017 elections in France, Germany and the Netherlands. In late 2016, a former senior Kyiv official told Crisis Group that Ukraine feels abandoned, especially on security matters. Kyiv, for its part, could have done more to increase Ukraine’s resilience, including by addressing corruption that is chipping away support for President Petro Poroshenko’s government. The dangers for Kyiv increase if it loses resolute Western support, and especially if the U.S. wavers or drops its backing for continued sanctions on Moscow. President Trump has hinted that a deal is possible if Moscow cooperates on the anti-terrorism front. Trump refused to rule out the dropping of the sanctions in a press conference with Prime Minister Theresa May on 27 January. The next day, the first call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin covered opportunities for closer cooperation, and reportedly touched on the war in Ukraine with no public reference to sanctions. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley’s 2 February remarks to the Security Council stressed that the U.S. would not lift the sanctions until Crimea is returned to Ukraine. Her words need to be backed up by President Trump’s unambiguous statements and actions. Otherwise, the U.S. role will remain open to speculation, and continued uncertainty will further increase tensions. Any more general escalation of fighting would have unpredictable political repercussions throughout Europe. Ukrainian families have borne the brunt of displacement of 3.8 million people within the country, but their capacity is overstretched. Those displaced internally today could well become the next wave of refugees pushed into Central and Western Europe. From the Western Balkans to Central Asia, the wider geostrategic shifts are creating insecurity and entrenching positions. Georgia is a good example. Its conflicts have been protracted: the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have defied Tbilisi’s control for over twenty years, but Moscow’s direct role reached a new level with recognition of their independence in 2008 after the Russian-Georgian war.

173 Hopes rose that there could be some progress towards reconciliation in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian disputes after the Georgian Dream party overwhelmingly won last autumn’s parliamentary election. The ruling party’s constitutional majority has provided space to advance its long- discussed plan to reach out to the Abkhaz and Ossetians and start addressing divisive issues. Meanwhile, Tbilisi is trying to cope internationally with what it sees as Russian occupation, which Moscow has shown no interest in discontinuing. Any steps to address local conflict legacies are welcome. Any future settlement must address longstanding grievances in mutually acceptable ways and build bridges between divided societies. But this is only possible if Georgia is securely fixed and supported within a predictable international framework that will help address its own grievances vis-à-vis Russia. If the Ukrainian and Georgian governments feel that they cannot genuinely trust the West to protect them against Russia, they are likely to become increasingly nervous and unpredictable. They may also be less willing to invest in reconciliation with those living in breakaway areas, whom they too often see as willing Kremlin proxies. There is an immediate need for all international actors to prevent the present escalation in eastern Ukraine from getting out of hand and to address the growing humanitarian needs of the affected population. The primary responsibility for this lies with Russia. At the same time, however, the U.S. should join the European Union in giving their partners in the East strong reassurances of firm backing. The West must make clear that it will not compromise on their territorial integrity — nor will it hypocritically say the right things while in fact looking away, which is perhaps more plausible and scarier. With the U.S. course being far from certain, the EU’s confident and undivided support is more important than ever. If Western backing is solid, Ukraine and Georgia – each with their different conflicts and in different ways – may have the geopolitical space to start addressing existing local divides. This is not a given and would not alone deliver a full-fledged settlement – for that, Moscow would have to change its calculations and course. But without Western backing, Ukraine and Georgia will find themselves getting ever more deeply enmeshed in insoluble conflicts, with dire consequences for affected populations and increasing risks for security on the continent."

Andrew E. Kramer, "Assassins Are Killing Ukraine’s Rebel Chiefs, but on Whose Orders?" The New York Times, February 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia- mikhail-tolstykh-dead.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "All died far from the front lines in circumstances unrelated to military action. They died in elaborate ambushes, car bomb attacks and, in one case, a booby- trapped elevator. The latest died on Wednesday in an explosion in his office. The staccato of about half a dozen assassinations of commanders in the Russian-backed separatist army in eastern Ukraine has become one of the riddles of the war there since 2015, when the first unexplained killings of Cossack militia leaders occurred. Ukrainian officials have denied any involvement in the killings, while welcoming them for thinning the ranks of the breakaway military. The authorities in Kiev say the deaths point to either infighting in the separatist leadership or efforts by Russia to consolidate control by eliminating erratic, if popular, local commanders on their own side. The assassinations could ease peace talks; Ukraine had refused direct negotiations with the rebel leadership as long as men it deemed war criminals held senior posts."

Andrew E. Kramer, "Ukraine ‘Blockaders’ Try to Cut Off Rail Traffic From Rebel Areas," The New York Times, March 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-blockaders- cut-off-rail-traffic-from-rebel-areas.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Tensions are rising along the border between Ukraine and the breakaway 'republics' in the eastern part of the country as Ukrainian nationalists from the western part seek to choke off all railroad traffic in what they are calling a blockade. The war in eastern Ukraine, now entering its third year, has been the bloodiest in Europe since the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. Despite the continuing clashes, however, the lucrative cross-border coal trade has been peculiarly unaffected."

Barbara Surk, "Russia Stirs Friction in Balkans, as NATO Keeps an Uneasy Peace," The New York Times, February 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/world/europe/russia-nato-

174 balkans.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "It is down below, in Serbia and Kosovo, where old angers are resurfacing as the Balkan region that spawned so much suffering over the last century is again becoming dangerously restive. And once again, Russia is stoking tensions, as it seeks to exploit political fissures in an area that was once viewed as a triumph of muscular American diplomacy — but that now underscores the growing challenges facing NATO and the European Union."

ICG, Marko Prelec, Former Project Director, Balkans, "New Balkan Turbulence Challenges Europe, Commentary/Europe & Central Asia, April 28, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central- asia/balMarko Prelec Former Project Director, Balkanskans/macedonia/new-balkan-turbulence-challenges- europe?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=18efcb9497- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-18efcb9497- 359871089, commented, "The Balkans was best known for minority problems. Today, the most bitter conflicts are between parties that appeal to majority ethnic communities. As recent turbulence in Macedonia shows, Eastern Europe could face new dangers if majority populism ends the current stigma against separatism for oppressed small groups. The trouble in the Balkans today is not Russian meddling, though there is some of that, but a special case of the malaise afflicting Eastern Europe: unchecked executive power, erosion of the rule of law, xenophobia directed at neighbours and migrants and pervasive economic insecurity. The pattern varies from country to country but is palpable from Szczecin on the Baltic to Istanbul on the Bosporus. The countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia – have long tended to follow patterns set by their larger, more powerful neighbours. They are doing it again. The ability of the European Union (EU) to fix problems in the Balkans is hamstrung when the same troubles persist within its own borders, sometimes in more acute form. Take erosion of democratic norms: Hungary over the past decade has slid from 2.14 to 3.54 on Freedom House’s “Nations in Transit” democracy score (lower is better). Poland’s decline is more recent but equally steep. Croatia is also backsliding. Almost all the Western Balkan states are declining, too, but more slowly. The familiar image of the Balkans is of a region with lots of minority problems: small groups that are oppressed or want to break away. Today, though, the most bitter and dangerous conflicts in most of the states there are between parties that appeal mostly or exclusively to the majority ethnic community. Minorities are bystanders, pulled in against their wishes. What of the risks of secession? At least three territories have the capacity to break relations with their parent states and establish local control, at least temporarily: Bosnia’s Republika Srpska; Macedonia’s Albanian-majority north west; and Kosovo’s Serb-majority north. All three would prefer to live under a government of their kin, yet none has acted, because they believe secession is doomed to fail. No important country is willing to recognise another breakaway republic in the Balkans. This can change in at least two ways. If a state fails to perform essential tasks like holding elections, adopting a budget and disbursing funds, a region could claim independence was necessary and try to break off on these ground. Alternatively, separatism could lose its stigma if one or more territories in the EU context were to break off peacefully – though in practice there is no appetite to accommodate this at the EU level and sensitivities abound among member states. But if either of these happen, it will be time to worry about the Balkans. Faltering Macedonia A crisis is gathering momentum in Macedonia, highlighted as some 200 protesters stormed its parliament on 27 April after an ethnic Albanian politician was voted in as speaker. Clashes that followed inside and outside the parliament injured over 70 people. The country’s substantial Albanian minority fought a small, short war against the central government in 2001. Veterans of that conflict battled police with much loss of life as recently as May 2015. Yet as Macedonia teeters on the brink of state failure, its domestic conflict has little to do with inter-ethnic tensions: it is between two predominantly Macedonian parties, the ruling, right to far-right VMRO-DPMNE and the opposition Social Democrats (SDSM). The country has been a candidate for EU membership since 2005, when it was at the head of the Western Balkans pack. How did it fall behind?

175 VMRO-DPMNE has governed Macedonia since 2006. At some point after taking power – 2010 at the latest but the exact date remains unclear – the government began perpetrating what an EU investigation called a “massive invasion of fundamental rights”. This came to light in part in a series of leaks in spring 2015, summarised by the EU report as: “electoral fraud, corruption, abuse of power and authority, conflict of interest, blackmail, extortion … criminal damage, … nepotism and cronyism”, and many other offences including interference in the judiciary and independent institutions at all levels. The government was also shown to be illegally wiretapping thousands of people, including nearly all prominent political figures, along with media and many diplomats. VMRO had in effect converted most of the state into machinery to serve its partisan interests. Under intense EU pressure, early elections were held in December 2016 that would normally have resulted in an opposition coalition government. Macedonia had also agreed to a mechanism to investigate and prosecute the previous government’s abuses. Neither of these two things happened. Macedonia had agreed to a mechanism to investigate and prosecute the previous government’s abuses. There the matter should have ended; it did not. The largely ceremonial president, though constitutionally required to appoint the head of the majority coalition as prime minister, refused: he is a loyal VMRO man. The president claimed that the Social Democrats’ concessions to their Albanian coalition partners endanger the state. In fact these concessions are mild and reasonable. The result is a standoff. Naim Rashiti, executive director of the Balkans Group, a think-tank, warns that 'VMRO simply does not want to transfer power, so it threatens to provoke ethnic conflict instead'. Though neither party can form a government, VMRO continues to run the state in caretaker mode. Meanwhile, what began as a battle between two predominantly Macedonian parties has spilled over into ethnic tension. VMRO has pinned its hopes on mobilising Macedonian fears of the Albanian minority and its alleged separatism. There are signs this is working: support for the SDSM has fallen, and “patriotic” demonstrationsin favour of VMRO take place in Skopje daily. Europe needs to speak with one voice and show zero tolerance of any party that systematically abuses power, or any state that systematically ignores the rule of law. Macedonia’s Albanians have remained loyal despite reservations about how the government treats them. They reasoned that Macedonia offered them the fastest route to membership in NATO and the EU. Since VMRO’s abuse of power has frozen Macedonia’s candidacy, this is no longer true. Albania overtook Macedonia in Freedom House’s democracy rankings in 2016, and even Kosovo – with the worst rating in the region – is not far behind. Meanwhile, amid precarious inter-ethnic cohabitation, VMRO’s exploitation of fears of Albanians’ so far marginal separatism is creating the conditions – a xenophobic failed state – that may provoke the minority to seek secession. Macedonian civil society has called for targeted sanctions against officials, and the European Parliament’s rapporteur raised the possibility of 'other instruments, starting from the financial kind'. The basic requirement is that the majority coalition must be allowed to take office and govern. To do otherwise is to risk ethnic conflict in one of the most dangerous parts of the Balkans. Macedonia was spared bloodshed during Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and its populations are still mixed, with Albanian-majority regions starting in the suburbs of Skopje, the national capital. European messaging has been disastrously confused. While Brussels urges responsibility, some member states give aid and comfort to VMRO, which is an associate member of the European People’s Party (EPP). That link is presumably the reason for Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz’s otherwise inexplicable decision to campaign for VMRO in the December 2016 elections. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, also an EPP colleague, said 'Macedonia cannot be stable without [VMRO]', endorsed that party’s call for a new election and urged the EU to speed up accession talks with Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Europe needs to speak with one voice and show zero tolerance of any party that systematically abuses power, or any state that systematically ignores the rule of law. Kosovo’s Copycats Kosovo’s leaders need to hear the same warning, because they are making the same mistakes. A struggle for power between Albanian-majority parties is paralysing the state and creating a dangerous ethnic backlash. A coalition of opposition parties won national elections in June 2014, but the incumbents refused to give up power. The details are complicated, but the consequences of the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)’s clinging to power – if somewhat mitigated by a power-sharing-arrangement with

176 the centrist Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – are clear: Kosovars’ public trust in key institutions has plummeted; in the most recent poll, confidence in the prime minister fell from 48.5 per cent before the crisis to 19.7 per cent; faith in the Assembly and the president fell by similar amounts. The opposition chose to fight the PDK’s iron grip on power with the most powerful weapon in its arsenal: nationalist resentment of Serbia and Kosovo’s Serb minority. A minor rock-throwing incident in Gjakovë in January 2015 degenerated within weeks to riots in the capital, Pristina, as opposition activists focused popular rage on the government’s weak spot, its alleged coddling of the Serb minority and subservience to Belgrade. The parliamentary opposition resorted to months of disruption, setting off tear gas canisters in the Assembly, pelting the prime minister with eggs and blocking the lectern. The government responded with waves of arguably illegal arrests of opposition deputies. At one point in 2016, nearly half the opposition’s representatives were in prison. An entirely technical exercise in border demarcation with Montenegro, a key EU requirement for visa-free travel for Kosovars, became hostage to the crisis amid spurious opposition accusations the government was giving away land. Relations between the government and opposition parties have started a fragile recovery. A dialogue mediated by Balkans Group since March 2016 has party leaders talking and persuaded the opposition to stop disrupting the Assembly. Persistent work by civil society and local actors has in this case shown more durable results than high-level visits by international actors. Traditionally, Kosovo leaders have relied on internationals to resolve their conflicts. This home-grown initiative is a welcome departure. Lurching toward Paralysis in Bosnia In its last Balkans report, in 2014, Bosnia’s Future, Crisis Group noted 'little risk of deadly conflict' but warned the country was 'slowly spiralling toward disintegration'. Recent events confirm that assessment. Bosnia’s foundational problem is that none of its peoples, or their leaders, like its constitutional order – but ideas for fixing it run in opposite directions. When times are calm, Bosnians can muddle through. Even minor stresses bring the fault lines to the surface. The latest of these might prove fatal. The details are again complicated, but the gist is straightforward. The Constitutional Court has struck down part of the election law, and unless it is amended, Bosnia will be unable to replace the current legislature and executive when their terms expire in October 2018. A caretaker government could function for some months but not pass a budget; by spring 2019, therefore, Bosnia might be in paralysis and disintegration. Preventing a catastrophe in Bosnia requires placing the state on a more stable foundation, rather than merely repairing the cracks revealed by this most recent crisis. The good news is that the laws are not especially hard to repair. The bad news is that amendment requires the main Bosniak, Serb, and Croat parties to agree. Any major party can hold things up indefinitely, perhaps to wring unrelated concessions out of reluctant partners. Something like this happened before: in January 2012, the court struck down a small part of the election law pertaining to the city of Mostar. The town has now missed two rounds of local elections and is still run, after a fashion, by a mayor in his fifth year as caretaker. There is no city council. What is barely tolerable in a medium-sized town cannot work nationwide. Srećko Latal, director of the Social Overview Service think-tank and regional editor for the Balkans Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), warns that “state paralysis is exactly the kind of crisis that separatists in Republika Srpska are waiting for, as it would provide an ideal justification to break away”. Republika Srpska’s leaders have made no secret of their desire for independence; its president, Milorad Dodik, once boasted that “one day [independence] will fall into our hands like ripe fruit from a tree. We are waiting to have examples of how to do this in Europe so that no one can blame us for anything”. Preventing a catastrophe in Bosnia requires placing the state on a more stable foundation, rather than merely repairing the cracks revealed by this most recent crisis. Conventional wisdom holds that revisiting Bosnia’s constitutional structure is a fool’s errand, and that instead, the country needs the balm of European integration. That is now a very remote possibility: too remote for safety. Crisis Group repeats its recommendation to the leaders of Bosnia and its two entities: initiate a debate on fundamental reform along the lines sketched out in our last report. Our Man in Belgrade Macedonia’s crisis is the worst, and most dangerous, in the region, but its leaders are not alone in treating the instruments of state as their personal property. In Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić came to power in

177 2012 on a pro-European, clean government platform. He won EU support by promising cooperation on the main European priority, resolving the Kosovo-Serbiadispute. Since then he has leveraged that support – especially a claimed close relationship with Germany’s Angela Merkel – to gain what an international official described as “unparalleled control of all aspects of the Serbian state, media and society”. The official noted that Vučić’s “compliance with external partners has been rewarded with a blind eye being turned on [his] increasingly authoritarian” rule at home. His party’s influence over the media is reflected in his overwhelmingly positive coverage, compared to negative or neutral stories about his rivals. What did Vučić do to get carte blanche from Europe? His main achievement was giving up Serbia’s ambition to govern Serb-majority territory in Kosovo, and agreeing to partially lift the veto on Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. These were big steps, hard for a former nationalist to take. As a result, Kosovo could sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and get its own international telephone code. Yet, Kosovo is still barred from the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, and the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue has stalled. Serbia lacks a formal veto over Kosovo’s membership in these bodies but other states, notably Russia, back up and enforce Belgrade’s wishes. Vučić forced the Kosovo Serbs to join Kosovo government institutions at local and national levels, but he retains full control over their elected representatives, who make regular pilgrimages to receive instructions. In a reckless provocation that nearly led to armed clashes at the border, Serbia painted the first train scheduled to service both countries in its national colours and with the slogan 'Kosovo is Serbia'. The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was built on the assumption that the hard questions of recognition and status were unresolvable, so a long period of incremental rapprochement was the way forward. That was probably right, but the approach is now exhausted. Within Kosovo, debate on the role of the Serb minority has been hijacked for partisan mobilisation, and as long as Pristina treats its Serbs as a punching- bag, true normalisation with Belgrade will remain impossible. The time for a frank dialogue about status may not quite have arrived but it is not far off. The necessary outcome is already clear enough: an independent Kosovo, recognised by Serbia, with an integrated but autonomous and self-governing Serb minority. The Russians: More Opportunistic than Strategic Until very recently, Montenegro was the sole bright spot in the Western Balkans. It is due to join NATO in May 2017 and is the most plausible candidate for early membership once expansion returns to the EU agenda. Its economy shows robust growth, and its politics are relatively placid. Or they were, until a recent election was marred by a bizarre plot implicating Serbian and Montenegrin gangsters and Russian spies in what some claim was an attempt to topple the government and assassinate the prime minister. The New York Times reported in February on a series of Russian moves 'to exploit political fissures in [the Balkans,] an area that was once viewed as a triumph of muscular American diplomacy'. Others such as the Atlantic Council’s Dimitar Bechev are more cautious, but note the 'lacklustre political landscape of the present-day Balkans does provide Russia with endless opportunities to rock the boat'. Apart from this odd episode, Montenegro’s impressive track record is mysterious: it is the only country in Europe to be governed by the same party – in effect, the same person – since the late 1980s. It is enormously corrupt – so much so that an international watchdog named Montenegrin leader Milo Djukanović its Person of the Year ' for his work in promoting crime, corruption and uncivil society'. Djukanović became an important Western ally during the late 1990s, when he broke with Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević. Since then, he has fostered his country’s alignment with the EU and NATO, joining in the former’s sanctions against Russia in 2014. His country’s success suggests it is possible to thrive against all Western advice about democratisation and accountable government. Russia’s role in what really happened in Montenegro remains obscure. There is evidence of planning for violent action by a motley group of Serbs and Montenegrins, drawn from veterans of the wars of the 1990s and the criminal underground. The plotters were apparently connected to Eduard Shishmakov, said to be a member of Russia’s military intelligence service. Dejan Anastasijević, a journalist who has covered the paramilitary underground, has written that Shishmakov served with official cover in Poland but was expelled as persona non grata; his presence in Serbia was under a pseudonym and without cover, perhaps a demotion. For an intelligence officer seeking to rebuild a tattered career, Anastasijević added, recruiting

178 dodgy former fighters and gangsters would be normal behaviour, but it is unlikely Moscow would sanction an assassination. Moscow’s interests in the Balkans are clear: prevent or delay NATO expansion but also push against EU’s dominance in the region, and promote friendly parties and leaders while compromising and embarrassing opponents. Russia has few illusions about Slavic brotherhood. Few in the Western Balkans bother to learn Russian. Balkan leaders do play Russia off against the West, especially when they feel exposed to uncomfortable EU pressure – or when they hope for cash handouts from Moscow. But Europe is a far larger financial presence. While Russia is not above stirring up trouble when it can do so at low cost, BIRN’s Latal argues that it does not want to see deadly conflict in the region, because this would likely draw in NATO forces. The Balkans are increasingly discussed as a region hit by the chill of a new Cold War. But the most important thing Europe can do to keep peace and foster reform in the region is to focus on local sensitivities, which are much stronger drivers of risks in the region than geopolitics, and to remain healthy itself. This is a small part of the world, some eighteen million people with a collective GDP of about half of 1 per cent of the EU’s. They will follow the European lead, whether that is recession and xenophobia or booming open societies. Beyond this, Europe should affirm its basic standards of democracy. Leaders in Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and some EU member states systematically violate these norms with impunity. Whatever expediency justified this has passed; hollowing out the rule of law is now the main threat. Finally, Europe should signal that the time for avoiding hard questions in Bosnia and Kosovo is ending."

Matthew Brunwasser, "Serbia’s Prime Minister Projected to Win Presidency, Consolidating Control," The New York Times, April 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/world/europe/serbia- aleksandar-vucic-president-elections.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic appeared headed toward a first-round victory in Serbia’s presidential election on Sunday, winning more than 50 percent of the vote among a field of 11 candidates, according to exit polls and early results. If the preliminary vote count holds and Mr. Vucic passes the 50 percent threshold, he would avoid a riskier two-way runoff on April 16. While Serbia is a parliamentary republic and the presidency is intended as a largely symbolic position, the actual effect of the election result is seen as removing the last check on Mr. Vucic’s power and as a further erosion of Serbia’s nascent democratic institutions."

Kit Gillet, "Anger and Mistrust Fuel Unabated Protests in Romania," The New York Times, February 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/12/world/europe/romania-bucharest-protests- corruption.html, reported, "Exactly one week after the largest protests in a quarter of a century rocked Romania, an estimated 70,000 demonstrators filled the square outside the main government building in Bucharest on Sunday evening, determined to show those in power that the crisis was far from over. While significantly less than the half a million who took to the streets across the country the previous Sunday, the Bucharest demonstration was still a potent sign of the resilient unrest in the country and the loss of trust between the new government, only in office since the beginning of January, and a large sector of the population."

Andrew Higgins, "Cyprus Fears Russian Meddling in Its Settlement Talks," The New York Times, February 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/world/europe/cyprus-fears-russian-meddling- in-its-settlement-talks.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "As the United Nations geared up for negotiations that it declared the 'best and last chance' to unite Cyprus after more than four decades of acrimonious division, Russia’s ambassador attended a seminar dedicated to derailing any prospect of an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots."

"Deadly Attack Near U.K. Parliament; Car Plows Victims on Westminster Bridge," The New York Times, March 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/world/europe/uk-westminster- parliament-shooting.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "A knife-wielding assailant driving a sport utility vehicle mowed down panicked pedestrians and stabbed a police officer outside Parliament on

179 Wednesday in a deadly assault, prompting the hasty evacuation of the prime minister and punctuating the threat of terrorism in Europe. At least four people, including the assailant, were killed and at least 40 others injured in the confusing swirl of violence, which the police said they assumed had been “inspired by international terrorism.” It appeared to be the most serious such assault in London since the deadly subway bombings more than a decade ago."

Christina Anderson and Martin Selsoe Sorensen, "Stockholm Truck Attack Kills 4; Terrorism Is Suspected," The New York Times, April 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/europe/stockholm-attack.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "A man drove a stolen beer truck into a crowd of people in a popular shopping district in Stockholm on Friday afternoon and then rammed it into a department store, killing four people and injuring 15 others in an attack that unleashed bloodshed and panic on the streets of another European capital. 'Sweden has been attacked,' Prime Minister Stefan Lofven said in a televised news conference. “This indicates that it is an act of terror.'”

African Developments

ICG, "Twelve Points for the New African Union Commission Chairperson," Africa/Statement, March 13, 2017, stated, "Africa is experiencing the highest number of humanitarian crises since the 1990s. As the new chair of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, takes office, International Crisis Group suggests how he can strengthen the organisation’s response to threats to continental peace and security. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the new chair of the African Union Commission (AUC), takes office in mid- March as the continent faces its worst spate of humanitarian crises since the 1990s. The most alarming is in the Lake Chad basin where more than eleven million people need emergency aid. In Somalia, 6.2 million (almost half the population) face acute food shortages and in South Sudan, where the UN recently declared a famine, nearly 5 million are severely food insecure. The suffering is largely man-made: the effects of drought have been exacerbated by prolonged wars and mass displacement. More promisingly, Gambia’s peaceful transition, negotiated by the Economic Community of West African States with AU support, is one of the steps toward democracy and rule of law being taken in much of the continent. Whether these gains can be multiplied across Africa depends on how well Mr Faki, Chad’s former foreign minister, will use the tools at his disposal to persuade member states to address the triggers and longer-term drivers of conflict: fraught electoral processes; leaders who refuse to leave office as scheduled; corrupt, authoritarian or repressive governments; population growth; joblessness and climate change. These same forces precipitate two other major continental challenges, migration and the threat from religious extremists and other violent non-state groups. Mr Faki arrives at a time of upheaval for the AU. At January’s summit, heads of state agreed to proposals from Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame that the organisation should focus only on a limited number of key priorities with continental scope, such as political affairs, peace and security and continental integration, and that institutional structures should be redesigned to reflect this. He will have to carefully manage this radical reform, as well as Morocco’s recent re-admission, to avoid aggravating existing tensions and divisions and maintain morale in a beleaguered secretariat. The geopolitical context for multilateral diplomacy is also changing rapidly. The influence of China, the Gulf states and Turkey (especially in the Horn, the Sahel and North Africa) cannot be ignored. Growing nationalism in Europe and the uncertainty of U.S. President Donald Trump’s policies have created new concerns. There are opportunities here for the AU along with challenges, but to take advantage of them, Mr Faki will have to push it and its member states to take greater responsibility, both politically and financially, for conflict prevention and resolution. Crisis Group offers below ideas on how the new chair of the AUC can drive change and revitalise key relationships so as to strengthen the AU’s response to threats to continental peace and security, as well as suggestions for how the organisation can help prevent conflict escalating and move peace processes forward. Strategic Direction 1. Build support for a stronger, more self-sufficient union

180 In a deeply unstable global environment, with old power centres in disarray and Middle East rivalries infecting the continent, African multilateral diplomacy is more necessary than ever. The new chair’s challenge is to convince member states of the AU’s worth, in particular the value of its peace and security architecture. That leaders signed on to a bold reform agenda would seem to suggest they want a more effective AU. But for the process to be truly transformative, they must make tough choices on sovereignty, and the tensions between popular aspirations for more open government and the authoritarian tendencies of many of those governments. Working closely with presidents Kagame, Idriss Déby (Chad) and Alpha Condé (Guinea), the troika appointed to supervise implementation of the reforms, Mr Faki should build a coalition of leaders representing each region, who are committed to reform. But, building political support for a stronger AU will not be enough. Member states also need to provide adequate funding. Aside from the loss of credibility and ownership that reliance on external donors brings, the AU can no longer count on the same levels of external financing from the U.S. and Europe. The AUC’s ability to work effectively depends on member states willingness to implement the July 2016 summit decision for a 0.2 per cent levy on imports, with proceeds going to the AU. Only a handful of states have begun to enact the tax into law. Mr Faki should provide full support to the AU’s High Representative for the Peace Fund, Dr Donald Kaberuka, and encourage member states to fulfil their financial commitments. Those who pay only lip service to the idea of a stronger AU must recognise that without significant additional African financing, AU peace support operations will likely remain blocked from sustainable funding from UN assessed contributions as well. 2. Make effective use of the existing conflict prevention architecture The AU has the tools necessary for conflict prevention but finds it difficult to use them effectively because of resource constraints and the great influence member states willing to play the sovereignty card to avoid scrutiny wield. Changing leaders’ thinking is hard, and Mr Faki should focus on building political support for conflict prevention among like-minded members. Even without such a coalition, there are ways to improve existing mechanisms. Translating data and analysis of the AU’s early warning system into early action has been hampered, in part, by the way information flows within the AUC and between it and the regional economic communities (RECs). The chair should break down AUC barriers, especially between the Political Affairs and Peace and Security departments. Mediation mechanisms are fragmented, with little oversight and direction from the chair or the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Creation of the mediation support unit (MSU) has been a good first step, but Mr Faki must ensure it is well-staffed by skilled, experienced specialists. For it to be truly effective, all mediation activities, including those of the Panel of the Wise, special envoys and representatives, liaison offices and special political missions, should be under its purview. There is little transparency in how special envoys and representatives are selected. Mr Faki should work to change this as well as examine their performance and mandates, making changes where needed. He should also use the reform process either to reinvigorate or dispense with the Panel of the Wise. Likewise, he should engage more personally in preventative diplomacy, especially to unblock stalemated processes in Burundi, Central Africa Republic (CAR) and Mali, and work to build consensus at the local, regional, continental and wider international level so as to bring coherence to the efforts of all those involved in peacemaking. Mr Faki should understand the limitations of his office and bring respected former heads of state into the mediation process. Many crises are predictable, especially those linked to poor governance and disputed political transitions. The effects of generational and demographic changes, the slow pace of economic growth in many countries and the persistence of repressive or authoritarian regimes mean we can expect increasing discontent and violent protest. Mr Faki must ensure that AUC fulfils its responsibility to alert the PSC to impending conflicts, engaging with affected member states and encouraging the PSC to put them on its agenda at the first signs of crisis. This will be uncomfortable and provoke backlash, but it cannot be avoided if the AU is serious about conflict prevention. 3. Strengthen the institution The January summit adopted Kagame’s bold reform outline, which aims to streamline the AU, making it more efficient, focused and results oriented. The new chair is charged with realising these ambitions. This is not the first reform attempt; ten years ago an independent panel drew up a comprehensive program on which Kagame’s team drew heavily. Mr Faki must learn from previous failures by not rushing the process and building broad support by consulting widely within the AUC and with

181 member states. He should push forward on the reforms linked to the most urgent needs (eg, implementing the PSC protocols and strengthening sanctions mechanisms) and which have the greatest consensus. The AU’s relationship with the RECs, vital for effective conflict prevention and resolution, is often strained and competitive. The principles, rights and obligations governing this relationship are clearly set out in PSC Protocol (Article 16) and the 2007 memorandum of understanding. The chair should ensure these instruments are implemented. Some tension could be eased by more effective communication. Mr Faki should seek opportunities to work collaboratively with RECs and encourage direct, frequent exchanges at all levels during the lifecycle of a crisis. RECs should be consulted before major decisions, such as the selection of a special envoy or deployment of observers. Uncertainty regarding the principle of subsidiarity limits the AU’s its ability to intervene when regional peace processes stall, as in Burundi and South Sudan. He should use the reform process to establish comparative advantage, not subsidiarity, as the basis for the AU-RECs relationship. 4. Revitalise security partnerships During the past decade, the AU has taken on a greater role in preventing and resolving conflicts. At the same time, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has increasingly delegated to it a central role in political management of Africa’s conflicts, in part due to a growing recognition that it cannot manage these crises alone. The AU’s confidence and capacity have increased, but it still relies on partners and donors to fund its peace and security activities and fill capacity gaps. As a result, relationships are often strained, sometimes blighted by mistrust and misunderstanding. Collaboration with the UN, arguably the AU’s most important security partner, has increased, but room for improvement remains. Together with the UN Secretary-General, Mr Faki should ensure that UNSC and AU PSC agendas are more closely aligned and reflect the continent’s priorities. By preparing PSC positions ahead of major UNSC decisions, there is a greater chance Africa will speak with one voice and so increase its influence on decisions. Closer AU-UN cooperation, including collective assessments and joint field visits, would foster more understanding and help build common positions and a shared analysis. Mr Faki should take the lead in this area, setting the tone and direction for the rest of the commission. The European Union (EU) is identifying its strategic interests in Africa, and Mr Faki should ensure the AU defines its interests so common security challenges can be determined. The EU is a vital partner, but the relationship was tested in 2016 by its decision to reallocate 20 per cent of its funding for the AU’s Somalia mission, AMISOM, and stop directly paying Burundian troops serving in it. The EU-Africa November summit in Côte d’Ivoire is an opportunity to renew the partnership, discuss priorities and confirm areas of cooperation. The migrant crisis and terrorism threat will likely reshape EU-AU relations and feature prominently there. The chair must try to counter EU desire to focus narrowly on unpromising short-term curbs of migration to Europe by emphasising the need to address the drivers of the exodus: war, poverty, repression and the youth bulge. 5. Beyond a military response to “violent extremism” The past decade has shown the costs and limits of a military response to jihadist groups and other violent non-state actors, especially in the absence of a political strategy. Military action is sometimes a necessary part of a strategy – the efforts against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and jihadists in Mali are cases in point – but recent history in Africa and elsewhere suggests governments cannot rely on coercion alone. The AU and its member states must not overlook the conditions that enable jihadist groups and other violent non-state actors to thrive: distrust of the state, especially in the peripheries; declining state authority; underdevelopment and social deprivation; readily available weapons; and heavy-handed, ineffective security forces. Mr Faki should articulate a stronger focus on developing coherent plans for returning effective government to affected areas. The possibility of a U.S. return to heavier-handed counter-terrorism policies could encourage others to adopt similar approaches. This is especially dangerous in Africa, where rule of law is often weak or absent. The chair should remind leaders that in dealing with these groups they must not forget human rights obligations, and he should dissuade them from labelling all opponents as “terrorists” or “violent extremists”. Major Crises 6. Burundi Contrary to government claims, the crisis is far from over. Intimidation, disappearances and killings

182 continue and could quickly escalate, infecting a volatile region. Exact causes and motivations are hard to judge, as authorities have made no serious attempt to investigate and have frustrated the efforts of others, including the AU. The government and ruling party are intent on unilaterally dismantling the gains of the Arusha process that ended the last civil war, of which the AU is guarantor, including all vestiges of genuine power sharing and the critical presidential term limit. Internal debate on the direction is not permitted. The stability and relative peace Burundi recently enjoyed was premised on political pluralism and respect for Arusha’s main tenants, notably power sharing. The current path is highly likely to increase violence if left unchecked; the government’s drive to change the constitution to allow President Pierre Nkurunziza to run again would undoubtedly be a major spark. In December, Benjamin Mkapa, the East African Community-appointed mediator, spoke out against the opposition’s maximalist demand that the 2015 election result be revisited but did not balance this with criticism of the regime’s crackdown. The ruling party made no concessions and continues to refuse dialogue with exiled opposition. The AU’s path is difficult, especially following its retreat from active engagement after the failed January 2016 attempt to send an AU peacekeeping mission. Mr Faki should personally re-engage the government, but he should hold to principled positions. The absence of PSC discussion makes it difficult for the AU to intervene, and the chairperson must encourage the PSC to put Burundi back on its agenda. The AU can support future mediation by clearly stating the current dangers, underlining that violence and intimidation is unacceptable, abuses must be investigated, and free, democratic debate is vital for stability. The AU should also emphasise that opposition violence is unacceptable and dangerous. Burundi’s future direction, including continued application of Arusha Agreement, should be freely debated by all parties. 7. Central African Republic 2016’s peaceful elections raised hopes of a longer-term resolution of the crisis that began in 2012. Yet, barely twelve months after President Faustin-Archange Touadera’s victory, little has changed. A fifth of the population is internally displaced or refugees in neighbouring countries, intercommunal tensions are high, and armed groups de facto control most of the country. Though security in Bangui is improved, violence against civilians and fighting between armed groups have intensified in the provinces. In the east, ex-Seleka factions compete for territory and resources, triggering massive new displacement and strong anti-Fulani sentiment. In the west, the exclusionary “centrafricanité” concept that emerged in circles close to François Bozizé in 2013 and stigmatises Muslim as “foreigners”, prevents return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. The government, though legitimate, is not in full control and cannot respond to all the challenges. Little has been done at national level to advance reconciliation, and talks between the government and armed groups over disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are blocked. Regional powers have organised several parallel initiatives to kick-start talks between armed groups, including meetings in 2016 in Chad and Angola. A proliferation of processes with unclear agendas could undermine attempts to persuade groups to disarm. All initiatives should support Touadera, who must develop a clear strategy for the negotiations, so that his government leads the process. The AU could be important in this, coordinating the initiatives and pushing armed groups to join the talks. A major challenge will be dealing with armed-group leaders – much of the population views their exclusion from government as a prerequisite for a sustainable solution. 8. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) The 31 December agreement brokered by the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo (CENCO) calmed tensions resulting from the failure to hold elections the previous month. The deal was more inclusive than what the AU mediated in October and shortened the new date for the delayed polls from April 2018 to December 2017. But implementation is stalled over three issues: its timelines; appointment of the prime minister and composition of the interim government; and functioning of the oversight mechanism. The death in February of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi has suspended the talks, aiding the ruling majority, which consistently seeks to postpone elections. His loss deprives the Rassemblement, the main opposition coalition, of a genuinely popular leader able to cut deals, at a time when its inability to mobilise large protests undercut its legitimacy. The competition to replace Tshisekedi threatens the Rassemblement’s cohesion and could push the opposition to more hard-line positions.

183 Armed conflict has displaced more than 2.2 million persons and is increasing in many provinces. In addition to the recurrent fighting in North Kivu, instability is spreading. In Kasai-Central, the August 2016 killing of a traditional chief by security forces has pitted militias against government forces and displaced some 200,000. In Tanganyika, fighting between the Twa (Pygmy) and Luba (Bantu) communities is taking an increasing toll and also affecting Haut-Katanga and Haut-Lomami provinces. Increased tension in Kongo- Central province directly affects the capital, Kinshasa. Rising insecurity is linked to a crisis of state legitimacy, combined with deepening economic crisis. All this makes the organisation of elections increasingly unlikely and creates real risk of an implosion. The challenge is to ensure credible elections are held on schedule, and the constitution is respected. The AU, in close cooperation with the region and the UN, should call on all parties to implement the 31 December agreement and prioritise organising polls as soon as realistic. It should give full support as CENCO tries to keep the signatories on track. Mass violence remains a distinct possibility, the outcome of which could be state collapse and the entire region’s destabilisation. The PSC has taken a backseat on the DRC but needs to fully engage in attempts to broker a political transition. 9. Libya The immediate priority remains preventing an escalation of violence. The country’s de-facto partition into eastern and western areas dominated by loose, fractious military coalitions has been reinforced by failure of the Libyan Political (Skhirat) Agreement. Escalation would most likely come from an advance on Tripoli by General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army, buoyed by their takeover of oil facilities in the Gulf of Sirte and the dwindling international consensus behind the Skhirat deal. This would provoke fierce fighting, particularly with Islamist militias in the capital and from Misrata. Preventing this probably requires Egypt and Russia to dissuade Haftar; even with foreign backing, he cannot conquer the entire country. Resetting Skhirat is essential. Direct talks are needed between the Tripoli-based Presidency Council and politicians from the east, leading toward a new, broader-based unity government. A parallel security track should include Haftar and major western armed groups. But the diplomatic process is in limbo: the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj, barely functions, and there is a lack of direction from major outside powers. Only Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia appear to be proposing new solutions, but Algeria and Tunisia support the GNA, while Egypt is close to Haftar. The three share security concerns but differ on how inclusive a negotiated solution should be, especially toward Islamists. Time is not with the GNA. Electricity and water shortages, looming collapse of the health sector, shortages of local and foreign currency all have made life much tougher for ordinary Libyans. This gives GNA foes, especially Haftar, an opportunity. Signs of wider confrontation in the absence of a viable peace process abound, and local conflicts (for instance between Arabs, Tebus and Touaregs in the south and among Tripoli-based militias) are gaining importance. The AU should support Algeria’s and Tunisia’s more inclusive approach and urge more pressure on Haftar from Egypt, whose legitimate interests must be accommodated. AU support might help impose a solution proposed by neighbours (ultimately bringing in Chad, Niger and Sudan) and help it gain wider support. At a time when the peace process lacks clear direction, encouraging consensus among neighbours could show the way for the UN and non-African powers. 10. Mali With implementation stalling there is a real possibility the June 2015 Bamako peace agreement could dissolve. The Malian parties have little faith in the significantly flawed deal they were pressured to sign. Insecurity could increase with the fracturing of the main rebel coalition, the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, into new community-based armed groups. Jihadist organisations, like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Eddine, are still operating – striking provincial and district centres from rural bases. Insecurity is also rising in long neglected areas like central Mali, which is not covered by the northern peace process. The emergence of new groups, such as the Islamic State in the Great Sahara, and the possible incursion of defeated IS fighters from Libya further complicate the fraught security landscape. The crisis is now spilling over borders. The G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) thus announced the creation in February of a regional force to combat terrorism and transnational crime. The AU is well placed to give political and logistical support, as it does for the Multi-National Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin. But Mr Faki should push the G5 to take a realistic

184 approach and work primarily on border security and improved intelligence sharing and to develop economic cooperation, not focus solely on military action. A recent high-level Follow-up Committee meeting convened by the international mediation, was a last-ditch try to revive the peace process. It must not be squandered. Through Pierre Buyoya, the AU Special Representative, the chair should work with other partners to maintain momentum, focussing on relaunching the Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination (MOC) in northern Mali, including Kidal, and continuing to push for the newly-appointed interim authorities to start working effectively. 11. Somalia Despite a fractious, fraudulent and corrupt electoral process beset by divisions and delays, Somalia elected a new president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, with unprecedented cross-clan support. This is a chance for progress toward peace, economic prosperity and political stability. Expectations are inordinately high, however, and to avoid a backlash he must move swiftly on pledges to rebuild the security forces and state institutions, tackle corruption, improve justice and unify the country. His nationalist rhetoric, supported by Islamist factions in his government, threatens to antagonise powerful neighbours capable of undermining his administration. It is critical for Mr Faki to encourage discreet diplomacy and foster dialogue between Somalia and its neighbours, especially Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. Farmajo’s credibility and popular support improves the odds of progress in the government’s stalled national reconciliation process. A bottom-up approach has the greatest chance to produce lasting political settlements with and between federal member states. Mr Faki must seize this opportunity and encourage the new government to revive the process and help it mobilise technical and financial resources. Failure to reduce clan tensions and build sub-national administrations would create openings for Al-Shabaab and an emerging, albeit small, IS branch. Despite significant successes against Al-Shabaab, AMISOM is struggling to win a guerrilla war it is ill-suited and inadequately resourced to fight. Internal challenges, national rivalries and frictions among troop contributing countries compound this problem, hampering military effectiveness. The AU should help to repair cohesion and encourage more realistic, strategic thinking in preparation for a well-managed drawdown framed around Somalia’s security sector needs. Hasty withdrawal would be disastrous for Somalia and the region. 12. South Sudan Famine, driven by a deadly combination of conflict, economic crisis and drought, has left 100,000 on the verge of starvation with a million more at serious risk. Almost eighteen months since a peace agreement was signed, fighting, accompanied by atrocities, shows little sign of stopping in Equatorias, Upper Nile and Unity states. Fierce combat in Juba last July between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) forced ex-First Vice President Riek Machar to flee. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and other major international actors have acquiesced in his exile and replacement by First Vice President Taban Deng Gai. Without Machar, the SPLM/A-IO is less cohesive, and new armed groups are emerging, while President Salva Kiir strengthens his position in the capital and the region. Kiir’s December 2016 call for a renewed ceasefire and national dialogue presents an opportunity to promote negotiations between the government and parts of the armed opposition (including groups outside the transitional government) and to address the grievances of disaffected communities at the grassroots level. This will only succeed if the government is willing to negotiate fairly. Mr Faki should ensure that the AU High Representative Alpha Oumar Konaré receives the support needed to fulfil the mandate given him at the IGAD-UN-AU meeting in January 2017 to encourage all stakeholders to begin genuinely inclusive discussion on the scope and format of a national dialogue. He should also look for ways in which the AU and its partners can support local communities in this process, in particular by helping them formulate and articulate their complaints. Under the August 2015 peace agreement, the AU is responsible for establishing the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, mandated to investigate and prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the recent civil war. Insecurity and severe restrictions on freedom of speech make it currently unfeasible to set up the court, but Mr Faki should ensure that preliminary work defining operation, funding and composition goes ahead and that the collection of evidence begins."

185 ICG, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, President and CEO, "Open Letter to the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping in Mali, Open letter/Africa, April 24, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west- africa/mali/open-letter-un-security-council-peacekeeping-mali, commented, To address growing violence in Mali that is undermining the Algeria-brokered peace accord, the UN Security Council should in June renew the mandate of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with stronger political and civil affairs components and a greater role for the peacekeepers in local reconciliation. Excellencies, Only weeks away from the official end of the two-year 'interim period' defined in the June 2015 peace agreement, much of Mali remains unstable and a threat to regional stability. Implementation of the Algeria-brokered agreement consumes considerable diplomatic energy for little impact on the ground. Armed groups are more numerous, they clash more frequently with Malian and international forces, and violence has spread to Central Mali. The UN Security Council should reorient the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), whose mandate it will renew in June, to help prevent the agreement’s collapse, particularly by strengthening its political and civil affairs components and giving the mission a greater role in local reconciliation. The challenges confronting MINUSMA have evolved since the Security Council first authorised its deployment in April 2013. The balance of power among Malian parties in the north remains in flux, generating local competition. The main rebel coalition, the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a principal signatory to the peace agreement, has fractured; new community-based armed groups, such as the Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad and the Congrès pour la Justice dans l’Azawad, have emerged. These new groups, whose strength lies in local tribal alliances, in principle are committed to respect the peace agreement but are not considered signatories and therefore struggle to secure access to peace dividends. They will remain a potential nuisance as long as they are outside the peace process; the best option would be to integrate them into one of the existing signatory coalitions. Much of the fighting in the North is over control of trafficking routes. This hampers the peace deal’s implementation as traffickers sponsor armed groups of all stripes, including within the two coalitions – the CMA and its rival, the Platform – that signed the peace accord in Bamako. Mixed patrols as envisaged in the peace agreement, comprising Malian army, pro-government armed groups and former rebels, will struggle to curb insecurity as long as militias and key northern politicians depend on trafficking. These mixed units should have started 60 days after the signing of the peace agreement but it took eighteen months to launch the first in Gao, the Mécanisme opérationnel de Coordination (MOC), which then suffered a traumatic suicide attack on 18 January 2017 before even starting its first patrol. No other MOC has been active in other northern regions. The state remains largely absent across the north. While its return to Kidal, currently under the control of the CMA, is symbolically important for the government, its presence in rural areas is as much a priority. Jihadist groups are consolidating control in the vacuum, in some areas providing basic public goods, like local security and conflict resolution to nomadic communities. The Malian jihadist landscape also is evolving, with a new coalition that includes al-Qaeda-linked groups competing with a small faction that has declared itself part of the Islamic State. Iyad ag-Ghaly, a former Tuareg rebel who now leads the al- Qaeda-linked coalition, has outlined his strategy as attacking international forces in cities while extending influence over a wider territory by gaining popular support. The ensuing challenge for the state is to foster 'nomadic public services' across the immense and sparsely populated territory – a long-term project although one for which the government could start laying foundations. The state’s weakness is particularly worrying in light of rising insecurity in Central Mali, a region long neglected but largely outside the peace process. Violence is rooted in local tensions among communities over resources and in the dangerous growth of self-defence militias and banditry. But a jihadist uprising also is in the making in the region of Mopti and Ségou, where militants are capitalising on local disputes and the state’s absence and lack of legitimacy. Though collaboration between regional and Western powers has produced results, notably the peace agreement itself, diverging interests between them is sucking oxygen from its implementation. Though MINUSMA’s diplomacy around the peace process is active and valuable, without greater international coherence it yields little concrete impact on the ground. Algeria’s leadership was invaluable in negotiating the deal but its partners perceive its role since then as less decisive. Algeria could more firmly

186 assume its lead by establishing a permanent presence in Bamako. Multiple forces are attempting to bring security to the north. Already, the juxtaposition of MINUSMA, the French 'Barkhane' counter-terrorism operation, Malian security forces, the various armed groups – the peace agreement’s signatories and others – makes for a busy security picture. The benefits of introducing yet another force, which is envisioned to be formed by the G-5 (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) and/or the smaller G-3, comprising Burkinabe, Nigerien and Malian forces, are unclear. So too is the role either force would play; as a result, their deployment risks aggravating what amounts to a security traffic jam. MINUSMA itself is struggling against complex threats and is now the UN’s most perilous mission worldwide. Troop increases in themselves would not be game changers. The mission will remain a target for jihadists or other armed actors whose interests it disturbs, possibly including traffickers, which will only reinforce its tendency to retreat to heavily protected forts in urban areas. The forthcoming mandate renewal offers the Security Council an opportunity to adjust the mission’s role to these new challenges. Council members should consider the following: The Security Council should task MINUSMA, the only actor in the international mediation team with a significant presence in the north, to facilitate regional reconciliation forums, potentially with one in Kidal, another in Gao and a third for Timbuktu and Taoudenit regions. These local forums would complement the Algiers process – in whose framework they would need to be incorporated – decentralise its implementation and locally consolidate any gains. Such bottom-up approaches could help calm local tensions, like the rivalry between the Tuareg Iforas and Imrad tribes in Kidal, which fuel violence. They also might contribute to fashioning local solutions to prevent the growth of radical groups in rural areas and to lowering armed violence, including when it pertains to the smuggling economy. It will be critical to reinforce the mission’s political and civil affairs components, including deploying officials with expertise in local reconciliation to Central and Northern Mali. The Security Council also should reinforce MINUSMA’s good offices mandate. Strengthening relevant language in the renewal could help bolster the mission’s role in the international mediation team. In turn, that team should help develop a revised calendar for the agreement’s interim period after it officially ends, possibly extending it for a short period of time. As Security Council members discuss MINUSMA’s troop numbers and equipment, they should not lose sight of the core issue: a security context that has dramatically changed since its deployment. Expelled from towns, jihadists have gone rural and extended into Central Mali. While MINUSMA’s core focus must remain political and while it cannot directly fight jihadists, it can and should help prevent their expansion by supporting the state’s presence in areas at risk – even while recognising that the state bears primary responsibility for extending its own authority. The mission, particularly its civilian component, also should become more mobile, taking into account security constraints, and increase its presence in long neglected rural areas of North and Central Mali. In Central Mali, which is already in MINUSMA’s mandate but still awaits reinforcement, the mission should learn from its experience in the north. Instead of concentrating forces in urban military camps, it should emphasise mobility and dedicate its resources to facilitating the work of its civilian components. European and other advanced force contributors should ensure that the mission fields the necessary military resources to make this possible. To increase its mobility, MINUSMA should consider reducing the size of, or even closing, some bases especially in locations in which the mission has had limited impact such as Tessalit or Ansongo. This would allow MINUSMA to reduce the force contingent currently dedicated to protecting UN facilities in fixed locations and increase the number of its mobile elements. In other words, a more robust MINUSMA need not necessarily entail additional troops, but rather better equipped and more mobile contingents. The Security Council also should consider MINUSMA’s relationship to other military forces, particularly in light of potential G-5 or G-3 deployments. Given that key MINUSMA contingents are from G-5 states, discussions over respective roles among MINUSMA, the G-5 and the African Union (AU) are essential. Options will hinge on the role, strength, funding modality and composition of such a force, all of which currently are under negotiation. For now, however, the UN should work closely

187 with the AU, which is reviewing plans for the force. This discussion is especially important as MINUSMA’s mandate renewal will take place at a time when the new U.S. administration is pressing for review of all major UN peace operations. A sanctions regime for Mali, which some Security Council members have proposed, should be viewed with caution. Any such regime would need to be balanced and its purpose clear. The threat of sanctions during earlier negotiations yielded little return. The fragmentation and fluidity of armed groups would complicate targeted sanctions: groups from all sides, including pro-government groups, have ties to figures in smuggling and jihadist networks. Without a green light from the Malian government, some Council members would be reluctant to approve sanctions, which would taint the regime as partial. In this context, a visit from UN Secretary-General António Guterres to Mali would be particularly useful. It could boost the mission’s morale, serve as an opportunity to explain its revised mandate to Malian parties and help convince them that passivity of the Malian political elite and its lack of political will presently represent the greatest threats to the peace process. Such a high level visit also could encourage Boubakar Keïta, Mali’s president, to publicly demonstrate greater personal involvement in support of the peace process. The Security Council’s renewal of MINUSMA’s mandate should reflect the fresh challenges the mission confronts and the Malian environment in which it operates. Although the Algiers peace process has stalled, neither Bamako nor the region shows much appetite for a major course correction. This limits options. But by strengthening MINUSMA’s civilian components, reinforcing its good offices role, tasking it with local reconciliation and reviewing its relationship with other security forces in Northern Mali, the Council would better position the UN to support the peace agreement’s implementation and prevent its collapse."

U.S. intelligence officials warned, in March, that dispite U.S. bombing attacks on ISIS and its expulsion from Surt, many of its fighters moved to the South of Libya and have regrouped, posing a threat across the region (Eric Schmitt, "Warnings of a Powder Keg in Libya as ISIS Regroups After Setbacks," The New York Times, March 22, 2017).

Jeffrey Gettleman, "Kenyan Court Blocks Plan to Close Dadaab Refugee Camp," The New York Times, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/africa/kenyan-court-blocks-plan- to-close-dadaab-refugee-camp.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "More than a quarter of a million Somali refugees got a huge break on Thursday. A Kenyan judge ruled that the Kenyan government’s contentious plan to close Dadaab, the world’s largest refugee camp, was “illegal” and 'discriminatory,' and that the refugees could not be forcefully relocated. For years, Kenya has threatened to shut the sprawling camp, a crowded, sweltering realm near Kenya’s border with Somalia that has been a refuge for desperate people since Somalis began fleeing to Kenya in 1991, when their country was plunged into civil war. The government has said the camp is a breeding ground for Islamist terrorists, though the evidence is mixed for how central it really is to Kenya’s terrorism problem, which has claimed hundreds of lives in recent years. The vast majority of refugees who live in Dadaab are Somalis, too scared to return home to a nation plagued by war, famine, chaos, poverty and disease."

ICG, Murithi Mutiga, Senior Analyst, Horn of Africa, "Kenya: Avoiding Another Electoral Crisis," Commentary/Africa, March 3, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya- avoiding-another-electoral- crisis?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=faca33b41e- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_03&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-faca33b41e- 359871089, commented, "Political tensions are rising in Kenya ahead of elections in August for the presidency and other senior posts. Measures taken now can avert the risk of a repeat of electoral violence that killed hundreds of people in 2007-2008. Kenyans go to the polls in August, and fierce contests are likely in the race for the presidency and other elections the same day to county governorships and other senior posts. Electoral commission

188 preparations are dangerously behind schedule amid political polarisation, growing distrust and lack of communication between parties. Given the country’s troubled electoral history, it is essential that politicians and other key stakeholders discuss and agree on the measures necessary for credible polls and a way forward on the electoral timeline. The elections matter well beyond Kenya’s borders. The country is the transport and commercial hub of East Africa, so a protracted crisis would result in significant disruptions further afield. The 2007- 2008 post-election violence, which left 1,000 dead after a brutal police response to protests and ethnic killings, shut down international road links and slowed cargo shipments at Mombasa port to a trickle. Fuel prices more than doubled in neighbouring, landlocked Uganda and Rwanda, and humanitarian assistance further afield in the eastern Congo (DRC) was disrupted for weeks. It took a mediation effort led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and supported by international partners to get the main players to agree to a truce and form a power-sharing government. In the August 2017 poll, incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto face an energised opposition coalition, the National Super Alliance (NASA), that brings together all major opposition figures. It is led by Raila Odinga, whose campaign is all the more determined because this may be his last contest. A Level Playing Field? Neither side has made the job of the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) easy. In December, Kenyatta’s ruling Jubilee Party used its majority in parliament to push through controversial amendments to the electoral laws with little consultation. They provided for a manual backup to the electronic electoral system in case of equipment failure. This is arguably necessary since no electronic system is perfect, and no technology is foolproof against bad behaviour by politicians. The government’s unilateral measure sowed mistrust in the electoral process. But opposition leaders have not helped matters by claiming the voting will be rigged by the ruling party and threatening to challenge any outcome to the election that does not favour them outside legal channels. After the opposition claimed that the 2013 elections were fixed, the courts ruled against it. Following the 2007-2008 crisis, the Independent Review Commission (IREC), headed by retired South African judge Johann Kriegler, concluded that the 2007 polls had been marked by large-scale vote- tampering and issued far-reaching recommendations on the conduct of future elections, including that election commissioners take office at least two years before a general election. The review commission concluded that the technical system for tallying, recording and transmitting results was defective and called for an overhaul. It noted that the vast powers vested in the presidency set the stage for a high- stakes contest that increased the likelihood of violence. Only some of the proposals to improve the electoral process have been implemented. Most significantly, a progressive constitution was adopted in 2010. A two-round presidential election system now requires the ultimate winner to garner more than 50 per cent of the vote nationally and more than a quarter of those cast in more than half the 47 counties. The process for selecting election commissioners was made more inclusive, and power was devolved to counties whose elected governors and local representatives enjoy a fair degree of autonomy over the deployment of resources disbursed from the centre. The 2013 elections were reasonably peaceful, though the opposition challenged the credibility of the tallying process. Parliament has new responsibilities, including the power to vet most presidential appointees. Members also enjoy oversight of the cabinet through departmental committees. What has not changed is the behaviour of politicians and the zero-sum nature of political competition. Though the 2010 constitution sought to change the division of power between the presidency and parliament, the head of state remains immensely powerful, able to dole out patronage to supportive elites. When the president’s party commands a majority in parliament, that institution can be reduced to a rubber-stamp assembly. By the same token, devolution in the new constitution has raised the stakes in sub-national contests, with heated competition expected for governorships. Frequent leadership turnover at the IEBC means there will be a different set of inexperienced commissioners going into an election for the third vote in a row. Some who ran the last two votes left under a cloud, accused either of fiddling results (in 2007) or major corruption and political bias (2013). While the Kriegler report recommended that commissioners be in office at least two years before an election to enable them prepare adequately, the new team took office on 20 January, a mere seven

189 months before the vote. Delays in parliament, dithering by the executive and confusion within a team picked to interview the new commissioners were blamed for the holdup. This has left the IEBC, now headed by Wafula Chebukati, a lawyer little-known outside legal circles, facing tall odds to deliver a credible election. Overcoming formidable logistical, technical and legal obstacles within existing timelines and in a febrile, divisive environment will be a major challenge. Hi-tech Ambitions, Legal Challenges Kenya’s electoral commission, like many in Africa, hopes to deploy a system with biometric voter identification and electronic results transmission so as to avoid the ballot-stuffing and dubious turnout figures that plagued past elections, particularly in 2007. The IEBC estimates that the vendor that wins the contract will need 60 days to deliver the custom-made integrated electoral management system. It is well behind schedule in finding such a supplier. Legislative timelines initially called for the system to be in place eight months before the polls, which would have required installation by 8 December 2016. IEBC executives asked for more time, citing stringent procurement requirements. In November, Chief Executive Ezra Chiloba said it hoped to have the new system in place by the end of February. In fact, legal appeals by several of the companies that submitted tenders to supply the system meant that bid papers were only submitted in the first week of February. Now, another vendor’s legal challenge has blocked any decision on the tender. On 28 February, the IEBC admitted it was out of time to procure the new system on schedule. At a press briefing, its commissioners said, without elaboration, that they would explore using “an alternative voter verification” method. A day later, commission officials said they might procure the equipment directly from a vendor by “single sourcing” or issue a restricted tender that might be less open to legal challenge. The equipment for transmitting results from polling places to the tallying centre is as important as the voter kits. Past elections were compromised by lack of transparency in tallying and transmitting. The installation of a transparent, efficient electoral management system would go a long way to assuaging public concerns. Unfortunately, rushed procurement, with little lead-time for testing, may set the IEBC up for failure. That would also deepen suspicions in a situation already marked by significant tension between parties. Government steps to limit the role of external partners, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, that can offer valuable technical assistance, have not helped. On 22 December, the High Court granted an order halting the IEBC’s award of a tender to financial services firm KPMG for verification of the voter register, upholding an opposition petition that accused the IEBC of making the appointment without sufficient consultation. On 13 February, the High Court nullified a tender to a Dubai-based firm for printing ballot papers, citing violations of procurement regulations and electoral laws. A separate 13 February High Court decision that all IEBC executive decisions made before the January appointment of commissioners were null and void had particularly serious implications for preparations. The commission has appealed, but further court challenges to its decisions, particularly on tendering, remain possible and could create additional election complications. Racing Against the Clock The greatest operational challenge the IEBC faces is not lack of internal capacity but that there is little time to put in place all the elements required to make the vote transparent and credible. It needs to be clear-sighted and open about this. It should communicate to the public and international partners what extra help it needs to implement the various technical steps, including fast-tracked procurement of technology. If it becomes clear, however, that the remaining time, particularly in light of possible legal challenges, is insufficient, it should ask for an extension. The opposition may be angling for a postponement for its own reasons. Nonetheless, from a technical perspective the IEBC could well run out of time to deliver credible polls. If it becomes clear the commission needs more time, it may be possible to achieve consensus on a delay including by turning to the courts, because all parties have an interest in a smooth election. There is a precedent for this. Although the constitution provides that elections should be on the second Tuesday of August every fifth year, the High Court gave the IEBC more time to prepare for the last election. With little time left in which to build public confidence, the IEBC needs a communications strategy

190 to update voters regularly. More importantly, it needs a mechanism to discuss progress with politicians and consult on key decisions it makes on preparations to assure them the vote will be credible, free and fair. The commission should expand its Election Preparedness Task Force, currently composed of IEBC officials, representatives of the interior ministry, judiciary and director of public prosecutions. Giving civil society and the opposition greater access to all aspects of preparations would boost trust in the process. How Outsiders Can Help International partners should extend technical and financial help to the IEBC to help it better tackle the challenges. This should, however, be done with nuance, flexibility and complete transparency, in light of unfounded claims by the ruling party that external parties are seeking to influence the electoral outcome. International observers should be deployed in time to monitor crucial stages of the electoral process, such as verification of the vote register and procurement of electoral materials. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) should expand its technical aid initiatives, including deploying staff with experience handling fraught balloting around Africa to support the commission. Kenya’s raucous politics shows the relative openness of its democracy. That politicians explicitly mobilise along ethnic lines, however, means elections are marked by high communal tension. Since their words carry extraordinary resonance in a still ethnically fractured country, politicians should weigh them carefully during the campaign. The ruling party should not use state resources to gain an unfair advantage. Opposition leaders should play a constructive role in monitoring and supporting the electoral process and commit to using legal channels to air any grievances. The main presidential contenders could help by publicly signing a code of conduct ahead of the official start of the campaign, including a pledge to seek legal recourse in the event of disputes and a call to supporters to refrain from violence. A similar step during the heated 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign helped calm tensions before the vote. Similar codes of conducts should be organised in counties, including pledges not to use violence and to respect results. Establishing peace committees comprising different community leaders in especially contentious areas would help to bring groups together and limit the risk of communal violence once results are announced. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission should also closely monitor hate speech by politicians on the campaign trail and prosecute offenders. Disputed polls can carry a major human and financial cost, and three of five elections since a multi- party system was re-introduced in 1992 have been marked by violence. Kenya needs to ensure that the 2017 vote goes smoothly. Faced with the extremely tight timelines, all stakeholders should make their contribution to this."

Hussein Mohamed, "Pirates Seize Oil Tanker Off Coast of Somalia," The New York Times, March 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/africa/pirates-somalia.html?ref=todayspaper, reported "Pirates off the coast of Somalia have seized an oil tanker with eight Sri Lankans on board, in what is believed to be the first hijacking of a large commercial vessel in the region since 2012, officials said on Tuesday." That seems to be a return of an old pattern. Jeffrey Gettleman, "Somali Pirates Attack, Raising Fears That a Menace Is Back," The New York Times, April 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/africa/somalia-pirates.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Are the pirates back? After years of quiet seas, undisturbed voyages and no major attacks, Somali pirates have waylaid four ships in the past month, raising fears that the pirate menace has returned to the Indian Ocean."

Megan Specia, "How a Nation Reconciles After Genocide Killed Nearly a Million People," The New York Times, April 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/africa/rwandans-carry-on-side- by-side-two-decades-after-genocide.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Scenes like this one were playing out across Rwanda on this Saturday — a monthly day of service known as Umuganda. The premise is simple and extraordinary in its efficient enforcement: Every able-bodied Rwandan citizen between the ages of 18 and 65 must take part in community service for three hours once a month. The community identifies a new public works problem to tackle each month."

191 "This compulsory work is emblematic of a broader culture of reconciliation, development and social control asserted by the government. Each local umudugudu — or village — keeps track of who attends the monthly projects. Those who fail to participate without being excused risk fines and in some cases arrest." Rwanda has been a unique experiment in national reconciliation and assiduously enforced social re- engineering in the more than two decades since its devastating genocide, when thousands in the country’s Hutu ethnic majority unleashed unspeakable violence on the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutu countrymen who refused to take part in the slaughter. In just 100 days, nearly one million people perished. Umuganda was revived and dozens of other nation-rebuilding exercises were conceived under Mr. Kagame, who came to power after the genocide and has held the presidency since 2000. A recent constitutional amendment paved the way for him to seek a third term in office, and in August he plans to do just that. While many of his administration’s programs have lowered poverty and child mortality rates, Mr. Kagame remains a controversial figure. Many political analysts and human rights groups say Mr. Kagame has created a nation that is orderly but repressive. Laws banning so-called genocidal ideology that were adopted to deter a resurgence of sectarian or hate speech are also used to squelch even legitimate criticism of the government."

The U.S. military deployed dozens of regular troops to Somalia, in mid-April 2017, for logistics and training of the Somalia army ("Somalia Deployment," San Francisco Chronical, April 16, 2017).

Jeffrey Gettleman, "Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption," The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia- election-corruption.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, ""Politicians have been peeling off wads of hundred dollar bills to buy votes. Others have shown up for parliamentary races standing next to a political nobody who was bribed or coerced into running against them, to make the race look fair. In one case, the mysterious candidate was the politician’s maid. This week, Somalia, which has languished without a functioning central government for more than 25 years and has been propped up by billions of dollars of American aid, is holding an innovative, closely watched presidential election that United Nations officials have billed as a 'milestone.' But several analysts, investigators and some Western diplomats say the election has turned out to be a milestone of corruption, one of the most fraudulent political events in Somalia’s history — and that’s saying something, given that the country is already ranked by Transparency International, a global anticorruption organization, as the most corrupt on earth."

Francois Essomba and Dionne Searcey, "A Bilingual Cameroon Teeters After English Speakers Protest Treatment," The New York Times, February 7, 2017, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/africa/a-bilingual-cameroon-teeters-after-english-speakers- protest-treatment.html?ref=todayspaper, reports on rising difficulties in Cameroon, formed from a larger French speaking and a smaller English speaking colony, which has yet to bridge its linguistic divide, "Lawyers have long put up with laws that aren’t translated into their native English. They have endured French-speaking judges whose English is barely passable and who aren’t familiar with their judicial system. Last fall, after another new law, regarding business transactions, was not translated, the lawyers here in Bamenda, a bustling city in Cameroon’s northwest, decided they’d had enough. They organized a demonstration to protest a government that they believed had long slighted their English-speaking region by failing to uphold a constitutional promise of a bilingual nation. The demonstrations grew, as teachers vented their frustration that the government in Yaoundé — dominated by the French-speaking majority — sent teachers with shoddy English skills to schools in their area. Hundreds of citizens joined in, carrying banners and chanting against what they said were longtime injustices against their region. By December, the protests had turned violent. Security forces used live ammunition to disperse demonstrations in Bamenda. At least two unarmed protesters were killed and others were injured, according to human rights groups. News media reports said as many as four protesters died. As the violence and calls for secession in English-speaking areas rise, the issue is quickly becoming

192 a big problem for the central government. In recent days, protest organizers have called on businesses in Anglophone areas to stop paying taxes."

ICG, Zakaraia Ysusf and Absul Khalif, "The Regional Risks to Somalia’s Moment of Hope," Commentary/Africa, February 22, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/regional- risks-somalias-moment- hope?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=121970580d- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_22&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-121970580d- 359871089, commented, "Eruptions of joy across the Somali-speaking Horn of Africa greeted the election of President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo, but to deliver a cure for Somalia’s chronic ills he will need to counter distrust in neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya and win support from the African Union. The election of Somalia’s new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo offers the country’s international partners a new opportunity to step up efforts in advancing peace and stability in Somalia as well as the wider Horn of Africa. Yet the hopes of a stable future for war-torn Somalia may be short lived if the fraught regional dynamic, in particular the mistrust felt by regional powers Ethiopia and Kenya, are not effectively addressed. Farmajo’s near-landslide election victory on 8 February is without parallel. Although the eruptions of joy across the Somali-speaking Horn and the shared jubilation of citizens and soldiers in Mogadishu is rightly giving way to more sober assessments, the view that a seismic shift has occurred will be difficult to ignore. Ensuring that this election ushers in a new dawn, and that Farmajo’s new-found political capital is well invested, a renewed diplomatic engagement by partners on numerous fronts will be required to support national-level reform and ease regional anxieties. The upcoming London Conference on Somalia, now expected in early May, represents an opportunity to do just that. A Popular Mandate Many hope that Farmajo’s credibility and popular support can be channelled productively. The national reconciliation talks, aimed at healing deep wounds from the civil war that broke out in 1991, have stalled and Farmajo’s strong mandate may be what is necessary to resuscitate them. Although the entire indirect election process was extremely corrupt, Somalis have completed a relatively credible presidential election that has resulted in a peaceful transfer of power. Farmajo’s cross- clan support – the strongest platform for any Somali president – is a rare demonstration of unity in the ethnically homogenous but clan-fractured country. The mandate is indispensable for making critical progress on multiple fronts, particularly on reconciliation, addressing corruption and finalising the constitution. A number of factors worked in Farmajo’s favor and helped seal his remarkable victory. First, Farmajo tapped into a growing antipathy to the dominance of the Abgal, a Hawiye sub-clan that gave the country its last two presidents. Frustration among other clans was also directed at the implicit agreement between the Abgal/Hawiye and Majerteen/ clans that allowed them to control and share both the presidential and prime ministerial seats. Farmajo’s victory was also helped by former President Hassan Sheikh’s decision to support the re- election of of the Digil/Mirifle clan as parliamentary speaker cost him the Digil/Mirifle vote. This tactical support was intended to scupper Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan’s presidential campaign, since it is an unwritten rule that the president and speaker cannot hail from the same clan. This fuelled Digil/Mirifle resentment, who ended up coming together during the presidential election rounds to vote against Hassan Sheikh. Second, Farmajo is also well liked among diaspora and youth. More than 125 of Somalia’s 283 MPs and senators are from the diaspora and 165 MPs and senators are under 35 years of age. In addition, approximately 30 per cent of the newly elected MPs are also affiliated with Islamist-leaning groups, including Salafi movements and the Muslim Brotherhood (excluding Hasan Sheikh’s Damal Jadid). These have been, for some time, against the previous president’s perceived closeness with Ethiopia and its meddling in Somali political affairs. Third, Farmajo benefitted from a huge wave of nationalistic fervour and a widely-shared perception

193 he could be the right person to build a robust Somali National Army (SNA), speed up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)’s exit, stabilise security, curb interventions by neighbouring countries, and protect Somalia’s dignity and sovereignty. High Expectations Farmajo’s immediate task will be to manage the inordinately high expectations. Unless he takes some early steps toward fulfilling his pledges of rebuilding security forces and state institutions, tackling corruption and unifying the country, dissatisfaction could trigger a serious public backlash. A further immediate impediment to Farmajo’s proposed domestic agenda stems from the entrenched elites. Clan leaderships comprise a form of a very corrupt 'deep state' that often operate against the interests of the people. Some believe this network cut short Farmajo’s tenure as prime minister in 2011. Meaningful progress will be unlikely unless these factions are controlled through a mixture of co-option and coercion. The elections also highlighted the extent to which covert foreign funding of politicians fuelled allegations of clientalism and has impeded Somalia’s democratic transformation. Regional countries, and the Arab states of the Gulf in particular, were widely alleged to be giving cash to the top five presidential candidates. Managing competing foreign interests in future presidential elections and reducing the corrupting influence of illicit foreign funding must be a priority for the Farmajo government. One potential institutional solution would be to formalise the Integrity Commission, set up just days before the presidential elections with the aim of curbing bribery. Regional Mistrust On a regional and international level, Farmajo’s stated intent to reshape his country’s foreign policy could prove a daunting challenge, not least because his victory stemmed in part from his campaign image as a staunch nationalist opposed to foreign meddling – especially by Ethiopia and Kenya. As head of state, he will need to move with extra caution to navigate regional politics and ease the anxieties of these powerful neighbours who are suspicious of his brand of politics. Growing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia (over Nile waters, the Grand Renaissance Dam and South Sudan) could potentially spill over into Somalia and complicate matters for Farmajo. The speed with which Cairo has moved to embrace the new Somali president is bound to increase Ethiopia’s anxieties at the growing Arab influence in the country. The resurgent Somali nationalism that Farmajo is said to embody is causing particular concern in Ethiopia, which could become an equal, if not greater, challenge to the new president. Ethiopia and Somalia are historical rivals and Addis Ababa has intervened repeatedly in its eastern neighbour since the central government collapsed in the early 1990s. In 2006, Ethiopia moved swiftly to dislodge the popular Union of Islamic Court (UIC) Islamist government that had managed to restore peace in Somalia during its brief six- month reign. Addis saw the UIC's anti-Ethiopian posturing and Somali nationalist rhetoric in support of a “” that incorporates Somali inhabited areas in neighbouring countries as a threat and acted accordingly. If Farmajo adopts a similarly antagonistic posture – as his popular 'nationalist' constituency demands – then Addis will quickly act to undermine the new regime in Mogadishu, regardless of the progress made in Somalia’s domestic struggles. He will need to move slowly in relation to Ethiopia and Kenya – which shares many of Ethiopia’s concerns about Somali nationalism, given the large Somali population there – and reaching out to emphasise the shared interest between the new president and these countries in stabilising Somalia. The new president seems to be sensitive to these concerns and has sent emissaries to Nairobi and Addis Ababa with messages of goodwill and reassurances. This is hugely positive and ought to be sustained and supported by the international community. Still, there are signs that regional tensions may worsen. Pro-Farmajo social media activists posted a picture of an Ethiopian senior official at the election venue captioned 'Ethiopia shattered by the poll outcome'. Such taunts were disseminated widely across the Somali-speaking Horn and diaspora. Farmajo’s broad domestic popularity is unlikely to protect him from Somalia’s fragile relationships with its neighbours, and an Ethiopia that senses its interests and influence to be in jeopardy will almost certainly be a spoiler for Farmajo’s agenda of reform. The African Union’s Role

194 Somalia’s recent election marks another important milestone in the country: the tenth anniversary of the regional peacekeeping force AMISOM. In this time, the internationally supported mission has helped state forces in their fight against Al-Shabaab militants, provided and delivered humanitarian aid, and trained the Somali security forces. Yet the mission’s resource and management challenges remain unaddressed, which hamper AMISOM’s peacekeeping capabilities. The African Union (AU) must tackle the dysfunction, national rivalries and frictions among the troop-contributing countries: Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and . Such tensions hinder AMISOM’s military effectiveness in fighting Al-Shabaab and add to the incoherence surrounding the planned exit from Somalia envisioned to begin in 2018. A hasty pullout would be catastrophic for Somalia and the region. Since AMISOM’s deployment, Al-Shabaab has been significantly degraded but remains a lethal force with the capacity to continue destabilising the country for years to come. While Farmajo served as prime minister, Al-Shabaab lost significant territory and was ultimately forced to withdraw from the capital. With a stable government in place and Farmajo at the helm, greater effort can be made to coordinate between regional peacekeepers and national security forces to step up the campaign against Al-Shabaab and other militants, especially since a local group declaring affiliation to Islamic State briefly seized a patch of Somalia’s coastland late last year. Since the election, there has been cause for cautious optimism as reports were circulated by several Somali news sources this week that a significant dissident faction of Al-Shabaab led by Abu Mansur was considering surrendering to the new Somali government, in recognition of Farmajo’s huge popularity. This would be a great boost for the new administration, and all efforts must be made to help the new government peel away elements of the militants amenable to a peaceful settlement. No less important, the AU and other international partners must encourage the new government to focus on national reconciliation."

Dionne Searce, "‘They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.’ Then Came Slaughter," The New Yotk Times, February 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/world/africa/nigeria-civilian- massacre.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "In recent months, the Nigerian military has made great headway in its war against Boko Haram, the radical Islamist militants terrorizing northeast Nigeria. But the army’s aggressive sweeps to root out the remaining fighters have taken a toll on more than just Boko Haram. `Witnesses are accusing Nigerian soldiers of killing unarmed civilians, as well. `Reports of civilian massacres have emerged in recent weeks as residents from areas previously sealed off by Boko Haram start to stream out."

ICG, "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures," Africa Report 246, March 8, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haram-chad-beyond-military- measures?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=23418aa639- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-23418aa639- 359871089, commented, "Since 2015, the conflict between Chad’s armed forces and Boko Haram has destabilised the Lake Chad region in the west of the country. Defeating this resilient insurgency requires the state to go beyond a purely military campaign and relaunch trade, improve public services and reintegrate demobilised militants. Executive Summary Since early 2015, attacks in Chad by the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram have killed hundreds, displaced more than 100,000 and damaged the regional economy of the Lake Chad basin. Violence peaked in 2015 with suicide bombings in the capital and in the Lake region, and has since declined. Chad’s military engagements and its role in the fight against terrorism – around Lake Chad and elsewhere in the region – have brought significant diplomatic gains, most recently the appointment of Foreign Minister Moussa Faki as chairperson of the African Union Commission. But the security risk hasn’t disappeared. To counter the ongoing threat while responding to the immediate and longer-term needs of the population, Chadian authorities need to build on the relatively successful regional security cooperation, but also start to move away from their highly militarised response to include a more significant civilian component, elaborate a more coherent economic development plan and deal more effectively with former Boko Haram members.

195 Boko Haram’s presence in Chad has been most strongly felt around Lake Chad, which lies primarily within Chadian territory. The area combines rich agriculture, pastoralism and fishing and is a magnet for migrants from all over the Sahel, leading to tensions over control of resources. Boko Haram has taken advantage of the geography of the lake seeking refuge on its many islands. The cultural and religious influence of Nigeria’s Borno state facilitated the penetration of the Borno-born jihadist group, which has also taken advantage of longstanding communal tensions in the area. Initially, Boko Haram’s presence on the Chadian side of the lake was limited. But violence rapidly escalated in 2015, partly in reaction to the intervention by Chadian forces in neighbouring states. Two suicide bombings in the capital N’Djamena and multiple attacks on villages and army posts followed. Attacks diminished at the start of 2016, having never reached the levels seen in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger. This was accompanied by a wave of surrenders of Boko Haram members in the second half of the year, but which seemingly included few if any of the hard core. Attacks continued, however, throughout 2016, as the jihadist group showed repeated resilience and adaptability. The violence Boko Haram unleashed has led to over 100,000 displaced and 7,000 refugees on Chadian territory by the beginning of 2017. In 2015, this heightened longstanding antagonisms between communities and made community-level conflict management more challenging. Some community chiefs have been caught in a violent crossfire. Some have been pressured by the national authorities, while others have been accused of complicity or targeted by Boko Haram and one has even been killed. Stigmatisation of some of the Buduma ethnic group, suspected of colluding with Boko Haram, was acute but has calmed down since violence decreased. The reaction of the Chadian authorities has been primarily military, both in the Lake region and through interventions in neighbouring countries. A state of emergency was imposed in November 2015 and has been renewed several times since, and administration has been partly militarised. Many suspected Boko Haram members captured on Chadian soil have been imprisoned for long periods without trial. Local defence militias have been created and have played a significant role against the jihadist group. But the heavy security response has come at a cost, especially in restrictions of movement imposed on a traditionally highly mobile population heavily dependent on cross-border trade. As the first phase of a new military offensive by armies in the region has just been launched (Operation Rawan Kada), the risks of infiltration and a rise in attacks on the Chadian territory are real. A large-scale attack could act as a trigger and, as in 2015, lead to stigmatisation, particularly of the Buduma population. Until now, national authorities have failed to articulate any longer-term plan for the area, and there is little sense of how the impact of Boko Haram is dealt with at a civilian level. A clear new development strategy is needed, which should be driven by the needs of the population in the Lake Chad area and not tied too closely to the fight against the jihadist group. The reduction of the Boko Haram threat largely depends on actions taken in neighbouring countries, primarily Nigeria. However, measures can be taken to contain it in Chad and in particular in the lake area: Chadian authorities are ill-prepared to deal with suspected Boko Haram members who have surrendered or been captured. A screening process must be initiated to distinguish between real members and those who were either at the periphery or even not associated to the group at all. The latter should be released and integrated in broad community development projects targeting the youth. Following the recent initiative of the Interior Ministry in neighbouring Niger, Chadian authorities should elaborate a framework document for the treatment of surrendees and communicate it to its international partners. To encourage surrenders, counter violent radical messages, improve communication by the authorities and allow local people to express their concerns, community radios should be supported and expanded. Most of these will necessarily operate at local level, but consideration should be given to developing community radios with a remit to cover the whole lake area, to reflect the diversity and integration of the populations. Such radios, which could be based on existing initiatives in neighbouring countries, should broadcast in a wide and balanced range of local and national languages, and should include messages of peace, calls for surrender directed at Boko Haram members and information on other issues of lakewide interest such as cattle prices. To balance the heavily militarised response to the Boko Haram threat in the lake area and to avoid

196 its militarisation, and to address the needs of the population suffering from violence and displacement, including through better and more sustainable development strategies: Far more civilian capacity must be gradually brought in. This should include a stronger involvement of local authorities in strategic decision-making and a better administrative presence to rebuild social services and ensure civilian needs are taken into account. To encourage civil servants to work in the region, a system of temporary bonuses could be considered. Measures should also include support for community-level initiatives concerning social cohesion. Chadian authorities should propose clear political options for the future of the lake. They should elaborate a medium- and longer-term plan for the development of the Lake region, together with the development donors and in consultation with the local population. It should be sensitive to the needs of a highly mobile population. The risk of concentrating financial resources on the lake to the detriment of other regions should not be neglected. Chad is a very poor country with many areas in a precarious situation. It is therefore necessary to rebalance the portfolio of projects so as not to neglect the pressing needs of other regions. The welcome efforts of donors to set up projects in the region must take account of risks of injecting large amounts of development funding so as not to reinforce some conflict drivers. As a first step, development agencies should finance a socio-anthropological study into the livelihoods and mobility of the population, to also consider how to involve local communities in development programs. Chadian authorities should review their current policies, which restrict economic activities on the lake, and take measures to support, protect and relaunch the regional economy. A protected trade corridor between Chad and Nigeria would facilitate trade and improve the living conditions of the population."

ICG, "Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram," Africa Report 244, February 23, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad- vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram, commented, "Regional armies in the Lake Chad basin deploy vigilantes to sharpen campaigns against Boko Haram insurgents. But using these militias creates risks as combatants turn to communal violence and organised crime. Over the long term they must be disbanded or regulated. Executive Summary Vigilante groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad play a major role in the fight against Boko Haram, but their presence raises concerns. They make military operations less blunt and more effective and have reconnected these states somewhat with many of their local communities, but they have also committed abuses and become involved in the war economy. In Nigeria in particular, vigilantism did much to turn an anti-state insurgency into a bloodier civil war, pitting Boko Haram against communities and leading to drastic increases in violence. As the conflict continues to evolve, so will vigilantes. They are enmeshed with high politics, especially in Nigeria, and in local intercommunal relations, business operations and chiefdoms. Their belief that they should be rewarded will need to be addressed, and it is also important for the Lake Chad basin states to address the common gap in community policing, particularly in rural areas. To ensure vigilantes are not a future source of insecurity, these states will each need to devise their own mix of slowly disbanding and formalising and regulating them. Vigilantism, the recourse to non-state actors to enforce law and order (of a sort), has a history in the Lake Chad region. Colonial powers there relied, to a substantial degree, on local traditional chiefs and their retinues. The multi-faceted crisis in governance and decline in services among the Lake Chad states since the 1980s gave rise to new vigilante groups. The law and order challenges vigilantes tried to address were a factor in the formation and growth of Boko Haram, itself an attempt to provide regulation and guidance. The vigilante fight against Boko Haram started in 2013, in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the insurgency’s epicentre, under the twin pressure of mounting jihadist violence and security force retaliation. The Joint Task Force (JTF), led by the Nigerian army, quickly realised the vigilantes’ potential as a source of local knowledge, intelligence and manpower and set out to help organise it, with the assistance of local and traditional authorities. Operating under the unofficial but revealing name of Civilian

197 Joint Task Force (CJTF), vigilantes were essential in flushing Boko Haram out of the city, then began replicating throughout the state. The official use of vigilantes to fight the movement spread further in Nigeria, then to Cameroon in 2014 and Chad in 2015, where the groups are known as comités de vigilance. Niger has been more cautious, partly because of past struggles with armed groups and because it has not needed them as much. Vigilantes have played many roles, from mostly discrete surveillance networks in Niger to military combat auxiliaries or semi-autonomous fighting forces in Nigeria. For the region’s overstretched and under pressure militaries, they have somewhat filled the security gap and provided local knowledge. They have made the military response more targeted and more efficient, but their mobilisation also provoked retribution by Boko Haram against their communities and contributed to the massive levels of civilian casualties in 2014 and 2015. Paradoxically, this, too, has favoured regional governments’ strategy of pushing civilians away from the jihadists. As the insurgency splinters and falls back on more discrete guerrilla operations and terror attacks, however, the time has come to measure the risks posed by such a massive mobilisation of vigilantes (they claim to be about 26,000 in Borno state alone). Their compensation demands will have to be addressed, especially if authorities consider offering deals to Boko Haram militants to lay down their weapons. In the longer term, vigilantes may become political foot soldiers, turn to organised crime or feed communal violence. Vigilantism can be a powerful counter-insurgency tool, but there is a compelling need to confront the immediate concerns it raises, notably in terms of impunity, and to begin planning for its long-term post-conflict transformation. Recommendations To protect civilians, limit risks to vigilantes and improve accountability To the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger: Abstain, as much as possible, from creating additional standing vigilante units and focus instead on building intelligence and communication networks through which civilians can obtain state protection when needed. Ensure that as many civilians as possible have access to functional communication networks and can call on regular security forces, especially where risks remain high. Encourage, when necessary to maintain vigilante forces, their formalisation, including registration, and systems for internal oversight and external accountability, and include community oversight in accountability mechanisms. Supply assault rifles only to select groups of better-trained CJTF and for mission-specific purposes, such as when they serve as auxiliaries, while ensuring that those weapons are registered and remain security-service property. Synchronise CJTF accountability mechanisms with those of the federal Nigeria Police Force. Hold to account those vigilantes suspected of abuses, notably for sexual and gender-based violence, and ensure transparent and fair investigation of all suspects in accordance with domestic and international law, while publicising any judicial decisions. Provide vigilantes training programs that mix practical skills (eg, intelligence, first aid, handling of landmines and improvised explosive devices) and instruction in applicable national and international laws, while involving the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and relevant human rights groups (eg, in Nigeria, the National Human Rights Commission) in the latter. To donors: Adjust legal guidelines to permit assistance in building justice and accountability mechanisms. To acknowledge the contribution of the vigilantes and manage expectations To the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger: Combat stereotyping that certain entire ethnic communities, notably the Kanuri, support Boko Haram by highlighting vigilante efforts from those groups. Respect vigilantes publicly and give sufficient and standardised assistance packages to those wounded or killed in the line of duty and their families. Set expectations for compensation transparently through public announcements on what is being offered and to whom, who is not eligible and when it will end, so as not to motivate more vigilantism.

198 To prepare for a transformation of the vigilantes and prevent the emergence of mafias and ethnic militias To the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger: Plan to transform vigilante units when the situation stabilises further, with each country following its own pace according to its security situation and according to the extent and role of vigilantism, notably by: planning demobilisation processes for the majority of vigilantes that include small grants to help them go back to their former occupations, complete their education or develop businesses; creating, given the likely continuation of some form of lower-level jihadist activity and rural unrest, particularly in Borno and Adamawa states, a temporary auxiliary body under the army or Police Mobile Force, drawing on the vigilantes who have received weapons training and served directly with security forces; and providing for their potential integration into the security forces if they meet the educational and other requirements and undergo retraining; combatting police and vigilante corruption vigorously, so it does not undermine professionalism, and improving ties with local communities; and selecting, vetting, retraining and equipping a number of vigilantes with the help of local civil society organisations, so that they feed reports and early warning into both police and civil society networks. Prepare a disarmament plan that focuses exclusively on taking functional automatic weapons out of circulation. To donors: Support programs for vigilante demobilisation and to professionalise the police and their capacity to monitor and regulate temporary auxiliary forces."

ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," Africa Report No. 245, February 278, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/245-niger-and-boko-haram-beyond-counter- insurgency, commented, "The struggle against Boko Haram in south-eastern Niger is increasingly sharpening local conflicts over access to resources. There is no military solution to this insurgency, and the authorities should instead put the emphasis on demobilising militants, solving local conflicts, reinvigorating the economy and restoring public services. Executive Summary For the last two years, Niger has been at war with Boko Haram. The conflict has disrupted this poor country’s development, especially public finances, and destabilised the south east, the main scene of armed clashes. In this region, located some 1,350km from the capital and faced with an economic collapse, the battle against Boko Haram has stoked up local intercommunal tensions and exacerbated violence over access to resources. Despite direct support from Chadian troops since 2015 and improved collaboration with the Nigerian army, Nigerien forces have been unable to put a stop to attacks by insurgents, some of whom have links to the Islamic State (IS). The military option has produced results but has also shown its limits. The war effort must be accompanied by an approach that would allow demobilisation of the movement’s militants and promote a political solution to the tensions that have stimulated its local spread. The government must also prioritise economic revival and public service provision to bring relief to an exhausted population, whose suffering fuels the insurrection. Despite alarmist scenarios, Boko Haram has failed to extend its influence beyond the south- eastern Diffa region. This relatively wealthy territory has a special relationship with the Nigerian state of Borno. Close historical, religious, and economic ties explain the resonance of the message spread by Mohamed Yusuf, the Nigerian founder of Boko Haram. Many Nigeriens, especially young men, became his supporters after they travelled to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, only 425km away from Diffa, in search of religious training or business opportunities. When Nigerian armed forces massacred more than 1,000 of his Nigerian followers in July 2009, many members of Boko Haram found refuge in south-eastern Niger. The movement has long avoided conducting military operations in the country to build up Diffa as a refuge and a place to seek funds, supplies and recruits.

199 Nigerian authorities initially responded to the Boko Haram threat by keeping the movement under surveillance. They believed that it was essentially a Nigerian problem. This attitude changed in 2014, when the threat became more pressing. Boko Haram’s territorial expansion toward the Niger border was accompanied by a new push to recruit hundreds of young Nigeriens. Persuaded by its regional and international partners to become more actively involved, Niger joined the military efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The war effort has since proved to be a burden on the national budget and the judicial system and kindled tensions between the government and the military hierarchy. The Diffa region is suffering from both Boko Haram attacks and counter-insurgency measures taken by the Nigerien authorities, such as the extension of the state of emergency introduced in February 2015 that includes a ban on some commercial activities. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people only survive thanks to foreign aid. Recourse to local vigilante committees and reprisals by Boko Haram against anyone who collaborates with the army have created a difficult atmosphere in which local score-settling, collective fear and informants are all ingredients of a dangerously toxic brew. On the shores of Lake Chad, in the extreme east of Diffa region, Boko Haram’s presence has aggravated intercommunal tensions, which have degenerated into deadly conflicts since May 2016. Mediation between communities by the authorities since June 2016 is a welcome initiative but has yet to dissipate all of these tensions. On the lake’s islands, a group of combatants who have broken away from the Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau, head of the movement since the death of Mohamed Yusuf, is exploiting these local tensions. This group is currently trying to take root more permanently and allegedly has close ties with IS. Faced with Boko Haram’s resilience, the Nigerien government can no longer restrict itself to an approach solely based on military operations and commercial restrictions. In December 2016, the establishment of demobilisation sites signalled a change in the policy of repression that had prevailed since 2015. The government is also drafting a special plan for the resolution of the crisis in the Diffa region. With the support of regional and international partners, it must continue in this direction and expand its counter- insurgency strategy that goes beyond a mainly military response. This is all the more important given that some insurgents have rejected the excesses of Abubakar Shekau and may try to regain the support of the local population by avoiding the targeting of Muslims. The government must also increase cooperation with its neighbours and make contingency plans for the possible disengagement of international partners, whose public finances are deteriorating and who could opt for more isolationist policies in the months to come. Recommendations To reduce violence by going beyond the security response To the government of Niger: Discourage the development of armed community militias. Pursue and strengthen the efforts to mediate between communities on the shores of Lake Chad started in June 2016. Ensure equitable and fair access to the lake’s resources, including, if necessary, through a thorough reform of the system of chiefs in the lake area. Propose quickly a plan for resolving the crisis in south-eastern Niger, prepared in close partnership with civil society and elected representatives in the Diffa region, and paying particular attention to reconciliation, the reintroduction of public services and economic revival. To ease the pressure on the judicial system and prepare for the reintegration of Boko Haram militants To the government of Niger: Formulate demobilisation and reintegration policies for former Boko Haram combatants, especially those who have not been involved in serious crimes, while consulting Boko Haram’s victims and their representatives to avoid a cycle of score-settling. The recent establishment of demobilisation sites is welcome but the reintegration of former insurgents is a sensitive issue that requires skilful handling and major long-term investment by the government and its partners. Increase the resources allocated to the judicial system to ensure improved treatment of Boko Haram- related cases, including those dealing with suspects of involvement in serious crimes, which are currently clogging up the country’s courts.

200 Insist that the security services make a strong case to justify the transfer to Niamey prison of people who have been arrested on the basis of intelligence provided by informants. To Niger’s partners: Provide advice and human resources to boost the resources allocated to the judicial system. To suspend economic restrictions linked to the state of emergency and launch a plan to revive the economy of the Diffa region as early as possible To the government of Niger: Redirect suspended economic flows by channelling them through the town of Diffa and encouraging exporters to use more secure roads toward Nigeria until the southern Komadougou area becomes stable again. Build the capacities of the public administration to provide the population with tangible judicial, health and education services, encourage the recruitment of local civil servants and the granting of temporary bonuses to civil servants working in the regions affected by the insurrection. To supervise more effectively the security forces and their budgets To the government of Niger: Encourage the High Authority for the Fight Against Corruption (HALCIA) to investigate the use of funds allocated to the war effort. Provide the armed forces on the ground with the resources they need to conduct counter-insurgency military operations, while tightening supervision of the armed forces and requiring that military personnel found guilty of abuses and other crimes against civilians are held accountable. Supervise the vigilante committees to limit their role to the collection of intelligence; prepare policies immediately for their complete or partial demobilisation if the insurrection’s decline is confirmed."

Steve Wemia, "International Court Says Violence in Congo May Amount to War Crimes," The New York Times, April 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/africa/international-criminal- court-congo-war-crimes.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, “Recent acts of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including the murder of two United Nations researchers and the discovery of 23 mass graves in the Kasaï region, may constitute war crimes, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court said on Friday. 'I am deeply concerned by the numerous reports of serious violence in the D.R.C., particularly in the Kasaï provinces, for several months,' the I.C.C. prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, said in a statement. 'There have been reports of violence between local militias and Congolese forces, the killing of many civilians and noncivilians, kidnappings and summary executions of persons, including U.N. experts on mission and their accompanying persons,' she said."

ICG, Hans Hoebeke, Senior Analyst, Congo, "Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo, Commentary/Africa, March 21, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central- africa/democratic-republic-congo/kamuina-nsapu-insurgency-adds-dangers-dr- congo?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=dd729ac059- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_21&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-dd729ac059- 359871089, commented, "Conflict in the impoverished Kasai region was sparked by local grievances but has spread to reflect wider discontent, including frustration over the country’s ongoing political and economic crisis. The Kamuina Nsapu insurgency arose last year as a locally rooted conflict in the Kasai-Central province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but has since gained intensity and is spreading to neighbouring provinces. By January, 216,000 people had been displaced, and more than 400 killed, according to humanitarian sources. In one town, Tshimbulu, at least 84 militia members were killed between 9 and 13 February 2017. Mass graves have been discovered in the area since. Two recent events have drawn national and international attention to the crisis. In February, videos circulated on social media that appeared to show a brutal army crackdown in Kasai-Central. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the government to halt human rights violations, including apparent summary executions, by the armed forces. On 12 March, six people were kidnapped in Kasai-Central, including one American and one Swedish member of the UN Group of Experts

201 investigating violations of international sanctions and international humanitarian law, and four Congolese working with them. The circumstances surrounding the alleged kidnapping, the first such incident in the expert panel’s long existence, should be clarified as soon as possible, not least in light of the need for international journalists and researchers to access the country’s increasingly troubled interior. At the national level, a dangerous political stalemate continues following President Joseph Kabila’s decision to stay in power beyond his constitutionally mandated term limit in December 2016. Despite the agreement mediated by the Catholic Church and signed by the government and opposition party leaders on 31 December, which called for a transitional government and elections by the end of 2017, significant issues remain unresolved. With the economic crisis deepening, instability is rising, not only in the Kasai region but also in North Kivu, Tanganyika and Kongo-Central. While much of this violence is rooted in local causes, it directly challenges state authority, and serves as a warning that the political crisis at the national level is further destabilising the country’s provinces. Violence in North Kivu province, recently visited by Crisis Group, has already affected preparation for elections, and this could be repeated as voter registration rolls out across the country. It is vital that conflict resolution mechanisms are established or boosted at the local level in anticipation of further problems. MONUSCO, the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, has only minimal capacity to respond to civil unrest or widening conflict. Nevertheless, UN troop and police presence in potential hotspots could deter security forces from committing abuses, and the mission’s monitoring and good offices will remain important. In a welcome move, the UN Secretary-General on 10 March requested the Security Council to approve an additional UN police presence, including in the Kasai region, noting a “high risk of urban violence in the upcoming electoral period”. The Security Council is scheduled to decide on possible changes to MONUSCO’s mandate on 29 March. The Kasai region, which was split from two into five provinces in 2015 in a policy known as découpage, is one of the DRC’s poorest, and usually far off the radar of politicians and diplomats in the distant capital, Kinshasa. Since April 2016, it has experienced an increasingly violent insurgency by the Kamuina Nsapu militia, named after the title of a hereditary chief in Kasai-Central province. Fighting has rapidly spread from Kasai-Central to neighbouring Kasai, Kasai-Oriental and Lomami provinces. This insurgency has its origins in local tensions in Kasai-Central province. However, it has quickly tapped into the long-running political and socio-economic frustration in the Kasai provinces, and is also tied to national politics. The national and provincial governments’ legitimacy in the region is particularly weak. The crisis is now impossible to ignore and will require sustained effort on the political and development fronts to contain and eventually reverse. Kasai: Frustrations in an Opposition Stronghold Kasai-Central, the origin of the insurgency, ranks very poorly in its human development indicators, including high levels of child mortality and malnourishment, as well widespread illiteracy among women and girls. A 2012 World Bank report puts provincial per capita income below $200 per month, among the lowest in DRC, and an earlier study by the bank questioned the financial sustainability of the separated Kasai provinces. The province has diamonds and gold, but there is no industrial mining. Infrastructure and electricity supplies are inadequate. The province’s only major industry, the Brasimba brewery, was recently closed, leaving the public sector as the largest employer. Kananga is the birthplace of Etienne Tshisekedi, the historic leader of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) opposition party, and, until his death on 1 February 2017, the head of the Rassemblement opposition coalition. In the 2011 national elections, Tshisekedi and the UDPS dominated in the region. In Kasai Occidental (now split into Kasai and Kasai-Central), he obtained 75 per cent of the vote, and in former Kasai Oriental (now split into Kasai-Oriental, Sankuru and Lomami), he won 70 per cent. When President Kabila was declared the winner of the deeply flawed polls, the feeling that the national vote had been stolen by the regime was particularly strong in the area, where Kabila remains very unpopular. Current Prime Minister Samy Badibanga, originally from Kasai-Central, led the dissident UDPS parliamentarians who in 2011 took up their seats in defiance of the party line boycotting the parliament. They were consequently expelled from the party. The UDPS boycotted the 2006 elections (none have been held since at provincial level) and is therefore absent from the provincial parliaments and

202 governments, all dominated by the ruling majority. Despite the Kasai provinces being home to numerous other senior political figures, including Evariste Boshab, former interior minister and deputy prime minister, many locals are unhappy that no Kasaian has ever led the country. Many are also frustrated that their representatives have not invested in Kasai’s economy, particularly in comparison to what they see as the better served Kivu and Maniema provinces. The Kamuina Nsapu Phenomenon It took a fairly commonplace local problem, the politicisation of the installation of a hereditary chief, Kamuina Nsapu, to ignite a cocktail of frustrations. With feelings against the government already running high, the chief managed to mobilise followers and to gain support for his anti-government cause. Kamuina Nsapu is the hereditary title for the chief of Bajila Kasanga, or Bashila, a groupement containing several villages in Dibataie sector, Kasai-Central province, approximately 70km south east of Kananga. Since colonial times, the Bajila Kasanga chieftancy has spread and established several other groupements in the region, extending into Angola. In the DRC, traditional chiefs are integral to public administration, receiving a salary and managing villages. They have a role in the control of land and may perform an important spiritual function. Chiefs are appointed according to local traditions, and then recognised by the state. In principle, the chief is apolitical, but, to be recognised and maintain his position and authority, he is often pressured to align with the regime. Politicians and officials have also increasingly challenged traditional authorities by creating, and even selling, new chiefdoms. Tensions between state and traditional authority triggered the current conflict. In 2016, the state refused to recognise the traditional appointment of Jean-Pierre Mpandi as Kamuina Nsapu, and the provincial governor reportedly refused to meet him. This was considered an insult, and put the chief and the state authorities on a collision course, further aggravated by the state recognition of lower-ranked Bashila leaders. Subsequently, Mpandi criticised the regime in a nationalist diatribe using xenophobic language, decrying the presence of foreign mercenaries and what he called a government of occupation. Like many radical critics of the regime, he focused on its supposed Rwandan origin. According to local observers, the decision not to recognise Mpandi as chief was prompted by the then Interior Minister Evariste Boshab, because Mpandi was considered close to the opposition and refused to support the presidential majority. In January 2017, the new Interior Minister Emmanuel Ramazani Shadari stated that Mpandi had taken radical anti-government political positions as far back as 2013. Crisis Group was told during a recent visit to Kasai that the relationship between Mpandi and provincial authorities deteriorated following the 2015 découpage, which led to an increase in harassment of the population by the provincial and territorial authorities. In April 2016, while Mpandi was in South Africa, provincial authorities dispatched security services to the chiefdom to check for weapons. Mpandi later accused the authorities of entering sacred places, stealing traditional regalia and attempting to molest one of his wives. He accused the security forces of harassing the population and evicted them from the area. The chief increasingly considered the state and all its representatives, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), to be his enemies and incited his followers to rise up against them. After months of escalation, Mpandi, some of his followers and several members of the security forces were killed on 12 August 2016. Several of his supporters do not believe Mpandi died. Since early December, Kamuina Nsapu militia attacks on state institutions have intensified, including in Kananga and Tshikapa, the capital of Kasai province, and violence has expanded to Kasai, Kasai Oriental and Lomami provinces. In several Crisis Group interviews in Kananga, local observers said many young men and boys, some as young as five, had been conscripted or joined the militia. Its members wear red headbands or armbands, and like the Mai Mai groups operating in eastern DRC they undergo rituals and carry amulets that are believed to bring invulnerability. Some have guns, likely looted from the security forces. The government and several local observers claim some politicians support the insurgency. With no identifiable leaders, their demands are hard to verify. However, four elements were repeated during Crisis Group’s interviews in Kananga in January: calls for the return of Kamuina Nsapu’s body for burial, to which the government agreed after talks with the family mid-March; reparations to

203 Kamuina Nsapu’s family; repair of damaged hospitals and schools, to which the government has committed itself; social and economic development of the region; and the release of arrested militants and civilians, a demand the government partially met in February when it freed several prisoners and in March committed to continue the process. However, when self-proclaimed spokespersons for the group appeared in local media in late February, the demands became national, including a call for the quick implementation of the 31 December agreement. This appears to reflect wider popular frustrations as the Kabila regime hangs onto power. Political Dynamics The Kamuina Nsapu insurgency has become a symbol of widespread dissatisfaction of both the Kasai urban and rural populations. The defence of traditional customs and practices found particular resonance among the public and other traditional chiefs. Optimism that a new UDPS-led government could calm the situation took a blow with the death of opposition leader Tshisekedi last month. Recently, in a further alarming twist, insurgents have also targeted Catholic institutions, for unclear reasons. T he government has created a new military zone covering Kasai, Kasai-Central and Kasai-Oriental provinces. Numerous army reinforcements have been deployed and Kananga is increasingly militarised. Poorly paid, badly led and trained, members of the Congolese security services are often accused of using disproportionate force, which the government denies. In December 2016, MONUSCO sent military reinforcements to the area, followed by human rights observers, and in March published a strongly worded statement denouncing the restrictions imposed by the security forces on its freedom of movement. Following recent evidence of abuses by the Congolese armed forces and reports on the discovery of mass graves, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an investigation. In late February, responding to the mounting international pressure, the government dispatched a mission to investigate events and in mid-March announced the arrest of seven members of the armed forces, including several officers. The political response was late and ineffective. Former Interior Minister Boshab visited in 2016, but took little action to follow up. The opposition, busy with the political dialogue in Kinshasa, has been mostly absent from the local scene. A parliamentary question about the situation was tabled in December 2016. The provincial assembly has not yet visited the affected areas, citing a lack of resources. In late January, militia incursions in Kananga prompted Prime Minister Badibanga to abandon two attempts to visit the area. This painfully demonstrated his and his government’s lack of popular legitimacy in his home region. The government renewed its political efforts with the visit on 12 March of Interior Minister Emmanuel Ramazani Shadari, whose delegation included opposition members of parliament. He held talks with the Kamuina Nsapu’s family. On 16 March, the parliamentarians published welcome recommendations, including the appointment of a new provincial administration and measures to manage conflicts with the customary authorities. On 17 March, the government announced a less far-reaching compromise, including burial of the Kamuina Nsapu, measures on detainees and an agreement on the procedure to select a new chief. However, this agreement is unlikely to solve the underlying issues, and even Shadari admitted that pockets of instability would persist. Dealing with the Consequences The conflict has considerable humanitarian and political consequences. If the displaced and other affected communities are not able to prepare the next planting season, food insecurity will increase. At the political level, the CENI is preparing to start voter registration in the Kasai provinces, but in conflict- affected areas, offices have been destroyed and staff threatened. Displaced people must vote where they registered, which can be problematic. Anti-state sentiments resonate strongly among local citizens, which may lead many to not register at all and would leave pro-opposition areas with low vote counts. A first important step will be the creation of adequate security and trust for the people, including the displaced, to participate in the process. The 31 December political agreement called for simultaneous national and provincial elections by the end of 2017. Local elections are to follow at a later stage. Given the high stakes of the election and the troubling local conflict dynamics, legitimate mechanisms to resolve disputes should be put in place before polls are organised at the provincial and local levels. Local research, used by the UN, has identified no less than 79 potential conflicts in Kasai-Central province alone. More than half of these are related to

204 tensions with traditional authorities. Because provincial elections also add to the cost and to potential delays, consideration should be given to uncoupling them from the national polls. Intensified initiatives for voter and civic education that can counter violent, messianic and xenophobic messages, targeting specific communities, are also necessary. The national and provincial governments should strictly adhere to existing legislation on chiefdoms, and refrain from any divisive interference. In the meantime, the government should demilitarise domestic policing and establish provincial mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms, constituted by local and provincial groups, with support, if needed, from the national government and international actors. Stalled negotiations over implementation of the 31 December agreement, in particular the delay in installing an opposition-led government, are raising tensions and triggering popular unrest and in pockets across the country. In January 2017, conflict between the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) movement and security forces occurred in Kongo-Central and Kinshasa. Like the Kamuina Nsapu militia, the BDK combines mysticism with a populist political message, and is rooted in the fragile legitimacy of national political institutions and in economic problems. While none of these local conflicts alone are likely to fundamentally disrupt the national picture, they risk undermining the all-important voter registration process and thus the integrity and timing of the future elections. While local measures are important, maintaining the path toward elections to ensure representative government structures is ultimately the only way out of this quagmire."

Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, "Translating global policies into practical and necessary actions—one village at a time. The impact of the Localization of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 in Sierra Leone," Global Campaign for Peace Education, April 16, 2017, http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/translating-global-policies- practical-necessary-actions-one-village-time-impact-localization-resolutions-1325-1820-sierra-leone/, reported, "Chief (PC) Foday Alimamy Umaro Jalloh III is the third generation paramount chief in his family since 1896. As paramount chief, he governs the Nieni chiefdom in Koinadugu District, Western Sierra Leone that has a population of more than 40,000. Along with other local authorities and leaders such as mayors and councilors, PC Jalloh has been participating in the Localization of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 program in Sierra Leone since 2012. The Localization program is a people-based, bottom-up approach to policy-making and policy implementation that guarantees local ownership and participation initiated by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders with support from Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Government of Canada. Sierra Leone is one of 13 countries in Africa that have adopted a national action plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 and 1820. A NAP is a policy document that spells out the steps that a government is currently taking, and those initiatives and activities that it will undertake within a given time frame to meet its obligations under the resolutions. The Sierra Leone NAP (SiLNAP) was launched in 2010. There wasn’t much implementation activity until the Localization program was initiated by GNWP in partnership with its civil society members[2] and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (MSWGCA) and the Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) of the Ministry of Local Governance and Rural Development (MLGRD) two years later. The Localization program helped revitalize implementation when it convened paramount chiefs, ward leaders, local district administrators, civil society leaders, religious leaders and other key local actors to examine the SiLNAP and identify its provisions that are most relevant to the local context. This led to the drafting and adoption of the Localization Guidelines, a manual that serves as a sourcebook for local authorities to carry out implementation of the SiLNAP. The Localization Guidelines has been endorsed by the MSWGCA and the MLGRD."

Francis Byaruhanga, "Rwanda: Why Genocide Ideology Studies Are Key in Peace Building, New Times, April 12, 2017, http://allafrica.com/stories/201704120065.html, reported, "Following the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, it emerged that many youth of school-going age actively participated in this horrendous act. However, most of them acted due to influence from their superiors through lifelong hate speech and inculcation of genocide ideology from their teachers and parents. The Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010 by UNESCO shows that teaching practice and the history curriculum inculcated genocide ideology among students through a number of ways in the pre-

205 genocide education system, which provided fertile ground for conflict and genocide." "The report shows that the history taught at both primary and secondary levels propagated a version of the past based largely on colonial stereotypes and interpretations of Rwandan history, which supported the political ideology during that period. The above clearly shows that what is taught to students has a lifelong impact on them and determines, to a large extent, their perception of life and their future decisions. This is precisely what informed the introduction of integrated genocide ideology studies so that a new generation of ‘clean minds’ is molded in the quest for a genocide ideology-free Rwanda." "Packaging of genocide ideology studies According to Nehemiah Bacumuwenda, a pedagogical norms specialist, department of curriculum and pedagogical materials at Rwanda Education Board, the content in the integrated genocide ideology studies was reviewed in 2013 and started to be taught in schools in 2015 under the new competency- based curriculum. He explains that genocide ideology studies are integrated in social studies alongside peace education. 'In lower primary, pupils are taught to love each other, while in upper primary students learn content related to the historical background of the Genocide,' he says."

Jerry Azanduna, "NCCE intensifies Civic Education in Bawku schools," Modern Ghana, March 25, 2017, https://www.modernghana.com/news/764341/ncce-intensifies-civic-education-in-bawku- schools.html, reported that in Ghana, "The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) has intensified civic education in schools, on duties of the citizenry and the promotion of peaceful co-existence in the Bawku municipality and its environs. The move was aimed at sensitizing school children on the duties of citizens that would promote peaceful co-existence and national cohesion for the development of the country in Civic Education Clubs in schools in the Bawku area. About eleven senior high and basic schools that had civic education clubs were educated on post-election community engagement and good governance which would prepare them to be good citizens and assume responsible roles to manage the affairs of the country."

Ivory Coast was shaken, in March, by a strike by 180,000 civil servants and public protests. Civil servants had complained of overdue back pay, poor retirement conditions and limited freedom for unions. The government had addressed most of those concerns, but still owed $400 million in back pay (Sean Lyngass, "Strike and Protests Unsettle Ivory Coast as Gains Reach Few," The New York Times, March 29, 2017).

ICG, Hans De Marie Heungoup, Analyst, Cameroon, "The Humanitarian Fallout from Cameroon’s Struggle Against Boko Haram," Commentary/Africa, February 21, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/humanitarian-fallout-cameroons-struggle- against-boko- haram?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=c5db33c2ce- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_21&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-c5db33c2ce- 359871089, commented, " Cameroon has been fighting the Boko Haram jihadist group in its Far North region for the last three years. The conflict has killed nearly 1,600 people in Cameroon alone and has led to a humanitarian crisis in what was already one of the country’s most impoverished and least-educated regions. As donors and experts convene on 24 February at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, the international community must find ways to improve overcrowded refugee camps and mitigate growing problems for the local population. The Far North now hosts 87,000 of Cameroon’s over 360,000 refugees, 191,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) and 36,000 Cameroonian returnees. Overall, including local Cameroonians, an estimated 1.6 million people in the Far North now need urgent humanitarian assistance, more than half of 2.9 million people who share the same plight throughout the country. The government, preoccupied with its military campaign against Boko Haram, has done little to

206 support affected civilians. International agencies and NGOs have taken welcome steps to meet the needs of refugees, and to a lesser extent IDPs, even if these efforts have been underfunded and sometimes insufficiently coordinated. Earlier and much better-funded attention to the wider problems of displacement will make that response more effective, more sustainable and better able to prevent conflict recurring. Minawao camp: the visible tip of the humanitarian crisis Opened in July 2013 in the Far North’s Mayo Tsanga department, Minawao camp hosts Nigerians fleeing Boko Haram atrocities. Initially it hosted 18,000 refugees. Now 60,000 people live there, three times its official capacity. Each week 150 more people arrive and 60 babies are born. It now covers a sprawling 623 hectares, as the authorities decided to expand the camp rather than set up a second site in the Mayo Danay department, as proposed by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2015. When Crisis Group conducted research in Minawao in January, assistance was being given by ten NGOs and UN agencies. In 2013, the refugees’ situation was dire, due to a lack of government experience with refugees and an absence of international attention and funding. Since then, things have gradually improved, especially in education. Some 68 per cent of children go to school in the camp, far above the Far North’s 46 per cent education rate average, but still below the 84 per cent national average. Germany has helped some who finish high school in the camp to attend universities in Buea or Yaoundé. In last year’s First School Leaving Certificate Examination (a Cameroonian test taken between the ages of eleven and thirteen), Minawao camp students, taught by Anglophone Cameroonian teachers, ranked first in the entire Mayo Tsanaga department. However, because of funding shortfalls, humanitarian assistance still covers only about one third of the urgent needs in the Far North. As a result, key problems remain, including shortages of food, water, healthcare assistance, school equipment and social activities. The work of NGOs and religious leaders has also reduced initial communal and religious tensions caused by the crisis. But problems have emerged recently between established and newly arrived refugees. The former often suspect the latter of being Boko Haram sympathisers. 'How did they manage to stay in Boko Haram-controlled areas for more than a year if they were not sympathisers? Why do they only leave their place and seek asylum now, when Boko Haram is weakened?', one refugee asked us. These suspicions explain why the earlier refugees are reluctant to allow new ones to join their 184 strong camp security group, or the camp’s nine committees dealing with issues like the environment, water, youth and women’s needs. Such suspicions take little account of the complex route many new arrivals have taken to get to the camp. Most of those who arrived recently were already in Cameroon, living either in the border towns or with Cameroonian families. Very few have come directly from Nigeria, and many among them were previously in Nigerian IDP camps. “We were told by our friends and families that refugees are better looked after here than in IDP camps in our country”, one refugee said. Other newly arrived refugees told Crisis Group they moved to Minawao due to scarcity of resources in other parts of Cameroon. “My in-laws’ family in Mozogo (in Mayo Tsanaga) was no longer able to feed us and our four children. We had no access to land and no NGO support, so we decided to move in Minawao”, says recent arrival Yacoubou, a Nigerian from Balavrasa in the Gwoza local government area. The prefect, or head civilian administrator, of Mayo Tsanaga noted: “most new refugees have already been living in Cameroon for a year or more”. Tensions are also surfacing between new arrivals and local people. Between 2015 and 2016, Cameroonians from the town of Zamaï near Minawao camp accused refugees of destroying their trees for firewood. The spokesman and elected president of the Central Committee of refugees told Crisis Group: “We need that for cooking and build[ing] our shelters”. After the UNHCR and Plan International mediated between the refugees and the Zamaï traditional chief, the cutting of trees now appears to have been solved with compensation given to the local community, including through the replanting of 30,000 trees. The displacement crisis beyond the camps Despite needing far greater resources as ever more people arrive seeking refuge, Minawao offers the best humanitarian assistance in the region. It benefits from international aid, partly as a result of concern generated by visits from the former UNHCR head António Guterres, in March 2016, quickly followed by then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power in April. But not only refugees need help. More than 1.6 million are in urgent need of food aid in

207 Cameroon’s Far North, where even before the crisis three of the region’s four million inhabitants lived under the poverty line. Some of the 30,000 unregistered refugees and most IDPs live in host communities, not in camps. Those host communities have to share what they have with them and lack the funds and support to do so. Few of the 191,000 IDPs receive help from the government, which relies on the international community to deal with the humanitarian aspects of the conflict while it focuses on the military response. In Gassama, Labado and several other villages, the army has pushed inhabitants out of their homes to secure areas round their bases, but without giving any support or making plans for their return. International NGOs and UN agencies see IDPs primarily as a national problem and would prefer to follow and support a policy led by the government. In Logone et Chari department, the northern tip of the region that hosts half of Cameroon’s IDPs, security is a major problem for the provision of aid, according to several international NGO and INGO heads of delegation. The result is that very few INGOs work in Logone et Chari, and it has received less assistance than the two other affected departments. Lacking food, shelter and revenues, IDPs struggle to send their children to school, as, unlike refugees, they have to pay school fees. In Tourou, Hilé Alifa, Makary and Kousseri, several families told Crisis Group they cannot pay and their children are working in markets. Djene Abouga, the president of a women’s association in Kousseri, said some girls have turned to prostitution or begun relationships with much older local men. Since 2014, the government has urged public school directors to be lenient toward those who could not immediately pay fees. Now more IDP children are going to school, but they still face problems. According to Abbo Mahamat, a primary school head in Kousseri, “the IDP’s children are still traumatised, they are sometimes violent, fighting with other children, they have the lowest results of the school, and it is difficult for them to integrate with other children”. Assiata, a teacher in the same school, confirms: 'I have 80 children in my classroom, including seven IDP children, none of the IDP children have got over eight out of 20 average marks, while the other children get between eleven and seventeen'. On this point, the regional education ministry delegate in Maroua told Crisis Group: 'This is a general situation in the region. UNICEF has organised trainings for some school directors on how to deal with traumatised children, they have also distributed books to some of them. We hope things will change'. The story of Maimouna, a 32-year-old Kanuri woman from Fotokol on the Nigerian border, illustrates the desperate plight of IDPs, but also how things have improved for some. She fled with her five children in August 2014 after Boko Haram killed her husband and burned her house. Pregnant, she walked 40km over two days with her children, without eating, until a government truck picked them up. When they arrived in Kousseri, they were accused by locals of supporting Boko Haram and had no family support. Her first son, Issa, now fifteen, remembers not even thinking about their father, but about how to eat and sleep. A local woman then offered them work, for food, some livestock and 5,000 CFA (9 euros) per month. The situation improved again when WFP arrived in Kousseri and gave Maimouna material for a shelter and then some food each month. The family was full of praise for the WFP. Maimouna’s first two boys have gone back to school, and are doing exceptionally well for a displaced family. They are helped by Maimouna’s good education, which was cut short when she married aged sixteen. But the other children, Aminatou, Nafissatou, Ali, and the last one Boukar are not going to school as she cannot afford school fees and books for all six. Asked what she expected from the government and the NGOs, Maimouna replied she wanted her children to go to school up to the end of high school, and that she needed a sewing machine, costing 70,000 CFA (110 euros). Families hosting IDPs, already suffering from poverty, have opened their doors to extended family or friends. But the conflict and the closure of the border with Nigeria have made things worse. Tensions between IDPs and locals have spread everywhere, especially over access to land and water. In 2015, the WFP started giving rice to some host families. While this has eased some tensions, local communities often still resent IDPs and consider that they get favourable treatment. For a wider, more sustainable and more locally rooted response These stories of displacement, local tensions and missed education are part of the devastation wrought by the Boko Haram conflict, impacting on health, the economy, social relations, local politics and the role of women. The government has done little to support those affected. President Biya allocated $10 million to an emergency fund in 2014, mainly for rehabilitation of schools, and he has set aside some discretionary funds for vigilante committees and gifts of foods and cooking oil for the IDPs. Even though

208 most IDPs want to return home, they have had very little help to rebuild their livelihoods. Much more needs to be done, with a special focus on helping IDPs return to areas that are now safer, but where the local economy has been devastated. National and international responses need to shift from a humanitarian- centred approach to longer-term development that can make people more resilient and help ensure a more sustainable peace. The improvement in the international response in 2016 now needs to move on to focus on sustainability and local ownership. Local researchers, civil society leaders and traditional chiefs worry that NGOs have done little to incorporate qualified people from the north into their response teams, preferring instead southern Cameroonians or mainly African expatriates. This risks creating resentment among locals who already feel disempowered as two largely external forces (Boko Haram and the national army) fight it out on their soil. Accelerating sustainable recovery and development is all the more vital as humanitarian funds are limited and Cameroon, like other central African countries, faces numerous challenges. The East region is host to 276,000 refugees, mainly from Central African Republic, and is at risk of being neglected. At the same time as opening offices in the Far North, several NGOs have closed their offices in the East, while some UN agencies like the WFP have reduced their staff and funding. Improved international coordination is also needed. Between July 2015 and March 2016, citing security reasons, the Cameroonian government expelled more than 40,000 Nigerian refugees, to the consternation of Nigeria and the UNHCR. In December 2016, it restarted such repatriations of Nigerians. Nigeria, Cameroon, and UNHCR have drawn up a tripartite agreement for a peaceful repatriation of Nigerian refugees from outside Minawao camp. But Nigeria has not yet signed, claiming it does not have the funds to deal with returnees. Nationally or internationally, the response to the chaos caused in Cameroon by Boko Haram needs to be stronger and more joined-up, not only to alleviate suffering, but to start to forge a more secure future for all in the region. The plight of refugees and the internally displaced from the Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon’s Far North is adding to the many burdens of an already impoverished population."

ICG, "Burundi: The Army in Crisis," Africa Report 247, April 5, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/247-burundi-army- crisis?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=3751eca2f0- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_07&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-3751eca2f0- 359871089, commented, "Two years on, the Burundi crisis shows little sign of resolution. Political and ethnic polarisation are now tearing apart the integrity of the army, long seen as the primary achievement of the Arusha peace agreement in 2000 which brought an end to protracted civil conflict. Executive Summary Two years in, the Burundi crisis shows little sign of resolution. Following the July 2015 re-election of President Nkurunziza, whose April decision to run again sparked the troubles, and with no progress made in the mediation, the crisis has turned into a low intensity conflict. Almost 400,000 Burundians have fled the country. Since the attempted coup of May 2015, political polarisation has had violent repercussions in the army. A series of attacks have targeted numerous officers, both those favourable to the president’s political ambitions and those suspected of sympathy with the coup plotters. Assassination attempts have also taken place abroad. Following over ten years of foreign support for the army’s transformation, its reputation has suffered greatly. International training has ended, and the army’s lucrative participation in peacekeeping operations is in doubt. This divided and demoralised army is a major threat to the country’s stability. Only a real dialogue, more urgent now than ever, between the government and the opposition could offer assurances to those officers concerned at the politicisation of their institution. Long seen as the primary achievement of the Arusha peace agreement which ended the civil war in 2000, the army today is a microcosm of the country’s crisis. Through its multi-ethnic make-up, foreign training, and its role in international peacekeeping, the Burundian army had acquired a good reputation outside the country and a privileged position at home. But fragilities remained under the surface, and the 2015 crisis easily broke the key consensus on which the stability of the regime was based: between the

209 army and civilian power, and within the army between the former rebels, most of whom come from the ruling party, and the old guard. Ever since, the regime has tried to regain its hold on the military through purging or killing real or suspected opponents within its ranks – starting with officers from the pre-war army and Tutsi officers, but also targeting former Hutu rebels, including high ranking officers. The current crisis, in the form of tit-for-tat assassinations of soldiers and officers, is a violent reminder of the limits of the Arusha agreement within the army, and of the efforts made over ten years to depoliticise and professionalise it. It also reveals political and ethnic tensions that have continued to undermine it despite the reforms. The crisis has led to numerous defections and has compromised its future prospects. The European Union and the UN are reluctant to increase Burundi’s participation in peacekeeping missions and have taken steps to limit it. This participation used to be a source of revenue for an otherwise impoverished army, and a way of integrating its different parts. The current challenge to it and to associated external support could eventually weaken the economic and social advantages associated with the military career, and is a further risk for the stability of the country. Impoverished and ethnically and politically polarised, the army is reforming around a loyalist hard core and open confrontations between army factions have been avoided since May 2015. But this apparent and only relative calm is based mainly on fear and should not mislead outside observers. The army that has been built since 2004 is now in ruins, and cannot be reconstituted short of an inclusive political agreement. This appears ever further off with the continued hardening of the regime and consequent difficulties encountered by the mediation of former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. Without such a political agreement, the army faces two scenarios: a new confrontation, which could take the form of a new coup d’Etat, or a quiet but certain decline. The relative success of army integration since 2004 has flowed from the Arusha agreement. In this context, only guarantees concerning its continued application, or its consensual updating, could reassure officers that their future and that of their institution is secure. The UN, the African Union, the East African Community and the European Union should continue to push for an inclusive dialogue between the government and the exiled opposition, despite the government’s intransigence, which has hindered mediation attempts, and international partners who have supported the army since 2004 should not reinvest in an institution now deeply politicised as long as it remains under the control of an authoritarian and violent regime. The involvement of the Burundian army in peacekeeping operations should continue only under strict vetting conditions of the individuals taking part. The crisis in the army, reflecting that of the country, underlines the continued risk that the situation could deteriorate further."

ICG, Piers Pigou, Senior Consultant, Southern Africa, "Mugabe’s Brittle By-election Victory Bodes Ill for Zimbabwe’s 2018 Elections," Commentary/Africa, February 7, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/mugabes-brittle-election-victory-bodes-ill- zimbabwes-2018- elections?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=a21c65ce08- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_07&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-a21c65ce08- 359871089, commented, "The ruling ZANU-PF is exploiting the many weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s electoral system to outpace the country’s divided opposition. Yet without a real change of policy, the country seems doomed to steeper decline. The landslide victory of President Robert Mugabe’s ruling party in a 21 January by-election in Zimbabwe’s Bikita West constituency is a troubling bellwether for the future of the country. It signals that presidential and parliamentary elections in mid-2018 are unlikely to be credible, free or fair, and also that without fundamental change through a legitimate election, Harare will maintain the self-destructive policies that have done so much damage. In Bikita West, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) candidate, Beauty Chabaya, promoted from its provincial women’s league, won with 77.9 per cent of the vote. The opposition complained of assaults, intimidation and threats of retribution by senior ZANU-PF figures against disloyal voters – the identification of whom was easier as voting results are broken down by polling station. Local party structures and traditional authorities also helped to monitor voters and in the run-up to the poll reportedly manipulated the distribution of food aid and farming inputs. The Bikita West vote was the latest in a series of by-elections being watched for how Zimbabwe

210 and the ZANU-PF will fare, not just in next year’s elections, but also during the transition from more than three decades of rule by the ailing President Robert Mugabe, 92. Zimbabwe’s Relentless Decline Credible elections in 2018 will be crucial for arresting Zimbabwe’s precipitous decline. Considered a middle-income country in the 1990’s, the economy nearly halved in the 2000s and has not recovered since. A large number of skilled workers in the government and private sector have left the country. According to the World Bank, 72 per cent of the population is poor and 20 per cent live in extreme poverty. Zimbabweans, despite exposure to much poor governance, put great store in a legitimate electoral process leading to reform. But this will require more than simply depoliticising the institutional machinery responsible for elections. More years of unchanged policies would further entrench a corrupt government and predatory state incapable of decisive change, leading to further social stagnation, economic slowdown and risks for the future stability and development of the region. The opposition has struggled to make an impact following the 2013 elections defeat of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and subsequent turmoil within that party that resulted in the vacation of many parliamentary seats. The main opposition’s subsequent boycott has allowed ZANU-PF to win all but one of more than 20 post-2013 by-election contests and grow its two- thirds majority in parliament. The ruling party’s shock loss in the Norton constituency in the October 2016 by-election was seen by some as a sign of its vulnerability. The MDC-T and Joice Mujuru’s Zimbabwe People’s First (ZimPF) coordinated with disaffected war veterans to elect the independent candidate, Themba Mliswa (a former ZANU-PF parliamentarian and Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s cousin). Some argue Mliswa’s victory demonstrated that a unified opposition could win, even without meaningful electoral reforms. But others contend that the loss was a result of a contest between ZANU-PF factions, and that the nominally independent Mliswa was a stalking horse for Vice President Mnangagwa against the official ZANU- PF candidate, Ronald Chindedza, who was loyal to a rival faction of the party. ZANU-PF’s Show of Force There were no signs of ruling party vulnerability in Bikita West: President Mugabe sent a clear directive that the constituency be won at all costs; ZANU-PF presented a united front; and MDC-T and war veterans did not close ranks behind the main opposition candidate, ZimPF’s Kudakwashe Gopo. Opposition parties continue to talk, but, riven by infighting, have neither fully joined forces, nor been able to take advantage of ZANU-PF’s internal discord either. ZANU-PF’s most significant challenge remains the choice of Mugabe’s successor. Mugabe was re-endorsed at the party’s National Conference in December as its presidential candidate for the 2018 elections, when he will be 94. With his physical capacities visibly waning, his failure to put in place a clear succession plan appears to be designed both to temper the ambitions of Mnangagwa, who is regarded by many as an obvious heir, and also to soothe the frustrations of those opposed to the vice president. The intra-party discord and jockeying is likely to frustrate political and economic reform and thus Western re-engagement. The sweeping victory for the ruling party in Bikita West raises deeper questions about the scale of popular support for the opposition. The National Electoral Reform Agenda (NERA), an umbrella opposition campaigning platform, retains an official position of boycotting elections until the process is reformed, but has failed to present a united political front. The MDC-T has boycotted all by-elections because promised reforms remain largely unaddressed, but others have joined in to varying extents. It is unclear why ZimPF, a member of NERA, put up a candidate in the Bikita West election at all. There were internal ZimPF tensions over whether or not to participate, and the provincial party leaders who pushed against it have now resigned. In the end, the failure of ZimPF’s candidate in Bikita West has now damaged ZimPF leader Mujuru’s prospects of leading an opposition coalition in the 2018 elections. Addressing Zimbabwe’s Electoral Weakness ZANU-PF vehemently denies allegations by the opposition and civil society of wrongdoing in Bikita West. But that is not enough to make the opposition trust institutions like the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the police and the courts, which should be able to combat these violations. Severely underfunded after producing reports critical of the government, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) cannot launch a serious inquiry into the elections.

211 The region could help. The Southern Africa Development Community and African Union have developed a framework for electoral conditions, and should launch an assessment of Zimbabwe’s democratic progress and shortfalls. They should carefully consider the concerns raised by NERA and others, and propose realistic reform implementation timelines ahead of the polls. Powers from further afield will be less willing to engage the more compromised the legitimacy of the regime becomes. Even then they will have to tread carefully, balancing support for improving institutional capacities and addressing problems, without inadvertently adding to distortions of what is already a skewed electoral environment. The March by-election in Mwenezi East promises to test conditions once again, as a senior ZimPF leader and former ZANU-PF firebrand, Kudakwashe Bhasikiti, runs in his former constituency. The Bikita West by-election highlights how much still needs to be done – both by the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition."

Norimitsu Onishi, "Thousands March in South Africa to Demand Jacob Zuma’s Resignation," The New York Times, April 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/africa/south-africa-jacob- zuma-protests.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "In the largest protest in years, tens of thousands of people demonstrated in South Africa’s major cities on Friday to demand the resignation of President Jacob Zuma after his dismissal of a well-respected finance minister intensified concerns about government corruption."

Latin American Developments

ICG, "Veracruz: Fixing Mexico’s State of Terror," Latin America & Caribbean Report No. 61, February 28, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/61-veracruz-fixing- mexicos-state-terror, commented, "Mexico’s third-most populous state has suffered an unprecedented wave of violence. Veracruz’s new governor must stand by pledges to end state-criminal collusion and impunity. Strong international support will be needed to help find the bodies of the disappeared and transform the state police and legislature. Executive Summary Once regarded as a minor hub in Mexico’s criminal economy, Veracruz is now confronting the harrowing truths from over a decade of violence and grand corruption. At least 2,750 people are believed to have disappeared in a state whose former governor is wanted for embezzlement on numerous counts. The murders of seventeen journalists from 2010 onwards are the most notorious examples of a whirlwind of killings that targeted, among others, legal professionals, police officers, potential witnesses to crimes and any civilians who dared check the ambitions of a multitude of criminal organisations and their political accomplices. A new governor from the opposition National Action Party (PAN) has promised to clean out the state and prosecute wrongdoers, fostering hopes that peace can be restored. But as economic turbulence threatens the country, and bankruptcy looms over Veracruz, strong international support will be crucial to bolster initiatives aimed at finding the bodies of the disappeared, investigating past crimes, and transforming the state’s police force and prosecution service. Veracruz is emblematic of the challenges facing the country as a whole. Threats by the new U.S. administration to curb Mexican imports and fortify the border to keep out undocumented immigrants imperils its southern neighbour’s economic prospects. Similarly, President Trump’s predilection for armed force to combat cartels ignores the harm produced by the militarisation of public security as well as its proven ineffectiveness. But Mexican voices demanding a stronger national response are hamstrung by the extreme unpopularity of political leaders and public estrangement from government. Corruption and perceived criminal complicity have undermined the legitimacy of the Mexican government at all levels, especially at the tier of the country’s 31 regional states. Baptised 'viceroys' as a result of the extraordinary powers granted them during Mexico’s transition from one-party regime to multiparty democracy, state governors have also become some of the country’s most disreputable public authorities. Since 2010, eleven state governors have come under investigation for corruption. In Veracruz, an alliance between criminal groups and the highest levels of local political power paved the way to an

212 unbridled campaign of violence through the capture of local judicial and security institutions, guaranteeing impunity for both sides. Strengthening institutional probity and capacity in Veracruz, as in the rest of Mexico, will require federal and state levels to deliver on vows to work in partnership to staunch corruption, and on their willingness to abjure short-term political and electoral advantage. With the election of the new governor, Miguel Ángel Yunes Linares, the once hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost power in the state for the first time in over 80 years. But the PRI remains in control at the federal level and has shown wavering commitment to Yunes’ reformist plans, not least because of the importance of securing votes from the region, the country’s third most populous, in the 2018 presidential election. The state’s budgetary crisis and the new governor’s two-year mandate make it highly unlikely that the state government could accomplish sweeping reform to Veracruz’s institutions without sustained federal backing. A flagship initiative that deserves emphatic support is the Veracruz Truth Commission. Created in November 2016, it could establish the causes and responsibilities behind the state’s criminal atrocities, as well as create new benchmarks for transparency and civil society engagement in criminal investigation and prosecution across the country. To do so, it should be granted additional powers to initiate criminal investigations and searches for victims of disappearances. The Veracruz state attorney’s office and State Police should be provided with greater federal resources, and trained and thoroughly vetted seconded personnel from the federal Attorney General’s Office as well as the Federal Police, to help carry out these tasks. Simultaneously, donors should be encouraged to support local civil society actors participating in efforts toward transparency, truth and prosecution. By admitting that Veracruz has become the site of crimes against humanity, the new state government forced a radical break with the recent past. Empty state coffers, the governor’s short mandate, jostling for presidential election and the menace seemingly posed by an unorthodox U.S. administration together represent a set of obstacles and distractions that should not be allowed to impede Veracruz’s path out of silence and terror. Recommendations To break the cycle of violence, impunity and state-criminal collusion, and to restore confidence in the state as a guarantor of basic order and rights To the Veracruz state government: Admit to and thoroughly investigate state involvement in crimes against humanity such as forced disappearances. Strengthen the autonomy of the new Truth Commission, and provide civil society actors the right to pair with state judicial authorities in initiating investigations into serious crimes, especially disappearances; and coordinate the Truth Commission’s efforts with those of the federal government’s Commission for Victims’ Attention (Comisión de Atención a Víctimas, CEAV). Honour the independence of and refrain from political interference into the work of Veracruz’s state attorney’s office, especially regarding accusations against the new state government on embezzlement of public funds; and support the establishment of an effective witness protection program and independent forensic service. Fairly and transparently initiate the removal of corrupt and criminally complicit officials from state institutions, particularly the State Police and state attorney’s office, as well as the prosecution of high-level officials accused of collusion with organised crime groups and of involvement in serious crimes. Lay the bases for police reform by supporting professionalisation, improving police officers’ living standards and restoring a sense of dignity to their conditions of service; immediately implement measures to prevent the participation of state forces in crimes against humanity such as forced disappearances, including: installing GPS tracking devices in patrol cars and cameras in police stations; keeping continuous logs about movements of police and personnel in service; and storing and honouring freedom-of-information requests relating to such information. Introduce effective financial oversight mechanisms, beginning with the voluntary disclosure of the allocation and use of public funds. Demonstrate commitment to freedom of speech by fully disclosing how public funds are allocated to

213 media companies; and reform and strengthen existing protection mechanisms for journalists and human rights activists. Improve coordination with the federal government in areas crucial to delivering lasting security improvements, including policing, anti-organised crime operations, crime prevention programs and support for victims. To the federal government: Support the search for and identification of Veracruz’s disappeared persons by providing personnel, institutional support and financial resources; revoke recent cuts to the federal budget for the search of disappeared persons; and collaborate with Veracruz state authorities in the prosecution of high-level officials involved in crimes against humanity and embezzlement of public funds. Assist the Veracruz’s Truth Commission by obliging armed forces commanders and personnel to appear before civil authorities to clarify the involvement of the army and the navy in disappearances and other serious crimes, and refrain from adopting overly militarised approaches to state-level insecurity. Implement and reinforce oversight mechanisms regarding the use of federal funds by states, and support the full local implementation of ongoing federal justice reforms by strengthening the National Anti-Corruption System and new national Attorney General’s Office while refraining from politically motivated appointments to local delegate positions; and consolidate the local work of the national Executive Commission for Victims’ Attention. Strengthen protection mechanism for journalists and human rights defenders by introducing administrative sanctions against non-compliant officials. Strive to prevent the bankruptcy of the Veracruz state in order to avoid heightened local conflicts in the short term. To international governments, particularly the U.S.: End complacency toward abuses and increase pressure on Mexican federal and state governments to respect basic human rights, commit to the rule of law and prevent obstruction of justice. Evaluate programs of international assistance on the basis of their impact on the Veracruz security crisis and state crimes committed in the context of the militarisation of public security; and steer international assistance, particularly in the Mérida initiative framework, away from militarisation and toward the strengthening of civic institutions and regular police forces. To international organisations, particularly the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN, and international civil society: Support the search for and identification of disappeared persons by backing capacity building of state institutions and civil society, above all victims’ organisations, through direct technical and financial aid."

Haiti has suffered violent politics for many years, with opposition politics sometimes murdered with impunity by those in power. International efforts have long been underway to attempt to establish a democratic rule of law in Haiti. At the beginning of April 2017, a human rights case was being tried in Federal Court, in Boston against, Jean M. Viliena, a former Haitan Mayor who fled from Haiti after being charged with a political murder. The original bringer of the suite, Nissage Martyr, died under suspicious circumstance. The suit is being brough under the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act, which allows victims of human rights abuses overseas to seek compensation for their injuries from people who were acting in an official capacity (Francis Robles, "Haiti’s Violent Politics Are Taken to Court. In Boston," The New York Times, April 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/americas/haiti-politics- violence.html?ref=todayspaper).

ICG, "Mafia of the Poor: Gang Violence and Extortion in Central America," Latin America & Caribbean Report No. 62, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/62-mafia- poor-gang-violence-and-extortion-central-america, commented, "Central American gangs are responsible for brutal acts of violence, abuse of women and forced displacement of thousands. Governments must go beyond punitive measures and address the social and economic roots of gang culture, tackle extortion schemes and invest in communities.

214 Executive Summary Born in the aftermath of civil war and boosted by mass deportations from the U.S., Central American gangs are responsible for brutal acts of violence, chronic abuse of women, and more recently, the forced displacement of children and families. Estimated to number 54,000 in the three Northern Triangle countries – El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – the gangs’ archetypal tattooed young men stand out among the region’s greatest sources of public anxiety. Although they are not the only groups dedicated to violent crime, the maras have helped drive Central American murder rates to highs unmatched in the world: when the gangs called a truce in El Salvador, homicides halved overnight. But it is extortion that forms the maras’ criminal lifeblood and their most widespread racket. By plaguing local businesses for protection payments, they reaffirm control over poor urban enclaves to fund misery wages for members. Reducing the impact of these schemes, replacing them with formal employment and restoring free movement across the Northern Triangle’s urban zones would greatly reduce the harm of gang activity. Charting this route, however, requires a sharp switch in current policies. Ever since mara-related insecurity became visible in the early 2000s, the region’s governments have responded through punitive measures that reproduce the popular stigmas and prejudices of internal armed conflict. In programs such as Iron Fist in El Salvador, the Sweep-Up Plan in Guatemala or Zero Tolerance in Honduras, mass incarceration, harsher prison conditions and recourse to extrajudicial executions provided varieties of punishment. The cumulative effects, however, have fallen far short of expectations. Assorted crackdowns have not taken account of the deep social roots of the gangs, which provide identity, purpose and status for youths who are unaccommodated in their home societies and “born dead”. The responses have also failed to recognise the counterproductive effects of security measures that have given maras prisons in which to organise and confirmation of their identity as social outcasts. The succession of unsuccessful punitive measures is now coming under closer scrutiny across the Northern Triangle. All three countries are experimenting with new forms of regional collaboration in law enforcement. Guatemala has introduced vanguard measures to combat extortion rackets, many of them run from within jails, and has proposed a range of alternatives to prison terms. Although the collapse of the truce with the maras in 2014 spurred unprecedented violence in El Salvador, murder rates appear to have fallen again, while parts of the maras have proposed fresh talks with an eye to their eventual dissolution – an offer shunned by the government. Mass deportation from the U.S. back to these countries risks a repeated upsurge in gang crime. However, U.S. concern with reducing the migrant flow from Central America has generated significant new funds for development in the region via the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity. At the core of a new approach should stand an acknowledgement of the social and economic roots of gang culture, ineradicable in the short term, alongside a concerted state effort to minimise the violence of illicit gang activity. Focused and sophisticated criminal investigations should target the gangs responsible for the most egregious crimes, above all murder, rape and forced displacement. Extortion schemes that depend on coercive control over communities and businesses, and which have caused the murder of hundreds of transport workers and the exodus of thousands in the past decade, could be progressively transformed through a case-by-case approach. Ad hoc negotiations and transactions with gangs responsible for extortion are not uncommon in the Northern Triangle, and have generated insights into how the maras may be edged toward formal economic activity. Targeted and substantial economic investment in impoverished communities with significant gang presence could reduce the incentives for blackmail. Despite the mistrust bequeathed by the truce as well as El Salvador’s and Honduras’ classification of maras as terrorist groups, new forms of communication with gangs could be established on the basis of confidence-building signals from both sides, potentially encouraged by religious leaders. Government and donor support for poor communities and for improved prison conditions would ideally be answered by a significant reduction in violence from the maras. A momentous step by the gangs, above all in El Salvador, would be to guarantee free movement of all citizens through gang-controlled territories, as well as a restoration of the veto on violence and recruitment in schools. Rounding up all gang members, or inviting gangs to an open-ended negotiation, represent a pair of extremes that have both proven fruitless in the Northern Triangle. Gangs are both embedded in society

215 and predatory upon it, and both victims and perpetrators. Policies toward them need to recognise their social resilience and find ways to reduce the harm they undeniably cause without branding them enemies of the people. Recommendations To reduce the harm caused by gangs’ violence, restore the rule of law and address the socio- economic bases of gang recruitment and extortion To the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras: Acknowledge that the Northern Triangle is facing a serious security and forced displacement crisis, and call for international support to tackle the humanitarian fallout by collaborating with local organisations in offering temporary shelter and assistance to those displaced by violence. Engage transparently in confidence-building measures with the maras without necessarily engaging in direct dialogue; and prepare to support improved prison conditions in exchange for peaceful signals from gangs. Promote a responsible approach to integral investment and business support in areas and communities showing signs of pacification but still affected by entrenched gang-run criminal rackets, especially extortion. In Honduras, repeal categorisation of gangs as terrorist groups; and respect rule of law by promoting accountability efforts via the Office of the Attorney General and the Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). In El Salvador, release all facilitators of the gang truce accused of illegal association as a trust-building action; reverse the decision to renew the “extraordinary measures” against the gangs; and approve the stalled rehabilitation law. Prioritise tri-national collaboration between prosecution services as a means to identify the most effective harm reduction approaches to gang crime; and promptly target certain mara crimes, above all murder, rape and forced displacement. To the government of the U.S.: Continue providing Central American governments with financial support to carry out violence prevention initiatives and community development under the aegis of the Alliance for Prosperity, albeit with greater emphasis on long-term development projects involving grassroots organisations. Refrain from instigating mass deportations or harsher anti-migration measures against Northern Triangle countries without prior guarantees of investment in returnees’ communities, proper attention to returnees’ employment and vocational needs, and close monitoring of security effects; and strictly respect human rights of migrants and deportees. Drop the designation of the MS-13 gang as a significant transnational criminal organisation. To the UN: Extend the mandate of the UN special envoy in El Salvador for a further six months and design long-term goals in the areas of education and economy; and create a working group on peacebuilding and invite all parties, including local churches, to explore the possibility of inclusive dialogue. To the Mara Salvatrucha and Eighteenth Street gangs: Initiate efforts at pacification and spur future dialogue by declaring freedom of movement through gang- run territories; assure that schools and hospitals are violence-free zones; and renounce violence as a means of mass public intimidation."

Aurelien Breeden, "Strikes Shut Down French Guiana, With Effects Resonating in Paris," The New York Times, March 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/europe/french-guiana- general-strike-france.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "A general strike and widespread protests over high crime and economic hardship paralyzed French Guiana on Monday, as the government struggled to quell growing unrest that has disrupted travel, closed schools and thrust one of France’s often-overlooked overseas territories into the spotlight of the presidential campaign."

Nicholas Casey, "2nd Colombian Rebel Group Steps Up to the Table for Peace Talks," The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/americas/colombia-rebels-

216 eln-peace-talks.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "The National Liberation Army, Colombia’s second-largest rebel group, joined the government for peace talks in Ecuador on Tuesday, moving Colombia closer to ending a 52-year guerrilla rebellion."

Nika Knight, "Honduran Farmers Sue World Bank Lending Arm for 'Profiting From Murder': A private lending arm of the World Bank is not 'ending poverty,' it is 'ending the lives of the poor,' says one farmer," Common Dreams, March 08, 2017, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/03/08/honduran- farmers-sue-world-bank-lending-arm-profiting-murder, reported, "Honduran farmers on Wednesday filed a lawsuit against a branch of the World Bank for funding a massive palm oil corporation that the suit alleges has been responsible for the killings of over 100 farmers, as well as torture, violent assaults, and 'other acts of aggression.' The World Bank has 'knowingly profited from the financing of murder,' argues the lawsuit filed in a federal court in Washington, D.C. 'We have lost our compañeros, they have left our children without fathers, it's been difficult to move forward, we live from our families and our land and now we are left with nothing,' said one of the farmers, according to EarthRights International (ERI), the nonprofit which filed the suit on the farmers' behalf. All the farmers named in the suit were protected by the pseudonyms Juan Doe and Juana Doe, to shield them from retaliation on the part of the palm oil company, Dinant. 'We want justice and the ability to raise our children again,' the farmer added. 'We have to move forward.' The suit is requesting damages for specific deaths. The suit alleges that the 'International Financial Corporation (IFC), the World Bank Group's private lending arm, together with an IFC financial intermediary, the IFC Asset Management Corporation, have provided millions of dollars in financing to Dinant, even though, at the time, there were widespread allegations that Dinant employed hitmen, military forces, and private security guards to intimidate and kill local farmers who claim Dinant's owner stole their land decades prior,' ERI wrote in a statement. The rights advocacy organization continued: The IFC (with U.S. taxpayer money) and IFC-AMC knowingly financed Dinant's campaign of terror and dispossession against Honduran farmers. The IFC's own internal watchdog, the Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), found that IFC failed to adhere to its own policies to protect local communities, and continued to allow the company to breach those safeguards and either failed to spot or deliberately ignored the serious social, political and human rights context in which this company is operating. The result was an explosion of extreme violence by public and private security forces against the farmers, their movement leaders, and lawyers representing them. Over 100 farmers have been killed since November 2009 when the IFC disbursed the first half of a $30 million loan to Dinant; and the number of killings continues to grow today. So too has IFC's support for Dinant; even after the IFC's internal watchdog scolded the IFC for the 2009 loan, the IFC continued supporting Dinant via an opaque system of financial intermediaries, including the IFC-AMC and the Honduran bank, Ficohsa. The suit claims that the purpose of the systemic violence is to 'intimidate farmers from asserting competing rights to land that Dinant has sought to control.' 'The horrendous spate of violence that followed the IFC's loan to Dinant is probably one of the most severe instances of corporate-related human rights abuse and financier negligence in the past decade,' said one ERI lawyer, also unnamed because of security concerns. Another Honduran farmer quoted by ERI described the horrific violence: 'The police pulled people out of their houses. Military, police, and guards. We saw they were beating people including kids, so we were yelling, 'Don't hit the people!' One bullet hit me, it still affects my breathing. I didn't realize I'd been shot, but I touched it and saw blood. Another person was shot through the stomach.' 'Every day I am scared, but this is how life has become,' said a different farmer. 'At the end of the attack against me, the guards and military told me that they know where I live and that they will come to get me if I file a complaint against them.' ERI argues: 'While the IFC boasts of its mission to 'end extreme poverty by 2030 and boost prosperity in every developing country,' the IFC has knowingly entered one of the world's most persistent

217 and abusive land conflicts on the side of Dinant, a primary author of poverty and violence in Honduras. In the words of one farmer in the Bajo Aguán, the IFC is not 'ending poverty;' it is 'ending the lives of the poor.'' 'The IFC clearly cannot police itself and it should no longer be allowed to hide behind a veil of immunity,' an ERI lawyer said. 'The courts of the United States must be open to hear this case because nobody—not individuals, not corporations, not governments, and not the IFC—can get away with aiding these human rights abuses.' Honduras is one of the most dangerous countries in the world for land and rights defenders. In 2016 alone, multiple Indigenous activists—including Berta Cáceres, who won the Goldman Environmental Prize for her work—were killed." ICG, Kyle Johnson, Senior Analyst, Colombia, "A Wary Farewell to Arms for the FARC," Commentary/Latin America & the Caribbean, March 9, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america- caribbean/andes/colombia/wary-farewell-arms- farc?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=1f0ce9304b- EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-1f0ce9304b- 359871089, commented, "Since Colombia ratified a revised peace accord to end the country’s long insurgency, FARC rebels have moved rapidly to ad hoc cantonment sites where they will demobilize under UN supervision. But the FARC leadership’s commitment to the deal is under pressure from disparate elements in its rank and file. When Colombians streamed to the polls four months ago to vote in a plebiscite to accept or reject a peace agreement with the country’s leading guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), opinion polls predicted a resounding victory for the accord. Many citizens and internationals expected that the world’s second longest continuous armed conflict and one of its oldest Marxist insurgencies would soon become an historical relic. In Havana, the FARC leadership and its negotiating team sat with journalists to watch the votes come in. Once the result was announced – the accord was rejected by less than one-half of 1 per cent – the guerrilla group retired to a private meeting at which its leaders decided the loss was only a temporary setback. “The FARC-EP maintains its will to find peace”, declared FARC leader Timochenko that same day, “and reiterates its willingness to use words as the only weapon to build a [new] future”. Rebel leaders reluctantly accepted that the defeated peace agreement, 300 pages of transitional programs and socio-political reforms, would have to be reworked. All the while, peace held firm on the ground, and roughly 7,000 FARC fighters began moving to 51 pre-grouping areas. Now that a new accord has been signed and approved by Congress, the fighters have moved on to haphazardly-prepared cantonment sites where they will eventually hand over their arms and transform into ex-combatants under UN supervision. But this show of trust in the process has not yet removed all doubts over how far the FARC will go in search of peace and whether existing cracks within the group may open wider. Internal Fractures: Coca and Convictions The uncertainty of the renegotiation, in which ardent opponents of the FARC rapidly became extremely powerful players, compounded strains on the guerrillas’ unity. Strong and lucrative connections to the illegal drug trade, mixed with lingering doubts about whether any agreement would satisfy the more radical parts of the insurgent group, had already started to expose cracks in FARC cohesion. Two dissident factions had appeared earlier in 2016. The first arose in Tumaco, one of Colombia’s poorest municipalities, situated on the border with Ecuador with a mainly Afro-Colombian population. A hub for drug trafficking and production – it has the country’s highest concentration of coca crops, estimated at 17,000 hectares in 2015 – Tumaco has been the theatre of operations since 2001 for the FARC’s Daniel Aldana mobile column. Other armed groups have come and gone since then, but the Daniel Aldana, until recently, remained. Like all FARC units, the Daniel Aldana front includes rural combatants and urban militia fighters. In its case, the militia – in part criminals hired for specific activities, in part direct FARC fighters – was somewhat disconnected from the larger FARC structure. A militia commander Yeison, known as “Don Y” created a dissident group in rural Tumaco. At the same time, two other militia commanders, alias “Camacho” and “Mocho” with 73 other militia members, according to the FARC, decided to cut all ties and

218 set up shop on their own so as to take over the territory the guerrillas vacated. The FARC killed Yeison in November, as it has acknowledged, and ‘Camacho’ was found dead as well. According to reports, these two groups united, calling the new formation “People for Order”. The most notorious FARC schism is in Guaviare, a low-lying region in eastern Colombia. In June 2016, the FARC’s 1st front publicly announced it was divided and that some of its number would no longer support peace talks. Its commander, with the nom de guerre Iván Mordisco, led a dissident band of 60 fighters, along with the front’s financial commander, alias Danilo. The FARC put a member of its Central High Command, Gentil Duarte, in charge of the faction of the 1st front that stayed loyal to the peace process. Loyal fighters from its 7th and 44th fronts also moved into the region to track down Mordisco and either persuade him to support peace or kill him. Around the same time, according to interviews in the region, Danilo and some of his dissident fighters changed their minds and returned to the FARC, but the schisms in Guaviare were not over. Another commander, alias Aldemar, who originally supported peace, joined the dissidents. In December, in an announcement that stunned many Colombians, the FARC declared that it had kicked out five commanders for breaking ranks, including the erstwhile loyalist enforcer, Gentil Duarte, who now said that he believed the insurgency had betrayed its original ideals by negotiating, and that the government would not fulfil its part of the agreement. Three of the banished commanders belonged or had ties to the 7th, 16th and 44th fronts as well. The role of the drug trade in these decisions to continue the war is undeniable. The current breakaway group – no more than 250 fighters, according to FARC leaders – now operates in Vaupés and Guaviare provinces, and may also have crossed into Brazil, extracting protection payments from local elite and running the lucrative drug trade. The FARC have also argued that the 1st front is motivated only by money, as a way to discredit it internally. Paying with Paste To understand these fractures and what they may mean for peace and violence, it is essential to understand conditions in Guaviare, one of Colombia’s most remote and underdeveloped regions. It has one two-lane, clay-colored, dirt road between its capital, San José del Guaviare, and another of its four municipalities, Calamar. Smaller dirt roads and paths, often impassable due to rain, connect other towns and villages and are best travelled on a dirt bike. Road conditions can make short trips seem endless. The road from Calamar to the southernmost municipality of Miraflores – a twenty-street hamlet in the heart of the jungle with a dirt landing strip in its middle – does not even appear on maps. Though less than 100 km, the trip takes at best seven hours on a dirt bike; after light rain, twelve hours is standard; often the road is unusable. River travel is more common, but can take up to a day. An alternative is an old DC cargo plane that flies from San José to Miraflores twice a week. While it looks unsafe, a local pilot says its only accident was in the 1990s, when the cows it was transporting became scared on landing, causing it to turn on its side on the runway. Many towns in Guaviare have only an alcatel – a single telephone. Often located in a shop, it is their single contact with the outside world. In these towns, the FARC demands that one person keep a register of who has called whom in the town or outside it, and who leaves messages if the person called is not around. In May 2016, for instance, when the alcatel was damaged the village of Barranquillita deep in Guaviare’s jungle, Crisis Group was unable to visit because it was impossible to make contact and gain permission to enter. Open plains with cattle can occasionally be seen between these towns and villages; elsewhere only jungle and trees are visible. So strong is the coca economy in Guaviare that not only do some villages, hamlets and towns totally depend on it, but there is also so little currency that coca paste is sometimes used instead. One gram is about 2,000 pesos – 69 U.S. cents – so a beer, costing in some places 4,000 pesos, can be bought with two grams, for example. The FARC dissident group in Guaviare plans to continue to run the coca trade there, describing itself in meetings with communities as a 'necessary evil'. It also appears willing to use violence to protect that trade. It was likely responsible for the sniper killing in January of a police officer taking part in the manual eradication of coca crops. A Return to War? Since many of the areas under guerrilla control are similar to Guaviare in terms of remoteness,

219 poverty and dependence on the coca trade, the main concern for the FARC and its fighters is the government’s ability and willingness to meet the obligations laid out in the peace agreement. This poses the questions: would and could the FARC go back to war if the government does not deliver? A message from Timochenko to fighters in December suggested the insurgents would be willing to fight again if the validity of the peace agreement was contested or the fast-track mechanism to pass laws through Congress to implement it was not approved. Within the organization, the answers tend to vary: some argue the FARC would have to return to armed action; others look to the long term and are more committed to peace. 'Historically in Colombia they have killed guerrilla leaders after signing peace … without carrying out the reforms', one FARC leader told me. Yet, he said, he is still committed to peace, as his time horizon for FARC success in democratic politics is measured in decades, not months or years. Some version of that optimism seems to be true for the vast majority of the FARC. The guerrillas have sought the moral high ground by arriving at the cantonments sites even when these are barely ready to house and feed them. The government estimates that 95 per cent of rural fighters will hand over their weapons, and it may well be right. Going back to war would be difficult. First, the FARC will soon have handed in the names of all its fighters enlisted for the reintegration process. For an organization that needs to be clandestine, this marks a definitive break. Secondly, it may not be able to remobilize all its fighters once they have become acquainted with peaceful civilian life. Figures such as the guerrilla DJ, who at the tenth FARC Conference in September 2016 played a mix of techno and ranchero songs with a Simpsons sticker on his laptop, may show where the future for many lies: with one foot in the guerrilla, and the other in an increasingly globalized, consumerist world which will be new and probably attractive for many fighters. Thirdly, the political climate would probably be inauspicious, internationally and nationally, but also in the hamlets where the FARC has historically been active, where even an imperfect peace would likely be preferred to a new war. Lastly, other armed groups are already occupying its old territories, and by the time of a hypothetical FARC rearmament they may well be unwilling to accommodate competitors. That dynamic led to a fierce conflict between the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia’s second insurgency, in Cauca province between 2005 and 2009. Security Alarms The haphazard, under-prepared start to the arms handover has left some guerrillas fretting about the future, worried the government cannot deliver on the most basic parts of the peace agreement. Such concerns will likely grow. Following the guerrilla’s claim that at least two fighters have died because of health complications while in pre-concentration sites since October, the government has tried to extend health services to cantonments, but in one possible site, some twenty FARC had a malaria-like illness. Insurgent uncertainty is exacerbated by the differences between government and FARC about the killing of social leaders. Between 90 and 117 local leaders active in favor of peace, land restitution or other community causes were reportedly murdered in 2016. While the FARC leadership is willing to move forward, mid-level commanders and low-level fighters argue that these attacks are the result of a resurgence of paramilitary forces opposed to the peace process. The government insists there are no more paramilitaries and that most of the killings are isolated incidents. Nevertheless, they evoke the FARC’s core fear: concern for personal post-conflict security. At least 3,000 members of the Patriotic Union – a political party the FARC created in 1985 – were assassinated in the party’s early years, something the FARC has not forgotten. Security guarantees are a core part of the peace agreement, but in practice these will not be able to cover everyone who was part of the organization. Many members could find themselves exposed after handing over their weapons. As one fighter asked, “since they are killing social leaders, what awaits us?” As the FARC transitions from armed group to political party, it will face many challenges for which its leadership may not be ready. Many fighters will opt to leave the organization and reintegrate independently. Its early political performance may be worse than it expects, especially in urban areas. It will likely also have less success than it desires in hamlets and areas it previously controlled. Some members may be killed; more may eventually return to violence of some kind, if they have not already. The FARC no

220 longer wants war. But it is about to learn that even peace can be violent, and that there are downs as well as ups in electoral politics."

Nicholas Casey and Patricia Torres, "Venezuela Muzzles Legislature, Moving Closer to One-Man Rule," The New York Times, March 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/americas/venezuelas-supreme-court-takes-power-from- legislature.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, " Venezuela took its strongest step yet toward one- man rule under the leftist President Nicolás Maduro as his loyalists on the Supreme Court seized power from the National Assembly in a ruling late Wednesday night. The ruling effectively dissolved the elected legislature, which is led by Mr. Maduro’s opponents, and allows the court to write laws itself, experts said. The move caps a year in which the last vestiges of Venezuela’s democracy have been torn down, critics and regional leaders say, leaving what many now describe as not just an authoritarian regime, but an outright dictatorship." Following international and domestic pressure, the Venezuelan Supreme Court, a day later, began to revise its decision dissolving the country's legislature. The court's new ruling, not finalized or entirely clear as of April 1, would seem hold the legislature in contempt, preventing it from passing laws, but not giving the Supreme Court the power to do so (Nicholas Casey and Patricia Torres, "Venezuelan Court Revises Ruling That Nullified Legislature," The New York Times, April 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/americas/venezuela-court-national- assembly.html?ref=todayspaper).

Noicholoas Caseuy and Patricia Torres, "At Least 3 Die in Venezuela Protests Against Nicolás Maduro," The New York Times, April 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/americas/venezuela-caracas-maduro- protests.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "Protesters demanding elections and a return to democratic rule jammed the streets of Caracas and other Venezuelan cities on Wednesday. National Guard troops and government-aligned militias beat crowds back with tear gas, rubber bullets and other weapons, and at least three people were killed, according to human rights groups and news reports. President Nicolás Maduro defied international calls, including a plea from the American State Department, to allow peaceful assemblies and ordered his forces into the streets. Some demonstrators, wearing masks to protect themselves from tear gas, fought back with firebombs. The violence between the government forces and protesters quickly intensified. Nicholas Casey and Patricia Torres, "At Least 12 Die as Rioting Breaks Out in Venezuela," The New York Times, April 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/americas/venezuela- riots.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0. reported, "At least a dozen people were killed as the streets of Caracas, Venezuela, erupted into a night of riots, looting and clashes between government opponents and the National Guard late Thursday and early Friday, with anger from two days of pro-democracy demonstrations spilling into unrest in working-class and poor neighborhoods."

Simon Romero, "Brazil Gripped by General Strike Over Austerity Measures," The New York Times, April 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/americas/brazil-general- strike.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, "A general strike disrupted cities around Brazil on Friday as unions marshaled resistance to austerity measures proposed by the scandal-ridden government of President Michel Temer, reflecting his struggle to persuade voters that his proposals to overhaul pension systems and labor laws are necessary. Tensions flared in Rio de Janeiro, with schools warning parents to keep students at home, security forces using tear gas on protesters at ferry terminals near Guanabara Bay and clashes erupting in Santos Dumont Airport. In São Paulo, Brazil’s largest city, protesters blocked highways, halted much of the public transit network and shut down access to an array of public buildings. The strike also hit cities elsewhere in Brazil, including Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and the capital, Brasília, though many businesses in the country were still able to open on Friday, at least partly, or operate at a slower pace than usual."

221

U.S. and Canadian Developments

ICG, "Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid," Special Report 3, Middle East & North Africa, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf- and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/003-counter-terrorism-pitfalls-what-us-fight-against-isis-and-al-qaeda-should- avoid, commented, "This report examines President Trump’s emerging counter-terrorism policies, the dilemmas his administration faces in battling ISIS and al-Qaeda across the Middle East and South Asia, and how to avoid deepening the disorder both groups exploit. Executive Summary In pledging to destroy the Islamic State (ISIS), U.S. President Donald J. Trump looks set to make counter-terrorism a centerpiece of his foreign policy. His administration’s determination against groups that plot to kill Americans is understandable, but it should be careful when fighting jihadists not to play into their hands. The risks include angering local populations whose support is critical, picking untimely or counter-productive fights and neglecting the vital role diplomacy and foreign aid must play in national security policy. Most importantly, aggressive counter-terrorism operations should not inadvertently fuel other conflicts and deepen the disorder that both ISIS and al-Qaeda exploit. The new U.S. administration has inherited military campaigns that are eating deep into ISIS’s self- proclaimed caliphate. Much of Mosul, its last urban stronghold in Iraq, has been recaptured; Raqqa, its capital in Syria, is encircled. Its decisive defeat is still a remote prospect while the Syrian war rages and Sunnis’ place in Iraqi politics is uncertain. The threat it poses will evolve in its heartlands and elsewhere, as fighters disperse. But ISIS is in retreat, its brand diminished. For many adherents, its allure was its territorial expansion; with that gone, its leaders are struggling to redefine success. Al-Qaeda could prove harder to suppress. Its affiliates fight across numerous war zones in coalitions with other armed groups, its operatives are embedded in local militias, and it shows more pragmatic adaptability to local conditions. Though the roots of ISIS’s rise and al-Qaeda’s resurgence are complex and varied, the primary catalyst has been the turmoil across parts of the Muslim world. Both movements grow when things fall apart, less because their ideology inspires wide appeal than by offering protection or firepower against enemies, rough law and order where no one else can or by occupying a vacuum and forcing communities to acquiesce. The U.S. can do only so much to reboot Arab politics, remake regional orders or repair cracked fault lines, but its counter-terrorism strategy cannot ignore the upheaval. So long as wars continue and chaos persists, will thrive, whatever ISIS’s immediate fate. In particular, the new administration should avoid: Angering communities. Campaigns against jihadists hinge on winning over the population in which they operate. Offensives against Mosul, Raqqa or elsewhere need to avoid destruction but also need plans to preserve gains, prevent reprisals, stabilise liberated cities and rebuild them; as yet, no such plan for Raqqa seems to exist. “Targeted” strikes that kill civilians and alienate communities, as appears to have been the case in the January Yemen raid and the 16 March strike in Syria’s Aleppo province, are counterproductive, regardless of immediate yield. Loosening rules and oversight designed to protect civilians, as has been suggested, would be a mistake. Aggravating other fronts. The new administration’s fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda intersects a tinderbox of wars and regional rivalries. No regional state’s interests dovetail precisely with those of the U.S.; few consider jihadists their top priority; most are more intent on strengthening their hand against traditional rivals. The U.S. should be careful that the Raqqa campaign does not stimulate fighting elsewhere, particularly among Turkish and Kurdish forces and their respective allies. Success in Mosul hinges on preventing the forces involved (the Iraqi army, Kurdish peshmerga units, Shiite militias and Sunni tribes; Turkey and Iran) battling for turf after ousting ISIS. Likewise, support for Gulf allies should not mean a blank check for the Saudi-led Yemen campaign, which – if wrongly prosecuted – would play further into al-Qaeda’s hands. Picking other fights. Confronting Iran, which the administration identifies as a priority alongside the fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda, requires careful consideration. Militarily battling Tehran in Iraq, Yemen or Syria, questioning the nuclear deal’s validity or imposing sanctions that flout its spirit could provoke asymmetric responses via non-state allies and put Iraq’s government in an untenable

222 position. Iran’s behaviour across the region is often destabilising and, by aggravating sectarian tensions, provides fodder to jihadist groups; as with similar conduct by others, it calls for a calibrated U.S. response. But the answer ultimately lies in dampening the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, not stimulating it with the attendant risk of escalating proxy wars across the region and reinforcing sectarian currents that buoy jihadists. Similarly, sabre-rattling with China hinders diplomacy with Pakistan and thus efforts to stabilise Afghanistan; effective counter-terrorism in South Asia requires cooperation with Beijing. Defining the enemy too broadly. ISIS and al-Qaeda thrive on confusion generated by how the U.S. defines its foe: violent jihadists, political Islam or Muslims as a whole. Designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group would be a self-inflicted wound, alienating an ideological and political counterweight to jihadism. Similarly, many armed groups fight beside al-Qaeda in alliances that are tactical and do not signal support for jihadists’ goals of attacking the West or establishing a caliphate. Prising them away from al-Qaeda would be wiser than fighting them all. Neglecting peace processes. From Libya to Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, no country where ISIS or al-Qaeda branches hold territory has a single force strong enough to secure the whole country. Without accommodation, factions will either ally with jihadists against rivals or use the fight against them for other ends. Backing forces for counter-terrorism while neglecting efforts to promote compromise will deepen instability. Fighting terrorism without diplomacy. Navigating allies’ rivalries, preventing a free-for-all in Mosul, managing the fallout from Raqqa, mediating between Afghan, Iraqi or Libyan factions – all are diplomats’ work. Multilateral engagement matters too, whether to back UN mediation, enlist its help for reconstruction and stabilisation or use UN and other multilateral frameworks for counter- terrorism cooperation. Staffing the State Department’s top levels and sustaining its expertise are priorities. The cuts proposed to U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance, including to the UN’s budget, would damage U.S. security. That the new administration wants to prioritise operations against groups that plot against the U.S. is understandable, but counter-terrorism does not exist in a vacuum. The U.S. administration’s executive order banning entry from certain Muslim countries; the troubling rhetoric of some of its officials; the calling into question of some of the restraints imposed on military operations; and the proposed slashing of the State Department and development budgets all undermine its goal of protecting Americans from terrorism. More broadly, it should be cautious not to overlook or aggravate other sources of instability even as it takes steps to defeat jihadists. The big winners from any new disorder in the Muslim world would be groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda – whatever guise they ultimately assume."

Ben Hubbard and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. War Footprint Grows in Middle East, With No Endgame in Sight," The New York Times, March 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/middleeast/us-war-footprint-grows-in-middle- east.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The United States launched more airstrikes in Yemen this month than during all of last year. In Syria, it has airlifted local forces to front-line positions and has been accused of killing civilians in airstrikes. In Iraq, American troops and aircraft are central in supporting an urban offensive in Mosul, where airstrikes killed scores of people on March 17. Two months after the inauguration of President Trump, indications are mounting that the United States military is deepening its involvement in a string of complex wars in the Middle East that lack clear endgames."

The Trump Administration is moving to end considering human rights concerns in foreign policy. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Rex Tillerson to Lift Human Rights Conditions on Arms Sale to Bahrain," The New York Times, March 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/middleeast/rex- tillerson-bahrain-weapons-sales.html?ref=todayspaper, reported, "Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson has decided to lift all human rights conditions on a major sale of F-16 fighter jets and other arms to Bahrain in an effort to end a rift between the United States and a critical Middle East ally, according to administration and congressional officials involved in the debate. Mr. Tillerson’s decision comes as the Trump administration looks to bolster Sunni Arab states in

223 the Middle East and find new ways to confront Iran in the Persian Gulf. Bahrain is a key player in that effort, and home to the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which patrols the strategic waterway." Peter Baker, "In a Shift, Trump Will Move Egypt’s Rights Record to the Sidelines," The New York Times, March 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/middleeast/in-major-shift-trump- taking-egypts-human-rights-issues-private.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0, reported, "The White House signaled on Friday that it would no longer allow human rights issues to become a public point of conflict with Egypt, another striking shift away from years of American foreign policy by presidents of both parties."

In Camden New Jersey, the police department is having success with a new approach, minimize harm, and try to save lives. Officers are taught to be patient and deescalate confrontations and dangerous situations, when possible, especially when the perceived threat comes from someone seemingly mentally ill or disoriented. When police respond to a shooting officers are instructed to take victims to the hospital in their cruisers, rather than waiting for an ambulance, as the delay is likely to be injurious and may be deadly. In a poor community, officers hand out warnings more often than traffic tickets. As Police Chief J. Scott Thomson stated, " “Handing a $250 ticket to someone who is making $13,000 a year can be life altering.” For example, it can make car insurance unaffordable or result in the loss of a driver’s license. “Taxing a poor community is not going to make it stronger.” One result is that the murder rate has been dropping steadily in Camden. The number of homicides dropped in Camden, from a record 67 in 2012 to 44 in 2016. In the neighborhood of North Camden, the new community policing approach has greatly increased public safety and residents perception of safety. Officers commenced walking patrol in the neighborhood, knocking on doors to get to know people, and even to ask to use their bathrooms once they did. The city razed abandoned houses, and in consultation with the local population, arrested or chased out the drug dealers who had been a major problem for the community. Neighbors, including those the police have arrested, admit their neighborhood is now safer, and some who kept their children inside, now let them play outdoors (Joseph Goldstein, "Changes in Policing Take Hold in One of the Nation’s Most Dangerous Cities: It’s a sort of Hippocratic ethos: Minimize harm, and try to save lives. And in Camden, N.J., residents are noticing the results," The New York Times, April 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/nyregion/camden-nj-police-shootings.html?ref=todayspaper).

While traditionally welcoming Canada continues to embrace immigrants, concerns have been raised that right wing extremist groups have not been taken seriously enough and could cause violence. As of the end of April 2017, there had been a few isolated acts against Muslims (Craig S. Smith and Dan Levin, "Hateful Fringe Stirs as Canada Embraces Immigrants," The New York Times, February 1, 2017). ^^^^^^^

DIALOGUING

THE PLANET CAN'T STAND THIS PRESIDENCY

Bill McKibben*

Trump is in charge at a critical moment for keeping climate change in check. We may never recover. Image

AS Published in The New York Times, April 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/opinion/the-planet-cant-stand-this- presidency.html?ref=todayspaper.

President Trump’s environmental onslaught will have immediate, dangerous effects. He has vowed to reopen coal mines and moved to keep the dirtiest power plants open for many years into the future. Dirty air, the kind you get around coal-fired power plants, kills people.

It’s much the same as his policies on health care or refugees: Real people (the poorest and most

224 vulnerable people) will be hurt in real time. That’s why the resistance has been so fierce.

But there’s an extra dimension to the environmental damage. What Mr. Trump is trying to do to the planet’s climate will play out over geologic time as well. In fact, it’s time itself that he’s stealing from us.

What I mean is, we have only a short window to deal with the climate crisis or else we forever lose the chance to thwart truly catastrophic heating.

In Paris in 2015, the world’s nations pledged to do all they could to hold the rise of the planet’s temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit). It was a good idea since, though we’re still half a degree short of that number, we’re already seeing disastrous ice melt at the poles, the loss of coral reefs and the inexorable rise of the oceans. But at current rates of burning coal, gas and oil, we could put enough carbon in the atmosphere in the next four years to eventually push us past that temperature limit. The planet’s hope, coming out of those Paris talks, was that we’d see such growth in renewable energy that we’d begin to close the gap between what physics demands and what our political systems have so far allowed in terms of action.

But everything Mr. Trump is doing should slow that momentum. He’s trying to give gas-guzzlers new life and slashing the money to help poor nations move toward clean energy; he and his advisers are even talking about pulling out of the Paris accords. He won’t be able to stop solar and wind power in their tracks, but his policies will slow the pace at which they would otherwise grow. Other presidents and other nations will have spewed more carbon into the atmosphere, but none will have insured, at such a critical moment, that carbon’s reign is extended.

The effects will be felt not immediately but over decades and centuries and millenniums. More ice will melt, and that will cut the planet’s reflectivity, amplifying the warming; more permafrost will thaw, and that will push more methane into the atmosphere, trapping yet more heat. The species that go extinct as a result of the warming won’t mostly die in the next four years, but they will die. The nations that will be submerged won’t sink beneath the waves on his watch, but they will sink. No president will be able to claw back this time — crucial time, since we’re right now breaking the back of the climate system. We can hope other world leaders will pick up some of the slack. And we can protest. But even when we vote him out of office, Trumpism will persist, a dark stratum in the planet’s geological history. In some awful sense, his term could last forever.

*Bill McKibben is a founder of 350.org and teaches environmental studies at Middlebury College.

The Times Op-Ed was followed by the following, which are only listed here with whichcan be found at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/opinion/the-planet-cant-stand-this- presidency.html?ref=todayspaper:

"Tax cuts and executive orders can easily be reversed. The effects of climate change policy cannot. Here’s what we could lose for good."

Hawaiian Honeycreepers By RICHARD CONNIFF

Cloud Forests By CAITLIN LOOBY in ecology and evolutionary biology at the University of California, Irvine.

The Clarreo Mission By ADAM FRANK

225

Joshua Trees By FERRIS JABR

Horseshoe Crabs By SYLVIA EARLE and president of the nonprofit environmental group Mission Blue.

The Thwaites Glacier By RICHARD ALLEY

Water Under the Mojave Desert By EMMA MARRIS >>><>+<><<<

ACCELERATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TOWARD 2030

Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir*

Taken together, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – contained in U.N. Resolution 70/1 involving the 194 member states and civil society in its deliberation – seek an encouraging level of development of humanity’s social and environmental existence. They establish a framework through 2030 that can assist nations and communities of the world in plotting what could amount to transformative, prosperous, and sustainable achievements.

How can this potential development unfold and be long-lasting? What approaches should we catalyse so that sustainable projects result and generate the human development benefits the world’s local publics want and need?

As a starting point, most societies have internalized an enduring premise through experiences, particularly since World War II, of social development and reconstruction interventions: people accept and support decisions that they had a part in making. We have learned this critical principle as we have analysed human behaviour in our own and other cultures over centuries, and we find this essential premise in texts of philosophy and spirituality of civilizations over millennia. Indeed, this precept is no longer astounding, and is as true as ever.

Plans of development action that directly embody the spoken will of people naturally gain their partnership, energy, and dedication. After all, decisions people contribute to rendering, generally reflect the participants’ aspirations and interests. Thus, people’s active participation in creating the projects that fulfil the SDGs is ultimately the essential basis upon which the SDGs could come into fruition, expand, and uplift our society and world. The question then becomes: how do we set in motion across lands participatory democratic meetings of local communities of people so that they identify, prioritize, and implement sustainable development projects?

Morocco, for example, has a progressive national municipal charter that is intended to promote inclusive participation. Each municipality is required by law to create multi-year community development plans driven by popular participation. If nations of the world do not imbed in their national policies the essential requirement of inclusion in the creation and determination of sustainable development projects, how can we then expect to achieve SDGs when the public is not encouraged to be involved in the determination and design of initiatives?

However, we have also dishearteningly learned in Morocco’s case that laws and policies are not enough for the fulfilment of widespread participatory development actions. In fact, the example of

226 Morocco, critically underscores that we must also experientially learn methods (by applying them in reality) of community democratic planning of projects in order for these processes to genuinely take place. We must train our teachers, our youth and retirees, members of civil society and the business community, locally elected officials, women and men, those who have and those who have less, to not only participate in identifying sustainable projects, but also facilitate the dialogue needed in order for all people to come together, speak, argue, reconcile, and achieve consensus with one another. Policies that promote participation coupled with learning by doing is a needed combination that can lead to local community movements toward accomplishing SDGs.

However, even after codifying national policies and building capacities, these two essential components are still not enough for the tangible realization of SDGs. What would become of the designed participatory and sustainable projects without finance to achieve implementation? Even when communities are in a position to provide some work in-kind to help establish their development projects, materials to construct must still be bought, seeds to plant must still be purchased, capital must still be secured in order to enable production.

Addressing the distribution of public funds and obscene levels of inequality are inevitable parts of the solution, but sitting on our hands until that illusive day arrives is not an option, and not necessary. There are no pre-conditions to sustainable development, other than people’s own desire and the freedom to assemble.

In Morocco, there is what could become a self-reliant pathway to generate the new revenue needed in order to invest in projects that can achieve the economic, health, environmental, and indirect political impacts of SDGs. The needed finance can be generated by establishing the entire agricultural value chain, from nurseries to market, including growing hundreds of millions of diverse fruit trees that are indigenous to Morocco, such as almond, argan, avocado, berries, carob, cherry, date, fig, jujube, lemon, olive, pomegranate, prickly pear, walnut, and some apple varieties, as well as the more than two dozen varieties of wild medicinal plants.

This level and kind of planting and growing integrated with irrigation efficiency to vastly expand yields, in further conjunction with certifying organic and processing to markedly increasing income, and directing product toward both domestic and global markets, can multiply by five the revenue generated by the Moroccan agricultural economy. In Morocco, rural farming families, who experience most of the nation’s poverty, still typically conduct subsistence practices directed toward local traditional markets.

Greater levels of agricultural income at least in Morocco’s case is vitally necessary in order to secure the revenue needed to identify and achieve projects that accomplish SDGs, this sector’s growth in itself being an SDG. Our experiences in Burkina Faso and Cameroon, for example, also point to the same enormous opportunity, where entirely naturally grown avocados, papayas, and mangos are sold locally for a few cents each, where peanuts are bought and sold for figurative peanuts, all the while industrialized nations of the world have retail prices for these commodities 100 times what these growers receive.

Unless we capitalize and optimize the most undervalued resources, human and agricultural, how else may we derive the sorely needed finance in order to carry through the sustainable development projects wanted by the publics? We cannot wait for the justice of when there may finally be some semblance of wealth equality, but in fact it is this very integrated process described that will help achieve the income fairness, social decency, and sustainability that accompanies it.

Participatory movements driven by organic agricultural revenue inherently involve multi-sectoral and multi-tiered partnerships, whereby local communities along with government, civil, and business agencies collaborate in order to ignite community planning and establish development plans and projects. These networks of partnership also form decentralized arrangements or management channels of an evolving system committed to sustainable development. This is to say that decentralization is a by-

227 product of pervasive participatory planning and the implementation of community-identified projects. The kind of decentralization that forms will naturally resemble the experience that gave it birth, which in this proposed case is that of participatory governance.

In Morocco, the kingdom has committed itself formally in 2008 and in its constitution of 2011 to decentralized administration and inclusion of all people, religions, and backgrounds in all rights and in the national development imperative. The national commitment helps to create a society conducive for encouraging bottom-up inclusive movements to achieve sustainable projects, whereby civil organizations are founded and strengthened and in time federate as they a work together – a course we have also seen in Morocco. However, if a nation has not committed itself by its laws to decentralization and federalism, but does enable community management of their development, they still indirectly open a de facto pathway to a form of decentralized organization, and potentially a systemic one over time. This emerges from mounting and regularized inter-relationships involved in community development, but also from the politicization of participants as they internalize participatory procedures for governance and popular agendas for change – and may thus opt to enter electoral politics.

In sum, SDGs and their realization by 2030 will be a direct reflection of the extent to which people participate in the change they seek. Their participation will be a reflection of national policies that empower the sub-national and programs of experiential training in facilitating participatory community planning and development enacted in all parts of the land. That implementation of locally identified projects is dependent upon committed revenue and that requires, at least in Morocco and most developing nations, achieving the potential of organic agriculture and the rewards it is presented by global markets. Finally, by doing all of this and remaining true to the principles of participation and public-private partnerships, decentralized arrangements and federations for the management of development will emerge and institutionalize a constant bottom-up energy. Increasingly flourishing on its own successes, the model accelerates toward 2030 and to levels of sustainable development for humanity and the planet, shining perhaps as never before.

*Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir is president of the High Atlas Foundation, a Moroccan-U.S. non-profit organization dedicated to sustainable development and that since 2011 has Consultative Status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council. +=>H<=+

TRUMPISM AND THE ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE DENIAL

Sam Ben-Meir,* April 19, 2017

In recent years, President Donald Trump has used his Twitter account @realDonalTrump to share his thoughts on climate change – for example, in December 2013 he tweeted: “…global warming is a total, and very expensive hoax.” And in January 2014, Trump asks: “Is our country still spending money on the GLOBAL WARMING HOAX?”

In September 2016, Kellyanne Conway clarified the administration’s position, suggesting that climate change exists but is “naturally occurring.” The administration’s official position, however, does not avoid the epistemic and moral pitfalls in adopting a hypothesis which the evidence overwhelmingly points against.

Epistemology (or the theory of knowledge) is concerned with, among other things, what right we have to the beliefs we hold – in other words, it is a normative enterprise: it asks not merely the descriptive-psychological question of how people happen to come to acquire their beliefs, but rather how they should do so.

The mathematician and philosopher William Clifford in “The Ethics of Belief”, famously argued that it is morally wrong to believe anything, anywhere, at any time on insufficient evidence. To make his point, Clifford uses the example of a ship-owner who allows himself to believe that his vessel is seaworthy without giving it the proper inspection – thereby dooming all the passengers aboard.

"He knew that she was old and not over-well built at the first; that she had seen many seas and climes, and

228 often had needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy… Before the ship sailed, however he succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections … he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy. He watched her departure with a light heart and benevolent wishes for the exiles and their strange new home which was to-be. And he got his insurance money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales."

First and foremost, Clifford contends that if a person is aware of evidence against a hypothesis and aware of no good evidence in support of it, and nevertheless allows himself to believe it because it provides him private satisfaction, he has done an epistemic and moral wrong. It is often pointed out that the philosopher William James attacked Clifford’s view (in his essay “The Will to Believe”), yet he agreed with this fundamental principle. What he rejected was Clifford’s secondary claim – namely, that if an individual has evidence neither for nor against a belief, it is wrong for him to either accept or reject it. Rather, his ‘epistemic duty’, so to speak, is to withhold judgment on the matter until further evidence comes to light; that is, to remain agnostic. In the second case James thought that with respect to religious belief, it was permissible to allow the passions (the will) to guide or determine belief.

Clifford's ship-owner serves as an illustration for this administration’s attitude to our current environmental situation. Whether man-made climate change is occurring is no longer an object of serious scientific contention. The IPCC reports that: “Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reduction in snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes… It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.”

We must begin to ask ourselves whether we have any epistemic right to the belief that anthropogenic global warming is not a reality when virtually all the scientific evidence points to the fact that this is a reality which has already begun to exact a devastating toll – in terms of climate refugees, desertification, and the rapid loss of biodiversity. The bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef reveals the far-reaching impacts of climate change, which has led to rising ocean temperatures and an increase in its acidity.

Last month, Trump pledged to break financial commitments to the United Nations Green Climate Fund (GCF) as pledged by former President Barack Obama in accordance with the multinational Paris Climate Agreement. Newly-appointed head of the Environmental Protection Agency, Scott Pruitt, has rolled back former President Barack Obama’s plans to reduce carbon emissions from coal-fired plants, ending the former administration's so-called “war on coal” – an industry which provides far fewer jobs than in tourism or renewable energy.

The Executive Order President Trump signed on March 28th, 2017 rolls back agreed-upon emission standards and repeals the initiatives outlined in The Clean Power Plan in several critical ways, including a reversal of its goal to replace coal- and gas-fire power plants with renewable energy power plants. This expresses not only a dogmatic faith that anthropogenic climate change is not real, but also a self-interested and tunnel-like vision of the world which repositions fiction as facts.

The essence of Trumpism lies in its tendency to create the conditions under which we recklessly fail to give due weight to things like justification, evidence and warrant -- we enable ourselves to act in ways that are epistemically wrong. Nowhere is this more evident than in Trump’s disregard for man-made climate change.

Presently, Trump is behaving like Clifford's ship-owner – he permits himself to believe whatever he wants, that which he finds most-convenient, expedient and desirable. The ultimate critique of Trumpism is not simply whether we still value basic principles including what defines truth, but whether we are able to perceive objective reality at all.

Trumpism, with its readiness to cling to unsubstantiated claims, hearsay, rumors, and conspiracies is in turn making it easier for all of us to behave – epistemically speaking – like Clifford’s ship-owner; we are becoming credulous for the sake of short-term economic self-interest. In the context of climate change, we should see Clifford’s doomed émigrés not simply as ourselves, but also our posterity. By not responding effectively and rapidly enough to address the looming threat of climate change, we may fail to prevent a geological tipping point, on the other side of which lies a vast unknown.

The real tragedy is not simply that Trump is not doing anything to combat climate change; the fact is that little was accomplished in this respect under the Obama administration as well. In speaking to the Guardian on December 12th, 2015, James Hansen, the former NASA scientist who did much to popularize the dangers of climate

229 changes, dismissed the Paris talks as a “fraud” and “just worthless words.” Those were strong statements from someone who believes passionately in imposing carbon taxes. (“As long as fossil fuels appear to be the cheapest fuels out there, they will be continued to be burned,” Hansen added.)

Trump has avoided the prevalent hypocrisy of saying that we believe that man-made climate change exists while doing next to nothing to significantly address it; but he falls into a much graver error – namely in allowing himself to be persuaded that man-made climate change is not real – as this is a belief to which neither he, nor anyone, is epistemically entitled, given the massive evidence against it. And, as Clifford shows, to convince ourselves of propositions in a such an irresponsibly self-serving manner is also a moral wrong.

To really address Trumpism and the denial of man-made climate change, we have to assume moral responsibility, not only for our actions but for our beliefs themselves. Philosophy has a crucial role to play today in addressing the moral challenge we face in terms of the weakening of our normative commitments. The antidote to Trumpism must involve recommitting ourselves to epistemic values, including especially the universality and value of truth. With its outright disdain for objective reality and its repeated assertion of “alternative facts”, Trumpism represents the dismissal of self-critical thought; which is not only extremely dangerous, given the precarious situation that is enfolding daily before our eyes, but the first fateful step towards a crude mental barbarism.

*Sam Ben-Meir, PhD is an adjunct professor at Mercy College. His current research focuses on environmental ethics and animal studies. [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. +<::x<>x::>+

SAUDI ARABIA: STILL LOST IN THE SANDS OF WAR

Rene Wadlow,* April 4, 2014

The aggression of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates) against Yemen began on 24 March 2015 so that we can now mark its second anniversary. However there has been little progress toward a resolution of the armed conflict. Rather, there has been an increase in suffering, displacement of people, and destruction of the society. Saudi Arabia has changed the name from “Operation Decisive Storm” to “Operation Restoring Hope”, probably on the advice of the public relations firm which advises the US Pentagon on the name of its operations. The first 28 days in 2015 of bombing from the air of cities and camps, killing women and children, created a sand storm, but the results were in no way decisive. Since that start on 24 March, at least a 4,600 people have been killed, many more wounded and many displaced within the country. Nevertheless, the aggression has had little impact on the power configuration within the country.

The Association of World Citizens has constantly called attention to the violations of the minimum standards of the laws of war. There are international agreements which set humanitarian law and human rights standards in times of armed conflicts, mainly the Red Cross Geneva Conventions of 1949 written in the light of experience during the Second World War and the two Protocols to the Conventions written in 1977 in the light of experiences of the Vietnam War. Not all States have ratified Protocols I and II, and a number of States have made reservations, especially refusing to forgo reprisals against civilians. Protocol I requires that attacks against military objectives be planned and executed so that “incidental” civilian injuries are not “excessive in relation to the specific military advantages anticipated”. The decision-making is subjective on the part of the military, and military officers rarely see any action as “excessive” (1)

Another consequence of the bombing in Yemen is the starvation of the civilian population due to lack of food and water. As a result of the widespread use of defoliants in the Vietnam War, there was written as Article 54 (2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, a prohibition to destroy foodstuffs, crops, drinking water installations and irrigation works. Yemen is, at the best of times, short of food and drinking water installations. The bombing has deliberately increased the hardship as well as increasing the number of displaced people with resulting lack of access to food and water.

The members of the UN Security Council looked at the situation, and then decided to look away,

230 although the Council named a UN mediator to try to find a "political solution". The UN envoys to Yemen have had little influence on the promotion of a “political solution” or even any meaningful negotiations. The first UN envoy, Jamal Benomar, resigned in frustration. He has been replaced by Ould Cheikh Ahmed of Mauritania who had been earlier the UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen and so knows the country and its many factions well. There is wide agreement in UN circles that Yemen is in a quagmire, with a free-fall of its economy, a collapse of its health services, its food imports blocked, and the country on the eve of division between north and south. The country's present form dates from 1990 when south Yemen (Aden) was more or less integrated into the north, but the country remains highly fractured on tribal, sectarian, and ideological lines, with tribal structures being the most important. In the best of worlds, one could envisage a federal Yemen with a rule of law. More realistically, we can hope that autonomous tribal areas can be created that do not fight each other actively and allow necessary food imports and medical supplies into their areas.

Saudi Arabia, which should have known better, thought that it could expand its influence in Yemen. The new King Salman with his son Mohammed as Defence Minister hoped for a quick victory, having an endless supply of modern military equipment from the USA, England and cooperation from the Gulf States. The memories of the Egyptian intervention with its heavy use of chemical weapons in the Yemen civil war of the 1960s was overlooked, both by Saudi Arabia and its close partner Egypt, although Egypt had lost some 20,000 soldiers at the time.

One generation rarely learns from the experiences of earlier generations, and both Saudi's and Egyptians had hoped to advance their interests in Yemen's political confusion. Instead, Saudi Arabian leaders have been lost, blinded by the sands of war. It is likely that the King and his son will never be trusted again. The aggression in Yemen was the first foreign policy effort of Saudi Arabia which had not been designed and directed by the USA − their first effort to walk alone. The King and his son were lost in the sands of war and will never be heard of again on the international scene, but oil revenues will continue to assure the royal court of a comfortable life style.

The Association of World Citizens has proposed a four-step approach to the resolution of the armed conflict:

1) an immediate ceasefire ending all foreign military attacks;

2) humanitarian assistance, especially for hard-to-reach zones;

3) a broad national dialogue;

4) through this dialogue the establishment of a highly decentralized federal government.

In a 17 April 2015 letter to the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the President of the Association of World Citizens wrote "It is imperative for the United Nation to be more effectively involved in ending the senseless aerial attacks and to establish a ceasefire, ensuring humanitarian and medical assistance to the people of Yemen. The critical situation is escalating and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is approaching catastrophic dimensions"

We can, alas, only repeat ourselves today.

Notes

cf. D. Schindler and J. Toman. The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Martinius Nihjoff Publishers, 1988)

*René Wadlow is President, and a representative to the United Nations (Geneva), of the Association of World Citizens.

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231 TRUMP'S DANGEOUS AND CYNICAL ATTACK ON SYRIA

Stephen Zunes*

Republished with author's permission from the Progressive, April 7, 2017, http://progressive.org/dispatches/trump’s-dangerous-and-cynical-attack-on-syria/.

Let’s not pretend that Thursday night’s U.S. missile strike on Syria’s Al Shayrat air base has anything to do with concern for the civilian victims of the regime’s apparent April 3 chemical weapons attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun.

The unilateral military action was ordered by the same President whose proposed budget would make major cuts to programs that have provided relief to Syrian refugees fleeing the violence of the regime and has tried to bar any of the refugees from entering the United States.

With no direct threat to U.S. national security and with no congressional authorization, Trump’s use of force was illegal. By contrast, when President Obama considered authorizing military action against the regime following an even deadlier sarin attack in 2013, he respected constitutional limitations on his power and—failing to receive authorization from Congress—did not do so. This provided time for the Russian-initiated agreement, backed by the United Nations, which led to the destruction of the vast majority of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal.

Trump recently blamed Syria’s chemical attack on Obama, but it was a Republican-controlled Congress, backed by public opinion, that blocked Obama from taking military action. Indeed, Trump at that time tweeted, “The President must get Congressional approval before attacking Syria—big mistake if he does not!” He also tweeted, “Stay out of Syria.” Obama’s hesitation, Trump later tweeted, “may have saved us from doing a horrible and very costly (in more ways than money) attack on Syria!”

There is little question that the Syrian regime was responsible for the atrocity in Khan Sheikhoun: As with the 2013 Syrian attack on the Damascus suburb Al-Ghouta, the target of chemical attack was a rebel-held town on a road blocking the Syrian army from advancing to consolidate areas of control. Even if a rebel group had access to chemical weapons and wanted to launch a “false flag” operation to discredit the regime and encourage U.S. intervention, it would have presumably used them somewhere with less strategic importance.

Similarly, the Russian claims that it was the bombing of a rebel warehouse storing chemical weapons which resulted in the mass casualties doesn’t make sense, given that the rebel groups controlling the town have never used chemical weapons, and the likely nerve agent involved uses a binary mixing process which makes the lethal chemical reaction that took place impossible under such circumstances.

But the United States has no right to punish Syria. Yes, there is something uniquely horrific about chemical weapons, the use of which has been banned since the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the possession of which has been illegal since the Chemical Weapons of 1993 (belatedly signed and ratified by Syria in 2013.) But since Trump came to office, nearly 1,000 civilians have been killed by U.S. airstrikes in Syria and Iraq—including up to 200 civilians in Mosul and around sixty civilians in the bombing of a mosque in al- Jena (not far from the site of the chemical weapons attack) this past month.

These deaths raise serious questions as to whether Trump's bombing of the Syrian base has anything to do with protecting civilians. Waving the flag of fighting terrorism, the United States has been bombing Syria since 2014, conducting more than 8,000 air strikes against opponents of Assad, and not only the so-called “Islamic State,” resulting in thousands of civilians casualties.

There is little reason to think that Trump’s limited strikes will make much of a difference in terms of Assad’s behavior. The Syrian government has lost more than 150,000 soldiers and militiamen and

232 countless military assets, and the damage done by the 59 Tomahawk missiles is unlikely to lead to any change in regime policy.

It would not be too cynical to assume that the decision to bomb Syrian government positions was done for political reasons: to distract from the dangerous decision earlier that day to force through the confirmation of the right-wing Judge Neil Gorsuch without the longstanding practice of requiring a three- fifths majority of the Senate, for example. This missile attack may also serve to distance the Trump administration from the Kremlin—a key supporter of the Assad regime—in the face of growing evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election. As Andy Borowitz observed, “Cruise missiles are specially designed to distract the media with pinpoint accuracy.”

The manifold war crimes of the Assad regime, including this latest atrocity, should not be denied or minimized. However, unilateral military action is illegal, unconstitutional, and almost certainly counterproductive. It must be categorically opposed.

*Stephen Zunis is a professor of politics and international studies at the University of San Francisco and coordinator of the program in Middle Eastern studies. He serves as a senior policy analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus project of the Institute for Policy Studiesc He is a leading scholar of U.S. Middle East policy and of strategic nonviolent action.

*<::::>*

EROGAN CAN CELEBRATE THE TURKISH REFERENDUM FOR NOW

Stephen Zunes*

Republished with author's permission from the Progressive, April 20, 2017, http://progressive.org/dispatches/erdogan-can-celebrate-the-turkish-referendum—for-now/.

Declaring victory in the recent plebiscite granting him extraordinary powers, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan consolidated his authoritarian rule. A new constitutional amendment abolishes the country’s parliamentary system and gives the once-weak executive almost unlimited authority. It passed in the midst of a state of emergency imposed after last year’s coup attempt.

Since the failed coup, Erdogan has jailed 45,000 political opponents, including the head of the country’s third largest party and other parliamentarians. He has fired 130,000 government workers and thousands of teachers and journalists. One hundred seventy-six media outlets have been shut down. The censorship and intimidation of opponents made a free and fair referendum virtually impossible. European Union monitors, rather understatedly, noted that the vote “took place on an unlevel playing field and the two sides of the campaign did not have equal opportunities.”

Initially, it appeared that Erdogan’s referendum was headed toward defeat. A last-minute decision by Turkey’s electoral board to accept ballots as valid without official stamps raised concerns of widespread ballot stuffing; EU monitors noted how these “late changes in counting procedures removed an important safeguard” to a credible vote tally.

In response, Erdogan claimed those questioning the results were engaging in a “Crusader mentality” and that they should “know their place.”

President Trump was virtually alone among world leaders in congratulating Erdogan on his victory. Along with recent decisions to curtail President Obama’s limited restrictions on arms transfers to Bahrain, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern dictatorships, Trump is signaling to the region that the United States is no longer even pretending to support democracy.

233

Indeed, the United States has for decades provided unconditional support for Turkish authoritarianism, including the three times during past sixty years in which the Turkish military seized power and engaged in gross and systematic human rights abuses.

Erdogan’s appeal is based on his ability, like the Republicans, to convince millions of poor and working-class voters to vote against their class interests with appeals to nationalism, traditional religious values, fear of terrorism, and attacks on liberal secular urban elites. Indeed, the electoral map from the referendum looks remarkably similar to the map of the United States after the 2016 presidential election, with the rural areas voting “yes” while the urban areas and regions with large minority populations voted “no.”

Turkey’s society is badly divided, with at least half the population opposed to the slide into authoritarianism under Erdogan. This opposition will likely get stronger.

The once-booming economy has slowed, as the United States and other Western countries have tightened credit. One out of every four young Turks are unemployed. In addition, tourism, a major contributor to the economy, has declined as Erdogan’s policies have simultaneously alienated Russians, Iranians, and Westerners.

Erdogan has reignited the war against the country’s Kurdish minority, jailing not just suspected militants, but nonviolent Kurdish leaders, including seventy mayors. His support for hard-line Islamist groups fighting the Syrian regime—like the U.S. support for Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Soviets during the 1980s—has begun to backfire as Turkey has become a target of terrorist attacks from Salafist extremists.

As a result, it is extremely likely that Turkey will find itself riven with growing popular opposition to what is widely seen as an illegitimate autocratic government led by a dangerous and unpredictable demagogue. If the United States continues its policy of supporting its NATO ally despite the growing repression, it will end up alienating yet another group of Muslim people suffering under a U.S.-backed dictatorship.

Given the burgeoning Turkish civil society movement, along with Islamist extremists and Kurdish separatists emboldened by these developments,

Turkey is likely headed for years of domestic turmoil.

The big question is whether the United States will eventually ally with the tens of millions of Turks resisting authoritarianism or if, once again, the United States will find itself on the wrong side of history.

*Stephen Zunis is a professor of politics and international studies at the University of San Francisco and coordinator of the program in Middle Eastern studies. He serves as a senior policy analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus project of the Institute for Policy Studiesc He is a leading scholar of U.S. Middle East policy and of strategic nonviolent action.

AVAVAVA

RELOCATING THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM

Alon Ben-Meir,* February 8, 2017

Attaining a major breakthrough from a potentially disastrous fallout.

Should President Trump fulfill his campaign promise to relocate the American embassy from Tel

234 Aviv to Jerusalem, it would have major regional and international repercussions. The Trump administration is currently reevaluating the implications of such a move and no final decision has been made. Given the sensitivity and far-reaching consequences, if he nevertheless decides to relocate the embassy it is critical that he concurrently takes a balancing act to prevent the potentially disastrous fallout. This could profoundly change the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the better while preserving the two- state solution.

Trump should use the occasion of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Washington on February 15th to make it clear that relocating the American Embassy to Jerusalem has a price tag: a) it cannot infringe on the prospect of a two-state solution; b) the US will recognize that East Jerusalem will be the capital of the future state of Palestine; c) the expansion of the settlements cannot continue unabated; and d) Israel must not begin the implementation of the new law that retroactively legalizes scores of illegal settlements built on private Palestinian land, which in any case the Israeli Supreme Court will more than likely overturn.

Relocating the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem unconditionally will be a de facto recognition of Jerusalem, east and west, as the capital of Israel. Since the Israeli government insists that Jerusalem is the eternal united capital of the state, the move would suggest that the United States recognizes the Israeli position.

To put things in perspective, it is necessary to first assess the fallout of such a unilateral move on the part of the Trump administration.

First, the Arab states led by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—which is the custodian of the holy Muslim shrines, the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock—will view such a move as a flagrant assault on Islam itself. Even though the Israelis will make a special provision that will allow Jordan to continue to administer its custodianship over these holy places, under no circumstances would the Arab states allow Israel to have sovereignty over Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), with the exception of the Wailing Wall (a part of the outer wall of the Second Temple).

Second, such a move will, for all intents and purposes, put an end to the prospect of peace based on a two-state solution. Indeed, for the Palestinians, the establishment of an independent state with its capital in East Jerusalem is non-negotiable. This is not merely a symbolic demand; it is a requirement which is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. No one should dismiss the potential breakout of ferocious violence between Israel and the Palestinians joined by other Arab extremist groups if the Palestinians are denied the establishment of their capital in East Jerusalem. Such violence would be incomparable to any such conflagration that we have witnessed in the past.

Third, the United States’ standing and credibility in the Middle East, which has eroded since the , would suffer another major setback in its relations with its Arab allies in the region. The US must reassert its position and lead with the support of its European and Arab partners to bring about an end to the many conflicts sweeping the region. The US cannot simply provide more openings for Russia, which is eager to capitalize on US setbacks as President Putin is poised to take full advantage of the prevailing chaotic conditions throughout the region.

Fourth, the move could have an extraordinarily adverse effect on Israel’s future as this would foreclose any prospect of an Arab-Israeli peace. The move would also embolden the right-wing Netanyahu government to annex more Palestinian territories and further expand the settlements, scuttling any prospect of peaceful Israeli-Palestinian coexistence. While the Trump move appears on the surface to help Israel realize its long-held dream, it will in fact severely undermine Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan and jeopardize their peace treaties, which is central to containing regional instability and limiting the threat against Israel’s national security.

235 Fifth, the move would further alienate the European community, which feels the most affected by continuing turmoil in the Middle East and views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a major contributor to the upsurge of extremism. They view the rise of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other extremist groups as a direct result of the Israeli occupation. For the EU, relocating the American embassy to Jerusalem is another, if not the final, nail in the coffin of a two-state solution, which would instigate increasing regional violence from which Europe will continue to suffer.

Attaining breakthrough from the potentially disastrous outcome:

Should President Trump still decide to relocate the American embassy, he can convert the prospective disastrous consequences of such a move into a historic breakthrough that could change the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and cement the prospect of peace based on a two-state solution.

Given that the US purchased land in West Jerusalem on which to build the American embassy, which has been postponed by successive American administrations, Trump can announce that the US will soon begin the building of the new embassy in the western part of the city.

In conjunction with that, Trump must reemphasize the US’ traditional support for the two-state solution and the establishment of the Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, provided that the Palestinians move quickly and steadily toward negotiating peace with Israel. The US ought to make it clear that relocating the American embassy to West Jerusalem does not constitute recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

That said, the US needs to reaffirm its position that Jerusalem must remain under any circumstances an undivided city and that the rights of every religious and ethnic group are secured. To assure the Palestinians of its intention, the US could purchase land or a building in East Jerusalem for future use for the American embassy in Palestine, because in any case there will be no Israeli-Palestinian peace unless East Jerusalem becomes the capital of the state of Palestine.

There is no doubt that the Netanyahu government would vehemently object to such a move, but due to the fact that US military and political support is indispensable for Israel, no Israeli government can ignore the US’ position. Indeed, if Trump is concerned (as I believe he is) about Israel’s national security and its future wellbeing, the only way to safeguard that is by insisting that the two-state solution remains a viable option.

life into the two-state solution; It will prompt the Palestinians to change their approach to the conflict by ending incitement and violence, as they will begin to see the prospect of establishing a Palestinian state could soon become a reality which they do not want to jeopardize; It will dramatically enhance the US’ overall positon among its Arab allies and restore its credibility as the ultimate guarantor of regional stability; It will prompt the Arab states to support the American initiative and pressure Palestinian extremists to accept the inevitable; It will strengthen the hand of Israel’s opposition parties, who will be in a better position to develop alternate policies to that of Netanyahu while weakening the hand of extremist Israelis.To be sure, President Trump can keep his promise to relocate the American embassy and at the same time, instead of torpedoing any prospect for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, inject new life into it and perhaps put an end to the most debilitating conflict since World War II.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacted at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. +UUUU+

236 ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN WOMEN MUST RAISE THE BANNER OF REVOLT

Alon Ben-Meir,* Apr 27, 2017

On the sad occasion of the fiftieth year of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, I will be writing a series of articles that will propose a number of peaceful people-to-people measures—which have been largely missing—that Israelis and Palestinians must take to bring an end to the occupation. This is the first article that addresses the critical role of Israeli and Palestinian women.

Historically, women have played a critical role in solving major violent conflicts that have lasted for years, if not decades. Although Israeli and Palestinian women have protested in the past against the occupation, it was on a small scale and their voices were drowned by the intense resistance of the powerful settlement movement. While there is a majority of Israelis and Palestinians who consistently want an end to the conflict, neither the Netanyahu government nor the Palestinian Authority have pursued policies consistent with the requirements to reach a peace agreement. It is time for Israeli and Palestinian women to raise their voices en masse and demand peace now, and be prepared to resort to any peaceful measure to that end, regardless of how taxing and long this process may be.

The role of women in ending global conflicts offers a vivid picture of how women can impact the course of events. In Northern Ireland, the organization Peace People was instrumental in increasing solidarity across sectarian divides, delegitimizing violence, and providing the momentum for peace. The group organized marches, culminating in a 10,000+ strong rally in London, and further engaged in facilitating peace in local areas. The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition ultimately gained representation in the Northern Ireland Forum (which led to the Good Friday Agreement) and provided a critical voice in the peace process.

A number of women’s organizations were active during the conflicts in the Balkans, each providing its own voice to end the conflict. The Belgrade branch of Women in Black began organizing weekly silent vigils to protest Serbian atrocities in the region and supported the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Today, they continue their work through ongoing vigils and protests, along with supporting refugees and displaced persons from the conflict, and partnering with a Kosovar women’s organization to create bridges between Serbia and Kosovo.

Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace was critical in facilitating the end of the second Liberian Civil War. Women involved with this group engaged in protests in their own communities (publicized initially by Catholic Church-owned radio stations, which later spread to other domestic and international news organization) and subsequently traveled to peace talks in Ghana, blocking all entrances and exits from the building where negotiations took place until there was a resolution.

Perhaps one of the most famous women-led peace organizations in the world is Madres de Plaza de Mayo, which was formed in 1977 by mothers of the “disappeared” during Argentina’s Dirty War. Their weekly protests prompted the civilian government starting in 1984 to investigate and prosecute those involved in the atrocities. A related organization, Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, was instrumental in the foundation of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team and the National Genetic Data Bank, which have located and identified the bodies of those disappeared, as well as their still-living children who were clandestinely and illegally adopted.

In Israel, civil society should support current efforts by groups such as Women in Black and Women Wage Peace to use their challenging power and make their voices heard. Women in Black have hosted vigils every Friday night in Jerusalem starting in 1988 to protest the Israeli occupation, and have in fact inspired a number of branches across the globe (including in Serbia, as previously mentioned).

Women Wage Peace has engaged in a number of activities, including a prominent hunger strike

237 during 2014’s Operation Protective Edge, which led to a meeting with Netanyahu and his promise that he would meet with Abbas at any time without preconditions. Other programs included country-wide screenings of Pray the Devil Back to Hell, a documentary about Liberia’s peace movement, in Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian, to foster interest in peace and demonstrate how successful such movements can be.

Whereas all of these activities were absolutely necessary, they were limited in scope and failed to engender wide-spread public support – reflecting the overall complacency of Israeli society – and force the hands of the Israeli and Palestinians governments to commit to peace rather than pay lip-service by calling for peace but taking no concrete actions to demonstrate that commitment.

There are a number of joint civic actions that should be spearheaded by Israeli and Palestinian women that could change the dynamic of the conflict in a similar way to the examples cited above. To succeed, Israeli and Palestinian women should undertake multiple activities, remain consistent, and escalate these activities should their respective governments fail to respond to their demands.

Mass protests should be organized by the tens of thousands, and they must signal their intention to follow these protests with regular weekly demonstrations, on a relatively smaller-scale. These demonstrations should take place in different parts of the country to voice their opposition to their government’s policies, and demand an immediate shift by beginning a process of reconciliation to mitigate hatred and distrust between the two sides.

Should there be no official positive response or movement from the government, this is where escalation can begin—i.e. moving toward civil disobedience provided that violence in any shape or form is prevented.

Civil disobedience should include, but is not limited to, mass crowding of public spaces (airports, city squares, malls, etc.), as the general society needs to feel the tangible effects of these protests in real time. Many of the demonstrators can expect to be arrested; they should not resist arrest but welcome it, making it impossible for the authorities to cope with hundreds if not thousands of detainees.

Sit-ins at military checkpoints on both sides will greatly hinder security personnel from processing the movement of Israelis and Palestinians from one side to the other, making it especially difficult for Palestinian laborers to work in Israel where they are needed. This not only has an impact on Palestinian laborers, but negatively impacts the Israeli industries in which they work.

Protests at the separation wall will make it all but abundantly clear that peace will not rest on separation between the two sides, but on collaboration and full cooperation on all civilian and security interactions.

Protests at the Israeli Knesset and the Palestinian Authority’s headquarters in Ramallah will send a clear message to legislators and those in a position to shape policy that the current deadlock cannot and must not continue, as there is no alternative to coexistence and peace.

Any and all symbols of the occupation need to be specifically targeted (e.g. separation wall, settlements) – possibly creating works of art on the wall that highlights the irony that Israel is in fact building a prison for itself while acting as prison guards against the Palestinians under siege.

To ensure peaceful marches, organizers should have a clear plan of action about any of the civil disobedience activity, have contingency plans on hand, and enlist volunteers to act as ‘crowd control’ to prevent any confrontation with police officers.

Israeli and Palestinian women should use their formidable power to demand an end to the conflict. They will have far greater sway than men if they join hands, go out in force, and remain consistent with

238 the message to end the occupation.

After 70 years, the tragedy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must come to an end. Israeli and Palestinian women have the power to raise the banner of peaceful revolt, and ought to use it now to bring peace to the land that both sides must inevitably share.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacted at [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. ///<>\\\

UNIVERSITY OF TERROR

Uri Avnery,* April 1, 2017

SOME DAYS ago, a man committed an act of terrorism in the center of London, a city I love.

He ran over several persons on Westminster Bridge, stabbed a policeman to death and approached the doors of Parliament, where he was shot dead. All this in the shadow of the tower of Big Ben, an irresistible photographic target.

It was an electrifying world-wide news item. Within minutes, Daesh was blamed. But then the truth came out: the terrorist was a British citizen, a Muslim convert born in England. From early youth he had committed a string of petty crimes. He had been in and out of prison several times.

So how did this individual, of all people, become a religious zealot, a Shahid – a witness to the truth of Allah, who sacrificed his life for the greatness of Islam? How had he become the perpetrator of an act that shook Europe and the world?

BEFORE TRYING to answer this mystifying question, one remark about the effectiveness of "terrorism".

As the term implies, it is a matter of spreading fear. It is a method of achieving a political end by making people afraid.

But why are people so afraid of terrorists? This has always puzzled me, even when as a boy I belonged to an organization that was labeled by our British overlords as "terrorist".

I don't know how many people died in road accidents in the United Kingdom in the same month as the Westminster killing. I surmise that the number was vastly larger. Yet people do not greatly fear road accidents. They do not refrain from walking out into the street. Dangerous drivers are not held in preventive detention.

Yet a very small number of "terrorists" suffices to create a climate of fear throughout entire countries, entire continents, even the entire globe.

Great Britain should be the last place in the world to succumb to this totally irrational fear. In 1940, this small island stood against the colossus of Nazi-conquered Europe. I remember a stirring poster that was pasted to the walls in Palestine. It showed the head of Winston Churchill with the slogan: "Alright Then, Alone!"

Could a lone terrorist with a car and a knife frighten such a country into submission?

239 To me this sounds crazy, but this is only a side remark. My purpose here is to throw light on an institution few people think about: prison.

THE WESTMINSTER terrorist attack raises a simple question: how did a petty criminal become a shahid who attracts world-wide attention?

There are many theories, many of them raised by experts vastly more competent than I. Religious experts. Cultural experts. Islamist experts. Criminologists.

My own answer is very simple: it's prison that did it.

LETS MOVE as far away from Britain and religion as possible. Let's come back to Israel and our local crime scene.

We often hear of major crimes being committed by people who started as juvenile delinquents.

How does an ordinary person become a chief of organized crime? Where does he study?

Well, in the same place as a British jihadist. Or an Israeli Muslim jihadist, for that matter.

A boy has trouble at home. Perhaps his father regularly beats up his beloved mother. Perhaps his mother is a prostitute. Perhaps he is a dumb pupil and his comrades despise him. Any one of a hundred reasons.

At 14, the boy is caught stealing. After being warned and released by the police, he steals again. He is sent to prison. In prison, the most respected criminals adopt him, perhaps even sexually. He is sent to prison again and again, and slowly he rises in the invisible prison hierarchy.

He is respected by his fellow prisoners, he has authority. Prison becomes his world, he knows the rules. He feels good.

When he is released, he returns to being a nobody. Correction personnel treat him as an object. He longs to go back to his world, the place where he is known and respected. He is not sent to prison because he has committed a crime. He commits a crime in order to be sent to prison.

So he commits a crime, more serious than all before. He becomes a crime boss himself. When he returns to prison, even the chief warder treats him as an old acquaintance.

Throughout the years, prison has acted for this person as a university, a University of Crime. It is there that he learned all the tricks of the trade, until he himself becomes a professor.

The little Muslim thief sent to prison may meet there an incarcerated Muslim preacher, who convinces him that he is not a despised criminal but one of the few selected by Allah to destroy the infidels

ALL THIS is old stuff. I am not revealing anything new. Every inmate, criminologist, senior police officer, chief prison warder or correction psychologist knows it, far better than I.

If so, how come nobody does anything about it? Why does prison function today as it did centuries ago?

I suspect the simple answer is: Nobody knows what to do instead.

240 The British once had a good answer: they sent all criminals, even petty thieves, to Australia. If they did not hang them first.

But in modern times, even these remedies were abandoned. Australia is now a strong nation, that sends hapless refugees to remote Pacific islands.

The United States, the world's foremost power, with some of the best universities, keeps millions of its citizens in prison, where they turn into hardened criminals.

Israeli prisons are bursting with inmates, many of them "terrorists" sent there without trial. This is euphemistically called "preventive detention" – an oxymoron if ever there was one.

If one asks a police officer about the logic of this entire system, he shrugs his shoulder and answers – the Jewish way – with another question: What else can you do with them?

So for year after year, century after century, society has sent its criminals to Crime University, where they learn to become better and more professional criminals. Tuition with full board, all expenses paid by the state.

And, of course, a huge army of prison personnel, policemen and women, experts and academics depend on this system for their livelihood. Everybody happy.

Prison is not only counterproductive. It is also inhuman. It turns human beings into zoo animals. (And these should be liberated, too.)

CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, I was never in prison, though I came close to it several times.

As I have recounted elsewhere, the chief of Israel's political police (sorry, I mean "security agency") once proposed to the Prime Minister to put me in "administrative detention", without involving a judge, as a foreign spy. This was only prevented by Menachem Begin, the leader of the opposition, who refused his assent.

Another time was after my meeting with Yasser Arafat during the siege of Beirut, when the government officially requested the attorney general to investigate me for treason. The attorney, a nice person, decided I had committed no crime. I did not illegally cross any border, since I was invited to occupied East Beirut by the Israeli army as a newspaper editor. Also, there was no suspicion that I had the intention of harming the security of the state.

So I have no personal experience of prison so far. But the absurdity of the entire situation has occupied my mind for many years. I made several speeches about it in the Knesset.

To no avail. No one knows of an alternative.

My late wife, Rachel, was a teacher. She always refused to move up from the second grade (age 8). She maintained that at that age the character of a human being is already fully formed. After that, nothing can be done.

If so, perhaps all efforts should be concentrated on a very early age.

I am sure that somewhere experiments with other answers are being carried out. Perhaps in Scandinavia. Or on the island of Fiji.

Isn’t it about time?

241

*Uri Avnery is a former Israeli war hero and member of parliament, and a long time leader of the Israeli peace movement. AVAVAVA

PERHAPS THE MESSIAH WILL COME

Uri Avnery,* March 11, 2017

IF SOMEONE had told me 50 years ago that the rulers of Israel, Jordan and Egypt had met in secret to make peace, I would have thought that I was dreaming.

If I had been told that the leaders of Egypt and Jordan had offered Israel complete peace in return for leaving the occupied territories, with some exchanges of territory and a token return of refugees, I would have thought that the Messiah had come. I would have started to believe in God or Allah or whoever there is up there.

Yet a few weeks ago it was disclosed that the rulers of Egypt and Jordan had indeed met in secret last year with the Prime Minister of Israel in Aqaba, the pleasant sea resort where the three states touch each other. The two Arab leaders, acting de facto for the entire Arab world, had made this offer. Benyamin Netanyahu gave no answer and went home.

So did the Messiah.

DONALD TRUMP, the comedian-in-chief of the US, some time ago gave his answer to the question about the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Two-states, one-state, whatever the two sides agree on, he answered.

He could just as well have answered: "Two-states, one-state, three-states, four-states, take your pick!"

And indeed, if you live in la-la-land, there is no limit to the number of states. Ten states is as good as one state. The more the merrier.

Perhaps it needed a total innocent like Trump to illustrate how much nonsense can be talked about that choice.

ON THE fifth day of the Six-day war, I published an open letter to the Prime Minister, Levy Eshkol, urging him to offer the Palestinians the opportunity to set up a state of their own in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Immediately after the war, Eshkol invited me for a private conversation. He listened patiently while I explained to him the idea. At the end he said, with a benevolent smile: "Uri, what kind of a merchant are you? A good merchant starts by demanding the maximum and offering the minimum. Then one haggles, and in the end a compromise is reached somewhere in the middle."

"True," I answered, "if one wants to sell a used car. But here we want to change history!"

The fact is that at the time, nobody believed that Israel would be allowed to keep the territories. It is said that generals always fight the last war. The same is true for statesmen. On the day after the six-day war, Israeli leaders called to mind the day after the 1956 war, when the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Soviet President Nikolai Bulganin compelled David Ben-Gurion to give back all the occupied territory

242 ignominiously.

So there seemed to be only one choice: to give the territories back to King Hussein of Jordan, as the great majority advocated, or to give them to the Palestinian people, as my friends and I, a tiny minority, suggested.

I remember another conversation. The Minister of Trade and Industry, Haim Zadok, a very clever lawyer, made a fiery speech in the Knesset. When he came out of the plenum, I admonished him: "But you don't believe a single world you just said!" To which he replied, laughingly, "Anybody can make a good speech about things he believes in. The art is to make a good speech about things you don't believe in!"

Then he added seriously: "If they compel us to give back all the territories, we shall give back all the territories. If they compel us to give back part of the territories, we shall give back part of the territories. If they don't compel us to give back anything, we shall keep everything."

The incredible happened. President Lyndon Johnson and the entire world did not give a damn. We were left with the entire loot, to this very day.

I CANNOT resist the temptation to repeat again an old joke:

Right after the foundation of the State of Israel, God appeared to David Ben-Gurion and told him: "You have done good by my people. Utter a wish and I shall grant it".

"I wish that Israel shall be a Jewish and a democratic state and encompass all the country between the Mediterranean and the Jordan," Ben-Gurion replied.

"That is too much even for me!" God exclaimed. "But I will grant you two of the three." Since then we can choose between a Jewish and democratic Israel in a part of the country, a democratic state in all of the country that will not be Jewish or a Jewish state in all of the country that will not be democratic.

That is the choice we still face, after all this time.

The Jewish state in all of the country means apartheid. Israel always maintained cordial relations with the racist Afrikaner state in South Africa, until it collapsed. Creating such a state here is sheer lunacy.

The annexationists have a trick up their sleeve: to annex the West Bank, but not the Gaza Strip. This would create a state with only a 40% Palestinian minority. In such a country there would rage a perpetual intifada.

But in reality, even this is a pipe dream. Gaza cannot be separated forever from Palestine. It has been part of the country since time immemorial. It would have to be annexed, too. This would create a state with a slight Arab majority, a majority bereft of national and civil rights. This majority would grow rapidly.

Such a situation would be untenable in the long run. Israel would be compelled to give the vote to the Arabs.

Utopian idealists would welcome such a solution. How wonderful! The One-state solution! Democracy, equality, the end of nationalism. When I was very young, I too hoped for this solution. Life has cured me. Anyone actually living in the country knows that this is totally impossible. The two nations would fight each other. At least for the first one or two hundred years.

I have never seen a detailed plan of how such a state would function. Except once: Vladimir

243 Jabotinsky, the brilliant leader of the Zionist far-right, wrote such a plan for the Allies in 1940. If the President of the state will be Jewish, he decreed, the Prime Minister will be Arab. And so on. Jabotinsky died a few months later, along with his plan.

Zionists came here to live in a Jewish state. That was their dominant motive. They cannot even imagine an existence as another Jewish minority. In such a situation, they would slowly emigrate, as the Afrikaners do. Indeed, such an emigration to the US and Germany is already happening under the radar. Zionism has always been a one-way street – towards Palestine. After this "solution", it would go the other way.

TRUTH IS that there is no choice at all.

The only real solution is the much-maligned "Two States for Two peoples", the one declared dead many times. It's either that solution or the destruction of both peoples.

So how do Israelis face this reality? They face it the Israeli way: by not facing the reality. They just go on living, day by day, hoping that the problem will just go away.

Perhaps the Messiah will come after all.

*Uri Avnery is a former Israeli war hero and member of parliament, and a long time leader of the Israeli peace movement. “”|””

THE GREAT RIFT

Uri Avnery,* February 25, 2017

I BELIEVE I was the first to recommend that the soldier Elor Azaria, the killer of Hebron, be granted a pardon.

But this recommendation was conditional on several requirements: first, that the soldier openly and unconditionally confess his crime, that he apologize and that he be sentenced to many years in prison.

Without these conditions, any request for a pardon by the soldier would mean an approval of his act and an invitation for more war crimes.

Sergeant Azaria, a medic in a combat unit, appeared on the scene after an incident in the center of the Jewish enclave in the ancient town of Hebron. Two young Palestinians had attacked an army control point with knives and been shot. We don't know how the first one died, but the second was filmed by a camera provided to the locals by the wonderful Israeli anti-occupation organization B'Tselem.

The camera shows the assailant lying on the ground, heavily wounded, motionless and bleeding. Then, some 12 minutes later, Azaria, who had not been present, appears on the screen. He stands less than a meter from the wounded Arab and shoots him point-blank in the head, killing him outright.

The photographic evidence, made public at once on Israeli TV (a fact not to be forgotten), left the army no choice. Killing a helpless enemy is a crime in any civilized military. Azaria was accused of manslaughter – not murder.

All over the right wing, he at once became a national hero. Politicians, including Binyamin Netanyahu and the present Minister of Defense, Avigdor Lieberman, hastened to adopt him.

244

Azaria was found guilty. In a sharply worded judgment, the military court stated that his testimony consisted of sheer lies.

The judgment aroused a storm of protest all over the right wing. The court was cursed and became the real accused. Facing this storm, the court buckled and this week sentenced Azaria to a ridiculous prison term of 18 months, the usual penalty for an Arab juvenile stone-thrower who has not hit anybody.

Azaria has not apologized. Far from it.

Instead, he, his family and his admirers stood up in the courtroom and broke into the national anthem.

THIS COURTROOM scene became the picture of the day. It was clearly a demonstration against the military court, against the high command of the Israeli army and against the entire democratic structure of the state.

But for me it was much, much more.

It was the Declaration of Independence of another Israeli people. It was the breaking up of Israeli society into two parts, the tensions between which have been growing more acute from year to year.

The two parts have less and less in common. They have entirely different attitudes toward the state, its moral foundations, its ideology, its structure. But until now, it was accepted that at least one almost sacred institution stood above the fray, beyond any controversy: the Israeli army.

The Azaria affair demonstrates that this last bond of unity has now been broken.

WHO ARE these camps? What is the most profound element of this division?

There is no way around it: it is the ethnic factor.

Everybody tries to evade this fact. Mountains of euphemism have been erected to hide it. Everybody is fearful, even frightened, of the consequence of it. Hypocrisy is an essential defense mechanism.

There are now two Jewish-Israeli peoples. They dislike each other intensely.

One is called Ashkenazi, a derivative of an old Hebrew term for Germany. It encompasses all Israelis of European and American origin, who adhere or pretend to adhere to Western values.

The other is called Mizrahi ("eastern"), They used to be called - erroneously - Sephardim ("Spaniards"), but only a small fraction of them are actually the descendants of the Jews expelled from Spain some 700 years ago. The great majority of these expellees chose to go to Muslim countries, instead of Europe. The Mizrahi community encompasses all the Israelis whose families came from countries extending from Morocco to Iran.

Historically, Jews were often mistreated in Europe, and rarely so in Islamic countries. But Ashkenazim are proud of their European heritage, while in fact growing more and more estranged from it, while for the Mizrahim there is no greater insult than comparing them to Arabs.

245 How did the rift start? The Zionist movement was created mainly by Ashkenazim, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the world's Jews before the Holocaust. Naturally, they were also the main contributors to the new Zionist community in Palestine, though there were also some outstanding Mizrahi figures.

The deep division started right after the 1948 war. As I have often mentioned, I was one of the first who saw it coming. As a squad-leader in the war, I commanded a group of volunteers from Morocco and other Mediterranean countries (who, by the way, saved my life when I was wounded). I witnessed the beginning of the split and warned the country in a series of articles, dating from 1949.

Who was to blame? Both sides. But since the Ashkenazim controlled all aspects of life, their share of the guilt is surely larger.

Coming from two great but very different civilizations, it was perhaps inevitable for the two communities to differ on many aspects of life. But at the time everybody was befuddled by the Zionist world of myths, and nothing was done to avoid the disaster.

Nowadays, the Mizrahim see themselves as "the people", the real (Jewish) Israelis, despising the Ashkenazim as the "elites". They also believe that they are the great majority.

This is quite wrong. It is more or less an even split, with Russian immigrants, ultra-orthodox Jews and Arab citizens constituting separate entities.

An intriguing question concerns intermarriages. There are a lot, and once I believed that they would automatically heal the rift. That did not happen. Rather, every pair joins one or other of the two communities.

The lines are not drawn clearly. There are many Mizrahi professors, medical doctors, architects and artists who have joined the "elites" and feel part of them. There are many Ashkenazi politicians (especially in the Likud) who behave as if they belonged to "the people", hoping to attract votes.

The Likud ("unification") party is a phenomenon by itself. The preponderant mass of its members and voters are Mizrahim. Indeed, it is the Mizrahi party per excellence. But almost all its leaders are Ashkenazim. Netanyahu pretends to be both.

BACK TO Azaria.

Public opinion polls tell us that for the large majority of Mizrahim, killing a seriously wounded "terrorist" is the right thing to do. After the singing in court, his father kissed him and cried out: "You are a hero!" For many Ashkenazim, it was a despicably cowardly act.

One casualty of the affair is the Chief-of-Staff, Gadi Eizenkot. Until recently, he was the most popular person in the country. Now he is cursed by the Mizrahim as a contemptible lackey of the Ashkenazi "elites". Yet, in spite of his German-sounding name, Eizenkot is of Moroccan descent.

(A personal note. In the 1948 war, I saw with my own eyes many acts of real heroism: soldiers who sacrificed their lives to save a comrade or who fought on in desperate situations. I remember the deed of Natan Elbaz, a full-fledged Mizrahi, who threw himself on an activated hand-grenade to save the lives of his comrades. I feel insulted when a soldier is crowned with this title after cold-bloodedly shooting a wounded enemy.)

For more than 40 years now, the army has not fought a real war against a real military. It has deteriorated into a colonial police force, the instrument of a system of oppression of another people. In

246 the performance of this role, many acts of brutality are committed every day.

Quite recently, an innocent Arab teacher, a Bedouin citizen of Israel, got involved by accident in an incident, when policemen clashed with the local population. They shot the teacher, in the erroneous belief that he was about to run them over.

The man was severely wounded and bleeding, with policemen all around him. They did not call the medics. He slowly bled to death. It took 20 minutes.

Only a soldier of the highest human quality, who grew up in a sound human family, can withstand this brutalizing effect. Fortunately, there are many.

I BELIEVE that it is there that the solution lies. We must get rid of the occupation, by all available means, the quicker the better.

Every true friend of Israel around the world must help.

Only then can we devote our mental and social resources to mending the Great Rift and become the people many of us would like to be.

And sing our national anthem with a clear conscience.

*UriAvnery is a former Israeli war hero and member of parliament, and a lonmg time leader of the Israeli peace movement. ***^***

THE BIPARTISAN EFFORT AGAINST CAMPAIGNS FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

Stephen Zunes*

Republished with author's permission form the Progressive, March 22, 2017, http://progressive.org/dispatches/the-bipartisan-effort-against-campaigns-for-corporate-respon/.

The Trump Administration’s efforts to legitimize the Israeli occupation and illegal settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories has received surprising bipartisan support. A series of bills passed or under consideration in Washington and in state capitols seeks to punish companies, religious denominations, academic associations, and other entities which support the use of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) to challenge the occupation of Palestinian land.

Some elements of the BDS movement have been criticized for not distinguishing between Israel, a recognized nation-state, and territories seized by Israeli forces in the June 1967 war, which remain under foreign belligerent occupation. For example, while most of the BDS efforts on college campuses and within religious denominations have focused primarily on U.S.-based companies which directly support Israel’s repressive occupation and colonization efforts in the West Bank, the formal BDS call by Palestinian civil society groups also supports academic, commercial and other forms of boycotts and sanctions of Israel itself.

However, a number of the recent anti-BDS legislative initiatives in the United States, have also failed to distinguish between the two by legally defining Israel as including the occupied territories and illegal settlements.

Claiming the BDS campaign is “anti-Semitic in nature and seeks to destroy Israel,” the 2016 Republican platform calls for the passage of “effective legislation to thwart actions that are intended to

247 limit commercial relations with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories.” [emphasis added]

At the state level, bipartisan legislative majorities, with the support of their governors, have heeded that call. Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Iowa, Georgia, Arizona, Florida, and Indiana have all enacted laws between 2015 and 2017 making it illegal for their respective states to contract with or invest state pension funds in any company which refuses to do business with illegal Israeli settlements or businesses based in these settlements, even if the company produces and sells products in Israel itself.

Some of these laws also prohibit the state from contracting with any nongovernmental group, including churches and other nonprofits, which promote a boycott of companies involved in territories controlled by Israel. For example, a homeless shelter run by a Presbyterian or Congregationalist church would now be ineligible for state funding because these denominations have divested from four or five companies directly supporting the Israeli occupation.

There are a number of states where such legislation is in progress, such as New York, where the State Senate recently passed a bill making it impossible for the state contract with or invest in any company or nongovernmental entity, organization or group which engages in or promotes a boycott of any company involved in territories controlled by any “allied nation.” (Governments not allied with the United States are exempt, therefore it does not impact U.S. boycotts and sanctions against Russia for its occupation of Crimea.) New York Governor Andrew Cuomo also issued the first-ever executive order forcing state agencies to divest from any organizations aligned with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement.

In Montana, a bill was recently pushed through the State House which would bar public agencies— including counties, cities and towns—from doing businesses with companies that don't agree to certify in writing that they are not engaged in a boycott of Israel or its illegal settlements. As with a number of other cases, the bill’s chief sponsor has claimed that such legislation targeting those opposed to the Israeli occupation and settlements is a necessary response to the recent rise of bomb threats and other anti- Semitic activity by neo-Nazis.

Some states have gone even further, seeking to suppress student advocacy against the occupation and settlements. On March 8, the New York State Senate, with broad bipartisan support, passed a bill that would prohibit any state university from funding any student organization which directly or indirectly promotes boycotts or divestment against companies operating in “territories controlled by an allied nation.” According to the legislation, any campaign to persuade university endowments to divest from stockholdings in companies supporting the Israeli occupation and settlements “seeks to advance anti- Semitic, anti-freedom and anti-capitalist principles.”

Given the likelihood of lawsuits challenging such legislation on First Amendment grounds, the U.S. Senate is working on bipartisan legislation that would indemnify state and local governments seeking to punish any entities which attempt to “limit commercial relations” with those doing business in “Israeli- controlled territories” for the purposes of influencing Israeli government policy. The bill currently has 31 co-sponsors, including eleven Democrats.

Similarly, as part of an effort to stifle student activism against the occupation, the Senate in December passed a bill by unanimous consent that would have required the Department of Education to pressure colleges and universities to suppress BDS activism under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by including such “anti-Israel conduct” as a form of “anti-Semitism.” Chief sponsor Bob Casey (D-PA) justified the bill, which never passed the House, as a response to growing anti-Semitic attacks.

The purpose of such legislation is pretty clear. Given that the U.S. government no longer even pretends to oppose the Israeli occupation and colonization of Palestinian territories, a bipartisan effort has

248 emerged to suppress student activists, churches, socially-conscious companies, and anyone else organizing against it.

Such legislation would be problematic on free speech grounds even if it did only apply to BDS actions against Israel. However, the fact that many of these efforts also target those who simply oppose the occupation—including many self-described Zionists and other supporters of Israel—is indicative of a broader crackdown against civil society campaigns supporting corporate responsibility, international law, and human rights. In one sense, this suppression of civil liberties is not surprising under the Trump Administration. However, the fact that this has such broad Democratic support shows that the problem goes much deeper. ***^^^^***

PALESTINE'S NELSON MANDELA

Uri Avnery,* April 22, 2017

I AVE a confession to make: I like Marwan Barghouti.

I have visited him at his modest Ramallah home several times. During our conversations, we discussed Israeli-Palestinian peace. Our ideas were the same: to create the State of Palestine next to the State of Israel, and to establish peace between the two states, based on the 1967 lines (with minor adjustments), with open borders and cooperation.

This was not a secret agreement: Barghouti has repeated this proposal many times, both in prison and outside.

I also like his wife, Fadwa, who was educated as a lawyer but devotes her time to fight for the release of her husband. At the crowded funeral of Yasser Arafat, I happened to stand next to her and saw her tear-streaked face.

This week, Barghouti, together with about a thousand other Palestinian prisoners in Israel, started an unlimited hunger strike. I have just signed a petition for his release.

MARWAN BARGHOUTI is a born leader. In spite of his small physical stature, he stands out in any gathering. Within the Fatah movement he became the leader of the youth division. (The word "Fatah" is the initials of "Palestinian Liberation Movement, in reverse),

The Barghoutis are a widespread clan, dominating several villages near Ramallah. Marwan himself was born in 1959 in Kobar village. An ancestor, Abd-al-Jabir al-Barghouti, led an Arab revolt in 1834. I have met Mustafa Barghouti, an activist for democracy, in many demonstrations and shared the tear gas with him. Omar Barghouti is a leader of the international anti-Israel boycott movemen.

Perhaps my sympathy for Marwan is influenced by some similarities in our youth. He joined the Palestinian resistance movement at the age of 15, the same age as I was when I joined the Hebrew underground some 35 years earlier. My friends and I considered ourselves freedom fighters, but were branded by the British authorities as "terrorists". The same has now happened to Marwan – a freedom fighter in his own eyes and in the eyes of the vast majority of the Palestinian people, a "terrorist" in the eyes of the Israeli authorities.

When he was put on trial in the Tel Aviv District Court, my friends and I, members of the Israeli peace movement Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc), tried to demonstrate our solidarity with him in the courtroom. We were expelled by armed guards. One of my friends lost a toenail in this glorious fight.

YEARS AGO I called Barghouti the "Palestinian Mandela". Despite their difference in height and skin color, there was a basic similarity between the two: both were men of peace, but justified the use of violence against their oppressors. However, while the Apartheid regime was satisfied with one life term,

249 Barghouti was sentenced to a ridiculous five life terms and another 40 years – for acts of violence executed by his Tanzim organization.

(Gush Shalom published a statement this week suggesting that by the same logic, Menachem Begin should have been sentenced by the British to 91 life terms for the bombing of the King David hotel, in which 91 people – many of them Jews – lost their lives.)

There is another similarity between Mandela and Barghouti: when the apartheid regime was destroyed by a combination of "terrorism", violent strikes and a world-wide boycott, Mandela emerged as the natural leader of the new South Africa. Many people expect that when a Palestinian state is set up, Barghouti will become its president, after Mahmoud Abbas.

There is something in his personality that inspires confidence, turning him into the natural arbiter of internal conflicts. Hamas people, who are the opponents of Fatah, are inclined to listen to Marwan. He is the ideal conciliator between the two movements.

Some years ago, under the leadership of Marwan, a large number of prisoners belonging to the two organizations signed a joint appeal for national unity, setting out concrete terms. Nothing came of this.

That, by the way, may be an additional reason for the Israeli government’s rejection of any suggestion of freeing Barghouti, even when a prisoner exchange provided a convenient opportunity. A free Barghouti could become a powerful agent for Palestinian unity, the last thing the Israeli overlords want.

Divide et impera – "divide and rule" – since Roman times this has been a guiding principle of every regime that suppresses another people. In this the Israeli authorities have been incredibly successful. Political geography provided an ideal setting: The West Bank (of the Jordan river) is cut off from the Gaza Strip by some 50 km of Israeli territory.

Hamas got hold of the Gaza Strip by elections and violence, and refuses to accept the leadership of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), a union of the more secular organizations which rules the West Bank.

This is not an unusual situation in national liberation organizations. They often split into more and less extreme wings, to the great delight of the oppressor. The last thing the Israeli authorities are willing to do is release Barghouti and allow him to restore Palestinian national unity. God forbid.

THE HUNGER strikers do not demand their own release, but demand better prison conditions. They demand, inter alia, more frequent and longer visits by wives and family, an end to torture, decent food, and such. They also remind us that under international law an "occupying power" is forbidden to move prisoners from an occupied territory to the home country of the occupier. Exactly this happens to almost all Palestinian "security prisoners".

Last week Barghouti set out these demands in an op-ed article published by the New York Times, an act that shows the newspaper's better side. The editorial note described the author as a Palestinian politician and Member of Parliament. It was a courageous act by the paper (which somewhat restored its standing in my eyes after it condemned Bashar al-Assad for using poison gas, without a sliver of evidence.)

But courage has its limits. The very next day the NYT published an editor's note stating that Barghouti was convicted for murder. It was an abject surrender to Zionist pressure.

The man who claimed this victory was an individual I find particularly obnoxious. He calls himself Michael Oren and is now a deputy minister in Israel, but he was born in the USA and belongs to the subgroup of American Jews who are super-super-patriots of Israel. He adopted Israeli citizenship and an Israeli name in order to serve as Israel's ambassador to the USA. In this capacity he attracted attention by using particularly virulent anti-Arab rhetoric, so extreme as to make even Binyamin Netanyahu look moderate.

250 I doubt that this person has ever sacrificed anything for his patriotism, indeed, he has made quite a career of it. Yet he speaks with contempt about Barghouti, who has spent much of his life in prison and exile. He describes Barghouti’s article in the New York Times as a "journalistic terror act". Look who's talking.

A HUNGER STRIKE is a very courageous act. It is the last weapon of the least protected people on earth – the prisoners. The abominable Margaret Thatcher let the Irish hunger strikers starve to death.

The Israeli authorities wanted to force-feed Palestinian hunger strikers. The Israeli Physicians Association, much to its credit, refused to cooperate, since such acts have led in the past to the deaths of the victims. That put an end to this kind of torture.

Barghouti demands that Palestinian political prisoners be treated as prisoners-of-war. No chance of that.

However, one should demand that prisoners of any kind be treated humanely. This means that deprivation of liberty is the only punishment imposed, and that within the prisons the maximum of decent conditions should be accorded.

In some Israeli prisons, a kind of modus vivendi between the prison authorities and the Palestinian prisoners seems to have been established. Not so in others. One gets the impression that the prison service is the enemy of the prisoners, making their life as miserable as possible. This has worsened now, in response to the strike.

This policy is cruel, illegal and counter-productive. There is no way to win against a hunger-strike. The prisoners are bound to win, especially when decent people all over the world are watching. Perhaps even the NYT.

I am waiting for the day when I can visit Marwan again as a free man in his home in Ramallah. Even more so if Ramallah is, by that time, a town in the free State of Palestine.

*Uri Avnery is a former Israeli war hero, member of parliament and long time leader of the Israeli peace movement. ^^^^^^^

PRESIDENT TRUMP'S MORAL HARM

Sam Ben-Meir,* January 9, 2017

During President Trump’s first full week in office he has begun to dismantle America’s moral standing on the international stage. From his reconsideration of CIA ‘black sites’ to his insistence on vast voter fraud, to his inhumane ban on immigration from Muslim countries, Trump seems to be intent on normalizing discredited policies, adhering to blatant falsehoods, and waging an assault on human dignity.

To those who say ‘it can't happen here’ – generally the same ones who said Trump can never become president – to them I say: it is happening here. We must guard against attempts to undermine the rule of law and our commitment to welcoming immigrants; we must not allow facts to be rewritten to support the administration’s chosen narrative. The only way to avoid compromising our fundamental principles is not to say it cannot happen here, but rather to actively and zealously defend them.

Trump is an authoritarian who has already begun to ride roughshod over the freedom of the press - as we saw with the arrest of journalists who were covering the protests. Trump is successfully stoking the flames of a false populism based on discrimination, anti-immigration and a flamboyant disregard for truth and decency. The denial of anthropogenic climate change, for example, is part of Trump's overall contempt for opinions or conclusions that, however well substantiated, do not agree with his nostalgic and dangerous agenda for this country.

251

Trump's epistemology, if we may call it that, reduces knowledge to perspective, a condition where everything is open to creative redescription. If we can propose alternative facts to the inauguration turnout, why need we stop there? Can we propose alternative facts to any objective description of reality? Perhaps a white supremacist would like to pose alternative facts to the history of American slavery. Are there alternative facts to the Holocaust waiting to be discovered? To truly defeat Trumpism, it will require among other things, reinvigorating our commitment to things like truth, justification, objective evidence, and warrant.

The banning of refugees is a cruel and inhumane policy: it is an attack on human dignity. It is un- American, it is also un-Christian and un-Jewish. The most basic moral tenet of both Christianity and Judaism is the injunction to love thy neighbor. Jesus' story of the Good Samaritan is especially timely now because when we understand the story in context we see that to love thy neighbor really means to love your enemy (the Samaritans and Jews hated each other). I am not suggesting that we should open our borders to professed enemies – I’m saying that we must either be a nation that protects and nourishes dignity, righteousness, and justice, or we must steadily sink into a new era of brutal policies – and on the other side of that lies a dark and perilous unknown.

Not only is the ban illegal, heavy handed, and grossly immoral, it is also self defeating and lacks any logic whatsoever: forbidding entry from countries that have not harmed an American here in forty years – including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria – while exempting countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which was the country of origin of most of the 9/11 terrorists. Nor should we overlook the fact that Trump has exempted countries where he happens to do business.

This ban is positively harmful to America, while at the same time revealing a depressing lack of psychological insight. It is characteristic of a narrow-minded and authoritarian personality. In the end, Trump's ban will likely make us more enemies than it succeeds in protecting us from. It is as if he is going out of his way to generate Muslim outrage at American bigotry and cowardice.

For the ban is, indeed, a profound act of cowardice. It is certainly possible that a refugee may commit some violent crime in the US – we shouldn't suppose they're angels – but the question is do we want to allow that fear to override our basic commitment to do what is right not only ethically, but also in terms of our long-term interests as a nation.

Our long-term interests do not prescribe discrimination against people based on faith; our long- term interest does not prescribe turning our backs on those who have worked alongside American soldiers every step of the way; it does not prescribe turning away the best minds and promising talents because we've adopted inane views about their religion.

Our institutions are still stable and they will continue to be so through the next four years – but that requires vigilance, resistance, and sometimes defiance. Fortunately, the majority of Americans are opposed to Trump's morally corrupt and craven immigration policy. Fortunately, mayors across the country are reaffirming their cities as sanctuaries, where all of its people will be protected from deportation.

Although Trump has already succeeded in creating a degree of havoc all around the globe, what we need to begin to prepare for is the moment this president is truly tested. We cannot afford to let his administration play fast and loose with objective facts, to dismiss serious findings because they do not suit the president’s outsized ego. When Trump doubles down on a patent falsehood, he is actually debasing the most valuable currency we possess, namely truth. The president has already inflicted significant moral harm through his rejection of basic manners and decency, his devaluation of objective inquiry, his readiness to fan the flames of resentment, and his disregard of the plight of millions of refugees, for whose dire condition America is at least partially responsible.

252 We need to continue to resist by every means at our disposal, lest he drag this country into the moral gutter.

*Dr. Sam Ben-Meir teaches philosophy at Eastern International College. His current research focuses on environmental and business ethics. He may be contace at: [email protected], www.alonben- meir.com. +=<*>=+

AMERICA'S WEIMAR MOMENT

Sam Ben-Meir,* December 22, 2016

This month commemorates seventy-five years since the attack on Pearl Harbor by the forces of Imperial Japan - an attack in which 2,403 Americans were killed and directly led to the United States' entry into World War II. By December 11th, the United States was officially at war with Japan, as well as Germany and Italy. The war lasted four years, and by the end over four hundred thousand Americans were killed - approximately sixty million people worldwide.

It is perhaps not an exaggeration at all to say that we are perceptibly succumbing – in word if not in deed – to the same ugly reactionary forces that brought on that war: fascism, the politics of racial superiority, anti-Semitism, and militarism. The so-called alt-right, a still relatively small but growing white nationalist movement, is slowly creeping into the mainstream of American politics. In fact, given that it has a line to the White House (through the president-elect’s appointment of Steve Bannon as Chief Strategist) we can expect that it will continue to gain followers in this country.

The alt-right movement is precisely a betrayal of everything Americans fought and died for in World War II. When their spokesmen quote Nazi propaganda with approval -- when they shout ‘hail victory’ (the English translation of Sieg Heil) -- US citizens disgrace America; they disgrace our national history and the blood we spilled fighting and defeating fascism.

The worst mistake we can make is to treat the alt-right as a movement embodying opinions: already, we have begun to see a decided shift towards the acceptance of white nationalist and separatist ideology as simply one more position alongside others on the political spectrum. But the alt-right is not just one more point of view: we cannot afford to dignify it by merely agreeing to disagree. While it would like to be regarded as a movement of ideas, its momentum is emerging not from opinions or ideas at all, but insecurity and resentment.

The alt-right has given new vitality to white supremacism, which is not an idea but a racist ideology, and thus cannot simply be treated with counter-arguments. Once it is regarded as a political position -- to be countered with rational argument -- it has already implicitly been accorded a rational status. The white supremacist does not simply have an incorrect, distorted view of reality - he has a distorted view of himself. He has not fallen prey to bad science; he has not simply embraced positions that happen to be wrong, because what he defines as a position is a façade -- a front, not only to the public, but even more so, to himself. The white supremacist is not in the grip of merely false beliefs, but illusions – beliefs that are allowed to operate because they are self-gratifying. Sometimes illusions may be harmless. Illusions about race are not – they are inherently violent: that the white race is the source of all creative value in the world, at once satisfies a deep-seated wish for racial superiority, and provides the justification for the exclusion and outright discrimination against non-whites and minorities.

If racially motivated extremists have not received explicit or direct support from Trump himself, they have undoubtedly benefited from the widening spread of Trumpism, which continues to embolden their movement. Trumpism -- we might say -- is the victory of a certain epistemology; it is the view that knowledge is reducible to perception. It has no use for anything like the disinterested pursuit of truth –

253 which has become no more than whatever belief happens to be expedient and best serve one’s self- interest.

In its contempt for things like evidence, justification and warrant, Trumpism has created a social condition in which virtually all the normal constraints on public speech and discourse no longer apply. The problem is that when anything can be said, we must invariably find ourselves in the predicament that nothing can be said; because if we do not recognize any non-formal unwritten rules about what can be said, we lose the background assumptions without which public discourse ceases to have any meaning at all.

It is perhaps sad to say, but nonetheless true, that liberals helped to create the conditions in which Trumpism could flourish. As the French philosopher Alain Badiou put it, the truth is “indifferent to difference” and in its essence universal in nature – it is not impressed by ethnicity, nationality, or race: truth is “the same for all.” This basic principal is what many liberals and multiculturalists ultimately refused to acknowledge; and it is coming back to haunt them. Over the past two decades, much of the political sphere has been reduced to respecting personal identity – and, consequently, identity politics has been co- opted by white nationalists, as was inevitable. Now, political correctness is dead in the water: its phoniness and patronizing racist underpinnings, as well as its artificially imposed rules, did little to address the causes of racism; but may have actually undermined genuine social solidarity.

Of course, we cannot entirely blame multiculturalism and liberal relativism for the emergence of white identity politics. America is experiencing something like a Weimar-moment, the liberal-democratic Germany that governed during the inter-war years, and was ultimately overcome and destroyed by the forces of fascism which geminated and was allowed to grow to infect the civil and political society within its borders. Unlike the United States perhaps, the Weimar Republic was weak: every political party -- no matter how anti-republican -- was allowed to compete for governmental power. Weimar was unable to clearly distinguish friend from enemy.

Today, as the race-fueled, far-right wing continues to usurp ever more political space, we are facing a very real, and very similar danger: that the extreme right will gradually infect and erode the body politic. We cannot avoid this if we allow the alt-right and its, albeit, ill-defined program to become “respectable”. With the permissibility and increasing prevalence of proto-fascist rhetoric, the extreme right is undergoing a pubic relations makeover; their leaders are making an effort to don a “human” face, appearing to normalize their agenda and broaden their growing appeal. At this moment in time, we must remain extremely vigilant: while our democratic institutions are not in immanent danger, the mixture of racial politics and the president-elect’s right-wing authoritarianism is potentially disastrous. If a geo- political or economic crisis should occur will we meet it with our moral awareness in tact, our sense of justice, and committed to fundamental democratic principles? Ultimately, this will depend on recognizing that the political problem of today is increasingly the problem of ‘love thy neighbor.’

The white-nationalists want us to believe that Muslims, Mexicans, and immigrants are not our neighbors: that Jews are not our neighbors – anyone not like them is not our neighbor. Unremittingly, however, what they have forgotten is that the neighbor does not necessarily accommodate our a priori assumptions about what they should look like, or wear, or what language they speak. As the great German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who in 1945 was hanged by the Gestapo, once wrote: “Neighborliness is not a quality in other people, it is simply their claim on our selves…We have literally no time to sit down and ask ourselves whether so-and-so is our neighbor or not.”

When we see the rise of nationalism in the United States and Europe, Russia and East Asia, and we are witness to the refugee crisis sweeping across the Middle East, Bonhoeffer’s observation that we have not the luxury of time could not be timelier.

*Dr. Sam Ben-Meir teaches philosophy at Eastern International College. His current research focuses on

254 environmental and business ethics. He may be contacrted at: [email protected], www.alonben- meir.com. <><><><><>

WHAT WE READERS ARE ABOUT?

Please share with us what you are doing relating to nonviolent change. If you send us a short report of your doings, learnings, ideas, concerns, reactions, queries,... we will print them here. Responses can be published in the next issue.

Steve Sachs: It is good to see the strong opposition to Trump, and its impact in stopping and slowing some of his destructive policies. The strength of public reaction against the extremist Republican policies is encouraging, and hopefully can bring a different Congress in 2018. Meanwhile, though lessened, real harm is being done, especially relating to the environment. Internationally, there continue to be great concerns that the current administration is doing little to help, and in some cases worsening. Aside from Trump's flailing, off-the-cuff, contradictions causing confusion, the more aggressive military policy is bringing increased civilian casualties - bad in itself - that helps extremist group recruiting. Meanwhile, the world is doing too little to help refugees, while misdirected reactions against real problems with the current form of globalization have helped the rise of the ultra- right and too many autocrats in too many counties. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+

ARTICLES

WHAT TO EXPECT FOLLOWING A MILITARY DEFEAT OF ISIS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci and Ahmet S. Yayla*

Republished from the Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Februry 2017, under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

Abstract

In the struggle against ISIS and the so-called Islamic State, the United States and its allies continue to achieve significant military victories, as evidenced by the ongoing efforts to liberate the city of Mosul in Iraq. What happens next with the returning or migrating foreign fighters and with whatever remains of ISIS’ influence in the digital battle space where up to this point it has been winning? Evidence of the group inspiring, remotely recruiting and directing attacks in Europe and elsewhere, and its continued ability to attract foreign fighters to the actual battlefield, makes it clear that ISIS may be losing the ground war in Syria and Iraq but winning in the other areas, especially in the digital battle space. The authors highlight the importance of creating compelling counter-narratives and products that compete with the prolific ISIS online campaigns.

Keywords: ISIS; Syria; Iraq; Caliphate; Counterterrorism; Foreign Fighters.

Introduction It is estimated that the so-called Islamic State has lost about 45 percent of its territory in Iraq and 10 percent in Syria (Chia & Xeuling, 2016). Such major gains in military campaigns, in particular, are instrumental in diminishing ISIS’ ability to exercise full control over its membership base and its ability to freely finance itself through the sale of oil, antiquities, slaves, and through taxing and extorting monetary payments from its civilian population (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016a). Recently, U.S. officials have reported a significant drop in the monthly number of foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria from 2000 to 500,

255 and some estimates are even down to 200 (Gibbons-Neff, 2016; “Are Airstrikes Successfully Weakening ISIS?” 2016).

Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, Islamic State’s spokesperson and the person believed to be responsible for plotting and directing the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, Istanbul, and Paris, as well as laying the ground work for future attacks (through the Emni—the ISIS’ external operations), was recently killed in Aleppo, Syria (Lister, 2016; Speckhard & Yayla, 2016b). This was on the heels of the July 2016 killing of Abu Omar al-Shishani, a top Islamic State commander and a veteran of the Chechen jihadi war, south of Mosul, Iraq (Worley, 2016). The killings of these two battle-hardened and charismatic leaders also represents a significant blow to Islamic State’s core leadership, especially important given the string of recent military setbacks that the group continues to experience in Iraq and Syria.

The available data suggest gradual, but likely, victory against ISIS on the military battlefield, although locals in Iraq have been expressing concerns over Shia militias already and potentially enacting revenge in liberated areas (An international aid worker in Iraq working in liberated areas, Speckhard personal communication, October 30, 2016). Despite the significant setbacks in the battlefield, ISIS continues to attract followers because its online narratives remain alluring. Evidence of the group inspiring, remotely recruiting and directing attacks in Europe and elsewhere, and its continued ability to attract foreign fighters to the actual battlefield make it clear that ISIS may be losing the ground war in Syria and Iraq but winning in the other areas, especially in the digital battle space.

The recent case of three French women arrested in France for their role in a failed, ISIS-guided terrorist attack near Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris; the recent case of a 16-year-old teenager charged with supporting ISIS and plotting to carry out a terrorist attack in France; the case of Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi who opened fire at a Garland, Texas, event and shot a security guard; and the case of the Bastille Day terrorist, Mohamed Lahouaijej Bouhlel, who killed 84 and injured more than 300 all serve as testament to the growing threat and the ability of ISIS to both inspire and direct attacks in the West (Connelly, 2016; Moore, 2016; Shoichet & Pearson, 2015; Verdier, Visser & Haddad, 2016).With the military defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters are likely to migrate elsewhere, and many of them will choose to return home. These will be profoundly ideologically-indoctrinated, weapons-trained, battle- hardened, and possibly explosivesskilled cadres moving home—some above, and others below the radar of government and safety and security services. Law enforcement officials in Kosovo, for instance, shared that some ISIS cadres are having themselves falsely declared killed on social media and then returned, illegally crossing the borders to bypass security. Whether all returnees from ISIS constitute a danger to their homelands remains to be seen, although those who left ISIS but still believe in building a utopian Islamic “Caliphate” are more easily manipulated to attack at home or to return to service.

Methodology

Over the past year, in their ISIS Defector Interview Project, the authors have been interviewing ISIS defectors (n=40) and the family members of those who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq (n=10). The authors had the opportunity to also interview law enforcement, intelligence, and representatives from non- governmental and civil society institutions in the countries they leave from, specifically in Jordan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Western Europe. The main goal was to learn first-hand how they were recruited, what motivations and vulnerabilities led to their joining, what they experienced, what caused them to defect, and how they kept in touch with affected family members left behind. More importantly, interviews were conducted to capture their stories on video to be used to denounce ISIS’ online recruiting efforts.

The interviews followed a semi-structured format to allow defectors and/or family members to voice stories in their own words. The authors videotaped most of the interviews and gained permission to use them for their project of fighting ISIS’ online recruiting. The defector sample included 35 males and five females. Four of the defectors were minors at the time of joining ISIS. The youngest was only thirteen.

256 The ages ranged from thirteen up to forty-five. Most of the defectors in the sample were Syrians interviewed in southern Turkey (32), with four interviews taking place in the Balkans, two in Kyrgyzstan, and two in Western Europe [1].

Results and Discussion

During our interviews with those who had served in ISIS-controlled territories in Syria and Iraq, we found the dream of the “Caliphate” to be a compelling and powerful one, and while many understood that ISIS would never be able to deliver, it nevertheless remained as a hoped-for ideal (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016c).

We also found that a vast majority of those interviewed were true defectors and no longer support or ever intend to go back to the ranks of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, or to serve them at home. However, we also found that a minority, particularly those in Europe and the Balkans, were more accurately viewed as Islamic State returnees, but not defectors, having only temporarily disengaged from the battlefield—sometimes even being allowed to temporarily return home by the group, or more chillingly, sent home to recruit, or otherwise serve the group’s goals in the West (Speckhard, Yayla & Shajkovci, 2017). Recent evidence also suggests that ISIS has long been preparing to attract, further indoctrinate, and weapons train European and Western cadres who could train quickly inside ISIS and then return to the West undetected to attack in the future (Callimachi, 2016; Gude & Wiedmann-Schmidt, 2015). These directed attacks were plotted by the ISIS Emni (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016d). Additionally, defectors are not always psychologically stable and may return their previous allegiance to the group.

Arguably, many of the thousands of foreign fighters ISIS has managed to attract to Syria and Iraq will return home. Some will return truly disaffected and as actual defectors from the group, while others will only be disillusioned but still longing to build an “Islamic Caliphate.” Others will be sent back to recruit and attack at home. Already Western consulates in Turkey reported instances of their citizens appearing at consulates to report “lost passports” and wishing to return home (Abi-Habib, 2016). Likewise, Huthaifa Azzam, a Jordanbased Palestinian and son of Osama bin Laden’s mentor in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, told the authors in Jordan of the Free Syrian Army’s base in Syria where over one hundred ISIS defectors from all over the world have been gathered, as they were caught fleeing the group (Huthaifa Azzam, Speckhard & Shajkovci interview, Jordan, November 2016). Some security experts predict that as ISIS continues to lose its territory in Iraq and Syria, it will grow its presence in other territories, such as Southeast Asia (Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia), Libya, and possibly even the Balkans (Chia & Xeuling, 2016; Mayr, 2016; “Why is ISIS Heading to Libya?” 2016).

Many ISIS defectors shared that in the event of losing their territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS cadres plan to shave their beards and blend into normal society in Syria and elsewhere to mount guerilla warfare attacks (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016c; Speckhard, Yayla & Shajkovci, 2017). Given the open and generous support of Turkey to Syrians fleeing the war, and illicit Turkish support of ISIS, Turkey in its present state may be one of the places many of them settle. As President Erdogan of Turkey continues to consolidate state powers to himself, he has also long been giving ISIS hidden and open support to keep the Kurds at bay, and may continue to find that to his advantage to remain in power and to keep the Kurds in Syria at bay (Yayla & Speckhard, 2016a, 2016b & 2016c). However, with recent ISIS attacks inside Turkey, this may be likened to dining with “cannibals,” as the authors recently wrote in an assessment of this policy (Yayla & Speckhard, 2016d) [2]. Despite assurances to actively pursue ISIS, no major sweeps or arrests of the countless ISIS terror cells and cadres inside Turkey have yet occurred.

As mentioned above, in the Balkans, law enforcement representatives shared that there were instances where ISIS fighters had falsely declared themselves killed in action over social media but were in fact alive and had returned home crossing borders illegally to live under the radar of government and security services (Law enforcement and intelligence officials, Speckhard & Shajkovci personal communication, October 2016). In Belgium, a security professional shared that a claimed defector came to

257 the consulate asking to return home repentant. On further investigation, however, he was found to be plotting an ISIS attack with contacts back home (Speckhard personal communication, March 2016). There are many foreign fighters married or who have taken their wives, and even children, with them to Syria and Iraq. Females and wives of foreign fighters who did not play violent roles in ISIS may avoid prison sentences upon their return home while their spouses are imprisoned or dead, and thus may be vulnerable to being manipulated by the group, or even worse remain powerful radicalizing forces once back home. In the Balkans and Western Europe, the authors found a number of them who regularly keep in touch with cadres still active in ISIS. Children of ISIS cadres returning home will also have to be rehabilitated after witnessing violence, and many may not even know local languages.

As ISIS continues to lose most, or all, of its territory and fighters begin to return, it is important to note that the problems facing foreign fighters in their home countries, specifically factors that had influenced their decisions to join in the first place such as high unemployment, underemployment, discrimination, marginalization, difficulty living a conservative Salafi lifestyle in the West, disordered and unsatisfying family relationships, and so forth, will all likely still exist upon return, and may be even more frustrating to a traumatized returnee. The problems that initially motivated them to leave will also likely continue unabated, without new or satisfying solutions, having mystically rematerialized upon their return from the ISIS battlefield.

Moreover, many returned ISIS cadres, having lived in conflict zones and having witnessed and taken part in extreme brutality, are likely to suffer from symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Their increased emotional arousal resulting from the battlefield experiences will not match the calm, bored ennui of being back home—without a clear purpose and cause. Having become accustomed to the adrenal rush of being in a conflict zone may cause some to once again seek that energized state of being. Most will not be able to procure good psychological treatment nor be able to safely admit to what they took part in, while some will be stressed by possible or actual prosecution and imprisonment. Thus, many returnees are likely to long again for the clarity of purpose and experiences of the battleground with the potential rewards of being a warrior and ultimate rewards of death by “martyrdom.” Likewise, frustrated returnee wives of those who are or end up imprisoned may become hopeless of living while having already accepted the “martyrdom” ideology, making them also at risk for returning to terrorism [3]. Prior research with cornered and nearly defeated terrorist groups teaches us the lesson that they often turn to women as suicide cadres at that point (Speckhard, 2008). A respondent from the Balkans shared about being treated in France for his posttraumatic responses to his time in ISIS and expressed gratitude for receiving care versus punishment after his time on the ISIS battlefield, although he remained cagey and less than honest about what he had actually participated in.

Despite the significant victories against ISIS and the Islamic State, defeating ISIS remains a daunting task. While face-to-face recruitment is still active in Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East, in the U.S. most recruitment occurs over the Internet. Even with face-to-face recruitment, the authors found that except among the Syrians, online ISIS materials played a significant role in terrorist recruitment around the world. The use of social media tools and social media campaigns to mobilize individuals into an extremist cause is not limited to ISIS. Other terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, have long used the Internet to attract and recruit followers. What differentiates ISIS from other extremist groups, however, is its ability to utilize its online campaign to both attract and recruit potential followers and promote its brand as a serious, powerful, and ruthless organization. Unlike other jihadist terrorist organizations, its online campaign does not operate in the shadows; on the contrary, its content is outsourced and distributed to everyone willing to embrace it. Equally important, the group’s online propaganda has permeated almost every sphere of our digital space. A study conducted by the Brookings Institution revealed a total of 46,000 Twitter accounts created in support of ISIS, though not all active at once, between September and December 2014 (Walker, 2015). As the group continues to lose its territory, it is highly likely that it will continue to strengthen its online propaganda to project the false sense of its continuing control of territories in Syria and Iraq. Such online campaigns will be crucial for groups like ISIS to not only attract followers, but to also showcase manifestations of its material power in

258 Iraq and Syria.

ISIS has managed to master the use of social media unlike any other terrorist group. First, they are known toflood the Internet with slick recruitment and propaganda materials. Next, they watch to learn who is liking, retweeting, or otherwise endorsing their materials. Once communications are established, often by swarming in, ISIS recruits then do their best to find out about the needs of their potential recruits and meet them to seduce, ultimately taking over their lives, either by inviting them to the battlefield or to mount terrorist attacks at home (Speckhard, Shajkovci & Yayla, 2016). In this manner, ISIS, like no other terrorist group, has been able to personally contact and groom new recruits, often using the intimacy of communication and encryption provided by social media apps such as Skype, Telegram, and Whatsapp.

In the Balkans, ISIS defectors shared that they were attracted to groups like ISIS and were moved to help Assad’s victims and their Syrian “brothers” simply because they could easily identify with the group and the conflict, specifically remembering the time when they had been the victims of the Serbian regime during the Kosovo conflict of 1999. Videos from Syria of Assad’s atrocities, alongside videos instructing how to go to Syria, were instrumental in getting them involved, although recruitment networks also functioned to finance their travel, encourage them to go, and help them with the logistics of entering Syria. The same was true in Europe, Jordan, and Kyrgyzstan.

ISIS videos and propaganda materials have a profoundly moving effect in the recruitment process. Consider the answer of an ISIS defector when asked to elaborate on what had reinforced his decision to join the conflict in Syria:

“I started following the videos of Lavdrim Muhaxheri [notorious Albanian Islamic State leader and recruiter of ethnic Albanians in Syria] and the videos of Albanians in Syria saying that people of Syria need other Muslims to come and fulfill God’s will. I became interested and started to look for the ways to go to Syria—how to join other Albanians in Syria against Bashar.” (F.L, Speckhard interview, June 2016, Kosovo)

When asked to discuss the nature of social media sources (e.g. YouTube, web browsing, etc.) that attracted him, he added:

“[YouTube?] Initially it was YouTube that inspired me about the war in Syria. However, I then started browsing the Internet, and each time I would see something with an Arabic flag on Facebook, or anything with Arabic subtitles/names, I would immediately befriend them. Then I would follow them. They would post their videos on Facebook. I also got inspired from videos posted on Facebook. YouTube videos were often getting removed, but most people didn’t know that you would get reposted on Facebook” (Ibid.).

Conclusion

The available data suggest likely victory against ISIS in the military battle space. The war, however, is not won simply because we have defeated ISIS on the battleground. Although groups like ISIS will continue to utilize technology to lure its recruits and followers and promote a medieval ideology that condones beheadings, rape, and enslavement, among others, efforts are needed to broach a counter- narrative to defeat the idea of utopian “Caliphate” that can be brought into being through ruthless brutality and through terrorism extended over the globe. This is not to say that defeating ISIS narratives and propaganda on the Internet and social media will be easy. Such efforts are often complicated by the fact that governments lack adequate policy and legal frameworks on how to incorporate effectively the narratives of those who have disengaged from terrorist groups like ISIS into their counter-narrative messaging. Put differently, much emphasis is placed on criminalizing the efforts of such individuals as opposed to finding creative ways to incorporate both. Even when the voices of ISIS defectors are raised, issues can arise when they do not remain true to their message and flip back and forth. Equally problematic is the fact that government efforts are mostly focused on removing online propaganda and

259 mounting counter messaging campaigns that are limited to rational and logical arguments while groups like ISIS use visuals and emotional arguments and material to attract followers (Speckhard, Shajkovci & Yayla, 2016).

The most credible voices to raise against ISIS are those of insiders—ISIS defectors—who have seen the cruel reality of life under the Islamic State and the ISIS-controlled territories [4]. In the ISIS Defectors Interviews Project, the authors have begun to use the voices of actual defectors telling their stories of time inside ISIS to denounce the group and its ideology. By capturing the voices of ISIS defectors as they denounce the group, and by creating from their stories compelling counter-narratives and products that compete with the prolific and persuasive ISIS online campaigns, we can begin to break the ISIS brand. There is yet the digital battleground to consider. This is just as important as defeating the ISIS narrative of building a utopian Caliphate, defeating its “martyrdom” ideology, and defeating its idea that Islam, Islamic lands, and Muslims themselves are under attack by the West, and that all Muslims have a duty to fight back.

Notes

[1] First and the second author also interviewed the family members of two foreign fighters, one killed in Syria and the other arrested on terrorism charges, in Jordan, November 12, 2016. [2] Thanks to Arthur Kassebaum for this pithy saying applied to Erdogan. [3] Similar scenario was carried out in Turkey as well. Turkish cadres who had fought “jihad” against the Russians in Afghanistan returned to Turkey and lived peacefully, although they spent their efforts spreading their Salafi- jihadi ideology. They remained peaceful, operating under the radar, for a period of ten years, after which they again reactivated and started carrying out terrorist attacks (Third author personal accounts when serving as the head of Counterterrorism for the Turkish National Police). [4] For that reason, at the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE), we decided in our ISIS Defectors Interviews Project to video record all the defectors we interviewed (given permission to do so) in order to be able to create short video clips to load on the internet raising defectors voices against ISIS’ online recruitment. We have also sub-titled them in the 20+ languages ISIS recruits in. As we have collected our interviews, most of them captured on video, we have been producing short and powerful edited video clips and Internet memes (posters) to amplify these voices of disaffected ISIS defectors speaking out against the group with the goal of breaking the ISIS brand. See: http://www.icsve.org/projects/ and https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCumpEsozixbl-PyKw12hmnw

*About the authors: Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University’s School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE). She is also the author of Talking to Terrorists, Bride of ISIS, and co-author of the newly released ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate, Undercover Jihadi, and Warrior Princess. Dr. Speckhard has interviewed nearly 500 terrorists, their family members, and supporters in various parts of the world including Gaza, West Bank, Russia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and many countries in Europe. In 2007, she was responsible for designing the psychological and Islamic challenge aspects of the Detainee Rehabilitation Program in Iraq to be applied to 20,000 + detainees and 800 juveniles. For a complete list of publications for Anne Speckhard see: https://georgetown.academia.edu/AnneSpeckhard and www.icsve.org

Ardian Shajkovci, Ph.D., is Research Director/Senior Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE). See http://www.icsve.org/staff-member/ardian-shajkovci-2/. Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D. is co‐author of the just released book, ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate. He is Senior Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) and is also Adjunct Professor of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University. He formerly served as Professor and the Chair of the Sociology Department at Harran University in Turkey and as the Chief of Counterterrorism and Operations Division for the Turkish National Police with a 20‐year career interviewing terrorists.

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261 Speckhard, A., & Yayla, S. A. (2016b, September 6). ISIS’ No 2 is dead: What it means to the West. The Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/294523-isis-number-two-is- deadwhat- it-means-to-the-west.

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262 THE BATTLE OVER SYRIA'S FUTURE

Alon Ben-Meir,* March 31, 2017

As we approach the sixth year of Syria’s civil war, the whole international community remains completely inept and has failed to join together in the search for a solution that could end the horrifying slaughter of thousands of innocent civilians each month. Sadly (but for obvious reasons), each of the countries and other groups involved, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the US, the Assad government, and the rebels, are focused solely on what best serves their own national interests.

I am not naïve enough to assume that the players involved would behave any differently, as none are guided by a moral compass that seeks to prevent at all costs the shocking loss of countless numbers of innocent men, women, and children.

The issue over which all the players have collective concern is the defeat of ISIS. But what is the end-game in Syria post-ISIS? More than six years of fighting has resulted to date in the death of nearly 500,000 mostly innocent civilians, with half the population (11 out of 22 million) having become refugees or internally displaced.

Nevertheless, what is needed is a recognition of the interests of all the stakeholders, whose presence and role in Syria is sine qua non to finding a solution that will ultimately serve Syria’s long-term national interests and end the tragedy that has had no equal since World War II.

Russia today is the leading arbiter, and its presence in Syria dates back nearly five decades. Its permanent naval base and huge investment in resources throughout the civil war place Russia in a position to frame the outcome of any solution, and it will continue to support Assad as long as he safeguards Moscow’s interests. Russia wants to minimize the US’ influence, but also recognizes that American support of any agreement remains essential due to the US’ extensive regional influence that has a direct bearing on Syria’s future.

Turkey feels threatened by the development of events in Syria, and President Erdogan is determined to maintain a certain presence in the country because: a) he wants to prevent the Syrian Kurds from establishing autonomous rule and accuses the YPG – the Kurdish militia – of being terrorists who are fighting alongside the PKK; and b) Erdogan desires to lead the Sunni Muslim world and “Islamize” conservatively the country next door to ensure Turkey’s continuing influence under the guise of national security. Even though Turkey is at the negotiating table in Geneva along with Russia and Iran, the military intervention of Russia in Syria’s civil war in September 2015 challenged Turkey’s interests and heighten the tension between the two countries. Moreover, Turkey’s growing discord with the US over the Syrian Kurds contributed to Turkey’s major setback in Syria.

Iran is the second most important player and it will not relinquish its interest in Syria under any circumstances. Iran wants to maintain its strategic influence from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. For Tehran, Syria is the crucial linchpin that allows it to project its power throughout this crescent with the implicit support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Like Russia, Iran has invested heavily in money, materials, and manpower in the war efforts; it has and will continue to support Assad and will insist, perhaps informally, on maintaining a permanent foothold in Syria.

Saudi Arabia is Iran’s chief rival over regional hegemony and is seeking to strengthen the position of the Sunni majority in Syria, prevent Iran from establishing a strong foothold in the country, and remove Assad. For the Saudis, Syria has become, along with Iraq, the battleground between the Sunnis and Shiites. Although Saudi Arabia has been supporting the rebels with money and equipment, Riyadh refused to introduce ground troops in the fight against ISIS, which could have also cemented its role in the country to counter the presence of Iran’s Shiite militias. Thus, it has seriously weakened its position in any future negotiations and their outcome.

263

President Assad, who has clung to his allies Russia and Iran, knows that his lease on life depends on their continued backing. He will agree to make almost any concession to both countries to ensure their continuing support to stay in power. His recent gains against ISIS and the rebels with the support of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah have only emboldened him to stay the course, and inevitably he will have to be part of any future solution.

The Syrian rebels, especially the Free Syrian Army (FSA), have largely been in retreat; nevertheless, they remain a force to be reckoned with in current and any future peace negotiations. The rebel representatives (mostly Sunnis) will remain steadfast to secure some of their important demands for social and political reforms and human rights. They will have to accept though the probability that in any future solution, Assad will lead a transitional government, however nominally, for at least several years.

Given the divergent interests of the players involved, the US should interject itself into the negotiation process and make efforts to ensure that should an agreement be reached, it will help facilitate the resolution of other regional conflicts. Notwithstanding the current precarious relationship between the US and Russia, the cooperation between the two countries is essential to finding a permanent solution to Syria’s civil war based on the following:

First, a new federalist decentralized government should be created technically led by Assad, with which the main sects (Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis, and Christians) maintain a loose connection. The power of this government should be invested in national projects to rebuild the nation’s infrastructure while focusing on the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Second, the US must accept the inevitable: Russia, having invested so extensively in the past six years, will maintain a stronger and more visible military presence in Syria that it had before the civil war, for decades to come.

Third, Iran will insist on maintaining a permanent presence, but it must be warned by the US publicly and directly that creating a third front from which to threaten Israel will not be tolerated. Any such provocation will be seen and dealt with as if it were a threat against the US. Iran will also have to restrain Hezbollah to prevent any future conflagration with Israel.

Fourth, whereas Turkey claims to have national security concerns, it must not be allowed to dictate the fate of the Kurdish community in Syria. The US must make it abundantly clear to Erdogan that meddling in Syrian Kurdish affairs is not acceptable. The solution to the Turkish Kurdish problem lies with reaching an agreement with its own Kurdish nationals.

Fifth, a process of peace and reconciliation must be undertaken and supervised by representatives of the Syrian population with the UN that will include the other involved countries to prevent revenge and retribution. This will be necessary to smooth the way toward restoring normal life, albeit it will take many years to heal emotional scars and the agony of dislocation that has affected just about every Syrian.

Sixth, a massive international aid effort will have to be undertaken. Tens of billions of dollars will be necessary to facilitate the return of the refugees, the rehabilitation of the internally displaced, and the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and other social services.

I feel safe to speculate that the situation in Syria would not have become so calamitous had former President Obama interfered early on in the conflict. He might have been able to help not only bring an end to Syria’s civil war which has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands under his watch, but also prevent Russia from filling the vacuum that he created, making Moscow the most powerful player in Syria.

President Trump must remember that although ISIS’ defeat is critical, he has to develop a

264 comprehensive strategy that will not only shape the final framework of an agreement in cooperation with Russia, but also facilitate a solution to other regional conflicts. Time is running out and the body count must stop.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contaced at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. <<><>>

THE LOOMING END TO THE WESTERN - TURKISH ALLIANCE

Alon Ben-Meir,* April 5, 2017

The growing tension between Turkey and its Western allies, which was further heightened during the Obama administration, is narrowing the space for cooperation between the two sides and in fact is progressively worsening. Erdogan’s hope that he and President Trump would improve their ties as members of NATO has dramatically diminished. Washington and the EU still deeply disagree with Ankara on a host of issues, which are unlikely to be resolved on a mutually gainful basis any time in the foreseeable future.

Turkey’s growing retreat from Western values may have already reached a point of no return. Erdogan has removed Turkey from the Western orbit and set the alliance on a collision course. The falling- out is attributed to the following troubling developments over the past several years.

The most daunting disagreement between the US/EU and Turkey is Erdogan’s systematic destruction of every democratic pillar in his country, including gross human rights violations, closing major media outlets, jailing scores of journalists, and forcefully quelling peaceful demonstrations. In particular, Erdogan exploited the July 2016 attempted military coup to incarcerate tens of thousands of educators, judges, military personnel, lawyers, and anyone else he chose to accuse of plotting against the government. Sadly, the West’s public reaction to Erdogan’s onslaught on human rights was largely underplayed out of concerns that Turkey is still an ally and actively involved in the fight against ISIS.

In this fight, the US from the start has backed the Syrian Kurds and provided its militia (the PYD) with money and military equipment. Whereas the PYD has proven to be outstanding fighters in the battle against ISIS, Erdogan views them as a terrorist organization which is collaborating with the military arm of the Turkish Kurds’ Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Erdogan has threatened that he would not allow the US to access Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base if the US continues to support the PYD and prevent the Turkish army from active participation in the fight to retake Raqqa, which would have allowed Ankara to establish a permanent presence in Syria. What irks the US is that instead of focusing on defeating ISIS, Erdogan is fighting the US’ ally (the PYD) which undermines the coalition’s efforts to defeat ISIS.

During the past six years Erdogan began to publicly, with the support of his Islamist AK Party, embrace a religious narrative, and has taken many practical and symbolic steps to Islamize Turkey. He embarked on building thousands of new mosques including 80 in various universities, introduced Islamic studies in school curricula, and legalized the wearing of headscarves for women. In addition, he made Islamic credentials the litmus test for any government post. Erdogan made no secret of his ambition to become the leader of the Sunni Muslim world. Many in the West believe that he is determined to create an Islamic Sunni state fashioned after Shiite Iran, which runs contrary to the Western principle of separation of church and state.

Another conflict between the US and Erdogan was precipitated over Turkey’s demand that the US extradite Fethullah Gülen, whom Erdogan accused of being behind the unsuccessful military coup. Whereas the Turkish government insists that it has provided indisputable evidence that justifies his extradition, the Trump administration (like its predecessor) maintains that it found no sufficient evidence to warrant Gülen’s extradition. In any case, the State Department contends that the Gülen case is not a political

265 matter but falls strictly within the domain of the judiciary. Nevertheless, the conflict over Gülen’s fate continues to sour US-Turkey relations.

Erdogan’s propensity to bully his Western allies has lately reached a tipping point. In recent months, he escalated his criticism of the EU and threatened to annul the agreement over the readmission of refugees who have crossed over illegally into Europe if the EU does not permit visa-free entry for Turkish citizens, as the agreement stipulated. Erdogan’s habitual bullying of his Western allies raises serious doubts about his reliability as a trusted partner and uncertainty about the future of their bilateral relations, especially in connection with issues of national security.

In recent weeks, the tension between the two sides further escalated because of European (especially Germany’s and the Netherlands’) unwillingness to allow Turkish ministers to hold campaign rallies among the Turks living in the EU in support of the upcoming referendum that would grant Erdogan near-absolute powers. He compared the Netherlands and Germany to ‘Nazis and fascists,’ a charge that inflamed the Germans in particular, who are understandably sensitive about the Nazi era. The irony is that Erdogan vehemently denies the Ottomans’ role in the genocide of over a million Armenians, and becomes enraged when this horrific historic episode is attributed to the Ottomans.

Despite being a NATO member, Turkey is flirting with Russia, which raises serious questions about Erdogan’s loyalty and commitment to the seven decades-old alliance. Erdogan has recently stated that Russia could become an alternate ally to the West, and he is seriously considering purchasing the Russian- made S-400 air defense system. Even though Erdogan might not follow through with his public conjecture about future ties with Russia, the fact that he is even entertaining the thought that he is willing, under certain circumstances, to ally himself with the West’s staunch enemy, sends a chilling signal to the US and Europe.

More recently, the tension between the US and Turkey was further heightened due to the arrest by the FBI of Mehmet Atilla, vice president for international banking of the state-owned Halkbank, for his violation of US-led sanctions against Iran by assisting Reza Zarrab, a major gold trader who is awaiting trial in the US. It appears that Zarrab acted as an in-between for Turkey and Iran to arrange for Ankara to buy gas and oil from Iran in exchange for gold, which is difficult to trace. Halkbank played a significant role in these transactions, which the Erdogan government supported in violation of US sanctions.

Given the continuing deterioration in the relationship between the West and Turkey under Erdogan, Turkey’s prospect of becoming a member of the EU is essentially over. Moreover, the rise of Islamic extremism has left the EU with little appetite to admit into its ‘Christian’ club an Islamic state governed by a dictator, which is totally inconsistent with Western sociopolitical values. Meanwhile, Turkey’s potential of becoming a true Islamic democracy is wholly and perhaps irrevocably squandered.

In addition, given that Turkey’s population is roughly 75 million, it will be second only to Germany with 80 million. As a member of the EU, Turkey would be in a position to influence the development of every economic, political, and security policy. For the majority of EU members to admit an Islamic state, especially in the wake of the United Kingdom’s departure, is simply a non-starter.

Even more disconcerting is the fact that it is no longer a secret that Turkey’s viability and importance as a NATO member is being discussed not only because of Erdogan’s unruly behavior, but also because Turkey under his stewardship is in violation of the NATO charter. The charter specifically stipulates that the signatories “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”—all of which are being grossly violated by Erdogan.

It is time for the US and the EU to stop downplaying the profound and growing cleavage with Turkey over the many deeply contentious points between the two sides. As long as Erdogan remains in

266 power, their divorce from one another is moving forward at a rapid pace, and there are no powerful voices on either side to sound the alarm about the impending breakup.

It is now left to the Turkish people who want a secular and democratic Turkey with Islamic values to say NO in the April 16 referendum to amend the constitution and deny Erdogan the dictatorial powers he is seeking. Moreover, defying him in the referendum would potentially accelerate his departure from the political scene.

This will save Turkey from being governed by Islamic despotism, and by popular demand gradually restore the country to the Western orbit as envisioned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacted at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. For media inquiries, contact Kim Hurley at 212.600.4267 or at [email protected]. ***<>***

ERDOGAN: A CLASSIC CASE OF HOW POWER CORRUPTS

Alon Ben-Meir,* Feb 2, 2017

This is the second in a series of articles based in part on eyewitness accounts about the rapidly deteriorating socio-political conditions in Turkey and what the future may hold for the country. The first article is available here.

Much has been written on the endemic corruption in Turkey which involves virtually every social strata—including political, judicial, government administration, private sector, civil society, business, and military—and which stands in total contrast to President Erdogan’s grandiose vision to make Turkey a significant player on the global stage. After fifteen years in power, Erdogan now presides over a state deeply entrenched in corruption, theories, and intrigue. He uses every lever of power to cover up the pervasive corruption consuming the nation and overshadowing the remarkable socio-political progress and economic growth that he made during his first nine years in power.

To consolidate his reign, he intimidated his political opponents, emasculated the military, silenced the press, and enfeebled the judiciary; most recently, he pressed the parliament to amend the constitution to grant him essentially absolute powers.

Turkey ranks 75th in the world in transparency on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index—falling nine places since 2015—along with Bulgaria, Kuwait, and Tunisia. More than 40% of Turkish households perceive public officials to be corrupt.

The economy: Given the pervasiveness of corruption, economic progress in Turkey has slowed down. In Erdogan’s initial years, the economy grew by 5-7 percent because he made it a priority while focusing on the poor and less educated, who subsequently became his core supporters.

When the global economy was strong Turkey registered significant economic growth, but the recent economic slowdown revealed the fault line in Turkey’s economy. An inflated and corrupt bureaucracy made it extremely difficult to be granted licenses for development, making it ever harder for foreign and local investors to accelerate the process without bribing government officials.

During a corruption investigation in 2013, $17.5 million in cash was discovered in homes of various officials, including the director of state-owned Halkbank. Fifty-two people connected to the ruling

267 AK Party were detained in one day, but subsequently released due to “lack of evidence.”

Given this grim reality, as long as the government continues to deny the existence of pandemic corruption, Erdogan’s ambition to make Turkey’s economy among the ten largest economies by 2023 (the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic) has become nothing but a pipe dream.

Suppressing the press: Erdogan has shown zero tolerance for criticism and has worked to stifle the press. Any media outlet that exposed corruption cases became an ‘enemy of the state.’

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 81 journalists are currently imprisoned, all of whom have been charged with anti-state offenses, and over 100 news outlets have been ordered closed by the government. In total, between July 20 and December 31, 2016, 178 broadcasters, websites, and newspapers were shuttered.

Whereas in a democracy the media is considered central to keeping the government honest, in Turkey investigative journalism has become taboo as the Erdogan government is terrified of the potential exposure of corruption cases where government officials are directly involved.

The implications of this are far and wide as other countries, especially democracies, become suspicious of Turkey’s positions. The lack of transparency severely erodes its credibility and international standing.

Political: Two-thirds of Turks in a survey revealed they perceive political parties to be corrupt. Turkey lacks an entity that monitors the financing of parties, which are required to submit their financial tables to the Constitutional Court, an institution ill-equipped to handle audits.

Additionally, according to the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Turkey “does not have a specific regulatory process to eliminate possible conflicts of interest” for parliamentarians who transition to the private sector after their terms are complete.

Commenting on former Prime Minister Davutoglu’s “transparency package”, Erdogan shamelessly stated that “If it [requiring party officials to reveal wealth] goes on like this, you can’t find anyone to chair even [the AKP’s] provincial and district branches.”

Several of Erdogan’s ministers (Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan, Interior Minister Muammer Guler, and Environment Minister Erdogan Bayraktar) resigned after their sons were arrested on allegations of bribery. Following their resignation, Erdogan “proceeded to dismiss thousands of police officers, prosecutors, and judges” and accused the Gulen movement of a coup attempt.

The arrest and indictment in US courts of Iranian-Turkish gold trader Reza Zarrab poses a significant threat to Erdogan’s authority, as top AK officials are wrapped up in the indictment—including some of Erdogan’s family members. Pro-government media quickly leveled accusations against the American prosecutor and judge involved in the case of being instruments of the Gulen movement.

The ramifications of the wide-spread political corruption also have major adverse impacts on Turkey’s relations with foreign governments who interact with Ankara out of necessity rather than by free choice—particularly the EU—which makes Turkey’s foreign relations tenuous and puts its long-term security at risk.

Judiciary: According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 13% of households reported having to pay a bribe after coming into contact with the judiciary, which has increased in the past three years. The flaws of the Turkish judiciary have “undermined the acceptance of the ruling by all segments of Turkish society and tainted it with allegations of political score-settling.”

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An even-handed judiciary is necessary to have a healthy and sustainable democracy. But when it becomes corrupted, as it has in Turkey, it is not just the cases before a court that become compromised— there is a ripple effect that occurs, impacting on behavior of officials engaged in criminal activity and who feel they can continue to act in such a manner with impunity.

Military: According to the EU Progress Report 2016, extensive legal protection is given to counter- terrorism personnel and “the military and intelligence services continue to lack sufficient accountability in Parliament.” The same report states that “Access to audit reports by the Turkish Court of Accounts on the security, defense and intelligence agencies remains restricted.”

Erdogan has replaced hundreds of generals, which led to a reduction in strategic planning and overall quality of military effectiveness. His purge of the military high brass three years ago on charges of conspiring to topple the government has eroded Turkey’s position in NATO.

Similarly, the purge of the top echelon of the military following the July 2016 coup further weakened military preparedness, which raises serious questions about Turkey’s military prowess and its effectiveness as a member of NATO.

Turkey defies the NATO charter that requires its members to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” By not adhering to these principles, Turkey risks being potentially expelled, especially now that Erdogan appears to be increasingly gravitating toward Moscow.

Civil society: The EU Progress Report 2016 notes: “Participation by civil society in the budgetary process is poor…and independent civil society organizations are rarely involved in law- and policy-making processes.”

Corruption creates fear in society—individuals who might otherwise wish to expose acts of corruption are now afraid to be implicated. According to Transparency International’s Oya Ozarslan, “Today you can’t offer people neither a good nor a bad example because corruption trials have become impossible in Turkey. This in turn legitimates the notion that [the corrupt] get away with it anyway.”

The AK Party pledged “[to wage a] most intensive struggle [against corruption],” and fully ensure “transparency and accountability prevail in every area of public life… [to prevent] the pollution of politics,” but then Erdogan himself rejected any practical measures to tackle corruption, fearing damaging exposure.

Sadly, much of what Erdogan aspired for could have been realized had he continued the reforms he initiated and brought Turkey to the international status he desired without resorting to authoritarianism.

After 15 years in power, Erdogan provides a classic example of how power corrupts. It is time for the public and the opposition parties to demand that he leaves the political scene and allow the formation of a democratically-elected government to begin the process of stemming corruption.

Otherwise, Turkey will forfeit its huge potential of becoming a significant player on the international stage.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacted at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. <+>---><---<+>

269 CAN ISRAEL FIGHT A WAR ON THREE FRONTS? A NIGHTMARISH SENARIO

Alon Ben-Meir,* March 15, 2017

Although Prime Minister Netanyahu is known for his focus on the Palestinian and Iranian threats to Israel’s national security, in recent months he has increasingly sounded the alarm over Iran in particular rather than the Palestinians. As the defeat of ISIS in both Iraq and Syria is all but inevitable, Netanyahu’s main concern now is that Iran will insist on maintaining a strong foothold in Syria by establishing a significant military presence as recompense for its continuing support of the Assad regime throughout the civil war. This, of course, should not come as a surprise to Netanyahu or anyone else familiar with Iran’s ambitions to become the region’s hegemon, as it views Syria as the linchpin that will preserve its influence from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.

For Netanyahu, however, to put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the back burner is a terrible mistake. In fact, because of the increasing Iranian threat, Netanyahu should do everything in his power to negotiate a peace agreement with the Palestinians now in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. In so doing, he will not only neutralize the Palestinian threat but potentially mitigate the Iranian menace at least to a certain degree; otherwise, he will simply continue to play into Iran’s hand.

Iran’s involvement in Syria is not new and precedes the civil war by several decades. What is new, however, is that Tehran is now determined to establish—in addition to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon—a third front in Syria against Israel.

Israel’s high military command are particularly concerned about the possibility that once hostilities break out between Israel and Hamas, it could potentially be joined by Hezbollah (or vice versa), and Iran may decide to join the foray or instigate the hostilities in the first place and force Israel to fight on three fronts. This would also provide the Palestinians in the West Bank the opportunity to rise against the occupation.

In a speech at the Foreign Ministry commemorating the Israelis who were killed in the 1992 embassy bombing in Argentina (in which Iran was implicated), Netanyahu statedthat “The regime in Tehran aspires to plant its flag atop the ruins of the free world. It continues to threaten to annihilate Israel.”

Although Netanyahu realizes that he cannot persuade the Trump administration to revoke the Iran nuclear deal, he wants to make certain that Washington remains attentive to Iran’s mischievous and destabilizing conduct in the region and continues to hold Iran accountable to its commitment to fully adhere to the deal.

In addition, Netanyahu wants to ensure that Washington understands the danger that emanates from Iran’s military presence in Syria by establishing a base not far from the city of Quneitra, only a few miles from the border of the Golan Heights. To that end, he also conferred with Russia’s President Putin, expressing in no uncertain terms that Israel will not tolerate such an outcome once ISIS is defeated.

It should be noted that while ISIS’ defeat is all but certain, by all military calculations it will take at least six months to bring about its demise. In the interim, Iran is systematically consolidating its presence in Syria by increasing its military hardware, including short- and medium-range rockets, with no objection from Assad, who views Iran’s continuing presence for the foreseeable future as pivotal to his hold on power.

Although Moscow and/or Washington may support Netanyahu’s position, neither can do much about it now as the war against ISIS continues with the participation of Iran. In addition, Tehran is carrying on with the transfer of an array of weapons to Hezbollah, including rockets. In spite of the fact that Israel has and continues to intercept and destroy many such weapons shipments, significant quantities still

270 manage to reach their destination in Lebanon.

It is now estimated that between Hamas and Hezbollah, they have nearly 200,000 short- and medium-range rockets; many of them can reach any target in Israel from Metula in the north to Eilat in the southern tip. Together, they can rain more than a thousand rockets each day for nearly seven months.

Given the increasing tension between Israel and Hamas, and with Hezbollah, a major breakout of hostilities cannot be ruled out. Although Israel’s Defense Forces are not oblivious to such a possibility, they are faced with a nightmarish scenario regardless of how and when such a conflagration may occur.

Even though Israel’s air defense system is one of the most sophisticated in the world, Israel will still be unable to intercept all incoming rockets. Out of the thousand rockets Hamas and Hezbollah can fire daily, a few dozen could still land on many Israeli urban centers, causing hundreds of casualties and massive structural damage, especially in areas where shelters are either limited or do not exist.

In addition, businesses would be closed for weeks, supplies of food and medicine will become increasingly scarce, schools will be shut, and hospitals will be overwhelmed. Moreover, the military will be stretched, especially if Israel ends up invading Gaza and Lebanon while bombing Iranian installations in Syria, overpowering the Palestinian uprising, and protecting settlers in the West Bank.

To prevent such a nightmarish scenario, the Israeli government may feel that they are justified to conduct widespread bombing on all three fronts. Given the fact that much of Hezbollah and Hamas’ rockets are embedded in civilian communities, there will likely be tens of thousands of civilian casualties. Moreover, attacks against Israel by Iranian forces in Syria may well force Israel to bomb targets in Iran, focusing in the main on the country’s nuclear installations.

How the Arab world, Europe, the US, and Russia will react is hard to predict. One thing, however, is clear: much of the Middle East will be on fire and it will be hard to fathom how perilous the consequences will be.

Yes, Israel will technically win the war, but it will be the most devastating victory in the annals of warfare in modern times.

This may seem like an unlikely scenario, but the probability of it is increasing every day. If Netanyahu is truly concerned about Iran establishing a permanent military base in Syria from which it can seriously threaten Israel’s national security as he professes, he cannot rule out such a terrifying possibility.

His seriousness about the Iranian threat is now tested by his action or inaction on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. I maintain that there is no better time to look very carefully at the two state-solution to be preceded by a process of reconciliation, in the context of a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, especially now that the Arab states share his concerns about the Iranian threat.

More than any time before, the Arab states led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar are in a position to exert significant influence over the Palestinian Authority and Hamas to enter into serious negotiations, provided that Israel shows a genuine appetite for real peace.

Netanyahu and some of his recalcitrant ministers can demonstrate that by first stating that Israel has no intentions of annexing more Palestinian territories, and second by declaring a moratorium on the expansion of settlements for at least one year.

If Netanyahu’s coalition partners do not support such an initiative, he should have the courage to fire them and establish a new government with the left and center parties that support a negotiated peace with the Palestinians.

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Netanyahu has only paid lip service to the idea of a Palestinian state, but if Israel’s very existence is on the line because of the Iranian threat as he persistently asserts, he has the capacity and public support to pursue that objective. He has a propitious opportunity to forge peace and usher in a more promising and secure future that Jews in and outside Israel are yearning for.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacte at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com.

TRUMP AND NETANYAHU: EMBRACING ILLUSIONS, IGNORING REALITY

Alon Ben-Meir,* Feb 21, 2017

President Trump remained true to his customary flip-flopping on just about every issue when he stated during a joint press conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu that he is “looking at two-state and one-state, and I like the one that both parties like… I can live with either one.” By stating so, Trump gave Netanyahu what he was hoping to get—a departure from the two-state solution. To achieve that, Trump is reportedly looking at other options that would enlist the Arab states—who presently share mutual strategic interests with Israel to form a united front against their common enemy, Iran—to help broker a solution to the Palestinian problem.

To be sure, the two leaders who are both in trouble—Netanyahu is under multiple criminal investigations for corruption, and Trump is being attacked from just about every corner for his outrageous statements, contradictions, and self-indulgence—found comfort with one another.

Netanyahu went back home feeling triumphant, as he seemingly managed to sway Trump from the idea of two states, while Trump presented himself as a statesman thinking out of the box by looking at an Israeli-Arab comprehensive peace through which to fashion a solution to the Palestinian conflict.

Although CIA Director Mike Pompeo met with Mahmoud Abbas the day before the press conference, I was told by a top Jordanian official in Amman that Abbas was abundantly clear during the meeting that there is not and will never be an alternative to a two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative (API). Moreover, Abbas indicated that Hamas’s position on a two-state solution is unequivocal, and in any case, Gaza and the West Bank must constitute a single Palestinian state.

While Netanyahu often pretended that he still believes in the two-state solution, during the many encounters he had with former Secretary of State John Kerry (including a joint meeting with Egypt’s President Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah in Aqaba in 2016) where he was presented with a comprehensive peace plan, he repeatedly changed his position.

Netanyahu habitually claimed that his extremist right-wing partners oppose the creation of a Palestinian state under any circumstances and that his government would collapse if he were to actively pursue the idea, as if he could not form a new government with the left and center parties who are committed to a two-state solution. Nevertheless, he continued to sing the song of two states for public consumption and to get the Obama administration off his back.

Regardless of what new ideas Netanyahu and Trump concocted, one thing remains certain: there is simply no other realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict other than two independent states, Jewish and Palestinian.

The viability of this solution does not only rest on preserving Israel as a democracy with a Jewish

272 national identity while meeting the Palestinians’ aspiration for a state of their own. A careful scrutiny of other would-be alternatives floating around have no basis in reality.

Jordan is not and will never become a Palestinian state (as some Israelis advocate) because the Hashemite Kingdom will resist that with all its might; a binational state is a kiss of death to the Zionist dream; the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza while incorporating much of the West Bank into Israel is a non-starter; the creation of a federation between Israel, Jordan, and Palestine is a pipe dream; and finally, confining the Palestinians in the West Bank in cantons to run their internal affairs as they see fit, while Israel maintains security control, will be violently resisted by the Palestinians until the occupation comes to an end.

It is true that the Arab states view Israel today as a potential ally in the face of the Iranian threat, and there may well be a historic opportunity to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. This opportunity, though, can be materialized only in the context of the API.

The central requirement of the API is a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution, which would subsequently lead to a regional peace. Indeed, only by Israel first embracing the API will the Arab states lend their support to a two-state solution by putting pressure on the Palestinians to make the necessary concessions to reach a peace accord.

Those who claim that the two-state solution has passed its time and new and creative ideas should be explored must know that many new ideas have been considered. None of them, however, could provide a solution that meets the Israelis’ or the Palestinians’ requirement for independent and democratic states enjoying Jewish and Palestinian national identities, respectively.

Netanyahu has found in Trump a co-conspirator. Both have a proven record of double talking, misleading, and often outright lying. Both are blinded by their hunger for power and are ready and willing to say anything to please their shortsighted constituencies. Neither has the vision or the courage to rise above the fray, and nothing they have uttered jointly meets the hardcore reality they choose to ignore.

What Netanyahu and Trump have demonstrated during their press conference was that both seem to revel in illusions where they find a zone of real comfort, while leaving Israelis and Palestinians to an uncertain and ominous future.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacted at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. XXXXX

THERE WILL BE NO PALESTINIAN STATE UNDER NETANYAHU'S WATCH

Alon Ben-Meir,* February 14, 2017

President Trump should not be swayed by Netanyahu’s duplicitous argument, however convincing it might sound, that he is committed to a two-state solution when in fact he has opposed and will continue to reject in principle the creation of an independent Palestinian state under any circumstances.

Netanyahu’s repeated assertions that he is ready to negotiate with the Palestinians unconditionally is hollow because he knows that President Abbas will not enter into negotiations unless Israel suspends the continuing expansion of settlements and the creeping annexation of Palestinian land, which prevents the Palestinians from establishing their own viable state.

273 To establish Netanyahu’s lack of commitment, one has to simply observe his actions in the occupied territories and listen to his public narrative, which squarely contradicts his presumed willingness to negotiate an end to the conflict. Netanyahu’s objections in words and deeds to the creation of a Palestinian state are undisputedly manifested in the following:

First, Netanyahu’s insistence that he is ready to negotiate unconditionally is in and of itself a precondition. Suppose President Abbas agrees to negotiate on that basis—there is simply no avoiding the requirement to first agree on rules of engagement, including the venue, makeup of the negotiating teams, their mandate, etc. Most importantly, they must agree on which of the main conflicting issues to tackle first that could facilitate negotiations on other critical issues.

Netanyahu has all along refused to commence negotiations by first meeting the Palestinians’ demand to establish the contours of their future state. Instead, he kept insisting that Israel must first negotiate the mechanism that would ensure its national security. The fact, however, that he always sought “secure borders” would have made it reasonable and practical to negotiate borders first.

This would not only establish what constitutes (from his perspective) secure borders, but it would have also met the Palestinians’ demands and given them the confidence that a future state will eventually be created. In conjunction with that, the future of many of the settlements could have also been settled. Netanyahu’s insistence, however, on negotiating national security first was nothing but a ploy designed to play for time as previous negotiations have clearly shown.

Second, Netanyahu presides over a coalition government that includes, other than his own right- of-center Likud party, two other extremely right-wing parties—Yisrael Beiteinu and Jewish Home, led by Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Education Minister Naftali Bennett, respectively, who are both committed and subservient to the settlement movement. Bennett in particular openly calls for the annexation of much of the West Bank, especially Area C, which constitutes 61 percent of the Palestinian territory.

If Netanyahu were to embark in earnest on negotiating a two-state solution, this would immediately unravel his government, as these two parties (along with many members of his own Likud party) have threatened to leave the government if he were to take such a step. Thus, as long as he maintains the present make-up of the current government, there is absolutely no prospect of reaching a peace agreement that would grant the Palestinians a state of their own.

Following his 2015 campaign for reelection, Netanyahu clearly stated “I think that anyone who moves to establish a Palestinian state today, and evacuate areas, is giving radical Islam an area from which to attack the State of Israel. The left has buried its head in the sand time and after time and ignores this…” When asked whether a Palestinian state would not be created under his leadership, the prime minister said “Indeed.” What he said then he still means today; anything he says to the contrary is for show.

Third, the unabated expansion of existing settlements and the passage of the recent law that authorizes the government to retroactively legalize scores of illegal settlements unambiguously suggests that he has no intention whatsoever of allowing the Palestinians to establish a state of their own. This systematic annexation of Palestinian land makes it impossible for them to maintain land contiguity. To suggest, as he claims, that the settlements are not an obstacle to peace is disingenuous at best and he knows it. Under Netanyahu’s watch, the government has built a major network of roads crisscrossing the West Bank exclusively designated for the settlers, while confining the Palestinians to cantons with the intention of making the current status quo permanent.

Fourth, his objective is to settle at least one million Israelis throughout the West Bank and create irreversible facts on the ground. Currently, there are nearly 650,000 settlers in the West Bank, including

274 East Jerusalem, making the removal of any significant number of settlers simply impossible. The lesson that Netanyahu’s father, Benzion Netanyahu, who was a staunch revisionist Zionist, ingrained in his son was the belief that all of the biblical “land of Israel” belongs to the Jews in perpetuity. In a 2009 interview, Benzion stated “The two-state solution doesn’t exist. …There is no Palestinian people, so you don’t create a state for an imaginary nation.” That lesson was not lost on Netanyahu.

Not surprisingly, whenever Israel’s Supreme Court orders the removal of a certain illegal settlement built on private Palestinian land, such as the recent dismantling of Amona with roughly 250 settlers, Netanyahu immediately announces plans to build new units. He is determined that the number of settlers continues to grow to reach the milestone of one million, regardless of what the Israeli courts decide or the international community demands—including the US, Israel’s closest ally.

Fifth, if Netanyahu were to truly opt to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two- state solution, he could disband his current and establish a new coalition government composed of several centrist and left-of-center parties, including the Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, Kulanu, Meretz, and Netanyahu’s own Likud party, which would provide him a decisive majority of 80 out of 120 seats in the parliament, versus the current government of Likud, Kulanu, Shas, Jewish Home, Yisrael Beiteinu, and UTJ, a very slim majority of 67 out of 120 seats. Although some members of his own party will defect, he will still have a significant majority that reflects the aspiration of the Israelis who want to end the conflict. It should be noted that with a new government, the 13 members of the Arab List would support any initiative towards a two-state solution.

Such a coalition can certainly agree on an equitable peace with the Palestinians that would entail some land swaps if only Netanyahu wills it. Sadly, however, Netanyahu simply will not entertain such a peace agreement because he is ideologically committed to control in perpetuity all of what he terms the ‘Land of Israel’, while accusing the Palestinians of wanting to destroy rather than make peace with Israel.

To be sure, Netanyahu is not and has never been a proponent of creating a Palestinian state. Hence, President Trump will be wise not to engage him during his visit to the White House in a futile discussion searching for an agreement based on a two-state solution. This outcome cannot and will not happen as long as Netanyahu is in power.

If Trump is serious about his desire to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for Israel’s own sake, he must demand that Netanyahu commit himself to create a Palestinian state not by simply stating so, but by taking concrete steps to form a new government composed of the left, center, and his own party, hold a new election, or resign.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. He may be contacted at: [email protected], www.alonben-meir.com. >++=++<

TRUMPISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Sam Ben-Meir,* Mar 6, 2017

The United States is witnessing a disturbing rise in anti-Semitic acts, which are sweeping over the country in wave after wave. In St. Louis, more than a hundred tombstones were tipped over; similar hate crimes have taken place in Philadelphia and New York. Attacks are taking place not only in cities across the country, but also in small towns. In Scottsburg, Indiana (a community with less than ten thousand residents), the gravestones of a Jewish couple were defaced with spray paint. To date, there have been reports of bomb threats against Jewish institutions in thirty-three states, and across college campuses.

275 The rise in hate crimes has risen sharply since Trump’s election. As early as four days following President Trump’s electoral win, an Episcopal Church in a small town in southern Indiana was vandalized with “Heil Trump”. Last weekend, in Orchard Park, a suburb of Buffalo, New York, residents and local law officials discovered spray-painted swastikas and vulgar graffiti on overpasses, a dozen vehicles, and on an elementary school playground. Ten Jewish community centers have been targeted with bomb threats for the fourth time in five weeks. And the list goes on.

While it is not only Jewish individuals and groups who have been increasingly subjected to bigotry and xenophobic outbursts, these latest acts are the escalation of overt anti-Semitism which re-appeared during the 2016 election. What began with tweeting and Internet trolling, is now manifesting itself in more brazen and threatening ways. Unless the underlying conditions are answered, there is every reason to expect that these attacks will persist and become more violent.

The growing anti-Semitism in the United States has been fed by a social-political atmosphere that is conducive to groups that thrive on racist ideology. White nationalist groups have been encouraged by the current administration's willingness to lend an ear and more to those on the far right.

The president of the United States does not have to be explicitly, or even implicitly, anti-Semitic in either words or deeds to create conditions in which anti-Semitic groups feel emboldened. By being ever ready to entertain conspiracy theories, by showing little regard whatsoever for facts when they are not to his liking, by "remembering" the Holocaust without any mention of the destruction of European Jewry, by failing to condemn these acts in a more timely manner, by empowering figures such as Steve Bannon, and by lending credence to the agenda of the alt-right, the president has helped to make these waves of anti- Semitism and bigotry possible.

Over the past year, the space of public discourse has deteriorated; what was once political spin has been replaced by palpable and shameless lying. It is clear that Trumpism – with its contempt for inconvenient truths, and glorification of authoritarian strongmen – is in part responsible for what is taking place. Racist ideology feeds off of illusions, beliefs which are held because they satisfy deep-seated wishes, without regard for evidence, justification, or warrant. Trumpism has provided the soil in which such illusions are free to grow unhampered by a sense of epistemic and moral responsibility.

The current rise of antisemitism was able to take root more easily when common manners and basic decency were shoved aside during an increasingly ugly election. Courtesy and manners are not insignificant things, but essential to ethical life (in the Hegelian sense), to our shared social substance, the ethical medium in which we dwell with others. The loss of the simple decency that we generally take for granted has wide ramifications and ultimately it creates a social environment where inhibitions against overtly racist acts are weakened, and hate crimes are more likely to occur.

Trump has shown himself ready to make brazen accusations without citing any evidentiary support; he has shown contempt for the rule of law and the freedom of the press, turning away the New York Times and CNN and referring to the media as "the Enemy of the American people" – language which is itself fraught with fascist undertones. Trumpism insists that we cannot be held morally responsible for the claims we make and the statements we endorse.

Indeed, what Trumpism represents is, to put it simply, the suicide of thought (to borrow a phrase from G. K. Chesterton). We are being reminded every day that the human intellect is free to destroy itself precisely by abdicating the responsibility and authority we have to think – we are becoming a society increasingly at war with reason and ‘the tower already reels.’ Trumpism is one of the great-thought destroying forces of our time in its contempt for things like objective knowledge and the disinterested pursuit of truth. The assault on epistemic values has moral consequences – to entertain ‘alternative facts’ and endorse theories on the basis of rumor or heresy is a moral failing, not only because it can lead to actual harm, but because in time it corrupts the mind itself.

276

To stem the rise of anti-Semitism, we need to restore the integrity of our public discourse, our commitment to intellectual honesty and self-scrutiny. Anti-Semitism has been allowed to grow because we as a country have created an environment that is conducive to race-minded reactionaries. Our country has grown meaner and more cynical. In the span of only a decade, comments that it would have been inconceivable to say in public are now becoming increasingly commonplace.

To properly address the deterioration of our nation’s ethical substance, we cannot underestimate the importance of trust. As the philosopher Jay Bernstein observed, “…trust relations provide the ethical substance of everyday living… Trust relations are relations of mutual recognition in which we acknowledge our mutual standing and vulnerability with respect to one another.” Trust is the “invisible substance of our moral lives” – we only notice it when it has been shattered.

These anti-Semitic and racist acts are attacks precisely on that trust which, under normal conditions, we take for granted. Restoring social trust is a long and difficult process. In this case it will involve, among other things, undoing the moral and epistemic harm caused by Trumpism, and Trump himself must begin this undertaking.

*Sam Ben-Meir, PhD is an adjunct professor at Mercy College. His current research focuses on environmental ethics and animal studies. He may be contacted at: [email protected], www.alonben- meir.com. >>>ó<<<

LATIN AMERICA: TRUMP'S WALL AND CHINA'S BRIDGES

Raúl Zibechi

Republished from Americas Program, March 24 2017. Translated by Paige Patchin.

In November, President Xi Jinping made his third visit to Latin America in just four years. This time the week-long trip took him to Peru and Chile, member nations of the Pacific Alliance, led by the US as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Partnership excludes China, and also Ecuador, with which the Asian country maintains an important economic and political relation.

The tour began on November 16th, included participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in Lima, and concluded in Chile on November 23rd. The dates of the presidential trip say it all. On November 8th, Donald Trump won the US election with the promise of ending the TPP, something which leaves the countries that had opted to join this alliance – such as Peru and Chile, as well as Mexico and Colombia – hanging.

Although the trip was scheduled before the US elections, it was a master power play. While the US becomes a problematic partner through its erratic foreign policy, China extends its arms and offers a new type of relationship that goes far beyond commercial ties, as it has until now.

“This is Xi’s third visit to Latin America since he came to power three years ago, beyond those of 2013 and 2014, and centers on countries on the Pacific coast with which the Asian giant maintains important economic and political relationships” (El Comercio, November 16, 2016). The Peruvian conservative newspaper put its finger in the right place. China’s relationship with Latin America, including mineral-exporting countries like Peru, has already shifted from mere commercial ties to global geopolitical issues.

In his speech to Peruvian parliament, Xi emphasized the relationship between the region and China attained a leap forward in development, “with a comprehensive advance in cooperation in all areas.” This

277 is, in the words of the president, comprehensive cooperation characterized by “equality, mutual benefit, and shared development” (Xinghua, November 23, 2016).

The contrast with White House policy, which threatens to deport millions of undocumented Latinos – while Xi speaks of a “shared future” based on cooperation – could not be starker.

Xi met with Mauricio Macri twice in less than a year, showing that ideological differences are nothing compared to the economic advantages a relationship with China brings. During the President’s tour, the fifth China-Latin America High Level Dialogue Forum was held in La Plata, Argentina, where the Chinese ambassador in Buenos Aires Yang Wanming proposed “a model of cooperation to promote the effective coupling of industries between China and Latin America.”

While Washington and Brussels are hesitant about the current scenario and tend to fall back on a certain protectionism, taking a step back in globalization, Xi did not cease highlighting that “economic globalization is an irresistible trend.” He called for “promoting liberalization and trade and investment facilitation, and to oppose any kind of protectionism” (Diario de Pueblo, November 25, 2016).

That the emerging power appropriated the discourse of Western elites is evident, because it feels strong in that same terrain, not only the economic terrain, but also in finance with the internationalization of the yuan underway.

China at the vanguard

A considerable slice of the public reckons China is a massive manufacturer of low-quality, cheap products. That perception loses sight of the fact that no nation reaches the rank of global power producing trinkets. By contrast, the dragon is able to flood the world with all kinds of goods at prices impossible for other producers, but it is also the most advanced country in innovation and cutting-edge technologies.

Every six months, the list of the top 500 “supercomputers” in the world is updated at top500.org. In 2001 almost half of these computers belonged to the United States and China did not appear on the list. In 2013 the United States still held the absolute majority, but China had 63 supercomputers among the 500 fastest. That year, the fastest computer was the Tianhe-2, manufactured by the National University of Defense Technology in China, displacing the best of the United States. Time would tell this was not a flash in the pan.

This year, a remarkable feat. Or better said, three in one. The Supercomputing Center in Wuxi created a computer that leaves behind all known machines in the dust. It’s called the Sunway TaihuLight, and it is capable of performing 93 petaflops per second. In sum, it is three times faster than the Chinese supercomputer that was first in the world ranking and almost six times faster than the highest-ranked American computer. It has 41,000 processors and 260 cores, at a cost of $260 million. Second, it was built entirely with Chinese components. Other Chinese supercomputers, such as the Tianhe-2, are made with chips from the American company Intel. But in April 2015, the United States banned the sale of supercomputer chips to China, which actually served to stimulate Asians (El Mundo, June 21, 2016). Third, for the first time, China has surpassed the United States in the number of machines in the list of the world’s 500 fastest. It has 167 supercomputers, compared to 165 of its competitor. All computers of this type in all countries use Linux, free software.

At the same time, China has surpassed all other countries in patent applications, widening the distance each year. In 2015, China applied for 1,100,000 patents to the World Intellectual Property Organization, surpassing those from the United States, Japan and South Korea combined. (They follow in the world ranking.) But most important is the speed of Chinese growth, similar to that recorded in all areas of growth. In 2001 China filed for more than 30,000 patent applications, while Japan requested half a

278 million and the United States nearly 300,000. An abysmal difference. Fifteen years later, Japan stalled and the Americans got barely half as many patents as the Chinese.

China has become the most innovative country in the world, not only the most productive. The differences are so great we can be assured Asian supremacy will continue to grow like a tsunami in the coming decades.

New relations

At the end of Xi Jinping’s South American tour, the Chinese government released a new document on its relations with Latin America. Unlike the previous document – from 2008, when then-president Hu Jintao toured the region – the new one focuses not on the economy, but on politics.

In any case, the proposals underway are based on previous economic links. To date, three countries have signed free trade agreements with China: Chile in 2005, Peru in 2009, and Costa Rica in 2010. In 2015, the volume of trade reached $236 billion, a figure that had multiplied by 20 in just a decade.

Various cooperation forums were created in this period, the most important of which being the China-CELAC[1]Forum. Its first meeting took place January 2015 in Beijing. The new agency established a plan for 2019 that envisages $500 billion in trade and $250 billion of reciprocal foreign direct investment.

It is unlikely these targets be met within the stipulated deadlines, as bilateral trade has been falling since 2013 due to the slower growth of the Chinese economy and the post-2008 financial crisis global slowdown. However, Chinese diplomacy was very optimistic. The document highlights that since 2008, “the rise of developing countries and emerging markets has becomes an irreversible trend.”

But the most novel aspect is when it states that “China can introduce its experience to Latin America and the Caribbean to help them improve their governance.” This is a language that had not appeared before. The version published by the official newspaper Global Times adds that the exchanges must be freed of “ideological shackles.”

That is the path China is exploring in Latin America when it proposes a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” as well as in organizing a summit for the media leaders of China and Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago. A new language follows new objectives. The first clue was given by Chancellor Wang Yi’s statement on the importance of “China’s image as a responsible actor and its key role in giving people peace of mind, strengthening trust, and building consensus” (Xinghua, November 25 2016).

Heading in the same direction, but more forcefully, was the Global Times editorial which contrasts Washington’s warmongering and destabilizing policies in the world with proposals to achieve “global governance” in the hands of Beijing. The newspaper quotes a recent Financial Times article, “Trump builds walls, Xi builds bridges in Latin America,” to illustrate the sharp differences between the two projects.

In this reading, Trump is making the heritage of the Washington Consensus worse, although Chinese diplomacy is very clear that there won’t be a rupture between the region and the United States. To balance, the editorial concludes with a revealing phrase: “Economic cooperation between China and Latin America has given Latin American countries an alternative in the diplomatic field and more power to negotiate with the United States” (Global Times, November 17, 2016).

Nothing is what it seems

"From the perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean, export diversification appears to be the main pending issue: only five products, all primary, accounted for 69% of the value of regional

279 shipments to China in 2015. The dynamics of Chinese foreign direct investment in the region reinforces this pattern, since almost 90% of such investment between 2010 and 2015 was directed to extractive activities, particularly mining and hydrocarbon production,” CEPAL Executive Secretary Alicia Bárcenas synthesized, when presenting the “Opportunities and challenges” document published on the occasion of Xi Jinping’s visit to the agency.

She compared the region’s trade with China to that of other regions of the world. “The export basket of Latin America and the Caribbean to China is much less sophisticated than its export basket to the rest of the world. In 2015 primary products represented 70% of the region’s exports to China, compared to 34% of its shipments to the world.”

In parallel, 90% of Chinese investments are focused on natural resources, which is a source of many social conflicts. At this point, it should be mentioned that the organization Ecuadorian Ecological Action launched a document that coincided with Xi’s visit, which highlighted the serious environmental and social problems generated by the massive Chinese investments. The environmentalist group points out that until 2000, Monsanto held the patent on glyphosate, but upon expiry, various companies began to manufacture the generic product at a lower cost: “Thus, China has become the largest producer and exporter of glyphosate worldwide” (Acción Ecológica, November 15, 2016). Although this isn’t a new fact, it allows us to emphasize that the hegemonic power in ascent can bring consequences as disastrous as the hegemonic power in decline.

China leads mining investments in Ecuador, which has led to the modification of mining law to favor its companies. They have large enterprises, such as the Mirador project, which includes the construction of a port and highways to transport the material from the Amazon region. Additionally, the Asian country is the main source of credit for the country, tied to the prepayment of oil or buying and selling commitments. Thus, more than 80% of Ecuadorian oil exports are sold to China.

But the most emblematic case is the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric facility, built by Sinohydro with state funding and inaugurated by Xi on his trip. In December 2014, thirteen workers died in the construction of the dam, adding to the four dead on another dam built by China months earlier, this time Asian technicians. “The projects are part of a network of eight hydroelectric plants under construction with which Ecuador, a petro-state, hopes to stop importing electricity and become a clean energy exporter” (El Comercio, December 14, 2014).

Director of the Chinese Policy Observatory Xulio Ríos says “the new strategy registers a qualitative leap signaling China’s willingness to actively participate in the transformation of the region, not only adding development opportunities but also sealing an alliance to catapult its global political projection.”

But, at the same time, he points out, “the document suggests the parallel urgency that Latin America and the Caribbean establish minimum guidelines for its policy towards China” (Rebelión, December 1, 2016).

This appears to be the key point today. That for China to be ready to cooperate with the launch of the region as a global player, it must have its counterpart: that the region arrives at some achievements in integration and, above all, in its strategic profile; or rather, the place it wants to occupy in the world and therefore, what type of investments it intends to take in. Without making that leap, Latin America will continue to be a supplier of commodities without added-value, mortgaging its future. ______[1] CELAC: Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. <|++:++|>

280 MOROCCAN CULTURAL PRESERVATION AND THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE

Yossef Ben-Meir*

Morocco’s vision of sustainability

In the Kingdom of Morocco, there are a number of sustainable development programs and policies that display innovation and promote social solidarity. These participatory democratic initiatives are designed to catalyze people’s development that meet multiple human needs at the same time.

For example, the Municipal Charter of the nation requires the application of participatory methods for inclusive planning of community projects. Doing so enables new enterprises to address economic, environmental, and social factors and goals in a given region. Another example is Morocco’s Decentralization Roadmap, which in its design harnesses the resources of the national and regional levels in order to achieve locally-identified development priorities.

And, an embodiment of Morocco’s integrated development approach is its chosen way to preserve its culture. According to statements and the vision of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, multicultural actions should directly lead to human development results.

This is to say that preserving Moroccan cultural institutions, locations, and artifacts, also intends at the same time to enhance the lives of people in measurable ways, such as in education, income, and health. In essence, cultural activities are to be advanced simultaneously together with people’s development.

Since early in his reign, the King of Morocco has championed the premise of integrating cultural and sustainable development into single movements. The kingdom’s position in regards to the Alliance of Civilizations, for example, embodies the natural chemistry of actions that are both multicultural and developmental, as well as – in the case of the Alliance – meant to improve cooperation among nations. As King Mohammed VI explained in 2008: “That vision consists in making sure culture serves as a driving force for development as well as a bridge for dialogue.”

Moroccan-Jewish cemetery rehabilitation

One clear example that is occurring within Morocco (where cultural preservation and advancing the well-being of people work congruently) is regarding the national project launched in 2012 to rehabilitate the Jewish cemeteries. There are approximately 600 Hebrew “saints” that are buried in all parts of the kingdom. Many have laid in rest a millennium or more, and 167 of the sites have been part of the national preservation effort. Importantly, the Jewish community (starting in Marrakech) also began in 2012 to lend land to the High Atlas Foundation, a U.S.-Moroccan nonprofit organization, nearby seven of the sacred burials in order to plant organic fruit tree nurseries for the benefit of farming families and schools. Initial local efforts to preserve the Jewish cemeteries and lend land for community tree nurseries began in the 1990s, and has since been building to scale.

Given that most poverty in the nation (and in the world) exists in rural places, and that Moroccan farmers are transitioning from traditionally growing barley and corn, the demand for more profitable fruit trees is therefore very significant. Growing fruit trees from seedlings on land lent by the Moroccan Jewry and distributing them in-kind to marginalized rural communities not only meets a development priority, but is also an act of interfaith. The reinvigorated relationships between the Muslim farming families and Jewish community members leads to deepened appreciation among the beneficiaries of these historic religious places (even as the burial sites have been respected ever since their beginning). This multicultural initiative lends towards more goodwill due to the sustainable development results, and in turn increased social unity and actions of preservation. What maximizes the measure of solidarity (and sustainability),

281 however, is that the farming communities themselves identified fruit trees and their varieties as a development priority. Therefore, the project responds to the expressed needs of the people and helps to deliver the outcomes they seek, illustrating how cultural benefits can be maximized when participatory human development is fully incorporated into their processes.

The Marrakech mellah and Jewish continuity

Now, let’s consider the rehabilitation of the mellah, the Jewish quarter which historians suggest first appeared in Marrakech during the second half of the 16th century. The Jewish experience in Morocco, and certainly in Marrakech, with all of its cycles and periods, can be characterized as quite remarkable in its longevity and quality. There are impressive scholars who have dedicated themselves to understanding specifically and thematically what has transpired in Marrakech in regards to Jewish life, thought, cultural evolution, practice, trials, and major stretches of peaceful pluralism. I personally have not given this level of consideration to the social developments that constitute the Jewish-Marrakech narrative. However, one can fairly state that Jewish life in Marrakech has been incredibly rich, complex, nonlinear, hopeful, painful, continuous, and ongoing to this very moment. Therefore, the initiative to preserve this living and evolving social artifact is exceptionally worthy, and an action fully consistent with the Moroccan national identity and Constitution.

I have often come up against this question of, why Morocco? Jewry had lived for millennia in Near Eastern nations, but no longer do; yet in Morocco they remain to this day, and are invited to return if they had left. When vandalism, violence, and rejection seems to characterize the Jewish experience to varying degrees at different times in many nations of the world, one might ask why this has not been the case in Morocco. This question on one level may be as difficult to answer as is the question of why the Jewish people continue to exist as a cohesive group in the world at all. Why Morocco is an ongoing home when other nations have ceased to be, could invite an esoteric explanation, or one simply accepting that observers have yet to fully explain Moroccan-Jewish exceptionalism.

One “mystical” explanation that accounts for the deep Moroccan-Jewish bond was given by the last Lubavitcher Rebbe, the most influential Jewish leader of the 20th century, the late Rabbi Menachem Schneerson (1902-1994). In messages conveyed between the Rebbe and the late His Majesty King Hassan II (1929-1999), the Rebbe had made positive statements regarding the continued security of the kingdom, and it as a home for Jewish people, on account of the Hebrew saints (referred to earlier) that are buried in its ground. In fact, it was precisely the presence of the buried saints that prompted the Rebbe to equate the holiness of the land of Morocco to that of Israel. These assertions of the Rebbe are according to my conversations (in 2016) with Serge Berdugo, the Secretary General of the Moroccan Jewish Community and the then interlocutor between the Rebbe and King Hassan II.

Two considerable, more social scientific factors that account for the Moroccan-Jewish experience are seemingly clear: the kings of Morocco have set a vision and historic outlook that is absolutely indispensable to Jewish continuity and the indelible connection that Moroccan Jews have to the country, even long after they have relocated elsewhere. Another noted example of this is the manner in which the late His Majesty King Mohammed V protected Moroccan Jews in the face of Nazi persecution during World War II – a display of statesmanship for the ages.

In addition, the Moroccan people and the ultimately accepting culture that has emerged from them, is a vital element which helps to explain the Moroccan-Jewish story. This is to say, the people and their monarchs have set the standard which has chartered the kind of life that allows Moroccan Jewry to endure until today. The mellah and its preservation is a “normal” outgrowth of the past and present. Again, the fact that Moroccan public and civil sectors recognize and continuously uphold this dimension of its culture is in itself ordinarily Moroccan.

282 Evaluating the mellah’s revitalization

In regards to the human development dimension of the Marrakech mellah’s rehabilitation, one can first begin by stating that the initiative clearly serves as a short-term economic stimulus by way of investing in the employment and materials necessary to design and reconstruct the area. Rebuilding infrastructure is a form of measurable human development. It is no wonder then that the residents of the mellah in general have positive outlooks on the initiative.

Taking a participatory development perspective, however, there are further questions to consider, such as: how many local residents and their associations were involved in the planning of the rehabilitation of their neighborhood? How many residents were involved in the prioritization of the sites to be refurbished? Did the residents have a voice in creating the new designs of public areas? Were the immediate residents informed and educated about the meaning of the Jewish-Hebrew names of old of the streets and the reasons they were brought back?

In the Moroccan coastal city, Essaouria, for example, the local associations were fully involved (again with the facilitation work of the High Atlas Foundation) in the selection of the specific historical- religious sites that require rehabilitation. Inclusive participation helped bring out the idea – as well as helped forge needed public-private partnerships – to enable the proposed renovation of the Portuguese church to provide space for civil society workshops, their offices, and a display area for their crafts and innovations. Here there is a link between cultural preservation and the ongoing advancement of human development, that would continue well after reconstruction ends.

Taking the proposed rehabilitation of Essaouria as a model and applying it to the renovation of the Marrakech mellah, we need to evaluate if the structures that have been brought back provide civil society space and continue to further sustainable development. Did rebuilding the mellah create a groundswell of community meetings where the local people participated in the planning and design of projects that meet their needs? Are we witnessing ongoing development transformation driven by heightened solidarity and new opportunity? Are there subsequent or indirect projects that will ripple on from people’s broad participation, thereby generating many times over the amount of the cultural preservation investment?

It is exceedingly difficult, but not impossible, to involve people’s participation in defining goals after the development process is deep into implementation. My understanding is that to date, the mellah has been a good economic and publicity stimulus, but the needed domino-effect of ongoing development carried on by the local residents and their civil organizations is substantially less than optimal. This is primarily due to the fact that their participation was not adequately enlisted from the start of the rehabilitation program.

However, there is a strong desire among local partners to facilitate people’s participation in the human development dimension of the mellah’s restoration. For example, during the upcoming holy month of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar (from May 26th through June 25th), the Marrakech Jewish community, the Association Mimouna of Moroccan Muslim students, with the High Atlas Foundation are organizing F’tor (the meal breaking the fast at sundown) for local residents each Monday and Thursday at the mellah’s 400-year-old Slat Lazama Synagogue. The meal will be followed by community discussion and determination of local people’s new primary socio-economic and environmental initiatives.

Finally, the case of the mellah reminds me of an observation that one often makes when assisting social development in Morocco over time: the kingdom offers powerful and exemplary models for sustainable and shared growth driven by the participatory method. Thankfully, the participatory approach is codified into laws, polices, and programs. On the other hand, however, it remains a serious challenge to effectively achieve broad-based implementation in close accordance with the participatory vision that has been set forth to guide such actions. This is primarily because the skills to organize and facilitate local collaborative planning are not well enough dispersed, and the system of centralized management is so well

283 entrenched.

The nation is one of hope because of its past and present, its idealism, and commitment to sustainability. In a sense, though, Morocco’s challenge is confronted by all nations that are guided by practical ideals: to conscientiously embody act-by-act the progressive values that are intended to plot the course of their national development now and in the future.

*Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir is a sociologist and president of the High Atlas Foundation, a non-government organization dedicated to sustainable development.

ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL RENEWAL

Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir*

What does it look like when the local approach to achieving sustainable development projects guides not just how we govern, but is also strategically implemented by candidates to help them campaign and secure elected office?

First, let us consider which processes are most effective in advancing community initiatives that meet both socio-economic and environmental needs. From this vantage point, we can see how participatory development procedures translate into broad-based political movements.

Public participation in community programs and projects is the factor that most determines whether development-interventions successfully achieve their objectives. Sustainability requires local control in both the determination of priorities – regarding education, health, or the economy – as well as in management and evaluation of development projects.

By facilitating inclusive dialogue and planning, participatory development provides the basis for community-based and institutional relationships and the win-win cross-sectoral partnerships they form to achieve common goals. Critically, these projects are defined by the people (down to their budgets) in rural and small towns and cities, and designed to further their individual and shared interests.

A benefit of this process that can be especially harnessed in electoral politics is this: community- driven projects generate trust among beneficiaries, and between them and the individuals and agencies who helped turn their expressed ideas into improved life conditions. That goodwill and commitment is social capital that can launch political action and candidates.

The awesome challenge, however, is to organize across geographic spaces these open and local discussions regarding the needs of the community, and the implementation of solutions. To achieve this requires tremendous energy on the part of a dedicated political candidate. It requires communities that invite engagement and are willing to listen to and share different ideas. To catalyze participatory action, it requires experientially trained local facilitators of community planning.

How would this unfold in a political campaign? First, a political party or candidate would organize a series of meetings that involve local people assessing their needs, prioritizing their problems and opportunities, and implementing their plans of action. Political campaigning is then a process by which the people of a given jurisdiction meet, discuss, argue, reconcile, achieve consensus, and embark on a development path forward to meet their human needs.

In essence, the platform of one’s candidacy for public office becomes the genuine article of bottom-up politics and change, embodying the development projects of the people themselves. A candidate, able to catalyze participatory interaction across a municipality or state, will not only be in an

284 excellent position to govern if elected, but the candidate will most likely be elected because the platform is a direct outgrowth of what the people have prioritized for themselves and their communities.

Candidates and their campaigns will forge collaborative bonds in the process of assisting communities in generating the data derived from local discussion, so they may then decide and act immediately on what they most want. This also leads to candidates gaining deep knowledge and insight into the issues of the people and the performances of existing social programs.

Indeed, campaigning this way in itself enables people to have a clear understanding of the kind of democratic governing to which the candidate is dedicated. A promise to rebuild infrastructure, retool dislocated workers, improve our schools, and heal drug addiction will no longer be just words, but a commitment that has emerged from hands-on experience regarding how improving society actually takes place, and the critical role that local empowerment has in such a process.

In fact, running for elected office in a manner informed by the concepts of participatory development and sustainability is a no-lose proposition. The results of the campaign itself will be numerous, viable, and may ultimately serve as essential proposals for local projects that can then become a bill of legislation before a state assembly, or a national congress or parliament. Win or lose, good shall be done – the campaign shall not be in vain due to this tangible accomplishment.

Juxtaposing this political strategy against the two dominant parties in the United States, it resonates with the core ideals of both the Democratic and Republican platforms. When people participate in and control the social initiatives that impact their very lives, it is true an expression of federalism or state (sub-national) empowerment. It promotes a decentralized system of managing affairs, it champions municipal and provincial or state levels of decision-making, and builds local capacities to create the change that people seek. At its founding and still today, engendering local control is a primary value of the Republican Party.

The Democratic Party would find its identity embodied in this strategy, because of its inclusive nature, which embraces young and old, women and men, the marginalized, the disabled, the less heard, indeed every person who abides in a locale. Furthermore, this approach inherently acknowledges that poverty, inadequate education and health care, etc. are not predominantly caused by the people who endure these trials. Rather, social problems that afflict our lives are rooted in matters of history, geography, decisions of previous generations, decisions made in distant places, our treatment of gender and ethnicity, circumstances of birth, and inadequate human services.

Indeed, alternative politics driven by the tenets of sustainability is a fulfillment of outlooks of both the left and right. It does not compromise the individual for the sake of the community, and vice versa, but rather simultaneously enhances both. Participatory renewal diminishes the separation between campaigning and governing, by way of the electoral process being a series of community actions that would unfold if the candidate or party were in the position of governance.

Most essentially, people need to be heard, needs are dire, stratifications within society and between societies are alarming, and campaign promises often ring hollow. When a bill for funding the projects of the people is a certain outcome of electoral campaigns themselves, then no words are necessary to accept on faith. But in fact, the actions that constitute a campaign for public office become much less distinguishable from those that characterize governing after victory.

*Dr. Yossef Ben-Meir is a sociologist and president of the nonprofit organization, the High Atlas Foundation. .:..:::..:.

285 STRATEGIES FOR RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE BEHAVIOR: ADDRESSING ANXIETY IN LARGE AND SMALL SYSTEMS

Robert W.Hotes*

Recent (2017) political events such as the use of Syria’s alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians and the United States’ response are capable of increasing anxiety that both threatens world peace and may limit organizational effectiveness. This article examines some factors which contribute to organizational stress and strategies that may be used by practitioners to alleviate the effects of anxiety within organizations, and effects of the growing presence of societies to choose national leaders with. tendencies to increase stress and uncertainty are also dis cussed.

Organization Development (OD) specialists who are interested in non-violent change and global peace initiatives often encounter organizational dysfunctions due to individual stress. While the special helping relationships between OD practitioners and their clients or client systems are unique (Schein 2013), there may be cases in which OD interventions can relieve some aspects of individual stress and organizational dysfunction. Anecdotal and research based data indicate an increase in the level of organizational stress in many large systems due to global political instability (American Psychological Association (APA), (2016). The current (2017) global political environment shows an increase in stress in members of organizations of all sizes and produce decrements in organizational focus on outcomes. Aggressive and belligerent behavior on the part of world leaders may lead to stress within organizations and have a negative impact on productivity. Survey research by the APA in (2016) revealed a significant increase of stress in the U.S. population attributable to political instability and perceived threats. It would seem reasonable to hypothesize that such stress levels exist in other societies as well. Selected anecdotal evidence points to stress as a factor in initiating violent behavior. Global terrorism and economic stressors make a significant increase in stress a global reality. While the quantitative impact of environmental stressors on organizational performance remains n object of study, there is a significant body of anecdotal and research evidence that points to the negative impact of stressors on individual human life and organizational performance. Individuals may face a variety of stresses at work as well. While the economic outlook in the United States and other Western democracies has improved significantly in recent months, individuals may still experience significant stress due to career frustrations. In addition, organizational productivity and work life may be affected by current (2017) instability in the political and social environment. Perceptions of vulnerability to terrorist aggression and to other expressions of violence within the society may have significant impact on the ability of individuals to lead productive and satisfying lives. In turn, this environment may engender significant threats to world peace by fostering the rise of defensive nationalism based upon fear and allowing the ascendance of fascist demagoguery in large political systems. As Adler (1979) notes, intimidation may be due to feelings of inferiority on the part of those who are attempting to intimidate. Expressions of power and dominance may be a felt need to compensate for perceptions of insecurity and weakness. It might be suggested that such factors may be seen in the psychological profiles of Bashar al Assad, Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un, Marie Le Penne and Donald Trump.

While it is beyond the scope of OD practice as generally accepted to conduct individual or group psychotherapy, practitioners may need to address mental wellness within the organizations that they strive to help. Stress can have both negative and positive effects on organizational culture. In relationship to the negative effects of stress mentalization, that is, the ability to be aware of mental states and the process of understanding oneself and others, and mindfulness in terms of psychological centering may have distinct applications to OD practice. In the literature of contemporary behavioral science, mindfulness offers strategies for dealing with stability of mental health. One application of the practice of mindfulness is the relief of stress. In this discussion, the position is taken that stress as experienced by stakeholders within an organization may impact a variety of economic decision making factors in a form that may inhibit non-violent change. The ability of practices related to mindfulness aimed at mitigating such stress may be considered in the context of facilitating nonviolent change. In addition, the cultivation of mindfulness

286 practices and mentalization may provide individuals with resources allowing them to cope with the effects of violence on organizational culture in small, large and medium systems.

Stress may produce either positive or negative results. The type of stress hat Hans Seyle (1974) calls eustress” can be seen in aiding athletic performance. Stress influences the neurochemistry of the individual. Though stress the individual may experience an increase in norepinephrine leading to improvements in alertness and concentration. In other words, it is possible that stress can produce positive effects since it produces heightened awareness and the potential for exceptionally productive and creative behavior. Such effects may include increased focus and what some researchers (Csikszentmihalyi 1990) have termed “Flow” in personal performance Increased personal performance, if aligned with organizational realities, may well result in increased organizational health, stability and measurable outcomes. Individuals who experience “flow” are integrated with their performance to the extent that they may be “in the moment” Comparisons are made of this stare with the feelings that athletes have during their best performances.

On the other hand, the kind of stress that produces negative physical effects through elevation of cortisol levels can have a serious negative effect on individual and therefore organizational performance. Some of the effects that might be observed include:

• Increase in unaccounted for absences • Reduced productivity as indicated by standard measures • Less career motivation • Increased reporting of health-related issues such as hypertension

In organizations in which there are excessive internal and external stressors organizational team members may exhibit symptoms that are like those of persons with generalized anxiety disorders. According to the National Institute on Mental Health (2017) people with generalized anxiety disorder display excessive anxiety or worry for months and face several anxiety-related symptoms. Generalized anxiety disorder symptoms include:

• Restlessness or feeling wound-up or on edge • Being easily fatigued • Difficulty concentrating or having their minds go blank • Irritability • Muscle tension • Difficulty controlling the worry • Sleep problems (difficulty falling or staying asleep or restless, unsatisfying sleep)

Culture has a significant effect on how stress is managed within an organization. Organizational culture holds important indicators as to resilience in the face of stressful conditions. In several his works on organizational culture and organization development Edgar Schein () has stressed the difference between the helping relationship that is established between OD clients and consultants and those relationships typical of other types of helping relationships. For Schein, it is essential that OD practitioners understand in which ways their roles as helping professionals differ from those roles of practitioners in other disciplines. The relationship between the OD practitioner and her/his clients or client system is different in nature from that of the psychotherapist or other helper.

Technologies related to of mentalization and mindfulness are worthy of consideration by change agents in adding individuals reach goals related to non-violent change. Organization Development Specialists who are dedicated to the fostering of non-violent change may find the use of mentalization and mindfulness techniques of use in their work with clients affected by the stress of uncertainty. Therapists

287 working within an organizational context often assist their clients through training in reframing, meditation, physical activities and relaxation

Mindfulness and mentalization can be helpful in the face of violence and fear. Mindfulness is a process that allows individuals to bring focus and attention to the present moment. As such mindfulness can be an aid to the relief of anxiety and stress. While it is essential in OD practice to understand that the helping model employed is not based on a practitioner – client mental health therapeutic relationship, practitioners may find that providing information on mindfulness is useful in reducing stress within organizations. In addition, mentalization can aid in the understanding of the mental states of behavior. Mentalization may focus on both the mental states of oneself and others.

Because organizations exist to focus the abilities and productive capabilities of individual contributors on specific outputs, Modalities and interventions that are designed to mitigate such stress can be important tools in bringing about non-violent change. Mindfulness and mentalization techniques adopted by individuals may also aid in defense against organizational bullying. Robust defenses on the individual level may have positive consequences for the ability to handle organizational change in non- violent ways. OD specialists may consider employing such strategies as mindfulness training and mentalization strategies as tools to facilitate change in the desired direction. Although O.D. specialists are not in the role of individual therapists, they can be of assistance in helping individuals to cope with stress in the organizational workplace. By their training in behavioral science techniques, OD practitioners can be helpful is assisting individuals to master skills in expressing empathy, discrepancy analysis, avoiding argumentation, accepting and use resistance (principles of Aikido), Supporting self-efficacy among individuals within can lead to increased organizational effectiveness and movement toward peaceful resolution of conflicts. This is not to suggest that OD specialists can or should assume roles appropriates to organizational therapists. But providing information and referrals would seem to be logically within the scope of OD practice.

Discussion

Pathologies in organizational behavior exhibited by leaders may infect the entire organization. The rise of populist sentiments in several Western democracies has provided a basis for activities that are focused on the domination and/or abuse by one individual or group of another individual or group. The prime considerations developed in this literature center on the abuse and intimidation of individuals. But it is also relevant to the behavior of large systems, i.e., societies and nations and groups of nations on other societies or groups. In the current (2017) socio-political environment, immanent threats to world peace and, indeed, human survival, are resulting in increased individual and organizational stress. Historically such stress has often lead to violent behavior on the part of individuals and nations. Violence and intimidation on an organizational scale can take place between or among individuals and groups. This may take the form of threatening behavior or verbal expression. As noted by Adler (1979) many of these behaviors may be the result of feelings of inadequacy on the part of the perpetrator of violence. The quest for acknowledgement of superiority by others is often the result of deep-seated feelings of inferiority. Given the current (2017) geo-political situation, assessing and working to improve organizational behavior through mindfulness and mentalization strategies may be considered as appropriate OD interventions if conducted with a correct understanding of the scope of service by both providers and clients. - Citations/resources American Psychological Association, downloaded March 29, 2017 http://www.apa.org/topics/bullying/.“To read the full Stress in America report or to download graphics, visit http://www.stressinamerica.org

• For additional information on stress, lifestyle and behaviors, visit www.apa.org/helpcenter. • Join the conversation about stress on Twitter by following @APAHelpCenter and #stressAPA.

288 Adler, A (1979 ) Superiority and Social {nterest. New York WW Norton and Company Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1990). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: Harper and Row. ISBN 0-06-092043-2 · Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (2014). Flow and the Foundations of Positive Psychology: The Collected Works of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. ISBN 978-94-017-9087-1 · Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (2014). Applications of Flow in Human Development and Education: The Collected Works of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. ISBN 978-94-017-9093-2 https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/anxiety-disorders/index.shtml J. Kabat-Zinn. Full catastrophe living - how to cope with stress, pain and illness using mindfulness meditation. (2013) New York, Bantom · Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

· Selye, Hans (1974). Stress without distress. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company. p. 171. Schein, E. H. (2013). Humble Inquiry: The Gentle Art of Asking Instead of Telling. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. *Robert W.Hotes Ph.D, RODC, is a Fellow, The Association for Psychological Science. © 2017 Robert W. Hotes Ph.D. [email protected] }---->>>------+++<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<==+++==>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>+++------<<<----{

MEDIA NOTES

Green Century’s free guide to responsible and fossil fuel free investing is available at: http://greencentury.com/why-choose-green-century/fossil-fuel-free-investing/download-the- guide/?utm_source=AME1701B&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TPIN&urlVariable=AME1701B.

Search for Common Ground, Peacebuilders Guide to Transforming Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilders Guide is available from Common Ground at: https://www.sfcg.org/transforming-violent-extremism-peacebuilders- guide/.

In a new publication released today by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Understanding fragmentation in conflict and its impact on prospects for peace, the author highlights a number of key findings about fragmentation in conflict, and the role of mediation in such situations. Drawing on a range of examples, the author examines the consequences of fragmentation for conflict and how peace processes may affect this fragmentation, including an exploration of the role mediation can play in exacerbating it. Practice-oriented throughout, the publication assesses techniques which mediators have used to respond to fragmentation in the past, including negotiating solely with armed actors, involving unarmed actors in the process, sequencing the negotiations, and undertaking efforts to coalesce the opposition. Understanding fragmentation in conflict and its impact on prospects for peace is the latest in the Oslo Forum Paper series. The publication is available as a free download from HD's website at https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Understanding-fragmentation- in-conflict.pdf.

USEFUL WEB SITES

UN NGO Climate Change Caucus, with numerous task forces, is at: http://climatecaucus.net.

On the Frontlines of Climate Change: A global forum for indigenous peoples, small islands and vulnerable communities can be subscribed to at: http://www.climatefrontlines.org/lists/?p=subscribe. See postings on the website at: http://www.climatefrontlines.org/en-GB/node/148.

Earth Policy Institute, dedicated to building a sustainable future as well as providing a plan of how to get from here to there: www.earthpolicy.org.

289

Wiser Earth lists more than 10,700 environmental and environmental justice organizations at: http://www.wiserearth.org/organization/

Earthwatch, the world’s largest environmental volunteer organization, founded in 1971, works globally to help the people of the planet volunteer realize a sustainable environment: http://www.earthwatch.org/.

Avaaz.org works internationally on environmental and peace and justice issues: http://www.avaaz.org.

The Environmental Defense Fund works on environmental issues and policy, primarily in the U.S.: http://edf.org.

Earthjustice focuses on environmental issues and action: http://action.earthjustice.org.

The Sierra Club works on environmental issues in the United States: http://action.sierraclub.org.

SaveOurEnvironemnt.org, a coalition of environmental organizations acting politically in the U.S.: http://ga3.org/campaign/0908_endangered_species/xuninw84p7m8mxxm.

The National Resources Defense Council works on a variety of environmental issues in the U.S.: NRhttp://www.nrdconline.org/

Care 2 is concerned about a variety of issues, including the environment: http://www.care2.com/.

Rainmakers Oceania studies possibilities for restoring the natural environment and humanity's rightful place in it, at: http://rainmakers-ozeania.com/0annexanchorc/about-rainmakers.html.

Green Ships, in fall 2008, was is asking Congress to act to speed the development of new energy efficient ships that can take thousands of trucks off Atlantic and Pacific Coast highways, moving freight up and down the costs with far less carbon emissions and more cheaply: http://www.greenships.org.

Carbon Fund Blog carries climate change news, links to green blogs, and a green resource list, at: http://carbonfund.blogspot.com/2008/03/sky-is-falling.html. Carbon Fund is certifying carbon free products at: http://www.carbonfund.org/site/pages/businesses/category/CarbonFree.

Grist carries environmental news and commentary: http://www.grist.org/news/,

Green Inc. is a new blog from The New York Times devoted to energy and the environment at: greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com.

Planting Peace is, "A Resource Center for news and activities that seek to build a powerful coalition to bring about cooperation and synergy between the peace movement, the climate crisis movement, and the organic community." Their web site includes extensive links to organizations, articles, videos and books that make the connections, at: http://organicconsumers.org/plantingpeace/index.cfm, Planting Peace is sponsored by the Organic Consumers Association: http://organicconsumers.org/.

The Global Climate Change Campaign: http://www.globalclimatecampaign.org/.

The center for defense information now carries regular reports on Global Warming & International Security at: http://www.cdi.org.

Georgetown University’s Conflict Resolution Program and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) have created an online database of multimedia resources related to conflict management, as well as best

290 practices for designing and using them at: Peace Media http://peacemedia.usip.org. For information, contact: Dr. Craig Zelizer, Associate Director, Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution, Department of Government, Georgetown University, 3240 Prospect Street, Washington, DC 20007, (202)687-0512, [email protected], http://conflictresolution.georgetown.edu, http://internationalpeaceandconflict.org.

Learn Stuff has a long list of groups that deal with international conflicts and crises at: http://www.learnstuff.com/learn-about-international-crisis-groups/.

Global Beat, has been an excellent source of information and further sources for Nonviolent Change, at: http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat. Global Beat also has an E-mail list serve.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) carries regular reports and sets of recommendations about difficult developing situations around the globe, and has been an extremely helpful source of information and ideas for this journal: http://www.crisisgroup.org/. ICG also has a regular E-mail report circulation service that can be subscribed to on its web site. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has launched a frequently updated website on “the nexus of issues surrounding Cyprus, Turkey and the European Union,” at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/.

The International Relations Center (IRC): http://www.irc-online.org/.

"Models of Unity", at: http://www.modelsofunity.net/, is a new web site that seeks to explore where people have come together across racial, ethnic, and religious divides to work for the betterment of their communities.

Tikkun, the Network of Spiritual Progressives is at: http://www.tikkun.org

IMRA – Middle East News and Analysis: http://www.imra.org.il/.

Transcend Africa, provides reports from across Africa at: www.transcendafrica.net.

Americas Program: www.cipamericas.org, which includes a blog.

The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO): http://www.unpo.org/.

Europa World Plus: Europa World/Regional Surveys of the World On Line is at: www.europaworld.com.

Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA http://wozazimbabwe.org/.

The Pulitzer Center, whose mission is to promote in-depth coverage of international affairs, focusing on topics that have been under-reported, mis-reported - or not reported at all: http://www.pulitzercenter.org/.

Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR): www.acr.net.

Peace Voice, a source for thoughtful articles on the world today by Peace Professionals including members of academia and the non-profit sector, Home page is: http://www.peacevoice.info.. To view abstracts of unpublished current offerings, which are available at no charge, go to www.Abstracts.PeaceVoice.info. To view pieces that have been published and are also available for reprint at no charge: http://www.peacevoice.info.

Peace Media publishes a monthly web magazine at: http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=6086.

291

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is at: www.wagingpeace.org, providing educational information on nuclear weapons abolition and other issues relating to global security

The Open society Institute and the Soros Foundation: http://www.soros.org/

Conciliation Resources (CR) has re-launched its website http://www.c-r.org.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: http://www.hdcentre.org/.

International Peace Bureau (IPB): http://www.ipb.org.

Noviolenciaactiva.com is a collection of posts that cover the importance of nonviolent action, events, and news in Spanish. Nonviolent Action, in English, presents a diversity of points of view about nonviolent action and nonviolence at: http://org2.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=lfiV4N6x%2B8od%2FyOP7%2F2hEePJkCiqRSZ Q. Additional resources in Spanish are on-line at the website: TrainingforChange.org. Mostly training materials, plus some articles on nonviolent strategy.

Gush Shalom, voice of the Israeli Peace Movement is at: www.gush-shalom.org.

Adam Keller of Gush Shalom has a blog, at: http://adam-keller1.blogspot.com/ in Hebrew and http://adam-keller2.blogspot.com/ in English.

The Institute for Strategic Studies: http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database/.

Peace and Collaborative Development Network “is a free professional networking site to foster dialogue and sharing of resources in international development, conflict resolution, gender mainstreaming, human rights, social entrepreneurship and related fields. Feel free to explore the site content and features”, at: http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/.

World Security Institute and the Center for Defense Information: www.worldsecurityinstitute.org. The World Security Institute (WSI) offers audio podcast programming in its list of interactive communication features at the iTunes Music Store, WSI’s podcasts will include audio recordings of press conferences, panel discussions, and interviews with WSI experts hosted by WSI or in collaboration with other media outlets. Download iTunes at www.apple.com/itunes. Find WSI podcasts by searching for “World Security Institute” under the podcast section of the iTunes Music Store, or by clicking this link: http://phobos.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewPodcast?id=215717216, The WSI Brussels Security Blog aims to continue and expand the efforts of the World Security Institute, Brussels, to inform, stimulate, and shape the debate around the security and defense dilemmas facing Europe and the world, with a view to formulating effective and lasting solutions, posting regular commentary related to: Afghanistan, the Balkans, Darfur, ESDP, Iran, Iraq, Missile Defense, NATO, OSCE, Peace Support Operations, and Terrorism, at: http://wsibrusselsblog.org/.

The Universal Human Rights Index Website is a database for finding information and documents produced by the various components of the UN human rights system. It can easily do searches, by keywords and other methods on inquiry, at: http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/.

The Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA): http://www.peacejusticestudies.org/.

Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR): http://www.psysr.org.

The International Peace Research Association has a new website, ass of November, 2007:

292 http://www.ipraweb.org.

The International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) Program a American University web site, including bi-monthly newsletters, is at: newsletter at www.aupeace.org.

The Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict: http://www.uwsp.edu/cols-ap/WIPCS/Pages/journal.aspx.

Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace is at: www.religionconflictpeace.org.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Jerusalem 2050 Project: http://envisioningpeace.org.

The Human Rights Campaign (HRC): http://www.hrc.org/.

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP): www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org.

Ikeda Center for Peace, Learning, and Dialogue (formerly the Boston Research Center for the 21st Century), is at: http://www.ikedacenter.org/publications.htm.

The Network of Spiritual Progressives: http://www.spiritualprogressives.org/.

The Baha'i International Community's journal, One Country: www.onecountry.org.

The Stanley Foundation, “brings fresh voices and original ideas to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance,” is at: www.stanleyfoundation.org.

Global Peace Hut: http://www.globalpeacehut.org/

Awakening the Dreamer, Changing the Dream runs on line discussions of “the most critical issue and greatest opportunity of our time and what you can do about it,” at: http://www.awakeningthedreamer.org/.

The America’s Program is at: http://www.americaspolicy.org/, with detailed news of Mexico at: www.americasmexico.blogspot.com.

Peace and Collaborative Development Network is at: http://internationalpeaceandconflict.org).

The Network for Peace through Dialogue's Shaping Our Future program offers online dialogue sessions at: http://networkforpeace.com/Who/quality-dialogue.htm.

The International Journal of Conflict and Violence focuses on one specific topic in each semi-annual on line issue while also including articles on other, unrelated subjects. In the Fall 2007 issue the focus will be on terrorism. The Journal is at: http://www.ijcv.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=27.

Culture of Peace Online Journal is at: http://www.copoj.ca/.

The Journal of Stellar Peacemaking is at: Error! Hyperlink reference not valid..

Peacework Magazine, "Global Thought and Local Action for Nonviolent Social Change" (also in print), published by the American Friends Service Committee - New England, 2161 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, MA 02140 (617)661.6130, [email protected], is at: www.peaceworkmagazine.org.

293 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy is at: http://www.bepress.com/peps.

Jewish Voice for Peace and Jewish Peace News: www.jewishpeacenews.net.

Adam Keller of Gush Shalom blog, is at: http://adam-keller1.blogspot.com/ in Hebrew and http://adam- keller2.blogspot.com/ in English.

Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies is at: http://www.peaceresearch.ca/index.html.

The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies is at: http://www.peaceresearch.ca.

Nonviolent Social Change: the Bulletin of the Manchester College Peace Studies Institute, Nonviolent Social Change: the Bulletin of the Manchester College Peace Studies Institute: http://www.manchester.edu/Academics/departments/Peace_Studies/bulletin/index.ht.

The Journal of Aggression, Conflict, and Peace Research is at: www.pierprofessional.com/jacprflyer.

Journal of Conflictology, Campus for Peace, Open University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain is at: http://www.uoc.edu/portal/english/campus_pau/novetats/actualitat/noticies/0312_JOC.html,

Journal of Globalization for The Common Good, dedicated to global cooperation and dialogue, is at: www.commongoodjournal.com.

Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative (GCGI): www.globalisationforthecommongood.info. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy (PEPS), is at http://www.bepress.com/peps.

The UN Chronicle: United Nations in a United World is at: www.un.org/chronicle.

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy is at: http://www.bepress.com/peps.

The Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution (JLCR) is a multidisciplinary peer-reviewed journal published monthly by Academic Journals: http://www.academicjournals.org/JLCR.

The Muslim World Journal of Human Rights (MWJHR) is at: http://www.bepress.com/mwjhr.

The Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace is at www.religionconflictpeace.org.

Peace Action is at: www.Peace-Action.org

Caucasus Context is at: http://www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/showarticle.cfm?id=218. The National Conference on Dialogue and Deliberation (NCDD)'s Learning Exchange, as of August 2007 included over 2200 resources, is at: www.thataway.org/exchange/.

The Africa Peace and Conflict Network (APCN) offers open-access publications, including full research papers, Briefings, and a photo journal, at: www.africaworkinggroup.org/publications.

The Global Development Briefing, the largest circulation publication designed specifically for international development professionals, is at: www.DevelopmentEx.com.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), CSO Net - the Civil Society Network: http://www.un.org/ecosoc/csonet.

294 UN Millennium Development Goals, indicators of levels of success on ending poverty: http://www.mdgmonitor.org/.

Peace and Collaborative Development Networking at: http://internationalpeaceandconflict.ning.com/, is a free professional networking site to encourage interaction between individuals and organizations worldwide involved in development, peace, conflict resolution and related fields.

The Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC) at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University blog, entitled "Conflict and Collaboration" is at: http://conflictandcollaboration.wordpress.com/about/.

International Society for Universal Dialogue: www.isud.org.

Ideologies of War and Terrorism Web Site is at: http://www.ideologiesofwar.com/.

The Global Nonviolent Action Database, as of March 26, 2013, was offering over 560 cases in its expanding database, in both formats: 2-3 page narratives that tell the story of the campaign, and searchable fields that enable the viewer to research many questions, from how other movements have used the occupation method (or nearly two hundred others!), to which countries have done what kinds of campaigns as researched so far, to finding dozens of examples of struggles for environmental justice and overthrowing dictators. It includes a map that enables one to search by clicking on a graphic "pin" located on any of six continents. Just click on Browse cases by geographic location: http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu.

H-Net-Peace carries announcements, etc., relating to peace at: http://www.h-net.org/~peace/.

The Journal of Peacebuilding and Development (JPD) is at: www.journalpeacedev.org, or email: [email protected].

Conflitti is the journal of Centro Psicopedagogico per la Pace e la gestione dei conflitti (in Italian) available from the center at: http://www.cppp.it/il_numero_12012.html.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation publishes an E-mail newsletter, The Sunflower, carrying its purpose, positions, programs and relevant developments, which can be accessed via: www.wagingpeace.org/sunflower-newsletter-february-2015.

The M. K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence, is at University of Rochester, Interfaith Chapel, Box 270501, Rochester, NY 14627 (585)276-3787, [email protected], gandhiinstitute.org

The Peace Education Center, IIPE, and Global Campaign for Peace Education invite have a global online initiative “the Peace Education Online Communities,” at: www.c-i-p-e.org/forum. The Peace Education Online Community is an interactive website that enables members of the global community to communicate and interact with eachother through a number of tools including: online discussions, collaborative working spaces, an updatable calendar of events, member profiles, reports of institutes, the sharing of files and papers including sample curricula and best practices from local communities, and much, much more. This web-based initiative was developed to support the members and participants of the International Institute on Peace Education, Community-based Institutes on Peace Education, and the Global Campaign for Peace Education, and other concerned educators. For more information contact: peace- [email protected]. The Global Campaign for Peace Education Newsletter is usually published as a list serve monthly, with subscription and back issues at: www.tc.edu/PeaceEd/newsletter.

The Global Campaign for Peace Education (GCPE) e-newsletter provides a monthly bulletin of GCPE news, events, action alerts and reports of peace education activities and developments from around the world.

295 Back issues of the newsletter are archived online at www.tc.edu/PeaceEd/newsletter. To subscribe via E- mail go to: http://c-i-p-e.org/elist/?p=subscribe&id=2.

Peace Education Research Update One World, Many Peaces features a regular update on published work in peace research, from academic, popular and organizational sources. The March 1, 2010 update gives special focus to peace education at: http://www.oneworldmanypeaces.

The online Encyclopedia of Peace Education is at: http://www.tc.edu/centers/epe/.

The Plowshares site has on it a section for Syllabi from Courses Related to Peace Studies (from various sources) at: http://www.plowsharesproject.org/php/resources/index.php.

L'Escola de Cultura Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) – Teacher Resource offers an interactive resource targeted to teachers interested in promoting conflict transformation and peace education at school at: http://www.escolapau.org/castellano/convivencia/index.htm.

Edward W. Lollis tries to keep track of all peace monuments worldwide, including peace murals: http://peace.maripo.com.

The Organization Development Institute is a nonprofit educational association organized in 1968 to promote a better understanding of and to disseminate information about organization development, at: http://www.odinstitute.org/. ||||||||||-}}}}}}}}++++\,,,,,,,,,,@,,,,,,,,,,/++++{{{{{{{{-||||||||||

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