The Role of Presidents in Foreign Policy Making Since the Foundation of Turkish Republic

Home , Adnan Menderes, Ali Bozer, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Ferruh Bozbeyli, Fuat Sirmen, Refik Koraltan

T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE DEPARTMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE ROLE OF PRESIDENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF TURKISH

REPUBLIC

MASTER THESIS

HAMZA YURTERİ

JUNE 2019

THE ROLE OF PRESIDENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF TURKISH REPUBLIC

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE INSTITUTE SOCIAL SCIENCES

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

HAMZA YURTERİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JUNE 2019

Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

______

Doç. Dr. Seyfullah Yıldırım Manager of Institute

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

______

Prof. Dr. Birol Akgün Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

______Prof. Dr. Birol Akgün Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Birol Akgün (AYBU, IR and IR) ______

Dr. Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan (AYBU, IR and IR) ______

Dr. Metin Çelik (SU, IR and IR) ______

PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Hamza YURTERİ

İMZA

iii

ABSTRACT

YURTERİ, Hamza

MA, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN

June 2019, 158 Page

THE ROLE OF PRESIDENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF TURKISH REPUBLIC

In the wake of Cold War changing dynamics of international politics bring about diversification of determinants of foreign policy. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) provides an opportunity for analyzing the diversification by opening the “black-box” of the state. However, in the studies related with Turkish foreign policy, attempts to open the black-box the remain incapable in order to meet requirements of the diversification. The main concentration of the research is to fill the deficiency in the literature by investigating how a foreign policy output is shaped regarding role of the institutions and domestic powers. The study aims to investigate influence of the Presidents on foreign policy decision making and emphasize changing of the influence from a president to other president based on legal context within frame of authority given by the constitutions and balance of domestic political context involving de facto situation materialized beyond legal conditions. In addition, the presumption that the leadership styles of the Presidents shape their impact on the process will be discussed by using the leadership profile analysis method.

Key Terms: Foreign Policy Analysis, The Role of Presidents, Turkish Presidential System, Development of Foreign Policy Making Process

ÖZET

YURTERİ, Hamza

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN

Haziran 2019, 158 Sayfa

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ’NİN KURULUŞUNDAN GÜNÜMÜZE DIŞ POLİTİKA YAPIMINDA CUMHURBAŞKANLARININ ROLÜ

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında uluslararası politikaların değişen dinamikleri, dış politika belirleyicilerinin çeşitlenmesini beraberinde getirmiştir. Dış Politika Analizi (DPA), devletin “kara kutusunu” açarak bu çeşitliliğin analiz edilebilmesine imkan sağlamaktadır. Fakat, Türk dış politikası ile ilgili çalışmalarda, söz konusu çeşitliliğin gerekliliklerini karşılamak adına yapılan kara kutuyu açma teşebbüsleri yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu noktada söz konusu araştırma, yasal bir bağlamda kurumların, pratik bağlamda ise iç siyasi güçlerin Türk dış politikası yapım sürecindeki rollerini araştırmak suretiyle literatürdeki eksiklikleri gidermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu minvalde Cumhurbaşkanlarının dış politika yapım süreçlerindeki rolü anayasanın tanımış olduğu yetkiler çerçevesinde yasal zeminde ele alınacak ve iç siyasi güç konfigürasyonundan etkilenerek yasal zeminin ötesinde ortaya çıkan fiili durum incelenecektir. Bunun yanında Cumhurbaşkanlarının liderlik tarzlarının onların süreç üzerindeki etkisini şekillendirdiği öngörüsü liderlik profili analizi yönteminden faydalanılarak tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika Analizi, Cumhurbaşkanlarının Rolü, Türk Tipi Cumhurbaşkanlık Sistemi, Dış Politika Yapım Sürecinin Gelişimi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Foremost, I would like to express my very great appreciation to Prof. Dr. Birol Akgün for his valuable advice, constructive suggestions, kindly contribution and leading not only at the formation but also evolution of the thesis. I would like to emphasize that the courses I have received from him both in undergraduate and master’s degree and his works provide me unique perspective seeing the bases of academic maturity and critical intellectual production. It was a great privilege and honor to work and study under his guidance. Therefore, I am grateful to him.

In addition, I would like to offer my special thanks to lecturers at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University who provided my inspiration and my first steps in the academic field.

In addition, I am particularly grateful for the assistance and friendships given by Mehmet Ali Ak, Ahmet Baykal, and Ömer Faruk Uğurlu who always take care to be with me for the stimulating discussions, and for their great sense of humor.

Last but not the least, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my dear wife Mürvet Yurteri, my dear mother Sultan Yurteri and my kindly father Kadir Yurteri for their support, prayers and encouragement throughout my study. I am also very grateful to my dear sisters Dilruba Yurteri, Elmas Yurteri and Esra Yurteri for their, understanding and continuing support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM ...... iii ABSTRACT ...... iv ÖZET ...... v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vii TABLE LISTS ...... x INTRODUCTION ...... 1 CHAPTER I: THEORITICAL BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS ...... 4 1.1 Concept of the Foreign Policy ...... 4 1.2. The Rising of Foreign Policy Analysis Studies ...... 5 1.3. Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations ...... 8 1.4. Historical and Paradigmatic Development of Foreign Policy Analysis .... 12 1.4.1. Sociological Development of Foreign Policy Analysis ...... 16 1.4.2. Domestic Political Development of Foreign Policy Analysis ...... 17 1.4.3. Psychological Development of Foreign Policy Analysis ...... 20 1.5. Contemporary Foreign Policy Analysis Studies ...... 22 1.6. Decision Unit ...... 23 1.6.1. Predominant Leader ...... 24 1.6.2. Single Group ...... 25 1.6.3. Multiple Autonomous Groups ...... 26 CHAPTER II: PRESIDENCY IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ...... 27 2.1. Legal Context ...... 27 2.2. Internal Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 29 2.3. Personality and Leadership ...... 31 2.3.1. Leadership Trait Analysis ...... 34 CHAPTER III: 1924 FOUNDING CONSTITUTION ...... 39 3.1. Legal Status ...... 39 3.2. Actual State ...... 43 3.2.1. Single-Party Period ...... 44 3.2.1.1. Mustafa Kemal’s Era ...... 44

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3.2.1.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers ...... 44 3.2.1.1.2. Ataturk’s Leadership Profile ...... 47 3.2.1.2. İsmet İnönü’s Era ...... 49 3.2.1.2.1. Balance of Domestic Powers ...... 49 3.2.1.2.2. İnönü’s Leadership Profile ...... 52 3.2.2. Multi-Party Period ...... 55 3.2.2.1. Celal Bayar’s Era ...... 55 3.2.2.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers ...... 55 3.2.2.1.2. Celal Bayar’s Leadership Profile ...... 60 CHAPTER IV: 1961 CONSTITUTION ...... 62 4.1. Legal Status ...... 63 4.2. Actual State ...... 67 4.2.1. Cemal Gursel’s Era ...... 68 4.2.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers...... 68 4.2.1.2. Cemal Gürsel’s Leadership Profile ...... 71 4.2.2. Cevdet Sunay’s Era ...... 72 4.2.2.1. Balance of Domestic Powers...... 72 4.2.2.2. Sunay’s Leadership Profile ...... 74 4.2.3. Fahri Korutürk’s Era ...... 75 4.2.3.1. Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 75 4.2.3.2. Korutürk’s Leadership Profile ...... 77 CHAPTER V: 1982 CONSTITUTION ...... 79 5.1. Legal Status ...... 80 5.2. Actual State ...... 84 5.2.1. Kenan Evren’s Era ...... 86 5.2.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers...... 86 5.2.1.2. Evren’s Leadership Profile ...... 89 5.2.2. Turgut Özal’s Era ...... 90 5.2.2.1. Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 90 5.2.2.2. Özal’s Leadership Profile ...... 95 5.2.3. Süleyman Demirel’s Era ...... 98 5.2.3.1. Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 99 5.2.3.2. Demirel’s Leadership Profile ...... 102

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5.2.4. Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s Era ...... 104 5.2.4.1. Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 105 5.2.4.2. Sezer’s Leadership Profile ...... 109 5.2.5. Abdullah Gül’s Era...... 111 5.2.5.1. Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 112 5.2.5.2. Gül’s Leadership Profile ...... 117 5.2.6. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Era...... 119 5.2.6.1. Balances of Domestic Powers ...... 119 5.2.6.2 Erdoğan’s Leadership Profile ...... 122 CHAPTER VI: ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION ...... 126 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 137

TABLE LISTS

Table 1: Identification of a Problem Triggered Occasion for Decision ...... 24 Table 2: Leadership Trait Analysis: Schema of Trait Description and Coding ...... 34 Table 3: Leaders’ Response to Constraints ...... 36 Table 4: Leaders’ Openness to New Information ...... 37 Table 5: Rules for Assessing Motivation ...... 37 Table 6: Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, And Motivation ...... 38 Table 7: Organizational Structure of Turkish Presidential Office ...... 43 Table 8: Following 1982 Constitution Organizational Structure of Turkish Presidency Office ...... 84 Table 9: Özal’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups ...... 96 Table 10: Demirel’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups ...... 103 Table 11: Gül’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups ...... 118 Table 12: Erdoğan’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups ...... 123 Table 13: Organizational Structure of Turkish Presidency Office Following 2017 Constitution Amendment ...... 131 Table 14: President’s Leadership Traits ...... 136

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is generally defined as a field of high politics. The realist approach, one of the most fundamental theories of international relations, regards international relations as the relationship between the states which it assumes as a rational and unity actor. It is estimated that the actors involved in the decision-making mechanism have no impact on the foreign policy making process and that foreign policy is composed of state behaviors. In other words, foreign policy is not considered as a result of the balance of internal power and bureaucratic processes, but as the rational decisions of states which are the main actors of international relations.

However, the profound changes in global balances in the last quarter of the 20th century show that these assumptions and considers are insufficient to explain the events in world politics. Culture and identity-oriented studies have accelerated taking into account the impact of globalization and the role of decision makers in the start of the Cold War period. In addition, studies such as constructivism and democratic peace theories, which show the necessity of analyzing the impact of sub-state actors on foreign policy-making, constitute the new dynamics of changing international relations.

This change brought with the questioning of the traditional paradigm that symbolizes the state considered as only unit of analysis with the black box. In other words, the existence of different dynamics that shape foreign policy and the assumption that foreign policy emerged as a result of a process influenced by these dynamics made necessary to open the black box (Alden & Aran, 2017, s. 25; Light, 1994, s. 93).

Hudson and Vore (Hudson & Vore, 1995) discussed the change in foreign policy in the “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow” study. They have stated that there is no longer a constant and predictable system in the international context, so that objectively functional data is not sufficient for foreign policy analysis.

The world views of the actors and the leaders of the institutions involved in the foreign policy making process shape the understanding of foreign policy, which they put forward

1 with their political identities and role conceptions. In other words, internal political processes need to be taken into account in order to analyze the foreign policy considered as a rational output. In this manner Putnam (Putnam, 1988) referred to the internal political dimension of foreign policy and described the interaction between them as two-level game.

In order to understand the foreign policy of a country, it is necessary to know the institutional framework of foreign policy making, and then analyze the actual de facto situations shaped by the internal power balance beyond the formal situation and, finally, evaluate the identities and leadership styles of political and bureaucratic leaders who lead those institutions. In this respect, this thesis aims to meet the aforementioned needs of Turkish foreign policy. Since the foundation of the Republic, it will be analyzed in depth how Turkish foreign policy is carried out and the role of the presidency in this process.

Within this framework, initially the literature on the DPA will be examined in depth. Starting with the developments that enable the emergence of the DPA, the relationship between the DPA and the discipline of international relations, its development and today meaning of DPA will be discussed.

In the second part, it will be revealed with which approaches the Turkish foreign policy will be evaluated. First of all, the legal state that determines cornerstones of foreign policy making process, secondly, the de facto situation shaped by the effect of the internal powers balance and finally the personal characteristics of leaders will be examined with leadership trait analysis method.

In the third part, the political system envisaged by 1924 constitution, together with the internal power balances and the role of the presidency will be investigated. Within the framework of the powers provided by the Constitution, leadership styles of Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inönü and Bayar carrying out presidency duty will be analyzed.

In the fourth part, it is aimed to evaluate the actual situation that shapes the process beyond the legal state and the powers provided by the 1961 constitution to the institutions involved in the foreign policy making process. In addition, the leadership features of Gürsel, Sunay and Korutürk, which were the presidents of the period, will be discussed.

In the fifth section, the 1982 constitution, which is the main reason for many discussions in Turkey, will be analyzed in depth. In this respect, distinct dimension of previous constitutions and the structure of the system will be evaluated. Moreover, the actual situation beyond the constitutional order will be discussed in a multi-faceted way. The roles of Evren, Özal, Demirel, Sezer, Gül and Erdoğan, who have served as president within the framework of the powers provided by the 1982 constitution, will be evaluated with the findings obtained by the leadership trait analysis method.

In the last chapter, the foreign policy making process envisaged by the 2017 constitutional amendment, which provides a legal basis for the transformation that Turkey experienced in both the government system and the institutional structure, will be evaluated. In the wake of the constitutional amendment, the new dynamics of the foreign policy making process will be analyzed. Besides, the role of the presidency in the process will also be investigated.

In the past decade much research has focused on Turkish foreign policy as a high politics. Main concentration of the research is to analyze Turkish foreign policy as just an output and evaluate its consequences at regional and global level. However the approachment has not been adequate for understanding of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore it remains unclear how foreign policy is made. The thesis aims to reveal the foreign policy making process and the role of the presidency during the process.

CHAPTER I:

THEORITICAL BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION

OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

1.1 Concept of the Foreign Policy

In literature, there are many definition of the term of ‘foreign policy’. The term has been defined differently according to changing views and approaches of the experts. Therefore it can be said that the diversity in description of the term come from being diverse of the point to which they want to draw attentions and emphasize. Some scholars give importance to “foreign”, while others emphasize “policy” while describing the term (Gözen, 2001). That means, the concept of ‘foreign’ and ‘policy’ can contain different meanings. ‘Policy’ can be used for completely different meaning such as struggle for power, class struggle, conflict, cooperation, division of resources (Arı, 2008, p. 36). On the other hand, ‘foreign’ is a more controversial concept. Its scope has differentiated day by day. For traditional approaches like realism adopting state-centric view, ‘foreign’ expresses other states. Nevertheless, with the globalization and emerging non-state actors in international area, state-centrism started to be questioned (Şener, 2013, p. 14). Thus, this concept has been extended to comprehand non-state political actors (Baharçiçek & İnan, 2013, p. 102). Considering the extension, Holsti (1992, p. 9) describes foreign policy as the political attitudes and behaviors towards the external environment. In addition, foreign policy can be described as a policy of a state towards other states or international area (Kürkçüoğlu, 1980, p. 311) or the term commonly refers to attitude and behaviors of only states to other units (Sönmezoğlu, 2005, p. 165).

Changing nature of international environment caused change not only in meaning and scope but also content of the term. While for realists, foreign relations means a rational outcome regardless of conditions and dynamics (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 6), for neo-realists foreign policy is a outcome of international balance and order (Waltz, 1979). Unlike these views which accept foreign policy as fixed and given, foreign policy has been influenced

4 by domestic factors apart from international factors (Aydın, 1996, p. 97). Public governmental, representing national legal authority, privileged governmental, symbolizing highest bureaucracy, and non-governmental sector expressing interest groups personal traits of decision-makers play role in shaping the national factors (Hammond, 1965, pp. 657-658).

Foreign policy has been also affected by personal traits of decision makers (George, 1980; Hermann, 1980; Hermann, 1987). Beliefs (Jervis, 1976), motives (Hermann, 1980), worldview (Hagan, 1994), role conception (Holsti, 1970), perception (Jervis, 1976), cognitive maps (Axelrod, 1976) have played role in shaping personal traits of decision makers.

Valerie M. Hudson has argued that the cognitive process, the leader's personality, the small group dynamics, institutional processes, bureaucratic politics, culture, internal political disputes, national features and international system affect foreign policy (Hudson, 2008, p. 16). Changing dynamics of international politics bring about diversification of determinants of foreign policy. So, multidimensional and multilevel studies regarding personal traits of decision makers have become necessary to analyze foreign policy decision in detail.

To summarize, foreign policy can be described as whole “official foreign relations” (Hill, 2003, p. 3), decisions, behaviors and objectives that governments have produced in relation to international environment and a strategy or a designed action formed by a state's decision-makers towards other states or other international bodies (Plano & Olton, 1988, p. 6).

1.2. The Rising of Foreign Policy Analysis Studies

Traditional paradigm was dominant view in international relations discipline as a result of being unsuccessful of idealist paradigm in avoiding the WWII. The paradigm perceives the world in eyes of “third image” (Waltz, 1959). It is interested with power politics and relations between states at level of international system regardless of the internal structures of the states or individuals and groups within the state. For this reason, the assumptions of international relations based on the proposal which is related with human nature (first

5 image of Waltz) and construction of society (second image of Waltz) remain largely out of the traditional paradigm. For analyzing foreign policy, traditional paradigm was preferred. According to the approaches described as “state-centric realism” (Nye, 1975, p. 36), states are core of international relations, and they are unitary and rational actor. So states are perceived as “black-boxing” or as a “billiard ball” (Hudson, 2007, p. 4). Morghantau (1978, p. 6) who buy into such approaches and perceptions argue that all decision-makers are similar. The approach ignores decision making process, domestic balances of the states and roles of individuals. Actually Morghantau thinks that seeking clues of foreign policy in motivation and personal traits of the decision makers is a futile effort.

It was assumed that decisions are made in result of same process in pursuant of rationality. The approach can be defined as rational actor model. In the model decision makers are fixed and given and has no role in foreign policy output. Because it was supposed that decision makers has exact and right perception (Jervis, 1976, p. 6). Yet, limitation of rationality has been accepted as a reality. Namely unbounded rationality is no longer unchallengeable (Polič, 2009, p. 80).

Being too complex of the world to understand totally force human tend to use strategy of satisfying (Simon, 1955, p. 100). The complexity avoids evaluation of all options and causes being used heuristic as a type of mental shortcuts. Simon described the reality as bounded rationality. Therefore rationality of modern world has been challenged. The situation can be entitled as “irrationality of rationality” (Ritzer, 2011, p. 306).

On the other hand, realist paradigm has taken the road by positivist assumptions. Positivism was started to be criticized for being reductionist and far away explaining reality. Because positivism argues that truth can be comprehended by only empirical data. Positivism, which identifies the being with the measurable substance, has reduced the truth to "physicalism". Namely, the situation refers to putting natural sciences into place of social sciences. This reductionist, fragmented, increasingly instrumental and pragmatist understanding of being has been described by Husserl (1974, p. 280) as the most fundamental crisis of European humanity. The roots of this crisis are based on rationality straying away (1974, p. 281). Because positivism cannot go beyond the being of mechanic

6 with such a truth and being understanding. Therefore it can suggest only engineering solutions to the problems which are related with life.

Rationalism straying away has reduced the ontological basis of being to “ratio”. The Cartesian argument who puts the thinking subject at the center of existence has imprisoned “being” to be measured and seen. In the words of Thomas Nagel it is “view from nowhere” like a little god look (1986). Heidegger (1959, pp. 39-45) states that the tragedy of modern thought began here. Husserl has argued that there is an own epistemological basis of being instead of such a reductionist understanding. In this system named by the name of phenomenology, the beings present themselves and it provides possibility "speaking of beings between themselves" (1995, pp. 11-17). Because it is as important as how we perceive the being with our empirical data, microscopic equipment, how it is and how it looks without equipment. Heidegger has expressed his desire to return such a universal understanding of science and being and to transcend ratio-centered ontology and subjectivist epistemology with the call "remember the being" (Kalın, 2014, p. 319).

Similarly, Habermas argued that modernity should be evaluated again by the new rationality approach, because he has believed that a new epistemology is a crucial need in order to emancipate individual and society (Keyman, 2000, pp. 142-143). Because Positivist epistemology has made subject the issue in which it interests ignoring individual who should be subject. For instance critical theorists, underlining the situation, claim that positivism has make passive and negligible the individual (Emekliler, 2011, pp. 155-158).

In summary accepting bounded rationality and being insufficient and inadequate of the classical epistemology of international relations to explain the new chaotic and multicomponent process which is called the post-Cold War and / or post-Westphalian process; has caused being more creative and powerful of sociological and socio- psychological analysis in explaining the relative contradictions and crises that have arisen in international relations. At this point the issue of what foreign policy is come into question. Necessity of foreign policy decision making process in detail has become clear. Foreign policy analysis studies have aimed to fill the gap and provide better understanding of foreign policy of the states.

Unlike "macro" approaches that analyze international relations only through the international system, the FPA is a "micro" level approach to international relations,

7 focusing on the state's decision-making process, decision makers (Lovell, 1970) and the various dimensions of the state's relationship to the international system (Clarke & White, 1989, pp. 11-12). Making clear understanding of foreign policy two dimensions are underlined in FPA. One of them is related with national domestic order of states; other is associated with personal trait of the leaders.

Initially, changing nature of the International Relations created a system including national environment within state, and non-state actors in international area (Farrands, 1989). So, it can be concluded that broad understanding compromising national and international factors has formed foreign policy decisions. Putnam (1988) defined the interaction as “two level game”. While in process of making foreign policy leaders have to consider national balances as well as international balances.

Then, FPA has main two arguments. One of them is that it rejects rational human and accepts bounded rationality of human. Namely, FPA reject fixed and given human and it is trying to comprehend psychological and sociological base of decision maker. Secondly, foreign policy is a number of decisions made by decision-makers beyond being an output shaped by external input (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954, p. 65; Clarke & White, 1989, pp. 12).

1.3. Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations

In the last quarter of 20th century, international relations theories were not as successful as in the Cold War period in explaining the meaning, interpreting, analyzing events and predicting possible future scenarios (Gaddis, 1992; Hudson & Vore, 1995, p. 1). Because it was no longer possible to talk about the decisive role of the system and different poles on foreign policy of the states like in the Cold War era. The theories of international relations were questioned at this point. The passless borders between states disappeared with globalization and domestic politics has been regarded as a factor influencing foreign policy. Thus, local factors such as public opinion, identity, the leader's perception towards his own country and world, and domestic political balances have become important issues that the discipline of international relations have to take into account (Hudson & Vore, 1995, pp. 210-212). In short, these domestic factors took the place of the power-centered decisive role of the system and poles manifesting itself especially during the Cold War era.

In this connection, the role of the individual and the determinants shaped by individual has become questionable.

Although some international relations theories include some of these factors in their own research areas partially, the lack of a theory comprising all factors and being noticed the factors, which considered as fixed by the discipline ontologically, has emerged misapprehensions in predictions of theories of international relations (Kaarbo, 2015, pp. 1- 3). In theories of international relations, while the foreign policy outputs are explained by given concepts such as interest, power demand, and survival, it is not emphasized how these concepts are perceived and how they are shaped at the end of a process. In other saying, what makes the decision of the individual or the state suitable with the interest is not questioned and is ignored. The variable that will determine whether behaviour of the state is suitable interest of the state or not is undoubtedly influenced by the individual and the internal processes of the state. It is important to investigate the extent to which internal processes and local factors affect the process. Therefore, the need for studies and theories individual-based and accepting fundamental role of individual political choices of international relations is obvious.

The fact that the theories of international relations ontologically were not possible to eliminate the deficiency brought the Foreign Policy Analysis Studies to the fore (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 2). Ontological difference is one of the fundamental points of separation between international relations and FPA. Waltz (1996) underlined that the theory of international relations is not similar with foreign policy theories in order to reveal the difference. According to him, foreign policy is the outcome of a set of variables and specific parameters. Systematic theories do not explain to us why a state exhibits a certain attitude towards any event. The foreign policy theory tries to explain why a state prefers the policy at a given time. In contrast IR theories clarify general assumptions, approaches, frame and orders. On the other hand, FPA has focused on different foreign policies regarding their leader and unit-level differences between states in spite of their similar position under a same structure (Waltz, 1996, p. 54).

Another important point of the separation lies in the fact that the theories of international relations sustain different analytical traditions in comparison with FPA. In other words, while the FPA considered the individual as the ground of international relations theories,

9 the theories adopted a system-level perspective as a basis (Kaarbo, 2015, pp. 2-4). The emergence of such a difference in terms of analytic tradition confirms the motto of Waltz’s “theories of international relations are not foreign policy theories." Nevertheless for Elman, there is no logical barrier to such a synthesis (Elman, 1996). Even though it may not be practicable completely synthesis of the two courses, the courses have many common points making them closer and bringing them together as well as contributing their progress.

In this regard, Smith (1986, p. 13) questioned that FPA as a distinct field which is interested with foreign policy can contribute to grand IR theories. Almost 20 years later, Houghton (2007, p. 26) consolidated the phenomenon that FPA has a “persistent minority status’ within IR and stated that it has not completely integrated with the discipline.

Kaarbo (2015, p. 6) asserts four reasons to explain the disconnection between FPA and IR. Firstly, the situation come from misperception about FPA and the assumption that FPA and IR ought to be separate. Secondly, the weaknesses and different trends within the FPA's sub-area caused to increase the distance between FPA and IR theories. The fact that Rosenau's comparative foreign policy analysis, which he developed by avoiding the positivist and quantitative approach, failed to achieve the desired result led to the need to redefine FPA in the 1980s. As a result, while common studies have been made with psychology and political psychology, it was further become distanced from the field of international relations.

Thirdly, perception of IR theorists about FPA help to elucidate the disconnection. They argue that FPA is extremely individualistic, and ultra-positivist beyond IR epistemology. Lastly, the disconnection is connected with the supposition of “division of labor.” The idea of division of labor comes from Waltz’s assumption that international theories are not foreign policy theories. However the idea was refused by contemporary international relations theories and FPA studies (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 7). As Mearsheimer put it: “Neorealism is a theory of international outcomes and a theory of state’s foreign policy” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 422). In this regard, many liberals and constructivists have integrated their studies with FPA (Hopf, 2002, pp. 4-15).

Although the reasons and factors that differentiate these two areas remain, the FPA has promoted the progress of IR theories. Contribution of the FPA to the discipline was investigated by Hudson (2005, pp. 3-4) in four different themes. The most remarkable

10 contribution of FPA to IR theories is to specify main determinants of state behavior as intersection point. The intersection point is not the state, but the individual as decision- maker. Positioning of the human in the center within the theoretical framework ensured that social and individual factors affecting state behavior were also taken into account.

Additionally, FPA has brought an agent-oriented perspective rather than a structure- oriented to IR theories. Because IR theories are structure-oriented studies, they can ignore a significant change and creativity and misinterpret thereby accepting them as fixed. The FPA is well aware of the idea of infrastructure and scientific studies that will rid the theories of IR from the given assumptions.

The third contribution of FPA to IR theories is that it analyzes state behavior beyond generalizations like natural law. The methodology has made essential to examine concepts such as motivation, emotion and identity that emerged as a result of the agent-oriented perspective. In other words, what is actually necessary is to study the anthropology of international relations (Snyder & Paige, 1958).

The current contribution of FPA to IR theories is the link between IR theories and other areas such as public policies, political, psychology and CFP. The FPA's interest in the decision-making process reveals the situation. Because the decision-making process is a process that involves many different science area and disciplines as well as those mentioned above. The FPA serves as a tie between IR and other sciences and disciplines as a field of study has mentioned identity.

FPA is not accumulation of some IR theories, it has serious challenges for each. Before 1970s, position of FPA can be evaluated as completely separate ontologically and epistemologically regarding Kaarbo’s second conceptualization (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 3). It’s as point of interest as separate from the given theories can be added the differentiation. Although especially after Cold-War considering domestic factors and social-psychological Dynamics within foreign policy making process by the IR theories has emerged some common points between FPA and IR, they continue different approached towards the common points. However the differentiation provides opportunity for development of both.

For Kubalkova the differentiation cannot be explained only by ontological, epistemological dimensions and point of the interest. He has stated that the differentiation is derived from

11 historical debate entitled as “Second Debate.” Namely their separation originally coincided with the “scientific” or “behavioralist” revolution in the social sciences, its controversial impact on IR studies having been played out in the course of what has been known as “Second Debate.”

As a result, recent IR theories have recognized the influence of leaders and internal political, social and psychological factors on foreign policy making. At this point, there has been a convergence between FPA and IR theories. While these theories assume that these factors form the human and influence the individual in the decision-making process, the FPA states that the leader may have the capacity to influence these factors, these factors should not be considered as fixed and emerged as a result of a particular process.

Although IR theories have begun to produce hypotheses about the subjects of FPA's point of interest, different approaches and interpretations coming from their own fundamental assumptions and ontological and epistemological differences remain. FPA's agent-oriented and specific approaches to each event have not yet been adopted and have been criticized by IR theories. It should also be noted that there is a considerable rapprochement between the IR theories and the FPA, and that the FPA contributes significantly to the IR theories. In addition, any of the two approaches mentioned is not superior to the other. Under this heading, both approaches are taken into consideration and their differences, similarities and interactions with each other are tried to be explained. In this case, it should be kept in mind that both approaches can be used depending on the content of the subject and the purpose the researcher wants to achieve.

1.4. Historical and Paradigmatic Development of Foreign Policy Analysis

Questioning traditional paradigms’ dynamics and determinants due to being inadequate to explain foreign policy make essential opening of the black box. Because the world has passed to breakthrough phase and international relations and foreign policy has been shaped according to changed factors of the new phase entitled such as age of hyper- modernity, post-modernism, or post-Westphalia. In addition aims and tendencies of foreign policy are diversified. States has built relations in field of culture, science, knowledge, humanitarian aid, climate change as well as military political and economic relations. States have noticed necessities of protection of their own culture and identity alongside their border (Buzan, Waever, & Wild, 1998, pp. 2-10).

The transformation process has caused comprehending that the factors considered as given and fixed by realist school such as leaders’ personal trait, role conception, domestic process etc. has been shaped as a result of various and different developments. The comprehension make necessary investigation of the developments to analyze foreign policy. So foreign policy studies became more crucial.

Foreign Policy Analysis has focused on shaping process of foreign policy instead of discussing results of foreign policy on international politics. So the field can be evaluated as a dissimilar branch of international politics. Because foreign policy has tried to investigate the factors and process affecting shaping foreign policy but ignored by the discipline. Studies of FPA reveal that; foreign policy is shaped at the end of many complex processes. The complexity is reflected in the definition of foreign policy analysis that Kubalkova (2001, pp. 17-18) has done:

FPA refers to a complex, multilayered process, consisting of the objectives that governments pursue in their relations with other governments and their choice of means to attain these objectives… Thus foreign policy encompasses the complicated communications within governments and amongst its diverse agents, plus the perceptions and misperceptions, the images of other countries, and the ideologies and personal dispositions of everyone involved. An important part of the study of foreign policy has been the nature and impact of domestic politics.

Juliet Kaarbo (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 3) has conceptualized FPA with two Different context. Firstly, he has approached FPA as a “subfield or area of research”. In the approach, foreign policy refers to explicit explanandum, domestic factors are seen as starting point for the explanation. In addition, states are not perceived as "black box" and role of domestic factors are seen essential characteristic of FPA.

Secondly, he has conceptualized FPA as "a different perspective or approach". Namely, he has emphasized role of subjective consciousness of the leaders particularly in the latter approach. According to him, subjective consciousness of decision makers are only factor which all other international, institutional, societal and domestic affect. He has used such a conceptualizing to state that FPA is a sui generis IR approach (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 4). To sum up, the argument has indicated different beginning point for analyzing international relations.

Comprehending how humans discern the world, approach and respond to cases happening around them and how they affect and are affected by national and international factors are one of the significant bases of FPA. However while Waltz (1979) argued that behaviour of states are shaped by structure of international political system, Wendt (1999) claimed that

13 interest, perception and policy of state are formed by ideas. Namely, material world is what ideal world makes of it (Hudson V. M., 2008, p. 12). At this point, Hudson denounces Waltz and Wendt for dropping human out and perceiving human as if a machine. Main assumption of FPA is that solely mankind have ideas, and can bring into being identities. Similarly, Wight (1999, p. 128) has underlined that state can only make preference through individual preference. Namely, the determinant shaping preference is not state, system and ideas, it is individual.

To sum up main concern of FPA are to explain state behaviour, briefly analyze "why state X made a certain move last Tuesday" like Waltz said (1979, p. 121). Namely FPA has tried to explain why states behave distinctly under alike circumstances or why states act similarly under different circumstances. So, FPA is indispensable for anybody who wants to comprehend all details of "why" question root the cases, circumstances and relations shaped by state policy (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962, p. 33)

Three paradigmatic works shaped frame of FPA. First of them is Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics written by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. They were interested in revealing that how foreign policy decisions made instead of focusing on just outcomes of foreign policy. They believed that policy makers' interpretations of the world and preferences were put together in a decision- making attempt could shape governments' foreign policy choices.

Namely, main contribution of Snyder and his colleagues is to bring inside of nation-state level of analysis up for discussion (Hudson V. M., 2014, p. 14). They intended to analyze the way in which the actors' leaders, groups and coalitions framed foreign policy issues, selected options, choices that are made and how they applied them. Their study can be evaluated as a partial initiative to put together information from various disciplines and level of analyses under a single roof (Hudson V. , 2002, pp. 4-6).

The second work is Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy made by James N. Rosenau. He laid emphasis on generalizations deduced as a result of systematic and scientific works at the level of middle range theory. Namely, theory should compromise grand principles and complexity of reality. In addition, Rosenau verified necessity of associating information from various level of analysis in comprehending foreign policy. One of the main contributions of Rosenau is revealing actor-specific theory which would

14 guess the "relative potency" of various factors for a country and then analyze foreign policy of the state (Toktomushev, 2017, p. 12). His work transformed to theory of comparative foreign policy. His idea forming multidimensional foreign policy theory beyond the states and testing the theories empirically inspired occurring sub-branch entitled of comparative foreign policy (CFP). Namely, it is assumed that under which conditions, which behaviours such as political, military, and economic are preferred by states, are comparable and the results obtained from the comparison can provide meaningful generalization theoretically (Hudson & Vore, 1995, pp. 215-222). Foreign policy behaviors such as visits by statesmen, war, peace have been conceptualized as dependent variables (Hudson V. , 2005, p. 9). In this way, it is aimed to obtain law-like generalization about foreign policy behaviour beyond periods and states in order to explain and foreseen the cases faced in international area.

The third work is Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics written by Harold and Margaret Sprout. According to Sprout, the "psychological environment" (psych milieu) of individuals and groups who make foreign policy decisions is necessary to explain foreign policy (Sprout & Sprout, 1965, p. 256). The psychological environment refers to how decision makers perceive the international area. Their main argument foreign policy analysis, that is relevant with power ability within the inter-state system, ignoring foreign policy undertakings which refer to intentions, strategies, and aims is misdirected. At this point Spout (1965, p. 118) put it:

"Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an Individual's probable motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive behavioralist-be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist- undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies. ".

The common point of these three perspective studies is that they have emphasized the vital role of decision makers in foreign policy making. So, various levels of analysis covering from most macro level through most micro level ought to be combined (Hudson V. M., 2008, p. 19). Instead of evaluating foreign policy as an output they focus on foreign policy making process.

1.4.1. Sociological Development of Foreign Policy Analysis

These three paradigmatic studies inspired many studies in different level, contexts and disciplines. These studies can be classified on three bases. First of them is sociological base. In the period of the first wave of FPA, the studies about the base concentrated on connection between social context and foreign policy. Holsti (1970, p. 246) has tried to reveal the link national role conception and foreign policy. The role conception can be seen as locating of oneself in one’s region and international area taking into consideration one’s history and identity. National role conceptions offer norms, guidelines, and standards affecting several dimension of foreign policy (Wish, 1980, p. 533). During second wave, the study of culture and identity shaping foreign policy was reformulated and culture is perceived as an independent variable and a factor that has effect on cognition (Hudson V. M., 2014, p. 26). Also according to culture, technique of problem solving can change. In the period, it has been revealed that the cultural heritage and the socialization process of the society in which the person is grown may have an influence on the decision-making process. The main difference of the culture in the period from culture perception in first wave is that culture is seen now effective factor on foreign policy through decision makers. Briefly, FPA focused on how culture and identity is formed and how the factors show their effect on human attitude.

In the third wave period, studies have been carried out on understanding that different cultures may have different perceptions, and that policy making structures and processes may change depending on the culture. In addition, effect of identity and culture are emphasized in the context of institutional decision-making. Namely, the scholars evaluate identity by elites who are mostly heads of institution. Because, one of the most important elements determining the identity of the state is the political elite, which is effective in the political regime (Erol & Ozan, 2012, p. 246). These groups and individuals tend to institutionalize their political ideas and identities within the state mechanism.

On the other hand, Katzenstein (1996) tried to explain the effect of norms and identities on security policy. In addition, Onuf in his famous book “World of Our Making” (1989) and Wendt in his well-known study entitled as “Social Theory of International Politics” (1999) has emphasized identity as crucial factor shaping foreign policy. Two scholars revealed

16 two different type of constructivism. The main difference between them, Onuf has investigated domestic influence on shaping identity.

1.4.2. Domestic Political Development of Foreign Policy Analysis

Second base is associated with domestic balances. The studies about the field has tried to explain that as a result of which process a foreign policy is formed. Snyder and his colleagues inspired some scholars after their emphasizing on effect of groups on foreign policy. Their main argument is that foreign policy is shaped after consensus of a group of people. On the other hand Maoz (1990) claims that several foreign policy decisions are made by groups not by mighty individuals At this point Irving Janis in his important work named "Victims of Groupthink" has investigated persons within group making foreign policy. Janis (1972, p. 9) stated that the group members were hesitant to express their opinions freely in order not to be excluded from the group, so they decided under the pressure of majority, without analyzing alternative politics in a healthy way.

According to him, some inauspiciousness decisions containing attacking to North Korea, the case of Bay of Pigs and increasing tension in Vietnam War are results of the groupthink. However, it cannot be claimed all foreign policies made by group represent effect of the groupthink.

In another classical period DPA study, Charles F. Hermann (1978) also examined the personal characteristics of the group members, the position within the leader group, and the size of the decision-making group, in addition to "group thinking". Thus, Hermann argues that the group considers different dimensions and that each of these dimensions plays a role in determining external politics.

Allison's book "Essence of Decision" has an important place among the classical DPA studies related to domestic politics. In this work Allison (1971) states that the rational actor model is insufficient to explain the Cuban crisis, which has been examined. Because rational model may not work as supposed. It can be irrational. Herbert Simon argues that humans are boundedly rational. Bounded rationality is procedural, because it is attitude adaptive within restriction enforced by capacities of decision maker together with exogenous condition (Simon, 1985; Breuning, 2007, s. 66). Cognitive limits and different

17 perceptions based on psychology, which humans have, make more preferable satisficing outcome rather than optimal choice.

John Steinbruner (1974, pp. 51-57) argues that decision maker comprehend the cases as a simple one that there is no need to consider all possible choice and guess that actors is only pay attention limited incoming information. It is not supposed to take into consideration of wide range of outcomes. He described the decision making model as cybernetic decision making.

After being accepted the idea of bounded rationality and coming out of being inadequate of rational actor model, Allison offered two alternative models. In contrast to rational actor model, the alternative models assume including several actors in multiple agencies. Initially, according to the related Institutional Process Model, the foreign policy of states should be regarded as the output of the standard operating methods developed by the institutions whose responsibilities are predetermined (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 143).

Secondly, According to the Bureaucratic Policy Model, which is another alternative model, the final decision in foreign policy is not the end of an institutional process, but the result of negotiations between actors in the foreground within the government (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 143). According to the model, various organization and bureaucracies play role in decision making process, rather than single dominant actor. The model emphasizes political competition elicited as a result of involving multiple actors to decision making process (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 71). The actors which are leader of significant institution attempt to increase their own interest and empower their own positions.

Another suggestion of Allison (1971, pp. 258-259) is combining elements of the rational, organizational and bureaucratic politics model in elucidating foreign policy decisions. However Mintz (2010, p. 78) has suggested combining cognitive and rational assumes instead of regarding three models one by one. Mintz described the own suggestion as poliheuristic model. According to model firstly, with cognitive shortcuts, leaders eliminate some alternatives and then rational models is preferred to choose one among remaining alternatives (Breuning, 2007, s. 66).

The second alternative of Allison is questioned and challenged by Stephan Krasner due to ignoring president’s role. Krasner (1972) states that bureaucracies and the heads of institution playing role in decision making process are obliged to the President and the obligation avoid them to conduct their own hidden agenda.

Khong entitled “Analogies at War” examines different perceptions which are related with Vietnam problem and Khong (1992) states that incorrect analysis are made because of the fact that Korean analogue was used ignoring the differences between the two events.

Another important point shaping foreign policy which is related to domestic politics is type of regime and political opposition. Some scholars inspired from the Kant's "democratic peace theory" have made studies that democracy is more peaceful than totalitarian or authoritarian systems during the second wave period of FPA studies. Accordingly, democratic nations will respect the rights of other nations, will regard international law, and will adopt conciliatory attitude rather than a conflict (Holsti O. R., 1976).

Hagan has revealed effect of type of regime on foreign policy behaviour especially regarding executive and legislative construction. The differences within institutional design such as between parliamentary (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998) and presidential (Barber J. D., 2009), single party and coalition make understandable different policies and practices of states (Saideman & Auerswald, 2012).

Besides, studies about public opinion have showed its effect on foreign policy and leaders’ decision (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Any leader cannot take risk of losing public support even in autocratic regime. So leaders have to take account of public opinion. However size of its effect is still unknown. Therefore leaders are careful and sensitive to public. On the contrary, Kreps (Kreps, 2000) states that even in democratic countries leaders ignore public opinion like happened in Afghanistan even though they regard with disfavor the mission. Also, contemporary studies have tried to display how leaders manipulate public opinion to gain their support especially by way of media (Shapiro & Jacobs., 2000).

Domestic politics can be effective in making foreign policy through such manners. As mentioned, while studies of first two waves part of FPA focused on decision making process within a group and structure of the group, studies of third wave try to find answer to the questions that how options are developed, how group memory affect the decision,

19 and how members of group make comment about specific situation (Hudson & Vore, 1995, p. 225). Briefly the studies of third wave try to elucidate cognitive map which the group has.

1.4.3. Psychological Development of Foreign Policy Analysis

Studies in the field work on particular leaders and endeavor to clarify why they make such a decision depending on psychological terms. Although favored methodology and approach changes based on aim and knowledge of the researcher, fundamental idea has always been same: to comprehend behaviour of decision-makers regarding their unprecedented psychological personality. One of most significant contributions of FPA is inter-discipliner studies made in psychological base. Emphasizing of psychological factor affecting decision makers by Sprout inspires several studies investigating minds of leaders. At this point, one of the main assumptions of the FPA studies during second wave is that minds of the leaders are not a tabula rasa. Namely the minds can be affected by culture, ideology, economy, political situation, beliefs, experiences, traits, style and national role conception (Hudson V. , 2005, p. 10).

From this point of view, crucial role of decision makers in shaping foreign policy is revealed. Henry Kissinger once said, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make” (Byman & Pollack, 2001). Namely, decision makers can be evaluated as a heart of international politics (Hudson V. , 2005, pp. 1-2). Vital position of decision makers in making foreign policy has required studies about psychology in order to understand personality of decision makers. In this regard Sarıbay has argued that decision-makers classify, describe and interpret cases in international area in line of in the light of their own psychology (Sarıbay, 2004). On the other hand, Hermann who insist that the leader shouldn’t be considered as an external factor in foreign policy decision making process, argues that the leader’s personality determine his initial tendencies and shape leaders’ approach to ideas of rest (Hermann, Hermann, & Hagan, 1987).

On the other hand, Alexander L. George made studies factors influencing political behaviour of leaders. He stated that a leader’s political behaviour will be given form by a diverse of cognitive beliefs (ideology, world view, beliefs about right political strategy and tactics, etc.) and skills that he has acquired from his past experiences (George, 1980). Since

20 the decision maker who is located in head of the state make foreign policy on behalf of the state, the approach that state is actor turned into the assumption that official decision makers are actor (Kahraman, 2007, s. 181).

Joseph de Rivera has focused on psychoanalytic studies with more theoretical view and underlined psychological effect on individual in his book entitled as “The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy." He has investigated the decision-makers as dependent variable regarding their effect of past experiences and personality (Rivera, 1965, s. 195- 208). The variable contains perception, selective biases, pressure of international environment and domestic balances (Rivera, 1965, s. 250-288).

The development made necessary analyzing personality of decision makers. Examining personality of leaders provide an opportunity understand why leaders make particular decisions, whereas rest facing alike cases behave entirely. Hence, Leites tried to satisfy the need by putting forward “Operational Code” method to analyze personal traits systematically of decision makers. Alexander George (1969) redeveloped the method by responding the ten questions about leader’s philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Walker (1983) and Holsti (1977) developed the method by their studies. Basically, the Operational Code method aims to reveal the decision-maker's approach to the political arena and what political area Express for the decision-maker.

Margaret G. Hermann has investigated differences of leaders’ beliefs, motivation, and method of decision making by using operational code method together with content analysis (Hermann M. G., 1974). In addition, Hermann developed “Leadership Trait Analysis” method to comprehend traits of leaders. The best and practicable way to evaluate leadership trait is to examine leaders' speech (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 179). Because it is assumed that words of the leaders is crucial for comprehending their "minds" (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 26). At this point, Hermann bring unprepared and spontion speech into the forefront in terms of reflecting inner tendencies and motivation of the leaders (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 179). Leadership Trait Analysis is conducted by seven different personality variables. By using scores of variables, Hermann (Hermann M. G., 2003, pp. 181-185) classified decision makers according to eight different leadership typologies. The variables and classifications will be mentioned and explained in detail in the later part of thesis.

Furthermore, the effect of perceptions and images in shaping foreign policy were emphasized. Jervis (1976, p. 6) has tried to investigate effect of misperception on foreign policy and stated that perception play more effective role rather than intention in making foreign policy. Sometimes, leaders can perceive the case more seriously than it happens and as a result the misperception they can show reaction unduly. Decision maker approaches the cases through the lens shaped by these factors. As Henry Kissinger (Kissinger, 1966, s. 503) has noted:

“The definition of what constitutes a problem and what criteria are re1evant in «solving» it reflects to a considerable extent the domestic notions of what is just, the pressures produced by the decision- making process, and the experience which forms the leaders in their rise to eminence.”

Psychological studies which is related with decision making process have been developing and increasing their importance day by day. However it has still been difficult to generalize role of psychological factors on decision makers.

1.5. Contemporary Foreign Policy Analysis Studies

Thanks to such bases, top-down approaches to international relations are integrated with bottom-up approaches. One of the most important contribution of the integration is multi- perspective taking into account multiple determinants and nested issues without separating from each other and in their own context. Namely, the complementation is an initiative to combine and ingrate knowledge, theory, paradigm, and statements seen as separate beforehand (Stern, 2003, p. 185).

Today's DPA studies, in which all these studies mentioned above has shaped, have six hallmarks according to Hudson (2005, p. 2). Firstly, FPA studies are multifactorial. Accordingly, foreign policy decisions are made by integration of various factors. Secondly, FPA has a multilevel feature in that, it is assumed that multiple variables from different levels have affected foreign policy. In this regard, FPA has taken into consideration data of various sciences and disciplines such as sociology, economics, politics and psychology. The approach of FPA towards different sciences and disciplines has brought FPA into the forefront as a multidisciplinary study. FPA is also a field that accepts information obtained from many levels of analysis as data in order to make investigation on foreign policy. Therefore, as an area where information from different levels of analysis is gathered, FPA has an integrative structure. The one of major hallmarks that distinguishes FPA from its

22 equivalent counterparts is that it is based on people. Hence, FPA is referred to an agent- oriented approach. The sixth and last hallmark of the FPA is actor-specific approach rejecting approaches that accept the system as the main determinant factor of human behaviour. From this point of view, FPA has aimed to examine the “source of diversity” which actor-specific approach has been adopted, by abandoned exploring the “source of change” that the actor-general approach has adopted (Hudson & Vore, 1995, p. 210). Because problems arising in the international arena, especially after the 1980s, cannot be understood with an actor-general assumption, and the solutions for these problems cannot be produced.

1.6. Decision Unit

Another critical issue for Foreign Policy Analysis studies is the decision unit. Which actors within the state have made foreign policy and the impact of the decision units on foreign policy has been one of the cornerstones of the FPA. Because the foreign policy actor and in frame of which authorities actor makes the foreign policy are accepted as dynamics shaping foreign policy as an output. Margaret Herman and Charles Hermann (1989, p. 362) have investigated how the governments and ruling parties of several actors in the international arena make their foreign policies, and argued that the foreign policy-making authority is used by many different bodies. It is also seen that the decision unit is composed of presidents, prime ministers and parliaments as well as junta, coalitions, bureaucratic groups and cabinets. In addition, depending on the content of the event and the circumstances of the time, the current decision unit may change. According to Rosati (1981, pp. 249-250) the dynamics of an event give us clues about who will take position in the decision-making process. Gaenslen (1992) stated that the decision-making authority would be closed in cases, which are about crucial interest of the state, and in crisis time in which the personal character of the leader and prominent advisers would be decisive in the final decision. According to this situation, the less important issues are followed by the bureaucracy.

In addition Hermann (2001, pp. 48-49) has described “the individual or a set of individuals” as authoritative decision unit and argued that there are three types of authoritative decision units. These are predominant leader, single group and coalition of multiple autonomous actors.

Table 1: Identification of a Problem Triggered Occasion for Decision

Source: Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework”, International Studies Review, Vol:3, No.2, (2001), p.58.

Type of decision unit shows who has the authority and power to canalize resources of the state in case of necessity. Type of decision is shaped by structure and institutional order of the state determined by law as formal. However beyond being formal, informal structure of the state should be considered in determining type of decision (Margaret G. Hermann, 2001, p. 57). The questions in figure 1 have focused on both formal and informal structure in case unauthorized structure within state try to influence the decision on particular issues.

1.6.1. Predominant Leader

Being predominant leader of decision unit refers to a regime which gives an individual authority to canalize resources of the government in making foreign policy decision. That means if an individual has the authority to determine how state approach and react to a international case, the individual is predominant leader and the situation make other’s opinions meaningless in the process of foreign policy decision making. (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001, p. 84). As Abraham Lincoln addressed his cabinet: “Gentlemen, the vote is 11 to 1 and the last 1 has it.” (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 365) Actually, Lincoln declared that his own vote is only determinant in the given situation. Thanks to his behave, he can be evaluated as a predominant leader. In addition, if the government system of a state is organized in a way to give an individual authority either legally or practically in committing resources within the frame of foreign policy making and only a person take part of at the high level of state mechanism as being

24 in charge of any policy of the state, the decision unit is likely to be predominant leader (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001, p. 85). American presidency can be evaluated within the category, Harry Truman described the presidency of the USA with such words: “The buck stops here.” He located his office at the top of hierarchy and had the last say especially in the foreign policy making process (Breuning, 2007, s. 66). From this aspect, he can be evaluated as a predominant leader.

Margaret Herman and Charles Hermann (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 365) have take studies of predominant leader a step further. They have emphasized importance of leader’s personal characteristics. Lastly, if leaders seen the foreign issue as crucial for the regime and its interest, the leader is likely to seem as the dominant leader (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001, p. 85).

1.6.2. Single Group

When ultimate decision unit become single group which consists of individuals who have ability or authority to canalize resources of the government, the decision is made by interaction among the group members (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 366). Namely, if several individuals make foreign policy together through sharing their own ideas, the unit can be assumed as single group. According to Margaret and Charles Hermann (1989, p. 367) within the group each members has not equal the authority and same ability. However the consensus among the members is so crucial for the state. Because they have argued that if there is disagreement between the members of the group, outside factor can include the decision process.

In single group cases, crucial point is whether the group can provide consensus in itself or not. If consensus among group members, for analyzing how the group is likely to approach and respond to the case, investigating of internal conditions and factor can be adequate. Nevertheless, if the consensus isn’t provided, the group faces a case which external dynamics can influence. Namely, in the scenario, how external dynamics play role during foreign policy making process should be taken into consideration inevitably (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 367).

1.6.3. Multiple Autonomous Groups

Multiple autonomous groups is the case when different individuals, delegations of organization and organs gather to decide how the state is likely to respond to the foreing policy problem. Main difference such a ultimate decision unit from others is that any organ, individual or organization has not adequate power and authority to canalize resources of the state. On this occasion several divergent organizations or organs which aren’t dependent to each other may play role in course of the proceeding. On the other hand each of them has potential and authority to terminate the enforcement of the decision and to cancel the decision about canalization of the resources (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak & Özkeçeci-Taner, 2004, p. 46). In other words, there is no superior authority in such a decision unit. Each of them has to gain others’ support to carry its own initiatives into effect. Multiple autonomous groups take in place in presidential democracy and authoritarian regimes as well as parliamentarian democracy. While in presidential system, the president needs approval of legislature, in authoritarian regimes, which consist of three contributing causes; state or government, the party and unauthorized but influential structures, such diverse constituents within state have to take into consideration each other (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 368).

Coalitions consist of several actors just as single group. However, the most fundamental difference between groups and coalitions comes from the approaches and viewpoints of the people and institutions that come together. Within coalitions, the approaches and world views may not be familiar to each other.

In this regard the decision unit is so crucial in analyzing foreign policy. Namely, type of decision determine using methodology and approaches of scholars while analyzing the foreign policy. Hence, specifying the decision unit can be considered as a first step to analyze a foreign policy. The step prove that the “black-box” cannot stay no longer close.

CHAPTER II

PRESIDENCY IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. Legal Context

Each country has foundation rules and constitutional mechanism to describe problems related with foreign affairs and specifies the way to solve it regarding to protect national interest in any case. Almost in each state, the system and mechanism can be changed, but main aim remains same. The reason of why the system and mechanism change ranging from state to other state is that each of them has developed its own system and mechanism by learning from its own history, problems which it has faced through history, and taking into consideration culture and tendencies of the world. The first determinative factor in foreign policy is a country’s own domestic law (Pazarcı, Spring 2008, p. 119). Therefore, both in the process of foreign policy making and in its implementation, decision-makers specify the area of action according to the framework drawn by the Constitution.

Institutions and leaders of the institutions are authorized by the constitution. The constitution determines area of responsibility of the institutions. Therefore base of the institutions which is in charge of foreign affairs are constitution. The foreign policy issue has been given to the legislative and executive bodies within the framework of the constitution. Turkey’s constitution has changed five times since foundation of Turkish Republic. So, authority on foreign affairs has been given different organs and institutions from time to time. Likewise, with the new constitution while some institutions have increased its influence in making foreign policy, other institutions has lost their own effect on foreign policy making process. For instance, 1982 Constitution gave important role to National Security Council, in which commanders have power, to be effective in foreign policy making.

In addition to the constitution framing authority of state organs, traditions of institutions and role of the institutions in shaping the individual's behavioral are also significant points in foreign policy decision making process. Institutions as a reflection of political culture of the states can influence individual preferences, social movements, state and citizenship (March & Olsen, 1984). Heper, who studies in the process of institutionalization, claims that states are institutionalized either within the norms or in line with the demands of the society (Heper, 2012, p. 28). He states that in former choice norms are imposed upon society, while in latter for providing consensus behaviors of individuals should be limited.

The new institutionalism movement, which emerged with such assumptions, develops a new institution definition and understanding that goes beyond the limits of formal-legal analysis of institutionalism since the 1980s. The literature of new institutionalism that has been expanding and differentiated since the 1980s examines how relations between institutions and individuals have evolved, why institutions exist, how institutional change takes place, or how institutions have become resistant against change. New institutionalism goes beyond ordinary formal understanding of political institutions and tries to explain development of the institutions with dynamic perspective (Peters, 1999).

March and Olsen (1989, p. 21)has defined institution as a collection of rules and organized practices that are relatively continuous, embedded in the resources that are relatively permanent in case of meaning structures and displacement of individuals. They have stated that institutions are relatively resistant to the unique preferences and expectations of individuals and to changing external conditions. Namely, the institutions, which have written and unwritten rules and have a dynamic value judgment and moral sentiment, have developed a system that will maintain its existence by considering the lifetime and cognitive and psychological limitations of human. According to the view, institutions are not competition field for various groups, but rather are centers forming norms which determine manners of such groups. Institutions are the determinants of social actors not only in their actions but also in their discourse and relationships (March & Olsen, Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism", 2006).

Institutions have rooted by undertaking the direction of political behavior, the representation of demands, and sometimes the representation of the state itself (Alkan, 2018). Briefly main assumption of new institutionalism is that normative rules of political

28 institutions have a transformative role on the manner of politics, the behavior of political actors, and electoral preferences.

To sum up, in the Turkish foreign policy making, not only the authorities provided by constitutions but also development, culture and roots of the institution are so crucial in order to comprehend the role of the presidential institution. In the third and fourth part of our thesis, foreign policy decisions of the presidents will be examined one by one. In addition in these parts, in the given period, each constitution whichever is valid and role of the presidential institution will be mentioned one by one as well. Namely, Turkey’s political life is shaped by different constitutions. The constitutions offer various governance contexts. The provided authorities to presidential institution by 1924 Constitution, 1960 Constitution, 1982 Constitution and 2017 Constitution are different and required to be investigated separately. The requirement will be carried out in fallowing sections.

2.2. Internal Balances of Domestic Powers

In the previous section, the role and influence of the President of the Republic was tried to be considered at the legal level within the framework of the constitution regarding process of making and implementing of Turkish Foreign Policy. Both the gaps in the Constitution and the extraordinary situations create de facto situation beyond the legal one. In fact, the de facto situation can be seen in each stage, from the process of the making and implementation of the foreign policy, to the process of perceiving, describing, understanding, explaining and interpreting the inputs provided by the internal and external environment in foreign policy, and from determining the targets to be reached, to determining the strategies to be used to achieve these goals. As mentioned at the beginning of the work, the individual has a central role in the construction of foreign policy. However, the role of the individuals in institutions and organizations in the process of making foreign policy and how they can use the role in the decision-making process are related with the nature of the political system, the internal political balances and the type of regime of the state. (Ozcan, 1998: 511) Turkish Foreign Policy, an outcome of the state mechanism, is shaped by internal political balances that are a result of the effectiveness of individuals in the head of institutions as beyond the constitutionally given legal powers of individuals in the head of institutions. Because of the differentiation (Gozen, 2000)

29 between the roles given by the constitution and the manifestations of these roles in the process of making and implementing Turkish Foreign Policy, it is necessary to analyze domestic political balances in order to make sense of this process. According to Barber, power balances are one of the important factors influencing the foreign policy process and the leader's possibility of success (Barber, 2009, pp. 4-6). Therefore, during the presidential period of each leader, the internal political balances of the period must be examined in order to understand change of the effect of the presidency office on the foreign policy making process.

There may be differences between the de facto effect and authority of institutions in foreign policy making. In this context, the president's authority and influence on the process can be differentiated. At this point, the presidents’ character, knowledge and experience, interest and relations with the actors who will participate in the process is coming into prominence. In this light, the president may sometimes play a role that transcends the authorities, but sometimes he may not even be involved in the process by not exercising his authorities.

Foreign policy has always been regarded as a state policy and has been perceived as a trans-political and evens a beyond-political field. For this reason, Akgün (2011, p. 57) stated that Turkish foreign policy has remained an autonomous space that formulated and shaped by bureaucratic elites who are supposed to know the "state interest" best, is practiced by political leaders who respect to “expertise of the elites” in foreign affairs, and is not affected by the functioning of democratic politics. Even in government agencies, it is a common belief that foreign ministers haven't choose their own bureaucrats, but the bureaucrats have chosen their foreign ministers (Akgün, 2011, p. 57). Hence, during these periods "foreign policy, which is the output of the state", was shaped by some foreign bureaucrats and the army, which limited the influence of constitutionally authorized institutions (Robins, 2003, pp. 52-92).

To sum up, in the Turkish political life, the de facto situation beyond the being legal is always a matter of debate. Therefore, To make Turkish Foreign Policy Analysis the internal political balances and the de facto situation beyond the legal situation should be addressed. In the fallowing parts of the thesis, foreign policy decisions of the presidents will be examined one by one. While investigating Turkish foreign policy in their periods,

30 the internal political balances of each period and the de facto situations created by the balances will be examined one by one as well. Since each period has various balances in conjunction with existence of single party regime, multi-party regime or coalition governments, role of presidents in decision making process will be analyzed by taking into consideration their own domestic context.

2.3. Personality and Leadership

Leadership is overemphasized from the most basic sources of international relations to the most modern sources. Thucydides, in his famous book entitled as "Peloponnesian War", laid stress on leaders and their methods in the war between Athens and the Spartans and stated that how leadership of Pericles, who is a pragmatic leader, and Alcibiades, who abandoned Pericles' plan had an impact on the war. Machiavelli and Sun Tzu have likewise revealed in their books entitled as “Prince" and "The Art of War" respectively that how effective a leader is for the future of a nation. Nowadays, it is obvious that with the increasing dependence of states to each other and being multidimensional of relations between states, a leader has become more important not only for a nation but for a global order. For example; destructive damage of World War II to which Hitler entailed the world has felt deeply not only by Germany but the by all states.

However, the prominent theories of international relations have placed vital importance on systemic factors by ignoring the individual factor in order to explain international politics. Especially in the bipolar Cold War period, individual-based factors were not seen as significant and the assumption that systemic factors played an important role in determining the policies of states became the dominant opinion. Recently, these theories have been criticized because of ignoring factors apart from systemic factors and, in particular, individual-based factors.

The power of individual-based factors, and in particular the personal characteristics, to influence foreign policy has become an issue that attracts researchers' attention in the next process. Henry Kissinger once said, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make” (Pollack, Spring 2001). That means individuals can be evaluated as a heart of international politics (Hudson, 2005, pp. 1-2). At this point, one of the critical issues is what shapes the leader's approach and behavior. . Barber argues that as a political leader,

31 the American president's political performance at work is closely related to his three personal characteristics. These are character, worldview and style (Barber, 2009). According to him, while style refers to custom of president in fields of rhetoric, individual connection and homework, worldview means political idea of decision maker regarding human nature, condition of the society and moral debate of the time. On the other hand character is expressed by Barber (2009, pp. 5-8) as leaders’ intention to life and his own virtue.

In addition, While Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin argue personal feature of the leaders in foreign policy making, Sprout has emphasized "psycho-milieu" of individuals and groups who make foreign policy decisions must be examined in order to explain foreign policy. (Sprout & Sprout, 1965, p. 256) In this context, the psychological environment is related with how the international environment is perceived and interpreted by such decision makers (Hudson, 2005, pp. 6-7). In other words, state policies and approaches are affected by personality, cognitive process, perception and character of political leaders. Besides, socio-psychological situation of the society which leaders grow is so important shaping character and perception of the leader. So, like Rosenau explains in his “actor-specific theory”, it is necessary that the findings obtained at various levels of analysis must be evaluated together in order to understand the foreign policy clearly and fully (Rosenau, 1966, p. 118).

Another issue discussed in this context is to what extent the leader plays a role in determining foreign policy. Greenstein (Greenstein, 1987) states that dynamics, like whether political environment would allow the leaders' influence on political area or not, the position of the leader in the political scene, and the strengths and weaknesses of the leader, may change the given extent. Hermann expresses that the factor that would determine the effect of the leader on foreign policy making are shaped in connection with personal characteristics of the leader.

While Max Weber, classifies the leaders as the authoritarian leader, the rational- bureaucratic leader and the charismatic leader, Kissinger categorizes the leaders through examples of the bureaucratic-pragmatic leader, ideological leader and charismatic- revolutionary leader. (Arı, 1996, p. 133). On the other hand, Barber stated that the basic position of a leader would be shaped by the endeavor and effort (active or passive) which

32 he makes during his period and the self-fulfillment (positive or negative) which he took from his mission. The detection has shaped his famous “typology” explaining presidential character.

The reason why scholars make different classifications is that each of them takes different variables and factors into account. Likewise, “leadership trait analysis” is one of the most significant methods for using to comprehend personality of leaders. LTA analyze speeches of the leaders. According to Hermann, to analyze speeches of the leaders is so crucial to understand their psychological and personal features (Hermann M. G., 2003, pp. 178-179). Especially spontaneous speech of a leader which is not prepared beforehand reflects better his inner world. Because leaders has less control on their words during spontaneous speech (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 179). The speeches of the leaders are evaluated using the words that indicate the personality variable. Then the results can be examined to reveal the “Leadership Profile.”

Before reviewing of Leadership Trait Analysis in detail it is also worth noting that political leaders of Turkey have always dominated significant and strategic point in Turkish political life since Atatürk (Mango, 2002, p. 15). They are effective in election process, they decide who will be inside of election list, who will take position in decision making bodies of the party and they specify party program etc. So, Turkish politics has always been “a stage for leader–based politics” (Kesgin, 2013). In the same way, in issue of foreign policy, leaders emerge as crucial actor in foreign policy making process. Particularly some leaders such as Turgut Özal pioneered in evolving Turkish foreign policy. He excluded traditional decision maker in foreign policy decision making process, In other words he as a leader challenged traditional decision maker and traditional direction of Turkish foreign policy respectively and tried to get rid of such a tradition in making foreign policy process. Likewise Erdoğan has been dominant in both domestic and foreign policy of Turkey. With the leadership style, Erdoğan as a president has differentiated from many leaders in Turkish politics. Because almost all presidents of Turkey choose passive position in political like Ahmet Necdet Sezer. To comprehend the difference and changing effect of presidency on Turkish foreign policy from one president to other president, leadership style and personal feature of the leaders should be investigated. If it is within bounds of possibility, leadership style of the presidents will be discussed by regarding LTA.

2.3.1. Leadership Trait Analysis Leadership Trait Analysis is conducted using seven different personality traits. Each trait is numbered among zero and one according to results. These are the belief of the leader intended for controlling happenings, conceptual complexity, lack of confidence of others, in-group bias, leader's desire or need to have power and influence, self-confidence and leaders’ task focus. Table 2: Leadership Trait Analysis: Schema of Trait Description and Coding Trait Description Coding Belief can Perception of the world as an Percentage of verbs used that reflect action or control environment leader can influence. planning for action of the leader or relevant events Leader’s own state is perceived group. as an influential actor in the international system.

Conceptual Capability of discerning different Percentage of words related to high complexity dimensions of the environment complexity (i.e., ‘‘approximately,’’ when describing actors, places, ‘‘possibility,’’ ‘‘trend’’) vs. low complexity ideas, and situations. (i.e., ‘‘absolutely,’’ ‘‘certainly,’’ ‘‘irreversible’’).

Distrust of Doubt about and wariness Percentage of nouns that indicate misgivings others of others. or suspicions that others intend harm toward speaker or speaker’s group.

In–group Perception of one’s group as Percentage of references to the group that are bias holding a central role, favorable (i.e., ‘‘successful,’’ ‘‘prosperous,’’ accompanied with strong ‘‘great’’), show strength (i.e., ‘‘powerful,’’ feelings of national identity and ‘‘capable’’) or a need to maintain group honor. identity (i.e., ‘‘decide our own policies,’’ ‘‘defend our borders’’).

Need for A concern with gaining, keeping Percentage of verbs that reflect power and restoring power over others. actions of attack, advise, influence the behavior of others, concern with reputation.

Self Personal image of self– Percentage of personal pronouns used such as confidence importance in terms of the ability ‘‘my,’’ ‘‘myself,’’ ‘‘I,’’ ‘‘me,’’ and ‘‘mine,’’ to deal with the environment. which show speaker perceives self as the instigator of an activity, an authority figure, or a recipient of a positive reward.

Task focus Relative focus on problem Percentage of words related to solving versus maintenance of instrumental activities (i.e., relationship to others. Higher ‘‘accomplishment,’’ ‘‘plan,’’ ‘‘proposal’’) score indicates greater problem versus concern for other’s feelings and desires focus. (i.e., ‘‘collaboration,’’ ‘‘amnesty,’’ ‘‘appreciation’’).

Source: Stephen Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 2006), p. 292.

The scores which leader obtains from each trait are compared with other leaders’ trait score or norming groups’ trait score. The comparison gives us some clues and evidence in understanding reasons of different choices of leaders in foreign policy and it help us by answering questions whether the leaders challenge the constraints in the environment or not and leaders are open to information coming from their environment or not (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 185). In addition, Hermann (2003, p. 185) has also stated that the scores of the leaders Show us “reasons motivate leaders to seek political office are they driven by a cause, ideology, the desire for power and status or by an interest in building relationships?” According to answers to these questions, Hermann has categorized the leaders in eight different leadership styles. The categorizations are expansionistic, evangelistic, actively independent, directive, incremental, influential, opportunistic and collegial (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 185).

Firstly, a leaders’ response to constraints which come from both domestic and international environment is a significant cornerstone in understanding personality of the leader. Keller (Keller, 2005, p. 210) for analyzing how a leader is likely to response to political constraints, has emphasized four characteristics such as task emphasis, need for power, distrust and nationalism. On the other hand, Hermann (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 182) has explained that leaders’ scores in belief in one’s own ability to control events and need for power reveal the leader’s behavior against constraints. Leader has always faced constraints. While in process of making foreign policy, he can face domestic constraints from public opinion, opposition, business groups as well as international constraints, in process of making domestic policy he can also face international constraints such as economic necessity because of membership to international institution. Robert Putnam describes the situation “two-level game” (Putnam, 1988). In this point, leaders challenge or respect to constraints. Leaders’ score in belief in one’s own ability to control events and need for power show us his or her response to constraints as seen in table 3.

Table 3: Leaders’ Response to Constraints Belief in One’s Own Ability to Control Events Low High Need for power Respect constraints; work within Challenge constraints; but less such parameters toward goals; successful in doing so because too compromise and consensus building direct and open in use of power; less Low important. able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence.

Challenge constraints; but more Challenge constraints; are skilful comfortable doing so in an indirect in both direct and indirect influence; fashion-behind the scenes; good at know what they want and take High being “power behind the throne” charge to see that it happens. where they can pull strings but are less accountable for result.

Source: Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis”, in Jerrold M. Post (ed.), The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003, pp.188.

Second result obtained from the scores is about leaders’ approach to new information. Conceptual complexity and self-confidence score of the leaders determine whether leader is open or closed to new information. While leaders who have higher conceptual complexity score than their self-confidence score are evaluated as open to new information, other leaders who have less conceptual complexity score than their self- confidence score are evaluated as closed to new information (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 183). Hermann explains us how preferring to be closed or open to new information can influence decision making. She argues that the presidents who is closed to new information carry out their duties with information and suggest which provided by people which have similar viewpoint with them. However presidents who are open to new information are in quest for competent person to receive advice before concluding an issue. In addition, while leaders who are open to new information take account of perception of people having different view, leaders who are closed to new information seek the way to persuade people having different view (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 183). As noted above, a leaders’ score on self-confident and conceptual complexity help us to comprehend either the leader is open or closed to new information.

Table 4: Leaders’ Openness to New Information

Source: Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis”, The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

Another clue which can be extracted from these traits is about motivation. Motivation refers how leaders direct themselves temporarily and permanently (Barber, 2009, p. 8). Hermann, emphasizes pointing out that political leaders are driven, in general, both by an internal factor such as particular problem or cause, an worldview and by external factors like the desire of taking acceptance and positive ideas from society (Hermann M. G., 2003, pp. 183-185).

Each leader moves towards for his specific goals. While some leaders motivated by the influence of their own internal factors have a problem-oriented motivation, other leaders who are motivated in the line with external such as support of the political environments, and the society, are relationship-focused motivation (Hermann, Preston, Koran, & Shaw, 2001, pp. 93-94). Relationship-focused leaders prefers building relationship caused improvement of consensus, cooperation and interaction.

While high task focus score indicates problem-focused motivation, low task focus score states relationship-focused motivation. Score of task focus reveals whether the leader aims being successful in his actions, or he is focused on improving relationship with voters, elites or important others etc. in his actions.

Table 5: Rules for Assessing Motivation Score on Task Focus Motivation for Seeking Office High Problem Moderate Context-specific Low Relationship Source: Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis”, The Pychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

As a result of obtaining scores from three equations, it is revealed whether the leader challenge constraints or respect constraints, the leader is open to new information or closed to new information, the leader is problem-focused or relation-focused and the leader perceive the world as a hostile or safe. According to the result, Hermann finds out eight different leadership style prospects as seen in table 6.

Table 6: Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, And Motivation

Responsiveness Openness to Motivation to Constraints Information Problem Focus Relationship Focus

Evangelistic Expansionistic (Focus of attention is on Challenges Closed to (Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's constraints information expanding leader's, government's, mission, in mobilizing others and state's span of control) around one's message)

Actively Independent Directive (Focus of attention is on (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the maintaining one's own and the Challenges Open to government's maneuverability and government's status and constraints information independence in a world that is acceptance by others by engaging perceived to continually try to in actions on the world stage that limit both) enhance the state's reputation)

Influential Incremental (Focus of attention is on building (Focus of attention is on cooperative relationships with improving state's economy and/or Respects Closed to other governments and states in security in incremental steps constraints information order to play a leadership role; by while avoiding the obstacles that working with others, one can gain will inevitably arise along the more than is possible on one's way) own)

Opportunistic Collegial (Focus of attention is on assessing (Focus of attention is on what is possible in the current reconciling differences and Respects Open to situation and context given what building consensus— on gaining constraints information one wants to achieve and prestige and status through considering what important empowering others and sharing constituencies will allow) accountability)

Source: Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis”, the Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill (Ed. Jerrold M. Post), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2003.

CHAPTER III

1924 FOUNDING CONSTITUTION

The state exercises its own sovereign right through the bodies acting on its behalf and the institutions acting on behalf of the bodies. These bodies are legislative, executive and judicial. The harmony and interaction between the bodies, the institutions authorized on behalf of the bodies and the limits of the authority are determined by the constitution. These organs are collected either in one hand, or in two hands within a parliamentary regime, or in three hands within a liberal system, according to the state of government in which they are owned. In other words, within the framework of the constitution, each state has adopted unity of powers or division of powers.

In the process of preparation of the Constitution of 1924, the unity of powers and the principle of separation of powers were discussed. At this point, the proposal for the implementation of two-chamber system, as seen in the minutes of the parliament, was discussed. However, the adoption of the principle of the unity of powers, the maintaining of the parliamentary government and the unicameral legislative model resulted in the rejection of the proposal (Gözübüyük & Sezgin, 1957).

3.1. Legal Status

Turkey has adopted the principle of unity of powers by the 1924 constitution. Namely, the constitution made Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) superiority organ between state organs. The fact that the legislative body is composed of a single assembly, the President is elected by the parliament and the Assembly can only abolish itself are exemplaries of the principle of the supremacy of the Assembly adopted by the 1924 Constitution. 1924 constitution gave executive and legislative power to TGNA as pointed out in 6th article. At this point, Article 6 clearly sets out the principle of the unity of powers in the constitution. However, compared to the 1921 Constitution, the 1924 Constitution enshrined the principle of a more softened unity of powers. With reference to

39 the 7th article (Earle, 1925, p. 89), the Assembly receiving its power directly from the will of the nation, was exercising its executive power through the President, who is elected by TGNA, and Council of Ministers, which is appointed by the President. The fact that President and Council of Ministers, which President assigns, use executive power implies a form of government approaching the parliamentary system. However, the Council of Ministers must receive the vote of confidence from the Assembly. The Council of Ministers is responsible to the Assembly and the Assembly always has the right to check and abolish the Council of Ministers. According to the 1924 Constitution, although the President and the Council of Ministers were authorized to make and conduct foreign policy, the final word was belong to the Assembly (Efegil, 2002, p. 142). Therefore, according to the constitution, the ultimate authority in making foreign policy was not in the executive body of the state. Because in 5th article it is stated that executive and legislative powers are vested and centered in the Assembly concentrating these two powers in itself (Earle, 1925, p. 89). In fact, the article shows that the parliamentary government was adopted, unlike the parliamentary system (Özbudun, 2012, p. 37).

In 1924 Constitution, significant roles in field of foreign policy were given to TGNA. The Assembly has a number of administrative and executive powers, as specified in Article 26, in addition to a non-assignable legislative power in accordance with the principle of the unity of powers and the system of the parliamentary government. According to this, crucial foreign policy decisions such as concluding international agreements, making peace and declaring war are made by the Assembly itself.

On the other hand, Presidency has also considerable roles in foreign policy making process in framework 1924 Constitution. Article 32 states that (Earle, 1925, p. 92):

“The President of the Republic is the head of the State; in this capacity he presides over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions and in case of necessity over the Council of Commissioners. During his entire term of office the President of the Republic may not take part in the discussions or in the deliberations of the Assembly and may not vote.”

Therefore the president has authority to preside over the Council of Ministers legally in case of necessity. In Article 37, authority appointing the diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Turkey in foreign countries and receiving those from foreign countries was given to the President. In addition, supreme military command is represented by the

President and the command of the military forces in time of peace may be assigned to the Chief of Army and in the time of war to the person appointed by the President of the Republic with the advice of the Council of the Ministers.

Despite of such significant authorities, the President is only accountable to the Assembly in the event of treason. All decrees carried into effect by the President must be signed by Prime Minister and responsible minister like article 39 pointed out (Earle, 1925, p. 93):

“All decrees promulgated by the President of the Re- public shall be signed by the President of the Council and by the Com- missioner within whose jurisdiction the measure lies.”

In short, all responsibilities arisen from the decrees carried into effect by the President are belong to Prime Minister and the responsible minister who sign the decrees as stated in article 41. That is, the President does not have any political responsibility. The practices in this regard are the applications of the parliamentary regime.

According to article 44, President assigns Prime Minister among parliamentarians and all ministers are chosen by Prime Minister among parliamentarians. Then the cabinet is submit to President. With approval of the President, the cabinet is offered to the Assembly. Article 46 argues that The Council of Ministers is liable of the governments’ general policy together. Besides, each of ministers, lonely, is responsible of issues and practices of underling within his own authority.

The President had a delayed veto power and the supreme commander of all powers. The President may send the law back to the Assembly for review within 10 days of the law approved by the Assembly. The President of the Republic is obliged to declare the Law, which is accepted by Parliament again, in accordance with Article 35, even though it has the power of delaying veto. The operation of the President here is not an approval of the legislative process. In practice, the President of the Republic is an administrative practice in the sense of announcement (Kubalı, 1959, p. 197).

As seen, all the changes made in the general assembly were to increase the supremacy of the nation and the superiority of the Assembly, which is representative of nation. When these powers are taken into consideration and compared with the powers of the Assembly, it can be considered that the role of the President was a representative and pushed to a symbolic level (Gözübüyük & Sezgin, 1957, p. 47). The President does not have an

41 authority to determine the policies of the government (Arsel, 1961, p. 45). However, the constitution intitle to the President the right in order to preside over the Council of Ministers if deemed necessary.

The fact that the constitution brought together the legislative and executive power in the Assembly, the legislative power would be used by itself and the executive power would be used by the President and the Council of Ministers meaning, in one hand, dependence on unity of power and parliamentary government, on the other hand separation of executive and the legislative authority as a power. Thus, the inclination towards the parliamentary system, which started with the declaration of the Republic, was reinforced by the 1924 Constitution.

In summary, according to Ozbudun, the Constitution of 1924 seeks to establish an impartial President (Özbudun, 2012, p. 48). The President is not different from the head of state in the parliamentary system. In addition, the constitution aimed not to have a strong president in political life. In order to prevent the formation of a strong president, the Constitution of 1924 did not give a remarkable authority to the President except delayed veto power (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009, p. 12).

Despite the limited authority intitled by the constitution, single-party presidents have practically been the most influential figures of political life and have shaped both domestic and foreign policy considerably. In other words, the presidents of the period held a power beyond the power intitled by the constitution. The main reason of this situation was to provide that determinant influence of the new regime on the political and social life were irreversibly assured. In order to achieve this goal, they kept the political regime under their personal control (Gönenç, 2008, p. 492). In short, determinant powers of Turkey's first and second presidents on Turkish political life stems from, not the 1924 Constitution, the political characteristics of the mentioned period and their personal leadership.

When all this legal ground is examined, it is interpreted that the Constitution of 1924 gave birth to a parliamentary government, unlike the parliamentary system. However, according to Balta (1960, s. 8) the administrative powers given to the Assembly as if it is an executive body in Articles 5, 7 and 26 are in fact the legacy of the national struggle period and it is obvious that there was a transition to the parliamentary system compared to the

1921 Constitution. In addition to the legal process, the actual situation will be examined under the following headings.

Lastly, on the basis of codes of this period, it is understood that the Presidential organizational structure was shaped as indicated in table 7.

Table 7: Organizational Structure of Turkish Presidential Office

President

Secretariat General of the Presidency

First Aide-de- Office of the Chief Support Unit Camp of Cabinet Management

Source: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, Ankara: Cumhurbaşkanlığı, p. 353. (The table is formed by asking for information from mentioned source.)

3.2. Actual State

43 process of making and implementation of foreign policy as well as a lower level of leadership.

3.2.1. Single-Party Period

The 1924 Constitution was prepared, not by the constituent assembly, by the second Grand National Assembly of Turkey and remained in effect for thirty six years by undergoing some changes. Like the 1921 Constitution, the Constitution of 1924 regulated the assembly as the unique competent body in the exercising of sovereignty. As a result of the coordinating National Liberation War with the Assembly, the restriction of the will of the parliament representing the will of the nation in the transition from the empire to the nation-state was considered as a measure of preventing the return to the previous regime. For a long time during the period when the Constitution of 1924 was applied, TGNA as the ruler of the sovereignty was a single-party parliament. The Constitution of 1924 is a constitution which was implemented in both a single party and a multiparty period without any change. Multi-party life was passed in 1946. However, two unsuccessful multi-party life experiences were attempted at the time of the Constitution and during leadership of Atatürk.

3.2.1.1. Mustafa Kemal’s Era

3.2.1.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers

The government is the main body that has the executive power in the 1924 system. Political responsibility is also belong to the government. It appears that the constitution, which started out from the point of unity of the legislative and executive powers, continued its line on the parliamentary system by taking authority of establishing the Delegation of the Executive Committee from the Assembly and giving it to President and Prime Minister.

The 1924 Constitution has a different legislative-executive relationship than the 1921 Constitution. Unlikely in the 1921 Constitution, statement "The Government of Turkey shall be administered by the National Assembly and the government is called as Grand National Assembly Government" have not been included in the 1924 Constitution. The fact that such a statement was not included in the Constitution of 1924 is considered to be a sign of approaching the parliamentary system. Hence according to Güneş (Güneş, 1956, p. 14) the TGNA itself did not conclude that it would carry out its executive duties on the

44 basis of these articles. TGNA accepted the distinction between the legislative and the executive powers itself. Even the parliament made decision that "Article 7 of the Constitution prevents the Grand National Assembly from conducting executive power in its hand." as seen in parliament decision no. 803, dated April 12, 1934 (2018).

As a result of the political developments in practice, the center of gravity in the administration passed to the executive body without hesitation (Soysal, 1964, p. 104). According to Soysal, the reasons for this situation should be sought in a single-party regime. Because the head of the executive body, the people who dominate the one party in the Assembly. Despite the government system, which is dominated by the legislature, there is a de facto situation in which the executive body dominates legislation. Under these circumstances, Soysal claimed that foreign policy-making process was under the control of the executive body, the government and even the President who is 'chief of one-party.' This situation, in the 37th article of the constitution, revealed a de facto situation in which the President has important roles beyond the powers in the foreign policy field intitled by the constitution.

In the Republican regime, the existence of any class, such as the bourgeoisie, which could direct the bureaucracy apart from a certain bureaucratic class and would be its ”driving force" or could balance it, is out of question (Ahmad, 2006, p. 57). The Republican regime, which emerged as a result of the process following the last period of the Ottoman Empire and especially the post-World War I period, represented the break from the past (Ahmad, 1995, p. 10). Therefore, the regime had to liquidate the structures of the past and the autonomous classes that could oppose it. In addition, with Takrir-i Sükün, putting out of action of the Progressive Republican Party, led by Mustafa Kemal's close friends, such as Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay, who leaved from Republican People's Party meant removing of all classes and opponents except the 'Kemalist environment' from power (Zurcher, 2007, p. 124). As a result, within the period, no one was left, except Mustafa Kemal and his close friends, who could have an impact on foreign policy making (Balcı, 2017, p. 48).

In the context of the conditions during the one-party period, the negotiations in the Parliament on foreign policy-related matters were in favor of consensus and decisions taken unanimously. In 1939, the mutual aid and guarantee agreement with Britain and

France came to the Assembly, including four deputies, including Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoglu and Ali Rama Tarhan. The open vote was held after the speeches which did not contain any opposing views and the agreement was signed unanimously by 354 members (Soysal, 1964, p. 112).

At this point, opinions have been expressed that government control is taking place in the party group rather than the general assembly (Balta, 1960, s. 6). Parliamentary minutes which were composed of unanimous and ideas in the favor explained the effect of the single-party regime on the legislative-executive relationship. In fact Ahmad (1993, p. 53), stated that Mustafa Kemal had decided to shift the political struggle from the Assembly to the party and he had kept completely under his own control. Similarly, Fuat Sirmen, who carried out important duties in Turkish politics, such as deputy, ministry and parliamentary presidency, stated that the negotiations that led to the Government's activities took place on Tuesday's party group meeting (Soysal, 1964, p. 114). 1937 constitutional amendment and the inclusion of RPP's principles in the constitution show how far the party and the state are intertwined. Ataturk’s political leadership prevented the confrontation between the President and the government and Parliament.

Although power of having final word in foreign policy was given to parliament constitutionally, a different practical situation arose as a result of these practices. The Republican People's Party, which was the only actor together with Takrir-i Sükün, was directing the political system with its party constitution (Mardin, 2002, pp. 62-65). In the RPP's third regulation dated in 1927, it was pointed out that the role of the leaders in the decision-making mechanism could not be questioned (Erdoğan, 2000, pp. 23-28). Therefore, the fact that the single party dominated the parliament during the period and the candidates themselves were determined by Atatürk, when considered together with the above-mentioned cases, it is obvious that Atatürk and his close friends had a decisive role in the making and implementation of foreign policy. In fact, Mazıcı (Mazıcı, 1996, p. 44) stated that the government program was determined in line with the directives of Atatürk. In summary, the Assembly, which holds the authority to say the last word on the legal ground, has become a kind of approval authority.

In his study, Soysal (Soysal, 1964, pp. 118-119) who examined the relationship between parliament and foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic, stated that the

46 opinion of the dominant party in this period was not based on any ideology or doctrine and expressed that foreing policy was shaped in frame of diplomatic capabilities of Mustafa Kemal and his close friends such as İsmet İnönü and Tevfik Rüştü Aras.

In short, when the internal political developments of the period are examined, it can be seen that the Presidency's authority dominates foreign policy beyond the legal ground and manages the foreign policy-making process itself. The fact that Tevfik Rüştü Aras was referred as 'Atatürk's Foreign Minister' shows the influence of the Presidency in foreign policy during the period (Aras, 2003).

3.2.1.1.2. Ataturk’s Leadership Profile

Mustafa Kemal, who served as the Founding President, played an important role in foreign policy making because of his strong personality and political leadership. During his 15 years from 1923 to 1938, he guided Turkish Foreign Policy and demonstrated a charismatic leadership after the war. In fact, it is a fact that Mustafa Kemal's influence cannot be underestimated when the 20th century Turkish Political History is told. In addition to giving direction to both domestic and foreign policy, but he has also shaped the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. While investigating institutional, social, political and identical transformation of Turkey, ignoring the effect of his leadership style may make the cases which are related with the period incomplete. With this leadership style, Atatürk has an influence beyond his legal powers in the field of foreign policy. For example; in Nyon Conference held in 1937, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu defended staying Turkey out of the conference in order to not strike an attitude against the Italians, Atatürk was giving instructions to the Foreign Minister to sign the agreement. Tevfik Rüştü Aras acted in accordance with the instructions he received from Atatürk and signed the Treaty of Nyon. This treaty, which İnönü and his government mostly rejected, was approved by the Assembly. As we learned from the memory of İsmet İnönü after this process, Atatürk informed İnönü that he would dismiss him from office of prime minister and assign Celal Bayar as a prime minister (İnönü, 1987, p. 290). Although Prime Minister İsmet İnönü has constitutional powers, Mustafa Kemal has said the final word about the process thanks to his charismatic leadership. As Mazıcı (Mazıcı, 1996, p. 44) said, the government program was determined in line with Atatürk's directives.

Starting from this point, it is understood that Ataturk “challenged the constraints.” In addition to this, even he transcended several domestic and international constraints by making reforms in political and social field. Removing sultanate and caliphate, adopting laicism and Latin alphabet instead of Arabic alphabet and banning all symbols and practices that evocated tradition are extreme examples of the situation. All of these are to create “a new Turk identity” (Ahmad, 1995, pp. 113-114) and a new state. With this aspect, he is described as transformative leader. According to Northouse (Northouse, 2016, p. 161), transformational leaders become role models for their followers, determine a vision, trigger new tendencies, and, manifest the values and norms of the society. In a similar manner, in name of manifesting the values and norms he specified six principles and in name of determining the vision and the tendencies he (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1961) put it:

“We want to make our homeland modernized. All our efforts are to create a western government body in Turkey. Is there any nation that desires to enter civilization but does not oriented towards the West?”

As it is seen, Atatürk identifies with an modernization and westernization, and uses them in synonym. In this regard, the period of Atatürk, Turkey's foreign policy directed to the west and connects with the West in the field of culture has been established.

In addition, he is rigidly loyal to the manifested norms, the determined vision and the triggered tendencies for the society (Robinson, 1963, p. 22). Such a loyalty proved that he was motivated by internal factors. That means he had a ‘problem-focused’ motivation. Because he was an ‘achievement-oriented’ person (Atay, 2004) in contrast to feature of ‘relation-focused’ motivation such as approval and status oriented. His speech in Konya showed his achievement-oriented. He stated that (Mango, Ataturk, 1999, p. 420):

“‘Victory is won by the man who says “Victory is mine”, success belongs to him who starts by saying I will be successful and can then say “I have succeeded.”’

Before he decided, Atatürk considered the different dynamics, thought long and hard and he gave a wide area to discharge the responsibilities for his employees (Mango, 2002, p. 15). So he was open to various information. This openness was limited with certain political and bureaucratic circles. Hopkins and Mansbach define this situation as deciding with small groups. According to Hopkins and Mansbach, decisions can be taken by a small

48 group of leaders, especially in cases of international crisis, by bypassing current mechanisms (Raymond & Mansbach, 1973, p. 164).

Because of inadequacies in Ataturk's life period and not existing of his spontaneous speech, "leadership profile" which Hermann put forward cannot be revealed. However, as noted above, based on his statements, foreign policy understanding and the memories of his close friends, it is understood that Gazi has a transformative character that is achievement-oriented, open to new knowledge and challenge the constraints. When an evaluation is made within the scope of table 6 mentioned in Section 2, it can be interpreted that Gazi has an "actively independent" leadership profile. According to that; Mustafa Kemal focused on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both.

Similarly, Mustafa Kemal demonstrated an active-positive leadership style according to Barber's typology with his decisive role in the making and implementation of foreign policy. During his term of office, Mustafa Kemal had never conducted a visit abroad but received 23 high-level guests and held official talks. Besides, Atatürk received 23 high- level foreign guests and held official talks (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323). If necessary, his bypassing the Prime Minister and giving direct instruction to the Minister of Foreign Affairs indicates that the Presidency played a vital role in the foreign policy-making process during that period. The role of the Presidency beyond its constitutional power can only be explained by the leadership style and profile of Gazi and the internal political conditions of the period.

3.2.1.2. İsmet İnönü’s Era

Before Atatürk died, İsmet İnönü resigned from the office of the Prime Minister and replaced him with Celal Bayar. After the death of Atatürk, Celal Bayar supported Inonu who received support from the army and bureaucrats. In the extraordinary CHP congress, İnönü was elected as the permanent president. In addition, İsmet İnönü received the title of "national chief" in this congress and then was elected unanimously as the President.

3.2.1.2.1. Balance of Domestic Powers

The internal political balances of the period were reflected in the presidential elections held in Parliament. İnönü was unanimously elected as President by the Assembly. This election

49 shows that İnönü, who served as prime minister a year ago, had a considerable influence in the Assembly and was capable of ensuring harmony among all members of the Assembly (Ahmad, 1995, p. 88). Inonu gave Celal Bayar the office of Prime Minister. Furthermore, İnönü himself has personally wish not take position of Aras within the government. Because, for İnönü, Aras has made attempts against him and fulfills the instructions of Atatürk by not listening him during the Nyon Conference despite of being foreign minister. İnönü appointed Aras as the Ambassador of London. (Koçak, Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950), 1989, p. 123).

In this period, the regime was described with the slogan “one party, one nation, one leader" at the extraordinary party congress which was held on 16 December 1938. The reflections of this slogan were manifested in the following months. Celal Bayar was replaced by Refik Saydam from the Prime Ministry. In the same session, a new election was decided. With the new election, important figures like Kılıç Ali, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Hüsrev Gerede, Şükrü Kaya and Tahsin Üst, who are known as Atatürk's close friends, have been left out of parliament. (Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi, 2005, p. 327). Thus, İnönü designed and dominated the party, the government and the Assembly.

İnönü took the party under his control by the congress, the government by changing Prime Minister and the Assembly by elections. In other words, İsmet Pasha became the ruler of political life all alone. Metin Toker (1970, p. 21) expressed that Inonu shaped politics and everything, that the national chief regards objectionable, was being banned in Turkey despite the presence of the law of parliament and the government. As a result of this situation, the national chief became the only decision maker of Turkish foreign policy and hold under his control even last detail of government (Tamkoç, 1973). In respect thereof Weisband (2002) has claimed that All diplomatic correspondence and telegraph messages passed through İnönü's control, while the contribution of the diplomatic or consultant staff to the foreign policy-making process was adhered to the grace of İnönü.

Within this equation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become a kind of ministry entrusted with a task of the implementation of İnönü's policy (Oran, 2015, p. 75). Although the foreign ministers of the period, especially Numan Menemencioğlu and Şükrü Saraçoğlu, have the power to shape the foreign policy making process from time to time, the limits of this power have been drawn by İnönü. For example, Numan Menemencioğlu,

50 known for his German prowess, was dismissed when the England turned the pointer in favor of the Second World War. In the same way, the Soviet's increased pressure on Ankara, and Şükrü Saraçoğlu, known for his anti-Soviet stance, was resigned for health reasons (Diringil, 2000, pp. 47-50). In short, İnönü has always determined the limits of this area, even though it gave an influence to the foreign ministers of the period in order to keep up with the balance changes in the international environment.

With the wining of democratic countries World War II rather than single-party regimes, such practices have ended. For the held in the US, Turkish delegation, who came to conference held in the USA for the establishment of the United Nations, explained Turkey's progress towards democracy and gave guarantee that after the war it would be permitted to any democratic steps (Balcı, 2017, p. 92). As a result of the guarantee given, in 1946 at the Extraordinary Congress of the People's Party, İsmet Pasha's national leadership and his permanent leadership were terminated (Karatepe, 2001, p. 42). After this date, the transition to multi-party life has started.

After losing the battle of the single-party regime being made pressure by international environment and sending a diplomatic note of USSR about changes in Turkey's eastern border and in the status of the Straits made compulsory approaching to western block for Turkey. For this convergence it was necessary to fulfill the requirements of a democratic regime. For this, it was planned to establish a party pulling of the Republican People's Party, which would enable the country to gain a democratic identity, but would not have the chance to come to power in reality and not go beyond occupying seats in parliament (Esirci, 1967). In this context, Celal Bayar reported his commitment on many issues, particularly foreign policy and secularism, and received Inonu's approval for the establishment of the Democratic Party (Toker, 1970, p. 83). Thus, the Democratic Party was founded under the leadership of Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan who lead the a Memorandum of the Four. The first election of multi-party life took place in 1946, but this election took its place in the minds with undemocratic practice which is open vote, secret counts. The Democratic Party, which won 54 seats in this election, took its place in the Assembly.

Despite all the steps towards democratization, foreign policy making took place under the control of Ismet Pasha and his close friends in the post-1945 period (Balcı, 2017, p. 80).

However, as mentioned above, with both the area of freedom given to the press and taking seats of a new opposition party in the Assembly, foreign policy became an issue that can be stated on opinion.

3.2.1.2.2. İnönü’s Leadership Profile

As mentioned above, after the death of Atatürk, who was included in Weber's class of charismatic authority, an assessment can be made on Weber's assumptions about who his successor would be. Weber speaks of three main processes for the election of the charismatic leader's successor. These are being chosen leader according to the criteria to define the charismatic qualities, being chosen successor by charismatic leader himself, and finally being chosen leader by disciples (Weber, 2012, pp. 366-367). The fact that Inonu have charismatic qualities and is elected by the Assembly, which Weber defines as his disciples, shows that the first and the third assumptions, Weber made, were realized. Contrary to the second assumption, İnönü was not chosen by Mustafa Kemal.

Celal Bayar (2010, p. 44), who was the third president and close friend of İsmet İnönü, stated that İnönü had complete control over politics during his presidency. During the term of his national chief, the fact that he had a dominant role on the political institutions in question shows that İnönü had power beyond the powers granted constitutionally. Inonu has maintained this power for a long time with its charismatic leadership profile.

Inonu is remembered especially for the pragmatist politics between the two poles that he conducted in the Second World War. He has always thought about past events and what he learned from them, has always carefully calculated what will work well and has adopted a pragmatist worldview (Heper, 1999). In this way he was far from the adventurous policies and never took risks (Toker, 1998, p. 298). Coldness and logic always prevailed in İnönü against feeling and excitement (Aydemir, 1999, p. 136).

As mentioned above, İnönü's giving limited field to his close advisors led to the interpretation that İnönü ignored various factors. The fact that Heper (2002, p. 26) argues that İnönü has an inward looking personality and the idea that the world revolves around itself has proved confirmation the interpretation. As we have learned from Metin Toker (1992, p. 283), İnönü would have made a decision after thinking deeply before making a decision. He thought a lot to make a decision, but he did not return from his decision

(Mutlu, 2007, p. 170). Also, according to Heper (2002, p. 30) İsmet Pasha was self- confident enough to be able to act independently from Atatürk. This information, taken from the memories of İnönü's immediate surroundings, shows that İnönü's self-confidence is higher than the cognitive capacity. In the light of this information, if table 4 is examined in the second part of thesis, it can be concluded that Ismet Inonu has a personality which is closed to new knowledge and dynamics. Ali Fuad Erden, one of the closest friends of İsmet İnönü, also confirms this. According to him (Erden, 1952, pp. 161-163), İnönü was a realist, math-minded, perseverant and voluntary, authoritarian, but not a dictator, and he did not like any other ideas.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, the fact that İnönü left important political figures outside the Assembly such as Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Şükrü Kaya opposing to him, an opposition party can only be established after receiving İnönü's approval, and being clarified of which areas should not be opposed by İnönü indicate his "high need for power" and "belief his own ability to control events." In this respect, İnönü appears as a leader who challenges the constraints when evaluated according to table 3 in the second section.

On the other hand, according to Semih Kalkanoğlu, İsmet İnönü was not a politician but a statesman. He was inexperienced in making political propaganda, and unsuccessful to carry into effect projects in the party that he usually wanted to do (Heper, 1999, pp. 86-88). İnönü, who did not have a revolutionary character, did not want the alphabet revolution. However, after the law was passed, he certainly did not write in old letters. On the other hand, a leader who gave great importance to law and order was a serious lawman. Nevertheless, he had no courage and attempt. In this respect, it can be said that İsmet İnönü “respected the restrictions” instead of “challenging the constraints” and determined his movement area within these constraints. In this respect, İnönü is a leader who “respect the constraints.” In short, İnönü has developed a policy by occasionally “challenging constraints” and sometimes by “respecting these constraints.”

Inonu's daughter Özden Toker expressed this situation in these sentences:

“Atatürk is a dreamer, a person who wants to reach the sun, and my father is the person who decides what to do after thinking for more than twenty-four hours. Ataturk is also thinking of some things before, but more impulsive and hasty, my father is a hard decision maker (Mutlu, 2007, p. 170).”

So; İnönü had a highly rational based thinking structure, unlike the targets that Atatürk idealized. From this point of view, it is understood that İnönü is motivated by external factors rather than internal factors such as ideal, idea and ideology. In other words, İnönü has a process-oriented and “relationship-oriented motivation”, not result and “problem- oriented.” Because, İnönü always has the flexibility to make relations with different institutions and individuals by separating from the institutions and individuals that he established relations. During the Second World War and in the post-war period, İnönü adopted the balance policy according to changing power projections in the international environment and shaped its relations with the countries accordingly. For instance; with the increasing pressure of Soviet government on Ankara, İnönü made Şükrü Saraçoğlu resigned, known for his anti-Soviet stance. Another important example was with winning the war of the Western bloc, practices such as single party and national chief were given up and the transition to multi-party life, which shows that the democratic process continue, was accelerated. In short, İnönü established this flexible balance in order to get the support and acceptance of the changing forces. This indicates a type of motivation shaped by external factors as mentioned in the second part of the thesis. In Inönü's foreign policy understanding rather than an ideal or a dream, the presence of a highly rational objectives such as keeping Turkey out of the war shows that his “relationship-oriented motivation.” In the words of Heper, İnönü considers politics as an activity whose only goal is to develop the general interests of society and nation (Heper, 1999, p. 224).

In the light of this information, it can be extracted that as a leader who is closed to the information and has relationship-oriented motivation, while İsmet Pasha was a leader that challenging constraints from time to time, he was also leader respecting constraints occasionally. When İnönü's profile is evaluated in table 6 mentioned in Chapter 2, it can be commented that in one hand İnönü exhibited "evangelistic leadership" on the political scene and on the other hand he has "influential leadership" style. At this point, while as an "evangelistic leader", İnönü was a statesman leading and prescribing for his environment (Mutlu, 2007, p. 168). At the same time he was a leader who can eliminate the Soviet threat by taking advantage of power of the western bloc as an "influential leader” (Tuncer, 2012, p. 162).

During his presidency, İnönü worked with only one advisor. Again in this period, İnönü received 5 high-level foreign guests and visited abroad only once in Egypt. In addition, he

54 dominated foreign policy making process. On that sense, Inonu exhibited an active- positive leadership style according to Barber's typology with his decisive role in both the making and implementation of foreign policy just like his successor Mustafa Kemal. If necessary, resigning the Foreign Ministers and shaping foreign policy directly indicate that the Presidency played a vital role in the foreign policy-making process during this period. As a result he has played a central role in the foreign policy making process by transcending his constitutional authority.

3.2.2. Multi-Party Period

1946 is known as a year which first multi-party election was made, because of undemocratic practices such as open vote, secret counting democratization of the election were discussed. At this point, the elections in 1950 are considered more democratic. As a result of the elections held in 1950, the Democrat Party won 416 seats in the Assembly consisting of 487 seats with a rate of 52.68%. The Democratic Party, which came to power alone, ended the 27-year RPP power.

3.2.2.1. Celal Bayar’s Era

In the post-Atatürk period, it was widely believed that Celal Bayar, who took first opposition flag, would be the prime minister and that Celal Bayar was reluctant to be elected President (Birand, 1995, p. 66). However, in the newly formed Parliament, Celal Bayar was elected as President and Refik Koraltan was elected as the Speaker of the Assembly. Celal Bayar, who was elected as the President of the Turkish Republic due to the party bylaw, has resigned his duty of the General President of Democrat Party (Özgen, 2007, p. 237). Celal Bayar gave Adnan Menderes the duty of forming the government. Mahmut Celal Bayar, who served as the President until the 1960 military coup, was removed from the office by force as a result of the military coup. He was sentenced to death by the Yassıada Court on 15 September 1961, but was later sentenced to life imprisonment. On 7 November 1964, he was released due to his disease.

3.2.2.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers

The fact that almost 85% of the Assembly passed to the Democratic Party left the opposition's voice on the political scene very weak. In the next elections held in 1954, the DP won 503 out of 541 seats in the Parliament and achieved a record in the Turkish

55 political life. In the 1957 general elections, the Democratic Party won 424 out of 610 seats. At this point, the executive organs between 1950 and 1960 had a significant determining power in the foreign policy area compared to legislation. Democratic Party achieved great success in the political arena in the 1950 general elections, and took the Presidency and the Prime Minister's offices in the executive power and formed its own government and had the opportunity to hold a large majority of the parliament. In the meantime, with the expression of Kongar (2007, p. 612) in the opposition of the statist-elitist front, which controlled the military and civilian bureaucracy, the traditionalist-liberal front was taken position. This statist-elitist clan holding the bureaucratic cadres has been liquidated with the strong power of the Democratic Party (Hatipoğlu, 2012, p. 227).

Heper (1985) also explained the existence of the elitist and kemalist class in the bureaucracy and the military, which were decisive in some vital decisions of the state, even though they are not elected. This class has gained such a power because they lead the state during the Independence War period, and especially in the Westernization process. The kemalist class, who defined themselves as defender of the long-term interests of the nation and the state and sustained their political struggles within the RPP (Heper, 2002, p. 140). The Democrat Party has expressed their struggle against the state elites in the political arena with motto of "national will against the state will" (Heper & Keyman, 1998, pp. 259- 260). With the heavy defeat of the RPP in the 1950 elections, the state elite lost their weight in the political and bureaucracy. However, his decisive positions in the military continued. After the 1960 military coup, the state elite wanted to design politics by establishing institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council with the Constitution of 1961. These institutions had no political responsibility, but had the power to intervene in the executive body constitutionally. It is clearly seen that being given of such a power to irresponsible institutions aimed not to lose influence of the state elites in the political and bureaucracy just as happening between 1950 and 1960. They tried to preserve their decisive role in Turkish politics though such institutions.

The fact that President Celal Bayar was the previous leader of the Democratic Party, as well as having such a power within the Assembly, gave the Democratic Party the opportunity to dominate domestic politics. At this point, during the one-party period, the prime ministers had been in the background of the Presidents as a de facto situation beyond

56 their legal status. It was a controversial issue whether the Democratic Party would continue. Celal Bayar, who resigned from the party chairmanship, showed that he was above the parties and at the same time appointed Adnan Menderes to form a government with which he could get along (Şeyhanlıoğlu, 2011, p. 134). According to Yücel (Yücel, 2000, pp. 35-38) although the years 1950-1960 were referred as Menderes Era, real leader of the Democratic Party and the driving force of that period was always Celal Bayar. In addition to these allegations, there are also opinions which argue that Menderes dominated the Democratic Party (Baban, 1970, pp. 44-48). Aydemir (1984, p. 141), one of the most ambitious advocates of this view, stated this situation by saying that DP means Menderes.

Despite all these different views, Bayar and Menderes have served together as President and Prime Minister for 10 years. In addition, Bayar appointed Menderes 5 times as a prime minister and did not consider Menderes' resignation as an option even when resigning of Menderes was offered as a remedy to decrease the political tension before the 1960 military coup (Uyar, 2001, p. 82).

In contrast to these discussions, either of the two leaders is not passive or ineffective. According to Karpat (2011) the balance of power in the party after 1950 had shifted towards Menderes and Menderes had unlimited power over the party and the government. However, Menderes has always taken into consideration the President's recommendations because of Bayar's experience at the point of regime and bureaucracy as well as his ongoing relationship with them during the War of Independence (Karpat, 2011, pp. 133- 134).

In short, as Mr. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who served as the Foreign Ministry after Köprülü, told the ambassador of Iran, Dikerdem about his visit to the Soviet, President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes are the ones to be convinced when a decision on foreign policy will be made (Yılmaz, 2004, p. 134).

Beyond the internal dynamics of the Democratic Party, the impact of domestic dynamics on the foreign policy making process has also been discussed. Even in the case of vital foreign policy issues, not taking the ideas of opposition and not recognizing to them has caused the opposition's reaction. The most significant discussions of the period stem from the fact that the opposition was not allowed to intervene especially in the foreign policy area, and even foreign policy issues were never brought to Parliament. For example, the

57 decision to send troops to Korea was never offered to the Assembly's approval. On 18 July 1950, the government met in Yalova under the chairmanship of President Celal Bayar and decided to send troops to Korea.

As an opposition leader, İsmet İnönü later challenged the decision because of not working of government with the Assembly on foreign policy issues. Inonu stated that "in the Second World War, while the war was in Turkey's door and while German armies were in our border, before taking the decision to discontinue even our on economic relations with Germany, CHP Government consulted Parliament" (Soysal, 1964, p. 197).

In addition, during this period, the Government did not hesitate to call for an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly during a pause for foreign policy issues. Between 1923 and 1946, the five extraordinary meetings out of nine were made in field of foreign policy (Soysal, 1964, p. 106).

Fahri Belen, who served as the Minister of Public Works in the government, explained the conditions in which the decision on sending troops to Korea was given (1861, pp. 378-79):

“...Do you know how the decision is made? President, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense decided in Yalova ... The Council of Ministers was met formally after 3 or 4 days the decision was made. The fact that the decision was made by the Council of Ministers formally was met for participation of our amenable friends to decision-making process and I and Mr. Nihat Reşat Belger was not invited the Council of Ministers meeting.”

In fact, Article 26 of the 1924 Constitution states that the war declaration itself can be made by the Parliament. But according to the government there was no war in reality. The opposition said that a soldier was sent to a war declared in Korea, and that it was a violation of the constitution without the approval of the TGNA. Opposition leader İsmet İnönü said that the Government has not even received the Grand National Assembly's request and that the Constitution has not been followed on the issue (Erdemir, 1956).

In fact, President Celal Bayar plays an active role in the foreign policy-making process, as seen in the decision on sending troops to Korea. Bayar carried out domestic and international travels with factory openings, public address and did not compromise its active politics.

Another example in which the Assembly and the public were excluded from the decision- making process was the arms agreements with the US in 1959. Jupiter missiles were placed

58 in Turkey in accordance with US nuclear treaty without informing the Assembly and the public (Uslu, 2000, pp. 135-140). As in the case of Korea, it was criticized for not giving the opposition the right to speak about the deployment of Jupiter missiles and the making of foreign policy around Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and its immediate surroundings during the period in question. The objection of the RPP's spokesman to the issue of sending troops to Korea indicated their approaches: “There is no separation between the parties in the principles of foreign policy. Separation is on method and exercises” (Mütercimler & Öke, 2004, p. 91).

In short, between 1950 and 1960, foreign policy is generally describes as ”Turkish Foreign Policy during the Menderes Period" or "Turkish Foreign Policy of the Democratic Party." In this period when the government used its influence on foreign policy making as compared to the one-party period, the opposition and parliament were not involved in the decision-making process. The heavy defeat of the opposition in the elections has prepared the process. With the abolition of the bureaucratic-elitist that might stand against harmonious work of president, the government and the Assembly, the Democratic Party dominated the political scene. But the 1960 coup shows that the military elite has maintained its power.

During the single-party period, foreign policy-making process was dominated by the former presidents, with the influence of their leaderships and historical personalities and titles such as the National Chief, in contrast to the independent legal status of the prime ministers. It was important whether this situation would keep going in the DP period or not. However, while the authorities remained the same, the names had changed. These names consisted of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. However, the fact that Celal Bayar was president indicated that he was above the parties. Celal Bayar, who was in the office of the presidency, was an actor who could influence the foreign policy making process, even though he is one step behind Menderes. Although Bayar's influence on Menderes declined due to legal requirements, Bayar's abandoning his party leadership and Menderes's successful performance in the elections (Karpat, 2011, pp. 133-134), Bayar is a leader who always needs to be convinced in foreign policy cases.

3.2.2.1.2. Celal Bayar’s Leadership Profile

President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and two foreign ministers of the period, who were Fuat Köprülü (1950-1956) and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (1957-1960), came to the forefront as the most important figures in the foreign policy decisions during the 1950s. Oran (2015, pp. 57-60) expressed that in this period, Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to influence the foreign policy making process as different from previous periods. In particular, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu played a decisive role in vital issues such as the Cyprus issue, the application for membership to the European Economic Community and contact with the Soviets by taking personal initiatives during his Foreign Minister's era (Balcı, 2017, p. 105). Bayar, who played a more passive role in determining foreign policy than his successors and shared the corporate role with Prime Minister Menderes, did not have any relevant channels and mechanisms to determine the policies of the government and to influence these policies in the constitutional framework. Despite this, Bayar was not only completely outside the decision-making process, but an actor who needs to be convinced at the center of the decision-making process as seen in Köprülü's statement (Yılmaz, 2004, p. 134) and even got involved in an intense diplomatic activities himself. In this manner Bayar received 38 high-level foreign guests and paid 17 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323).

As already mentioned, the constitutional framework did not foresee the existence of a strong president and the political environment did not give the president such an opportunity (Yiğit, 2013, p. 167). The fact that the president does not have a legal mechanism to influence the government's policies has caused that Bayar could implement his own agenda only issues on which Menderes can be convinced. The legal situation for Bayar has always been an issue to be considered. Bayar, who is aware of the place where the presidency on the legal order should stop, did not compel to accept Menderes on any subject which they think differently as it is understood from expression of Ağaoğlu (Ağaoğlu, 1972, p. 142; Bayar, 2010, pp. 197-199) who was a minister in Menderes's government. While his successors possessed charismatic authority, in this respect Bayar could be regarded as a leader who had legal / rational authority. Based on this situation, it can be interpreted that Bayar's need for power and belief in his ability to control events are low. When these indicators are evaluated in table 3 mentioned in the second section, it will

60 be concluded that Bayar has a leader profile that does not try to challenge the restrictions, namely he respects the restrictions. Harris's (2002, p. 53) statement, which is "Bayar was able to nullify or dampen his own desires when the more powerful leaders take place on political arena" proved the such a conclusion. Bozdağ (Bozdağ, 1986, p. 91) stated that foreign policy was not among Celal Bayar’s priorities. Bayar adopted his role provided by the constitution. This shows that Bayar is not trying to challenge the restrictions.

In his study, Harris states that Bayar has a simplistic approach. The fact that he has insistence on the decisions he made until the end is the source of the weakness of Bayar (Harris, 2002, pp. 53-54). At this point, it can be deduced that Bayar has a closed source of information and, with its simple approach, ignores different interpretations. Besides, Bayar followed a relationship-focused method as well as exhibiting a problem-focused leadership. In other words, Bayar is a leader who is motivated by external factors such as the demands of the people and the feedbacks from the people, by paving the way for the establishment of close relations between political institutions and society (Kutay, 1982, s. 179). On the other hand, Bayar wrote a book named as "Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek" (Thinking Like Atatürk) and tried to explain Atatürk's ideas, methods and principles (Yiğit, 2013, pp. 138-139). In addition, the fact that he accord priority treatment completion of Anıtkabir during his duty shows his devotion to Atatürk. That is, Bayar is motivated by internal factors such as Ataturk's principles and ideology.

As it can be understood, while Bayar performed a relationship-oriented leadership in a certain period of time, he also performed a problem-oriented leadership in the course of his presidency as well as respecting constraints and being close to new information. In the light of this understanding, when we look at table 6 in the second section, while Bayar appears to perform an "influential" leadership profile from time to time, he also set an example of a "incremental" leadership occasionally. Accordingly, Bayar, as an incremental leader, he acted in accordance with the norms and rules required by its current position in order to avoid obstacles that may arise in front of it and focused on gradually improving the economy and security of the state. It is likely that Bayar always sees the legal limits of authority as mentioned above during the presidency. In other respects, as an influential leader, Bayar sought to develop a collaborative relationship with both other states and other actors. In doing so, he reached more power than he had in Turkish political area. Celal Bayar's relationship with Adnan Menderes can be evaluated in this manner.

CHAPTER IV

1961 CONSTITUTION

The elite, who is most closely identified himself with the independence of the country and the nation's long-term interests, was losing gradually its influence both on politics fallowing the election and on bureaucracy in pursuit of coming into power of DP. However the influence of the group in the army still continued. By giving as pretexts such as getting away from Atatürk's lines and revolutions (Özdağ, 1997, p. 55), the situation in universities (Özdağ, 1997, p. 59), closure of the people's houses by the government, economic difficulties and the suppression of the opposition and press by the establishment of "Investigative Commissions" (Erer, 1963, pp. 182-183; Çavdar, 2004, pp. 72-77) various secret committees were established within the military in order to make a coup against the elected government (Özdağ, 1997, p. 75). The committees who are aware of each other's work decided to come together in later periods (Aydemir T. , 1968, pp. 38-39). General Cemal Gürsel was the head of the committee (Hekimoğlu, 1975). Thus, all conditions for the revolution have been prepared.

On 27 May, a coup was carried out by thirty-seven officers out of chain of command. Cemal Gürsel became president of the state, Prime Minister, Commander-in-chief and chairman of the National Unity Committee (NUC). Thus, Gürsel, who had authorities that even Ataturk didn't have, and next presidents Cevdet Sunay (Özdağ, 1997, p. 235) and Fahri Korutürk took part in National Unity Committee (Yılmaz E. , 2007, p. 99). On the other hand, the death sentences of Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rusti Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were approved by the National Unity Committee and court decisions were met.

The chairman of the commission that drafted the Constitution of 1982, Prof. Dr. Aldikaçtı (1982, p. 121)described the 1960 coup as the liquidation of illegitimate power. Tanör (Tanör, 1995, p. 305) stated that the military coup was successful and there was no legitimacy crisis. In addition, according to Erdoğan (Erdoğan M. , 1998, p. 396) the aim of

62 the May 27 coup plotters was not to institutionalize political democracy but to rule over the state as independent of the people's will. This is an expression of an anti-democratic mentality and attitude. Erdoğan (1998, pp. 396-397) states that;

“The coup process has been prepared not by the will of civil society, only by a group of university teachers who sympathize with CHP and a few university students who share the same ideological view with them. Therefore, not being legitimacy crisis of the coup for these clique was normal, but if legitimacy is a civil-social basis, it was obvious that the majority of the people were not on stage.”

In the aftermath of the coup, the authorities of the Turkish Grand National Assembly were transferred to the Committee of National Unity with the Law No. 1 amending the 1924 Constitution on 12 June, and the NUC, which uses the legislative power directly, was envisaged to use the executive power by the Council of ministers. In addition, in the text of the amendment of the law, it is stated that the presidency will be carried out by the NUC (Gözübüyük, Anayasa Hukuku, 2000, p. 118). As a result of the referendum in 1961, the new constitution was adopted.

As Ergun Özbudun (1998, pp. 22-25) pointed out, the referendum on the 1961 constitution of 9 July 1961 showed that there was a strong opposition in some parts of Turkish society against this Constitution. The 1961 constitution was accepted only by the “yes” vote of 61% of the current votes. Although the referendum is not made in complete freedom and the voters of the Democratic Party were not fully organized, the fact that there were nearly 40% negative votes against the constitution shows that the 1961 constitution did not form a social contract based on the majority of the society's vote. (Türk Anayasa Hukuku, 1998, p. 23).

4.1. Legal Status

According to Aldıkaçtı (Aldıkaçtı, 1982), it can be said that the government system assumed by the 1961 constitution is a parliamentary system. In the grounds of the Constitution, a choice was made among the government systems of the representative regime and it is obviously stated that the parliamentary system based on the soft separation of the forces was adopted (Aldıkaçtı, 1982). Hence, as basic features of the parliamentary system the constitutional provisions and the legislative and executive bodies were separated, the president and the government were empowered for executive duty and the legislative and executive bodies were equipped with the powers to end the existence of each other (Yazıcı, 2002).

According to Article 5 of the 1961 constitution, legislative power is belong to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.1961 constitution accepted two-chamber system as distinct from 1924 constitution. Article 63 of the constitution stated that “The Grand National Assembly is composed of the National Assembly and Senate of the Republic.” According to Article 67, the National Assembly is composed of four hundred and fifty parliamentarians elected by the general vote (The 1961 Turkish Constitution, 1961). The Senate of the Republic consists of three kinds of members. The first group of one hundred and fifty persons is elected by the people. The second group of fifteen members is elected by the president. The first two groups of members serve for six years. The third group members serve for life. The Constitution calls these “ordinary member”. These are divided into two groups. The first of these are the president and members of the National Unity Committee, the second is the former Presidents.

The 1961 constitution referred to legislative and Judicial as an “authority” and in Article 6 referred to the executive as a “duty”. According to Article 6 of the Constitution, “the executive function shall be carried out by the president of the Republic and the Council of Ministers within framework of the law. In addition, in accordance with Article 95, the president of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority of the total number of the members of the TGNA for a period of seven years. If this majority is not achieved, it is sufficient for the president to elect the absolute majority in the next vote (The 1961 Turkish Constitution, 1961). Similar to the 1924 Constitution, according to Article 97:

“The President is head of the state. In this capacity he shall represent the Turkish Republic and integrity of the Turkish Nation. The President of the Republic presides over the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary, shall dispatch representatives of Turkish State, shall receive representatives of foreign states, shall ratify and promulgate international convention and treaties and may commute and pardon on grounds of chronic illnesses, infirmity or old age the sentences of convicted individuals.”

According to Article 97, the president has no political responsibility. Practice of countersignature was kept going in 1961 Constitution just as in 1924 Constitution. Articles 110 and 111 regulate that the president is the representative of the high command and that he would preside over the National Security Council, which took place in the Turkish political life with the Constitution of 1961 (The 1961 Turkish Constitution, 1961).

On the other hand, the 1961 constitution gave the president some duties and powers related with legislative body. First, as can be seen in Article 70 (The 1961 Turkish Constitution, 1961), the president has the authority to appoint 15 members to the Republic Senate. Second, like the 1924 constitution, the 1961 constitution gave the president the authority to call only the extraordinary assembly.

Thirdly, the president shall also publish the laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly within 10 days according to Article 93. The process carried out by the president is only to publish, there is no approval or dissuading process. The president shall send the law which he considers unsuitable to the TGNA within 10 days, for the reason to be discussed again. Budget laws and constitutional amendments are excluded from this provision. This veto is for delay. If parliament adopts the law again, the president has to publish it just like in 1924 Constitution.

Fourth, with the 1924 Constitution, the president was not authorized to renew the TGNA elections. In response to this, in accordance with articles 89 and 104 (The 1961 Turkish Constitution, 1961), if vote of no confidence is given to the Council of Ministers three times within eighteen months, the prime minister may request from the President to renew the elections of the National Assembly (Teziç, 1998, p. 414).

Finally, as can be seen in the 24th article of 1924 Constitution, the authority to make international treaties is entirely within the monopoly of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. However, Article 65 of the 1961 constitution shared the authority to make the treaty between the legislative and executive bodies (The 1961 Turkish Constitution, 1961). Accordingly, Article 65 authorizes the government wing of the executive for negotiating and signing, and regulates the legislative and executive bodies to work together for the approval phase.

The 1961 constitution, unlike the 1924 Constitution, amended Article 95 that the President's parliamentary membership will be terminated and his relations with the party will be ceased. In accordance with the 1924 Constitution, the president continued to be the official or actual leader of his party and was in an organic connection with the majority of the assembly. In this way, the 1961 constitution carried the president out of Parliament and gave him a role over politics.

One of the most important innovations brought by the 1961 constitution is the establishment of the Constitutional Court and the supremacy of the Constitution. It is emphasized that the numbers does not mean sovereignty and that the use of sovereignty is determined by the Constitution. (Tanör B. , 1994, p. 20). The 1961 constitution abolished the sovereignty of the Turkish Grand National Assembly over all organs and left the understanding of the unity of the powers completely and made parliamentary democracy dominant in politics. (Hekimoğlu M. M., 2009, pp. 183-185).

Another important point is, as Tanör (Tanör B. , 1994, p. 56) states, the 1961 constitution weakened the elected organs in the face of the appointed organs. The executive and legislative procedure has been put under control by the Constitutional Court. While in 1924 Constitution, the only real representative of the nation was the TGNA, in 1961 constitution it is stated that sovereignty the sovereignty would be used by authorized bodies according to the principles laid down by the Constitution. That means, with these changes, it is observed that the powers of the executive are limited and the TGNA is weakened against the appointed organs. These appointed organs, which have no political responsibility and which have no connection with the votes of the nation, are given the privilege to exercise the right of sovereignty on behalf of the nation. (Yılmaz E. , 2007, p. 102). As a matter of fact, Demirel stated that the country could not be governed by this Constitution (Tanör B. , 1994, pp. 63-37). As a result, the system that was convenient to political crisis brought the military memorandum in 1971 and the military coup in 1980.

Together with the 1961 constitution, the National Security Council took its place in Turkish politics as a constitutional body for the first time. 111th article of the Constitution draws the framework of the NSC as follows:

“The National Security Council shall consist of the Ministers as provided by law, Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of armed forces. The President of the Republic shall preside over the National Security Council and in his absence this function shall be discharged by Prime Minister. The National Security Council shall communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national security and coordination.”

The Council took decision with majority and in the event of equality, the president's vote shall determine the result. The National Security Council consists of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of State and the deputy prime ministers, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of

Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Transport and Labor, and the commanders of the forces (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, 2019). In this period, there was a balance in favor of civilians compared with military members in the structure of the National Security Council according to Law No. 129, due to the numerical superiority of the ministers.

4.2. Actual State

In the process of making and implementation of foreign policy in the Turkish political system, as in all other actors, the legal status of the President in terms of his duties and powers and the actual situation in politic do not always coincide with each other, and serious differentiation may occur among them. Legal procedures may be effective in the emergence of this situation; the personal characteristics of the President, his interest in foreign policy, his relationship with other actors in the foreign policy making process, the current domestic political situation of the country and the interaction of the political actors with each other, and the nature of the foreign policy issue can also play a role. In this framework, the President may take a role above the constitutional framework in the process of making and implementation of foreign policy as well as a lower level of leadership. Legally, the army obtained some gains in the face of civil politics with its Constitution of 1961, but it is evident that it did not content with practical achievements in practical politics. The main feature that marked this period in Turkish politics is the institutionalization of military tutelage on the democratic regime and the election of three soldiers to the Presidency, consecutively; Cemal Gürsel, Cevdet Sunay and Fahri Korutürk (Acar & Çelebi, 2012, p. 12). Unlike the Constitution of 1982, the Constitution of 1961 could not elect a President outside of members from the Parliament. In this period, as an exception to this rule, it was seen that the presidential candidates who were not members of the Parliament were elected senator by the President of the Republic and entered the Republic Senate and thus gained the right to run. General Cemal Gürsel, General Cevdet Sunay and Admiral Fahri Korutürk are members of the Republic Senate didn’t elected by the people to be come to sit as the President of the Republic (Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku, 2004).

In a normally functioning parliamentary system, it is expected that someone with a political background will be elected to the Presidency. For being President of Cemal Gürsel the military made pressure the strong presidential nominee Ord. Professor Dr. Ali Fuat Başgil for giving up the nomination (Acar & Çelebi, 2012, p. 12). In 1966, when the Justice Party was able to elect a President alone, Demirel proposed this task to Cevdet Sunay, the Chief of General Staff. Cevdet Sunay was seen as a guarantee of civilian authority, but the 12 March 1971 intervention showed that these expectations are not so accurate(Özbudun, Türkiye’nin Anayasa Krizi, 2009).

4.2.1. Cemal Gursel’s Era

4.2.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers

After the 1961 Constitution came into force, general elections were held on 15 October 1961. In these elections, RPP won 36% of the votes resulting in 173 seats in Parliament and 36 senators, Justice Party (JP), which was replaced by the Democratic Party won 34% the votes resulting in 158 seats in Parliament and 70 senators, New Turkey Party won 14% of the votes holding 54 seats in Parliament and 28 in the senate, lastly, Republican Villagers Nation Party won 13% of the votes holding 65 seats in Parliament and 16 in the senate (Erdoğan M. , 1999, p. 101). According to Talat Aydemir, who wanted to see RPP in power alone required the military to do a coup again according to the figures behind the elections (Öztuna & Gökdemir, 1987, p. 145). The only scenario that could be accepted by the military was that Gürsel is President, and İnönü is Prime Minister, according to Abdurahman Doruk, the general commander of the Gendarmerie (Seyhan, 1966, pp. 140- 152). Even President Gürsel, the Chief of the General Staff Sunay and the Party leaders of the Force of Commanders in a meeting in Çankaya later reached a consensus called as Çankaya Protocol. According to this agreement, politicians would not attempt to take back the political gains of the army, and most importantly, that the parties would not be in the presidential elections (Koçaş, 1977, pp. 1039-1040; Kardaş, 2017, p. 30). Briefly, the transfer of power to civilians and the return to the multi-party system were prevented by non-democratic methods.

The Çankaya Protocol was agreed and Cemal Gürsel came out as the sole candidate. From the 607 members who attended the meeting, Gürsel took 434 of their votes in the first round being elected as the fourth President of the Republic of Turkey.

According to the results of the elections in October, despite the fact that the majority of the two chambers were formed by the Justice Party, Sunay sent a message to Gürsel persistently asking Gürsel to have the army to see İnönü as prime minister (Toker, 1992, pp. 13-15) and Gürsel appointed İnönü to establish a government. Inonu started negotiations to form a government and a RPP-JP coalition government was established. As seen the influence of the army on politics in this period is very decisive.

Gürsel showed his intention to become an active president in the political scene by making political statements. The political leaders had waited for Gürsel to prevent the presidential office from making political statements. Gürsel (Milliyet, 24.05.1962) responded to these expectations with the following statements: “I am not a regular President. I have to guard the regime I set up. I can't speak for that. While the foundation of the constitution is shaken and the Constitution is collapsing, I cannot turn around.

7 months after the government's coalition government disintegrated. During the period short-term governments carried out governance duty and couldn’t provide stability in politics (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 363). President Gürsel became ill and fell into a coma in the beginning of 1966 and was unable to perform his duty as President. On 28 March, Cevdet Sunay was elected President and on 14 September 1966, Gürsel lost his life.

As it is seen, the lack of political stability has brought political gaps. The existence of a fragmented and weak coalition government rather than a stable civilian power against the army deepened the military's influence on politics and left the people on alert for a possibility of another coup to happen. Therefore, the period between 1960 and 1965 was a period when the military took guardianship on the political sphere. The period in which the policy is under the control of the military is defined as the “tutelage democracy” (Ahmad, 1996, p. 167).

According to Balcı (Balcı, 2017, p. 134) the 1961 Constitution brought the foreign policy making process to a different direction with the innovations it brought. With the article 111 of this constitution, the military command has been legally allowed to design politics and

69 foreign policy through the National Security Council. According to the said article, this body, which notified the Council of Ministers of the views of the soldiers in making decisions about security, has been one of the main actions of the foreign policy making process since its establishment. In the words of Haluk Bayülken, in the period after 1960, NSC became the follower and protector of basic ideological position and unchanging principles from time to time of foreign policy with the institutional function (Kaliber, 2004, pp. 328-330). Zürcher (2016, p. 357) states that the National Security Council has gradually increased its influence in the state and has taken the position of the cabinet and became decision-making center. According to him, the NSC is a kind of watchman of the state.

Although the NSC does not have any executive jurisdiction legally, its effect on the Council of Ministers' policies stems from its actual role in the Turkish political life (Yazıcı, 2009, p. 85). The Council serves as a kind of advisory body in which you are judged on legal grounds. Therefore, it does not have any legal personality (Gürpınar, 2013, p. 80). Although it does not have legal personality, the NSC would not hesitate to explain the will and to perform the execution if it deems necessary.

According to Balcı, another innovation was the Republican Senate, which was established by the constitution. In addition to the members of the National Unity Committee, the Senate of the Republic of Turkey, where the appointed and retired soldiers could participate, has been involved in the construction of domestic and foreign policy by overseeing the decisions taken by the popularly elected National Assembly. For example, Haydar Tunçkanat, who was in the Senate as the representative of the National Unity Committee, constantly advised on the foreign policy of the government (Balcı, 2017, p. 135).

In summary, in this period, Prime Minister İnönü was the main actor of the foreign policy- making process due to the fact that the army respected his views due to his leadership role in the War of Independence. Inonu had an active role in the Johnson letter issue and, along with writing to Johnson, had a visit to Washington (Cumhuriyet, 2019). İnönü, who played a critical role in the process of this crisis, objected to the choices of soldiers, that envisages the continuation of the intervention, in the NSC meeting during the air intervention to Cyprus and ensured the interruption of the intervention (Bölükbaşı, 2001, pp. 131-134).

At this point, the role of the President in foreign policy was in the background. Because Cemal Gürsel is the first supreme president of the republic. The practice of the neutral, presidential arbitrator model prescribed by the 1961 Constitution was first experienced by Cemal Gürsel. However, according to Akın (Akın, 2009, p. 72) the history of the coup has undoubtedly made Gürsel to side by to the established order. It is understood that Cemal Gürsel played a catalytic role rather than a referee role during his term in office. During his term of office, Gürsel only sent back two laws to be re-discussed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, pp. 310-315). In the establishment of close relations between the military and politics, Inönü and Cevdet Sunay, Chief of General Staff, as well as the President, became the decisive figures of the political scene.

4.2.1.2. Cemal Gürsel’s Leadership Profile

Cemal Gürsel was a President involving in daily politics and political debates, rather than being a referee role during his term of office. In fact, Irfan Baran, a deputy of RVNP, criticized President Gürsel's statement to the newspapers and magazines (Dünya, 1964), and Gürsel stated that he had freedom of speech as a response. In addition, the RPP deputy Giritlioğlu stated involving of President into the debate which were banned by the constitution (Dünya, 1965).

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir states that, unlike the soldiers who have left their mark in the time of Gürsel's recent history, the goals and ideals changed and the spirit and duty of Gürsel's generation was only military (Aydemir Ş. S., 1984, p. 326). Aydemir has already stated that Gürsel was a top official but could not be superior official. Another reason for this situation is that the army did not give this area to Gürsel. The fact that all members presided over NUC from the first day in order, prevented Gürsel from rising (Aydemir Ş. S., 1984, p. 321). Gürsel, in spite of his position and authority, accepted this role. With this image, it can be interpreted that Gürsel's “need for power” and “belief on ability to control events” is low, as discussed in table 3 in the second part of the thesis. Therefore, Gürsel is a leader who “respects constraints”. During his Presidential era the fact that he was unable to withstand pressure from the military and was not able to undergo a radical change in foreign policy prove his style. According to his successor, Bayar, he remained passive in foreign policy issues and diplomatic processes. In this manner Gürsel received 14 high-

71 level foreign guests and paid an official visit to foreign countries(Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323).

As it is seen, Gürsel did not act on his own head even when he was the head of the NUC and shared his powers with the committee friends. In addition, due to the conjuncture of the Cold War period he held meetings with the leaders of all parties except the Labor Party on issues about the country. Compared to İnönü, the fact that Gürsel authorized the people around him, and came together with leaders of different parties signifies his “openness to new information”.

Gürsel is a mature and equilibrium revolutionist who bridges different ideas within the revolutionary forces, not a young and idealistic commander who succeeds in the struggle for liberation by taking the whole nation behind him. Therefore, it can be concluded that Gürsel had a relationship-oriented external motivation. In addition, as stated by Akın (2009), the fact that Gürsel took on the role of a catalytic role and carried out the relationship between the politicians and the military is the proof of this.

In the light of this information, when an evaluation is made according to table 6 in the second part of the thesis, a collegial leadership profile could be drawn for Gürsel as he is a person respecting constraints, open-to-new information and a relationship focused leader. At this point Gürsel is a leader who focuses on reconstructing differences and building consensus and empowering others by sharing his own accountability. As mentioned at this point, Gürsel's effort to build a consensus between politics and the army proves that Gürsel has a collegial leadership profile.

4.2.2. Cevdet Sunay’s Era

4.2.2.1. Balance of Domestic Powers

In the elections held in 1965, the Justice Party received almost 53% of the votes and had the opportunity to become a power alone. The RPP’s votes fell below 29% (Tunçay, 1983, p. 1984). In this way, in the period between 1965-1969, the Justice Party came to power alone. But the army's right to speak on politics has been reserved. In the wake of Cemal Gürsel's inability to leave coma, Prime Minister Demirel believed that the nominate should be accepted by the military(Arcayürek, 1992, pp. 90-95). Therefore, Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay's name came to the fore. In the election, General Cevdet Sunay was elected

72 as the President by winning 461 votes out of 532 senators and deputies. As seen in the elections, the JP, which come to power alone, chose the way of reconciliation with the military.

According to Sakallıoğlu (1993, p. 53) Demirel was trying to distance National Unionists from the psychology, ideology and cadres of May 27 by satisfying the army and providing them what they wanted. Zürcher interpreted this situation as a result of Demirel's successful reconciliation of the military and civilian management (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 364). Demirel would later consider this issue as the army embracing the nation. Thus, Demirel, did not face any difficulty from Sunay and Sunay acted in compliance with the constitutional limits (Akın, 2009, p. 76).

In the elections held in 1969, the JP increased the number of seats in parliament to 256 with 46% of the vote. CHP won 143 seats in the parliament with a 27% vote rate. After this election as well, JP was also able to remain in power (Özdemir, 1994, p. 96).

By 1971 the events on university campuses, the violence that escalated on the streets and the fact that the country's financial statements were not very clear all brought a strong government demand by TAF to implement reforms with a Kemalist view. If this demand was not fulfilled, the army would have not hesitated to fulfill its constitutional duty. This demand and threat has taken its place in Turkish political life as the 1971 Memorandum.

Demirel resigned after the memorandum was issued. The duty of forming a government was given to Nihat Erim, RPP deputy, by the generals and Inonu declared his support for the government (Erim, 2005, p. 968). Then, Nihat Erim resigned in April 1972. Although the AP held the majority in the Parliament, the duty of forming the government was given to Ferit Melen. During his term in office, Sunay sent 18 laws back to the TGNA for reconsideration (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, pp. 310-315). Meanwhile, the country was ahead of a new presidential election. Sunay’s term in office ended in 1973.

During his tenure as president, Sunay has maintained consensual and pro-party positions. In this period, 6 different governments were formed (Zürcher E. J., 2016, pp. 376-377). Zürcher stated that with the memorandum the legislative amendments were made in order to increase the political influence of the NSC in decision-making mechanism.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Demirel Government Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil was an important figure in the foreign policy making process. The fact that Prime Minister Demirel was focusing on domestic politics, economics and local developments provide having such a effect of Çağlayangil on foreign policy. In fact, this situation also means increasing the effect of the ministry on foreign policy making process (Oran, 2015, p. 80). Because Çağlayangil has included ministerial bureaucrats decision-making processes by entrusting vital tasks to them. In short, the presidency focused on domestic political developments during this period, when the ministry was a decisive factor in foreign policy. In this process, Sunay has not been an effective figure in the foreign policy making process like his predecessors such as Atatürk, İnönü and Bayar and has not been a leader dominating the process.

According to Rıdvan Akın (2009, p. 76) who examined Presidency from 1923 to 2007 states that after Sunay became a president, Demirel and the AP government were able to work more easily. Sunay didn’t make trouble Demirel’s appointments on bureaucracy. Until 12 March Sunay used the symbolic representation of the Presidency in official ceremonies, openings. Sunay's presidency coincided with the politically irresponsible President of the 1961 Constitution. After March 12, he intended to cooperate with the generals and intended to shape politics (Akın, 2009, p. 79).

4.2.2.2. Sunay’s Leadership Profile

Sunay did not assume any responsibility in the foreign policy making process as of the former Presidents. During this period, foreign policy was shaped more in the hands of ministries and ministerial bureaucrats. In this respect, Sunay, Barber's typology, has shown an active-negative model compared to other presidents. Sunay has been involved in diplomatic processes and has been closely involved with foreign policy issues. In this manner Sunay, who worked with 4 consultants, received 48 high-level foreign guests and paid 17 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323). Despite the intense efforts of Sunay, its impact on foreign policy-making has been limited. During this period, the military and the ministry bureaucracy dominated the foreign policy-making process.

As Rıdvan Akın stated, since Sunay has implemented a model of the President in accordance with the constitution, it is understandable that Sunay acts within the limitations

74 and therefore could be understood that he is respecting constraints. The fact that Sunay shape his action according to the wishes of the generals after the memorandum period (Akın, 2009, p. 79) proves his respectful attitude towards the limitations.

In addition to being a leader open to new information (Güresin, 1966), Sunay has acted in accordance with the demands of the structure dominating the politics. As Demirel pointed out, Sunay responded positively to the political demands of the army after the military intervened again with the memorandum. In this respect, it can be deduced as a person with “relation focused motivation” about Sunay. In light of this information, it is understood that when an assessment is made according to table 6, Sunay has a collegial leadership profile just like his successor Gürsel.

4.2.3. Fahri Korutürk’s Era

4.2.3.1. Balances of Domestic Powers

When Sunay’s term office ended, Chief of General Staff Faruk Gürler, Tekin Arıburun, President of the Republic Senate, and the Democratic Party Chairman Ferruh Bozbeyli became a candidate. In the first three votes, a 2/3 majority could not be reached, as stated in the constitution. As stated in the constitution in the next rounds, none of the candidates were able to obtain the absolute majority. Then, Demirel, Ecevit and Feyzioğlu announced that they agreed on the candidacy of Fahri Korutürk, President of the Republican Senate (Cumhuriyet, 1973). In the 15th round of voting, Fahri Korutürk was elected Turkey's 6th President by winning 365 votes. The fact that the President was elected in the 15th round of voting only gives us the signs related to this period.

In the wake of presidential election, first general election was held in October 1973. RPP won 33.3%, JP 29.8%, DP 11.9%, and National Salvation Party (NSP) 11.8% of the votes (Yeni Şafak, n.d.). According to these results, no party has achieved to come power alone. After a long period of government crisis, the RPP-NSP coalition government, however, was able to start its mandate by taking a vote from the parliament, just four months after the elections on February 7, 1974. Disagreements at the stage of the Cyprus issue brought about the dissolution of the coalition following the temporary settlement of the Cyprus issue. In this period eight different coalition governments were formed (Zürcher E. J., 2016, pp. 379-391). Therefore, In this process, the country became involved in the spiral of violence due to social unrest, economic troubles and leftist tensions. Mehmet Ali Birand

(Birand M. A., 1987, p. 84) argues that the military started the preparations of the coup at this date.

Even in the period of four-month coalition governments, there was no stability in the country. Likewise, the decision-making mechanism in foreign policy making has been able to work as a result of very slow and long-term consultations. During this period, vital issues such as Cyprus and the American embargo were determined by the line of foreign policy. In particular, if an assessment is made on the Cyprus issue, it can be said that Prime Minister Ecevit is at the center of the decision-making process. The army and coalition partners also influence the process. During the coalition period, when small partners shaped the decision considerably, Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan became one of the leading actors in the decision-making process.

The Cyprus issue in this period shows which actors are effective in foreign policy making. While the international environment prevented Ecevit from intervening, the army, coalition partner NSP leader Erbakan, and the public were pressuring Ecevit to approve the intervention in Cyprus. Ecevit played the role of a key actor to convince the UK, another guarantor for intervention, after the intervention he transferred this role to Foreign Minister Turan Güneş (Balcı, 2017, p. 162). In the case of the second intervention, if Ecevit did not display a decisive attitude, the pressure of Erbakan and the expansion of the intervention from the army caused Ecevit to review his decision (Adamson, 2001, pp. 291-294). Indeed, after the second intervention had passed nearly 40% of island was under Turkey's control.

In this period, the army's influence in foreign policy area sustained. For example, following the 1974 Cyprus Intervention, the government's decision to jointly use the Aegean Sea with Greece was abolished by the efforts of the Chief of General Staff (Sakallıoğlu, 1993, p. 206). This event proves the decisive role of the army in foreign policy making.

Demirel, in a speech he made with journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek, stated that they were running the "government" but that they could not operate the "state" and emphasized the effect of the army on the state's decision mechanism (Arcayürek, 1990, p. 470). In addition Aksu (2018, p. 75), stated in his study “Governments, Presidents and Prime Ministers of Turkish Foreign Policy Crises” that Demirel has made decisions that will change the course of the issue during both the prime minister's office and the presidency's foreign

76 policy crises. According to Balcı, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the National Salvation Party, played a decisive role in the crisis periods as well as in relations with the Islamic World.

In 1980, President Korutürk's term of office was completed. Although the Assembly convened to elect a new President, the assembly still could not be elected president even after conducting more than a hundred ballots (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 381). This structure of the political system, the economic crisis, the violence in the streets, and above all, the lack of a strong government that could stop them, revealed a situation in which the political system could not produce a solution (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 381). Some disagreements between the government and Çankaya have come to light from time to time. In this period, Korutürk sent 13 laws back to the TGNA for reconsideration, while six laws were applied to the Constitutional Court for cancellation (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, pp. 310-315). The army has taken over the constitutional borders by putting forward these crises and seizing power again.

4.2.3.2. Korutürk’s Leadership Profile

As it can be seen, Korutürk did not play an active role in the foreign policy making of the presidency, like the presidents after the 1960 period. According to Barber's typology, Korutürk's position in the foreign policy making process can be expressed as a passive- negative. Korutürk's participation in diplomatic processes is also very limited compared to his successors. In this manner Korutürk who worked with a team of 4 consultants received 31 high-level foreign guests and paid 5 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323). Korutürk stated his own role conception and limits of the Presidency in foreign policy making process with such words (Cumhurbaşkanı Fahri S. Korutürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri-III (6 Nisan 1977 - 6 Nisan 1980), 1980, p. 222):

“Today’s President is not the President of the Republic, who established our republic, won the pitched battles and and defeated the macula fortune of the nation. I only take the power from the authority that the Constitution provides to the President, and finally my power consists of the public opinion, the press, the organs of the political parties and the opinions of their general chairman's.”

As can be seen, Korutürk stated that the role of the Presidency in the process depends on the interest attributed by the opinions of the public, the press, the competent bodies of the political parties and the chairmen. In other words, Korutürk states that he would include to

77 the decision-making mechanism depending on the approval of these structures. Based on these situation, President Korutürk's “need for power” and “belief on ability to control events” can be interpreted as low. When this interpretation is evaluated on table 3 in the second section, it is understood that President Korutürk was a leader respecting to constraints.

As Atalan Öymen pointed out, even in the period when the tension between the parties increased the most and politicians could not agree on forming a government, Korutürk made a statement on the issue and stated that he was open to the ideas and recommendations of all the citizens and professional organizations (The Milliyet Jounal , 1987). In addition, he often came together with the rectors and governors to get information from them. In addition to all these, he often met with all the party leaders and listened to their ideas (Cumhurbaşkanı Fahri S. Korutürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (6 Nisan 1973 - 6 Nisan 1975), 1975, pp. 220-225). As can be seen, Korutürk is a leader who is open to different sources of information and has a relationship-driven motivation. When all this information is evaluated according to table 6, it can be concluded that Korutürk has a collegial leadership style just like Sunay and Gürsel.

CHAPTER V

1982 CONSTITUTION

On the morning of September 12, 1980, the junta announced that the armed forces had seized the country's government for the non-functioning of state bodies, the parliament was disbanded, the ministerial council was dismissed and the immunities were lifted (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 401). While all parties were dissolved, all the organs and instruments of power were gathered in the National Security Council headed by the Chief of Staff Kenan Evren. A week later, the Council appointed Council of Ministers composed of bureaucrats and retired army officers. The only function of the Council of Ministers was to execute the National Security Council's decisions. The Constitutional Commission, under the presidency of Orhan Aldıkaçtı, has started preparations for the new constitution.

The new constitution was reversing the constitutional developments in the 1960s. The power was held in the hands of the executive branch and the positions of the President and the NSC in the executive were being strengthened. Thus the elitist-kemalist class was taking full control of the state apparatus. The new constitution was made public on 7 November 1982. A provisional article of the Constitution also stated that Kenan Evren was going to run the presidency for a seven-year term (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 405). In other words, the adoption of the constitution meant that Kenan Evren would be the president. As a result of the referendum, the new constitution was adopted with a 91.4% vote.

The 1983 general elections were held between the three parties that were allowed by the NSC to participate in the election (Akın, 2009, p. 101). The first is the Nationalist Democratic Party, which is supported by the generals, the People's Party which is the continuation of the RPP, and finally the Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal. The Motherland Party had won more than 45% of the vote, achieving a electoral quotient in the newly formed parliament.

5.1. Legal Status

In Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution, the President is defined as the head of the state. In the continuation of the same article, the President's duties and powers related to foreign policy are expressed as follows (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982)):

“…To call the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to session on the first day of the legislative year if and when deemed necessary, To preside over the Council of Ministers when deemed necessary or to call the Council of Ministers to session under his presiding, To send representatives of the state of Turkey to foreign states and to accept representatives of foreign states sent to the Republic of Turkey, To ratify and promulgate international treaties, To represent the Office of the Commander-In-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in the name of the Grand National Assembly, To decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces, To appoint the Chief of the General Staff, To assemble the National Security Council, To preside over the National Security Council, To declare martial law or state of emergency by means of a Decree of the Council of Ministers assembled under his presiding and to issue Statutory Decree by the same means, To ratify and sign all Decrees by the Council of Ministers.”

On the other hand, irresponsibility and responsibility of the President's decisions are regulated in Article 105. According to that, responsibility of decisions which President take is belong to prime minister or relevant minister. Although the president is irresponsible, he has broad authority and extensive powers. Although he had no responsibility, the President was a crucial actor of the executive in terms of the duties given to him in Article 104. In other words, the 1982 constitution give presidency prominence in the balance of the presidency and council of ministers which are executive organs and make the presidency more decisive in foreign policy making process (Özbudun, 1998, pp. 38-41).

In the last paragraph of Article 104 of the Constitution, the president has been given the power to act on his own by law. However, the Constitution does not stipulate which actions the president can perform alone, and which actions are subject to the counter- signature rule (Gözübüyük, 2000). This ambiguity sometimes caused tensions between the President and the government.

Another issue discussed is the use of the TAF. The President is authorized to decide on the use of the TAF according to Article 104. However, Article 92, the authority to make

80 decision on the use of the TAF has also been given to the legislative body. According to the article, when the legislature is on holiday or in a break, if the country is subjected to a sudden armed attack and therefore it is unavoidable to use the armed force, the president may decide to use the TAF. It is therefore an exceptional authority to decide on the use of the armed forces by the president, and the requirements of Article 92 of the Constitution must be happened in order to put into practice it.

The president of the 1961 Constitution was a parliamentary-type president of a state structure organized according to the principle of soft separation of powers. In the 1961 Constitution, no institution, including the presidency, was equipped with the authority to use the “state power” with an initiative to solve the crisis. Each institution was balanced by another institution, judicial organ was strengthened against executive and legislative organs. One of the issues that the 12 September coup plotters complained most about was lack of authority of Çankaya (Akın, 2009, p. 97).

In the 1982 Constitution, Sevinç (2002, p. 121) interpreted the fact that the President has quite a broad authority in the executive branch, as President's assuming the guardianship of the parliamentary regime. On the other hand, Duran (Duran, 1988, pp. 50-51) has evaluated adoption of a president who has broad authority in the Constitution as creation of “a state power in addition to political power." The decisions made by the President on his own and the appointments he has make to the high bureaucracy and the judiciary were excluded from judicial review, and the president was seen the highest and the key figure of the system in security and emergency situations (Tan, 1984, pp. 40-42). In addition, the high level bureaucratic appointments by the government are subject to the approval of the president. The coming into force of a decree without the signature of the President has become impossible. This legal base allows the President to dominate the decision-making mechanism based on internal political balances and the personal characteristics of the leader.

There are two main tendencies in the new Constitution, such as centralization of state structure and strengthening of the presidency. According to Akın (Akın, 2009) the 1982 Constitution adopted the principles of rationalized parliamentary and revealed the mechanisms of quick decision making and sanctions. First, the presidential election was reduced to four rounds. In the first two rounds, if two-thirds of the majority could not be

81 found, in the 3rd and 4th rounds, the Assembly, which could not elect only the president, would be renewed. The new Constitution changed the quorum of decision and quorum of meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Assembly would now be able to convene with one-third of the total number of its members, not a mere majority just as in the 1961 Constitution, and decide on more than one quarter of the total number of members.(The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982)). The 1982 Constitution generally strengthened the State.

Regarding the role of the military, Article 117 make decision that duties and powers of The Chief of the General Staff and army would be regulated by law1 (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982)). According to this law and Article 117, the Chief of General Staff is required to perform his duties within the framework of the government's policies and is held accountable to the Prime Minister. Turkey was the only country that the Chief of Staff served as accountable to the Prime Minister (Akay, 2009, p. 118). The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law Article 35 has placed the army pretorian position in Turkey and provided legitimacy to the military's autonomy (Şener, 2013, p. 264). According to Şener, the duty of protection assigned to the Turkish Armed Forces out of the approval of the civilian political authority, is accepted as a norm above the constitution. It is seen that the constitution has formed the necessary legal basis for the Turkish Armed Forces to have a decisive effect on foreign policy decision making processes. In the words of Izol (İzol, 2002), a consensus between Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish foreign policy is a compulsory. Furthermore, the TAF has the capacity to influence the process indirectly through National Security Council which is a constitutional institution (Şener, 2013, p. 265).

The first significant alteration with respect to the NSC is related to the status of the Council by the 1982 Constitution. In the Council equal position has been established by providing not exceeding of number of its civilian members. At the same time, the Chief of General Staff is in equal position with the prime minister in determining the agenda of the council (Gürpınar, 2013, p. 81). On the other hand, in terms of authority and duty, the council, which took advisory decisions for Council of Ministers in the previous system, has now been brought to a different position. The status of the decisions of NSC, which was recommendation for Council of Minister became priority consideration for the Council of

1 See also: https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=Gorevi date accessed: 23.01.19

Minister. Such a change points to an opinion that sees the NSC above the will of the Council of Ministers, and gives the impression that the government's national security policy was established in the NSC (Tezkan, 2000, p. 30).

The concept of “national security” was widely defined in the law of the National Security Council and protection of Turkey's status was placed in the interest of military bureaucracy (Şener, 2013, p. 276). According to Aksu (2010, pp. 498-501), being broadly defined of national security and the status concept has provided that even intention of civil politics to change the status quo attitude of Turkey in foreign policy can be evaluated in the scope of the “security crisis” according as the situations including military threats.

The Prime Minister, on the other hand, as the head of government in Article 112, was made fully responsible and duly-authorized for the establishment and execution of the general policy. The Parliament is authorized with supervising the Council of Ministers, approving international treaties, declaring the war, sending Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and allowing deployment of foreign forces in Turkey in the article 87, 90 and 92 of the constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982)). Within the framework of these powers, the TGNA had the opportunity to directly or indirectly influence the foreign policy. However, according to Soysal (Soysal, 1964, p. 258), the opportunity does not go beyond the control function that can be used fallowing action formed by the executive.

Lastly, the first regulation on the organizational structure of the Presidency was made in the 1982 Constitution. The organizational structure of the Presidency was established under the General Secretariat of the Presidency. Article 107 of the constitution gives judgment that all manner of regulations of Office of Secretary General to the Presidency can be determined by the Presidential decree. In this connection, in the mentioned period Turkish Presidential organizational structure was shaped as indicated table 8.

Table 8: Following 1982 Constitution Organizational Structure of Turkish Presidency Office

The President

The Department Secretariat General of of State the Presidency Supervision Deputy of Secretariat General of the Presidency

Office of the Chief Directorate of

First Aide-de-Camp

of Cabinet Security

Principal Principal

Consultancy

Press Principal Principal Press

Foreign Affairs Affairs Foreign Defence Defence

Energy

Source: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, Ankara: Cumhurbaşkanlığı, p. 353. (The table is formed by asking for information from the mentioned source.)

5.2. Actual State

The 1982 Constitution strengthened the executive branch against the legislative body and the President within the executive body. In other words, the constitution increased the role of the Presidency, in which the previous constitutions were framed as a symbolic authority, in the decision-making mechanism. In this respect, the Constitution has made the President more powerful, and active and significant decision-maker in the mechanism by including the actions that he can take alone (Erdoğan M. , 2003, p. 207; Gözen, 1996, p. 291).

Since the President is the highest authority in the state, he is expected to participate in this process, particularly in foreign policy matters. In addition, the President may also be effective in foreign policy making process by using the competent committees. Particularly, the fact that the President has authority to determine the agenda of the meetings of the NSC, preside at NSC meetings and pronounce taken decisions in the meeting as "priority advice" to the Council of Ministers, and call the meeting and preside at the Council of Ministers, he is likely to impose his own opinion to other actors in the councils and play considerable role in the process (Gözen, 1996, p. 291). Namely, in practice, the presidents with the charismatic leadership have masterminded foreign policy in a way that almost leave government and parliament completely out of the process (Şener, 2013, p. 301).

In addition to providing alternative choices and information to decision-makers in the process of foreign policy making, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also a central institution in the implementation of foreign policy (Oran, 2015, p. 73). Even when the Ministry was excluded from the decision-making processes, it maintained its central position and "get its own way when needed" (Koçer, 2003, p. 44). Baskın Oran claim that the ministry has been able to maintain this position due to its relative autonomy. Temel İskit (2007, pp. 441-445) also pointed out that the appointment of the Chief of Cabinet of the President from among the career employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that personnel of the Presidency's foreign affairs principal consultancy consisted of senior officers of the ministry became an established practice. İskit also stated that this practice is now institutionalized by emphasizing the appointment of the foreign affairs advisor to the President of the Grand National Assembly and to the Prime Minister, usually at the level of the ambassador. In short, even though the ministry is excluded from the decision-making process, it may affect the decision-making process even indirectly.

With the 1980 coup, the position of members of the army within the NSC was strengthened that they could shape on the council's decisions (Özcan, 2006, pp. 32-33). Şaban İba (İba, 1999, p. 204) stated that the NSC has become the most competent institution of the state in the joint movement of civil and military institutions in spite of being narrowest council of the state. In this respect, the NSC takes resolutions that must be followed for all the problems of the state. The NSC has been designed as a consultative body within the bureaucracy on the legal level, but in practice has had extensive intervention power to cases in the political area under the domination of the military. As a politically irresponsible, unbalanced and unchecked council, the NSC became the main actor in the decision-making process without any legal ground. In the politics shaped in the shadow of military tutelage just as in the aftermath of the 1960s and 1970s, the army, beyond its legal authority, shaped the decision-making mechanism. At this point, the role of the President in the decision-making mechanism depends on leader’s characteristic traits and role conception, as in the case of Sezer and Özal, while the position of the military in this mechanism is institutionalized by NSC.

As for how the decisions were taken, Article 7 of the relevant law stated that it would be taken by majority vote. As for how the decisions were taken, Article 7 of the relevant law stated that it would be taken by majority vote. However, the statements made by the Chief of the General Staff General Doğan Güreş (Şevkat, 1993, p. 6) do not reflect the requirements of the relevant law: “In the NSC there is no finger account. Not until today. The procedure in the NSC is as follows: Some issues come to the table. President and prime minister offer. As a result of the evaluations mentioned, we say our opinion.”

In sum, the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC have extended the mandate and powers, defined in the Constitution, to be an executive institution that draws the official boundaries of the state's ideology, policy and practice. Pronouncing the necessary measures within this boundary has led the NSC to give opinions even in many cases related with social and political areas.

5.2.1. Kenan Evren’s Era

5.2.1.1. Balance of Domestic Powers

The National Security Council, chaired by Kenan Evren, was the only organ that formed foreign policy by gathering all powers of the TGNA and the government until the

Motherland Party obtained the absolute majority in the Assembly in 1983. The powers of the presidency were transferred to Kenan Evren, the president of the National Security Council. Following the general elections, the main nucleus of the power bloc consists of the civilian government which aimed to take its position in neoliberal order and military bureaucracy, which took responsibility of “protection and conservancy” the regime (Özkazanç, 1998). In the field of foreign policy, while civil power members are closely interested in the opening of capital to outside, in the field of security, military bureaucracy have taken a decisive role by using initiative.

Following the demilitarization of power, as mentioned above in the framework of the legality stipulated by the 1982 Constitution, the Presidency and the Council of Ministers were authorized to make foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was designated as the main body to be responsible for the implementation of foreign policy (Efegіl, 2001, p. 147). The Chief of the General Staff has the authority to proclaim opinions in security agreements. But beyond legal authority, in practice, the military's weight in the foreign policy-making process has made National Security Council one of the main organs of decision-making mechanism. In 1983, together with the “Law of the NSC and the NSC Secretariat”, NSC had the authority to establish and implement security policies beyond being a consultative body. In addition, by analyzing the political, economic, social and technological capacity of Turkey, NSC would be able to determine the measures to be taken to protect the indivisible integrity, security and independence of the country (Efegіl, 2001, p. 148). According to Efegil, although the decisions of the NSC are legally advice, the Council of Ministers has been expected to discuss these decisions without any postponement and even though the Council has the authority to reject them, it has never been able to use this authority within that period. In short, even though civil power re-gained to dominate the country with the 1983’s general election, the final decision on issues that concern the security of the country especially, was the monopoly of the NSC beyond civilian power. In summary, these mentioned internal political organizations, which do not have a political responsibility, limited the power of the civil power empowered by the people.

Between 1983-1987, during the period of Turgut Özal's government, civil power could not be included in the foreign policy making process and Kenan Evren and bureaucracy were taken into consideration primarily (Yavuzalp, 1996, p. 265). Gözen (2000, pp. 115-118)

87 also agrees that Özal left the final word to the General Staff and Kenan Evren in the fields of foreign policy related to military and security issues and he stated that civil power plays a more decisive role in economic relations and technical issues in the governance. As an instance for this situation, Özal started dialogues with Greece in order to improve relations between two countries and showed a concessive attitude towards the aggressive postures of the Athens administration in the Aegean in the name of the continuity of this process. In this process, the bureaucracy of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff together sent a note to Greece because of its aggressive postures in the Aegean, by so, they interrupted Özal’s initiatives (Fırat, 2014). Çankaya Administration and the General Staff have influenced the foreign policy making process as well as the government's decision-making mechanism. While Evren sent 26 codes back to Parliament for reconsideration, he filed an annulment action to the Constitutional Court for 6 codes (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, pp. 310-315). In addition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Özal government, Vahit Halefoglu, was elected by the suggestions of Kenan Evren (Yavuzalp, 1996, p. 226).

The Cyprus Policy of the period demonstrated in which institution is in the center of gravity in the foreign policy making process. Özal believed that Turkey should get involved in the European Union in order to ensure its position in the neo-liberal world order and to facilitate its integration into the international economic system. But Greece vetoed Turkey to become a member of the community. According to Özal, the biggest obstacle for membership to the community was the Cyprus issue, which makes it difficult for Turkey to get closer to Greece. Özal made attempts to reduce the presence of Turkish troops on the island in order to overcome the obstacle, but the general staff blocked the process in which Özal could finalize his attempts both by the his speeches and challenged Özal’s policies at the NSC (Balcı, 2017, p. 188).

As seen, in terms of domestic power balances, President Kenan Evren and NSC have been the most important actors shaping the foreign policy making process. In particular, the NSC acted as a plenipotentiary organ under the leadership of Kenan Evren during the foreign policy-making process on security issues. In addition, the 1982 constitution strengthened the president legally and provided broad authority. By using these powers effectively, the President Evren has made the presidency the most prominent actor of the executive body and the top and key institution of the system.

5.2.1.2. Evren’s Leadership Profile

As seen, Evren played an active role in foreign policy making, contrary to the military- origin presidents in the sequel of 1960 military coup. Evren exercised the broad authorities granted to the president by the legal ground without hesitation, and became key actor of the period, not only in the field of foreign policy but also in issues of domestic politics. In this manner Evren who worked with a team of 13 consultants received 55 high-level foreign guests and paid 32 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323). According to Barber's typology, the position of Evren in the foreign policy- making process can be expressed as active-positive. Because Evren said the final word about the decisions in question, just as he was at the heart of critical foreign policy decisions. As mentioned above, Evren's interference in the matter of Özal's attempt to improve relations with the Athens administration (Fırat, 2014) point to this situation.

During his term of office, Evren fulfilled his duty beyond the legal authorities of the presidency. For example, Turgut Özal, taking into account opinion of Kenan Evren, attached importance to Evren’s “sine qua non” and red lines in the appointments (Yavuzalp, 1996, p. 265). Paying attention to the warnings of the president, Özal either resigned the ministers or shifted them to relatively passive ministries. The fact that the president's such an involvement in the internal affairs of government beyond the legal situation refers to existence of de facto situation. In fact, these situations give clues to the fact that Evren's scores on need for power and belief can control events are high. At this point, Göksu (2013, p. 86), who examined the images of the Presidents in the post-1980 period, confirmed the clues by stating that Evren has a personality that attaches importance to authority and hierarchy in his bilateral relations. In this respect, when the style of Evren is evaluated according to table 3, it can be interpreted that he has a leadership challenging the constraints.

Akın (2009, pp. 126-128) stated that Evren had a consultative dialogue with a limited group of people who were only identified as conservative kemalist. In addition, the Secretariat General of the National Security Council, which is considered as the factory floor of the political and administrative reforms of the military regime, kept in limited contact with a certain environment (Akın, 2009, pp. 125-130). In this case, it can be deduced that Evren and its power are closed to different and new information.

On the other hand, Evren is a leader who acts with internal motivation, especially within the framework of ideas such as secularism, in contrast to the leaders who have external motivation, such as paying attention to the public opinion and the public feedback. So Evren is a problem-focused leader. It can be made interpretation that when his challenging constraints, closed-information and problem-focused traits are evaluated in table 6, Evren has an expansionist leadership profile. Namely, Evren was trying in order to expand his own span control and ability to obtain leverage in a particular field.

5.2.2. Turgut Özal’s Era

Following the expiration of Evren’s term of office in 1989, the parliament re-entered the atmosphere of a presidential election and then Turgut Özal stated that he will be a candidate. The opposition stated that in the last local and general elections the votes of the ANAP decreased, so that the parliament should not go to the elections on this arithmetic, and that if the elections were to be held, the opposition will boycott the sessions of the presidential elections (Zürcher E. J., 2016, p. 412). Özal was elected as 8th president by the support of the absolute majority obtained in the 1987’s general election by the ANAP in the Parliament.

5.2.2.1. Balances of Domestic Powers

It is an indisputable fact that there is a close relationship and interaction between domestic and foreign policy. The foreign policy, as an outcome, can be directly influenced by internal political actions. From this point of view, by considering internal political structure of Turkey in that period, examining the conditions shaping foreign policy of the period will be appropriate to understand the foreign policy of the period.

Özal’s election as president has prepared a process in which Çankaya plays a decisive role in foreign policy in addition to gaining power in civil politics. The 1982 constitution provides the presidency important powers in the foreign policy decision making process and Özal’s appointment Yıldırım Akbulut, who is a loyal person to him and passive figure in action, as Prime Minister, are other factors contributing to this process. During Yıldırım Akbulut’s term in office, Özal had an active and decisive position in the decision-making mechanism (Tanör B. , 2011, p. 85). The government, which was one step ahead of the presidency in the period when politics became civilized, did not go beyond being an

90 approval authority during Özal's presidency (Balcı, 2017, p. 213). During his presidency, Turgut Özal played an active role in the making of foreign policy by reducing the influence of the government as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TAF and the TGNA (Ertosun, 2014, pp. 295-297). At this point, Özal considers these institutions, military and Foreign Affairs bureaucracy, as the answer for Turkey's status quo stance in regional and global order and so that they should be excluded from the foreign policy decision-making process. During his visit to the US, Özal told to Bush that “The reason behind the impasse of Cyprus problem is bureaucrats. The best way to solve this problem is to discuss the issue as tete-a-tete without including our bureaucrats” (Dündar, 2016, p. 7).

Özal's approach to these traditional decision makers and the fact that he made foreign policy decisions as a result of consultations with his own consultancy staff, (Laçinok, 2007, p. 561) was interpreted as a shadow cabinet application. Heper (2013, pp. 144-145) says that Özal made all vital decisions by himself or consulting only a few ministers or senior bureaucrats, he only expects from the others to provide needed information to him (2013, pp. 144-145). He also underlined that he has shaped the state's policy in foreign policy and economy by consulting with senior bureaucrats directly, sometimes disabling the Prime Minister as well as the relevant bodies of the cabinet. In this regard, on the one hand, with his personal intervention, he was criticized for restraining the authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the other hand for putting into action the actual presidential model within the parliamentary system (İçener, 2015, p. 319).

Özal believed that Turkey should pursue a revisionist foreign policy that prioritizes economic cooperation, integration and development, and takes risks, unlike the status quo foreign policy that prioritizes the security (Ertosun, 2014, pp. 292-294). In short, Özal emphasized pragmatic and economic-oriented foreign policy performance by ignoring the hierarchical order in bureaucracy and rejecting traditional foreign policy discourse (Ataman, 2003, pp. 51-53). At this point, Özal has made direct contact with diplomats when making foreign policy decisions in order to overcome the ministry bureaucracies sustaining the status quo tradition. By so, the high level bureaucracy of the ministry was excluded from the foreign policy decision-making process.

In short, in the wake of being President of Özal, Çankaya became an important actor in Turkish foreign policy making process. Özal's economy-oriented active foreign policy and

91 an active leadership style in the foreign policy making process highlighted the presidency in foreign policy, by eliminating Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs especially in case of crisis. Evaluating the opportunities provided by the First Gulf War, Özal, by using a great skill during the crisis, has maximized the position of the Presidency in the power configuration in Ankara.

The Gulf crisis, as well as meaning vital interests for Turkey, it has to be analyzed because of indicating how the decision-making mechanism carries out during this period. Parliament and the opposition were out of the process because the ruler party holds the absolute majority. Özal is the most effective figure of the foreign policy making process of the period. The government closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline in accordance with demand of Özal and stopped its trade with Iraq. In addition, following Özal's directive, the Foreign Affair Minister of the period with some members of Council of Ministers visited several neighboring countries and tried to persuade them to take a similar action against Iraq (Yeşiltaş, 2012, p. 83).

These decisions were taken entirely by the initiative of Özal and even despite the decision taken by the NSC contrary to Özal's preferences, Özal insisted and implemented his preferences (Balcı, 2017). This caused the polemic of authority confusion and the Chief of General Staff, Necip Torumtay, resigned (Dündar, 2016, p. 11).

On the other hand, the demand for support from the US forces in Saudi Arabia was rejected by the pressure of the TAF despite Özal's efforts. While Özal insisted on the necessity of keeping soldiers ready at the border, he was not successful to admit his thesis to the actors involved in the foreign policy-making process. In a recent period, the fact that including his chief of cabinet instead of Foreign Minister Ali Bozer to Özal's meeting with Bush and US Secretary of State, Baker, resulted in Bozer's resignation. Minister of National Defense Sefa Giray resigned in response to Özal's pressure on the decision- making process and to exclude himself from the process (Eriş, 1996, p. 258). It should also be noted that Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz, who is predecessor of Bozer, resigned because of the personal interference made to realm of his authority (Dündar, 2016, p. 7).

Özal's determination of Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf crisis based of US-axis position and his intention to be fully engaged with the USA’s policy have caused opposite

92 reactions from his own party. The declaration, containing permit of using TAF and deployment of foreign troops in Turkey, was rejected by the counter votes of a group in MP that holds absolute majority in the Parliament. These powers were approved by the amendment that these all could be used only in case of an attack against Turkey. But in the following days, this condition was abolished and the armed forces were allowed to be sent abroad. Although the parliament allowed, the internal opposition within the party, some government members’ opposition, the stance of the foreign affairs’ bureaucracy and the military caused a serious counter-war opinion (Ertosun, 2014, p. 312) and prevented Turkey to enter into Iraq War.

As can be seen, Özal's activity was tried to be balanced in the following periods. The experience in the Gulf crisis shows that the presidency’s activity to shape the foreign policy (Dündar, 2016, p. 7) did not only face with the constant bureaucracy’s resistance such as the military and the foreign affairs, but also an opposition group within the MP and restrained Özal's maneuverability (Balcı, 2017, pp. 222-223). In addition, the domestic political events have prepared this situation. Following the election of Mesut Yılmaz as the chairman of the MP, Yilmaz will not allow Özal to make interference to governmental issues just like Akbulut allowed. Firstly, Yılmaz directed all the bureaucrats not to give any information to Özal without his permission. Yılmaz took this action in order to prevent Özal’s effectiveness in the government. Until that time, Özal was taking the information from the top bureaucrats by by-passing the prime minister and the related ministers (Heper, 2013, p. 145). Thus, Özal's maneuverability in decision-making mechanism was limited. On the other hand, Özal sent the 19 laws back to the TGNA for reconsideration and filed an annulment action to the Constitutional Court for 2 laws (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923- 2005, 2005, pp. 310-315).

Despite all this, the presidency has been regarded as the most fundamental actor in foreign policy decision mechanism. As regards the issue, Balcı states (Balcı, 2017, p. 214) that the presidential office in Turgut Özal’s period, for the first time after the single-party period, plays such a critical and guiding role in foreign policy. The fact that the MP has the majority in Parliament and Özal is supported by the MP paved the way for President Özal to actively engage in foreign policy (Gözen, 1996). However, following Yılmaz's snap election decision, Özal's effectiveness in directing the government and the assembly decreased because of the loss of the majority in the parliament in 1991 general elections.

So that, Özal has partially lost the power to direct foreign policy. The balance of the decision-making mechanism of the period will be shaped by the positions taken by Özal, as a former president of MP and with broad legal powers, and Demirel, who was the head of the True Path Party (TPP). Being of the president and the government from different parties created a competitive environment in the political scene. Özal who dominates the process by excluding the traditional institutions and bureaucracy in the decision-making process and can use all powers when the absolute majority of the assembly was under the control of MP (Gözen, 2009, p. 74) was forced to keep its active role in foreign policy decision-making and maneuverability by the TPP- Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) coalition government that was formed after the loss of MP’s absolute majority. Inconsistency between the two heads of the executive and the use of Demirel's power in Parliament to make decisions restricting the active role of the presidency in the decision- making mechanism led to different and various discourses in public that would harm the stability of the executive.

The escalation between the two heads of the executive was reflected in the field of foreign policy. In 1992, as a result of the Armenian gangs attacking Nakhichevan, Özal offered to intervene in the war, and Demirel believed (Aksu, 2018, p. 76) that the problem should be solved through diplomacy without any intervention, ‘if they want to go and fight, there is no obstacle’, Demirel said (Hürriyet, 2001).

The dispute between the two heads of the execution was also reflected at the summit of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in 1992, which was attended by the heads and governments of eleven countries. During the ceremony organized to enhance economic cooperation between the countries in the region, there was a disagreement between Özal and Demirel about who would sign the agreement. Özal, who is called as mastermind of the organization, left the summit in question and Demirel signed the agreement (Laçinok, 2007, p. 624).

Just as at the BSEC summit, the inability of providing balance in competition of domestic powers led to increasing of tension in regard to the initiatives of parties at the point of foreign policy. For example, Özal's visit to Central Asia in April 1993 was a crisis issue both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Grand National Assembly. While many parliamentarians were not allowed to attend the visit, it was decided at the last

94 moment that Hikmet Çetin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time, would join to official visit delegation (Balcı & Gülener, 2018, p. 95). In short, while Turgut Özal sought an autonomy to shape the foreign policy making process from the army and foreign bureaucracy before and during the Gulf Crisis in 1990, in the wake of Gulf Crisis from the domestic opposition and the government. Within such a seeking, Özal was able to achieve the autonomy in foreign policy making as long as internal political conditions and domestic powers balances became convenient in order that he works in compatible with Parliament.

5.2.2.2. Özal’s Leadership Profile

Turgut Özal has left an indelible impression to Turkish political life and become one of the most important politicians with his leadership. In his presidency between 1989-1993, his practices in both domestic and foreign politics differed Özal from his usual leader. In particular, he set aside the status quo, one of the main pillars of traditional Turkish foreign policy, and made attempts to play an active role in the regional and global cases. At this point Özal, with its initiative, exceeded traditional decision makers and took foreign policy decisions (Dündar, 2016, p. 4). During his term of office, Özal has closely followed the issues of domestic and foreign policy with 23 consultants (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923- 2005, 2005, p. 323) and diversified the flow of information. Özal has been an effective actor not only in the foreign policy making process but also in the implementation process. In this manner Özal received 64 high-level foreign guests and paid 40 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323). In this respect, Özal has an active-positive leadership according to Barber's typological classification. According to Lewis (Lewis, 2010) , in the sequel of being president, he tried to rule over the prime ministers and direct them. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Özal period necessitated an analysis in which leadership factors were given priority apart from the usual type of leadership. While Turgut Özal with his leadership, innovative style, courage, being skillful in decision-making, visionary, and good sense was compared with Atatürk by some, , for others Özal was an opportunistic leader without the principle of rule of law (Acar F. , 2002, p. 163). The fact that Özal's developed policies still affect today's Turkish foreign policy has brought about the continuity of these discussions. The comparison of today's leaders with the reference of Özal after Atatürk point to Özal's crucial position in Turkish

95 political life. Özal, unlike other leaders in the politics of the period, has adopted an active and revisionist political view aimed at changing the system by rejecting the role of which internal balances within system provide (Laçinok, 2007, p. 545).

While the traditional structure of the current bureaucracy is quite timid at risk taking point, Özal showed a leadership that can take risks and take initiatives, contrary to the status quo attitude. Özal stated that the period of abstention in order not to take any risks and becoming introverted in foreign policy for Turkey was over, and that an active attitude would be shown by taking into consideration the conditions of the period as a result of a political choice (Ahmad, 1995, p. 281). Özal's entrepreneurial and innovative spirit broke grounds in foreign policy. For example, during the Gulf War, Özal's use of telephone diplomacy and inclusion businessmen and members of the media to his foreign visits, was evaluated as a means of diversifying Turkish foreign policy (Dündar, 2016, pp. 18-19). In fact, this situation shows that Özal adopted a foreign policy approach beyond the security priority nature of the Cold War era.

Table 9: Özal’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups Personality World leaders (Kesgin Turkish leaders Turgut Özal (Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Trait B. , 2013, p. 145) average profile Kesgin, & Ozkececi-Taner, (Kesgin, 2011, p. 138) 2015, p. 17; Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, & Ozkececi-Taner, 2017, p. 46) Belief Can Mean = .35 Mean = .351 Control Events Low < .30 Low < .319 0.357 High > .40 High > .383 Need for Power Mean = .26 Mean = .287 Low < .21 Low < .243 0.216 High > .31 High > .331 Self-Confidence Mean = .36 Mean = .400 Low < .26 Low < .320 0.433 High > .46 High > .480 Conceptual Mean = .59 Mean = .564 Complexity Low < .53 Low < .527 0.642 High > .65 High > .601 Task Focus Mean = .63 Mean = .637 Low < .56 Low < .572 0.644 High > .70 High > .702 Ingroup Bias Mean = .15 Mean = .142 Low < .10 Low < .114 0.109 High > .20 High > .170 Distrust of Mean = .13 Mean = .138 Others Low < .07 Low < .097 0.129 High > .19 High > .179

When investigated results in table 9, according to study of Cuhedar and others, Özal’s belief can control events isn’t under the low degree with reference to head of state comparison group. However his score on belief can control events is above average in compared with world leaders and Turkish PMs comparison group. In other study made by Ak (Ak, 2012, p. 522), Özal’s score on belief can control events is higher than score of three comparison groups. In the most general sense, Özal’s score on belief can control events isn’t definitely low. As for need for power, Özal’s score is lower than mean of comparison groups. Hermann (Hermann M. G., 2003)stated that while leaders with high need for power have a strong desire to take other actors in hand, leaders with low need for power dispose to let other actors to lead and have decisive role in decision making process. From this point of view, Cuhedar and others (Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, & Ozkececi- Taner, 2015, p. 19) claimed that although Özal’s score on need for power is low, he acted much more like a leader with high need for power. Özal's direct contact with diplomats, excluding the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a step that can be considered in this regard. In addition, contrary to Özal's successors, the fact that he preside over the Council of Ministers frequently and he showed leadership apart from usual presidential type confirm the claim of the Cuhedar and others. When this data are evaluated table 3, it can be deduced that Özal was a leader who challenge constraints. However, according to table 3, Özal was less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence. As mentioned above, shutting down the pipeline by ignoring the NSC decision, contacting the diplomats directly and pushing the Foreign Ministry out of the decision making process and by contacting the bureaucrats directly and keeping the government out of the process can be assumed as examples of using directly the power of Özal. As a result of these processes, Özal's loss of influence in the decision- making process in the coalition established by Demirel is an example of his failure while challenging the constraints as indicated in table 3.

According to study of Cuhedar and others, Özal’s conceptual complexity score is over high limit of heads of state and Turkish PMs comparison groups and is almost one standard deviation higher than world mean. Hermann stated that leaders with high conceptual complexity incline to discuss different perspectives and approaches with other people and evaluate various factors influencing the case. When it comes to self-confidence, Özal’s

97 score is almost low in comparison with heads of state comparison group. On the other hand, in comparison with world leaders and Turkish PMs Özal’s score is above the mean. Acar (Acar F. , 2002, p. 170) also drew attention to the role of his self-confidence in his political decisions in his work on Özal. According to him, Özal's ability to easily establish personal relationships with commanders, senior bureaucrats, power holders and leading politicians in his professional life and with the heads of state in his presidential term shows how high his confidence is. When this data is evaluated in table 4, Özal can be considered as open to new information. Leaders’ CC score may be associated with leaders’ capabilities to challenge constraints as far as it is correlated with leaders’ openness to new approaches. Consistent with leaders who are open to new information, Özal kept in touch with state leaders, kept up with developments and tried to get first-hand accounts from his counterparts.

Although Özal's involvement in the diplomatic process caused an unusual situation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an interpretation in matter of making the ministry dysfunctional, the minister of National Defense, Safa Giray, who resigned stressed that Özal had no attempt to monopolize the process of Foreign Policy and that he was extremely open to consultation and debate. (Dündar, 2016, p. 8). Ekrem Ceyhun, former Minister of State, states that Özal is a very good negotiator (Laçinok, 2007, p. 544).

Lastly, with almost high task focus score, Özal can be regarded as problem-focused leader when table 5 is investigated. In consideration of these results and table 6, the fact that Özal is a leader who is challenging the constraints, is open to new information and is problem- focused reveals that Özal has an actively independent leadership profile. According to this, it is deduced that his main concentration was on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both as seen in table 6.

5.2.3. Süleyman Demirel’s Era

Following Özal's death as president, the most powerful candidate for Çankaya was Demirel, who was the Prime Minister. In the first two votes of Parliament, there was no result; in the third ballot, Demirel won only the votes of the majority and became the ninth president of the Republic of Turkey.

5.2.3.1. Balances of Domestic Powers

Seven governments were established between 1993 and 1999 when Demirel was president. Since the absence of a stable and strong government, 9 different foreign ministers performed duty. The fact that unstable and weak governments are in power has revealed an internal political equilibrium in which the military and the ministry bureaucracies, which can be shown as established institutions, have shaped the process of foreign policy making by exceeding their constitutional boundaries.(Balcı, 2017, p. 235).

The military has been an active actor in foreign policy since the 1960 coup. In addition, through institutional instruments such as the NSC, the army formed a constitutional basis for monitoring the policy pursued by elected governments and determined the direction and boundaries of foreign policy. Although the active leadership of Özal and the fact that stable governments were in power during his period made the army take steps backward in the process, the weak and unstable governments in the Demirel period prepared the ground for the army to regain and maintain its position on politics.

During this period, the military took steps to make its political influence visible. Instead of government officials, the fact that members of the army made statements, signed agreements, published reports and made mutual visits, it became commonplace during this period, unlike other periods (Balcı, 2017, p. 236). This situation is reflected in the press releases of the NSC. Gürpınar, who examined the NSC Press papers between 1991-2002, stated that in 92 of the 154 papers, foreign policy issues were at the forefront (Gürpınar, 2013, p. 86). In addition, Gürpınar stated that 19% of the issues discussed in the previous period in the NSC press releases had been in the foreign policy area and that this ratio was up to 60% in this period (Gürpınar, 2013, pp. 82-86). Another issue that drew attention to the NSC papers during this period was the fact that the issues such as economy, education, tourism and summer tourism expectations were included in the paper. As foreseen by the Constitution, mentioning the issues, that are expected to be announced and make policy by the government, in the NSC reports shows how much the concept of national security is expanded as a scope.

In addition, Gürpınar examined the relationship between the NSC and the Council of Ministers during this period. In the previous period, the Council of Ministers was gathered

99 in the wake of the NSC, in this period the Council of Ministers was gathered fallowing the NSC, and then the Council of Ministers was gathered again and reviewed the issue within the framework of the NSC's "advices." However, the fact that taking shorter time of latter Council of Ministers is becoming more common was interpreted Gürpınar (Gürpınar, 2013, pp. 89-91) as a state assessment and approval process of the NSC decisions.

The military's role in this period can be clearly observed in military relations with the United States and Israel. Balcı (Balcı, 2017, p. 236), claimed that the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel in 1996 was shaped out of civilian political initiative because of internal political disputes and that the then National Defense Minister, Oltan Sungurlu, did not have the details of the agreement. In August 1996, another agreement with Israel was signed by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan as a result of pressure by the army, although he made statements opposing the agreement. In May 1997, the army declared that it would be involved in a joint exercise between the US and Israel by bypassing the government. The Welfare Party officials interpreted the situation exclusion of civilian power from the foreign policy-making process.

In addition to its decisive role in the field of foreign policy during this period, the military did not hesitate to attempt to design and influence domestic politics. During this period, the army prevented providing many critical ministries to the Welfare Party (Akın, 2009, pp. 159-160), a coalition partner, and forced Erbakan's government to resign by carrying out the 28 February military coup.

During this period, the military legitimized its central role in decision making with the “National Security Policy Document” known as” red book " in public opinion. In this document, the framework of national security and foreign policy has been determined and the military has been given the opportunity to intervene directly in politics. (Aksu M. , 2012, p. 447). Thus, the NSC has followed the process of taking the NSPD into consideration in the determination of the state policy, and has not allowed any laws, circulars or regulations to take precedence over the NSPD (Uzgel, 2001, p. 87). In other words, just as the General Secretary of the NSC has become a shadow prime minister with the powers he has, the NSPD has also been a kind of shadow constitution by virtue of his privileged position on all laws and regulations. Thus, the NSC decisions that must be taken

100 into consideration firstly have become mandatory to carry into effect (Aksu M. , 2012, p. 448).

Another example of the role of actors in the foreign policy-making process is the Operation Steel in northern Iraq in 1995. The operation was shaped entirely under the control of military bureaucracy without being received even opinion of Parliament (Balcı, 2010, p. 93). The upper bureaucracy of the military, which dominates the foreign policy making process, kept the discourse power of the foreign policy by the press statements and did not allow other actors to shape foreign policy making process. For example, during the Ocalan crisis with Syria, the Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Çıkrıkoğlu said that “Syria is continuing a war that has not been declared against Turkey. Turkey was patient. But Turkey's is no longer tolerate". The fact that he has clearly targeted the Syrian regime, provide an insight about decision-making mechanism of Turkey during the period.

The actors with constitutional responsibility are also positioned according to the foreign policy outlined in these statements. Although President Demirel took active role in cases of Kardak and capturing of Öcalan, he did not go beyond the situation of “warning and reporting opinion” as Gözler said (Aksu, 2018, p. 77), unlike his successor, Özal, and he was not a leader who led the process. Out of foreign policy issues, Demirel is remembered as the president who has been the most involved in daily politics because of the internal political dynamics that governments have not been able to establish for a long time (Yılmaz E. , 2007, p. 266). While Demirel sent the 14 laws back to the TGNA to be discussed again, he filed an annulment lawsuit to the Constitutional Court related with four laws. However, the role of Demirel in foreign policy has been limited as seen. The prime ministers of the period and likewise the Council of Ministers have not limited the decisive role of the military in foreign policy-making, but have integrated into the role of the army in the process (Balcı, 2017, p. 237). In short, institutions, representing civilian will, such as the presidency, the prime minister and the Council of ministers, and who are constitutionally responsible, have remained within the limits of which the military bureaucracy draw in the foreign policy making process.

101

5.2.3.2. Demirel’s Leadership Profile

During his 40-year active political life, Süleyman Demirel became one of the important figures of Turkish political life as prime minister for 13 years and as president for 7 years. At this point, one of the most striking aspects of Demirel during his presidency was his very harmonious work with the governments. During his term of office, Demirel has served as president of the Council of Ministers only once, although he is constitutionally authorized. It was also realized upon the invitation by Prime Minister Ecevit as a gesture because of the fact that Demirel's term of office would be soon expired.

During his presidency, Demirel has been active in the foreign policy making process as well as in its implementation process. In this manner Demirel received 229 high-level foreign guests and paid 125 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, pp. 323-324). Following closely with foreign policy issues, Demirel was actively involved in the foreign policy making process with 46 key advisors and advisors. However, the impact of Demirel on foreign policy-making left limited compared to his successor, Özal. Not exercising his authority to preside over the Cabinet of Ministers shows that Demirel did not take an initiative to increase his influence. Instead of taking steps to implement alternative policies like his successor, he preferred to present his opinion and warn about the issue. Therefore, according to Barber's leadership typology, Demirel has an active-negative leadership.

When investigated results in table 10 according to study of Cuhedar and others, Demirel’s score on belief can control events is almost average when regarding two comparison group. As for need for power, his score is also higher than average of world leaders comparison group and is close mean of Turkish PMs comparison group. On that sense, Demirel challenges constraints. With regard to the results Demirel is skilful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see that it happens. Although Demirel’s scores refers to his tendency to challenge constraints, there were some practices implying that he respect constraints. According to Arat (2008, pp. 106-107), he didn’t take a stand against military, in other words he did politics in a frame which is determined by military. Actually, Demirel thought that foreign policy should be pursued by the traditional way in which the government and the parliament exert their authority (Tuncer N. , 2007, p. 154). Demirel has prioritized working in harmony with governments, rather than following

102 its own agenda in foreign policy (Tuncer N. , 2007, p. 155). In this aspect, he would likely to respect constraints from time to time. Besides, in contrast to Özal’s revisionist approach, Demirel remained loyal to the traditional line of foreign policy that has been followed since the establishment of the republic. In other words, he kept going his policy in framework of the traditional line.

Table 10: Demirel’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups

Personality Trait World leaders Turkish leaders Süleyman Demirel (Kesgin B. , 2013, p. average profile (Cuhadar, Kaarbo, 145) (Kesgin, 2011, p. Kesgin, & Ozkececi- 138) Taner, 2017, p. 46)

Belief Can Control Events Mean = .35 Mean = .351 Low < .30 Low < .319 0.346 High > .40 High > .383 Need for Power Mean = .26 Mean = .287 Low < .21 Low < .243 0.278 High > .31 High > .331 Self-Confidence Mean = .36 Mean = .400 Low < .26 Low < .320 0.405 High > .46 High > .480 Conceptual Complexity Mean = .59 Mean = .564 Low < .53 Low < .527 0.579 High > .65 High > .601 Task Focus Mean = .63 Mean = .637 Low < .56 Low < .572 0.579 High > .70 High > .702 Ingroup Bias Mean = .15 Mean = .142 Low < .10 Low < .114 0.143 High > .20 High > .170 Distrust of Others Mean = .13 Mean = .138 Low < .07 Low < .097 0.120 High > .19 High > .179

According to study of Cuhedar and others, Demirel’s conceptual complexity score is lower than average of world mean. Low conceptual complexity signifies perceiving the world with sharply circumscribed concepts such as black-white. In other respects his score on conceptual complexity is above the mean of Turkish PMs comparison group. High conceptual complexity imply to realizing different perspectives and dimensions that is likely to be concerned with decision. As seen Demirel’s score can show an alteration according to comparison group. Such a leaders are accepted as context specific. In

103 compliance with the acceptance, considering circumstances, leaders may act in a certain manner. Hence their score differ from in case assessing different comparison groups.

When it comes to self-confidence, Demirel’s score is higher than mean of two comparison groups. So, regarding world leaders comparison group, the results indicate that Demirel is closed to new information. However taking into consideration Turkish PMs, Demirel’s scores point to his openness to new information. The difference stems from comparison group which is evaluated. Hence, in this regard Demirel has context specific personal trait. In this sense, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil who was Foreign Minister in Motherland Party’s governments stated that Demirel had a utterly self-confidence, but he didn’t make a decision on his own without consulting (Arat, 2008, p. 106).

Lastly, when table 5 is investigated with the his low task focus score, it is understood that Demirel is a relationship-focused leader. Briefly, it can be deduced that while Demirel is categorized as a directive leader in case regarding Turkish PMs comparison group, he is classified as an evangelist leader when evaluating with world leaders comparison group. So, in addition to persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message as an evangelist leader, Demirel would may occasionally focus on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation as a directive leader. Arat (2008, p. 107) has expressed that Demirel had not fixed leadership style. Namely, while investigating Demirel’s leadership style obtaining various and contradictory results based on comparison group is also arisen from not only his pragmatic manner and not having strict and unchangeable principles but also his ability that can keep pace with changing dynamics easily.

5.2.4. Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s Era

Following the completion of Demirel's term of office, the Constitutional Court President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was nominated by a protocol signed by the political party leaders who had a group in Parliament. Sezer was the tenth president of the Republic of Turkey in 330 votes in the third round of voting (Akın, 2009, pp. 173-174).

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5.2.4.1. Balances of Domestic Powers

Following Sezer's inauguration as president, the role of the military engaged in foreign policy-making in the 1990s was tried to be balanced. The government and the ministry, which are included in foreign policy within the boundaries of the NSC, lost its weight in the foreign policy making process as well as the president. Developments in northern Iraq and the Aegean have made security and military measures a priority in foreign policy.

Unlike the 1990s in which the military was engaged in foreign policy, the government's initiative under the framework of European Union reforms has created a strong basis for the military's withdrawal to the borders of democratic countries. Between 2000 and 2002, when although the military lost its privileged position, it sustained its weight on decision making mechanism, President Sezer did not take an active role in foreign policy issues, while the process was shaped under the control of the government and the military (Balcı, 2017, p. 264). This change was undoubtedly influenced by the dynamics of the international relations that developed after the Cold War. At this point, it would be appropriate to examine the global factors affecting the balance of domestic politics.

Under the influence of globalization during the post-Cold War period, the rigid boundaries of the concept of sovereignty have lost its validity in practice, and the distinction between domestic and foreign policy has been completely eliminated (Duran B. , 2011). In this way, the identity of foreign policy, which is called high politics and which prioritizes national security on its agenda, has been politicized and has been articulated to domestic politics. This change in the identity of foreign policy has necessitated that the actors, making foreign policy, transform themselves to adapt to global conditions. In the bipolar world order of the Cold War, the changing of the order, threat perceptions and security concept that the military dominated in order to protect national interests, and the diversification of foreign policy instruments with globalization have forced the institutions involving foreign policy making process to adapt to this change. Therefore, the actors involved in the foreign policy-making process have moved towards institutional restructuring and this has affected the hierarchy among the institutions in the process, as well as the restructuring of the power relations between the institutions.

For example, there was no need for the military to maintain threat perception against Soviet-backed groups just as during the Cold War period (Özcan, 2012, p. 27). This

105 situation, which is presented to the public as NATO's expectation from the Turkey and the necessity of global orientations, has shaped the power relations in the decision-making process. Therefore, one of the most important bases of the army, which dominates the decision-making process, has been eliminated by pointing to this situation. The new global trends have paved the way for civilian administrations to be decisive in decision-making position rather than an army approaching events with a absolute security perspective. At this point, the government has shown that it can respond to the global directions of the new century with its initiative to adapt to European Union reforms by using discourses such as the rule of law, democracy, freedoms and human rights out of the military's discourse on absolute security-oriented perspective.

These international developments have transformed domestic politics in Turkey, enabling the army to be balanced during the foreign policy making process. In line with the constitutional amendment of 2001, the NSC was composed of Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff, Deputies Prime Minister, Justice, National Defense, Interior, Foreign Ministers, Commanders of the Land, Marine and Air Forces and the Gendarmerie General Command under the presidency of the President (Özcan, 2012, p. 28). In this way, the majority of the troops on the council passed to the government wing and the weight of the military’s' upper bureaucracy on the council was restricted. In addition, in accordance with the same amendment, the expression “first consideration” by the Council of ministers for the decisions of the NSC, has been changed with “evaluation”. Thus the decisions of the NSC have the characteristics of recommendation for the Council of Ministers (Aksu M. , 2012, p. 448).

In this process, the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been actively involved in the process. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem shaped the main directions of Turkish foreign policy during this period (Balcı, 2017, p. 265). With his personal initiative, Ismail Cem took important steps towards membership to EU and towards the elimination of tensions with Greece. It should also be noted that the partners of the coalition government have also been involved in the foreign policy-making process. But according to Balci, the disagreements between partners prevented the government from pursuing a stable foreign policy in foreign policy, and they paved the way for early elections on November 3, 2002.

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In the November 2002 elections, the AK Party won 365 seats in parliament with 34.4% of the votes. During this period, the power relations of the actors participating in the foreign policy making process were restructured. The signs of this structure are shown in the AKP's party program (Özcan, 2012, p. 8):

“The AK Party believes that the decision-making and implementation process in foreign policy is inadequate only with the participation of bureaucracy. It is believed that Turkey's influence and power in foreign policy will increase by the participation of Parliament and various sections of society in such decisions.”

In fact, with the increasing influence of the army in foreign policy in the 90s, the ministry, the parliament and different sections of the society, which lost their weight in the foreign policy making process, saw these statements in the party program as an opportunity to retrieve their previous positions. At this point, while the government was decisively defending the EU harmonization process in order to put an end to the dominance of the military in its decision-making mechanism and to establish its own civil power, the ministry supported the government to regain its traditional influence in foreign policy (Özcan, 2012, pp. 15-17). As long as the government has a political voice, it increased the influence of the ministry on foreign policy. According to Özcan, increasing the influence of the ministry is also related to the position of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül in the party.

In this period, in order to reduce the influence of the military, changes on legal ground have been made that make the military so effective by taking support from global directions such as the harmonization process with the EU. In addition to the above- mentioned 2001 regulation, it was decided to convene the National Security Council in every two months in 2003, and appointment of civil origin person as NSC General Secretary has been paved the way (Aksu M. , 2012, p. 449). In 2004, the regulation, which provides an autonomous policy to the NSC Secretariat in the process of foreign policy making, envisages the participation of the NSC Secretary General as “shadow prime minister” in the decision-making mechanism, as Bayramoğlu (Bayramoğlu, 2002, p. 44) put it, was repealed.

In this period, in order to limit the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in the decision- making process, it was reminded that “the Council of Ministers is responsible for ensuring national security to TGNA" to NSC. The area of National Security Policy Document

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(NSPD), prepared as an average of 90 pages, was narrowed and its the focus was shifted to external threat elements and 25 pages were prepared (Özcan, 2012, p. 35).

During this period, the government established the General Directorate of Security Affairs under the prime ministry and transferred a vital authority to the prime ministry such as “ensuring coordination among the institutions responsible for internal security, foreign security and counterterrorism” which took place among the tasks of the NSC (Özcan, 2012, p. 37). Moreover, the Under secretariat of Public Order and Security (UPOS) under the prime ministry was established and the information and intelligence obtained by the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The National Intelligence Organization, the General Command of Gendarmerie and the General Directorate of Security were transferred to UPOS instead of NSC (Özcan, 2012, p. 38). All these arrangements show that the decisive role of the military in the decision-making process through the NSC has been formally transferred to the Prime Ministry.

In addition to the formal situation in question, the army did not refrain from criticizing the government's policies in Cyprus and Northern Iraq. Turkish Army Forces Commander Yasar Buyukanit accused the government of non-policy in the period when Iraq was restructured, Foreign Minister Gul reminded Buyukanit that the Chief of Land Forces had no authority to make public statements (Özcan, 2012, p. 14). As it is understood from these explanations, although the army does not dominate the process, it has signaled that it will insist on not being completely outside the process. The compliance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the government on these issues was another factor limiting the military's influence. On the other hand, TIKA, which is affiliated with the prime ministry, has a very active position compared to the previous period in terms of the implementation of foreign policy refers the increasing influence of the Prime Ministry on foreign policy.

In this period, President Sezer supported the steps taken within the framework of harmonization with the EU, especially up to 2002, and tried to achieve reconciliation by taking the initiative when the process was blocked (Özcan, 2012). But in the following period, he acted with the military in response to the joint approach of the prime ministry and the Ministry to the Cyprus and northern Iraq issues. However, Sezer did not play a role in the process as the military's influence on foreign policy making was limited (Özcan, 2012). Sezer has not been intimately interested in foreign policy agendas other than the

108 issues of crisis potential during his term office, and has not tended to display an active leadership in such matters.

The parliament played a decisive role in the process during the March 1 Memorandum process, when Erdoğan was not yet prime minister, but it was not so decisive in the next period when Erdoğan displayed strong and active leadership.

During this period, Prime Minister Erdoğan did not hesitate to put into effect the decisive role of the prime ministry. The role' legal basis was provided by the transfer of the authority of the NSC to the prime ministry. During this period, Prime Minister Erdoğan was the key actor of the foreign policy making process. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Chief Negotiator Ahmet Davutoglu also became prominent figures in the foreign policy-making process of this period (Balcı, 2017, p. 292).

5.2.4.2. Sezer’s Leadership Profile

The tenth president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, was the first president to come out of politics. The presidency of Sezer, who was elected and elected for the presidency by leaving the Presidency of the Constitutional Court, was shaped under the influence of his professional formation. Sezer, who used his legal powers to influence politics in internal political circles, couldn't to show the same effectiveness during the foreign policy making process. Especially in foreign policy issues such as northern Iraq and Cyprus, where the ministry's thesis matches the government's thesis, but the military contradicts with them, he tried to reduce the tension between the ministry and the military, but he failed. Later, Sezer supported the military's thesis. Disputes between the government/ministry and the presidency/army in foreign policy issues became apparent. As a matter of fact, the military has lost its legal bases allowing it to guide the foreign policy-making process and its role in the process has been limited. In connection with this, Sezer's role in the process has been limited. Sezer received 154 high-level foreign guests and paid 49 official visits to foreign countries (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, p. 323). At this point, it should be noted that the receivings of Sezer are more related to the pro-active foreign policy approach of the government. In other words, Sezer preferred a very passive leadership compared to his successors with 49 official visits. As Özcan (Özcan, 2012, p. 25) pointed out, Sezer, regarding his successors Demirel and Özal did not show a leadership that closely follows

109 foreign policy issues and wants to guide the process. In this respect, the evaluation of Sezer showing a passive-negative leadership according to the leadership typology classification revealed by Barber.

Although he had a passive negative leadership in foreign policy, Sezer did not hesitate to exercise the authority of the Presidency on issues related to internal politics. For example, while Demirel 14 times and Özal 19 times exercise their veto power and sent back the laws adopted by the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) to the Assembly, Sezer used 67 times the veto power (Barış Bahçeci, 2008, p. 210). Furthermore, while Özal two times, Demirel four times had filed an annulment action to the Constitutional Court, Sezer 22 times filed an annulment action to the Constitutional Court (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Tarihi 1923-2005, 2005, pp. 316-322). This shows that President Sezer's exercise with respect to legislative and executive powers prevented his work in harmony with the government. Beyond this situation, Sezer did not approve the government's appointments to high-ranking bureaucracy. The duties of the important bureaucratic positions, such as the General Directorate of TRT and the General Directorate of Security, have been carried out by proxy (Akın, 2009, pp. 181-182).

The fact that Sezer does not give speeches in any private channels and does not give interviews to any journalist is an obstacle for examining the leadership style. As the President, Sezer's being the subject of only a thesis and Sezer's highly passive leadership in foreign policy led to the failure to obtain the necessary data for leadership analysis. At this point, the available data do not allow Sezer's leadership style to be analyzed according to the criteria adopted in the thesis.

However, during his term of office, Sezer's approach to events and his attitude towards critical issues give us clues about his leadership style. As noted above, Sezer did not use his powers to guide the foreign policy making process, but did not refrain from using his powers in internal political matters. At this point, it can be assumed that Sezer showed a context-specific leadership in the face of constraints. In addition, his successor, Demirel, worked with a head consultant team of about 46 people and Sezer worked with a head consultant team of three people. In addition to working with very limited advisory staff, Sezer also held very few meetings with representatives of the legislative and executive wing compared to his successors. These conditions result in the comments that Sezer was a

110 closed to new information as a leader during his term of office especially in domestic issues.

One of the most important issues that Sezer emphasized in his speeches was secularism. It can be concluded that Sezer, who has a very strict attitude towards secularism, has an internal motivation in this aspect in domestic affairs. So Sezer can be perceived as a problem-focused leader. However in foreign affairs, Sezer got relevant person’s opinion and underlined approval of different domestic powers. When all these results are evaluated in table 6, it is possible to evaluate that while Sezer had an incremental leadership style in domestic affairs, he showed collegial leadership in foreign affairs. According to Akgün (Akgün, 2011, p. 59), Sezer, who drew a very low profile in foreign policy, came into prominence not with an initiative to contribute position of the presidency in Turkey's domestic and foreign politics, but rather with an attitude transforming approving/appointment authority into veto power.

5.2.5. Abdullah Gül’s Era

After Ahmet Necdet Sezer's term of office expired, the question of who the new president would be became one of the most vital issues in Turkish politics. Especially in the Republican meetings organized by Atatürk's Thought Association, the presidential elections started to take place in a different political environment with the expression that secularism and the values of the Republic would be damaged in case that the candidate of the Justice and Development Party comes to the Çankaya palace. Abdullah Gül received 361 votes in the first ballot and the CHP sued to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the quorum of the meeting was not achieved and that it violated constitution. In the meantime, on the night of the first vote, the TAF published a press release on the official website. In this publication, it is stated that the military is also a side in the debates on secularism in the presidential elections and that as a defender of secularism, TAF would not hesitate to perform this duty if deemed necessary.

The Constitutional Court announced annulment of the vote. In the political environment in which the presidential election turned into a stalemate, the government decided to resolve the crisis by making an early election decision. In the early elections held on July 22, AK Party gained 341 seats with 46.8% vote, RPP gained 112 seats with 20.8% vote, and NMP obtained 71 seats with 14.27% vote. According to the results of this election, the Justice

111 and Development Party (AKP) could be the sole power, but it could not reach the number of 367. The NMP appointed Sebahattin Çakmakoğlu as the presidential candidate and participated the election. Thus the quorum of the meeting could be achieved. In the third round of voting, Abdullah Gül was elected the 11th president of the Republic of Turkey.

5.2.5.1. Balances of Domestic Powers

The election of Abdullah Gül as the President of Republic of Turkey, it expressed the ability of the AK Party administration to direct the processes in the executive and legislative bodies completely. With the power of being the power alone, AK Party has maintained its ability to direct the parliament, which is the legislative body. Sezer by not approving or dragging out the bureaucratic appointments which the Council of Ministers or the Prime Minister decided upon, prevented the AK Party government from controlling to the State’s cadres. In the wake of being elected Abdullah Gül as President, this obstacle disappeared. Thus, the bureaucratic backbone of the state, the kemalist-elitist clique was completely liquidated from the decision mechanism (Balcı, 2017, p. 318). With the EU harmonization process in the sequel of terminating the ability of the army to shape the decision-making process, the liquidation of the kemalist-elitist structure in the bureaucracy has made the AK Party a decisive power in legislative and executive organs.

Özbudun and Hale examined the relationship between the AK Party and the army in three periods. According to this, the first period between 2002 and 2006 was seen as un controlled disagreement, the second period in 2007 was ”challenge and crisis“ and the third period in 2007-2008 was seen as the withdrawal of the military. According to Özbudun and Hale, the Kemalist-elitist clique inside the military believed that the AK Party had a secret agenda, such as replacing an Islamist system on the political scene of Turkey (Özbudun & Hale, 2010, p. 145).

With the solution of presidential election problem, the process of withdrawal of the Army pointed out by the Özbudun and Hale started. The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases brought with them the reformation of the NSC and the liquidation of the military from the political sphere, which has been thoroughly restricted in the decision-making process with initiatives within the framework of EU harmonization.

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By the removal of the elite group from the army, bureaucracy and judiciary respectively (Balcı, 2017, p. 318) the government, in which the president works in harmony, has reached the ability to direct the foreign policy making process. Balcı described this capability as “conservative hegemony”, while AK Party officials described it as “silent revolution” with the foresight of the nation's will to liquidate the elite structures and become dominant in the state mechanism and democratize.

Turkish foreign policy during this period was formulated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Prime Minister Erdoğan (Yılmaz & Özdemir, 2017, p. 17). Davutoglu (Murinson, 2006, p. 947), who was the architect of Turkish foreign policy during his term of office, it has been an actor that reveals the mind, principles, direction and objectives of the foreign policy of the period. In particular, Davutoğlu, who has outlined of foreign policy of the period with the “strategic depth, rhythmic diplomacy and zero problem with the neighbors” approaches, has played a central role in the process of making and implementing foreign policy. Prime Minister Erdoğan, with his strong leadership, has a privileged role in the process as the key actor in the foreign policy making process. The language of the foreign policy approach carried out by Erdoğan, who is closely interested in foreign policy issues, was created by Davutoglu (Oğuzlu, 2009).

Davutoglu said that Turkey's strategic position in the book of strategic depth should be reevaluated in the context of the transformation of world politics and emphasized that Turkey that is located at the intersection of geographical domains should undertake a central role in power domains by benefiting from the her historical and geographical depth (Davutoğlu, 2001). According to Davutoglu, Turkey needs to implement the following five principles in foreign policy in order to undertake the role (Davutoğlu, 2008, pp. 79- 84): (1) equilibrium among democracy and security (encouraging freedom, civil liberties and democracy without undermining security); (2) “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors” (3) developing relations with neighboring regions and beyond (4) inclination to a multidimensional foreign policy (i.e., getting over of bipolar world order and promoting relations with multi sides and ties with intergovernmental organizations) (5) rhythmic diplomacy, which includes taking active role in global and regional matters on international platforms to promote to peace, stability, solving crisis and wealth. These transformative foreign policy understanding manifested a new form of Turkish foreign policy making. Through this understanding, Davutoğlu tried to provide “normalization”

113 and “de-securitization” of Turkish foreign policy by transforming security understanding of Turkish foreign policy embedded in its guidelines (Kara & Sözen, 2016, p. 55). This transformation in the foreign policy approach is the steps of the active and independent foreign policy approach that Erdoğan-led AKP governments insist on following in this period (Duran B. , 2017, pp. 10-11; Aslan, 2017, pp. 25-32).

As for the president's role in foreign policy, Abdullah Gül was expected to play a very active role in the process of foreign policy making with his determination in politics. At this point, Barber and Rockman emphasize that their performance can not only be explained by their political background, but also the way political leaders are elected, the power balances within and outside the country, and the expectation of society may significantly affect the leader's performance (Akgün, 2011, p. 61). In the same way, although Gül was an important actor in the foreign policy making process during his term of office, the internal power configuration and internal political balances prevented Gul from displaying the expected activity. Although Gül's own party, AK Party, was in power, the fact that a strong and charismatic leader, such as Erdoğan, served as prime minister and party leader, led to Gül playing a more passive role in the decision-making process. For this reason, Gül served as president, not even in spite of the prime minister and the Council of Ministers, but rather on the basis of a policy that would not conflict with them, and therefore tended to foreign policy rather than to domestic political discussions. The fact that Gül, from his chiefs of cabinet to the press consultants, organized his close working team by people with foreign policy experience (Akgün, 2011, p. 62) proves this tendency. President Abdullah Gül did not neglect to act on the basis of reconciliation with Prime Minister Erdogan in foreign policy and he has been involved in decision-making processes on such a base.

According to Akgün, the most prominent role of Abdullah Gül as president in foreign policy was to take initiatives in neglected areas in accordance with the foreign policy of the government. When criticism of the government's loss of previous dynamism within the context of EU membership took place in the public opinion, Gül called the relevant diplomats and bureaucrats to Çankaya and showed that he was a close follower of the process.

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Turkey has pursued a multidimensional and proactive foreign policy in this period, and with Davutoğlu's definition, it has deepened its economic, political and cultural ties with the countries of the near land sphere, the near sea sphere and the near continent sphere. President Gül, who supported the government's policy of opening Africa, visited Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Congo, Gabon, Ghana and Cameroon and made official contacts. Gul's visit is evidence that the government's multi-faceted and proactive foreign policy find meaning at highest level of the state.

Gül took initiatives on risky issues and assumed important roles in the implementation of foreign policy. In the football diplomacy carried out with Armenia, Gül visited Yerevan and prepared the groundwork for taking steps to normalize the relations between the two countries. In addition, Gül has provided the necessary steps for the invitation of Barzani and Talabani to Turkey to develop relations with the regional Kurdish administration in Iraq. These initiatives are get attention with being complementary to “zero problem with neighbors” policy of the government.

One of the most striking aspects of Turkish foreign policy during this period is that it mediates the crises that concern the entire international community and makes it a priority to solve the problems through diplomacy. In this respect, the implementation of the soft power elements of Turkish foreign policy on the global level shows the dynamism, proactivity and multi-faceted understanding of the foreign policy. Turkey, with its mediation efforts to reduce tensions between Iran and the West attract attention on regional and global level and played a mediator role between Syria-Israel and Pakistan-Afghanistan. President Abdullah Gül, taking active role in Turkey's mediation role, invited Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to Turkey (Akgün, 2011, p. 64). In November 2007, Gül brought together the leaders of Israel and Palestine in Ankara and made initiatives for the solution of the Israeli problem.

Despite intensive diplomatic initiatives, the inability to achieve the desired result from the processes carried out with the EU, the inability to reach the desired level of relations with Armenia, the 2009 Davos crisis and the Arab Spring process that started in 2011 have limited Turkey's maneuverability in foreign policy field. In the wake of military coup reversing the Arab Spring process in Egypt, with the deepening of the crisis in Syria, the region become suitable for terrorist activities of DEASH and YPG, is branch in Syria of

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PKK. The threats has triggered that Turkey give priority to national security primarily in foreign policy. Turkey considers DAESH and PYD / YPG as a terrorist organization. The fact that some European countries and the United States arm and support PYD / PYD in the fight against DAESH caused increasing tension between Ankara and the Western capitals.

In addition, the liquidation of the elite group from the military and upper bureaucracy paved the way for the members of the FETÖ to influence the significant power positions. Beyond being a social and religious organization, it has an international economic network, educational facilities and non-institutional political connections, and has established a unique (sui generis) tutelage organization (Ulutaş, 2017, pp. 7-8). This structure is very common and deeply staffed in all state organs, especially the judiciary, civil service, military and security. At first, the organization established a bureaucratic tutelage over legitimate powers through these cadres, and after 2013, it attempted to take power directly by attempting to carry out a coup by different methods. In 2014, the FETÖ who infiltrated the state levels illegally and has international non-institutional connections, tried to resist the attempts of the state to liquidate its members from crucial position of the state by the coup attempt of the members of the judiciary in 2014 and the members of the military in 2017. The attempts of the FETO to take over civilian power have brought Turkey's taking care of domestic threat dimension of national security. These threats, which damaged national security both externally and internally, caused Ankara to prioritize its security policies.

In summary, the tendency of the foreign policy of the period was determined by Prime Minister Erdoğan. Foreign Minister Davutoglu has played an active role in the process of implementing foreign policy on the one hand and in the process of developing discourse of the foreign policy on the other hand. President Abdullah Gül has been closely involved in foreign policy issues throughout his term of office. Abdullah Gül's close interest in foreign policy has given Çankaya a role that has enriched, diversified and complemented the government's foreign policy. Although Çankaya has no privileged position in the foreign policy making process, it has become an important actor in the implementation process of Turkish foreign policy during that period. One of the most fundamental characteristics that distinguishes this period from the previous periods is the alignment between the government and Çankaya. The alignment put to an end effectiveness of the constitutionally

116 unauthorized institutions that dominate foreign policy making process in the previous periods. Thus, making of the foreign policy processes accommodately to the legal basis and democracy has provided the diversification and being multidimensional of the foreign policy approached by only security-oriented perspective.

5.2.5.2. Gül’s Leadership Profile

In general, President Gül was able to go to Çankaya through a political atmosphere that was difficult and almost can result in a military coup. During his term of office in Çankaya, Abdullah Gül continued his active political life and, in particular, took initiatives in foreign policy. In this respect, Gül gave an active image in terms of performance according to Barber's typology and showed a negative leadership in the foreign policy making process. In comparison to Özal, who served as the president as an active–positive leader, Gül showed a relatively more active-negative leadership. In contrast to Özal, the fact that Gül did not hold the Council of Ministers under his own presidency give rise to have limited influence on the foreign policy making process. But compared to his successor, Sezer, Gul is a more active-positive leader.

When we come to Gül's leadership profile, table 11 gives us some clues on this issue. Gül's limited maneuver field in foreign policy making are related to his leadership profile as well as the legal situation and the balance of domestic powers and domestic power configuration in Ankara. As seen in table 11 Gül’s scores on belief can control events and need for power are low, when the two norming groups are taken into consideration. The result indicated that Gul is a leader who respects constraints work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important. As mentioned above, Gül's involvement in the foreign policy-making process not notwithstanding the Prime Minister and the government but on a ground that he would not collide with them, can be regarded as a reflection of Gül’s leadership respecting constraints. In the same way, although he was constitutionally competent, the fact that he never presided over the council of ministers is not only a result of the internal power configuration in Ankara, but also a reflection of Gül's leadership style, as the results show.

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Table 11: Gül’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups Personality Trait World leaders Turkish leaders Abdullah Gül (Kesgin B. , 2013, p. average profile (Cuhadar, Kaarbo, 145) (Kesgin, 2011, p. Kesgin, & Ozkececi- 138) Taner, 2017, p. 46)

Belief Can Control Events Mean = .35 Mean = .351 Low < .30 Low < .319 0.268 High > .40 High > .383 Need for Power Mean = .26 Mean = .287 Low < .21 Low < .243 0.211 High > .31 High > .331 Self-Confidence Mean = .36 Mean = .400 Low < .26 Low < .320 0.484 High > .46 High > .480 Conceptual Complexity Mean = .59 Mean = .564 Low < .53 Low < .527 0.580 High > .65 High > .601 Task Focus Mean = .63 Mean = .637 Low < .56 Low < .572 0.660 High > .70 High > .702 Ingroup Bias Mean = .15 Mean = .142 Low < .10 Low < .114 0.129 High > .20 High > .170 Distrust of Others Mean = .13 Mean = .138 Low < .07 Low < .097 0.134 High > .19 High > .179

Gül has so high self-confidence score in relation to the two comparison groups. Furthermore, in conceptual complexity score, Gül is low the world average, while is above the Turkish leaders average. High SC score with low CC score indicate being close to new information, while high SC score with high CC score mean being open to new information as seen table 4. Namely, in case comparing with world leaders Gül is a leader who is a close to new information. However when his scores are regarded with Turkish leaders’ score, it is evaluated that he is open to new information.

Taking into account all of these results on table 6, President Gül can be classified as an incremental leader when his scores are compared with world leaders mean. On the other hand when his scores are regarded with Turkish leaders average, President Gül can be categorized as an opportunistic leader. Taking into consideration the norms and conditions required by the current situation is the common characteristic of both types of leadership, as can be seen in table 6. At this point, Gül's involvement in foreign policy making process in a manner that would not conflict with the government during his presidency shows that

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Gul is acting according to the norms and conditions of the current situation. Gül, particularly contributing to the government's African opening policy through official visits, has focused on gradually improving the state's economy as a means of being an incremental leader. In addition, Gül, who actively supported the steps taken by the government towards EU integration, shows that he did not ignore the expectations of the electorate as the qualification of an oppressive leader in the period when EU accession saw relatively high support by the people (Commission, 2014). In short, Gül showed both leadership qualities from time to time.

5.2.6. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Era

5.2.6.1. Balances of Domestic Powers

In this period, the reverse wave of the Arab Spring caused Turkey to not be able to provide support in the international public opinion for its arguments regarding the region, and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s foreign policy chief, Ibrahim Kalın, expressed this situation as “precious loneliness”. In the period, Ankara has faced with the terrorist threats such as PYD/YPG and DAESH, FETÖ's attempt to capture the state and the terrorist activities of the PKK within the national borders in the wake of the end of the "Solution Process" in 2015. Therefore, Turkey put the rhetoric of historical and geographical depth, the emphasis of civilization and the Ottoman heritage on the back burner. As Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu described the period as "the time of perpetual turmoil" for Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey, which has different arguments with the USA in the YPG/PYD issue and the way of fighting with DAESH, has also had to maintain a highly-charged relationship with Moscow in the wake of crashing of the Russian military plane. These crises deepened the “precious loneliness” of the Turkish foreign policy. The deepening loneliness in question, instead of the emphasis on civilization, the Ottoman legacy, the historical and geographical depth discourse, has dominated the foreign policy of a new political discourse with security-oriented. The transformation did not mean that normative values were isolated from foreign policy or that the understanding of proactive foreign policy was abandoned. Integration into new security-oriented of foreign policy that preserves the dynamism of normative values is described as “proactive moral realism” (Keyman, 2017).

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In addition to the developments in the field of foreign policy, transforming Gülen's organization into a terrorist organization with the intention of capturing the state mechanism through illegal means has made it necessary to reconsider the decision process. Before that, the most recent arrangement that would affect decision-making was made in 2007. Just as in the 2007 presidential election, it was planned to amend the Constitution related with election of the president by the people directly in order to prevent the presidential election from becoming a crisis again in the following years. The amendment was hold a referendum on in October 2007 and adopted by 68.9% vote. The authority provided by the Constitution to the president and the being elected of the president directly by the people have brought Çankaya to a decisive position in Ankara's power configuration. With the constitutional amendment, the president, which is no longer elected by the parliament, has been made accountable to the nation directly, not to the parliament.

In this period, the fact that Erdogan was elected for the first time by the nation form a strong basis for Erdogan to fully exercise his constitutional powers. This change, which was put into practice in the 2014 presidential elections in which Erdoğan was elected as president, brought Erdoğan to the center of the foreign policy-making process (Balcı, 2017, p. 349). In this period, with the leadership Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey has developed new foreign-policy understanding that have contributed the country‘s global and regional influence (Larrabee, 2010, pp. 157-158).

In August 2014, Erdogan give authority to form government to Davutoglu. He established the new government and started to serve as the Prime Minister of 62th government. The AK Party, which did not reach enough seats to establish the government alone in the June 2015 elections, provided the sufficiency with 49.94% of the votes in the November 2015 elections and came to power alone again. However, some disagreements between Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have emerged. These differences have led to a tension between Erdogan and Davutoglu both in domestic politics and in foreign policy understanding. For example, at Davutoğlu's request, the resignation of Hakan Fidan, Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (NIO), to be a parliamentary candidate, was not approved by Erdoğan and Fidan returned to the presidency of NIO (NTV, 2015). Another example is the fact that the negotiations on refugees with the EU have been revealed. The statements of the president of the European Parliament, Schulz, “we have agreed not with Erdoğan but with the Turkish government under the Prime Minister of Davutoğlu” (BBC, 2016) point

120 out the differences between the president of Turkey and Prime Minister Davutoglu who shaped the foreign policy-making process together.

The fact that President Erdogan keep going to take role in politics has led to criticism over the constitutional boundaries. Erdogan said that, by questioning how a president elected by the people would stay out of politics, someone was looking for a president like wall flower, but that he was elected by the people and that he would not be an ordinary president and that he would maintain to exercise his constitutional rights (Hürriyet, 2015).

On 5 May 2016, Prime Minister Davutoglu resigned from both the Prime Ministry and the AK Party's presidency. 24 May 2016 Yıldırım formed the new government, as Prime Minister. Binali Yıldırım has not showed a leadership that deals closely with foreign policy issues (Balcı, 2017, p. 350). According to Balci, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Foreign Minister of the new government, was not an active role in the decision-making process but rather a line minister. The fact that the government works in harmony with Erdoğan has prepared a process of which the initiative on foreign policy issues is belong to the presidency. Erdoğan’s close interest in foreign policy issues has taken Erdogan to the center of the foreign policy making process. In addition, unlike previous periods, the democratization process and non-institutional structures involved in foreign policy making beyond its legal powers were removed from the process and the directly election of Erdoğan by the people in this period has brought the presidency to a privileged position in the foreign policy making process.

In addition that the current constitution provides authority to the president beyond the authority envisaged by the parliamentary system. Directly election of the president by the people has given the president a ground to shape the foreign policy-making process. The legal situation and differences have allowed Erdogan to show more privileged and more active leadership than Özal. In particular, beyond the strong authority granted to the President constitutionally, Erdogan's direct election by the people, his charismatic leadership and his role in the decision-making mechanism have led him to have almost the authority of the presidential system in the parliamentary system. Erdogan explained this situation as follows (NTV, 2015):

“The president is obliged to carry out his duty as a direct accountable to the nation but within the framework of the authority provided in the Constitution. Whoever sits in this office, that's what he's

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gonna do. Whether it is accepted or not, Turkey's government system has changed in this sense. What needs to be done now is to clarify and make certain legal framework of the actual situation with a new constitution.”

As the 2014 elections approached, Erdogan often stated that there would not be a “protocol president” and a “usual President” (Milliyet, 2014), and directly being elected by people give additional responsibilities to the president. Çankaya was now politically independent, competent and responsible only to the public. Gözler (Gözler, 2014, p. 63), stated that from now onward the actions, that could be carried out with a counter-signature by president who is accountable to the assembly, can be carried out by the president accountable to the public on one's own without the need for a counter-signature. In other words, Gözler expressed that in actual state, president would have the authority just as president in the presidential system. To be elected by people directly provided such a authority to president. In short, with the constitutional amendment in 2007, it was necessary to make changes in the government system. (Coşkun, 2017, p. 5).

5.2.6.2 Erdoğan’s Leadership Profile

The fact that How to establish a new model for the making and implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the new period, and which dynamics may embody in foreign policy is discussed. It is envisaged that the foreign policy processes will be shaped with the understanding of “presidential foreign policy” of which president would be decisive in the foreign policy making and implementing. Within this method, Erdogan is legally authorized to carry out foreign policy processes apart from his leadership and internal power configuration. The fact that Erdoğan has such a legal authority has differentiated him from the presidents who shaped foreign policy thanks to their leadership and internal power balance during the foreign policy-making process such as Özal and Evren respectively. Erdogan, who has been revising the traditional definitions by considering the conditions of the period on both institutional and intellectual scale, has had a privileged position during the foreign policy making process. As a matter of necessity with the change of the system, Erdogan has been closely involved in foreign policy issues. In this respect, Erdogan has shown an active-positive leadership according to Barber's typology.

Erdoğan has been one of the leading figures in Turkish politics with his duties for nearly 17 years. Erdoğan has always sustained to be one of the most important actors of the

122 foreign policy making process with his leadership, although his duties and the internal power dynamics of the period changed. Erdoğan’s leadership enable to deduce as to his personal influence on decision making process. So, evaluating and analyzing Erdoğan’s leadership trait make possible to understand how much of foreign policy decision making process has been rooted in his personality. In the section, Erdoğan’s leadership trait is assessed through average scores of observed during the seventeen years.

Table 12: Erdoğan’s Personality Trait Scores Compared to Norming Groups Personality Trait World leaders (Kesgin Turkish leaders Recep Tayyip B. , 2013, p. 145) average profile Erdoğan (Kesgin, 2011, p. (Abdelfattah, 2017, p. 138) 49) Belief Can Control Events Mean = .35 Mean = .351 Low < .30 Low < .319 0.407 High > .40 High > .383 Need for Power Mean = .26 Mean = .287 Low < .21 Low < .243 0.240 High > .31 High > .331 Self-Confidence Mean = .36 Mean = .400 Low < .26 Low < .320 0.398 High > .46 High > .480 Conceptual Complexity Mean = .59 Mean = .564 Low < .53 Low < .527 0.602 High > .65 High > .601 Task Focus Mean = .63 Mean = .637 Low < .56 Low < .572 0.621 High > .70 High > .702 Ingroup Bias Mean = .15 Mean = .142 Low < .10 Low < .114 0.097 High > .20 High > .170 Distrust of Others Mean = .13 Mean = .138 Low < .07 Low < .097 0.162 High > .19 High > .179

For the BACE trait, Erdoğan has a high score in comparison with two norming groups. Namely, Erdoğan highly believes that cases around him are under his control and he can influence and conduct the cases happening in political area. The situation points to that he is likely to cope with restrictions on his position. Preston (Dyson & Preston, 2006, p. 267) claimed that in the sense of the decision making process, leaders ranking high in BACE incline to consider more appropriate proactive policy solutions rather than less deliberative decision process. As concerns his PWR score is lower than mean of the norming groups. In the light of such information, if being investigated table 3, it can be deduced that

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Erdoğan is a leader challenging circumstantial constraints that stand in his power capabilities to control decision making process. In leadership of Erdoğan, several domestic taboos and foreign policy routines have been broken. Especially in field of foreign policy Turkey has diversified her long-standing and status quo-oriented understanding (Görener & Ucal, 2011, p. 369). Turkey’s position in S-400 case and insistence on acquiring S-400 air defense system in spite of pressure of the USA, which are her long-standing and traditional ally, can be evaluated as a example and evidence of Erdoğan’s leadership style challenging the constraints and the situation mentioned above. In addition, Hermann notes that high BACE individuals prefer to meet face-to-face with other leaders in order to better judge their capabilities (Hermann M. G., 2003, pp. 188-189)

Moreover, through analyzing political leaders’ CC and SC scores, it is possible to draw conclusions with regard to their openness to new information. In respect to conceptual complexity, Erdoğan has a score of 0.602. In comparison with two norming groups such a score is regarded as high. With reference to self-confidence, Erdoğan’s score is higher than mean of world leaders norming groups. However, compared with Turkish Leaders norming groups, Erdoğan’s score is considered almost within the mean. In case the scores are evaluated in table 4, it is observed that Erdoğan is a leader who is open to new information.

As an another significant point indicating influence of leadership style on foreign policy decision making process, with examining TASK score of political figures, it is assumed what their motivation for seeking office is. Erdoğan received a TASK score of 0.621. The score is lower than mean score of norming groups. However, in spite of being lower than mean score, Erdoğan’s score is so close moderate. Moderate in TASK score indicates that the leader has context-specific motivation. Namely, the fact that Erdoğan is likely to motivate himself as context specific or situational implies that he would approach to each event on a case by case basis.

To sum up, Erdoğan is a leader who challenges constraints, follow to new information and has relation-focused or problem focused motivation as based on context. In the event of being investigated the results, obtained above, in table 6, it is drawn conclusion that while Erdoğan’s leadership profile is directive occasionally, his leadership profile is actively independent based on context from time to time.

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Main concentration of the directive leader is to lay stress on sustaining of government’s reputation in addition to his own reputation. Such a leader tends to take position in cases concerning global politics in other words world stage politics to gain his/her state’s status (Hermann M. G., 2003, pp. 187-188). Erdoğan’s such a tendency as directive leader is proved by his initiatives as for Al-Quds and Syrian Crisis. As a term president of Organization of Islamic Cooperation, by his initiatives, leaders of its members came together and condemned moving of US embassy to Jerusalem (Hürriyet, 2018). In addition, with the leadership of Turkey at the vote of the United Nations General Assembly, the decision, that Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as 'the capital of Israel' was 'null and void', was overwhelmingly accepted (Sputnik, 2017). Furthermore, taking core position of Turkey in diplomatic process concerning Syrian crisis implies to attempts enhancing Turkey’s status. The cases have proved such a tendency of Erdoğan. Meanwhile, as a remarkable feature of directive leader, Erdoğan have not neglected or ignored significant interest groups and taken care of support of society. Leaders who are open to new information are more pragmatic and sensitive to requirements, opinions and demands of others (Hermann M. G., 2003, p. 18). Therefore, as a directive and open to new information, Erdoğan have taken into consideration pragmatic aspects of the cases.

On the other hand, principle focus of actively independent leader is to provide his own and government’s maneuverability and independence from the contextual conditions trying to limit both. The fact that Erdoğan has attempted to solve Syrian crisis with Russia and Iran, entitled as “Astana Process”, due to the fact that Ankara’s thesis collided with Washington’s thesis (Yılmaz S. , 2018, pp. 79-91) as for solving Syrian crisis is a result of seeking of alternative for providing government’s maneuverability. Erdoğan’s personal initiatives have been leading to sustaining the process (Kirişçi & Toygür, 2019, p. 10).

Moreover, although the USA has tried to make pressure on Turkey not acquiring S-400 air defense system from Russia and threatened Turkey by sanctions (Aljazeera, 2019), Erdoğan rejected the pressure and expressed that S-400s issue is a done deal (Anadolu Agency, 2019). In this point, such initiatives can be regarded as an attempts of providing government’s maneuverability and independence from the contextual conditions trying to limit both. In other words, the initiatives point to Erdoğan’s actively independent leadership style.

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CHAPTER VI

ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

In a political atmosphere in which presidential system discussions kept going in Turkey, members of the FETÖ within the TAF attempted a coup in the evening of July 15, 2016. Just as the FETÖ attempted to take over civilian power with its members in the judiciary, the last initiative of FETÖ brought about reviewing the decision-making mechanism. General President of Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) Devlet Bahçeli stated that the president's attitude forms a de facto situation, and emerge contradiction between the actual situation and the legal framework, and this contradiction should be resolved by applying to the public arbitration (Anadolu Agency, 2016). In addition he made call to bring its proposal, if the Justice and Development Party (JDP) insists on the presidency. In the first case, the proposal, which was 21 articles, went down to 18 articles during the negotiations in the commission and parliament. Negotiations on the entire proposal were concluded on 21 January 2017 and the proposal was accepted by 339 votes. President Erdogan approved the Law No. 6771 amending the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey on 10 February 2017. Thus, the law was hold referendum in accordance with Article 175 of the constitution (Cumhuriyet, 2017). The constitutional amendment hold to the referendum on 16 April 2017 was adopted with 51.41% of the vote (NTV). The amendment envisages a new government system, unlike previous references. The political environment after the constitutional amendment will be examined under a new headings.

Article 77 of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, states that within every five years and on the same day elections as for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Presidency would be held. If a candidate cannot obtain required majority in the first ballot of a presidential election, a second ballot shall be held among two candidates who take most votes (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 2017, p. 34).

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Article 89 expressed that in case of adopting veto power of President, if TGNA adopts the law sent back for reconsideration without any amendment, the law shall be promulgated by the President of the Republic. Nonetheless in the new constitution, the article is changed by supplementing such a paragraph (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 2017, p. 38): “If the Grand National Assembly of Turkey adopts the law sent back for reconsideration without any amendment with absolute majority.”

In Turkey, the powers of the executive body were met in the president by the constitutional amendment in which the transition from the parliamentary system to the presidential system was provided. Thus, dual executive stemmed from parliamentarian system was abolished. Article 104 regulating the duties and powers of the president has been rearranged in accordance with the system change. Accordingly, the limits of the duties and powers of the president in particular regarding the legislative and executive affairs have been clearly drawn. The president was held responsible for the implementation of the Constitution as the head of the state and for the harmonious functioning of the state organs.

The article 104 give President authorization in respect of issuing presidential decrees on the matters regarding executive power. However the authority can be carried into effect provided that not containing fundamental rights, individual and political rights and duties, not involving regulated matters by law and not contradicting with laws. It is stated that the presidential decree can not be issued on issues that are foreseen to be exclusively regulated by the Constitution and issues which are clearly stated in the law, and that if there are different provisions in the law with the presidential decree, the provisions of the law will be applied. In the case of the Turkish Grand National Assembly enacting the law on the same issue with presidential decree, the constitution guarantee that the presidential decree will become null and void. It has been decreed that the president may issue regulations in order to ensure the implementation of the laws, provided that they are not contrary to the laws (Turan, 2018, p. 59). On the other hand, in state of emergency cases, the president is empowered to issue a presidential decree.

As well as legislative authorities of President, the article arranges President’s significant duties and authorities related with executive as fallows (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 2017, pp. 43-44):

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“He/she shall appoint and dismiss the deputies of the President of the Republic and the ministers. He/she shall appoint and dismiss the high ranking executives, and shall regulate the procedure and principles governing the appointment thereof by presidential decree. He/she shall accredit representatives of the Republic of Turkey to foreign states and shall receive the representatives of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey. He/she shall ratify and promulgate international treaties. He/she shall submit laws regarding amendment to the Constitution to referendum, if he/she deems it necessary. He/she shall determine national security policies and take necessary measures. He/she shall represent the Office of Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He/she shall decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces.”

In the new constitution, article 106 regulates that high bureaucrats and the ministers are responsible to the President of the Republic. Moreover according to the article President may shape the accuracy removal, the authorities, and the organizational structure of the ministries by the presidential decree.

Given the powers provided to the president in Article 104 and 106, the president is fully authorized to form and shape the cabinet. The authority can be implemented by the presidential decree. Thus, the president has the authority to organize the establishment, abolition, duties and powers of the Ministries, and their organizational structure and Central and provincial organizations. The fact that the members of the cabinet are solely accountable to the president indicates that the new constitution foresees the coming together of executive power in the president. In this system, the executive power and responsibility are entirely belong to the President.

In addition to Article 104, which establishes the relations between the legislative and executive bodies on the issue of legislation, the relations between the legislative and executive powers are regulated in Articles 105 and 116th. According to this “Absolute majority of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey may table a motion requesting that the President of the Republic be investigated on allegations of a crime. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall debate the motion in one month at the latest and may decide to launch an investigation with three-fifths of the total number of its members by secret ballot. If an investigation is decided to be launched, The committee shall submit its report to the Office of the Speaker within two months. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey may decide to refer the report to the Supreme Criminal Tribunal with two-thirds of the total number of its members by secret ballot.”

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In addition to this, as regulated in the article 116 of the new constitution TGNA is likely to renew the elections by three fifth majority of the total number of its members. In this case, article 77, that envisage holding together of the general election of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the presidential election, would be implemented (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 2017, p. 48).

In the new constitution, the parliament continues to have the authority to supervise the executive organ. As expressed in article 98 (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 2017, p. 42) The Grand National Assembly of Turkey have authority to obtain information and supervision through parliamentary inquiry, general debate, parliamentary investigation and written question. But as distinct from previous constitutions, from now on the Assembly have no authority to overthrow the government by the ways of obtaining information and supervision.

As seen, Turkey has proceeded to a new government system with the new constitution. One of the most important issues in the new constitution is the changes in the legal regulations that obstruct the political system and cause the political system to be deadlocked. As experienced many times in Turkey's political life, the deadlock of the political system has paved the way for military coups. But the existence of a functioning political system prevented military coup attempts just as in 15 July. Therefore, the continuation of the functioning of the system with the new constitution has been legally guaranteed. At this point, the concept of the coalition government, which the parties tend to as a solution if they could not reach the majority, has been eliminated. In the past, many examples have been found that coalition governments have paved the way for crises, short- lived governments and political uncertainties, making it difficult for the state to develop and implement a coherent and holistic policy. The system aims to create political stability, a holistic decision-making mechanism and to eliminate the dynamics that will disrupt the functioning of the state mechanism. The president, who will be elected by the people as the head of the executive, will be able to exercise his authority to form his cabinet on his own. The fact that the parliamentary and presidential elections would be held simultaneously, the elections may be mutually renewable, and in case of failure of the parliament to approve the government's budget, the ability of the executive to revise the budget of the previous year and put into effect was planned as mechanisms to prevent the system from deadlock (Alkan, 2018, pp. 146-149). In other words, the presidential government system

129 aims to harmonize the dynamics within the powers of which the system has adopted their separation in a holistic manner. Namely, the system endeavors prevention double-headed construction of the powers just as in executive organ foreseen by 1982 Constitution. In this system, the rigid separation of the powers was adopted and the possibility of preventing the political stability of the conflict between the organs was also tried to be prevented. As the most important indicator of this, with the amendment made in Article 82, it was averted assigning deputies temporarily by Council of Ministers (Akçakaya & Özdemir, 2018, p. 927). In addition, in the new constitution, it was aimed to make the elections of the parliament and the presidency together so that these two bodies can reflect similar political views, and the organs can work in harmony with each other.

Finally, with the new constitutional amendment, in Article 106, it was decided that the president shall form Cabinet and organizational structure of the presidency with the presidential decree. In consequence of published Presidential decrees Turkish Presidential organizational structure was formed as indicated in table 12.

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Table 13: Organizational Structure of Turkish Presidency Office Following 2017 Constitution Amendment

In the elections held for the carrying into practice of the new system, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the common candidate of the People's Alliance, was elected as the president with a 52.6% vote in the first round.

Unlike presidential system applications in the world, the presidential system in Turkey authorized executive organ in matter of appointment of senior bureaucrats without without the need to approval of legislative organ. Thus, the president, the head of the executive,

131 was authorized to make the necessary appointments by taking into account the effectiveness of the state mechanism in strategic positions. With this authority, the president had the opportunity to shape the state's top bureaucracy according to the requirements of changing national and international conditions (Alkan, 2018, p. 146).

The fact that the president is elected with the choice of 50+1% of the population gives him a wide area of legitimacy. The obligation of the elected president to receive at least 50%+1 vote enables a leader to be president, on condition that a significant part of society is agreed upon solely. Therefore, the president is also fully authorized to manage the process of making and implementing these policies and to determine the positions of actors who will take part in the process. At this point, the president can take the initiative of working with his own staff in the process.

The presidential government system in Turkey differs from the current presidential system practices by giving the president the authority to maintain its relationship with the party. Influence and maneuverability in the decision-making process of the president, who lost his parliamentary support, may be restricted as seen during the investigating of Özal's period. Concerning this issue, President Erdogan stated that the interruption of the president's relations with his party would bring vulnerability to his political activity and that the president's acting in a manner associated with his party would make both the party and the President stronger (Anadolu Ajansı, 2016).

In the pursuit of the change of the system, the necessity of the election that will carry the new system into effect emerged. In the sequel of July 15, JDP and NMP, which made an alliance for the amendment of the Constitution, supported Erdoğan's candidacy as the first president of the new system. In the election held on June 24, 2018, Erdogan was elected the first president of the new system with 52.59% of the votes in the first round. In the parliamentary elections held with the president's elections in accordance with the Constitution, the People's Alliance formed by the JDP and NMP obtained 53.66% of votes and 344 seats, while the Nation Alliance formed by RPP, IYI Party and Felicity Party (FP) gained 33.94% of votes and 189 seats in the assembly (Anadolu Ajansı, 2018). The People's Democratic Party (PDP) had 67 seats in parliament with an 11.7% vote (Anadolu Ajansı, 2018). Within the People's Alliance, the AK Party has 295 seats in parliament, while the NMP has 49 seats. According to the current election results, any party cannot

132 provide a majority in parliamentary arithmetic. This requires the continuity of alliance politics. Erdogan, re-elected president, formed his cabinet with the authority granted by the Constitution. With the realization of the transition to the new system with the elections, the presidency's complex had a privileged role in the foreign policy making process. President Erdogan, as a shaping leader in the process, has determined the direction of foreign policy.

In this period, when Turkish foreign policy had passed through the “perpetual turmoil”, serious deficiencies faced in institutionalization and producing foreign policy instruments brought difficulties in making and implementing foreign policy, and also caused Turkey not to fully utilize its current potential in foreign policy. In order to respond to changing regional and global dynamics, Turkey needs to prepare the foreign policy understanding and tools and the decision-making mechanism according to the conditions required by these dynamics. In other words, it is essential for the performance of foreign policy to integrate and support Turkey's soft power elements, especially with hard power elements in crisis environments. (Ulutaş, İnat, & Kanat, 2017). According to Ulutaş and other, in this regard with determining the president by the presidential government system as both the commander-in-chief and the top of foreign policy making authority, it is aimed to reflect the current potential in the performance of the foreign policy.

Turkish foreign policy has undergone radical changes in terms of both institutional and understanding and approach during of AK Party period. First of all institutionally the role of traditional actors such as the army, the NSC and the ministry bureaucrats, who resist against the post-Cold War global transformation and regard foreign policy as a “high politics” area, have been limited in the foreign policy-making process (Akgün, 2011, p. 54). Thus, the participation to decision mechanism within the constitutional boundaries of the traditional structures, that find an opportunity to shape politics beyond constitutional order with the deadlock of civil politics and consider themselves as the ultimate guardian of the regime, has been ensured.

In order to understand the foreign policy of a country, as Akgün (Akgün, 2011, p. 54) pointed out, it is necessary to analyze firstly institutional framework and then the political will that directs the institutions. In Turkey, the de facto institutional system that exceeds the legal status between 2002 and 2007 has been re-adapted to the constitutional requirements and a new institutional system has been adopted with the Constitutional

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Amendments of 2007 and 2017. The constitutional revision of the institutions directing foreign policy has brought about a new understanding of foreign policy. According to the new foreign policy approach which shaped with Erdoğan's charismatic leadership, Turkey has given priority to adopt a proactive and multi-directional foreign policy (Oğuzlu, 2014, pp. 354-357).

In accordance with the changes required by the international system and regional developments, Turkish foreign policy, that is more sensitive to regional and global developments, has been evolving from the one-direction based on Western line to an active and multi-directional line. During this period, Turkish foreign policy was liberated from the domination of Western-oriented foreign policy instruments and put into practice her own foreign policy instruments. Such a own foreign policy instruments have been achieved with the reflection of Turkey's own identity, cultural and historical depth as a unifying element in foreign policy (Ekşi, 2014, pp. 140-143).

In summary, the institutional transformation of the foreign policy making process in Turkey has laid the foundation for the transformation of the foreign policy understanding. The institutional transformation meant that not only strengthening the control of civilian power over the military but also liquidating completely Kemalist elite, which dominates the decision-making process (Larrabee, 2010, p. 160). The new understanding of foreign policy has transformed the perception of foreign policy based on security and geopolitics, as envisaged by the Kemalist elite, as well as making use of Turkey's own identity, cultural and historical heritage while making foreign policy. Ankara, which made its regional and global policies with a one-dimensional and passive understanding, now has a wide range of tools. The transformation and understanding, that Erdogan has guided, is being tested from time to time by changing regional and global dynamics.

In this study, the legal-formal status, that frames decision-making process, domestic powers balance, that shapes foreign policy making process and leadership profiles of the presidents of Turkish foreign policy are discussed in line with the foreign policy analysis approach. Based on the assumptions of the DPA, which focused on its inputs rather than on the evaluation of foreign policy as an output, these three variables were analyzed in depth in how the Presidents shaped the role of the Turkish foreign policy making process.

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One of the most important results of the study was that in 2019, the presidency became the key actor of the foreign policy making process, just like in the first years of the Republic. Therefore, the presidency has a role in determining foreign policy as in the first years of the Republic. While in the early years of the Republic, the position and role was associated with Atatürk's leadership, unlike the past, today has a legal-formal infrastructure. In addition, the transformations in the balance of internal forces and Erdoğan’s leadership have been effective in achieving this role. In other words, it is seen that the presidency, which dominates the foreign policy making process in 1923, has a similar role in todays' foreign policy making process.

About this, Roskin (Roskin, 2016, p. 41) states that countries with different systems, such as England, France, Germany and Japan, tend to “make themselves a presidential system.” Stating that no state in the global system is inclined to return to pure parliamentarians, Roskin claims that in parliamentary systems power is shifted to prime ministers and that the powerful prime ministers resemble the presidents in the United States. According to Roskin, this is due to the diversification of communication resources, the diversification of interest groups, and the tendency of voters to be at the center of the political spectrum.

As can be understood from Roskin's statements, government systems on a global scale, particularly exemplary parliamentary systems, tend to become increasingly centralized. This tendency, which started in Turkey after the 1980 military coup, gained legal personality as a result of the referendum to amend the Constitution in 2017. As a matter of fact, it is observed that the tendency has come into prominence during Özal and Erdoğan's presidential period, especially active-independent leadership style.

It is seen that the change of the government system in Turkey is a change that took place in time as a result of the political experience experienced by Turkey rather than a process that took place suddenly. Coup d'état, political crises, political dilemmas and coup attempt ensured reviewing of decision-making processes formally in Turkey and prepared the process.

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Table 14: President’s Leadership Traits The President Leadership Trait Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Actively-independent İsmet İnönü Evangelistic/Influential Celal Bayar Influential/Incremental Cemal Gürsel Collegial Cevdet Sunay Collegial Fahri Korutürk Collegial Kenan Evren Expansionist Turgut Özal Actively-independent Süleyman Demirel Evangelistic/Directive Ahmet Necdet Sezer Incremental/Collegial Abdullah Gül Incremental/ Opportunistic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Directive/ Actively-independent

The leadership of the presidents has also determined their positions in foreign policy making processes. For example, leaders with active-independent leadership have centralized the process of foreign policy making. From time to time, the leaders who dominate the process have been involved in the process as challenging constraints and customary practices. In addition, the presidents of the collegial leadership did not take on critical roles in the process, and they were more passive. The leaders who didn’t come from politics inclined to be more passive in decision making mechanism. This paved the way for sub-state institutions to be involved in the process, even beyond their constitutional powers.

As a result, following the 2017 constitutional amendment, the presidency has a privileged position in the center of the foreign policy process. In addition to being responsible of the Cabinet to the President, the presence of directorates and departments affiliated to the presidency ensures that the president is involved in the process more effectively. The tendency to centralize in decision-making mechanisms, which can see similar examples on a global scale, has emerged as a result of a process prepared by political developments in Turkey.

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