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Copyright © 2006, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland (410) 268-6110 www.usni.org /) S r E w to m/ co . es y E r fou (www. ittek w ch K. S A r A 2001 S © E v chi r A photo John Lehman institute l A v na Major Islamic Extremist Attacks U.S. 1972 1979 1983 1984 5 September 4 November 18 April killed) and the French mili- 12 April Palestinian Black Septem- 66 Americans taken An Islamic Jihad car tary barracks (50 killed) Hezbollah attacks restau- ber terrorists seize Israeli hostage from the U.S. bomb at U.S. embassy in Beirut. rant near a U.S. Air Force athletes at the Olympics Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, kills base in Torrejon, Spain, in Munich, Germany. In a by radical Iranian stu- 63—including 17 Ameri- 12 December killing 18 U.S. servicemen botched rescue attempt, dents. cans—and injures 120. Iranian Shiite suicide and injuring 83. nine hostages and five bombers attack U.S. and terrorists are killed. 23 October French embassies in Islamic Jihad suicide Kuwait City, killing 5 and bombers attack the U.S. injuring 86. Marine barracks (241 18 PROCEEDINGS • September 2006 www.usni.org A former secretary of the Navy and member of the 9/11 Commission identifies the real enemy in the current war and assesses progress. re we winning the war? The first question to what happened in the attacks on 11 September 2001, ask is what war? The administration of Presi- how they were organized and executed, and who was dent George W. Bush continues to befuddle a responsible. The answer established by the commission national understanding of the war we are in by was that Islamic jihadists were responsible, as they had continuing to call it “the war on terror.” This been for an increasing number of violent attacks against Apolitical correctness presumably seeks to avoid hurting the Americans and many other non-Islamists over the previ- feelings of the Saudis and other Muslims, but it comes at a ous 30 years. high cost. One reason the 9/11 Commission has had such The commission report contained a concise histori- an impact is that its language and logic are simple, clear cal tracing of the roots and rise of Islamic jihadism and and free of cant. The investigation established that we are identified this worldwide militant religious ideology as at war with an ideologically extreme Islamist worldwide the core enemy the United States must defeat. With no movement. Some have even called it World War III. The enemy has adopted terrorism as one of a number of weapons that have proved very effective against the United States. We are not at war against terror any more than World War II was a war against kamikazes. We are at war with Islamic jihadists motivated by a violent ideology based on an extrem- ist interpretation of the Muslim religion. This enemy is decen- tralized and geographically dispersed around the world. Its organizations range from a fully functioning state—Iran, for example—to small groups of individuals in U.S. cities. By speaking in riddles, the athieson . m E administration has confused eg r the American people, Con- G According to the author (left)—here, with fellow 9/11 commissioner, Washington attorney Rich- gress, and apparently itself. ard Ben-Veniste (right)—the commission’s report on the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks The 9/11 Commission laid out and its recommendations for what the United States should do to prevent such attacks from thoroughly and indisputably happening again have been largely ignored. 1985 1988 1993 20 September 12 April Navy Petty Officer robert 17 February 26 February Islamic Jihad detonates Bomb claimed by various Stetham is killed, and his Marine Lieutenant Followers of Egyptian van full of explosives at Islamic groups kills 18 and body is thrown onto the Colonel William Higgins cleric Umar Abd al-rah- a U.S. embassy annex injures 82, including 15 tarmac. Hostages are kidnapped and murdered man detonate a bomb in Aukar, lebanon, killing Americans, at a Madrid, released in Damascus, by Hezbollah in Southern under the World Trade two U.S. servicemen and Spain, restaurant. Syria, after 17 days. lebanon. Center in New york City, injuring 20 Americans, killing 6 and injuring more 21 December including U.S. ambas- 14 June 7 October than 1,000. Bomb planted by libyans sador reginald Bar- lebanese Hezbollah gun- Palestinian liberation on PanAm Flight 103 tholomew. visiting British men seize TWA Flight Front terrorists take more explodes over lockerbie, Ambassador David miers 847 and force it to land in than 700 hostages on Scotland, killing 259, also sustains injuries. Beirut and later Algiers. board the Italian cruise including 189 Americans. liner Achille Lauro. www.usni.org September 2006 • PROCEEDINGS 19 interference from the United States over three decades, ment and how that mentality led to failure after failure this violent movement has become global, well-funded, in connecting the dots prior to 9/11. If evidence—Arab and technologically advanced. The investigation identi- males taking flight lessons in suspicious circumstances fied Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran as for one—was insufficient to take to a grand jury, then it the principal sources of funding not only for the jihadists was ignored. themselves, but for the schools, mosques, and madrassas Following a commission recommendation, Congress throughout the Muslim world that are the proselytizers and sought to remedy this by creating a national security ser- recruiters of Islamic jihadists. To confront these realities, vice within the FBI to focus on preventive intelligence we must fight the war on three fronts. rather than forensic evidence. This has proved to be a complete failure. As late as June 2006, Mark Mershon, The Home Front an assistant director of the FBI, testified that the bureau The Bush administration deserves much credit for the will not monitor or surveille any Islamist unless there is fact that despite determined efforts to carry them out, no a “criminal predicate.” Thus, the large Islamist support Islamist attacks have been successful within the United infrastructure the commission identified here in the United States since 9/11. This is a significant achievement, but States is free to operate until it actually commits a crime. there are growing dangers and continuing vulnerabilities. Our attempt to reform the FBI has failed. What is needed The 9/11 Commission report described a government now is a separate domestic intelligence service without woefully unprepared to deal with Islamist attacks. One police powers such as the British MI-5. of the most deep-seated of these problems is the U.S. The 9/11 Commission catalogued in detail how our government’s tendency to treat this war as a law enforce- intelligence establishment simply does not function. We ment issue. Each of the last four presidents has publicly made priority recommendations to rebuild the 15 bloated reacted to Islamist attacks by saying “we will bring these and failed intelligence bureaucracies by creating a strong criminals to justice.” national intelligence director to smash bureaucratic layers, Thus, after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Cen- tear down the walls preventing intelligence-sharing among ter, $80 million and five years went into prosecuting the the agencies, and rewrite personnel policy to bring in new “Blind Sheik” and his accomplices, a group we now know blood, not only from the career bureaucracy, but also from was the core of al Qaeda. All the valuable intelligence the private sector. The Bush administration completely re- gathered in that investigation was put under seal and with- jected this approach, deciding instead to leave this sprawl- held from everyone outside the judicial process, includ- ing mess untouched and to create yet another bureaucracy ing the President and the CIA director, in order not to of more than 1,000 people in the office of the Director jeopardize the legal case. It was, however, provided to the of National Intelligence and to recruit only career people Blind Sheik’s attorneys and was promptly transmitted to from the failed intelligence agencies—the exact opposite al Qaeda in Sudan. Osama bin Laden thus had the FBI’s of what we had recommended. intelligence three years be- The greatest terrorist fore CIA Director George threat to the home front Tenet was allowed to see is, of course, the use of it. This is the process the weapons of mass destruc- American Civil Liberties tion by Islamists. Here the Union and many in Con- President has moved to gress wish to apply to establish a national coun- captured terrorists in the ter-proliferation center to future. share and act on intelli- Our report catalogued in gence, and he has recently depressing detail the FBI’s initiated an agreement total focus on law enforce- ce with Russia and our allies r fo r ai . S . U 1995 1996 1998 2000 8 march 13 November 25 June 7 August 12 October Unidentified gunmen fire An Islamic movement of A fuel truck bomb kills 19 A car bomb kills 247, Suicide bombers attack on a U.S. consulate van Change car bomb at the U.S. Air Force person- including 12 Americans, the USS Cole (DDG- in Karachi, Pakistan, U.S. military headquar- nel and injures more at the U.S. embassy 67) in the port of Aden, killing two U.S. diplomats, ters in Riyadh, Saudi than 500 Americans and in Nairobi, Kenya, and yemen, killing 17 Sailors Jacqueline Keys van Arabia, kills seven peo- Saudis at the Khobar another 10 are killed at and injuring more than landingham and Gary C.