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Politcal Science

Do Terrorist Beheadings Infuence American Public Opinion?

Sponsoring Faculty Member: Dr. John Tures Researchers and Presenters: Lindsey Weathers, Erin Missroon, Sean Greer, Bre’Lan Simpson Addition Researchers: Jarred Adams, Montrell Brown, Braxton Ford, Jefrey Garner, Jamarkis Holmes, Duncan Parker, Mark Wagner

Introduction At the end of Summer 2014, Americans were shocked to see the tele- vised execution of a pair of American journalists in Syria by a group known as ISIS. Both were killed in gruesome beheadings. The images seen on main- stream media sites, and on websites, bore an eerie resemblance to beheadings ten years earlier in Iraq. During the U.S. occupation, nearly a dozen Americans were beheaded, while Iraqis and people from a variety of countries were dis- patched in a similar manner. Analysts still question the purpose of the videos of 2004 and 2014. Were they designed to inspire locals to join the cause of those responsible for the killings? Were they designed to intimidate the Americans and coalition members, getting the public demand their leaders withdraw from the region? Or was it some combination of the two ideas? It is difcult to assess the former. But we can see whether the beheadings had any infuence upon American public opinion. Did they make Ameri- cans want to withdraw from the Middle East? And did the beheadings afect the way Americans view Islam? To determine answers to these questions, we look to the literature for theories about U.S. public opinion, as well as infuences upon it. We look at whether these beheadings have had an infuence on survey data of Americans across the last dozen years.

Beheading Cases Daniel Pearl Due to the recent beheadings done by the ISIS group, the memory of the 2002 horror of American Journalist Daniel Pearl’s decapitation resurfaced. ISIS, which is the newly formed terrorist group based in Syria, very closely emu- lates the early 2000s practices of the al-Qaeda group. Although ISIS is recreat-

168 Political Science ing the act of beheading and despite popular opinion, “A statement posted on jihadist forums Sunday…and purportedly issued by al-Qaeda’s General Com- mand said ‘It has no connection with the group’ and blamed it for ‘the enormity of the disaster that aficted the Jihad in Syria (CNN 2014).’” Al-Qaeda released gruesome viral videos starting with the beheading of Daniel Pearl. Qari Hashim was accused of Daniel Pearl’s murder but was ac- quitted by the court on Friday, October 24, 2014. He was detained again under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) rules one day after being acquit- ted. Three other men were sentenced to life terms. In addition to these men, Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was said to be the “mastermind” behind Pearl’s beheading (BBC News 2014), was sentenced to death.

Nick Berg Nick Berg, a 26-year-old young man that from Pennsylvania, was kidnapped by a group of al-Qaeda terrorists. It is believed he was executed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was behind several bombings in Iraq. The execution was recorded and posted on an Islamic website and it immediately went viral and people all over the United States watched it. According to Fox News, in the video that was recorded of Nick Berg being beheaded, there were fve men wearing scarves around their heads with black ski masks standing behind a man that was on the foor in an all-orange jumpsuit that looked just like a prisoners uniform. The video shows the prisoner saying “My name is Nick Berg, my father’s name is Michael, my mother’s name is Susan. I have a brother and a sister, David and Sarah. I live in Philadelphia.” The video shows him on the foor with his hands behind his back, and then there was a statement that was made that was read in Arabic. Then, one of the men behind him takes a large knife from under his clothes, while one of the other men takes Berg on his side. After that, the men take the knife to Berg’s neck and thrust right through it. After they cut his head of, they hold Berg’s head before the camera. Right before they thrust the knife through him, there was a phrase that was repeatedly shouted. This statement that they were screaming was,” Al- lahu Akbar!” This is translated from Islamic meaning, ”God is great.” Berg’s body was found on a Baghdad highway on the same day that he was beheaded, U.S. ofcials say. (Fox News 2004a) A former United States Navy Judge Advocate General, Tim Susanin, told Fox News, ”To see this poor soul beheaded is gruesome and barbaric. We are really seeing the difculty that our troops are dealing with. They have now been infltrated by members of Al-Qaeda (Fox News, 2004a).” Michael Berg, Nick’s father, said, “I knew he was decapitated. That manner is preferable to a long and torturous death. But I didn’t want it to become public.” The Bush Administration said those who beheaded Berg would be hunted down and brought to justice.

169 Owen Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley In addition to kidnappings, murders, suicide bombing attacks, and other acts of terrorism in Iraq, Al-Zarqawi was also accused of beheading two Americans: Owen Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley. Al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, released an audiotape demanding his Mujuhadeen fghters in Iraq to battle in a holy war. Soon after- wards, he was linked to a car bombing attack on the Jordanian embassy. Two weeks later he bombed the United Nations ofce in Baghdad (Faraj et.al. 2004). Jack Hensley was beheaded on September 21, 2004. On that day, a video showed the kidnappers beheading Hensley, an American worker from Marietta, Georgia. The 49-year-old was a contractor in Iraq (Fox News 2004b). The following day, Owen Eugene “Jack” Armstrong, the second of three men kidnapped, was beheaded and videotaped after a trade for Iraqi female prisoners broke down (Fox News 2004c). The third man, a Briton, was also killed.

James Foley James Foley was a writer for GlobalPost; he also made videos for other shows, including the PBS show NewsHour. He truly believed that war was hor- rible and he stood by that. He tried to show the world this with his report “hu- manity amid the horror of war (Stelter 2014a).” Foley was abducted while on a reporting trip to Northern Syria in 2012. Later there was a video posted on August 19, 2014 that showed his loved ones and the rest of this country what happened to him (Carter, 2014). “We have seen a video that purports to be the murder of U.S. citizen James Foley by (ISIS),” National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said. “The intelligence community is working as quickly as possible to determine its authenticity. If genuine, we are appalled by the brutal murder of an innocent American journalist and we express our deepest condolences to his family and friends (Carter 2014).”

Steven Sotlof Steven Sotlof was a 31-year old freelance journalist who wrote for multiple publications and reported for many Middle Eastern countries. Sotlof was abducted in 2013 in Northern Syria. It is believed the abduction happened near the city of Aleppo; he was then imprisoned by the “Islamic State” (ISIS) at the location of Raqqa. About a year later on September 2, Sotlof was beheaded by the jihadist group ISIS, this made Sotlof the second American journalist to be killed by ISIS. Sotlof, who was Jewish, was a dual citizen of the United States and Is- rael. He studied journalism at the University of Central Florida. An article by BBC said “Steven Sotlof… was described as an honest and courageous journalist… He often focused on the human side of the confict, writing about the plight of

170 Political Science displaced civilians in Syria struggling without adequate food or shelter in early 2013 (BBC 2014).” Now we know something about the cases of beheadings, designed to rally supporters and intimidate opponents. But what we need to understand is how these killings ft within the academic literature. What do we know about American public opinion, and the role of international events for infuencing it? And how have beheadings played a role in this crisis, or any crisis?

Literature Review Foreign Policy & Public Opinion Many questions around the world surround what is the primary role of public opinion when talking about foreign policy. Holsti stated that “the center of persisting debates [is] between the liberal-democratic and realist approaches to foreign afairs (Holsti 1992, 440).” Holsti also stated that there is a long liberal-democratic tradition, dating back at least to Kant and Bentham; the foreign policies of democratic countries are more peaceful, in part because the public can play a constructive role in constraining policy makers. The question that everyone really wants to know is do people of the world really have a clear idea of foreign policy, for them to be able to listen to someone talk about it, and maybe even hold a conversation about it? Some people don’t always think that public opinion is important; they would rather hear about who was stuck on the side of the road than hear about something that could potentially afect their lives. According to Hans Morgenthau (1978) “public opinion is a barrier, to thoughtful and coherent diplomacy, hindering eforts to promote national interest that transcend the moods and passions of moment.” Holsti (1992 440) stated that most realists would distinguish between foreign policy and other public policy issues. He means that the public opinion is volatile meaning the people opinion on foreign policy can change whenever they want it to change. Holsti also talked about how the diplomacy could be efective where he stated it that it lacked certain points, which were, “secrecy, fexibility and other qualities that would be seriously jeopardized were the public to have a signifcant impact on foreign policy” (Holsti 1992 440). He also stated that people could be stubborn and wouldn’t change their opinion, but was he con- tradicting himself when it came to what he really thought about people and their opinions when it comes to foreign policy? The average stereotype for a citizen when it comes to foreign policy is that they have no idea about what is really going on. Do we think that they will change their opinion for a point that they may really not care about to hear? This brings us back to the question of this: Is foreign policy public opinion volatile? In Holsti’s (1992 442) article, noted political scientist Gabriel Almond said “Depicted that public opinion is volatile and [a] mood-driven constraint

171 upon foreign policy.” This is an understandable quote, because honestly, we as Americans react to things based on how we feel. If someone were to ask you two questions but rephrase those using diferent words you would probably give me two diferent answers, while still talking about the same question. “The undertow of withdrawal is still very powerful. Deeply ingrained habits do not die easy deaths. The world outside is still very remote for most Americans and the tragic lessons of the last decades have not been fully digested (Almond, as quoted in Holsti; 1992 442)”. Almond stated that Americans react of of how they feel and not so much due to the knowledge they have about something. They take their reactions overboard before sitting down and actually listening to key points throughout the subject matter. They also make their opinions volatile, by changing their opinion when hearing something that they agree with. Hans Morgenthau summarized the case against the active role for the public that would get the attention of the some realists. “The rational require- ments of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational (Mor- genthau, 1978: 558).” The debate between liberals and realists has been a long one; it was really intensifed by World War I which might be best described as the frst public relations war. The Allied and Central Powers both tried to win over the world opinion in many ways including publication by many governments of highly se- lective document (Holsti; 1992 440). The propaganda war during the confict was almost as intense as the one on the battlefeld. President Wilson wanted a postwar world order which he would have solely depended on democratizing foreign afairs and diplomacy. Elihu Root, once a Secretary of State summarized the position of those who agreed and wanted a role with the public in the conduct of foreign afairs “when the foreign ofcers were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war in sinister purpose. When foreign afairs are ruled by democracies, the danger of war will be mistaken beliefs…while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent people from having an erroneous opinion (Root, 1922:5).” This Basically states that people opinions are easily infuenced just as they are not easily infuenced. They will agree with you on certain things, while others will continue to be stuck in their own ways and continue to believe what they think is right.

A Smart U.S. Public Opinion John R. Oneal, Brad Lian, and James H. Joyner, Jr., believe that the public opinion on issues can be used to make smart decisions for our country. On the contrary, Walter Lippmann wrote a book on public opinion in 1922 and truly believed “most citizens are too ill-informed and too fckle to make reasonable judgments (261).” He felt that the American people do not know enough to

172 Political Science infuence decisions that the leaders of this country make about our army. Ga- briel Almond was an author of the Almond-Lippmann consensus and he states “the public’s view can be fuctuated dramatically, because they lack structure and coherence and are driven as much by mood as by reason (262).” In his eyes, the people think too much of of their emotions and do not fully understand the situation that may be at hand and the outcome would be too inconsistent and unstable. When we deal with problems in our country the public has to be considered and how they will react. Of course they would rather the public to agree on all decisions made but that is not how it goes. Bruce Jentleson, a professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, agrees with the authors saying, “The public has become ‘pretty prudent’ (262).” The use of military force was supported more when it was used to “force foreign policy restraint on an aggressive adversary (265).” The use of military force in order to take over another country is not as much supported by the public. He admits that the citizens of America should not have such an infuence on military action to force internal political change because “it goes against the principles of sovereignty and self-determination and re- quires intimate knowledge of others’ history, culture, and society (263).” Lian and Oneal (1993) point out that Jentleson’s conclusions on his data have to be “accepted cautiously” because they were all formed from information solely from the post-Vietnam period. The revisionist view gives us a diferent way at interpreting public opinion. It states that “the instability of public opinion has been exaggerated (263).” Shapiro and Page believe that the public is stable and informed enough to have a big infuence on foreign policy. The authors reviewed around 1,000 questions about foreign afairs that were asked several times in surveys from 1935 to 1990. The results showed that the public was pretty steady with their answers. When they did fuctuate, it was because of major events such as World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. They came to the conclusion that “the public has stable beliefs and responds appropriately to international events (263).” This research shows that the public is actually capable of having an infuence on foreign policy with consistent success.

Changes in U.S. Public Opinion What exactly moves public opinion? This is the question posed and answered by Page, Shapiro and Dempsey in their article, “What Moves Public Opinion?” They approach the question by asking more: Does the public react directly to objective events? Do experts or enlightened political leaders edu- cate the public with helpful new information, or do they manipulate opinion with false or misleading propaganda? Which infuences are most important: events, experts, politicians or interest groups? Do the mass media report relevant information accurately or inaccurately? The authors go on to examine

173 the level of infuence the media, events and politicians actually have on public opinion, and also discuss their own research into the matter. “Citizens’ preferences” are considered “primarily instrumental” when it comes to controlling and manipulating public opinion. According to the text, “policies are judged in terms of expected costs and benefts for the individual and for his or her family (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 23).” In other words, politicians measure the efectiveness of new policies by how it will afect “the working man.” The working man’s interests matter to these politicians because, in order to sway the public’s opinions towards policy, fve pieces of criteria must be met: “[information] must be (1) actually received, (2) understood, (3) clearly relevant to evaluating policies, (4) discrepant with past beliefs, and (5) credible (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 24).” The underlying idea behind this is that “if the conditions are met in the same way for many individuals, there may be a change in collective public opinion (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 25).” These changes are then measured by polls. During the Cold War, for example, Americans were frightened by the idea of Russia becoming a more powerful nation. Politicians were able to take advantage of that fear easily, which resulted in a drastic rise in public support for an increase in spending on national security. However, if new information were published by a “highly credible, well publicized (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 24)” source that conficted with the idea, public support may drop signifcantly. Unfortunately, most people rely on what is described as the “cheapest and most accessible” forms of media to learn about politics: “newspapers, ra- dio, television [and] especially network TV news” (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 26). The level of credibility that lies with these outlets is exceedingly dif- fcult to discern. In fact, “news from such diferent sources is likely to have quite a range of salience and credibility, and therefore quite a range of impact on the public (Hovland and Weiss, 1951).” These forms of media are able manipulate stories with ease in order to meet the fve criteria listed above, which causes a change in public opinion. The authors go on to explain their own investigation into public opinion and democracy, in which they “[assemble] a comprehensive collection of survey data on U.S. citizens’ policy preferences.” The information they were presented with explored the “marginal frequencies of responses to thousands of diferent policy questions asked by various survey organizations since 1935 (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 28).” The authors focused specifcally on eighty repeated policy questions from the previous ffteen years. The dependent variables in these cases are “the level of public opinion at the time of the survey (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 28).” The independent variables are taken from the actions of a source. These, along with a few other factors, are plugged into a mathematic formula in order to measure the

174 Political Science amount of change in public opinion. In this case, the change came out to be around 5%. The study conducted by the authors observes how opinion changes as time passes or as new information becomes more prevalent. The point of plugging their research is to relay the efects that the public’s awareness of a subject has on the public’s opinion. For example, if new information from “a credible and well-publicized source” came about that detailed plans by Swe- den to go nuclear and wipe America of of the face of the Earth, public opinion towards the country would change. In their frst data table, the authors failed to ask participants where they received their news. Political bias has an incredibly large efect on public opinion, making it difcult to reach an objective conclusion. In the second table, they took this factor into account and reported accordingly. The researchers found that news sources “[tend] to have efects of diferent magnitudes and directions (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 31),” and that news commentary has the most drastic impact on public opinion, causing it to sway by four percentage points. As mentioned previously, however, news commentators as a source can very easily manipulate both news and those who refuse to look at news objectively. While other factors may have an important efect on public opinion, their impact was negligible. What exactly moves public opinion, then? The accessibility of information is very important. The interest in said information also plays a large role, as does the credibility of it. Events, especially those on a large scale, also have a drastic efect on public opinion. Unfortunately, the average citizen lacks the time and patience to look into political policy on their own. Public opinion as a whole is very difcult to measure, and, for the most part, only those interested enough to participate in polling speak for the public.

The Role of Zeitgeist Zeitgeist is how people react to the spirit of the times and they can express how they feel by their ideas or beliefs of that time period. It has been applied on a smaller scale and showing the growth and development of young children (Boehnke et.al. 2007). Boehnke and the co-author’s study fnds that there was a weak general zeitgeist efect. This involves the spirit of the times, stating that people are a product of their environment and will be infuenced by this behavior.

Agenda Setting Triangle & Perception of Foreign Countries The perception of crucial issues in the United States is based on waves of trends. The agenda-setting theory proposes that the public works together with the mass media and policy-makers to determine what issues deserve the most amounts of time and resources. Zhang and Meadows (2012) apply this

175 concept both theoretically and through a study in order to determine the dynamics that sway the perceptions of foreign countries in the U.S. The dynamics are assessed on two levels, the frst being salience, or a country’s frequency and importance of recognition, and the second being valence, or a country’s associ- ated tone when being discussed. These two levels of analysis are used with the agenda-setting triangle in order to develop six testable hypotheses. The stated goal is to “investigate how media salience, public opinion, and policy agendas infuence the perceptions of foreign countries in the United States (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 76).” In other words, these hypotheses are used to determine the trendsetters for perceptions of foreign countries in the U.S. The application of the agenda-setting theory has been limited not only in foreign politics but in many other felds. Zhang and Meadows ground the relevancy of their study by extending perceptions of foreign countries for the need for nations to develop an “image” or “national brand” in order to take part in globalization (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 77-78). The article cites Saudi Arabia’s association with terrorists following 9/11, and the resulting damaged reputation in the U.S., as a real-world application of the study’s results. The “multimillion repair campaign” launched by Saudi Arabia could have been op- timized by understanding more thoroughly how perspectives are infuenced and agendas are set (Zhang and Benoit 2004). The results, according to the article, could also be used to improve foreign economic relations. However, the claim that “national image may provide a more favorable environment for tour- ism, international trade, the international job market, and political relations” alongside the claim that “corporations [appear] to play an important role in national branding (Zhang and Meadows 2012)” is circular and stated without causal evidence. Despite this, one considerable application of the study’s over- arching goal is established. Another arguable weakness of the article is its heavy leaning on the use of surveys, especially in the way of determining the public’s perception. While surveys are exceptional for raw data collection, determining the cause of the relationship between variables is an important part of supporting a claim. The article recognizes this when discussing increased media salience in relation to public opinion, but further mention of causal relationships is negligible (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 79). The crux of the study is the combination of the agenda setting triangle (political, public, and media) and analyzing how foreign countries are afected on two levels, (salience and valence). The sum idea of the frst analytical level of salience is to determine if a country holds signifcance in terms of agenda setting (McCombs, 2005). Salience can be measured by observing how frequently a country is mentioned. Another option is to conduct a survey directly ranking the importance of countries to the U.S. The second level of valence is not if, but how or in what way a country is perceived (Wanta et al. 2004). Valence is

176 Political Science broken down into attributes of being perceived as positive, negative, or neu- tral. The study tests if there is a positive relationship between salience, valence, and agendas (the independent variables) and the impact on foreign countries’ perceptions (the dependent variables). Specifcally, the hypotheses on the frst level test the relationships between public opinion and media coverage; presidential papers (policy agenda) and public opinion; and media coverage and presidential papers. The second level evaluated the same relationships but in terms of valence, (again, the causation is being inferred from the correlation and not concretely tested). The supposed idea is that if a country is discussed frequently and positively (or infrequently and negatively) in one part of the triangle, its perception in another part of the triangle will be mirrored (Zhang and Meadows 2012). The results of the study are interesting in that they reveal power dynamics both within the agenda-setting triangle and between policy-makers and foreign countries. The only two hypotheses of the six that were solidly supported as having a positive correlation were the salience of countries in public opinion related to media coverage and the salience of countries in media coverage related to presidential papers (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 84-85). In terms of salience, presidential papers discussing countries frequently did not increase the perceived importance of countries to the public. The fact that media coverage afects public perception and policy-makers do not means the government has limited control over public perception, while foreign countries can launch campaigns and engage in international trade (as discussed earlier) in order to improve perception. This control could be considered a form of soft power because of the public’s ability to infuence policy makers under the agenda-setting theory (Zhang and Meadows 2012). The results of the hypotheses regarding the valence of foreign countries hold that in any agenda relationship, negative tones afect perceptions consistently while positive tones have no defnite efect (Zhang and Meadows 2012, 86-87). These results bode poorly for countries looking to increase their support within the U.S. after any negative exposure is given, as they will have to combat the resistance to change in opinion. For all three of these hypotheses, the positive relationship is only partially supported. The fnal conclusion that can be derived from Zhang and Meadow’s study (2012) is that media coverage is most infuential for foreign countries in terms of salience. It can also be concluded that the context of a country’s perception is signifcant only in terms of negative exposure, and that there is no relationship regarding foreign countries between policy makers and public opinion in terms of salience. These fndings can be used by foreign countries to assess and control their perception in the U.S., but they can also be expanded upon to fnd causation in order to more fully understand how agenda setting works within the U.S. in relation to international politics.

177 Public Opinion & Territorial Confict How is this agenda setting sought out? Is it just publicly opinionated or are there facts to determine these theories of war and territorial confict? Tir (2010, 413) says “[a]ccording to the diversionary theory of war, unpopular leaders generate foreign policy crises to both divert the public’s attention away from the discontent with their rule and bolster their political fortunes through a rally around the fag efect.” Yet it is unclear whether it is an opinion or a fact. Is this a cause from military? Tir proposed (2010, 413) “the cause of some militarized conficts is not a clash of salient interests between countries, but rather problematic domestic circumstances. I argue that this puzzling lack of support could be addressed by considering the possibility that the em- battled leader may anticipate achieving their diversionary aims specifcally through the initiation of territorial confict—a phenomenon I call territorial diversion.” Tir and Coser’s (1956, 413) informed the idea on military stance that “[t]he use of military force is seen in the diversionary literature as attracting the public’s attention, which, in the face of a perceived threat and via the ingroup, outgroup mechanism, is in turn expected to translate into a feeling of loyalty to the state and its leader.” Tir (2010, 413) also argues saying “that territorial conficts have a better capacity to elicit feelings of threat and unity than other issues (e.g., trade, humanitarian intervention), in part because territory speaks more directly and convincingly to the people’s instincts and their conceptions of national identity.” Is there a direct link between diversion and territorial confict? Tir (2010, 414) studied that “[i]n the voluminous diversionary literature, no prior work has directly linked diversions with territorial confict. In the territorial confict literature, a connection with the diversionary theory is also not made.” Tir (2010, 415) going of other works described that “concerns may be lessened in the context of territorial diversion. First, the power projection capability is not necessarily an issue because most territorial conficts take place precisely between neighboring countries (see Tir 2003; 2006 and Vasquez 1993 for more details). Tir also stating that “[s]econd, diversionary action has to be perceived by the population as so important that it is persuaded that the confict (i.e., the diversion) is worth the cost of damaging or even breaking the otherwise important ties (2010, 415).” This worries the population of countries and causes an impact on their critical thinking before just jumping right into something. Can territorial diversion cause advantages for leaders? Tir (2010, 415) agrees saying “that territorial diversion can provide the leader with certain advantages, which are unlikely to be found in the realm of conficts over other issues.” Can land be a factor? Tir (2010, 415) believes “[p]eople have unique and strong bonds to land, which can be manipulated by the unscrupulous leader them to mask the true intents of their actions, which include rally efects and retention of power.”

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The main independent variables throughout the sections follow. Tir (2010, 418) shows that “[t]he ideal indicator of the diversionary incentive, the leader’s popularity rating, is either unavailable for a broad range of countries or cannot be trusted as it is subject to governmental manipulation.” Saying this shows just how much public opinion can result in the upbringing of leaders into a country. Tir relies strictly on two indicators. One indicator is that the citizens dissatisfed with the country’s government. Another is to take the country’s growth rate into consideration since the state of the economy, an important predictor of leaders’ popularity. What could change the outcome? Tir (2010, 419) states saying that “several infuences that have been found to afect the likelihood of dyadic confict, such as capturing a countries’ relative power.” Tir uses models and research tables from various people to test diferent outcomes. Did ISIS change public opinion on the outcome? Were the beheadings efective in this cause? Reports show after the ISIS beheadings the American population showed a dramatic change on the way they feel about this prob- lem. Most Americans’ realistic views say that the U.S government is not doing what needs to be done to lessen the threat of the terroristic group. Tir (2010, 422) concludes by explaining how “diversionary works may have underspecifed the inner workings of the diversionary theoretical mechanism, by neglecting to consider that the leader anticipates that the population may react to territorial issues in ways that are more consistent with the diversionary expectations.” Tir also shows that the diversionary theory has broad roots that go beyond usual aspects seen or noticed. Tir (2010, 422) states in his fnal paragraph stating “[t]his study points to at least two main directions for future research. First, do territorial diversions actually cause the anticipated rally efects? Second, forthcoming research should integrate the full scope of options available to an unpopular leader, such as territorial diversion, diversion over other issues, repression, implementation of policies to address the underlying grievances, resignation from ofce, doing nothing, etc.” Finally it should be safe to say that territorial confict is heavily urged by the public opinion because they have a bond or close connection to the land in which they live on or own.

Public Opinion and Infuence on U.S. Presidents How much afect does the public’s opinion have on a president to use military force in his foreign policy? Baum (2004, 187) writes “public scrutiny can inhibit U.S. presidents from using force as a foreign tool.” Baum creates the argument “My argument difers from existing theories of domestic audience costs in two principal ways. First, I argue that audience costs are not always worth the domestic political risk engender, and hence, leaders will sometimes prefer to avoid them, especially if the strategic

179 stakes in a given foreign crisis are relatively modest. And second, I argue that leaders cannot perfectly control the processes through which audience costs are, or are not, generated. I explicate both diferences, and their implications, in greater detail below.” (2004, 190) In Baum’s theory, the public’s attentiveness is the independent variable, and the president’s likelihood to use military force as a foreign policy tool is the dependent variable. This is a negative relationship, because as the public attentiveness rises, the president hesitates to use force. Baum argues by stating “presidents’ preferences regarding public attentiveness will vary under difering circumstances” (2004, 196) to back up this argument he touches base on the fact that Somalia was considered a “low- stakes” operation for the military, and the public showed little interest. Baum has examples all throughout his article to support his claim. He touches base on multiple cases throughout his article. “Operation Restore Hope spans two administrations and can be usefully divided into four major policy decisions: (1) the August 1992 decision to forego a ground intervention, in favor of a low-risk humanitarian airlift; (2) the November 1992 decision to launch a large-scale intervention; (3) the June 1993 decision to escalate the hunt for Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed; and (4) the autumn 1993 decision to end the U.S. intervention in Somalia. This provides substantial variation in my dependent variables (going public and willingness to escalate/use force) and my key independent variable (public attentiveness), while holding both the strategic stakes and the probability of success constant (Baum, 2004, 199).” The point is that Baum is emphasizing that public opinion infuences the presidents’ decision making in foreign policy. The press was not heavily covering the situation in Somalia until Bush made a statement about the situation (Baum 2004, 206). President Bush ofered ground troops to lead a take-over in Somalia; The New York Times and USA Today published between 33 and 38 articles about the statement (2004, 205). The public wanted something done about the situation in Somalia (2004, 206). Baum claims that President Bill Clinton ended U.S. involvement in Somalia because the public had a bad taste in their mouth after certain events. The big picture here is that after certain events the public opinion changed, and the president responded accordingly. After the events that in- spired the flm “Black Hawk Down” incident the American public were divided and wanted two things: on one hand the public wanted to retrieve the bodies of the fallen soldiers in Somalia, on the other hand the public wanted to pull out and leave Somalia to its own fate.

Ideas and Institutions “What is the most resilient parasite? Bacteria? A virus? An intestinal worm? An idea. Resilient...highly contagious. Once an idea has taken hold of

180 Political Science the brain it’s almost impossible to eradicate. An idea that is fully formed - fully understood - that sticks; right in there somewhere (Internet Movie Database for Inception, 2010).” Do you think idea-infused, or “missionary” institutions survive and thrive in a world of bureaucratic politics? Some may state that missionary institutions face tradeofs between surviving and thriving. Daniel W. Drezner from the University of Chicago said that “Ideas have taken a renewed prominence in the international relations literature (Drezner 2000, 733).” Meaning there are several ways through which ideas and theories are supposed to infuence opinions, preferences; and outcomes. One of the most important ways is that they are instilled into institutions. Many scholars or professors emphasize constructivism, intellectually discussing and giving feedback, and other approaches. Goldstein (1993), and Goldstein and Keohane (1993) have highlighted roles of institutions in pursuing ideational agendas. That may be true, but there is not a real strategy institutions pursue to survive and thrive when competing against others. Bloomfeld notes “For it is then that an idea, however morally powerful and however authentically grounded in the national political epistemology, encounters the instruments, the forces, and the fallible human beings who implement…foreign policy programs (1982, 2).” So ideas are relating to the truth or moral someone has dealing with foreign policy. The idea is always supported, but has unquestionable evidence. With diferent knowledge between foreign afairs, one’s ideas could be thwarted. From a public view, some ask “How do idea-infused institutions survive and thrive ?” Well, containing the placement of one’s institutions in the foreign policy structure helps to determine their chances of surviving and thriving. Missionary institutions have to survive with the consistency of their founding ideas (Drezner 2000, 733). With the development of a strong organizational culture it will prevent a new missionary institution from compromising with the other agencies insulated institution and harder to oversee bureaucratic divisions in spreading its ideas. An, idea-infused institution in a powerful bureaucracy has a lower chance of surviving with them alone.In the cast of idea-infused institutions embedded more powerful bureaucracy, there have a lower chance of surviving in the original form (Drezner 2000, 734).” Embedded institutions would thrive over time. With testing the two cases with: The United States Peace Corps and the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Afairs (Ja- cobsen 1995). The ideas literature has been unable to disentangle the efect of ideas from the efect of material interests. Van Evera (1984) implied “previous studies of foreign policy ideas, such the “cult of the ofensive”, or, “strategic trade theory (Goldstein 1993).” Do ideas survive in bureaucratic politics? We know Allison (1971) studied the diferent levels of analysis with the description of organizational interactions. Others (Welch 1992; Hudson and Vose 1995;

181 Stern and Verbeek 1998) had diferent opinions that led to heated debates about the salience of bureaucratic politics. Their test really was not a theory of bureaucratic politics. They suggested that, “origins of bureaucratic preferences, strategies to maximize organization utility, and likely outcomes (Drezner 2000, 734).” According to Drezner (2000, 737) “Embedded agencies possess a dif- ferent set of disadvantages and advantages in propagating ideas. Embedded agencies are located within a larger and more powerful bureaucracy.” So long term ideas might fght new ideas over time. We measure ideas with polls. Do people’s ideas change? Yes, because people’s perspective on certain things change one once they get information about a certain subject or topic that is being discussed. Do events change public opinion? Yes, before a major event the public may be behind you on certain foreign policy, but once you do something that the public doesn’t agree with, their opinion will change quickly. For example, before the Malaysian Plane was shot down, Vladimir Putin was considered a good leader. After, the plane crash the public started to dislike him. They saw an evil side of him. They found that Russia was involved with the downing of the plane. The U.S. saw diferent vibe from Putin.

Application of the Literature to the Middle East & Islam Iraq War In their article “Poll: Iraq war still unpopular, divisive on 10th anniversary” Peyton M. Craighill and Scott Clement (2013) talk about how the public support for the war in Iraq has decreased. The authors continue by claiming that the war in Afghanistan is the more popular war. Craighill and Clement (2013) state “From 2007 to mid-2009, at least half the public said the war [in Afghani- stan] was worth the sacrifce. During that same period, about six in 10 said Iraq was not worth it.” Basically they are saying that the public feels as if the war in Iraq was unnecessary and not worth the cost, while the war in Afghanistan is.

American Views on ISIS Americans view ISIS as a major threat. The US government should focus more attention on this national threat that is being directed across the country. Citizens of the United States know that ISIS has established themselves as a very dominant terrorist group that could attack the US and leave a fatal mark on the country. A poll was taken in late September to see how Americans felt about the government sending more air strikes to ISIS; in this poll, 73% of the people agreed more air strikes should be sent, while 23% disagreed with this idea (Preston 2014). Many Americans think this will provoke ISIS to do more beheadings of innocent people, and make matters worse. Another poll taken in

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September to see whether or not U.S. ground troops should be sent to fght the terrorists. The poll found that 61% of the people opposed this idea of ground troops, while 38% of the people favored ground troops moving into ISIS territory to help combat terrorism (Preston 2014). Citizens think that placing troops on the ground will spark a serious war between the two countries. The latest poll, taken on November 8, questioned providing humanitarian aid to those who are trying to fee ISIS; here 83% of the voters favored this while 16% opposed the idea (Preston 2014). Americans feel that Syria should be aided with a fresh start in a place with less violence. At least 7 out of 10 Americans want president Obama to seek congressional approval before he takes any actions towards ISIS and the terrorists (Preston 2014). Americans are now keeping a close eye on ISIS to be prepared if they try to attack just as al-Qaeda did on September 11, 2001.

American Fears of Islam An example of American fears of Islam comes from Justin O. Smith (2014). Writing on the blog site “American Thinker” Smith feels that for many years now violence has become an integral part of the Islamic doctrine. He claims that the Islamic people have been following the example set by its Prophet Mohammed, and in the name of Islam and Allah, Muslims have been murdering innocents, since 656 AD. Years after Mohammed’s death an Islamic scholar by the name of Khuldan wrote what is known by the Muslims as the “Muqaddimah.” This writing explains: “In the Muslim community, the holy war is religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and [the obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or force.” Polling research was conducted worldwide by the respected Program on International Policy Attitudes of the University of Maryland on the opinion of attacks against Americans and they are shown below:

61% of Egyptians approve of attacks on Americans 32% of Indonesians approve of attacks on Americans 41% of Pakistanis approve of attacks on Americans 38% of Moroccans approve of attacks on Americans 83% of Palestinians approve of some or most groups that attack Americans (only 14% oppose) 62% of Jordanians approve of some or most groups that attack Americans (21% oppose) 42% of Turks approve of some or most groups that attack Americans (45% oppose) A minority of Muslims disagreed entirely with terror attacks on Americans: Egypt 34%; Indonesia 45%; Pakistan 33%.

Smith (2014) also refers back to September 10, 2014 when President

183 Barack Obama made assertions stating “that the Islamic State ‘is not Islamic’ and that ‘no religion condones the killing of innocents.’”

American Attitudes towards Islam and an Invasion of Iraq Studies show that religion has been shown to play a crucial and powerful role in American domestic politics as well as playing an important role in public opinion related into American foreign policy. It is all in the religious standpoint, and how you see the invasion and how you see Muslims as a per- son, also how you and your religion see it. In December of 2002, there was a table recorded of data of Americans thoughts on the disarmament of the Iraqis, and Islamists, and the invasion on Iraq (Smidt 2005, 258). The poll said that 66% of Americans thought that Iraq were creating weapons of mass destruction and 80% thought the only way to disarmament Iraq was to completely remove Saddam Hussein (Smidt 2005, 258). About 40% said that they would favor the invasion of Iraq and almost 30% would oppose to the invasion but altogether, all of these 70% said that it all depended on the events that occurred in the weeks to follow. Lastly, almost 95% of Americans said that the Muslims encourage violence just as much, if not more than other religions (Smidt 2005, 258). Corwin Smidt’s article “Religion and American Attitudes toward Islam and an Invasion of Iraq” states that the tendency in the moralism in foreign policy is mostly refected on their presidents and how their president stands on the matter that is going on. If they see another country that they think can possibly become a threat to the country, they will see how their president reacts, whether he thinks they pose a threat or whether he thinks they aren’t harming anything, and then that’s when they make their decision on how they view the country as well. For example when President Ronald Reagan was in ofce, he viewed the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire” and didn’t like the way things were going. Also when George W. Bush was in ofce and the incident happened on September 11, he saw them as an “axis of evil” and thought that they posed a huge threat to us and didn’t like it. Once both of these presidents made these statements on how they felt, the people of the country kind of followed in their footsteps and started to feel how they felt because that was the leader of their country. In the public’s view, before September 11, we had no clue on earth Iraq was because nobody thought that they posed a threat to the United States because our president didn’t really say anything about them possibly posing a threat to harm us. Therefore, nobody in the United States was really worried about them, much less trying to fgure who they were or where they were from or anything of that nature because nobody really knew who they were. The public was dependent on their president and he didn’t let them know, so they were left out to dry when September 11 happened because it was like every-

184 Political Science thing was coming out of nowhere, like “who is attacking us?,” or “who is hijack- ing our airplanes and trying to take over our country?” As this paper has established, this was the act of al-Qaeda, a terrorist group. Yet this section shows the power of a president’s thoughts. Many were willing to believe that Iraq was responsible for this, based on words and deeds by President George W. Bush. After that happened, more of the United States started to fnd out a little more information out about just who Iraq was, whether they were fnd- ing this out through the president talking about them, or them being curious and fguring out themselves. More people were not being so dependent on their president and just going by what he was telling them, a lot more people wanted answers quick and wanted to know then. Now that ISIS has become a big group trying to take over Iraq, more Americans know more about them, not just from the beheadings that have gone on or what the president has said about them, but because they have been familiar with Iraq and they people there trying to overthrow their government the past decade. They have accumulated knowledge from the frst time about ISIS or Iraq. The public opinion on Iraq and the groups trying to overthrow their government such as ISIS has changed, but it has been more of a consistent change; it hasn’t been a drastic change every time something has occurred. At frst when they attacked us, everyone thought “They are evil. Take them out and that way we will not have to worry about anything.” After we sent troops over there and started to get everything under control, people started realizing that the Muslims might not be that bad after all. They might just have a group or two trying to overthrow their government and they couldn’t do anything to stop them. Then the beheadings happened and everyone in America hit the panic button again and started freaking out. Now that some Muslims have done something like this twice, Americans are starting to think that Muslims will always be evil and there will never be any change in them no matter what we do to try to stop them. There are some Americans that are saying that there are some Muslims that are okay and are fne and they act just like we do, but there are also some in Iraq that are crazy and that they need to be taken out. Public opinion will always be something that will change. Whether the cause of that is an event that goes on or takes place or multiple events that go on or take place, it will always change. There will also always be a diferent opinion coming from our president and leader of our country, which gives the people of the country another side of the story to see and to change their opinion and how they feel about the situation.

Baiting Americans With Beheadings A Hufngton Post article written by Matthew Hoh (2014) at Hufngton

185 Post, titled “The Behadings Are Bait,” talks about the worldwide confict against ISIS has brought to light a brutal form of punishment, beheadings. As America has been at war with Iraq and Afghanistan for the past decade, we have seen Iraqi and Afghan militias brutally mutilate bodies of our soldiers, but the beheadings are not only new to us but are being used as a form of “bait” to try and get a reaction out of our media and government. “The Islamic State is a parasite of war. Its members and its narrative need war for their personal, organizational and ideological validation and success (Hoh, 2014).” To eliminate the threat of ISIS beheading more of the world’s innocent people, we must take away their resources and take the war away from them. At this point we are playing into our enemies hands. We have to stop taking the bait and understand that in the grand scale of things, the beheadings should be looked at as bait. Adam Taylor, who wrote “From Daniel Pearl to James Foley: The Mod- ern Tactic of Islamist Beheadings,” talks about beheadings being a part of the Middle Eastern culture. “The religious and cultural symbolism that the sword carries with it in the eyes of the Muslims, particularly in the Middle East, is an important factor in determining the terrorists’ choice to behead hostages (Tay- lor, 2014).”

The Signifcance of Beheadings for Islamic Groups Islamic extremist groups have employed harsh scare tactics as a meth- od of grabbing the world’s attention for hundreds of years. Recently, they have turned back to an incredibly harsh and bloody ploy—decapitation—to get their point across. Their justifcation for this comes from historic practices of the Ottoman Empire and a Qur’an verse that quite literally translates to “when you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks.” These are just a few of the points that Timothy Furnish, an assistant professor of history at Georgia Perimeter College in Atlanta, touches on in his article called “Beheading in the Name of Islam.” He goes on to explain the signifcance of the Mahdi, and that, “according to Islamic tradition, the Mahdi, or ‘rightly-guided one’ will come before the end of time to usher in a worldwide, perfect Islamic state (Furnish 2005).” Many of the Islamic groups we see performing these beheadings believe that their religious leader is the Mahdi. In the Mahdi’s mind, perfect justice needs to be wrought on the infdels, and perfect justice can only be carried out by following the directions laid out in the Qur’an literally. What this means for the cur- rent Islamic groups is beheadings.

Psychological Signifcance of Beheadings on the American Public Terrorism is unique from other forms of violence in that it has a larger intention than its efect on the victim. As described by Strom and Irvin (2007), terroristic violence “is used to send a message of intimidation beyond the immediate victims to a wider target group of secondary victims” with the inten-

186 Political Science tion of creating “lasting efects far beyond the immediate incident, including long-term psychological and economic repercussions.” Because terrorist groups do not have the means to physically threaten a national audience, they must use psychological warfare to assert themselves. Beheadings are useful to terrorists because only one victim is needed, although a community-wide audience can be reached. With enough planning, victims can be deliberately chosen to afect the largest community possible and gain as much attention as possible. This is achieved more so with beheadings than any other form of execution because of the gruesome image it im- plants. In the case of James Foley’s beheading, an execution video was released online by the terrorist group ISIS and made its way to Facebook and Twitter before it was completely taken down, although it is still accessible through less regulated sites (Stelter 2014b). Minimalizing the psychological efects of these mass viewings can be more difcult than managing the efects of a natural disaster’s trauma according to Grossman and Siddle’s work (2008) “Psychologi- cal efects of combat.” They propose that “the ultimate fear and horror in most modern lives is to be raped, tortured, or beaten; to be physically degraded in front of loved ones or to have the sanctity of the home invaded by aggressive and hateful intruders (Grossman and Siddle 2008).” Certainly viewers of beheadings vicariously experience the physical degradation of the victim, if only for as long as the video lasts, as well as the sense of being invaded as an American by aggressive and hateful intruders, which can continue for days, weeks, months after the experience. Continued fear felt from a signifcant experience such as this can ultimately be diagnosed as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The article describes this reaction to “intentional, overt, ‘human’ hostility and aggression” as a “universal human phobia” that “assaults the self-image, sense of control, and ultimately, the men- tal and physical health of human beings (Grossman and Siddle, 2008).” Through the videos, American viewers are mentally brought to the battlefeld and sent home without a debriefng, left to deal with the jarring images themselves. In this fashion, terrorists can reach beyond the borders of their countries and in- still fear not only in the soldiers on the frontline but also the civilians of the home front.

Data Results Findings From Iraq If we compare polls taken over time to the timeline of events, we can fnd how much of an impact (if it all) events have on public opinion. A Gallup Poll collected data over a time span of seven years from mid-2003 to mid-2007 with 35 diferent measurements. The sample population was asked the question, “In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq?” The potential options were: “Very well, moderately well, moderately badly, (or) very

187 badly” (Gallup 2010). In this study, the portion of the sample that answered either moderately or very badly is going to be used in concert with dates of beheadings and killings of Americans in Iraq by al-Qaeda and afliates to ascertain if events afected the public opinion signifcantly. First, the data was processed to fnd the mean and standard deviation in order to see what time periods were signifcantly diferent in opinion. Over the timeline, the average opinion that things were going moderately/very badly is 50.33%. The standard deviation from this is 12.26%, so that time periods of signifcantly higher negative opinions have 62.59% or more and those signifcantly lower have 38.07% or less. Using these numbers, we can fnd what time periods had a signifcantly higher or lower percentage of people who thought Operation Iraqi Freedom was going moderately or very badly. Those periods one standard deviation or more above the mean indicate a more negative public opinion about U.S. involvement in Iraq; those periods one deviation or more below the mean indicate a more positive public outlook about U.S. involvement. The comparison shows that at no point did a collection of six killings over time afect the overall opinion about the afairs in Iraq. The frst event used, Nicholas Berg’s death, occurred on May 11 2004 (BBC 2004). The poll showed a negative opinion of 57%, about six percentage points shy of being signifcantly above the mean, (or more negative than usual). The next was Paul Johnson Jr. during June of 2004 with a negative public opinion of 60%, which is 3% closer to being signifcantly high (Toledo Blade 2004). However, this trend stops at Eu- gene Armstrong and Jack Hensley’s death releases on September 20 and 21, 2004 with 52%. There is a reported lull between Hensley’s death and the next American death reported by an Islamic insurgent group (NBC News 2005). Dur- ing this period, public opinion did not become more positive (or become closer to a deviation below the mean) but stayed relatively close to the average. The next reported death was Ronald Schulz’s on August 12, 2005. The next set of numbers taken after this killing was not until October 21, but they showed an insignifcant rise of 57%. On June 8, 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader allegedly responsible for all the deaths mentioned above, was reported dead after an American air raid. Public opinion at this time was measured at 53%, only 3% above the average. His death, nor any of these deaths, infuenced public opinion to show that things in Iraq were going moderately or very badly. The only points at which public opinion about Iraq was signifcantly negative were April of 2004, October of 2006, and January of 2007. The only points at which public opinion was signifcantly positive was April, May, and June of 2003, the frst three measurements taken for the overall poll. Other- wise, somewhere between 38% and 63% of all poll participants thought at any time that things in Iraq were either moderately or very badly. These numbers could not be raised by killings of Americans nor lowered by the killing of a ma-

188 Political Science jor al- Qaeda afliate. The hypothesis that foreign afairs have an impact on public opinion was proven false through this study. If we compare polls taken over time to the timeline of events, we can fnd how much of an impact (if it all) events have on public opinion. A Gallup Poll collected data over a time span of seven years from mid-2003 to mid-2007 with 35 diferent measurements. The sample population was asked the question, “In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq -- [RO- TATED: very well, moderately well, moderately badly, (or) very badly]?” (Gallup 2010). In this study, the portion of the sample that answered either moderately or very badly is going to be used in concert with dates of beheadings and killings of Americans in Iraq by al-Qaeda and afliates to ascertain if events af- fected the public opinion signifcantly. First, the data was processed to fnd the mean and standard deviation in order to see what time periods were signifcantly diferent in opinion. Over the timeline, the average opinion that things were going moderately/very badly is 50.33%. The standard deviation from this is 12.26%, so that time periods of signifcantly higher negative opinions have 62.59% or more and those signifcantly lower have 38.07% or less. Using these numbers, we can fnd what time periods had a signifcantly higher or lower percentage of people who thought Operation Iraqi Freedom was going moderately or very badly. Those periods one standard deviation or more above the mean indicate a more negative public opinion about U.S. involvement in Iraq; those periods one deviation or more below the mean indicate a more positive public outlook about U.S. involvement. The comparison shows that at no point did a collection of six killings over time afect the overall opinion about the afairs in Iraq. The frst event used, Nicholas Berg’s death, occurred on May 11 2004 (BBC 2004). The poll showed a negative opinion of 57%, about 6% shy of being signifcantly above the mean, (or more negative than usual). The next was Paul Johnson Jr. during June of 2004 with a negative public opinion of 60%, which is 3% closer to being signifcantly high (Toledo Blade 2004). However, this trend stops at Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley’s death releases on September 20 and 21, 2004 with 52% negative toward the Iraq invasion. There is a reported lull between Hensley’s death and the next American death reported by an Islamic insurgent group (NBC News 2005). During this period, public opinion did not become more positive (or become closer to a deviation below the mean) but stayed relatively close to the average. The next reported death was Ronald Schulz’s on August 12, 2005. The next set of numbers taken after this killing was not until October 21, but they showed an insignifcant rise up to 57% (against the Iraq War). On June 8, 2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader allegedly responsible for all the deaths mentioned above, was reported dead after an American air raid. Public opinion at this time was measured at 53% opposed to Operation

189 Iraqi Freedom, only 3% above the average. His death, nor any of these deaths of victims, impacted public opinion that things in Iraq were going moderately or very badly. The only points at which public opinion about Iraq was signifcantly negative was April of 2004, October of 2006, and January of 2007. The only points at which public opinion was signifcantly positive was April, May, and June of 2003, the frst three measurements taken for the overall poll. Other- wise, somewhere between 38% and 63% of all poll participants thought at any time that things in Iraq were either moderately bad or very bad. These numbers could not be raised by killings of Americans nor lowered by the killing of a major al-Qaeda leader. The hypothesis that foreign afairs have an impact on public opinion was not supported through this study.

Results Concerning American Views On Islam In this research we were trying to see if Islamic Religion were more likely to encourage violence among its believers or not encourage violence among it’s believers. Our group chose to talk about Islamic without the violence. As we researched diferent dates, the percentage of non-violence decreased as well as it increased. The lowest percentage of viewing Islam as non-violent was recently in 9/2-9/14 which was 39%. The highest percentage of seeing Islam as non-violent came from 3/x/2002. The mean that we came up with was the 43.58333333, and the standard deviation was 4.212250652.

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Iraqi Freedom, only 3% above the average. His death, nor any of these deaths In this research, we looked to see if the Islamic religion has infuenced of victims, impacted public opinion that things in Iraq were going moderately U.S. public opinion based of of its actions over the past decade or so. Pollsters or very badly. have asked the public the same question starting in 2002 and have asked it The only points at which public opinion about Iraq was signifcantly almost every year up until most recently in September of 2014. The question negative was April of 2004, October of 2006, and January of 2007. The only that was asked was “Which statement is closer to your views, even if neither is points at which public opinion was signifcantly positive was April, May, and exactly right: The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage vio- June of 2003, the frst three measurements taken for the overall poll. Other- lence among its believers, or: The Islamic religion does not encourage violence wise, somewhere between 38% and 63% of all poll participants thought at any more than others.” We found that the average responses indicating that the time that things in Iraq were either moderately bad or very bad. These num- Islamic religion is more likely to encourage violence from 2002 through 2014 bers could not be raised by killings of Americans nor lowered by the killing of were 40.17 percent. The standard deviation was calculated to be 6.22. This a major al-Qaeda leader. The hypothesis that foreign afairs have an impact on indicates that those responses that are one standard deviation above the mean public opinion was not supported through this study. were 46.38, while those that are a full standard deviation below the mean were at 33.95. We checked to see if world events have infuenced U.S. public policy on whether or not the Islamic religion is more likely to encourage violence than others. As we can see the latest survey was taken between 9/2/14 and 9/9/14 and turned out to the highest percentage of people who agree that the Islamic religion is more likely to encourage violence. This may very well be a result of the ongoing conficts between ISIS and the United States. But having said that, we do not have signifcant evidence that the Islamic religion has encouraged violence and afected public opinion. The year after the terrorist attacks on 9/11/ 2001, we would think that public opinion would have agreed that the Islamic religion encourages violence, but the survey responses show the op- posite with only 25 percent saying it encourages violence at that time. The theory that world events infuence public opinion is not supported. Public opinion was not dramatically increased or decreased by Islamic events. If we tested the theory again at a later date we may see more trends in the public opinion surveys. As the crisis with ISIS continues the public may be more or less infuenced to believe that the Islamic religion encourages violence.

191 Conclusion This data set is meant to express the opinions of diferent people in regards to how likely Islam is to encourage violence and how that opinion has changed with the rise of terrorism. To gather the information, the Pew Research Center (2014) looked at polling data from 2002 to 2014. It came to our attention that as time went on, especially after the threat of ISIS became public knowledge, only 39% of people believed that Islam did not encourage violence. The mean public opinion response of people that believe Islam does not encourage violence is only 43%, with a standard deviation of 4.2%. It is important to understand how signifcant of an impact the threat of terror can have on public opinion. In most cases, a steep drop in the mean public opinion was in response to a terrorist threat or occurrence. In 2004, for example, there are nearly hundreds of documented terrorist incidents. This was also the year with the lowest recorded public opinion response of 37%. The correlation between these two variables cannot be ignored. Public opinion can, and always will be, changed by the events of the time. Before terrorist threats became a part of everyday life, it was hard for the layperson to view Islam as a religion that encouraged violence. That’s why in 2002 only 25% of people viewed Islam as a violent religion, and by 2014 that percentage doubled to 50. And while the religion of Islam itself is not necessarily violent, it is easy for people to confuse it with the intentions of terror groups. Our research concludes that the beheadings of Jeremy Foley and Steven Sotl- of did increase the American public opinion to believe that Islam does encourage violence.

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