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The Polish Internet 2016 Annual Report from the Actions of CERT Polska ISSN 2084-9079

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SECURITY LANDSCAPE OF THE POLISH INTERNET 2016 Annual report from the actions of CERT Polska ISSN 2084-9079 1 THE SECURITY LANDSCAPE OF THE POLISH INTERNET 2016 Annual report from the actions of CERT Polska Introduction...... ..................................................5 Threats, incidents and observations About CERT Polska .............................................6 particularly important for Polish Internet users ........................................... 39 Highlights from 2016 ..........................................7 Pravyi Sektor ........................................ 39 Calendar ............................................................8 Ransomware ....................................... 43 Protection of Polish cyberspace Locky ................................................ 44 and actions by CERT Polska ...........................11 Cerber .............................................. 44 Misha & Petya ................................. 45 CERT Polska as part of the National TorrentLocker .................................. 46 Cyber-Safety Centre. ................................ 11 CryptXXX & CrypMIC ..................... 46 Handling incidents and reacting CryptoMix ........................................ 47 to threats ..................................................... 11 TeslaCrypt ........................................ 48 NATO Locked Shields 2016 exercises ....... 15 DMA Locker ..................................... 48 Cyber Europe 2016 exercises.................... 16 Summary .......................................... 48 SECURE 2016 conference .......................... 16 Polish malware scene ........................ 48 European Cyber Security Month .............. 18 Benio ................................................ 48 OUCH! bulletin ............................................ 18 vjw0rm .............................................. 49 Execution .................................................... 18 Proxy Changer (Pacca) ................. 50 NECOMA ................................................. 18 InPost campaign + “borrowed” SISSDEN .................................................... 19 LuminosityLink RAT .......................... 50 n6.... ......................................................... 19 DMA Locker ..................................... 51 CyberROAD ............................................ 20 GMBot .................................................. 51 Exploit kity ................................................ 21 Nymaim ............................................... 53 State of the Internet as of 2016 based The course of the infection ............ 54 on information gathered Infection symptoms ........................ 54 by CERT Polska .................................................23 Characteristic elements ................ 55 Global threats and incidents .................... 23 ISFB ....................................................... 55 Mirai ......................................................... 23 From ISFB to mobile devices .......... 55 Mirai operatio ..................................... 23 Ostap group........................................ 58 The largest Mirai attacks .................... 25 Bitcurex ................................................ 59 Mirai in Poland .................................... 26 Overview of the CTF 2016 scene ...... 60 Summary ............................................. 29 Statistics ......................................................... 61 Using network devices for malicious Botnets ......................................................... 62 purposes .................................................. 29 Botnets in Poland ................................... 62 Attacks on DSL servers ....................... 29 Botnet activity divided into Spam from routers .............................. 31 telecommunication operators ............. 62 Using routes as SOCKS Proxy ............. 31 C&C servers ............................................ 64 Attacks using a SWIFT Phishing ...................................................... 68 banking system ....................................... 33 Services used to perform Avalanche .............................................. 33 DRDoS attacks ............................................ 69 USA elections .......................................... 35 Open DNS servers ................................... 72 Most important vulnerabilities NTP .......................................................... 73 identified in 2016 .................................... 36 SSDP ......................................................... 74 DirtyCow (CVE-2016-5195) ................ 36 SNMP ........................................................ 75 MySQL Priv Escal / RCE Port mapper ............................................ 76 (CVE-2016-6662) ................................. 37 NetBIOS.................................................... 77 Tor Browser/Firefox RCE Vulnerable services .................................... 78 (CVE-2016-9079) ................................ 37 POODLE ................................................... 79 Cisco ASA – EXTRABACON NAT-PMP .................................................. 80 (CVE-2016-6366)/ EPICBANANA FREAK ....................................................... 81 (CVE-2016-6367) ................................. 37 IPMI.. ........................................................ 82 Google vs Microsoft - a 7 day Malicious websites ..................................... 83 disclosure (CVE-2016-7255) ............... 38 Vulnerabilities in anti-virus software Glossary of basic terms ..................................85 (including CVE-2016-2208) ................ 38 able of contents T CERT Polska Annual Report 2016 Introduction Dear readers, We present the report from the actions of the 20 years. We believe that network and infor- CERT Polska team in 2016. It is an attempt to mation security is the discipline, where coope- describe the security landscape of both the ration, trust and exchange of key information Polish and Global Internet, seen from the per- about threats are more vital than business spective of the incident reports handled by competition. That is why we hope that thanks our team and our own research activity. The to the development of NC Cyber and the report also includes the description of projects involvement of various entities in this initiative carried out by CERT Polska and the most im- (from essential service providers, through law portant events we participated in. enforcement, to the researchers and commer- cial companies from the security field), there In 2016, the Ministry of Digital Affairs gave NASK will be even more possibilities to use the com- a task to create the National Cybersecurity petence of the CERT Polska team. This means Centre (NC Cyber). The role of the CERT Pol- that 2017 will be a year of challenges for our ska team in this project is to provide analytical team, but also full of opportunities for progress. facilities with high technical competence, so as to be able to monitor and analyse threats to Polish Internet users and actively counte- ract them. It seems a natural continuation of our mission, which we have fulfilled for over CERT Polska 5 CERT Polska Annual Report 2016 About CERT Polska The CERT Polska team acts within the structures The main tasks of CERT Polska are: of NASK - an institute that carries out scientific • registration and handling of network security research, maintains the National Cybersecu- incidents; rity Centre (Narodowe Centrum Cyberbez- • active response in case of direct threats pieczeństwa, NC Cyber), the national registry to users; of .pl domains and supplies advanced ICT • cooperation with other CERT teams in Poland services. and worldwide; • participation in national and international CERT Polska is the first Computer Emergency projects related to the IT security; Response Team in Poland. By virtue of its ef- • research into methods of detecting security fective operations since 1996, it has become incidents, analysis of malware, systems for a recognised and renowned entity in the area exchanging information on threats; of computer security. Since its inception, the • development of proprietary and open sour- core of the team’s activity has been handling ce tools for detection, monitoring, analysis, security incidents and cooperation with similar and correlation of threat; entities around the world, both in operatio- • regular publication of the annual CERT Polska nal activities as well as research and deve- Report on security of Polish cyberspace; lopment. Since 1998, CERT Polska has been a • informational and educational activities, member of an international forum that brings aimed at raising awareness in relation to IT together emergency response teams – FIRST, security, including: and since 2000 it belongs to a working group of European emergency response teams – TF a. maintaining a blog at cert.pl as well as -CSIRT and is accredited by Trusted Introducer. Facebook and Twitter accounts; In 2005, CERT Polska initiated a forum of Polish b. organization of the annual SECURE con- abuse teams - Abuse FORUM, whereas in 2010 ference (www.secure.edu.pl); it joined the Anti-Phishing Working Group, an c. specialized trainings. association that gathers companies and insti- tutions that actively combat Internet crime. fot. pixabay.com 6 CERT Polska Annual Report 2016 Highlights from 2016 • In 2016, CERT Polska handled 1,926 in- e-mail messages with attachments, and cidents, 32
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