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Islamist Responses to Arab Normalization Agreements with Israel ISSUE BRIEF 01.27.21 Islamist Responses to Arab Normalization Agreements with Israel A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East sentiment, lending greater credence to the INTRODUCTION idea that democratization can threaten In the waning days of the Trump the interests of their respective countries, administration, a flurry of normalization especially among the secular segments of 2 agreements with Israel swept through the the society. Middle East and North Africa region. Since September 2020, the United Arab Emirates THREE DIFFERENT REACTIONS (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco have all taken steps to normalize relations with and, Despite near-universal identification eventually, formally recognize Israel. with the Palestinian cause and a visceral The agreements came against the opposition to Israel, religious and Islamist backdrop of an Israeli-Palestinian conflict responses to the normalization agreements that has assumed an increasingly religious have been varied. One reason for this lack overtone since the beginning of the 20th of uniformity is that Islamist groups have century. More so than any actor, Islamist increasingly taken on governmental roles groups across the region began invoking the in recent years; Islamists are no longer religious symbolism of Jerusalem and the relegated to permanent political opposition.3 al-Aqsa Mosque during the 1970s. Faced with potential pushback from regimes For many Islamists, the Israeli- or the electorate, Islamists constantly adjust Despite near-universal Palestinian conflict constitutes a key and recalibrate their discourse on a variety identification with the element of their discourse; the oppressed of issues, including Israel. Palestinian cause and status of Palestinians represents the “Muslim The most vocal critics of normalization a visceral opposition grievance par excellence.”1 As the conflict agreements in the region have been has evolved, the ever-greater levels of Islamists and religious actors with poor to Israel, religious and Palestinian political marginalization illustrate, prospects of winning power or who operate Islamist responses for Islamists, the threat that Muslims across in the shade of illegality. They have little to the normalization the region face from the West and Israel. to lose politically, and therefore do not agreements have been Likewise, non-Islamist religious actors have face pressure to mitigate their reactions. increasingly employed religious rhetoric to These criticisms have typically featured varied. voice their opposition to Israel and Israeli a clear religious component as well. The policies vis-à-vis Palestinians. Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society—a major The Islamist position on the Israeli- opposition group deemed illegal by the Palestinian conflict carries broader Bahraini government—argued that the implications for regional politics. As populist normalization agreement with Israel lacked movements, Islamist groups can link their “legitimacy” because neither the Bahraini anti-Americanism to a strong anti-Israel government nor Israel are legitimate, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 01.27.21 according to the group. Moreover, it religious significance of the Palestinian claimed that the agreement represents issue, instead highlighting solidarity with a “departure from the Islamic, Arab, and the Palestinians in their responses. The national consensus.”4 Another major, head of the Emirates Fatwa Council, outlawed Islamic group, Morocco’s al-Adl Abdullah bin Bayyah, chose to downplay wal-Ihsan, emerged as the country’s most the potential long-term implications of vocal critic of the agreement between the agreement for Palestinians and instead Morocco and Israel. The movement focused on Israel’s delayed annexation of organized large demonstrations to protest parts of the West Bank. Bin Bayyah praised the deal5 and declared that the agreement the normalization agreement “for the represented “a stab in the back to the supreme good for the nation and its people” Palestinian cause.”6 and stated that the Council “blesses” the The Palestinian cause has been a major Emirati policy on this issue.11 Likewise, the issue and rallying cry for the Egyptian chair of the UAE General Authority of Islamic Muslim Brotherhood since the 1930s. Affairs and Endowments, Mohammed Matar Despite its own struggle for survival both Salem al-Kaabi, praised the agreement’s in Egypt and throughout the region, the contribution to peace and the UAE’s global Brotherhood reacted strongly to the recent standing as a peacemaker.12 wave of normalization with Israel. The In Morocco, the ruling Party for group portrayed the Emirati agreement Justice and Development (PJD) issued a with Israel to normalize relations as not measured response to King Mohammed only a “betrayal of the Palestinian cause” VI’s decision to normalize relations with but also of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa.7 Israel and aimed to deflect responsibility The prospect of normalization from the monarch. Party leader and Prime with Israel drew sharp criticism from Minister Saad Eddin el-Othmani expressed the country’s Islamist parties in Sudan strong support for the Palestinian cause following Omar al-Bashir’s ouster from despite the normalization by highlighting power. The Popular Congress Party decried Mohammed VI’s phone call with Palestinian the secretive nature of the deal, claiming it Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, did not reflect the will of Sudanese citizens. where he reiterated the idea that Moroccan To distinguish between the government “support of the Palestinian cause remains and the people’s positions on the issue, the unshakeable, and that Morocco places party called on citizens to form “a broad it at the same level of Sahara issue.”13 front to resist normalization and maintain Importantly, el-Othmani’s statement our support for the Palestinian people.” sharply contradicts his earlier position on Kamal Omar, a leading party official, normalization of relations with Israel; he challenged the transitional Sudanese previously rejected outright the notion of government’s legal authority to undertake normalization because, he said, it would a normalization agreement with Israel.8 “embolden” Israel’s violation of Palestinians’ The National Umma Party threatened to rights.14 The PJD’s position on the issue also withdraw its support from the government differs significantly from that of the Unity over normalization with “the apartheid and and Reform Movement, the PJD’s affiliated occupation state” of Israel.9 Similar to their religious movement. Less concerned with fellow Islamists, the party stated that the the political fallout from its reaction to government lacked the legal standing to the normalization agreement, the Unity strike such agreements.10 and Reform Movement characterized the By contrast legitimate, recognized agreement as “deplorable” and rejected religious actors and Islamists who could “all attempts at normalization and the face political repercussions were more Zionist infiltration.”15 measured in their reactions to the Lastly, those Islamists who are in normalization agreements. Some groups power—and therefore have little concern underscored the benefits of the agreement; for the political ramifications of their others simply avoided focusing on the statements—were similarly critical of the 2 ISLAMIST RESPONSES TO ARAB NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL normalization agreements. What we also Hamas similarly conveyed its frustration observe among these actors is an effort with the Moroccan-Israeli normalization to play up the religious symbolism in the agreement. PJD leader el-Othmani’s Palestinian issue and secure political gains participation in the signing ceremony was in the process. considered a particular “let down,” as Following normalization agreements expressed by Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri. made by the UAE and Bahrain, the Hamas hoped that el-Othmani “would take International Union for Muslim Scholars— an honorable and historic stance” by at least an organization known for its Islamist not attending the ceremony.23 leanings—affirmed its opposition; Secretary-General Ali al-Qaradaghi stated that “normalization with the occupiers of ISLAMIST VS. ANTI-ISLAMIST Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem is forbidden CONFLICT and is considered a treason.”16 The union’s The regionwide Islamist vs. anti-Islamist leader, Ahmad al-Raysuni, justified the conflict similarly shaped religious responses opposition to normalization as being to normalization policies. While the anti- against “theft, occupation, and the other Islamist camp welcomed the normalization crimes committed and being committed by agreements as beneficial, the Islamist bloc the Zionists and their country in the past firmly opposed the agreements to avoid a eight decades.”17 change in status quo. The main concern Omani grand mufti Ahmad al-Khalili for the Islamist bloc is the potential loss came out strongly against any normalization of influence they gained across the region with Israel in the absence of “liberation” of As expected, the after the Arab Spring protests. al-Aqsa and the surrounding areas, which he most vocal critics of As expected, the most vocal critics of described as a religious duty for Muslims.18 the normalization the normalization agreements have been Similarly, Kuwaiti Islamists—along with non- those with the most to lose geopolitically, agreements have been Islamist political groups—criticized the UAE- such as Iran and Turkey. Iranian officials those with the most
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