Carl M Marcy Leaving the Committee
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Carl M. Marcy Chief of Staff Foreign Relations Committee, 1955-1973 Interview #8 Leaving the Committee (Wednesday, November 16, 1983) Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie RITCHIE: You said you wanted to write an article about committee hearings? MARCY: Yes. I just returned from a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where four very distinguished witnesses appeared. Senator Fulbright in his first appearance before the Committee since he was a senator was the lead witness. Richard Allen, Reagan's former security advisor, was there. Admiral Noel Gayler, former head of the National Security Agency, and Hal Sonnenfeld, formerly right-hand person to Kissinger, were also witnesses. Senator Percy, Senator [Richard] Lugar, and finally Senator [Claiborne] Pell showed up. Those were the only three senators who were there, and they were not all there at the same time. There were three senators and sixteen staff people sitting at various places behind senators' empty chairs. I don't know what comes out of a hearing like that. The testimony is printed but seldom read. There seemed to be some press coverage--we can tell more tomorrow. [There was one story featuring Senator Fulbright's appearance after years in retirement. I saw no press account of the substance of the testimony.] It's gotten to the point now where you don't have committees or subcommittees. There are in effect one-person, one-senator committees. I don't know page 237 how it is in the House, but I find it hard to see that such hearings serve any significant public purpose. It would be much better to have those four individuals on the McNeil-Lehrer show, or have them jointly interviewed and printed in the Post "Outlook" section or the "New York Times Magazine." Maybe these hearings would be of some use to a historian! RITCHIE: Was it that way when you were staff director? MARCY: It was much that way then. I think we did a little better at that time because Senator Fulbright and his predecessors didn't much like the idea of competing subcommittees with significant jurisdiction, or significant constituencies. If the subject was important enough for the senators to pay attention to it, it was important for al 1 of them, or most of them, to be present. As it is now, it's such a fragmented process. Individual senators sometimes use a subcommittee like a lottery. They hold a hearing on some subject and see who comes. Does the press cover it? As a result there are a lot of hearings held that United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project www.senate.gov nobody ever hears anything about, nobody pays attention, and even the senators who set them up don't pay much attention. They try a hearing, it doesn't strike a fire, and the result is that the subject is dropped. page 238 RITCHIE: Well, what's the purpose? For instance, today's hearing: what's the motivation there? It's to generate interest in the subject, but they can't even generate interest among their own members. MARCY: That's right. If there is any subject that should be of interest to every member of the Foreign Relations Committee, it ought to be the present state of United States-Soviet relations. Are they going to get worse? Are they going to stay about the same? Or are they going to get better? What underlies the present state of affairs? This is the most important relationship that we have in the area of foreign policy. Sure, Grenada is important, the Middle East is important, El Salvador and Nicaragua are important. But underlying it all from the point of view of the president, is the "evil empire," that is communism. Yet we spend time worrying about the next government in Nicaragua or Grenada, and worrying about the Middle East, but in every case the fundamental problem is traced to the superpower conflict. Yet we have a hearing on the subject of the two superpowers and their relationship, and nobody shows up! RITCHIE: Do you think the Committee spends so much time in executive session hearing what they consider to be more substantive information from people behind closed doors that they think that the public sessions are just decoration? page 239 MARCY: I think that's partly true, but my experience in the executive sessions was that by and large senators don't hear anything in executive sessions that they don't read about in the press. It sounds good to refer to information received in an executive session of the Committee. Senators and staff presumably then know more about what goes on, but the attitude of not only the previous administrations but most executive branch representatives is that they're not going to say anything to an executive session that they aren't willing to have appear in the press. So that's what they talk about. Witnesses in executive sessions discuss things that will not upset the applecart if they become public. RITCHIE: Do you think there is any way of improving the hearings? MARCY: That's why I said I think I'm going to write an article, so I can think about whether there is some way to improve the hearing process, to make it more effective. It strikes me that by and large they are not very effective. When was the last time that there was a significant public hearing? It goes back to the Vietnam period. Now and then, the Interior Committee gets a good turnout for a hearing United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project www.senate.gov with Secretary [James] Watt, but too few senators come to examine the substance of an Interior policy. They might want to be present to hear a gaff by the Secretary. page 240 RITCHIE: I noticed in your files that at the beginning of each year you would often send a memo to Senator Fulbright outlining what you thought ought to be subjects, or could be subjects, for major hearings during the year. Maybe a half a dozen suggestions. How much planning goes into a public hearing? And when you were looking over these things at the beginning of the year, how did you think out the types of subjects you would recommend to the senator? MARCY: Well, it depended upon what was current at the time, or what one could see was coming up. For example, if I were now planning hearings for beginning, let's say in January 1984, it seems to me that the hearings could well be focused on how to keep continuity in foreign policy during an election year? It would be a natural. One would hope to be able to establish a record and get attention to the fact that it's going to be a disaster not whether Republicans are elected or whether Democrats are elected, but it's going to be a disaster if there is not some carry-over, some continuity in the foreign policy of the nation. Otherwise, we lose the confidence of our allies and confuse our adversaries. That would be the kind of subject I think needs attention. Maybe it's too exotic. RITCHIE: You suggested a couple of times that they hold forums for presidential candidates on foreign policy. That one never got carried out. page 241 MARCY: No, I was accustomed to throw up a lot of ideas; some did fly and some did not. RITCHIE: Do you think that there is a lack of long-range planning and thought now that there is too much ad hoc hearings? MARCY: I think so. It's a characteristic of Congress to be intrigued by current events. There is another thing that is lacking in the Senate, or in the Congress. It is that there is no senior, executive committee of the Senate to deal with the White House. If the president wants to call a group together, he does it. He can invite the majority leader or the minority leader, or certain others. But it does seem to me that there is a need for a means by which the Senate would have a legislative counterpart to the National Security Council. Now I realize this runs contrary to what I have said, that there has been a proliferation of subcommittees. But it ought to be possible for the president or the National Security Advisor to seek the advice of, and consult with, a counterpart group in the Senate. United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project www.senate.gov Now, what does the president do? He may create a presidential commission on some aspect of policy. I don't object to that, but there needs to be an overall core group that represents prevailing Senate views across the board, as best as it can be done. It may be that there should be (I'm just thinking aloud) a sort of a super page 242 Senate institution which would consist of, let's say, the chairman and the ranking minority member of each committee. Maybe that's too large a group. But now the Senate is a fragmented institution as compared with a well-run executive branch. RITCHIE: Do you think that this is something that is inherent in the institution, or it's been developing this way, because of the reforms that have decentralized the Senate over the last twenty years? MARCY: To some extent it is inherent in a legislative body. But at the same time one doesn't let heredity control everything. Sometimes heredity can be shaped.