Imagining the Energy Cybergeddon

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Imagining the Energy Cybergeddon 1 Imagining the energy cybergeddon Digitalization and security epistemics in the energy system Lars Gjesvik Master Thesis in Political Science, Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring, 23.05.2018 2 Imagining the energy cybergeddon Digitalization and security epistemics in the energy system 3 © Lars Gjesvik 2018 Imagining the energy cybergeddon Lars Gjesvik http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo Word count: 37 587 4 Abstract In this thesis, I examine how the process of digitalization in the energy system is leading to changing understandings of its security. More precisely I track how discourses place themselves into different epistemic logics of security when debating digital incidents versus non-digital ones. I draw on the work of several critical security studies scholars, most notably Claudia Aradau (2014) and her work on security epistemics and the rise of resilience-thinking in modern societies. The creation of problems, through expressing concerns, assessing impacts, and promoting solutions, creates an overarching narrative that frames how we understand security events and dangers. Analyzing a broad collection of texts, I examine how expert discourse make sense of security concerns, impacts and solutions, centered around four main cases. These cases are the Baumgarten explosion in 2017, the Industroyer malware taking down the Ukrainian power grid in 2017, as well as a broader reading of security concerns pertaining to digital technologies and non-digital risks. The analysis highlights how digital security concerns are in part understood as radically uncertain, being unable to be understood both in terms of occurrence and impact, which implies certain security practices of preemption and societal resilience. As digital technologies and tools become more commonplace in the energy system, protecting these systems becomes more centered around the security practices “allowed” by the dominant understanding of cyber security. As a consequence, the digitalization of energy systems pushes societies further along in the move away from threats and existential dangers, and towards catastrophic risks, resilience and the management of uncertainty. 5 Acknowledgements First of all, a large portion of gratitude and thanks is owed my supervisor Kacper Szulecki, for answering emails, providing valuable feedback, exerting stoic calm and for pushing the right buttons. A special thanks to everyone who contributed input and crucial feedback in the process of writing this thesis. I owe Håvard Markussen a great deal for his unrivaled knowledge on Discourse Analysis and anything having to do with methodology. My parents are owed months of gardening work and dog-watching for sacrificing weekends proofreading and debating text selection to no end. Every discussion I had with co-workers at NUPI provided valuable input. In particular this applies to Malin, Henriette, Maja, Ole Martin, Emil, Helene and everyone at the Security and Defence Group. Furthermore, everyone at the NUPI Cyber Security Centre participated with valuable feedback, I thank Niels Nagelhus Schia, Lilly Muller and Karsten Friis for support and excellent ideas. In particular I owe Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud for the lion’s share of the theoretical foundations. Finally, I thank Sarah for support, encouragement and being willing to bear with me through it all Lars Gjesvik 23.05.2018 6 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 The Research Question ..................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Approach ........................................................................................................................11 1.4 Structure .........................................................................................................................13 2. Theory ...............................................................................................................................16 2.4.2 Practice and experts .....................................................................................................16 2.2 Risk and Uncertainty: a history of vital systems ............................................................18 2.3 Cyber security as risk and uncertainty............................................................................21 2.4.1 Epistemics of security..................................................................................................23 2.4.2 Known and measurable impacts: risk, redundancy, and resilience .............................25 2.4.3 Unknown impacts, societal resilience, and the role of imaginings .............................27 2.5.4 Enter the actor: terrorism, preemptive security, and the departure from the accident 29 3. Methodology .....................................................................................................................33 3.1 Materialism and the role of objects ................................................................................34 3.2 Discourses and representations.......................................................................................35 3.3 Research design ..............................................................................................................36 3.4 Operationalization and the research process ..................................................................39 3.5 Clarifications, validity and reliability .............................................................................43 4. Background .......................................................................................................................47 4.2 The changing energy system ..........................................................................................47 4.2 A brief history of cyber security.....................................................................................51 5. Analysis: ...............................................................................................................................54 5.1 An Austrian Gas Explosion ............................................................................................54 5.1.2 Understanding Baumgarten .........................................................................................57 5.2 Hacking the Ukrainian Grid ...........................................................................................60 5.2.1 The makings of a cyber threat .....................................................................................63 5.3 The reliable and resilient power grid ..............................................................................66 5.3.2 Managing uncertainty in the system and society.........................................................71 5.4 Smart meters and the radical uncertainty of IoT ............................................................72 5.4.2 Understanding the smart grid ......................................................................................80 6. Discussion.............................................................................................................................85 7. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................95 Main Findings.......................................................................................................................95 7 Avenues for further research ................................................................................................96 Broader implications ............................................................................................................97 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 101 8 1. Introduction It was 3:30 p.m. last December 23, and residents of the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine were preparing to end their workday and head home through the cold winter streets. Inside the Prykarpattyaoblenergo control center, which distributes power to the region's residents, operators too were nearing the end of their shift. But just as one worker was organizing papers at his desk that day, the cursor on his computer suddenly skittered across the screen of its own accord. He watched as it navigated purposefully toward buttons controlling the circuit breakers at a substation in the region and then clicked on a box to open the breakers and take the substation offline. A dialogue window popped up on screen asking to confirm the action, and the operator stared dumbfounded as the cursor glided to the box and clicked to affirm. Somewhere in a region outside the city he knew that thousands of residents had just lost their lights and heaters. The operator grabbed his mouse and tried desperately to seize control of the cursor, but it was unresponsive. Then as the cursor moved in the direction of another breaker, the machine suddenly logged him out of the control panel. Although he tried frantically to log back in, the attackers had changed his password preventing him from gaining re-entry. All he could do was stare helplessly at his screen while the ghosts in the machine clicked open one breaker after another, eventually taking about 30 substations offline. The attackers didn't stop there, however. They also struck two o ther power distribution centers at the same
Recommended publications
  • Cost of a Cyber Incident)
    CO ST OF A CYBER INCIDENT: S YSTEMATIC REVIEW AND C ROSS-VALIDATION OCTOBER 26, 2020 1 Acknowledgements We are grateful to Dr. Allan Friedman, Dr. Lawrence Gordon, Jay Jacobs, Dr. Sasha Romanosky, Matthew Shabat, Kelly Shortridge, Steven Surdu, David Tobar, Brett Tucker and Sounil Yu for the review comments and helpful feedback on the earlier draft of the report. The authors would like to thank CISA staff for support and advice on this project. 2 Table of Contents 1. Objectives .................................................................................................................................................................... 7 2. Results in Brief .......................................................................................................................................................... 8 3. Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................................... 16 3.1. Per-Incident Cost and Loss Estimates .............................................................................................. 18 3.1.1. Cross-Validation: Primary Loss Data for Large and Small Incidents .................................. 20 3.1.2. Reconciliation of Per-Incident Cost Studies .................................................................................. 26 3.1.3. Per-Record Estimates ............................................................................................................................. 29 3.2. Aggregate
    [Show full text]
  • Download Thesis
    This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Cyber security and the politics of time Stevens, Timothy Charles Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 25. Sep. 2021 1 ] Cyber Security and the Politics of Time Timothy Charles Stevens Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy King’s College London Department of War Studies November 2013 2 Abstract Time is an under-represented topic in security studies and International Relations (IR).
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Benefits and Risks: Quantitatively Understanding and Forecasting the Balance
    Cyber Benefits and Risks: Quantitatively Understanding and Forecasting the Balance Extended Project Report from the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver www.pardee.du.edu September 2015 Barry B. Hughes, David Bohl, Mohammod Irfan, Eli Margolese-Malin, and José Solórzano In project collaboration with and the Table of Contents Executive Summary 4 Conceptualizing Benefits and Costs 4 Using the IFs System for Analysis 4 Background Research Foundations 5 Forecasts and Findings 9 Conclusion 11 A Final Note on Study Contributions 12 1. Introduction: Understanding and Anticipating Change in the Benefits and Costs of Cyber Technology 13 2. ICT and Cyber Development Indices 18 Indices Replicated in the IFs Forecasting System 18 ICT Development Index 18 Global Cybersecurity Index 19 Additional Indices of Importance in Cyber Security Analyses 21 Digitization Index 21 Digital Economy Ranking Index 21 Networked Readiness Index 22 3. Benefits 23 Competing Schools of Thought on Economic Benefits 23 Pessimism Versus optimism concerning ICT’s economic production impacts 23 ICT as a general-purpose technology 25 ICT’s Economic Impact: The Production Side 26 ICT as a growth sector in the economy 26 ICT investment and capital services 29 ICT and multifactor productivity 32 Comparing the Productivity Impacts of GPTs: Steam, Electricity, ICT 33 Variation in ICT Impact across Time/Pervasiveness and Countries 36 Drivers of variation in ICT impact: ICT (especially broadband) pervasiveness 36 Drivers of variable ICT impact: Beyond PCs and broadband 39 Drivers of variable ICT impact: Country development level 41 Consumer Surplus 42 Consumer surplus forecasts 46 Summary of Knowledge Concerning Cyber Risk Benefits: Modeling Implications 47 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Deutsche Nationalbibliografie
    Deutsche Nationalbibliografie Reihe T Musiktonträgerverzeichnis Monatliches Verzeichnis Jahrgang: 2015 T 05 Stand: 20. Mai 2015 Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (Leipzig, Frankfurt am Main) 2015 ISSN 1613-8945 urn:nbn:de:101-ReiheT05_2015-7 2 Hinweise Die Deutsche Nationalbibliografie erfasst eingesandte Pflichtexemplare in Deutschland veröffentlichter Medienwerke, aber auch im Ausland veröffentlichte deutschsprachige Medienwerke, Übersetzungen deutschsprachiger Medienwerke in andere Sprachen und fremdsprachige Medienwerke über Deutschland im Original. Grundlage für die Anzeige ist das Gesetz über die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (DNBG) vom 22. Juni 2006 (BGBl. I, S. 1338). Monografien und Periodika (Zeitschriften, zeitschriftenartige Reihen und Loseblattausgaben) werden in ihren unterschiedlichen Erscheinungsformen (z.B. Papierausgabe, Mikroform, Diaserie, AV-Medium, elektronische Offline-Publikationen, Arbeitstransparentsammlung oder Tonträger) angezeigt. Alle verzeichneten Titel enthalten einen Link zur Anzeige im Portalkatalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek und alle vorhandenen URLs z.B. von Inhaltsverzeichnissen sind als Link hinterlegt. Die Titelanzeigen der Musiktonträger in Reihe T sind, wie sche Katalogisierung von Ausgaben musikalischer Wer- auf der Sachgruppenübersicht angegeben, entsprechend ke (RAK-Musik)“ unter Einbeziehung der „International der Dewey-Dezimalklassifikation (DDC) gegliedert, wo- Standard Bibliographic Description for Printed Music – bei tiefere Ebenen mit bis zu sechs Stellen berücksichtigt ISBD (PM)“ zugrunde.
    [Show full text]
  • Study (Abridged Version) the FUTURE of VALUES HELD by PEOPLE in OUR COUNTRY a Summary of Key Findings and Scenarios
    Study (abridged version) THE FUTURE OF VALUES HELD BY PEOPLE IN OUR COUNTRY A summary of key findings and scenarios Study (abridged version) THE FUTURE OF VALUES HELD BY PEOPLE IN OUR COUNTRY A summary of key findings and scenarios Principal investigators: Cordula Klaus Dr Christian Grünwald Michael Astor Authors: Anna Hornik Dr Georg Klose Dr Thomas Stehnken Florian Spalthoff Holger Glockner Dr Christian Grünwald Daniel Bonin Julian Sachs August 2020 This publication was developed as part of the Zukunfts- büro des Foresight-Prozesses (Foresight III) service contract awarded to Prognos AG and Z_punkt GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Strategic Foresight; Participation and Citizen Science unit. The authors are responsible for the content of this publication. The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) accepts no liability for the factual correctness, accuracy or completeness of the information provided. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). 3 Table of contents Summary of key findings ..............................................................................................................................................4 1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................................6 2 Summary of key findings: today’s life goals and the hopes and fears for the
    [Show full text]
  • Global Risks 2014 Ninth Edition Global Risks 2014, Ninth Edition Is Published by the World Economic Forum
    Insight Report Global Risks 2014 Ninth Edition Global Risks 2014, Ninth Edition is published by the World Economic Forum. The information in this report, or on which this report is based, has been obtained from sources that the authors believe to be reliable and accurate. However, it has not been independently verified and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness of any information obtained from third parties. In addition, the statements in this report may provide current expectations of future events based on certain assumptions and may include statements that do not directly relate to a historical or current fact. These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors which are not exhaustive. The companies contributing to this report operate in a constantly changing environment and new risks emerge continually. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these statements. The companies contributing to this report undertake no obligation to publicly revise or update any statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, and they shall in no event be liable for any loss or damage arising from the use of the information in this report. World Economic Forum Geneva Copyright © 2014 By the World Economic Forum All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the World Economic Forum. ISBN-13: 92-95044-60-6 ISBN-10: 978-92-95044-60-9 REF: 090114 This report and an interactive data platform are available at www.weforum.org/risks.
    [Show full text]
  • Ten Key Questions on Cyber Risk and Cyber Risk Insurance the GENEVA ASSOCIATION
    Ten Key Questions on Cyber Risk and Cyber Risk Insurance THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION November 2016 The Geneva Association The Geneva Association is the leading international insurance think tank for strategically important insurance and risk management issues. The Geneva Association identifies fundamental trends and strategic issues where insurance plays a substantial role or which influence the insurance sector. Through the development of research programmes, regular publications and the organisation of international meetings, The Geneva Association serves as a catalyst for progress in the understanding of risk and insurance matters and acts as an information creator and disseminator. It is the leading voice of the largest insurance groups worldwide in the dialogue with international institutions. In parallel, it advances— in economic and cultural terms—the development and application of risk management and the understanding of uncertainty in the modern economy. The Geneva Association membership comprises a statutory maximum of 90 chief executive of officers (CEOs) from the world’s top insurance and reinsurance companies. It organises international expert networks and manages discussion platforms for senior insurance executives and specialists as well as policymakers, regulators and multilateral organisations. Established in 1973, The Geneva Association, officially the ‘International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics’, is based in Zurich, Switzerland and is a non-profit organisation funded by its Members. 2 www.genevaassociation.org
    [Show full text]
  • European Cyber Security Perspectives 2019 | 1 Preface
    European 2019Cyber Security Perspectives European Cyber Security Perspectives 2019 | 1 Preface Dear reader, 2018 is a difficult year to summarize for Infosec. After the initial flurry of activity around Spectre and Meltdown in the beginning of January, we ended the year with global supply chain concerns brought about by the Super Micro story. Throughout the year we saw the geopolitical dilemmas of 2018 manifest in cyber security issues. Technology giants like Facebook and Google had a security reckoning. However in pure scariness the medical data breaches of MyHeritage (DNA) and MyFitnessPal (health) rank higher. The Starwood Marriot Hotel breach made every travelling executive nervous for the rest of the year, but probably not as nervous as the incident of CEO Fraud at Pathé. In an effort to alleviate some of that impact we are proud to publish the 6th European Cyber Security Perspectives (ECSP) report. The 2019 issue is filled with great articles from our partners ranging from government, universities and private companies. Special thanks goes out to all the partners who have submitted an article for the 6th edition of the ECSP. Also huge hugs to first time authors from de Piratenpartij, de Volksbank, Leiden University, University of Illinois, Hack in the Box and QuSoft. If IoT was the buzzword in 2017 then Artificial Intelligence (AI) was most definitely in 2018. AI and security seem to be intertwined and that is why you will find several articles about AI in this issue. This year the organization of Hack in the Box created a challenge which you can find at the bottom of the centerfold.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Journal
    THE CAPCO INSTITUTE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION 20YEAR ANNIVERSARY OPERATIONAL RESILIENCE #53 MAY 2021 1 / THE CAPCO INSTITUTE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION RECIPIENT OF THE APEX AWARD FOR PUBLICATION EXCELLENCE Editor Shahin Shojai, Global Head, Capco Institute Advisory Board Michael Ethelston, Partner, Capco Michael Pugliese, Partner, Capco Bodo Schaefer, Partner, Capco Editorial Board Franklin Allen, Professor of Finance and Economics and Executive Director of the Brevan Howard Centre, Imperial College London and Professor Emeritus of Finance and Economics, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Philippe d’Arvisenet, Advisor and former Group Chief Economist, BNP Paribas Rudi Bogni, former Chief Executive Officer, UBS Private Banking Bruno Bonati, Former Chairman of the Non-Executive Board, Zuger Kantonalbank, and President, Landis & Gyr Foundation Dan Breznitz, Munk Chair of Innovation Studies, University of Toronto Urs Birchler, Professor Emeritus of Banking, University of Zurich Géry Daeninck, former CEO, Robeco Jean Dermine, Professor of Banking and Finance, INSEAD Douglas W. Diamond, Merton H. Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, University of Chicago Elroy Dimson, Emeritus Professor of Finance, London Business School Nicholas Economides, Professor of Economics, New York University Michael Enthoven, Chairman, NL Financial Investments José Luis Escrivá, President, The Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF), Spain George Feiger, Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Executive Dean, Aston Business School Gregorio de Felice, Head of Research and Chief Economist, Intesa Sanpaolo Allen Ferrell, Greenfield Professor of Securities Law, Harvard Law School Peter Gomber, Full Professor, Chair of e-Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt Wilfried Hauck, Managing Director, Statera Financial Management GmbH Pierre Hillion, The de Picciotto Professor of Alternative Investments, INSEAD Andrei A.
    [Show full text]
  • The Quest for Cyber Confidence
    Contact Information: International Telecommunication Union Place des Nations - 1211 Geneva 20 Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.itu.int/cybersecurity 4 ember 201 November 2014 November Nov | CE THE QUEST FOR ISBN 978-92-61-15301-4 NFIDEN CO CONFIDENCE CYBER CONFIDENCE 9 7 8 9 2 6 1 1 5 3 0 1 4 Price: 79 CHF Printed in Switzerland Geneva, November 2014 4 Photo credits: Shutterstock 11/2014 THE QUEST FOR CYBER FOR CYBER FOR CYBER THE QUEST QUEST Couv_cyber-confidence_371690_Ed.indd 2 13/11/2014 14:22:42 International Telecommunication Union THE QUEST FOR CYBER CONFIDENCE By Dr Hamadoun I. Touré Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union and the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information Security World Federation of Scientists NOVEMBER 2014 Legal notice Authors individually retain copyright to their work. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is not responsible for the content of external sources including external websites referenced in this publication. Neither ITU nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication. Disclaimer The chapters in this publication represent the views of the individual authors, which are not endorsed by or intended to represent the views of any organization they may be employed by or affiliated with. Mention of and references to specific countries, companies, products, initiatives or guidelines do not in any way imply that they are endorsed or recommended by ITU, the authors, or any other organization that the authors are affiliated with, in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
    [Show full text]
  • On Cyberwarfare
    DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER No. 7 On Cyberwarfare Fred Schreier DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER No. 7 On Cyberwarfare Fred Schreier Table of Contents On Cyberwarfare 7 1. The Basic Building Blocks: Cyberspace, Cyberpower, Cyberwarfare, and Cyberstrategy 10 2. The Difference between Information Warfare and Cyberwarfare 19 3. Understanding the Threats in Cyberspace 31 4. Cyber Vulnerabilities and how Cyber Attacks are Enabled 48 5. Major Issues, Ambiguities, and Problems of Cyberwar 68 Annex 1: In which Ways is Cyberwar different from the other Warfighting Domains? 93 Annex 2: Summary of major Incidents of Cyber Conflict 107 Glossary 116 Select Bibliography 121 DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER 5 6 DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER On Cyberwarfare The digital world has brought about a new type of clear and present danger: cyberwar. Since information technology and the internet have developed to such an extent that they have become a major element of national power, cyberwar has become the drumbeat of the day as nation-states are arming themselves for the cyber battlespace. Many states are not only conducting cyber espionage, cyber reconnaissance and probing missions; they are creating offensive cyberwar capabilities, developing national strategies, and engaging in cyber attacks with alarming frequency. Increasingly, there are reports of cyber attacks and network infiltrations that can be linked to nation-states and political goals. What is blatantly apparent is that more financial and intellectual capital is being spent figuring out how to conduct cyberwarfare than for endeavors aiming at how to prevent it.1 In fact, there is a stunning lack of international dialogue and activity with respect to the containment of cyberwar.
    [Show full text]
  • 2015 7Th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace
    2015 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace M.Maybaum, A.-M.Osula, L.Lindström (Eds.) 26-29 MAY 2015, TALLINN, ESTONIA 2015 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT: ARCHITECTURES IN CYBERSPACE Copyright © 2015 by NATO CCD COE Publications. All rights reserved. IEEE Catalog Number: CFP1526N-PRT ISBN (print): 978-9949-9544-2-1 ISBN (pdf): 978-9949-9544-3-8 CopyriGHT AND Reprint Permissions No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ([email protected]). This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO, and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non-commercial purposes, providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page as follows: [Article author(s)], [full article title] 2015 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace M. Maybaum, A.M. Osula, L. Lindström (Eds.) 2015 © NATO CCD COE Publications PrinteD copies of THIS publication are AVAILABLE from: NATO CCD COE Publications Filtri tee 12, 10132 Tallinn, Estonia Phone: +372 717 6800 Fax: +372 717 6308 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.ccdcoe.org Layout: Jaakko Matsalu LEGAL NOTICE: This publication contains opinions of the respective authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of NATO CCD COE, NATO, or any agency or any government.
    [Show full text]