The threats from China
- A case study over how the Swedish media respond and is affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities
Julia Grip
Two-year Political Science MA programme in Global Politics and Societal Change Dept. of Global Political Studies Course: Political Science Master's thesis ST631L (30 credits) Spring Semester 2020 Supervisor: Ivan Gusic
A warm thank you!
To my supervisor Ivan Gusic, who has guided me through the process of writing this thesis, helped me to elaborate my ideas and been supportive when I needed advice.
To my interview participants, who openly have shared their experiences with me and have given me their time, in order to help me write this thesis.
To my family, friends, former colleagues and colleagues whom have encouraged me, gave me helpful comments, good tips and provided feedback whenever I needed.
Abstract In 2018, there was clear evidence that Sweden was targeted of China’s attempts to influence their media. The Chinese embassy started criticising Swedish news reporting through insults or even threats. Since 2017 the Chinese ambassador has been summoned more than 40 times to the Swedish foreign department for his spiteful attacks on the media. This thesis examines how the Swedish media has responded and is affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities from 2018 to 2020.
The thesis is based on interviews with 10 participants from the Swedish media, and documents. The thesis shows, that threats and harassment from Chinese authorities is a unique behaviour from a state towards the Swedish media. The response to the threats and harassment is seen through strategies of adding security, showing solidarity and support and showing resistance. The affect on the Swedish media can increase a self-censorship culture, regarding reporting about China. It has made the Swedish media worried in the working and daily life. In the long run, the threats and harassment can have a negative impact on the independent journalism and the Swedish democratic society.
Keywords: China, threats, harassment, journalists, media, Sweden Word count: 21 969, excluding the appendix
Table of contents
1. Introduction …...……………………………………………………………………………………..1 1.1 Formulation of research question ……………………...………………………………………….3 1.2 Outline …...………………………………………………………………………………………..3 2. Background ………………………………………………………………………………………….4 2.1 China’s embassy and the Swedish media ………………...……………..………………………..4 2.1.1 The embassy’s website ……………………………………………………..………………...5 3. Literature Review ..………………………………………………………………………...…….….7 3.1 The media …………………………………………………………………………………………7 3.2 Studies on the Chinese embassy through the concepts of different power dimensions ………...... 8 3.3 Threats and harassment against the Swedish media ..………….…………………..……………..9 3.4 The Swedish media and other authoritarian states …...……...…………………………..………10 3.4.1 Russia’s embassy and the Swedish media ………...….………………………………...…...11 3.4.2 Israel’s embassy and the Swedish media ………...……….…………………………………12 3.5 The Swedish media and criticism from non-state actors ..……….……………………………...13 4. Theoretical framework …………………………………………………………………………….15 4.1 Theorising how the media respond when threatened from foreign states …...………….……....15 4.1.1 Strategy of adding security …….………………………………...………………………….15 4.1.2 Strategy of solidarity and support …………....…….…...…….………………………...... 16 4.1.3 Strategy of personal and collective resistance ………...………..……………………...... …16 4.2. Theorising how the media is affected by threats and harassment ………..………...…………..16 4.2.1 Impact om the individual journalist ……...…………………………………………………16 4.2.1.1 Self-censorship ……...…………………………………………………………………..16 4.2.1.2 Changed behaviour in working and daily life ...……………………………………...…17 4.2.1.3 Impact on the independent journalism and the civil society ...………………………….17 4.3 Operationalisation …………………………….………………..…………….…………….…17 5. Research design and methodological approach ………………………………………………….20 5.1 Qualitative case study …...... ………….…...………………………………………………….20 5.2 Reliability and Validity ….……………...……….……………………………………………....21 5.3 Delimitation ....……….…………...…………………………………………………………..….22 5.4 Documents ……………...………………………………………………………………………..23
5.5 Interviews …....….……...……………………………………...………………………………...23 5.5.1 Semi-structed interviews ...……...... ………………………………………………………...23 5.5.2 Ethical discussion …...……....……………………………………………………………….24 5.5.3 Selection of interview participants ...... ……………………………………………………...25 5.5.4 Presentation of interview participants ...……………………………………………………..26 6. Analysis …...………………………………………………………………………………………...27 6.1 Types of threats and harassment …………………...... ……..…...…………….…...... 28 6.1.1 No threats or harassment at all ……………………………………………………………....28 6.1.2 Threats and harassment from others than Chinese authorities ………………………………29 6.1.3 Threats and harassment due to actions by Chinese authorities …………………………..….30 6.1.4 Threats and harassment from Chinese authorities …………...…………………...…………31 6.1.5 Threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy’s website and through news media ...…32 6.2 How has the Swedish media responded to the threats and harassment ..…....………………...... 34 6.2.1 Strategy of adding security …….……………………………………………………………34 6.2.2 Strategy of solidarity and support …..….….…………………………….…………...…...…37 6.2.3 Strategy of personal and collective resistance ………..…….………….………………...... 40 6.3 How has the Swedish media been affected by the threats and harassment ..…………………....42 6.3.1 Impact on the individual journalist ………………………………………………...………..42 6.3.1.1 Self-censorship …………………………………………………………………………..42 6.3.1.2 Changed behaviour in working life …………………………………………………...... 44 6.3.1.3 Changed behaviour in daily life .…….…………………………………………..……....46 6.3.2 Impact on the independent journalism and the civil society ………………………………...47 6.3.2.1 Impact on the independent journalism …….………..………….…….……………...…...47 6.3.2.2 Impact on the civil society ...... ……………………….…………...... 50 7. Conclusion ……………..………………………………………………………………...……….....54 7.1 Suggestions for further research ...….………………………………………………………...... 57 8. Bibliography …….………………………………………………………………………………….58 9. Appendix ...……………………………………………………………………………………….…67 9.1 Presentation of interview participants ....…...……………...……………………….…………….67 9.2 Interview guide (In Swedish) ……....……………………..………………...…………...... 71
List of abbreviations CCP-The Chinese Communist Party GP- Göteborgs-Posten MSB- Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Agency for Social Protection and Emergency Preparedness) RSF Sweden- Reporters Without Borders Sweden RSF- Reporters Without Borders SR- Sveriges Radio (Swedish Radio) SVT- Sveriges Televis io n (Swedish National Televis io n)
1. Introduction First, as Human Rights Watch emphasises, no one should equate the Chinese government with the people of China. That would be blaming an entire people for the abuses of a government (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This thesis focuses on threats and harassment of Chinese authorities against the Swedish media sphere. Whenever China is expressed in the text it refers to Chinese authorities. Mainly it refers to representatives of the Chinese embassy in Sweden, which is the extension of the Chinese government. It is also used as an expression for the Chinese regime.
China’s authoritarian government The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long sought to influe nce media coverage about China outside the country (Cook, Freedom House, 2020). During the past ten years, China has advanced their methods of controlling information flows and media outlets abroad. A new generation of Chinese diplomats has started to address the foreign press. Amongst democracies that in various ways have been targets of Chinese pressure and attempts of controlling their media are The United States, New Zeeland and Taiwan. In 2018 it became clear that also Sweden where amongst those democratic countries. The Chinese embassy in Stockholm has since early 2018 released statements on their website in attempts to silence the Swedish media (Jerdén and Bohman, 2019; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020; Melissen, 2005: 88, 95-96).
The attacks and notices published on the Chinese embassy’s website coincide with a period in which there was a significant rise in Swedish reporting on China’s human rights abuses. One case being that of Hong Kong-based publisher and Swedish national, Gui Minhai which is still ongoing. Other Swedish reporting has been about the protests in Hong Kong that started 2019 and the indoctrination camps in the China Province Xinjiang, where new evidence arose in 2019 (Cook, Freedom House, 2020; Makar and Hamidi-Nia in SVT Nyheter, 25/02/2020; Jerdén and Bohman, 2019). At the embassy’s website one find s statements with headlines such as Ambassador Gui Congyou Refutes Lies of Swedish Media About the Case of Gui Minhai (Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 14/11/2019). Similar statements are found regarding Xinjia ng, the Hong Kong situation and other sensitive topics relating to China.
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China’s ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, have had the same type of massage in public interviews in news media. For example, the ambassador explained to the public service channel SVT that the Swedish evening newspaper Expressen could forget about visas to China if they did not change their reporting (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020). The threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy in Sweden towards the Swedish media escalated in late 2019. Then the Swedish section of the organisation PEN, Swedish PEN, awarded the Tucholsky Prize, for authors and publishers, to Gui Minhai. China ’s ambassador threatened the organisation that it would “come to feel the consequences of its decision” (Thörnqvist in SVT Nyheter, 17/05/2019; Sinclair in Svenska Dagbladet, 15/11/2019; Svenska PEN, 4/11/2019 Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020: 16).
The Chinese embassy in Sweden have also attacked the Swedish media due to other events than directly connected to human rights. SVT’s satire programme called Swedish News, was public ly critic ised by the Chinese embassy after a satirical film about Chinese tourists in the programme in 2018. The Chinese embassy in Sweden called the film racist, demanded an apology from SVT and threatened to take “further action” (Granlund and Micic in Aftonbladet, 15/09/2018; Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 15/09/2018; China Plus, 15/09/2018; Nilsson in Aftonbladet, 22/09/2018).
The many incidents indicate that the situation is serious. The threats and harassment from Chine s e authorities towards the Swedish media have increased during the past years. Yet, we know little about how the Swedish media has responded and even less concerning to what extent it has affected the Swedish media and those working with it. This thesis aims to fill this research gap by investigating this issue. This study show, that threats and harassment from Chinese authorities is a unique behaviour from a state towards the Swedish media. The Swedish media has responded to the threats and harassment through different strategies connected to digital and other security methods, showing solidarity and support and showing personal and collective resistance. The affect on the Swedish media could be seen through two factors: The impact on the individual journalist and the impact on the independent journalism and the civil society. The two impact factors show that threats and harassment from Chinese authorities can increase a self-censorship culture for the Swedish media, regarding the reporting about China. It has made the Swedish media worried in the working and daily life. In the long run, the threats and harassment can have a negative impact on the independent journalism and the Swedish democratic society.
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1.1 Formulation of research question
The threats and harassment stated in the previous text, is a constant risk for both distribution and production of media content. Disturbed conditions for the media in a society risk the functionality of the society. It undermines democracy (MSB, 2016: 5, 16). Due to the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities towards the Swedish media, the following research question was formulated: How does the Swedish media respond and/or is affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities?
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how the Swedish media respond and/or is affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities. The Chinese embassy in Sweden and its ambassador are the core representatives of China in Sweden. The threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy and its ambassador, towards the Swedish media, is the focus of this thesis. This thesis is a case study. The aim is to highlight several examples where Chinese authorities have threatened and harassed the Swedish media. 10 interviews with participants from the Swedish media sphere will be presented. This study will also show collected documents concerning the subject, such as public statements by the Swedish media and the Chinese embassy.
1.2 Outline
In this introductory chapter, the purpose and issues of this thesis were presented. The second chapter consists of a backgound of the Chinese embassy’s attacks on the Swedish media. The third chapter presents this thesis literature review followed by chapter four and the thesis theoretical framework. In chapter four, I will theorise how the media in general respond and is affected by threats and harassment. The fifth chapter consists of the research design and methodological approach. In chapter six the results and analysis will be presented, connecting to the theoretical framework. The seventh chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis. Here, I also elaborate on ideas for further research.
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2. Background 2.1 China’s embassy and the Swedish media
In 1950, Sweden started to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. China’s importance as a trading partner and provider of investments to Sweden has grown substantially during recent years. Although, compared to other member states of the European Union, Sweden is highlighted as one of the most active states when it comes to promoting human rights and democracy in relations with China. During 2018 there was evidence that Sweden was targeted of China’s attempts to influence their media. The Chinese embassy in Stockholm started criticising the Swedish news reporting for being anti-China and for spreading disinformation about the country. The actions of the embassy should be considered above all from a Chinese perspective as a form of influence which is included in a larger state agenda from an authoritarian regime (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020; Jerdén and Bohman, 2019; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020).
It is above all the Swedish criticism regarding human rights issues in China that triggers public attacks by the Chinese embassy. The Gui Minhai case occupies a special position in this context (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020; Jerdén and Bohman, 2019; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020). Hong Kong-based publisher and Swedish national, Gui Minhai has been held in China since 2015 when the Chinese government had him arrested and forcibly disappeared after he printed books critical of the Chinese government. In February 2020, he was sentenced to ten years in prison in China (Cook, Freedom House, 2020; Makar and Hamidi- Nia in SVT Nyheter, 25/02/2020; Jerdén and Bohman, 2019). When Swedish PEN, awarded Minha i the Tucholsky Prize in November 2019, the threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy in Sweden towards the Swedish media escalated (Thörnqvist in SVT Nyheter, 17/05/2019; Sinclair in Svenska Dagbladet, 15/11/2019; Svenska PEN, 4/11/2019 Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020: 16; Svenska PEN, 20/02/20). Except from threats connected to specific events the Chinese embassy’s attempts to influence the Swedish media also includes threatening with denied visas for Swedish reporters who report negatively about China. Further, multip le criticising emails and letters has been sent from the embassy to media outlets and individual reporters. The Chinese ambassador have also invited media outlets and individ ua l reporters to personal meetings and lunches where he criticises the reporting of China (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020; Kainz Rognerud et al, in SVT Nyheter, 19/01/2020).
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2.1.1 The embassy’s we bs ite
The strategy to attack the Swedish media on the Chinese embassy website have been extensive. Under the headline “Spokesperson's Remarks” one can see that since the first post in June 2018, 67 official statements have been made (up to mid-August 2020). The by far most attacked person in the stateme nts on the website is Gui Minhai and events related to him (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020). November 14, the day before the Tucholsky Prize was to be handed out to Minhai, the Chinese embassy published a statement on their website with the headline : Ambassador Gui Congyou Refutes Lies of Swedish Media About the Case of Gui Minhai. The statement contains an interview which the ambassador made on November 12 with Swedish Radio (SR), concerning that the Swedish PEN would award Minhai the Tucholsky Prize. Below I present an extract from the interview:
Ambassador Gui: We urge Svenska PEN to cancel the award to Gui Minhai immediately, and the Swedish government officials not to attend the awarding ceremony. If they ignore the strong oppositions from the Chinese side and go ahead anyway, we will have to take measures. Some people in Sweden shouldn’t expect to feel at ease after hurting the feelings of the Chinese people and the interests of the Chinese side.
Q: I think the awarding will happen. Could you please specify the countermeasures from the Chinese side?
Ambassador Gui: You will see. We ask Svenska PEN to show some basic respect for China and the 1.4 billion Chinese people and stop the wrong actions before it’s too late. Let’s wait and see. (Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 14/11/2019).
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The embassy’s statements on the website and the rhetoric are similar in their design. They only seem to replace the person and the subject. For example, regarding the well-known Swedish author and public opinion former Kurdo Baksi, one statement has the headline: The Agenda of the Likes of Kurdo Baksi to Instigate Confrontation and Damage Relations between China and Sweden Will Never Succeed. The statement on the embassy website was made due to an article Baksi wrote about Gui Minhai in January 2019 stating that he was kidnapped. The article was published in the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). The Chinese embassy’s statement claims that Kurdo in the article “resumed his old tricks of distorting and fabricating facts”. Baksi is described as “a man who runs at the front of the anti- China forces in Sweden” (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020: 4; Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 20/01/2019).
There are other similar statements about Baksi as well as other Swedish media profiles, such as the journalist and China expert Jojje Olsson. Specific media outlets and organisations together with national and local newspapers are also targeted with similar rhetoric in the embassy statements (Embassy of People’s Republic of China to Sweden: Spokesperson’s remarks).
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3. Literature Review This study aims to provide good space for the analysis. Hence, this review will shortly present and recommend some specific studies whilst other interesting literature from books, articles and journals I have read on the subject will be referred to as several references in the text. News articles will also be included in some sections.
This review includes five different sections located as valuable for the study. First, I will present a short definition of the media and its importance. Second, literature on the Chinese embassy in Sweden through the concepts of different power dimens io ns will be viewed. Third, I present literature on threats and harassment against the Swedish media through the concepts of democracy principals and journalism ethics. I will also shortly explain the research gap noticed between these two types of studies as well as my focus of this thesis. Fourth, I present an overview on the relationship between the Swedish media and other authoritarian states, using Russia’s and Israel’s Swedish embassies as examples. Fifth, a short section will provide an overview of the Swedish media and their way to handle criticism from non-state actors, having private companies and their use of lawsuits and litiga tio n as an example.
3.1 The media
The media is an important source for most people concerning information and knowledge about current events and political issues. The media has a central position in democratic political communicatio n. Hence, the quality of democracy can never be decoupled from the way media works. Democracy, politics, media and journalism are always interconnected (Nord and Strömbäck, 2004; Carey, 1999). Further, the term media and journalism are often used as synonyms. Journalism is usually produced within the media. The media is necessary in order for journalism to be spread to the public. However, the media can, for example, also spread entertainment and movies. Thus, people who work with the media include all kinds of journalists, programme hosts, news anchors, authors and public opinion formers (Nord and Strömbäck, 2004).
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3.2 Studies on the Chinese embassy through the concepts of different power dimensions
The Chinese embassy’s escalated attempts to influence the Swedish media is recently discovered and in 2018 clear patterns could be seen. Thus, not much research is yet conducted on the specific topic. I will recommend and shortly present two conducted studies from this year that I found, that focuses on the Chinese embassy in Sweden. First, Karin Ek Thorbjörnsson have conducted the 2020 study A BALANCING ACT?: A study on Sweden’s ambivalence in responding to pressure from the Chinese embassy. Through interviewing six Swedish journalists and researchers, Ek Thorbjörnsson examines how the power asymmetry between Sweden and China affect the case of the Chinese embassy exerting pressure on journalists. She applies a theoretical framework of primarily soft power, sharp power and the power inbalance between China and Sweden (Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020: 1- 28).
She emphasises the method of doing what she calls “elite intervie ws ”, which include s participants selected due to their involvement or expertise in the specific case that is studied. Ek Thorbjörnsson’s analysis has a focus on the political pressure from the Chinese embassy and the response from the journalists and experts on the subject, where she uses her theoretical concepts to identify the responses (Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020: 1-28, 30-32). Ek Thorbjörnsson also emphasises that the case of the Chinese embassy’s pressure is something that Sweden is very unfamiliar with. This indicate that state’s embassies in Sweden usually not pressure Sweden in the way China does which is valuable information to my study. I will take a deeper look at other state’s embassies behaviour later on in this review (ibid).
Further, Vilma Björk’s 2020 study: En konstruerad verklighet: en narrativ analys av kinesiska ambassaden aims to understand China’s use of soft power in Sweden (Björk 2020). In order to understand how the Chinese embassy constructs an image of China, Björk’s study uses power and soft power in the literature review to then use narratives and strategic narratives as a theory. Björk has a narrative analysis conducted on texts produced by the embassy. Hence, Björk does not use interviews in her study (ibid). From the analys is Björk emphasises that there are two metanarratives being constructed: that China is harmonious, and that China is misunderstood. The two metanarratives are included in the way China construct the image of the country. The first metanarrative includes that China is a victim. Hence, their actions are only a self-defense mechanism. The second metanarrative include that people do not have enough knowledge about China. This is why people sometimes become critical, because they do not have the right information (ibid: 33).
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Thus, by promoting this image of being either victims or misunderstood China attempts to influence others opinion of the situation in China and what China stands for. In this strategy China tries to influence actors to change their behaviour (Björk, 2020: 33). This can be connected to how the Chinese embassy tries to change the Swedish media reporting about China and is therefore of interests for my research.
3.3 Threats and harassment against the Swedish media
Although, when searching through literature, I found that studies about threats and harassment towards Swedish journalists mainly concern threats and harassment from other actors such as individual people or criminal gangs harassing the media. This is because in a democratic country like Sweden it is rare for a state to be the largest threats for journalists. Hence, studies that focuses on threats and harassment towards Swedish journalists rarely focuses on the political pressure when for example self-censorship is studied (Dorian and Wirkensjö 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011; Olsve, 2014; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020).
Instead studies about threats and harassment towards Swedish journalists and media profiles often includes literature and theoretical concepts related to journalism ethics and democracy. For example, I recommend Oslve’s study Hot mot svenska journalister: en kvalitativ studie om påverkan i arbete och vardag for an understanding of threats towards Swedish journalists and the impact on their work and everyday life (Olsve, 2014: 2). Olsve explore eight journalists’ experiences related to threats and how journalists are affected. He analysis the threats on the basis of journalism tasks according to different models of democracy with the result that threats to journalists and the possible consequences have a negative effect on various democratic ideals (Olsve, 2014: 2).
For further research on the subject I recommend Dorian and Wirkensjö (2013) Näthatets konsekvenser – en studie av hur svenska kvällstidningskrönikörer förhåller sig till hot och hat and Arvidsson et al (2011) Hot mot reportrar på svenska dagstidningar – Påverkan och konsekvenser för journalistiken och demokratin.
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Thus, I noticed a research gap between studies who examine threats and harassment against journalists through the concepts of different power dimens io ns and through the concepts of democracy principals and journalism ethics. However, noted from both types of studies, is the value of doing interviews (Dorian and Wirkensjö 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011; Olsve, 2014; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020). The aim fo r this study is to focus on how the media respond/and or is affected by threats from Chinese authorities. To provide an in depth-knowledge of the response and affect, this study will focus on concepts that has its focus on the media and the journalist (Olsve, 2014). Thus, this study will combine the investiga t io n of a state that threats the Swedish media with theoretical concepts about how the media respond and is affected when threats occur. This provides a slightly differe nt and interesting perspective of how to examine for example the phenomena of self-censorship under political pressure.
3.4 The Swedish media and other authoritarian states
Here, I have viewed statements on the website of Israel’s and Russia’s embassies in Sweden and their public statements through news media in Sweden. China, Russia and Israel where all amongst the worlds 10 most powerful nations in 2020 according to the U.S News and World Report’s annual study (U.S. News, 2020). The states are all known to be the subject of Swedish and international journalism. I have only viewed statements on the Chinese embassy website and their statements through news media in Sweden from 2018 to 2020. The same applies for Russia’s and Israel’s embassies 1. In some occasions I have taken examples from Russia’s and Israel’s embassies actions further back in time and viewed how the Swedish media has responded to criticism. This was due to the lack of criticising statements towards the Swedish media on the two embassies website’s and through public statements in news media.
1 China’s embassy in Sweden do not have any official social media accounts other than the website. Russia’s and Israel’s embassies both have Twitter and Facebook accounts. In addition, Israel’s embassy also have a blog and Instagram while Russia’s embassy also has a Flickr account. Some accounts are in the respective country’s language. When quickly searching through the publications on Russia’s and Israel’s embassies other social media accounts that where in English, I found that the statements and the rhetoric when referring to the Swedish media or Sweden, where not different than on their websites or through news media (Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Sweden; Embassy of Israel in Sweden). 10
3.4.1 Russia’s embassy and the Swedish media
Russia is Sweden’s geographically nearest superpower and are constantly present in Swedish foreign policy (Orebäck and Öhrström 2017; Kragh and Åsberg, 2017). Kragh and Åsberg (2017) provide in their paper Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case empirical evidence on how Russia since 2014 has moved towards a preference for active measures towards Sweden. The Swedish media has since 2018 published several articles regarding Russia’s interference in the Baltic Sea as well as whether there are Russian spies in Sweden (Kragh and Åsberg, 2017; Sveriges Television, SVT Nyheter: Ryssland; Svenska Dagbladet, SvD-Ryssland). Russia’s current ambassador to Sweden, Victor Tatarintsev, has been the ambassador since 2014 (Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Sweden). The Russian embassy’s officia l website in Swede n contains very few statements regarding disputes between Sweden and Russia.
Under the headline the embassy in action – news and arrangements one of the latest news is a link to an article intervie w with Tatarintsev in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Industri 2018. In the interview Tatarintsev claims that Russia “does not have any spies in Sweden”. On the website the link to the article have the headline Russian Ambassador Victor Tatarintsev’s interview to Dagens Industri. Similar statements and links regarding public interviews in other Swedish newspapers is found on the website and the interviews follow the same rhetoric as stated above (Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Sweden 14/01/2018; Öhrn in Dagens Industri 14/01/2018). To find larger disputes one has to go back in time.
In 2016 Tatarintsev made an interview with Swedish Radio (SR) stating that relations between Sweden and Russia where on their lowest point in a long time with reference to the Swedish support to Ukraine regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He expressed that the Swedish media has ”Russian- phobia” (Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Sweden 14/01/2018; Öhrn in Dagens Industri 14/01/2018; Tatarintsev, 2016 in Sveriges Radio, SR, 02/10/2016; Munatu in SVT Nyheter, 08/12/2016). In 2016 the Russian embassy in Stockholm also exerted pressure against the Swedish journalist Maria Georgieva 2 (Voronov in Eskilstuna-Kurriren 29/02/2016; Dagens Media 29/02/2016).
2 The newspaper Svenska Dagbladet’s then Moscow correspondent Maria Georgieva wrote an article about the Malaysian passenger plane MH17 which was shot down over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014. It was concluded that Russian military commanders where responsible for the shooting. The Russian embassy critisised Georgieva in a Facebook post with a t e xt and a photo of her (Voronov in Eskilstuna-Kurriren 29/02/2016; Dagens Media 29/02/2016). 11
Amongst other things Georgieva was accused of pointing out the Russian leadership “in an absolutely ruthless and biased manner”. Swedish journalists reacted strongly to the attack on Georgieva. The local newspaper in Southern Sweden, Eskilstuna-Kuriren’s political editor Alex Voronov said that it is “difficult to see the comment as anything other than threats and pressure” (ibid). Georgieva has since the attack continued to write about sensitive topic related to Russia (Georgieva in Publikt, 09/02/2019).
To sum up, the public statements of the Russian embassy since 2018, have not included any major attacks on the Swedish media. Before 2018, when the Swedish media was exposed to harsher attacks the strategy from Swedish journalists seemed to be to answering the criticis m. Sometimes it was answered by co- workers such as other journalists. The Swedish media have also continued to write about sensitive topics related to Russia (Voronov in Eskilstuna-Kurriren 29/02/2016; Dagens Media 29/02/2016; Georgieva in Publikt, 09/02/2019).
3.4.2 Israel’s embassy and the Swedish media
The relationship between Sweden and Israel has long been tense due to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The conflict is especially a territorial conflict over the area that has historically come to be called Palestine. Sweden recognised Palestine as a state in 2014 (Jansson in SVT 10/09/2019; Wibeck, 2009; Berglund Svensson, 2019). The Swedish media has frequently reported news related to the Israel- Palestine conflic t. According to Berglund Svensson, the international community’s recognition of Palestine has been central in the Swedish reporting throughout the years (Berglund Svensson, 2019: 2-7).
Israel’s current ambassador Ilan Ben-Dov has been the ambassador since 2017. On the official website of Israel’s embassy there is not even a headline for public statements. No verbal attacks on the Swedish media or Sweden is found on the website (Embassy of Israel in Sweden). Although, since 2018 Ben-Dov have made some public statements through news media in Sweden. For example, in 2019 Ben-Dov mad e a statement in the Swedish newspaper Expressen. He claimed that Sweden by recognising Palestine “hurted the peace process” between Israel and Palestine (Lidholm in Expressen, 09/04/2019).
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In June 2020, the Swedish government adopted a strategy for development cooperation with the Palestinian authority for the period 2020-2024 (Grossman in Omvärlden, 02/07/2020). In connection with that the adopted strategy is accusing Israel of complicating developments on the West Bank, Ben- Dov claims that it is “completely wrong and not based on facts” (ibid). However, to find larger disputes one has to go back in time. For example, in 2004 Israel’s former ambassador to Sweden, Zvi Maze l, destroyed an artwork at the Historica l museum in Stockholm and verbally attacked one of the responsible artists, Dror Feiler. The ambassador was eventually forced by the museum manager to leave the place3(Malms trö m and Ekinge in SvD, 17/01/2004).
Also, here, it was shown that the public appearance of Israel’s embassy since 2018, has not included any major attacks on the Swedish media despite the media’s frequently reporting. When the Swedish media has been exposed to harsher attacks such as in 2004, the strategy appear to be to answer the critic is m. The Swedish media have also continued to write about sensitive topics related to Israel despite hateful attacks (Berglund Svensson, 2019: 1-7; Malmströ m and Ekinge in SvD, 17/01/2004).
3.5 The Swedish media and criticism from non-state actors
To compare how the Swedish media handles criticis m from state’s embassies I will present another kind of threat, mainly used from private firms and companies. Threatening the media with lawsuits and litigation is a relatively new issue for the media regarding handling critic is m from non-state actors (Levi, 2017). However, in a Swedish context this strategy from companies is rare. Literature on this subject often refer to companies in The United States of America (USA) (Levi, 2017). Below, I will shortly present an example of a USA based company which threatened a Swedish film company with laws uits and litigation4.
3 Here, I include the culture sphere in the Swedish media sphere as I present attacks relating to the freedom of expression. 4 Also here, I include the culture sphere in the Swedish media sphere as I present attacks relating to the freedom of expression. 13
The documentary film Bananas! *5 from 2007 provoked strong reactions from the America n food company Dole Food. In July 8, 2009 Dole brought an action before the court in Los Angeles against the journalist and maker of the film Fredrik Gertten, the film’s producer Margarete Jangård and the Swedish film company WG Film. The lawsuit meant costs in millions for the small film company (Sjölund and Enback, 2014; Lofturp in Swedish Radio, 15/10/2019). Gertten and Jangård had a strategy of answering the criticis m. Gertten claimed his right to freedom of expression relating to making the film (Lofturp in Swedish Radio, 15/10/2019, Idfa film).
In Sweden the attention around Gertten and his fight against Dole was huge. Individ ua ls as well as Swedish food companies engaged in the case. The Swedish Parliament expressed concerns about Dole’s attempts to impose censorship. Dole eventually made a withdraw of the lawsuit. The discussion about freedom of expression that took place in Sweden in connection with the dispute was a big reason for the withdraw (Lofturp in Swedish Radio, 15/10/2019; Idfa film). In 2011 a sequel was released, called Big Boys Gone Bananas! * about Dole’s reactions to the first film and their attempts to silence it (Svenska Filminsitutet). Hence, if we compare the strategies used by the Swedish media sphere to handle criticis m from state’s embassies with their strategies to handle critic is m from non-state actors regarding lawsuits and litiga tio n, it appears like answering criticis m and getting support from both the media sphere and other actors in Sweden are seen in both of the scenarios.
5 Bananas! * is a documentary film from 2007 directed by Fredrik Gertten. The film had its Swedish cinema premiere on October 9, 2009. The film is about a group of Nicaraguan fruit workers and their legal battle with the fruit and vegetable company Dole. Gertten follows the American-Cuban lawyer Juan Domínguez as he represents 12 workers at the Nicaraguan banana plantation in a lawsuit against their employer Dole Food. The trial takes place, in the Los Angeles Superior Court (Sjölund and Enback, 2014; Lofturp in Swedish Radio, 15/10/2019). The workers accuse Dole of having caused their infertility through the use of pesticide DBCP to protect its banana crops in 1982. The United States prohibited the use of the chemical’s five years earlier. Dole was aware of this, but continued to expose its foreign employees. Of the 12 workers, six of them won the lawsuit (Idfa film: Sjölund and Enback, 2014; Danielson in Aftonbladet, 15/06/2009). 14
4. Theoretical framework The theoretical framework has a focus on concepts of how the media generally respond and is affected when threatened. Initially, I will theorise how the media respond when threatened by foreign states. Then, I will theorise how the media usually is affected when exposed to threats and harassment. Here I will theorise the impact on the individual journalist when threatened. Followed by the impact on the independent journalism and the civil society when the media is threatened. In the end, an operationalisation model will be presented. The model illustrates how the Swedish media would respond and be affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities.
4.1 Theorising how the media respond when threatened from foreign states
When the media is threatened it is common to start developing differe nt strategies to be able to proceed the journalistic work.
4.1.1 Strategy of adding security
Adding security to feel safe is a strategy that is used in various types of journalistic work such as when covering the reporting in conflic t zones, political relationships between states or political matters in a specific state. Digital safety for journalists has become important since new technology is a powerful tool for states to track them. Journalists are likely to be surveilled when covering sensitive topics such as governmental actions and foreign policy (Digital Rights Foundation 2017; Waters 2018, Chen, 2020; Mills, 2019). Hence, journalists adopt different approaches regarding their digital safety (McGregor and Watkins 2016, Chen, 2020). For example, installing encrypted security apps to reduce the chance fo r others to access their internet or telephone accounts. Some will leave their telephone outside the room during work meetings. In addition to digital security, other types of security methods can be applied. For example, having extra work meetings concerning a specific topic that caused the threats (Chen, 2020). Reporting threats or harassment to the police or using police protection for public speeches and like wis e is seen if the threat situatio n escalates (Journalistpanelen, 2019; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011: 29-33).
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4.1.2 Strategy of solidarity and support
Further, solidarity and support include that working teams often come together in the fight against an external threat. A threat draws team members within the media sphere together. It heightens pressures toward uniformity. Therefore, common protests against a common threat is seen (Staw et al, 1981; Pepitone and Kleiner, 1957). For example, through public joint statements to raise awareness about the threats. Further, non-media actors such as the society or governments sometimes gives support to a media that has been threatened (Staw et al, 1981; Pepitone and Kleiner, 1957).
4.1.3 Strategy of personal and collective resistance
Studies also show that threats and harassment impact different types of media and those working with it to show resistance. Journalists that are threatened rather get motivated to continue to write about issues related to the subject that caused the threats (Olsve, 2014: 38; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013: 32). The resistance is shown on both a personal and collective plan. The ambition for the media to not decline because of threats is relatively pervasive. One explanation for this resistance, is that threats and harassment against the media sphere is seen as a democratic problem. It restricts the journalis tic autonomy and limits the ability of the individual to work and act independently (Keane, 1991: 36-37; Olsve, 2014: 38; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013). Hence, there is a strong will to live up to the democratic ideals of journalism, and thus, not to give up oneself to hatred and threats (Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013: 32).
4.2. Theorising how the media is affected by threats and harassment
4.2.1 Impact on the individual journalist
4.2.1.1 Self censorship
Threats and harassment also have a major impact on the individ ua l. Several studies show that one major consequence of threats and harassment is self-censorship (Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011; Clark and Grech, 2017). Here, instead of getting more motivated by the threats, as under the previous headline, people that work for the media consciously or subconsciously self-censor (Tapsell, 2012; Yesil, 2014; Journalistpanelen, 2019).
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For example, by avoiding to write about a particular topic that is the common root of threats. Strategies to avoid self- censorship and government interference is for example included in training for journalis ts in conflict zones due to the large impact it has on the individual (Tapsell, 2012; Yesil, 2014; Journalistpanelen, 2019; McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000).
4.2.1.2 Changed behaviour in working and daily life
Further, the affect of the threats and harassment is seen through a changed behaviour in the working and daily life, for those who work for the media. Negative consequences when external threats occur, relate to stress within a working team and feeling worried at home. Several individuals feel restricted in their work and daily life. Hence, there is a common stressed feeling from the media sphere due to threats and harassment (Griffith and Vatikus, 1999).
4.2.1.3 Impact on the independent journalism and the civil society
Last, threats and harassment against the media, will in the long run have a negative impact on the independent journalism and the civil society. This is connected to that threats and harassment against the media is related to a democratic problem. Hence, threats and harassment jeopardise the future of journalism. It also has a negative impact on various democratic ideals. Provided training to not be affected in the independent journalistic work is also something included especially for journalists in conflict zones (Yesil, 2014: 72; Olsve, 2014; McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000; Keane, 1991: 36-37; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013).
4.3 Operationalisation
Drawing from the theoretical framework, this study examines three major factors relating to the response and the affect of the Chinese embassy’s attacks on the Swedish media. On the next page a simple mod e l has been made to illustrate the factors included in the study. The first factor is the response which is developing different strategies to tackle the threats and harassment. The strategies are presented under the box The response from the Swedish media in the model. Further, two factors view how the media is affected when threatened. They are presented in the box The affect on the Swedish media in the model. After the presented model, there is an explanation of how I have examined the factors.
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Threats and harassment towards the Swedish media from Chinese authorities
The response from The affect on the Swedish the Swedish media media
Stradegies to tackle criticisim from Chinese authorities Impact on the individ ua l Impact on the independent journalist journalism and the civil society Adding security: For example, digital Self-censorship: For example, The threats on the media security or other security methods such as avoiding to write about a affect the independent reporting to the police, getting police particular topic that is the journalism negatively and protection or extra work meetings. common root of threats. jeopardise the future journalism regarding Solidarity and support: Support amongst Changed behaviour in reporting about China. media organisations, for exemple making working life: For example public joint stamtents to alarm about the stress and worry within a It also have a negative affect threats. Or support from non-media actors. working team. on the civil society and various democratic ideals. Personal and collective resistance: The Changed behaviour in daily threats motivates those who write/talk life: For example, feeling about the topic that caused threats. Hence, worried at home due to the threats. they continue to write/talk about the topic. In the broader perspective the topic is more monitored by the media.
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The response from the Swedish media: 1. Adding security: Here I have explored if the participants have added security due to the threats and harassment. The security concern digital safety and other types of security methods imple me nted, such as extra work meetings, reporting to the police or getting police protection. 2. Solidarity and support: Here I ask about the support the media organisations have given each other such as making joint public statements and alarming about the threats. I also ask about the support from non-media actors such as the Swedish government or international support fro m other states. 3. Personal and collective resistance: I ask the participants if the threats and harassment has motivated the participants to continue to write/talk about the topic. I have also examined if the participatns believe that topics related to China is more monitored by the Swedish media today.
The affect on the Swedish me dia: 1. Impact on the individual journalist: Here, I explore if self-censorship due to threats and harassment from Chinese authorities, is a consequential to the Swedish media. With my participants I have discussed if the threats and harassment have changed the way they write or talk about topics related to China. I also explore if the threats and harassment has affected the participants in the working and daily life. For example, if stress within a working team has occurred or if they feel worried at home. 2. Impact on the independent journalis m and the civil society: I ask the participants about the negative impact on the independent journalism and the civil society. For example, I examine if the threats and harassment jeopardise the future journalism regarding reporting about China or if it has a negative impact on the society and various democratic ideals in Sweden. I am aware that these components are difficult to fully examine. I have not focused constantly on this. However, from the interviews together with the collected documents, there are some indications and conclusions that is drawn concerning this. I will, as far as my empirica l materia l allow, exa mine these components.
When exploring the response from and the affect on the Swedish media I have also viewed the public debate in Sweden. I have used relevant documents concerning the behaviour of the Chinese authorit ies towards the Swedish media as a means of guidance.
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5. Research design and methodological approach In this chapter I am going to present this thesis research design and methodological approach. First, I am going to present my choice of doing a qualitative case study with a qualitative method approach. Then, I move forward to the questions of reliability and validity of this thesis, followed by the delimitation of this thesis. Further, I describe the material used in this thesis which includes documents and interviews. I present my choice of documents and my interview method. When it comes to the interviews, I will also include an ethical discussion. Last, I shortly present the interview participants.
5.1. Qualitative case study
I chose to do a case study since it appeared the most suitable in order to investigate the research problem. There are different ways to define what a case study is. A case study can, for example, focus on several individ ua ls, a fraction of a society, an organisation or a society as a whole. It is however, crucial that the researcher brings out the peculiar and essential in the case or cases (Johannessen and Tufte, 2003: 56-57, 83). I have chosen to highlight specific example cases of threats against the Swedish media from Chinese authorities. Thus, this study can be called a case study. Further, a case study is suitable for collecting a lot of information (data) about a specific phenomenon by using both observation, interviews, as well as existing data (Johannessen and Tufte, 2003: 56-57, 83). This case study consists of interviews with representatives of the Swedish media sphere, along with collected documents concerning the subject.
The use of documents is central to most research studies. Interviewing provides a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon and provides a rich variety of perspectives (Tjora, 2012). Hence, the combination of those two data sets, gives an analysis of both the interviews and the collected documents. Further, this study uses the qualitative method approach. I chose a qualitative method approach because the weight lies on an understanding of social reality on the basis of how participants in a certain environment interpret this reality. The involvement in a specific social environment leads to informat io n. The method is useful when seeking to understand or interpret a phenomenon (Bryman, 2011: 29, 40-41, 340-343). Qualitative studies are based on a research strategy where the emphasis more often lies on words than on figures, when collecting and analysing data. Alan Bryman believes that a qualitative strategy is inductive and interpretive, which goes in line with this study. A qualitative researcher strives for a close relationship with the group of people that is studied (ibid).
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5.2 Reliability and Validity
Starting with reliability, it refers to the question whether the results of one examination will be the same if it is replicated, or if the results are affected by random or temporary premises (Bryman, 2011: 49). Because it is impossib le to “stop” a social environment, it is often difficult to fully meet the criteria in qualitative studies. In order to come up with results that are comparable to the previous research, it is necessary to take on a similar social role, as the first researchers has done (Bryman, 2011: 352). This is applied in this study, by referring to the selected method and the theoretical framework. When selecting the method and the theoretical framework I have viewed previous research. Then I elaborated what specific methods and theory perspectives would contribute to this study, and could be measured fairly.
However, the case of the Chinese embassy’s attempts to influence the Swedish media is an on-going and relative ly new scenario. The subject is relevant, however, that it is ongoing can potentially affect the reliability of the study. New knowledge and perspectives may arise. Further, this study is conducted in a Swedish context. Hence, the variety of states’ values and politica l systems can affect the findings (Ek Thorbjörnsson 2020: 32-33). Although, the interview participants, were carefully selected to ensure that the intervie ws together with the collected documents is overall trustworthy and consistent with the research question and my purpose for the study (ibid).
Further, validity is about whether one observes, identifies or measures what is desired. Bryman highlights the concept of internal validity. It means that there must be a good correspondence between the observations made by the researcher and the theoretical ideas. The internal validity tends to be a strength within qualitative studies. This is shown in my analysis where a good amount of data has been provided by the help of the theoretical framework, indicating that the internal validity is good. External valid ity raises the question if the results from a study can be generalised based on the specific research context. Although, the relevance of external validity is not as high in qualitative studies and the question regarding representation in interview participants and results have a clearer relevance within quantitative studies (Olsve, 2014; Bryman, 2011: 50-53).
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A larger sample of interview participants would be preferable to ensure for the results to be generalised correctly. Although, a large sample do not necessarily generate more value or quality to the findings and it is also time- consuming. Hence, as mentioned, the importance of external validity is not as relevant in qualitative studies as in the quantitative ones (Bryman, 2011: 50-53; Tracy, 2013; 230-231; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020: 32-33).
5.3 Delimitation
Except from the media broadcast China Plus, in the introduction chapter, no sources from China will be used in this study. It is important to note when using an official broadcaster from China, that they represent the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus, they might not report incidents that may hurt the regime (Nerbu Baalsrud, 2013: 18). This thesis focuses on incidents regarding the Swedish media. Hence, this study does mainly include documents concerning how Sweden has reported the example cases in the study. However, public statements made by the Chinese embassy in Sweden have been highlighted. Since the Chinese embassy represents the state China in Sweden.
This thesis will examine the behaviour of Chinese authorities between 2018-2020, with a focus on the Chinese embassy in Sweden. Hence, the main material, both interviews and documents will include information about the subject from 2018- 2020. Except from the participant Jojje Olsson who was banned from China in 2016 due to his journalistic work and has been exposed to threats and harassment since 2017, I will examine how the participants in this study has been exposed to threats and harassment from Chinese authorities between 2018-2020 by highlighting examples. This study will not make any distinction between threats and harassment between persons of specific genders. The aim was to seek even representation regardless of gender or gender identification.
However, it should be noted that finding female participants who had been threatened by Chinese authorities was difficult. Partly, since the incidents linked to the problem were mainly directed towards men within the Swedish media sphere. Further, representatives from the media sphere in terms of chief editors and chairpersons, were mainly men. It should also be noted that the positive answers, about participating in the study, came mainly from men.
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5.4 Documents
The document selection for this study includes existing material that is relevant. It mainly contains sources from the Swedish media. For example, public statements in Swedish news coverage, that relate to the different examples of incidents. The Swedish news coverage comes from Swedish newspapers, TV news, radio news and online media in Sweden. The sources for the media news coverage are deemed to be reliable. It contains news from, for example, the public service channels Swedish National Televisio n (SVT) and Swedish Radio (SR). Some material will also come from the website of the Chinese embassy in Sweden. This is to explore the attacks the embassy has made towards the Swedish media sphere. Further, articles from different science journals and research is used in this study throughout.
In addition, five reports have been used. They are used as additional material to the arguments by the interview participants and the other collected documents. The reports come from the four reliable organisations, Reporters Without Borders (Swedish section and globally), Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and the Swedish think thank Frivärld (Free World). All reports, including the one from Reporters Without Borders Swedish section and Frivärld, exist in English. The English reports are the ones referred to in the study.
5.5 Interviews 5.5.1 Semi- structured interviews
This study will use semi-structured interviews. I chose this interview structure because, in semi- structured interviews, the interviewer has more freedom to design the interview. Semi-structured interview questions tend to be more generally formulated than structured ones (Bryman, 2011: 413-415). The interviewer has certain room to ask additional questions when needed which could give important information (Bryman, 2011: 413-415). I have followed a questionnaire during the interviews. Sometimes I have changed the order of the questions in between the interviews. I have also allowed myself to ask follow-up questions on such occasions when considered justified (Bryman, 2011: 419-434). During the interviews, much room was left for the respondents to give as exhaustive of an answer as they wanted. It should be added that some of the interview questions were reformulated at the level of detail, depending on how the conversation went.
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The crucial questions where I needed to find answers for the study, were always asked, and remained the same throughout, as recommended for this type of interview (Bryman, 2011: 419-434). My goal was to meet all interview participants in person for the interviews. Due to the ongoing Corona situation there has been no practical opportunity to meet in person. The time set for the data collection for the study has been during the Corona pandemic. Therefore, the interviews have been made through Skype or Zoom. Although, mediated interviews are cost-effective and time-effective because they do not depend on geographical location. Mediated interviews can also create a safer space for respondents to share their thoughts and experiences (Tracy, 2013: 164-165).
The interview participants were open with their experiences of threats and harassment. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, according to the interview structure (Bryman, 2011: 419-434). One short conversation was made through a telephone call between me and an interview participant. That conversation was not recorded. The participant has been informed about what I am going to write concerning the conversation. The participant has allowed me to include the conversation in this study.
5.5.2 Ethical discussion
Ethical discussions in political science studies concern the role of values in the research process. The discussion deal with how to treat the individuals being studied, for example, in matters concerning integrity, anonymity confidentiality, and to be able to participate voluntarily (Bryman, 2011: 126-127, 131-132). The interviews in this study were conducted in Swedish. This decision was made since it is the mother tongue of both the participants and the author. The interviews were translated to English by the researcher. The participants had the opportunity to view the quotations translated into English. They also had the possibility to comment on the formulations of the quotations. The interview participants were informed about the conditions for the study. The aim to do the interviews in Swedish was to allow the participants to feel comfortable with expressing themselves. It also gave the researcher a better understanding of what types of threats and harassment the participants were exposed to.
Every interviewee is a public figure in Sweden. Some of them are chairpersons of media organisatio ns and representatives of newspapers. Others are freelance journalists, programme hosts, authors and opinion formers.
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Hence, some interview participants answered the interview questions, representing only themselves. Others represented both themselves and the media for which they work. None of the participants wanted to be anonymous, even though it was given as an option.
5.5.3 Selection of interview participants
Here, I have applied the method of what Ek Thorbjörnsson (2020) calls elite interviews. Hence, include different well-known people within the media sphere based on their involvement or expertise in the specific case that is studied. This provide knowledge and insights of the Chinese pressure from the perspective of the Swedish media (Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020: 1-28). It was also my aim to look fo r interview participants from the Swedish media sphere who had experienced threats and harassment from Chinese authorities. Hence, representatives from Swedish PEN and SVT’s satire programme Swedish News, were selected. Swedish PEN received criticism from Chinese authorities when they awarded Gui Minhai the Tucholsky Prize 2019. The satire programme Swedish News has mainly been criticised by Chinese authorities, due to a joke they made in 2018. Further, the China expert and freelance journalist Jojje Olsson, as well as author and opinion former Kurdo Baksi, were also selected. They have, on several occasions, been attacked by the Chinese embassy in Sweden due to their writing and other actions relating to the case of Gui Minhai and their actions relating to China’s oppression of the freedom of expression.
The selection was also based on a desire to have a wide range of media outlets represented. Thus, I interviewed the chairpersons of the Swedish Union of Journalists and the Swedish Union of Writers. These unions have members consisting of Swedish journalists and authors. They also work closely with organisations like Swedish PEN. The two unions have publicly supported and defended Jojje Olsson and Kurdo Baksi due to the threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy in Sweden. Further, I interviewed the chairperson of Reporters Without Borders Sweden (RSF Sweden). In 2020, the organisation released a report about threats and harassment from Chinese authorities aimed at Sweden. The global organisation also released an international report in 2019, focusing on China’s attempt to create a new global media order. When it comes to the newspapers, the daily newspaper Göteborgs- Posten (GP) made an interview with the Chinese ambassador in Sweden during 2019. In the interview the ambassador amongst other things, criticised the Swedish media for giving an incorrect image of China.
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The morning newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN) was on the other hand in 2019 criticised, amongst others, by the Swedish media sphere and experts on the subject. This was because of an advertisement published in the newspaper. The advertisement was about the Hong Kong demonstrations, regarding Beijin g’s efforts to increase its influence there. The consignor of the advertisement was the one-party state China. The criticism of the advertisements concerned that DN was being too “China friendly”. Last, the evening newspaper Aftonbladet is in this study as the representative of an evening newspaper.
The selection of participants was also based on the positive responses I received about participating in the study. I found some participants through articles, since the person spoke openly about threats or harassment from Chinese authorities. In other cases, I contacted various media outlets and received contact information to a participant, through the editorial staff. Sometimes I received tips about potential participants through my own network of people, such as former and current colleagues.
5.5.4 Presentation of interview participants
This is a short list of the participants. In the headline profession, the focus is on the title relevant to this study. To a large extent, the participants also have other assignments in their professional careers. See the appendix (9.1) for the full presentation of the interview participants.
Jesper Rönndahl: Comedian and former programme host for SVT’s satire programme Swedish News 2018 – 2019. Jesper Bengtsson: Chairperson of Swedish PEN. Jojje Olsson: China expert and journalist. Manages InBeijing - Sweden’s largest digital newspaper about China. Kurdo Baksi: Author and public opinion former. Ulrika Hyllert: Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists. Grethe Rottböll: Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union. Erik Halkjaer: Chairperson of Reporters Without Borders Sweden (RSF Sweden). Christofer Ahlqvist: Chief editor at Göteborgs-Posten (GP). Eric Rosén: Deputy editor at Aftonbladet. Pia Skagermark: Foreign editor at Dagens Nyheter (DN).
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6. Analysis The major research question of this thesis is as mentioned : How does the Swedish media respond and/or is affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities?
In this section I am going to depend on the interviews as well as collected documents as my data sets for analysis. The analysis is divided in themes with headlines from the oprationalisation model, presented in the theoretical chapter. Under each theme, I will examine the interviews together with the documents. The first theme called types of threats and harassment was added. There, I will present the incidents my interview participants have been exposed to. Then I move over to the headline How has the Swedish media responded to the threats and harassment. Here the themes will follow this order: strategy of adding security, strategy of solidarity and support, strategy of personal and collective resistance.
Then I will move to the headline: How has the Swedish media been affected by the threats and harassment. Here the themes will follow this order: Impact on the individual journalist- with subhedlines; self-censorship, changed behaviour in working life, changed behaviour in daily life. Followed by the second headline Impact on the independent journalism and the civil society- with one subheadline regarding the independent journalism and one regarding the civil society.
Within the headlines I will also discuss other questions related to the subject, that has been raised during the interviews.
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6.1 Types of threats and harassment
Amongst the participants the most common words to express what they have been exposed to was threats, attacks and hate from Chinese authorities. This study chose “threats and harassment” as a collective name for what the Swedish media was exposed to. Some participants where exposed to several types of threats and harassment and will therefore appear in the text under several headlines.
6.1.1 No threats or harassment at all
Only 1 of 10 participants state that they do not have any problem at all, related to reporting about China. This participant is Pia Skagermark from Dagens Nyheter (DN). Skagermak, foreign editor at DN, only responded to the core questions about threats and harassment, in a short telephone conversation. She declined to do the full interview, since Skagermark felt that the answers to the questions would mainly be “no”. In the telephone conversation she answered that the newspaper has not received any threats or harassment from Chinese authorities6. Skagermark did not know of any hate or harassment from private people, through emails, which could be notified with Chinese names or likewise. The short conversatio n with Skagermark is still interesting for this study. As stated in the method chapter, DN have been criticised by the Swedish media sphere as well as experts on the subject, for being too “China friendly”.
In September 2019, DN published a full-page advertisement, where China was allowed to give its view concerning criticism of the state. The advertisement was about the protests in Hong Kong, regarding Beijing’s efforts to increase its influence there. In the advertisement, the following text could be read:
What you read, see, hear - or share in social media - is just part of a complex social, economic and political puzzle. A puzzle we will solve on our own (Milstead in Aftonbladet, 20/09/2019).
Concerning the advertisement Skagermark refers to the statement of the chief editor Peter Wolodarski. Before the telephone conversation with Skagermark I tried to reach Wolodarski. He was not availab le and I was recommended to contact Skagermark.
6 Since 2018 DN has been mentioned and critisied for two articels about China through the Chinese embassy’s statements on their website. The statements where made in 2018. However, this criticism was not brought up by Skagermark as a concern (Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, Spokesperson’s Remarks). 28
In the public statement by Wolodarski, he amongst other things, states that the ground statement at DN has for a long time been to have a generous policy in this area. It is part of their liberal tradition to allow advertisements. Preventing them is an exception. He further states that it is hard to set specific boundaries (Carp in Dagens Nyheter, 20/09/2019). DN has also published advertisements from the movement, protesting Beijing’s efforts to increase its influence in Hong Kong (ibid). However, DN stands out amongst the media outlets included in the study, which is worth a mentio n. In relation to the advertisement by DN, and the criticism they received for it, it is rather interesting that they did not have any issues related to China at all.
6.1.2 Threats and harassment from others than Chinese authorities
2 of 10 participants knew that the media they work for received hate when reporting about China. The hate where mostly digita l from other actors than Chinese authorities. Erik Halkjaer, from RSF Sweden states that nor he, the board, or the previous chairperson of the organisation have received any threats directly from Chinese authorities. However, the organisation definitely receives angry emails from Chinese consignors. For example, they had a problem with an angry man with a Chinese name. Through email, he expressed that everything with the organisation was bad. But he was not threatening. However, in 2019 the organisation had a bigger issue.
We got several emails from Chinese addresses, supposedly from Chinese private sector companies saying that it would be wise for us to buy certain domains with reporters without borders, otherwise those would be used against us, publishing articles, data etc on sites with domains looking like ours. We asked our office in Paris that said they had gotten the same […] We have since long bought domains such as .se, .com, .org, .net so we decided to ignore the threats. So far, we have not seen any domains or site posing as us. - Erik Halkjaer, Chairperson of Reporters Without Borders Sweden
Further, Ahlqvist mentions that GP always get criticism when writing about China from private people which is identified with Chinese names.
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6.1.3 Threats and harassment due to actions by Chinese authorities
4 of 10 participants had themselves or knew that the media they work for experienced trouble due to actions by Chinese authorities. Starting with Jojje Olsson, he was banned from China already in 2016, due to his journalistic work. He was first denied a visa back to China when he applied from Sweden, then again when he tried to apply from Hong Kong with a new passport.
I could not return to my apartment, where I had my belongings, so I lost all of them and as a further consequence I also lost my friends and my then girlfriend who lived there. - Jojje Olsson, China expert and journalist
Christofer Ahlqvist from GP and Eric Rosén from Aftonbladet stated that the newspapers noticed trouble with getting visas to China in 2018. In both cases the visa problem was related to work trips for the two newspapers. As an example of the visa problem, Eric Rosén tells about when one of their reporters, Peter Kadhammar was on a work trip in China 2018. Before Kadhammar could travel to China he had an interview with the Chinese embassy in Sweden. Throughout the interview Kadhammar got questions related to what he thought about Gui Minhai and about other journalists who wrote about China (Kadhammar in Aftonbladet, 22/11/2018). Rosén comments that this kind of embassy interrogation is unusual. Several similar situations with China, like the one Kadhammar went through, was also noted at Aftonbladet.
Further, Jesper Rönndahl, who was the programme host for SVT’s satire programme Swedish News 2018- 2019, received a letter with poop to his home after the satire programme made a joke about Chinese tourists in 2018. The joke was presented in a satire information film. The film was also posted on the Chinese equivalent YouTube channel Youku. This caused a storm of critical comments to emerge from the Chinese embassy and consequences followed for Rönndahl.
I got a letter with a small piece of poop in it sent to my house. But I did not think it was that bad, and otherwise some hate mails and such but it is so easy to ignore, I think. But I know others who were worse off, he who was the responsible publisher of the programme had people who came home to his house. - Jesper Rönndahl, Programme host, SVT
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Rönndahl also states that some people did not react so much to the satire information film they had put on the Chinese equivalent YouTube channel, Youku. The worst thing amongst many that were critical, seemed to be that the programme showed a map of China, that did not include Taiwan. The map was shown during several episodes. Further, a public apology for the satire film came from SVT and the programme. However, the apology was directed to the Chinese people and not to the regime. Between the episode with the satire film and the episode when the programme apologised to the Chinese people for the joke, the programme received positive responses. Rönndahl states that the positive responses came from Chinese people in Sweden who emailed and wrote “The programme is great, you should not be afraid, it is just empty threats you received”.
6.1.4 Threats and harassment from Chinese authorities
2 of 10 participants received digital and other forms of attacks from Chinese authorities. These attacks do not include the hate on the Chinese embassy’s website and through news media, which will be viewe d under the next headline. First, the author and public opinion former Kurdo Baksi received a letter from the Chinese embassy in Sweden since he was one of the signatures of the announcement Free Gui Minhai in 2018.
At first, I don't think the Chinese embassy knew I was the one who organised it. I received a letter both to my mail and home since I had also signed the announcement. In the letter it said that I should stop getting involved with Gui Minhai because he is a criminal and it is not a case about freedom of expression. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
Further, Jesper Rönndahl experienced a digital attack from Chinese authorities. Except for the “letter with poop” incident (explained under the pervious headline) Rönndahl also received digital hate after SVT’s programme made a joke about Chinese tourists in 2018.
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It was not so much threats from Chinese authorities against me, but rather social media bots and their online department that flooded my social media. Then the Chinese ambassador in Sweden went after SVT, and demanded excuses from them. - Jesper Rönndahl, Programme host, SVT
The Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI, which serves under the Swedish Ministry of Defence, explained for Rönndahl and his colleagues that the amounts of emails and comments on social media were not written by angry Chinese people but by employees at a Chinese state’s online factory in Beijin g. During a debriefing with FOI the programme team where informed that China was testing countries that were economically dependent on them, especially the Scandinavian countries. This in order to see how far Sweden allowed itself to be influe nc ed (Rönndahl in Fönstret, 2020). Hence, this digital attack is under this headline.
6.1.5 Threats and harassment from the Chinese e mbas s y’s we bs ite and through news media
5 of 10 participants received threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy of Sweden’s website and/or through news media in Sweden. Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN, states that the organisation received verbal attacks in connection to giving Gui Minhai the Tucholsky Prize 2019 7. This through public statements on the website of the Chinese embassy and statements from the Chinese ambassador through news media in Sweden. The verbal attacks were harsh during a short period. The day before the Tucholsky Prize 2019 was to be handed out to Gui Minhai, the Swedish Radio (SR) made an interview with China’s ambassador. The interview was posted on the website of the Chinese embassy the next day8.
7 The prize created issues at a governmental level. In public statements China’s ambassador threatened Swedish PEN and the Swedish Minister of Culture, Amanda Lind, who handed out the prize. Even the Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven received threats. The threats towards the government officials, mainly concerned that they would be denied entry to China if they supported the decision to give the prize to Minhai. 8 See 2.1.1 The embassy’s website in this thesis for an extract from the interview. For the whole interview see the website of the Chinese embassy “Spokesperson’s Remarks” with the headline Ambassador Gui Congyou Refutes Lies of Swedish Media About the Case of Gui Minhai (Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 14/11/2019). 32
There, the ambassador says that if the Minister of Culture hands out the prize, she will be banned from going to China, and it will have diplomatic and economic consequences for Sweden. And then it was written that those responsible for giving out the prize will not be able to feel safe. That is a direct threat and that escalation of threats and rhetoric we certainly did not expect. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
Bengtsson states that the public debate moved focus to the Swedish government pretty quickly. Although, the threat against Swedish PEN was still there. Further, Jojje Olsson and Kurdo Baksi have also received threats and harassment by the Chinese embassy on their website and through news media in Sweden. Olsson says the harsh attacks against him started around 2017. Baksi was mainly attacked between 2018- 2019. Olsson explain the hate towards him on the embassy website.
You might call it attacks from Chinese authorities with a clear purpose to get me to censor myself […] There I have been called everything possible, liar, non-reliable and so on. - Jojje Olsson, China expert and journalist
Further, Ulrika Hyllert from the Swedish Union of Journalists states that she has not received any threats or harassment. No members of the union have reported any threats or harassment relating to China. However, Hyllert does not know if anything has happened without being reported. Although, the Chinese embassy in Sweden has attacked the union as a whole, through statements on the website of the Chinese embassy. Conversations about the issue has been made with Jojje Olsson and Kurdo Baksi, since the union has supported them in public.
Last, Grethe Rottböll from the Swedish Writers’ Union has not been threatened or harassed. She expresses that the members of the union have been exposed to vague threats, for example in relation to the Swedish Tucholsky Prize ceremony 2019. Although, the Chinese embassy in Sweden has attacked the union as a whole, through statements on the website of the Chinese embassy.
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6.2 How has the Swedish media responded to the threats and harassment
Now I will analyse the responses of the threats and harassments from the Swedish media, drawing from the theoretical framework and the literature9.
6.2.1 Strategy of adding security
Previous research emphasised that one strategy journalists uses when threatened form foreign states was related to digital safety (Digital Rights Foundation, 2017; Waters, 2018; Mills, 2019; McGregor and Watkins, 2016; Chen, 2020). The digital safety could concern installing encrypted security apps. It could also be actions such as leaving their telephones outside the room during work meetings. Further, other security methods such as extra work meetings, reporting the threats and harassment to the police or using police protection for public speeches could be seen (Chen, 2020; Journalistpanelen, 2019; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011: 29-33).
4 of 10 participants express that they have added, changed or adapted methods regarding digita l safe ty and other types of security measures. These methods are implemented as a means of continuing work regardless of the threats or harassment from Chinese authorities. The new methods concerned both work and private life. Starting with the digital safety, Jesper Bengtsson expresses how he felt after the Chinese ambassador threatened Swedish PEN, due to the Tucholsky Prize 2019.
I actually did not feel completely safe for a few days, I turned around a few extra times as I exited the staircase and looked in the keyhole before exiting through the door in the morning […] The actions I took in the daily life concerned internet and telephone security. For example, I downloaded an app, which is encrypted and therefore more secure. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
RSF Sweden also had a focus on digital and cyber security. However, this change was not only related to China, but also to other states.
9 The interview participant from DN declined to answer the following questions in the study. The participant from DN is although counted in as my 10th participant. Hence, when presenting the analysis and results, 10 participants equals the total number. 34
To a large extent we use crypted apps when we are communicating about things that are sensitive before a launching and production. And on certain meetings we have left the mobile phones outside the meeting room. - Erik Halkjaer, Chairperson of Reporters Without Borders Sweden
Concerning other types of security methods than digita l, extra meetings amongst media organisations as well as meetings where the Swedish government was involved had been made relating to issues with China and the Chinese embassy.
We have had a meeting with the Foreign Minister Ann Linde, together with other organisations […] There have been special meetings where the situation and security were discussed before we were supposed to join a manifestation or likewise […] We have had a longer collaboration around the Dawit Isaak case where we have a group together with other organisations. Now we have formed a new similar group for Gui Minhai. - Ulirka Hyllert, Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists
Further, physical security was added. Swedish PEN made the most security changes when the organisation organised the Tucholsky Prize ceremony 2019. There they had extra security.
And I think we would have been forced to do the same with the security if we would have public arrangements concerning Gui Minhai or China today, after the award ceremony, but now we have not been able to have it because of Corona. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
Kurdo Baksi explains that he got worried and had police security, when he and a friend organised a demonstration at the square Mynttorget in Stockholm in September, 2019. The demonstration supported the democratic movement in Hong Kong. At the same time Chinese students organised a counter- demonstration. In an article by the Swedish newspaper Expressen, Baksi expressed that Chinese embassies around the world organise Chinese students to disrupt demonstrations, for example, in Australia and New Zealand. The Chinese student who organised the counter-demonstration at Mynttorget stated that the Chinese embassy in Sweden, was not involved in the organising (Åkesson in Expressen, 09/09/2019). However, Baksi is sure of that the Chinese embassy was involved.
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The counter-demonstration was organised by the Chinese embassy. This could be seen on the Chinese state television channel CCTV. CCTV would never interview an organiser of a counter-demonstration unless China’s embassy is behind the event […] But because there were so many journalists there, I think they got scared […] They did not dare to interfere and I also had the security service police there. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
The statements from Baksi indicates that Chinese authorities through private people with connection to China, attempt to influence other states. However, this claim is difficult to confirm beyond a doubt. This study aims to raise these happenings as something that ought to be discussed within the Swedish media. From an international perspective, this is of interest to elaborate between Sweden and other states with similar situations. If Chinese authorities through private people with connection to China, attempt to influence other states, it should be taken with seriousness.
However, the threats and harassment were not of such nature that it was common to report any incident to the police. Jesper Rönndahl believes that SVT reported the “letter with poop” incident to the police. However, he is not entirely sure. Otherwise, none of the participants have reported any threats or harassment to the police. Concerning this, Jesper Bengtsson from Swedish PEN, reminded me that the Chinese ambassador do have diplomatic immunity. Hence, this is something to keep in mind regarding reporting something against the ambassador to the police.
Thus, under this headline it was described that work methods such as extra meetings within and amongst media organisations where held as well as meetings with the Swedish Foreign Minister. Extra digita l safety measures were also added both in private and work life. There were even examples of police protection during demonstrations and likewise that was related to sensitive topics about China. The Chinese embasy’s and China’s threats and harassment against the Swedish media seems worth noting. Thus, the methods indicated by previous research was confirmed by the participants and the documents of this study (Digital Rights Foundation 2017; Waters 2018, Chen, 2020; Mills, 2019; McGregor and Watkins 2016, Journalistpanelen, 2019; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011: 29-33).
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6.2.2 Strategy of solidarity and support
Previous research indicated that working teams often come together in the fight against an external threat. Therefore, common protests against a common threat is seen. For example, through public joint statements to raise awareness about the threats. Further, also other actors such as the society and governments could give support to a media that has been threatened (Staw et al, 1981; Pepitone and Kleiner, 1957; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020). In this study, these assumptions were to a large extent confirmed.
There were several examples of when the Swedish media made joint statements regarding threats and harassment from Chinese authorities. The announcement Free Gui Minhai, organised by Kurdo Baksi in 2018, was one of them. Further, in the beginning of 2020, there was a lot of publicity concerning the matter in Swedish news coverage. In February 20, 2020 Sweden’s six largest newspapers jointly published an open letter to China’s President, Xi Jinping. The letter was signed by 30 cultural leaders, publishers, writers, journalists, lawyers and Chinese experts. Including some of the participants of this study. In the letter the release of Gui Minhai was demanded. And that China’s ambassador would stop insulting and threatening persons who criticised China and engaged in the case of Minhai (Svenska PEN, 20/02/2020). Grethe Rottböll was one of those who signed the letter and she emphasised the support the Swedish media has given each other.
What struck me was that as soon as it has been a matter of Gui Minhai or China and when it comes to freedom of expression it has not mattered if it has been a small or huge manifestation, the Swedish media has showed up. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
Further, 4 of 10 interview participants emphasised the current support and sharp criticism towards China , from the Swedish government.
Ann Linde has been very clear and quite sharp towards China. Which feels great, that we have a Foreign Minister who expresses these things and is not only diplomatic, but believes that we must stand up for important values. - Ulrika Hyllert, Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists
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What happened immediately when we were threatened and they demanded that the Swedish government, through Amanda Lind should not distribute the Tucholsky Prize was that almost all parties in the parliament were there for the distribution of the prize. And that had never occurred before. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
The response from the Swedish government concerning the Tucholsky Prize 2019, was documented through news media in Sweden. The Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven gave a response on the day of the prize ceremony, stating that his government would “never” give in to this kind of threat. Foreign Minister Ann Linde pointed out the seriousness of the behaviour of the Chinese ambassador. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs conveyed the message to the Chinese authority representatives both in Stockholm and Beijing, that in Sweden, the freedom of expression is applied (Hamidi-Nia in SVT Nyheter, 15/11/2019; Holmqvist in Aftonbladet, 16/11/2019). Later, in January, 2020, SVT reported that three Swedish government parties wanted the Chinese ambassador to be declared persona non grata, thus, leaving his ambassador post, due to his public attacks and behaviour towards Sweden. The parties who emphasised this were the left-wing party Vänsterpartiet (V), the right-wing party Kristdemokraterna (KD) and the nationalist right-wing party Sverigedemokraterna (SD) (Mokhtari in SVT Nyheter, 18/01/2020).
The Freedom House 2020 report emphasised that if Chinese authorities make attempts to interfere with media reporting in other countries, the host government should protest. Eventually, the host governme nt could consider any member of a diplomatic staff persona non grata (Cook, Freedom House, 2020). However, Sweden’s Foreign Minister, Ann Linde, stated that declaring China’s ambassador, persona non grata, is not the right way to go. She emphasised the importance of direct interactions with China (Svedberg Ågren et al, in SVT Nyheter, 19/01/2020).
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According to China expert Börje Ljunggren, Linde has a point. If Sweden asked the ambassador to leave his post, China would respond with the same method, towards Sweden’s ambassador to China. This would further complicate the cooperation between the countries (Thörnqvist in SVT Nyheter, 20/01/2020).
Moving forward, international support could also be found related to standing up against China’s attempts to silence the media. In January 2020, the Swedish publisher’s association Utgivarna, requested that the Swedish government acted together with the EU. This was in order to protest against China ’ s attempts to influence the freedom of the press (Utgivarna, 30/01/2020). Foreign Minister Ann Linde, replied in a written comment to the Swedish Radio news. Linde stated that the government has ongoing discussions on issues relating to China within the EU (Saleem in Sveriges Radio, SR, 30/01/2020).
An example of a case that has been discussed in the international political sphere is the one of Gui Minhai. In February 2020, Minhai was sentenced to ten years in prison in China (Makar and Hamidi-N ia in SVT Nyheter, 25/02/2020). On the website of the Chinese embassy it was stated that Minhai reinstated his Chinese nationality in 2018 on his own initiative. The case was removed from the archive of China- Sweden consular cases. China’s ambassador believed that this case was no longer a topic between China and Sweden (Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 25/02/2020). Foreign Minister Ann Linde immed ia te ly stated that the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs will continue to demand the release of Minhai who is a Swedish national (Makar and Hamidi-Nia in SVT Nyheter, 25/02/2020; Nordlund in SVT Nyheter, 25/02/2020).
Further, the European Commission stated that the EU follows Sweden’s stance and critic ises China after the prison sentence against Minhai. At the same time, former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, urged the EU to intervene in the case immediately (Rönnqvist Fors and Nordlund and TT Nyhetsbyrån in SVT Kultur, 25/02/2020). Thus, the interview answers and the documents seem to be in line with previous research. Threats and harassment draws team members within the media sphere together. Solidarity and support where seen amongst media organisations. It further appears to have raised the issue, concerning the behaviour of China’s ambassador and the Chinese embassy, within the Swedish and international politica l sphere (Staw et al, 1981; Pepitone and Kleiner, 1957; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020).
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6.2.3 Strategy of personal and collective resistance
Further, previous studies showed that threats and harassment impact different types of media and those working with it to show resistance. For example, the media sphere could continue to write about issues related to the subject that caused the threats. The resistance could be shown on both a personal and collective plan. Hence, there is a strong will to live up to the democratic ideals of journalism, and thus, not to give up oneself to hatred and threats (Olsve, 2014: 38; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013; Keane, 1991: 36-37). In this study, 9 of 10 participants, showed resistance towards the threats and harassment. The resistance could be seen both at a personal and collective plan. Grethe Rottböll and Kurdo Baksi explain that the threats and harassment rather motivated them or the organisation, to continue to write and talk about issues related to China.
I have always lived with threats and disturbances. It actually made me write more articles about Gui Minhai. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
We have rather been even clearer that we are going out with criticism concerning China. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
On the collective plan, 9 of the 10 participants believed that the Swedish media monitors China more today.
The editors have become more aware that this is a superpower state we need to monitor more. - Ulrika Hyllert, Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists
Erik Halkjaer was amongst the participants who believed that the Swedish media monitors China more today. However, he also highlighted that China in one way has succeeded with their aim.
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But I think that the Chinese ambassador also has succeeded. He chooses what he is going to attack and ends up in the TV sofa and in interviews in the Swedish daily newspapers such as Göteborgs-Posten and Dagens Industri, where he has been able to talk and speak out about his view on things. And that is exactly what he wants. - Erik Halkjaer, Reporters Without Borders Sweden
That the Chinese ambassador get too much attention in the Swedish media coverage is something Charlotta Friborg, editor in chief at SVT, brings up as something to evaluate (Reporters Without Borders Sweden, 2020). On the other hand, Eric Rosén and Christofer Ahlqvist both states that not giving the ambassador space in the Swedish media, would also be wrong.
I do not think it will affect us in giving our picture of the truth. - Eric Rosén, Deputy editor at Aftonbladet
For us, it is reasonable that the ambassador is allowed to talk so much. We write a lot about China and there is a lot of criticism against China. Then it is perfectly reasonable that they get a chance to make a statement. - Christofer Ahlqvist, Chief editor at Göteborgs-Posten (GP)
Hence, the statements from Rosén and Ahlqvist recognised that Swedish media outlets are giving the Chinese ambassador a platform for a rebuttal. However, this can be a good thing since we get to hear both sides of a debate. During the fall of 2019 GP made an exclusive interview with the Chinese ambassador to Sweden. There, the ambassador criticised the Swedish media sphere for giving an incorrect image of China (Andersson Åkerblom in Göteborgs-Posten, 6/12/2019). Ahlqvist states that after the interview, there were no responses from the Chinese embassy. From what he knows, there was no responses from readers or likewise, which criticised that the ambassador was able to do the interview. Rather, Ahlqvist explains that much of the responses came from the general public. People expressed that they were proud that GP stood up for freedom of expression and stood up against China.
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Thus, the resistance could be shown on both a personal and collective plan. The participants had continued to write about sensitive issues related to China and the participants noted that the Swedish media monitored China more today (Olsve, 2014: 38; Keane, 1991: 36-37; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013, Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020). Hence, the Swedish media showed poof of a strong will to live up to the democratic ideals of journalism, and thus, not to give up oneself to hatred and threats. The Swedish media seem to have a common purpose, to take action against the criticism from Chinese authorities (Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013: 32).
6.3 How has the Swedish media been affected by the threats and harassment
6.3.1 Impact on the individual journalist
6.3.1.1 Self-censorship
When viewing the theoretical chapter, several studies showed that one major consequence for the media when exposed to threats, was self-censorship (Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013; Arvidsson et al, 2011; Clark and Grech, 2017; McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020). None of the interview participants expressed that the threats and harassment had led to self-censorship for them or the media they represented. However, 9 of 10 participants state that the threats and harassment have led to an increased awareness about the consequences of expressing oneself about issues related to China.
For Swedish PEN, this has not meant a change in texts, we publish texts on the situation of the Uighurs for example […] But on the other hand, I can say that every time I have written about China I have thought about the threats and if it can lead to further consequences. I hope it has not affected what I write, but it has definitely affected me when I write. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
I do not feel that we have self-censorship, but rather that you realise that it can have consequences in the possibility of obtaining a visa to China, but not so that it limits us. - Christofer Ahlqvist, Chief editor at Göteborgs-Posten (GP)
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Grethe Rottböll also expresses that the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities will lead to self- censorship in the long run.
In the long run, if this kind of threat escalates, it will silence people, which is the plan as well. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
Further, 7 of 10 participants indicate that the aim with the threats, from the perspective of the Chinese authorities, is to get the Swedish media to self-censor itself. And that this also work to an extent.
Self-censorship is what many Chinese authorities want to develop. They have started using visas as a tool for holding journalists in hostage. It is more or less straightforward threats that you do not get a visa if you report critically […] This is a self-censorship that includes not mentioning that you got rid of the visa if you do. This method works on many. Self-censorship is the most effective form of censorship […] Many journalists practice self-censorship to prevent issues like visa problems. - Jojje Olsson, China expert and journalist
Further, Jeper Rönndahl expresses that he thinks that one can subconsciously self-censor themselves.
I believe that you can also easily subconsciously self-censor yourself […] Because you just do not bear with all the fights and the trouble that it can be. So, it is a method that unfortunately works, if not consciously so subconsciously in a certain way, and you have to be honest with that. - Jesper Rönndahl, Programme host, SVT
After SVT and the satire programme Swedish News showed the satirical information film about Chinese tourists 2018 the foreign editor at SVT, Pia Bernhardson, received a call from a representative of the Chinese embassy who demanded an apology from SVT. The film also resulted in threats from the embassy that no SVT employees would be granted a visa to the country. The situation was eventually resolved and a public apology from SVT came. Bernhardson also had a meeting with the Chinese ambassador (Reporters Without Borders Sweden, 2020; Wikén in SVT Nyheter, 10/06/2020; Renman in SVT Nyheter, 28/09/2018).
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However, the attacks towards SVT and the programme show that the pressure from the Chinese embassy causes trouble for the Swedish media, which can make the media to consciously or subconsciously celf- censor (Reporters Without Borders Sweden, 2020; Wikén in SVT Nyheter, 10/06/2020; Renman in SVT Nyheter, 28/09/2018).
Hence, under this headline I have been allowed to examine the phenomena of self-censorship under political pressure. It was recognised that self-censorship does occur within the Swedish media, regarding reporting about China. Self-censorship could be both consciously or subconscious ly. None of the participants stated that they allowed themselves to be self-censored. Although, China’s behaviour raise d awareness of the consequences when expressing oneself negatively about the country. If the threats and harassment escalate, an increased self-censor culture can rise within the Swedish media sphere (Tapsell, 2012; Yesil, 2014; Journalistpanelen, 2019, Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020). One will eventually avoid writing or talking about issues pertaining to China, since one does not want to deal with all the problems and fights that come with it (Tapsell, 2012; Yesil, 2014; Journalistpanelen, 2019, Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020).
6.3.1.2 Changed behaviour in working life
It was emphasised by previous research that a negative affect when external threats occur, relate to changed behaviour in working life such as stress within a working team (Griffith and Va t ik us , 1999). None of the participants indicate that they have changed their behaviour in their working lives in any major way. However, 7 of 10 participants describe situations when the threats in some way have impac te d their working life. For example, Jesper Rönndahl and Kurdo Baksi explain a shift in the atmosphere at both meetings and within work teams.
It was a huge thing at the editorial office, and something that influenced one, when you sit down and write jokes it is important to be in a good mood and have fun. And we managed to have that anyway, but there was still a little difference in the mood at the office. - Jesper Rönndahl, Programme host, SVT
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There is a Swedish/Chinese journalist who comes to our meetings. I know she takes pictures and gives it to the Chinese security service. But I think it is ok, because of the freedom of speech I cannot stop her from taking pictures either, but she knows that I know about her, so it is fair play. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
Further, 3 of 10 participants express that they have either given up the thought of going to China or reflected about the consequences of going to China. This is a consequence that limits both the working life and the daily life. It was mainly expressed as an automatic consequence due to their work.
When I started as chairperson, I thought that I will not be able to go to China or be a tourist in China. But that problem is minor to the problems that exists in China that we write about […] How we act as an organisation also affect employees who may not have any dealings with China at all […] There was a staff member of the union, who was going to China last summer and it became a pretty big procedure, it was not easy. - Ulrika Hyllert, Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists
[…] When you make such statements as we do, you have to be aware that then maybe it is not to China you should travel. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
Thus, under this headline, the participants answers recognised the assumptions that stress is shown in a working team when threatened. Individuals feels restricted in their work. The Swedish media demonstrated that the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities was something that bothers them. For example, it created a changed atmosphere at work and several participants had given up the though of ever going to China (Griffith and Vatikus, 1999).
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6.3.1.3 Changed behaviour in daily life
Previous research also showed that threats and harassment lead to changed behaviour in the daily life (Griffith and Vatikus 1999). None of the participants stated that they made any major changes in their daily lives, due to threats and harassment from Chinese authorities. 3 of 10 participants stated that they had changed their behaviour in some ways. These changes where mainly connected to the feeling of being worried due to threats and harassment from Chinese authorities. The changed behaviour mainly lasted during a short time of period, however, sometime s longer.
When I go to Chinese restaurants, they look at me awkwardly, everyone knows who I am so when I go in, the mood can get bad […] I still avoid going to Chinese restaurants in Sweden. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
Erik Halkjaer, from RSF Sweden stated that, during a period, he walked around and scouted the area around his house, just to be sure. This was when the organisation launched the global report 2019 and the Swedish report 2020, about China. Halkjaer also states that the organisation worked with matters concerning Saudi Arabia at the time. So, the anxious feeling was not only to blame China. Further, after Jojje Olsson got banned from China in 2016, he was forced to move to another country to work and Taiwan became the choice of country. That in itself is a large consequence to a person’s daily life.
Further, 7 participants describe that threats and harassment towards people within the media sphere are common. It seemed to be almost a part of the profession. The threats and harassment came from diffe r e nt kinds of groups. Ulrika Hyllert from the Swedish Union of Journalists, state that journalists usually receive threats when they write about criminal gangs, right-wing extremists, immigration, LGBTQ issues or equality issues. Thus, the Swedish media sphere have been exposed to larger and more direct threats than simply those of the Chinese authorities. However, Hyllert also points out that it is unusual that a state and representatives of a state threaten the media in this way.
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Hence, the feeling of anxiousness was present. This was also emphasised under the previous headlines throughout this analysis. As stated from the literatur e, China’s attempts to influence others opinions about the state include the strategy of influencing actors to change their behaviour (Griffith and Vatikus, 1999; Björk, 2020). Thus, even if China appears to not be the largest threat towards the Swedish media this is a warning signal. The threats and harassment seemed to create confusion and insecurity for the participants of this study.
6.3.2 Impact on the independent journalism and the civil society
6.3.2.1 Impact on the independent journalism
9 of 10 participants agreed that the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities, in the long run, will affect the independent journalism negatively.
I think it really affect the way you think and what fights you take, that I am almost completely sure of. It is a damn superpower state and that is hard to ignore, you cannot. - Jesper Rönndahl, Programme host, SVT
After all, the goal, and it is not possible to interpret in any other way, has to be to silence criticism of China. Wherever it appears, regardless of which country and from whom. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
China has a tactic, that one threatens and buys silence and takes away the criticism to then disseminate ones own image of China and how one views the world. - Erik Halkjaer, Chairperson of Reporters Without Borders Sweden
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Erik Halkjaer also points out that since the current Chinese ambassador took office in 2017, the attacks escalated. A difference from the previous ambassador was seen. This was also recognised in one of the organisation’s reports. Since Gui Congyou was inaugurated as the ambassador of the People’s Republic of China in Stockholm at the end of 2017, the Swedish foreign department had summoned him more than 40 times. He was summoned due to his spiteful attacks on Swedish media and Swedish journalists (Reporters Without Borders Sweden, 2020). From the statements and documents above, the attempts from Chinese authorities to influence the Swedish media appear serious. Although, 3 of 10 inter vie w participants expressed that the Swedish media would probably not tolerate the threats to go too far.
I have a hard time believing that Swedish media would bow down to China and these types of threats. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
Sweden is quite spared from the influence of China in the media. A big reason for that is that the Chinese diaspora is not so big here. The other thing is the very great integrity of the Swedish media. To just issue angry statements on its own websites does not have the same effect. - Jojje Olsson, China expert and journalist
Thus, it is emphasised that the Swedish media would not tolerate the threats and harassment to go too far. However, worth noting, is that 9 of 10 participants describe the rhetoric and behaviour from Chinese authorities in Sweden, as unique.
I would say that China is unique, that they intervene in this way. That you do not know where the liens go for diplomacy, it is special. It is official statements China makes in Sweden, that you should be aware of. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
Most other countries that act in similar ways, do this against their own dissidents and journalists that might live in Sweden. It is quite uncommon, the way that China does it, towards Swedish journalists and writers. - Jesper Bengtsson, Chairperson of Swedish PEN
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Other states have disliked me and been harsh on me but they have never said that I should be forbidden to write. But China has demanded that I should not be allowed to write. And it is very heavy, it is unusual10. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
The way China’s ambassador acts is not something familiar […] We have had discussions with the Nordic colleagues and this issue has been mostly recognised from Norway, who had problems during the Nobel Prize 11. - Ulrika Hyllert, Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists
From an international perspective, Erik Halkjaer, states that RSF could see from their reports that Chinese embassies and ambassadors made similar attacks as in Sweden, in states like Australia and South Africa. Further, 2 participants have heard that in England, China targets people expressing themselves negatively about their state. Further, 7 participants gave examples of other states that behaved in similar ways in Sweden, such as Israel, Turkey, Iran and Russia. However, they all pointed out that not even those states interfered with the Swedish media as much as Chinese authorities. In Israel’s and Russia’s case that could be confirmed in the literatur e review of this thesis. Erik Halkjaer from RSF Sweden also states that the organisation has examined Hungary in their reports. The conclusion was that their ambassador in Sweden, threatened the Swedish media in the same way as the Chinese ambassador with similar statements on the embassy website and letters to the Swedish newspapers. This is confirmed by several Swedish sources12 .
10 For the statement about that Baksi should be forbidden to write see the Chinese embassy website “Spokesperson’s Remarks” with the headline “Chinese Embassy Spokesperson: The ignorance and insanity of Kurdo Baksi shocked us again”, published September 9 2019 (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020: 3-4). 11 Liu Xiaobo received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 for his work with human rights in China and internationally. The prize caused a major set-back to the Norwegian and Chinese relationship including a new free trade agreement being put on hold. Xiaobo was imprisoned for actions which subvert the Chinese state (Baalsrud, 2013). 12 Hungary is not a superpower state. However, Hungary has had disputes with the Swedish media concerning their reporting about the states trend towards populism and human rights issues (Ilona Häyrynen in Aftonbladet, 30/03/2020; Daag in Utrikesmagasinet, 06/11/2018; Nesser in Journalisten 22/06, 2020; Embassy of Hungary Stockholm, 04/04/2020). 49
Thus, the answers by the participants and the documents under this headline, recognises that Chinese authoritie s tries to influence media content. The global organisation RSF emphasises that threats and harassment are used by Chinese authorities to silence journalists in democratic countries. This was confir med by the intervie w participants in this study. The Swedish media sphere seems targeted as a group, that receives threats and harassment from Chinese authorities (Reporters Without Borders, 2019; Yesil, 2014: 72; Olsve, 2014: 2). The threats and harassment from Chinese authorities against the Swedish media was unique and was not only a problem for the Swedish media and Sweden. This behaviour from a state needed to be dealt with, both from a national and international perspective. Hence, the material used in this study indicates that the threats and harassment, in the long run, will affect the independent journalism negatively and jeopardise the future journalism when it comes to reporting about China (Yesil, 2014: 72; Olsve, 2014; McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000; Keane, 1991: 36-37; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013).
6.3.2.2 Impact on the civil society
9 of 10 participants agree that the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities, in the long run, will affect the civil society negatively. However, 9 of 10 participants also point out that the threats and harassment, up until now, have had the opposite effect. The threats and harassment rather affected China negatively. This was seen through the response from the Swedish media and the Swedish society.
The number of Swedish cities that have friendship cooperations with Chinese cities has decreased. The university in Linköping has interrupted cooperation with them. It has now been required in Gothenburg that the place where the Chinese consulate is located should be called “Gui Minhai’s square”. Every week something happens to China that harms them. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
Further, 3 of 10 participants expressed that their attitudes and/or those of the Swedish society towards China have changed.
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It is the opposite effect, that one does not want to have with China to do and that is unfortunate. There could be a strong cultural exchange, but as long as China acts in this way, you really want to highlight that it is not okay. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
It becomes so strange in a Swedish context, to express oneself as the Chinese ambassador and the embassy does. So, the sympathies from the public for China is not large. - Ulrika Hyllert, Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists
Another interesting perspective, was the economic relations between China and Sweden. Christofer Ahlqvist and Eric Rosén brought up that China, through economical means, can influe nce media content. This is also seen as a way to influence the Swedish society.
It is clear that you can influence information flows in the media with financial means. Hypothetically, if a Chinese company owns a large part of a telecommunications operator in Sweden and offers a newspaper app in it for free, which has less Chinese criticism in its reporting, one could control information flows in this way. - Christofer Ahlqvist, Chief editor at Göteborgs-Posten (GP)
So far, we have not seen that Chinese companies, as far as I am aware, actively demanded something in exchange in the Western world, like investments and so. On the other hand, there has been a discussion now about buying companies, during the Corona pandemic where the politicians have acted to limit the opportunities for China and that is a political process. - Eric Rosén, Deputy editor at Aftonbladet
Consequences for the economic and trade relations between China and Sweden was seen approximately a month after the Tucholsky Prize was handed out to Gui Minhai. In December 2019, the Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou expressed that Swedish companies should be punished because of the politica l conflict between the countries. These opinions were backed up by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing (Andresson Åkerblom in Göteborgs-Posten, 5/12/2019; Andresson Åkerblom and Lönnroth in Göteborgs-Posten, 6/12/2019).
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The newspaper GP reported from a seminar where the Chinese ambassador threatened trade restrictio ns partly due to Sweden’s work with the Gui Minhai case and the Tucholsky Prize. For example, a meeting of the China-Sweden Joint Committee on Economic Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, was cancelled in December 2019 (Andresson Åkerblom in Göteborgs-Posten, 5/12/2019; Andresson Åkerblom and Lönnroth in Göteborgs-Posten, 6/12/2019). Hence, according to the material used in this study, the civil society and various democratic ideals will be affected negatively, if the situation gets worse (Yesil, 2014: 72; Olsve, 2014; Ek Thorbjörnsson, 2020; McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000; Keane, 1991: 36-37; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013). The participants expressed concerns for the future.
We would like, for example, that the business community took a clearer position. There should be no tolerance whatsoever of threatening Swedish freedom of expression. - Grethe Rottböll, Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union
Readers of my blog have reached out and said they do not dare to push like, share or comment on stuff I publish on Facebook, or do not dare to swish contributions to sponsor the blog, because they are afraid that Chinese authorities will found out and deny them entry to China. - Jojje Olsson, China expert and journalist
I am worried about two things. One is that China is trying to export its freedom of expression ban culture to our country. The second is that journalists are scared and they do not dare to write. But I think that every time the Chinese embassy has attacked me or others in the media, they have lost a lot […] Since Swedish magazines, chief editors, major publicists and Sweden’s Foreign Minister Ann Linde defended me, they have stopped attacking me during a half year. In June 2020, the Chinese embassy attacked me again. - Kurdo Baksi, Author and public opinion former
The attack in June 2020 against Baksi from the Chinese embassy, was in reference to Baksi having testified in the trial against Sweden’s former ambassador to China. In the statement on the website of the Chinese embassy Baksi was called a liar due to his testimony (Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Sweden, 17/06/2020).
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The worries for what the future holds, shed light on the central position of the media in democratic political communication (Nord and Strömbäck, 2004; Carey, 1999). Thus, this section in the analysis showed that the civil society had marked against the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities. The threats and harassment rather resulted in more negative attitudes towards China and Chinese authorities. As stated in the background chapter of this thesis, the actions of the Chinese embassy should be considered above all from a Chinese perspective as a form of a larger state agenda from an authoritarian regime. Hence, that the threats and harassment up until now rather seem to affect China and Chinese authorities negatively could, to an extent, appear to be a failure in China’s foreign policy (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020).
However, the Chinese ambassador had threatened trade restrictions partly due to Sweden’s work with the Gui Minhai case and the Tucholsky Prize 2019. Trade meetings had been cancelled due to the political conflict between the two countries. It was also shown that China with economical means could influence media content and the society even though such examples were, to a large extent, not seen yet. Nevertheless, the participants of this study expressed concerns for the future regarding the politic a l pressure from China and the Chinese embassy.
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7. Conclusion In this thesis I have investigated how the Swedish media respond and/or is affected by threats and harassment from Chinese authorities.
Of the 10 participants in the study, all except one stated that they had been subjected to problems or threats and harassment when reporting about China. The exception was the newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN). DN claimed that they had no trouble at all related to China, neither with Chinese authoritie s or other issues connected to reporting about China. This was worth noting. DN had, as the only Swedish media, published a full-page advertisement, where China was allowed to give its view concerning criticism of the state. This China-friendly advertisement was strongly criticised by a number of other media outlets in Sweden.
Further, the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities was mainly from the Chinese embassy in Sweden. Many times, they were presented by the Chinese ambassador, Gui Congyou, himself. The analysis showed that even if the types of threats and harassment were mixed, the content often followed the same rhetoric. Through public statements threats and harassment towards the Swedish media were made. The statements were mainly published on the website of the Chinese embassy and through Swedish media platforms.
Regarding the response on the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities, the Swedish media had developed different strategies to tackle the issue. Security strategies and new working methods was seen. This showed that the the threats and harassment required extra security and safety methods. The joint meetings within and amongst the media organisations showed the need for the issue to be discussed.
Further, the strategy of solidarity and support was emphasised by the participants. Public joint statements by the Swedish media was made and the support from the Swedish government as well as internatio nal support was highlighted. To not let oneself be silenced seemed to be a core opinion amongst the participants interviewed in this study (Staw et al, 1981).
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Strategies of personal and collective resistance where also seen. For some, the threats and harassment became a motivatio n to further mark against China and the Chinese embassy. The importance to monitor China as a state, both concerning foreign and domestic policy was described. This recognises that threats and harassment impact different types of media and those working with it to show resistance (Olsve , 2014: 38; Dorian and Wirkensjö, 2013: 32).
The affect on the Swedish media could be seen through two factors: The impact on the individ ual journalist and the impact on the independent journalism and the civil society. For the first mentioned factor the analysis showed that the participants of this study to a large extent was able to avoid self- censorship. However, there were examples that self-censorship does occur within the Swedish media when reporting about China. That one may subconsciously self-censor work was also stated. As Jesper Rönndahl expressed, after a while one does not want to deal with all the problems and fights that come with writing or talking about China. Thus, in the long run, the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities could lead to an increased self-censorship culture for the Swedish media.
Further under the first factor, the analysis showed that the threats and harassment to an extent interfered with the participants working and daily life. The feeling of anxiousness within the Swedish media was described both in the working and daily life which could be linked to previous researchers’ assumptio ns (Griffith and Vatikus, 1999, Björk, 2020). Some had given up the thought of traveling to China. And Kurdo Baksi, even today, avoided going to Chinese restaurants in Sweden.
Regarding the second factor, 9 of 10 participants believed that the threats and harassment, in the long run, will have a negative impact on the independent journalism and the civil society. This study showed that the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities towards the Swedish media was unique. Only a few other authoritarian states behaved in similar ways in Sweden. However, China stood out with these intense threats and harassment. Connected to this, the study also showed that a more negative attitude towards China and Chinese authorities could be seen from the Swedish media and the civil society. Thus, up until now, the threats and harassment had affected China and Chinese authorities negatively. To an extent, that could appear to be a failure in China’s foreign policy (Oskanen, Frivärld, 2020).
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Although, the threats and harassment from Chinese authorities was an issue for the Swedish media, Sweden and the globe, in different perspectives. Hence, if the Swedish media gets more controlled or adapted because of threats and harassment from Chinese authorities, it will in the long run have serious consequences, for the Swedish media and Sweden as a whole. If these types of threats and harassment escalate, it is a risk that China export its freedom of expression ban culture to Sweden. This study showed that a superpower state, like China, very easily can affect other smaller states. The study also showed that the media is used as a means for a powerful state to gain influence and to impact other states.
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7.1 Suggestions for further research
Some participants of this study expressed in their interviews, the security of being a large media organisation. To be a large media organisation means many people are involved and the employees have considerable support from each other. This might make it easier to stand up against threats and harassment. A suggestion for further research could be a comparison between rural and local and further smaller and larger Swedish media outlets. This could be of interest, relating to consequences when threatened and harassed from Chinese authorities. It would also be interesting to examine if and how the Corona pandemic has affected the China-Sweden relationships.
Another perspective is to investigate similar threats and harassment from Chinese authorities in other states, perhaps an examination around the other Nordic countries, or from a European perspective, explore Hungary in relation to this subject. As Erik Halkjaer pointed out, RSF Sweden looked at Hungary. Their ambassador in Sweden, attacked the Swedish media in the same way as the Chinese ambassador. This can be interesting to follow up on. Further, that Chinese embassies around the world seemed to coordinate Chinese students to disrupt demonstrations, can be of interest. For example, this could be seen in Australia and New Zealand, according to Kurdo Baksi (Åkesson in Expressen, 09/09/2019).
Apart from that, Erik Halkjaer, stated that RSF could see from their reports that Chinese embassies and ambassadors made similar attacks as in Sweden, in countries like Australia and South Africa. It was also expressed by some participants, that China targeted people expressing themselves negatively about the country, in England. Further, although China stood out with the intense threats and harassment, states like Israel, Turkey, Iran and Russia might be intresting to explore regarding the topic. These examples are all interesting if one ought to focus on other states relationships than specifically China and Sweden.
Thus, there are a lot of interesting follow ups, with different perspectives, on this subject.
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9. Appendix 9.1 Presentation of interview participants
Following, there is a presentation of my interview participants, including a background of their relation to threats and harassment from Chinese authorities, if such has occurred. In the headline profession, the focus is on the title relevant to this study. Hence, to a large extent, the participants also have other assignments in their professional careers.
Jesper Rönndahl Age: 41 Profession: Comedian. Former programme host for SVT’s satire programme Swedish News 2018 – 2019 In September 21, 2018, the satire programme made a joke about Chinese tourist in Stockholm. The joke was presented in a satire information film. The film was also posted on the Chinese equivalent YouTube channel Youku. This caused a storm of critical comments to emerge from the Chinese embassy. The embassy demanded an apology from SVT which aired the programme. During the same period, the programme also received criticism for showing a map of China that did not include Taiwan. The map was shown in several episodes.
Jesper Bengtsson Age: 52 Profession: Chairperson of Swedish PEN Bengtsson has been the chairperson since 2018. He was together with the organisation responsible for the decision to give the Tucholsky Prize 2019 to imprisoned Chinese/Swedish book publisher Gui Minhai. This caused much criticism from the Chinese embassy. It created issues at a governmental level. In public statements China’s ambassador threatened Swedish PEN and the Swedish Minister of Culture, Amanda Lind, who handed out the prize. Even the Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven received threats. The threats towards the government officials, mainly concerned that they would be denied entry to China. This was because they supported the decision to give the prize to Gui Minhai.
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Jojje Olsson Age: 37 Profession: China expert and journalist. Manages InBeijing - Sweden’s largest digital newspaper about China Olsson moved to China in 2007. He worked there as a journalist from 2010-2016. In 2016 he was denied a new visa to China. Olsson had for example, written about Gui Minhai and China’s oppression of journalists. After getting banned from China, Olsson moved to Taiwan. During the interview he was in Japan. Due to the Corona situation, he was not able to travel back to Taiwan.
Kurdo Baksi Age: 55 Profession: Author and public opinion former Baksi has a long history of being an author and public opinion former in Sweden. Concerning China, Kurdo was 2018, the initiative taker to the announcement Free Gui Minhai. The announcement and protest gathered many public people within the Swedish culture and media sphere. Kurdo describes that from 2018-2019 he received a lot of hate from the Chinese embassy in Sweden.
Ulrika Hyllert Age: 43 Profession: Chairperson of the Swedish Union of Journalists Hyllert has been the chairperson since 2019. The union has taken public defense for Kurdo Baksi and Jojje Olsson, regarding the threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy in Sweden. The union has stood behind public statements, both alone and together with other organisations, to bring light to these threats coming from the Chinese embassy in Sweden.
Grethe Rottböll Age: 64 Profession: Chairperson of The Swedish Writers’ Union Rottböll has been the chairperson since 2018. The union has taken public defense for Kurdo Baksi and Jojje Olsson, regarding the threats and harassment from the Chinese embassy in Sweden. The union has stood behind public statements, both alone and together with other organisations, to bring light to these threats coming from the Chinese embassy in Sweden.
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Erik Halkjaer Age: 47 Profession: Chairperson of Reporters Without Borders Sweden (RSF Sweden) Halkjaer has been the chairperson since 2019. Almost right when he started, a global report from the organisation was released. It was about China’s pursuit for a new global media order. In 2020, the Swedish section of the organisation, released a report about China’s threats towards the freedom of expression in Sweden.
Christofer Ahlqvist Age: 40 Profession: Chief editor at Göteborgs-Posten (GP) GP is the largest newspaper in the western part of Sweden. Ahlqvist has been the chief editor since the spring 2017. The daily newspaper has for a long time reported about China, particularly related to trade. The newspaper made a work trip to China in 2018 and noticed how hard it was to get a visa. During the autumn of 2019, they made an exclusive interview with the Chinese ambassador in Sweden. In the interview the ambassador, amongst other things, criticised the Swedish media for giving an incorrect image of China.
Eric Rosén Age: 40 Profession: Deputy editor at Aftonbladet Aftonbladet is Sweden’s largest newspaper. Rosén has been the Deputy Editor at Aftonbladet since 2018. Aftonbladet has also experienced trouble during work trips to China. Rosén expressed that China has become more active in their way of giving criticism to the Swedish media in recent years.
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Pia Skagermark Age: 59 Profession: Foreign editor at Dagens Nyheter (DN) DN is Sweden’s largest morning newspaper. In September 20, 2019, the newspaper DN was criticised by the Swedish media sphere and others, for an advertisement they published. The advertisement promoted the Chinese regimes view, relating to the protests in Hong Kong. The criticism concerned that DN was being too “China friendly”. I had a short telephone conversation with Skagermark. She answered that DN has not received any threats or harassment from Chinese authorities. Concerning the advertisement Sagermark refers to the public statement from Peter Wolodarski, chief editor at DN. Before the telephone conversation with Skagermark I tried to reach Wolodarski. He was not available, and I was recommended to contact Skagermark.
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9.2 Interview guide (In Swedish) Bakgrundsinformation Ålder: Familj: Yrke: Tidning/typ av tidning (alternativt radio- eller TV-station. Alternativt: Tidning/typ av tidning (alternativt radio- eller TV-station) som du jobbade på då hot och trakasserier kom från kinesiska auktoriteter:
Huvudfrågor: 1. Har du utsatts för hot och trakasserier i ditt yrkesliv av kinesiska auktoriteter?
Underfrågor till huvudfråga 1: Hur såg din familjebild ut vid tillfället för hotet/trakasserierna från kinesiska auktoriteter?
Har du fast anställning, jobbar som frilans eller är du anställd av ett bemanningsföretag?
Alternativ fråga: Hade du fast anställning, jobbade som frilans eller var du anställd av ett bemanningsföretag vid tillfället för hotet/trakasserierna?
2. Varför och på vilket ett vilket sätt har du och din redaktion/organisation utsattas för hot och trakasserier från Kina?
Underfrågor till huvudfråga 2: Vilken typ av text/sammanhang föranleder/föranledde dessa hot eller trakasserier?
Hur ser hoten/trakasserierna ut och vilka medel används för att framföra dessa?
3. Vilka är konsekvenserna av hoten/trakasserierna?
Underfrågor till huvudfråga 3: Vilka konsekvenser har hoten/trakasserierna fått för ditt yrkesliv samt privatliv? (ex. omedveten/medveten självcensur i arbetet/förändrat beteende i arbets- och vardagsliv)
Vilka arbetsmetoder har du och din arbetsplats utvecklat för att kunna fortsätta utföra ert arbete trots hot och trakasserier?
Vad tror du att hoten/trakasserierna kan innebära för den oberoende journalistiken och det öppna samhället?
Har du upplevt att företrädare från och supportrar till andra stater än Kina har agerat på samma eller liknande sätt?
Har hoten /trakasserierna samt uppmärksamheten kring dessa fått några positiva följder? Stöd/ickestöd från stat och andra?
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