Se Inicia La Inflexión

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Se Inicia La Inflexión Ejercicio de 2012 Se inicia la inflexión Resultados anuales Presentación a medios de comunicación Barcelona, 24 de enero de 2013 Índice 1. Claves del ejercicio – Josep Oliu 2. Análisis de los resultados – Jaime Guardiola Negocio, balance y liquidez Gestión de activos inmobiliarios 3. Perspectivas 2013 – Josep Oliu 2 Claves del ejercicio Josep Oliu, presidente Claves del ejercicio • Integración de Banco CAM • Refuerzo del core capital • Stress test de Oliver Wyman • Saneamiento del balance • Buena evolución de ingresos y costes • Incremento sustancial de la posición de liquidez • Gestión activa de la exposición inmobiliaria 4 Análisis de los resultados Jaime Guardiola, consejero delegado Cuenta de resultados 2012 2012 2011 2012* vs. 2011 Margen de intereses 1.537,3 1.868,0 21,5% Método participación y dividendos46,4 -1,9 -- Comisiones573,6 628,7 9,6% ROF y diferencias de cambio341,2 606,1 77,6% Otros resultados de explotación8,2 -142,5 -- Margen bruto 2.506,7 2.958,4 18,0% Gastos de personal -742,6 -996,5 34,2% Gastos de administración-402,5 -515,1 28,0% Amortización-130,9 -156,9 19,9% Margen antes de dotaciones 1.230,7 1.289,9 4,8% Total provisiones y deterioros-1.048,9 -2.540,6 -- Plusvalías por venta de activos corrientes5,7 15,4 -- Fondo de comercio negativo-- 933,3 -- Impuestos y otros 44,4 383,9 -- Beneficio atribuido al grupo 231,9 81,9 -64,7% En millones de euros. * Incluye siete meses de Banco CAM 6 Buen comportamiento del margen de intereses… Margen de intereses En millones de euros +21,5% • Gestión activa 1.868,0 de los diferenciales 1.537,3 • Limitado incremento del coste de los recursos de clientes 2011 2012 Rotación de la cartera de crédito en 4T12: 18.185 millones 7 …las comisiones evolucionan de acuerdo con el incremento de negocio… Comisiones En millones de euros +9,6% 628,7 573,6 8,5 26,1 311,3 241,4 Servicios 186,6 206,2 Inversión Gestión de activos1 119,5 102,7 Intermediación de renta fija 2011 2012 1 Incluye comisiones de fondos de inversión y comercialización de fondos de pensiones y seguros. 8 …y los costes están bajo control… A perímetro constante, disminuyen notablemente Gastos de personal Gastos administrativos A perímetro A perímetro constante* constante* +34,2% -3,9% +28,0% -9,3% 996,5 19,5 742,6 29,1 515,1 402,5 997,0 2,8 713,5 9,1 512,3 393,4 2011 2012 2011 2012 No recurrentes Recurrentes En millones de euros * Incluye Lydian Bank y Banco CAM en 2011 y excluye no recurrentes. 9 …con una adaptación constante de los recursos Evolución de empleados y oficinas Ratio En número de eficiencia En porcentaje Adquisición Adquisición Adquisición Adquisición de Mellon de Banco de Lydian de United Guipuzcoano Private Bank Banco CAM National Bank 51,1% 47,3% 16.754 16.413 14.961* 10.777 9.839 10.721 10.610 10.699 10.675 9.746 9.701 10.550 2.202 2.204 1.898 1.467 1.467 1.383 1.221 1.223 1.222 1.379 1.387 1.382 2011 2012 BS BS+CAM 1T10 2T10 3T10 4T10 1T11 2T11 3T11 4T11 1T12 2T12 3T12 4T12 Empleados Oficinas * Enero de 2013. 15.596 empleados a cierre de 2012. 10 Negocio, balance y liquidez Captación creciente de clientes… Captación bruta de clientes (Sabadell stand alone) Incremento de captación 2009 2010 2011 2012 anualizado Particulares 128.567 200.507 286.560 338.830 +38% Empresas 24.567 39.611 55.536 72.981 +44% Total 153.134 240.118 342.096 411.811 +39% 8.000 nuevos clientes por semana durante el 2012 Número total de clientes Banco Sabadell Banco Sabadell con stand alone Banco CAM Dic. 12 Dic. 12 2.998.219 5.502.584 12 …con crecimiento orgánico de recursos de clientes de un 11% Evolución de los recursos de clientes En millones de euros Crecimiento orgánico Crecimiento orgánico: interanual: 11,0% 5.892 millones 80.179 75.420 75.058 Crecimiento no orgánico: 20.933 millones 53.354 53.446 4T11 1T12 2T12 3T12 4T12 13 Captación de clientes en la zona de Valencia, Alicante y Murcia Campaña de captación de clientes Resultados de la campaña SabadellCAM de captación de clientes Número de clientes nuevos y dinero nuevo en millones de euros, SabadellCAM. acumulado sep-nov 2012 Sep-nov 2012 Nuevos clientes: 10.000 1.500 7.335 8.000 1.200 6.000 900 Nueva captación: 1.286 millones 4.000 600 2.000 300 0 0 3-sep-12 27-sep-12 24-oct-12 20-nov-12 Clientes nuevos Dinero nuevo (Eje derecho) 14 La red SabadellCAM converge de forma sólida con el resto del grupo… Campaña seguros del hogar Campaña seguros de vida En número de pólizas sep-nov 2012 En número de pólizas sep-nov 2012 6.048 6.792 6.460 4.079 Objetivo Pólizas Objetivo Pólizas de ventas vendidas de ventas vendidas Excelente resultado en las recientes campañas, con 12.508 pólizas vendidas (+115% del objetivo) La plantilla adquiere know-how a una velocidad superior a la prevista - reiteramos nuestros objetivos de delivery 15 …consiguiendo incrementar cuotas de mercado, tanto en particulares… Total depósitos a vista de hogares Facturación con tarjetas Nov. 11 2,17% Sep. 11 3,27% +184 pbs +268 pbs Nov. 12 4,01% Sep. 12 5,95% Nóminas Transaccionalidad1 Nov. 11 2,31% Dic. 11 4,78% +308 pbs +173 pbs Nov. 12 5,39% Dic. 12 6,51% 1 Cheques, transferencias, transferencias SEPA, recibos, efectos de comercio presentados y recibidos. Banco CAM no incluye transferencias SEPA. 16 …como en empresas Depósitos a la vista de empresas Facturación en TPV Nov. 11 7,25% Sep. 11 7,64% +307 pbs +356 pbs Sep. 12 11,20% Nov. 12 10,32% Crédito a empresas Crédito documentario exportación Nov. 11 5,63% Dic. 11 25,52% +297pbs +18 pbs Nov. 12 8,60% Dic. 12 25,70% 17 Notable incremento del gap comercial Evolución de los recursos (En millones de euros) 2011 2012 Var. Recursos de clientes en balance 53.354 80.179 50,3% Otros recursos de balance a plazo* 34.614 53.095 53,4% Cuentas a la vista 18.740 27.085 44,5% Recursos fuera de balance 17.942 20.659 15,1% Fondos de inversión 8.024 8.585 7,0% Fondos de pensiones 2.858 3.709 29,8% Seguros comercializados 5.926 7.313 23,4% Total recursos 71.296 100.838 41,4% Inversión bruta de clientes ex repos y ajustes 73.540 115.458 57,0% Inversión bruta de clientes ex repos y ajustes ex EPA 99.925 35,9% Gap comercial Menos demanda de crédito +15.452 Incremento en la captación de depósitos millones de euros Flight-to-quality • * Otros recursos a plazo incluye depósitos a plazo y otros pasivos colocados por la red comercial: participaciones preferentes, obligaciones necesariamente convertibles en acciones, bonos simples, pagarés y otros. Excluye repos. • En 2012, el gap comercial incluye ajustes por actuaciones de capital. • Los datos de junio, septiembre y diciembre de 2012 incluyen Banco CAM 18 Desapalancamiento Evolución del gap comercial Gap 2013e * En millones de euros €12.620M 15.452* Ventas inmuebles 11.120 Reducción EPA 5.811 Descenso del crédito 3.439 -2.682 815 1.322 Incremento de los recursos 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e * Incluye ajustes por actuaciones de capital * Cambio gap comercial + ventas de inmuebles Ratio LTD Adquisición 182,1% Buena evolución Banco CAM 168,3% del gap, impulsado por 174,8% 146,7% 137,8% 144,0% 132,7% el desapalancamiento Ex. EPA 125,8% y el flight-to-quality 119,8% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 19 Morosidad. Provisiones y cobertura La morosidad en 2012 Provisiones y cobertura En % En millones de euros y porcentaje 11,38 Proporcionada por FGD 25% (% sobre el total) 9,33 Constituidas por 7,41 Banco Sabadell 75% (% sobre el total) Cobertura total 17.159 (millones) Morosidad BS Morosidad BS+Banco CAM Morosidad sistema 14% de cobertura sobre Diferencial vs. sistema el total de exposición En puntos básicos en el balance del grupo 2010 2011 2012 80 189 205 El diferencial con el sistema se multiplica por 2,6 en los últimos dos años 20 Elevado nivel de capital tras consolidar BancoCAM Actuaciones de capital en 2012: Ratio de core capital incrementos de 3.092 millones En porcentaje • 01.2012: canje de preferentes por acciones 10,4% 10,3%* 10,2%** Ö Mejora en capital: 785 M • 03.2012: ampliación de capital 9,3% Ö Mejora en capital: 903 M • 07.2012: canje de preferentes y subordinadas de Banco CAM por acciones Jun. 11 Dic. 11 Jun. 12 Dic. 12 Ö Mejora en capital: 1.404 M * Ratio proforma incluyendo el canje de preferentes de Banco Sabadell, que se inició el 14/12/11 y finalizó el 3/01/12 ** Ratio proforma incluyendo el canje del 95,7% en la recompra de preferentes y deuda subordinada de Banco CAM 21 Gestión de activos inmobiliarios Más de 2.200 millones de euros en ventas de inmuebles en 2012 … Actividad de ventas del grupo (balance y financiados) En millones de euros y unidades Valor Unidades CAM BS – inmuebles de promotor 13.777 BS – inmuebles en balance 2.234 +1,6x +2,0x 746 6.021 1.414 6.903 1.029 268 862 5.406 1.980 619 5.470 800 4.824 4.015 527 626 2.286 229 582 908 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 Se supera el objetivo de ventas de 2012 Nota: Valor activado antes de provisiones 23 …con un comportamiento mejor que el del mercado… Número de transacciones Unidades Mercado (INE) Grupo Banco Sabadell 439.591 -18,2% 13.777 359.824 -12,3% 336.824 295.535 +2,0x 6.903 5.406 2011 2012 2010 2011 2010 20111 2012 Enero - Noviembre Incremento significativo de ventas en un entorno de mercado en contracción… …en paralelo a una reducción de la exposición inmobiliaria Datos de Sabadell: Incluye CAM en 2011 y 2012.
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