Inside Ibb: a Hotbed of Infighting in Houthi-Controlled Yemen

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Inside Ibb: a Hotbed of Infighting in Houthi-Controlled Yemen Inside Ibb: A Hotbed of Infighting in Houthi-Controlled Yemen acleddata.com/2019/10/03/inside-ibb-a-hotbed-of-infighting-in-houthi-controlled-yemen/ Renewed attention on southern Yemen has largely obscured recent political developments in the north of the country, where over the past year the Houthis have faced scattered, yet increasing opposition to their pervasive rule. This localized dissent generated a sequence of violent incidents and a spike in infighting, which is at its highest levels since the alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh crumbled in December 2017. These events point to the highly volatile and unstable nature of the Houthi governance system across northern Yemen, and questions their ability to run politics in times of de-escalating conflict . Conflict since the December 2018 Stockholm agreement has assumed various forms. The agreement averted a looming military offensive with potentially disastrous consequences and led to a stagnation in the conflict between Houthis against the coalition-backed forces; although few territorial changes have occurred between these forces, they are firmly entrenched where they were a year ago. The agreement contributed to a significant decline in combat fatalities along the west coast, but violence has surged in other governorates, including Hajjah, Ad Dali and Taizz ( ACLED, 18 June 2019 ). Simultaneously, despite the Saudi-led coalition’s intention of gradually disengaging from direct military operations, reflected in a consistent decrease in the number of airstrikes recorded since last year and culminated in the UAE’s drawdown announced last June, the Houthis have claimed an increasing number of attacks against Saudi and Emirati facilities (see Figure 1). While the conflict is drawn into stagnation, the Houthis have faced isolated pockets of rebellion from within their own ranks as well as from tribes and communal groups opposed to their rule. Included in these episodes is the quashed rebellion of the Hujur tribes in Hajjah, triggered by the Houthis’ alleged invasion of tribal territory earlier this year ( al-Deen, 23 April 2019 ), as well as a string of clashes in Amran that culminated with the killing of a tribal leader the Houthis accused of defection in July ( The National, 23 July 2019 ). Throughout 2019, sporadic factional clashes occurred in Ad Dali and Taizz, but the province of Ibb reported the highest levels of infighting between opposing Houthi factions in northern Yemen, marking a record high since the split with Saleh in 2017 (see Figure 2) [1] . Ibb provides a good example of how the Houthis’ attempt to assert their authority is antagonizing local elites. In this governorate, the Houthis have reconfigured the local political environment, promoting loyalists from their stronghold of Saada and stirring opposition from increasingly marginalized elites and allies. How the Houthis seized Ibb Strategically located on the highlands of central Yemen along lucrative wartime smuggling routes, Ibb is the second most populous governorate of the country, home to nearly 4 million people and sheltering more than 200,000 IDPs ( International Organization for Migration, 11 March 2019 ). The vast majority of the local population adheres to the Shafi‘i Sunni school of Islam, but Zaydi minorities are scattered in the province and largely concentrated in the ‘ hijras’ — protected enclaves within tribal territory mostly inhabited by sayyids , the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Though scarcely penetrated by Zaydi religious and cultural centers, Ibb was the first governorate outside the far north to witness clashes between the Houthis and Islah during the summer of 2013. In July that year, skirmishes erupted in the ar-Radhma district, located in the north-east of Ibb at the crossroad between four governorates and a Zaydi enclave ( al-Heyad, 20 August 2013 ). Hashemites from local hijras (al-Manjar in Bani Qays and adh-Dhari in Shayzar) operated as a Houthi foothold by establishing checkpoints to protect a Shiite religious festival celebrating the martyrdom of Ali Ibn Abu Talib. Violence escalated as members of the prominent Du‘am family, a lineage of shaykhs unofficially affiliated with the anti-Houthi Islah party, demanded to lift the checkpoints. An agreement was brokered by a local mediation committee led by Abdulkarim ash-Shahiri , paramount shaykh of the central areas. In October 2014, the Houthis overran al-Hudaydah and Dhamar; soon after they entered the city of Ibb from a northern checkpoint without facing resistance from the government forces. The Local Security Committee held a meeting at the presence of Abdulmushin at-Tawwus , an in-law of the movement’s leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi and the Houthi appointed supervisor (mushrif) for the governorate ( al-Jazeera, 15 October 2014 ). A ten-member tribal mediation committee was established, led by the deputy governor of Ibb and president of the General People’s Congress’s (GPC) local branch shaykh Abdulwahid Salah . The full takeover of Ibb governorate also encountered little resistance. Sporadic clashes with Islah took place in the north-eastern districts of Yarim and ar-Radhma ( Sabq,18 October 2014 ), and 1/10 around the governorate’s capital city ( al-Jazeera, 17 October 2014 ). Local resistance mobilized around the Du‘am family and the Islah party, finding a leader in shaykh Abdulkarim ash-Shahiri. After the Houthis succeeded in crushing the resistance forces in ar-Radhma and destroyed Du‘am family’s house ( al-Araby, 29 October 2014 ), its members agreed to leave the province and joined the ranks of the internationally recognized government. This rapid advance across the governorate was facilitated by a strategic alliance with the former president Saleh’s GPC, which secured the support of the 35th and 55th brigades of the Republican Guard and a direct access to local tribal networks. Yet from the very beginning, the Houthis worked to eradicate the GPC and coopt their networks. Some key GPC deputy governors were confirmed in their positions, while many were replaced with Houthi loyalists or tribal figures close to the movement. Replicating a divide-and-rule strategy used in other governorates under their authority, the Houthis thus attempted to weaken local structures of power splitting up tribal or family lineages and manipulating local tribal orders through the appointment of second-rate shaykhs in state positions . Some examples may further clarify these dynamics. The Houthis designated Abdulhamid ash-Shahiri , brother of Abdulkarim, as First Deputy Governor with authority over the north-east of the governorate, and Muhammad ash- Shami , a Hashemite from Ibb, as Security Director. Through these two appointments, the Houthis managed to break up an influential tribal group and assert control over the governorate’s north-eastern districts, while handing over local security to the member of a prominent Hashemite family with close links to the Houthis’ inner circle. Additionally, the Houthis’ general supervisor in Ibb, at-Tawwus, soon established contacts with the members of the Tribal Mediation Committee. Among them are Abdulwahid Salah , appointed by the Houthis Governor of Ibb in August 2015; Aqil Fadhil who later became the GPC’s local leader; Ashraf al-Mutawakkil , a Hashemite appointed deputy governor in August 2016; Ibrahim al-Musawi , another Hashemite who became director of the Youth and Sport Office; and Tariq al-Mufti , a Hashemite who was appointed member of the Shura Council in April 2018. An unstable coalition and the onset of infighting Unlike the neighboring governorates of al-Bayda, Taizz and ad-Dali, Ibb is not located on the front line of the war but has nevertheless experienced sustained levels of violence since the start of the conflict around Ibb city and in its easternmost districts bordering Ad Dali and Taizz (see Figure 3). Airstrikes are the primary mode of violence, followed by clashes between armed groups and improvised explosive devices (IED) attacks targeting both combatants and civilians. Factional clashes within the Houthi-Saleh alliance occurred occasionally between 2015 and 2017, often pitting Houthi militias against Republican Guard soldiers for the control of security checkpoints and tax collection. In the wake of Saleh’s assassination, infighting remained low, only to remerge vehemently in the second half of 2018. This wave of factional fighting is linked to changes in the local political order enforced by the Houthis. In July 2018, Yahya al-Houthi – Education Minister in the Sana’a-based government and a leading political figure in the movement – reportedly visited Ibb to address urgent security issues. At the same time, Hamud al-Harithi was appointed Commander of the Rescue Police while Abdulhafiz as- Suqqaf – the former Deputy Minister of Interior, hailing from Ibb – replaced Muhammad ash-Shami as Security Director in the governorate ( Yemen Shabab, 26 July 2018 ). Yet, there was no surge in violence during the January- August period of 2018 to justify the reshuffle in response to alleged ‘security emergency’. In September 2018, new reshuffles involved the local military and security leadership. Abu Ali al-Ayani , the Houthis’ military supervisor, was appointed commander of the Ibb axis and of the 55th brigade; Yahya Muda‘is , the Houthis’ security supervisor, was appointed Chief of Staff in the Central Security Forces; Abu Hashim adh-Dhahyani was appointed director of the Political Security ( al-Mashad al-Yemeni, 12 September 2019 ). In a further attempt to tighten
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