Running head: IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS TRAINING 1

U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officers to Adopt U.S./International Merchant Mariner Training

Joseph Schwartzstein

California State University Maritime Academy

IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 2

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic CAPSTONE Project are those of the paper’s author

(Joseph Schwartzstein) and the author’s quoted references, and do not reflect the official

policy of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or Department of Transportation.

This paper is used to suffice course and graduate program requirements.

IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 3

Abstract

Today’s U.S. Navy is one of the largest and most technically advanced in the world. Officers and crew are the operational back bone of the surface fleet. Surface Warfare Officers are the sea bound warriors that serve on surface combatants that fulfill the Navy’s mission to maintain global maritime superiority (U.S. Navy, n.d.). The Surface Warfare Officer is considered the back bone of the Navy. They are the leaders and operators of surface ships at sea, with primary responsibilities of safe navigation and management of various shipboard systems. Recently the

U.S. Navy has had a series of tragic maritime incidents. The incidents have included three collisions and one grounding. The results are the death of 17 sailors and repair cost estimates of nearly $367 million to $500 million per ship (LaGrone, 2018). The 2017 Navy Comprehensive

Review found that poor seamanship and failure to follow safe navigational practices was a major contributing factor (U.S. Navy, 2017). The Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, National

Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer Corps and U.S. Army have all adopted International Maritime Organization/U.S. Coast Guard Standards of Training,

Certification and Watchkeeping standards. This project outlines an international and U.S. approved training regime for the U.S. Navy to adopt to increase the maritime professional expertise and safety of their Surface Warfare Officers.

Keywords: ARPA, bridge resource management, BRM, CBT, Coast Guard, ECDIS,

IMO, MMC, Merchant Marine, mariner, navigation, Navy, rules of the road, ship handling,

Surface Warfare, SWO, SWOS, STCW, training, U.S.C.G.

IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 4

U.S. Surface Warfare Officers to Adopt U.S./International Merchant Mariner

Training

The U.S. Navy is the world’s leading sea power. U.S. Navy Surface ships are a visible presence throughout the globe. Surface ships provide readily available power projection and

U.S. diplomacy across the global and maritime domain. The fleet has to respond to ever changing global challenges. The surface fleet assures U.S. allies that the U.S. has the ability to promote global stability with power projection. The Navy achieves its goals by deterring enemies with a forward and ready force, establishing maritime sea control and projecting national power. The U.S. Navy must be a credible power by having: capable and combat ready warships, tactically and technically proficient personnel, and realistic and integrated training.

However, navigation and seamanship have become an issue within the Surface Fleet.

The Surface Fleet has recently experienced a string of maritime incidents aboard their ships. These incidents have included: the grounding of the U.S.S. Antietam and U.S.S.

Guardian, the collisions with commercial vessels of the U.S.S. Porter, U.S.S. McCain, U.S.S.

Lake Champlain and U.S.S. Fitzgerald. The U.S.S. Antietam grounded in Tokyo Bay on 21

January 2017. The report for the U.S.S. Antietam grounding stated that senior leadership did not account for the effects of high winds and currents during the execution of the anchoring plan.

The navigation team and the Combat Information Center failed to notify the commanding officer that the ship was moving towards a shoal. They also failed to provide recommendations for maneuvering the ship away from danger. The U.S.S. Guardian ran aground off Tubbataha Reef on 17 January 2013. The report issued by the U.S. Navy found that the grounding was caused by poor voyage planning, poor execution, and a series of unfortunate circumstances. The report stated that the crew failed to follow safe and sound navigation principles. The U.S.S. Porter was IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 5 damaged in a collision with the tanker MV Otowasan on 12 August 2012. The Navy released their findings that the crew demonstrated a lack of knowledge of rules of the road and a failure to act in accordance with accepted norms and rules. The U.S.S. Lake Champlain had a collision with the South Korean fishing vessel Nam Yang 502. In an investigation report released by the

U.S. Navy, it was found that poor training, poor leadership and failures in watchstanding and navigation were causes for the incident. The reported cited problems made by the bridge watch team and the combat information center. The report found failures in executing basic watchstanding practices, adherence to sound navigational practices, failures to use navigational tools and failure to respond to an extremis situation. The U.S.S. McCain collided with the M.V.

Alnic MC on 21 August 2017. The Navy’s comprehensive review found that the primary causes for the McCain collision were a loss of situational awareness in high traffic area and a failure of safe navigational practices. The report also found that there were failures in basic watchstanding and seamanship. The U.S.S Fitzgerald collided with the containership ACX Crystal on 17 June

2017. The Navy found that the collision resulted from a failure in leadership and watch standers.

Leadership and watch standers failed to plan for safety and adhere to sound navigational practices. Watch standers failed to properly utilize navigational tools and basic watchstanding principles. Watch standers also failed to take deliberate and effective actions when put into extremis. The recent string of incidents has highlighted the Navy’s basic lack of seamanship, navigation and ship handling. The Navy has a lack of effective training and the diminution of individual and group professional skills.

After the maritime incidents, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations led a comprehensive

60-day review of the accidents. The review led to a 122-page comprehensive report. It was used to determine changes and improvements for the Surface Fleet. The report recommended IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 6

“nearly” 60 dramatic changes to Navy operations and stated that officers had inadequate training that leaves crucial skills to be picked up through on-the-job learning (Seck, 2017).

The report highlighted that the major contributing factor to the mishaps was a failure to observe safe navigational practices. “The proficiency in seamanship and navigation competes for time and attention with the expanding tactical duties of naval professionals at sea” (U.S.

Navy, 2017). The costs of these accidents are on average $165 million dollars per ship

(Tangaleaga 2017). This does not include operational-down time and impacts on the increased operations for other surface ships. Naval officers appear not to be receiving the prerequisite maritime foundation training prior to arriving in the fleet. The failure in basic seamanship and navigation fundamentals has led to shortcomings in Navy leadership. The purpose of this paper is to describe a way forward for the Navy is a comprehensive revamping of Surface Warfare

Officer training focusing on the basics of seamanship and navigation.

In 1978, the International Maritime Organization adopted the Standards for Training,

Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW). The standards came into effect in 1984. Amendments were made to the STCW in 1995 that came into effect in 1997. The IMO adopted further amendments in 2010 that came into effect in 2012. The STCW is the training standard for merchant mariners throughout the world and includes U.S. Mariners. The reason for the adoption of universal training standards was to raise the professional skills of mariners worldwide. The convention was created to ensure a minimum standard for ratifying countries to meet or exceed. It is important to note that these standards apply to all mariners engaged in international trade regardless of their country adopting the convention. Prior to 1978 there were no international standards for training and certifying mariners. The STCW ensured the practical skills, competencies and theoretical knowledge of mariners. They were also intended to ensure IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 7 safety of life at sea, protect ships and the environment. The additional amendments following

1978 were designed to improve training, address new technology and inconsistencies, and update outdated provisions. In addition to merchant mariners having to meet STCW standards, the

Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Commissioned Officer Corps and the U.S. Army have adopted and met STCW training and certification standards.

To move forward, the Navy needs to revamp their training regime. The focus should be on the fundamentals of seamanship, navigation and ship handling. The question that has to be asked is: does the Navy need to align its training with IMO/U.S.C.G. training and certification of merchant mariners? This paper will show that the best course of action for the U.S. Navy is to adopt an internationally recognized and approved training regime. Near peer and commercial industry have found that IMO or U.S.C.G. standards are necessary to ensure the fundamental knowledge needed to operate a ship. A U.S.C.G./IMO approved officer in charge of a navigational watch and management level training would give Surface Warfare Officers the fundamentals in navigation and seamanship needed to run a ship more effectively.

This paper will discuss the history of Surface Warfare Officer Training and its evolution.

It will be followed by a discussion of deck watch officer near peer training and certification. The paper will also discuss deck officer training at the Federal and State Maritime Academies.

Finally, this paper will suggest a new training regime for the U.S. Navy, method of implementing the regime and a summary for how to move forward.

Literature Review

The U.S. Navy has done limited research with regards to the effectiveness of Surface

Warfare Officer training. The research that has been done is in response to the recent training IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 8 issues and accidents within the Navy. The research is usually accompanied by various articles written by Navy and maritime professionals critiquing current and past training. Recent Naval accidents have drawn more attention to the subject. The Surface Warfare community has failed in its basic mission of navigating ships. Recently, Senator Rocker Wicker (R-MS) and former

Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced the Surface Warfare Enhancement Act of 2018. The legislation was a result of the Navy’s Comprehensive Review.

The bill required a study that would have Navy standards more closely align with the standards for the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping (STCW) qualification. Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) chair of the House

Armed Service Committee (HASC) subcommittee on sea power and projection wants Surface

Warfare Officers training to align with international merchant marine standards. Representative

Wittman has also called for Surface Warfare Officers to have two separate career paths. The two paths would be shipboard engineering and shipboard operations and combat systems. This plan would more closely align with the United Kingdom Royal Navy and Australian Navy systems.

Congress has become concerned with the state of Navy Surface Warfare Officer training and has made a concerted effort to address the problem.

The Navy surface community has an issue with regards to their performance at sea. The

Navy has adopted more than 100 recommendations due to two internal reviews of recent accidents (Schmitt, 2017). These recommendations are designed to help improve the navigational problems within the Navy. The Navy has addressed officer training, however there has been no research on the Navy adopting IMO/U.S.C.G. training and certification of merchant mariner training. Further research will be necessary to address the need for IMO/U.S.C.G. training and certification of merchant mariners. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 9

The Navy’s 2017 Strategic Review discussed how today’s fleet is made up of fewer, more complex ships. The Surface Fleet is spending a larger amount of their time at sea. The ships are working with smaller crews. Today’s ships are technically complex. The equipment, systems, and ships with their reduced manning need a far more educated and experienced sailor.

These sailors are serving at higher grades. They are more expensive to recruit and train.

Navy Surface Warfare Officers have fewer opportunities to maintain and gain mastery of naval science. In 2003, the Navy eliminated the sixteen-week Surface Warfare Officer Basic

Course in favor of computer-based training (CBT). The elimination of the course also eliminated instructor billets. The elimination of instructor billets resulted in fewer officers returning to sea with enhanced in-depth knowledge derived from teaching (U.S. Navy, 2017).

The elimination of the course also resulted in junior personnel with minimal training. The officers impacted by the elimination of the sixteen-week basic course and transition to computer- based training are currently serving as executive and commanding officers of surface ships. In light of the issues, the Navy’s 2017 strategic review required Surface Warfare Officers to keep a career record of watchstanding hours. The book is to include a log of specific operational evolutions for surface ship watch standers. The requirement is similar to a naval aviator’s flight hour logs. The review also recommended establishing a minimum hour and evolution requirements for officers to become/remain as qualified Officer of the Deck, Combat

Information Center Watch Officer and Tactical Action Officer. It also requires the Navy to have more relevant simulator training scenarios for watchstanding qualifications.

The 2017 Strategic Review addresses some of the issues in Surface Warfare Officer’s major training problems. The review also provided recommendations to resolve critical training gaps. It recommended establishing a plan to train and assess units under stress and fatigue. It IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 10 also recommended team and leadership building exercises as well as establishing mentors for officers at sea. The report was very light on addressing the core problem of the surface fleet, a lack of proficiency in seamanship and navigation.

The Navy in 2010 produced a report from the Naval Postgraduate School identified shortcomings in computer-based training and its impact on junior officers. Crawford and Stoker, the authors of the report, found that; the importance of any entry-level training cannot be understated because of its known links to employee socialization, job satisfaction, and retention

(2010). The report found that the Navy moved away from computer-based training due to the many negative consequences.

Crawford and Stoker found that computer-based training was not adequately training new officers. The Naval Postgraduate study went on to find that the computer-based training resulted in a number of problems. The report found that newly commissioned officers were not prepared to lead as division officers. The new officers received varying levels of training, and at times no training occurred. Crawford and Stoker (2010) wrote, “ensigns perceived a negative message from the Navy in being handed a stack of CDs rather than being sent to a formal, dedicated, post- commissioning school like other unrestricted line officers.” Crawford and Stoker found that changes needed to be made with CBT learning. The Naval Postgraduate study found that ensigns who only had CBT should be required to take more training before reporting to their ship as with the old Surface Warfare Officer School Division Officer Course (SWOSDOC)

(Crawford, Stoker, 2010). Newly commissioned ensigns had stated that the Navy was giving a negative message to them. They felt the lack of structured training as compared to their peers in other communities meant the Navy did not value them. This negative feeling impacted their desire to remain in the Navy. The report found that initial training had positive outcomes. Other IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 11 studies had not given enough weight to the importance of initial training for ensigns prior to arrival to their first ship. The Navy created Afloat Training Groups (ATG) to address the lack of formal training. The ATGs taught a four-week introductory course. The four-week course provided ensigns with the fundaments to become a division officer. The course also provided ensigns the opportunity for camaraderie and team building exercise. Ensigns who were given an introductory course taught by ATGs had better knowledge and confidence than those given computer-based training. However, most felt the four-week course was not lengthy enough. The initial course needed to provide more breadth and depth. The majority of officers also believed that more time was needed in ship simulators. New officers believed this was the most useful part of the new course. Senior leadership appreciated the new training. A common theme from senior leadership was that commanders wanted ensigns to report aboard their ship with as much training as possible. Commanding officers believed this would also reduce the pressure and burden on ships to train new officers. The senior officers also expressed that a return to a full- time classroom course of three to four months after initial commission was the best solution to the training problem.

The research concluded that classroom training provided greater practical exposure and confidence for new officers. Classroom training provided for more mentoring of the new officers as compared to computer-based training. The report found that the training needed to have clear objectives with the ability to show how it should be implemented and how objectives should be met. Overall there is a belief that initial training needed to be longer. The initial training burden on ships needed to be reduced. The surface community has taken steps at improving training, but more work needs to be done. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 12

The recent accidents forced the Navy to create a Comprehensive review. The Navy’s

2017 Comprehensive review found that a SWO’s career development emphasized a variety of professional experience and professional competencies rather than an emphasis on seamanship and navigation. The Review Team found that SWO candidate training relies too much on the job training (OJT). The Review Team also found that throughout a SWO’s career path, simulator training does not have assessment on seamanship and navigation. The simulator training scenarios also included a lack of emergency and extremis situations.

The Comprehensive review also found that the SWOS Basic Division Officer Course only taught half the prerequisite fundaments and theory in a Surface Warfare Officer’s Personnel

Qualification System (U.S. Navy, 2017). The Navy’s research found that junior officers did not receive the prerequisite education and skills to perform the duty as a Conning Officer. Most of the education and skills that junior officers receive is on the job. OJT is meant to provide the new officers with the fundamentals for Conning Officer, Junior Officer of the Deck and Officer of the Deck. OJT varied for each officer. The report found that the level of training depended on the type of ship, the Commanding Officer and the skill level of senior officers assigned to the ship.

The Comprehensive Review found multiple watch standers did not apply safe navigation and seamanship practices properly. These errors resulted in the recent maritime accidents. The report also found that it was not uncommon to have unqualified, untrained or noncertified personnel and watch teams aboard ship. Surface Warfare Officer navigation and training lacked comprehensive assessments of officers’ navigational and seamanship skills throughout their career. The Comprehensive review found that; IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 13

foundational standards for professional core competencies are not consistent among all

accession sources. The team found that the U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Service

Training Command have jointly promulgated an Officer Professional Core Competencies

(PCC) manual to delineate the knowledge, skills and abilities requirements for basic

trained naval officers to possess, but the competencies actually taught are not consistent

across all accession sources (U.S. Navy, 2017).

The Navy lacks a basic seamanship and skills educational standard. The report gave a recommendation to improve individual training. The recommendations consisted of a

Navigation Skills Assessment Program to improve seamanship and navigation skills training for

SWO candidates and provide fundamentals training for officers who qualified SWO without initial classroom training. Finally, the report recommended the use of Yard Patrol craft to provide real-world hands-on training to help supplement classroom training. However, most of the conclusions consisted of the Navy establishing a process for reporting near misses, address stress and fatigue, reinforce team building, team leadership and team effectiveness. The Navy also recommended establishing a human expertise program. The review did not address additional basic fundamentals of seamanship and navigation.

Steve Wills wrote in his article “Circles in Surface Warfare Training” (2016) that

Surface Officer Warfare training should be reviewed from a historical perspective. He points out that CBT training did not provide professionally qualified and motived officers. The data showed that CBT had the opposite effect. Those that approved CBT should have looked to the past to see what training had worked and what training had not. The cost savings of eliminating the Surface Warfare Basic Division Officer Course and changing it to CBT created significant problems. Steve Wills wrote in his article “Circles in Surface Warfare training”: IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 14

Those engaged in the planning and approval of the new computer-based surface warfare

training program should have reviewed past surface warfare training initiatives and

experiences before radically returning the fleet to a journeyman culture. The history

clearly suggested that a fast-paced operational environment, with complex technologies

and evolutions was no place to send untrained officers (2016).

The Navy believed that on the job training at sea was better than shore-based classroom training. Dr. Wills points out that from a historical perspective the Navy created classroom training in 1961 because the traditional on the job training practice had become inadequate due to advances in technology. Dr. Wills points out that in 2003 a similar set of technological circumstances existed which should have pushed the Navy to follow past practices. The changes in 2003 were driven by reducing costs and improving retention and education. The

Navy believed that Surface Warfare Officers could maintain their professional skill, however there was no plan how this was to happen. By 2009, the Navy realized that CBT was not working as well as they had hoped. CBT had elicited a number of negative comments. One captain commented that no other first-rate Navy in the world would push newly commissioned officers out the door and directly on combatants without the benefits of formal training (2016).

Many new officers expressed their feelings about CBT. Many felt that they were teaching themselves the basics while leading their respective divisions. Soon after, the Navy took notice and instituted a Surface Warfare Introduction Course. By 2012, the Navy had reinstituted the

Basic Division Officer Course. Dr. Wills states that history demonstrates untrained officers do not belong in a high tech faced paced environment.

With budget cuts and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Navy needed to create financial efficiencies. One of these efficiencies was the elimination of the SWOS Basic Division IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 15

Officer Course. CAPT Kevin Eyers, USN points out in his article that today’s Surface Warfare

Officers have less professional knowledge then previous officers over the past 25 years. The reason is due to the transition from classroom training to CBT. CAPT Eyers wrote a dedicated academic environment eliminates distractions and allows for immediate feedback from an instructor. Sitting alone in a room, in front of a computer, is in no way an equal choice (2016).

CAPT Eyers believes today’s Surface Warfare Officers have undergone great damage to their culture. To solve the problem the Navy should to go back to a long-term in-residence school with expanded courses in Fleet concentration areas.

LT Mitch McGuffie, USN wrote that a two-year tour on a Royal Navy destroyer showed one young Surface Warfare Officer how much he didn't know (2009). LT McGuffie points out that the U.S. Navy trains new officers with computer-based training and a two-week navigation course to serve on the most advanced ships in the world. He adds that the training has been declining over the past decade. He thought that as a midlevel officer with pervious tours at sea he was qualified to serve on a British warship. LT McGuffie also believed that computer-based training had given him the fundamentals to be successful.

“It didn't take long to discover that he was not the seasoned and accomplished bridge

watchkeeper he had thought. He was being held to a much higher standard, serving

alongside Royal Navy officers who had endured years of training and had been certified

by the International Maritime Organization's Standards of Training, Certification, and

Watchkeeping (STCW)”. (McGuffie, 2009)

LT McGuffie’s experience gives a firsthand account of the Navy needing to create a standardized training program for its officers. LT McGuffie performed so poorly that he was embarrassed by his lack of knowledge and skills during his first months aboard the vessel. One IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 16 year into his tour aboard the British warship, he was able to attend the Royal Navy’s Provisional

Navigating Officer’s course. The course was four weeks long. Three weeks of the course consisted of classroom instruction in general navigation, chartwork, seamanship and meteorology. The final week was bridge simulator. He worked eight hours a day in chartwork, planning, exaction and technique. After completing the course LT McGuffie believed that he had become a true mariner. In his own words, he was capable of carrying out his duties as a navigator and providing sound advice to his captain (McGuffie, 2009). LT McGuffie believes that the Royal Navy has a training program that sets their officers up for success. His take-away from his time with the Royal Navy was that it had developed standardized training for their officers. He believed that the shore-based training augmented by sea time was a successful blend. LT McGuffie points out that in the U.S. Navy every other officer specialty is standardized. He states “virtually every other branch in the Navy spends countless months undergoing such training and evaluation - all with the exception of SWOs” (2009). LT

McGuffie has written that the most effective way to train Surface Warfare Officers is to have standardized training curriculum and send everyone to the same location. LT McGuffie says:

Officers must be the ones upholding the standards of the Fleet whether it is with

regard to preventive maintenance, firefighting, or watchkeeping. But over the past few

years officers have lost this ability because they have depended on their subordinates to

teach them virtually everything they know. In today's surface Navy, a junior seaman or

seaman recruit has more formalized naval training when reporting on board his first ship

than the average junior ensign. Obviously, some skills are best learned on the job, but we

cannot expect the operators of the Fleet to bear the burden of training junior officers from

the ground up, especially given the operational tempo of today's Navy. We must teach IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 17

officers the skills needed to successfully run a division, lead a repair party, or safely

navigate a ship before they are actually asked to do so. (2009)

LT Audrey Talbot, USN, writes about how second tour division officers and department heads need to understand that they belong on the bridge of a ship. She states that typically these officers are trying to receive their advanced qualification in warfare and engineering. Due to the qualification process many of these officers believe that they do not need to be involved in bridge watch standing. LT Talbot adds that a junior Surface Warfare Officer can spend as many as 13 years off the bridge before reporting for the executive officer tour—18 months as a second- tour division officer assigned to combat or engineering, three years ashore, three years as a department head (broken into two 18-month tours) standing watch in combat, and five more years ashore (2019). With this much time away from driving a ship, an officer would naturally lose their knowledge, skill and expertise in navigation and seamanship. The issue is that without a proper background and fundamentals in seamanship and navigation 13 years away from the bridge of a ship can be catastrophic (Talbot, 2019).

CAPT John Cordle, USN, the investigating officer for the U.S.S. Porter incident wrote about the U.S.S Fitzgerald investigation. He believed that no single sailor bears the full responsibility for the accident. His investigation showed that the crew was unprepared for the given situation. The ship had ineffective command and control. Finally, the crew was deficient in training and navigation. He believes that his investigation could also apply to the U.S.S Porter and U.S.S McCain. CAPT Cordle points out that the investigations of the three accidents have some parallels. He draws the following parallels:

Understanding and adherence to rules of the road, specifically sound signals and

maneuvering requirements when in sight of each other, a lack of understanding in the IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 18

tuning and operation of radar equipment (and by extension, steering machinery controls),

improper interaction between the Commanding Officer and Bridge team with respect to

giving orders and taking recommendations from bridge team, failure to note and

understand the nature of traffic in a traffic separation scheme i.e., cutting across a known

traffic pattern and thus raising the chance of interaction with other vessels, and a lack of

safe speed, although a factor in all three events, only one of the two recent investigations

notes this as a contributing factor (the Fitzgerald and the John S. McCain seem to have

been operating at about the same speed (20 knots) in about the same traffic situation

(Cordle, 2017).

In CAPT Cordle’s article he notes that the accidents of the U.S.S. San Jacinto/Montpelie and the U.S.S. Winston S. Churchill/McFaul, the groundings of U.S.S. Antietam,

U.S.S. Champion, U.S.S. Arleigh Burke and the U.S.S. Port Royal that the crews showed a lack of knowledge or failure to perform within accepted rules and norms. These failures to act within accepted rules and norms show a gap in training and experience. CAPT Cordle believes that the highest echelons of the Navy need to take a comprehensive review of training, manning and policy to find what actions they need to take to make sailors safer.

Sam LaGrone, in a recent article, wrote about a navy study that found junior Surface

Warfare Officers have major gaps in seamanship, ship handling and knowledge. In 2018, the

Navy gave 164 junior surface warfare officers a comprehensive test of seamanship skills. The review was a battery of competency checks on officers who were qualified to stand OOD watch.

The officers were qualified in seven fleet concertation areas. Prior to the exam, the Surface

Warfare School performed a survey of the officers to gauge their experience level. VADM

Richard Brown, Commander Naval Surface Forces stated that the results were sobering, of the IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 19

164 officers asked, only 27 completed with no concerns, 108 completed with some concerns, and

29 had significant concerns (LaGrone, 2018). A glaring problem from the report was that OOD qualified officers had a lack of understating of navigation with radar. As a result of the exam, the Navy expanded the radar and ARPA courses of instruction from two to 11 hours. The exam also gave all officers a comprehensive rules of the road exam. The written exam had a pass rate of 91 percent. However, it was found that the more than half the officers had difficulty applying the rules during the practical exam. The officers had trouble extraditing themselves from extremis collision situations. VADM Brown believes that the study is a chance for the Navy to rectify deficiencies.

David Larter recently wrote about the Navy review on the widespread shortfalls of basic seamanship. His article states that the evaluations raise distressing “questions about the level of ship handling training junior officers get both prior to their arrival at their first command and when they arrive” (2018). VADM Brown has directed the Navy to create extremis extraction scenarios to help reduce or eliminate watchstanding paralysis aboard ships. In addition, the

Navy plans on adding training to the advanced division officer course and two weeks of U.S.

Coast Guard approved radar training. The result of the evaluation is that the Navy will be adding improvements in simulator training, new courses of instruction, new assessment teams and increased sea time for junior officers.

U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs released the results of the investigation into the grounding of the U.S.S Guardian in Philippine waters. “The report found that the U.S.S

Guardian leadership and watch teams failed to adhere to prudent, safe, and sound navigation principles which would have alerted them to approaching dangers with sufficient time to take mitigating action” (Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, 2013). The report also pointed out that the IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 20 watch team had an over reliance on inaccurate Digital Nautical Charts for navigational planning and operational purposes. The grounding was preventable but was a result of numerous errors.

Had the officers and crew the fundamental training in seamanship and navigation they would have been able to observe and understand the visual navigational marks for safe and prudent navigation.

Geoff Ziezulwics, writer for the Navy Times, wrote in 2014 an article on the grounding of the U.S.S Antietam in Toyoko Bay. The Navy performed an internal investigation as a result of the grounding. It found lackadaisical seamanship and a concern about the crew anchoring the ship properly. The report laid out how the grounding was preventable and that the ship’s

Commanding Officer is ultimately responsible. The investigation also prompted Surface Naval

Force Commander VADM Rowden to review whether existing Navy technical manuals sufficiently laid out proper procedures on how to anchor a ship.

In the Navy’s command investigation of the grounding of the U.S.S. Antietam, found that the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Deck, the Conning Officer and the Navigator did not consider or understand the effects of high winds and currents on anchoring the ship. The report detailed the accident and the full chain of events that lead to the grounding. In the end, the investigation recommending adding an anchoring training event to the

Navy’s navigation assessment.

The Naval Postgraduate School in 2008 sponsored a report on the assessment and effectiveness on computer-based training for newly commissioned officers. The report discussed a number of differences in learning aboard ships. It recommended that the Navy conduct additional research on learning and training aboard ships. Bowman and Crawford found that newly commissioned officers preferred face to face learning over computer-based training. The IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 21 officers preferred the interactivity, collaboration and supportive learning environment and the immediacy of instructor feedback as well. In addition to the research on the computer-based training, the report went into junior officer on the job training. On the job training that was structured, planned and systemic is preferred over unstructured on the job training. The reason for the preference of structure versus unstructured is that structured is consistent and ensures objectives are achieved and met. The computer-based training was designed to be performed after work hours aboard ship, with structured training during the working day. The Surface

Warfare computer-based training turned out to be unstructured and put newly commissioned officers in positions without the prerequisite skills and knowledge to perform their job.

Bowman and Crawford through their research found:

Officers assigned to the primary line ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, called

CRUDES) are significantly less likely to pass the CBT module tests. Those assigned to

home ports on the Atlantic coast have significantly lower passing rates on the CBT tests

than do others. Naval Academy graduates had significantly lower passing rates than

otherwise similar officers commissioned by NROTC and OCS. The quality of one’s

undergraduate college—used to approximate academic ability—is directly related to

performance on the CBT modules. Graduates with technical majors have higher passing

rates on the CBT tests than those with non-technical skills. However, it is important to

keep in mind that the CBT modules do not capture all of the skills needed by junior

officers to become successful Division Officers (DIVOs). Women have significantly

lower pass rates than men. Few differences are found by ethnicity with the exception of

the scores on the Conning Officer Virtual Environment exam given toward the end of IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 22

SWOSDOC; all minorities are less likely to pass this exam as compared to their majority

counterparts (2008).

It is interesting to note that when the Navy gave structured introductory classroom training, test score differences between junior officers disappeared (2008). Officers found the sections of the CBT to be dry with no video or interaction. CBT contained practical problems and case studies. The officers found the case studies useful but there was no collaborative setting for students to work in groups to solve problems and create new learning opportunities.

The study recommended that the Navy investigate differences in scores among officers.

Bowman and Crawford also recommend that the Navy should make efforts to understand the learning and training opportunities for officers aboard ship prior to making an assessment on classroom and computer-based training. Bowman and Crawford found “two years into the new training régime, concerns began to surface that the self-directed training may not be working as expected when the DIVOs were formally tested at the beginning of a 3-week SWOSDOC

“leveling” school in Newport” (2008). Officers’ biggest issues with the CBT training were due to having to work full time and perform a job that they did not have adequate knowledge about

In 2010, Alice Crawford and Carol Stoker conducted a Naval Postgraduate School study in the evaluation of SWOS Division Officer training. The purpose of the study was to weigh costs of training in the current form against the potential for poorly trained junior officers. The report suggested a needs-based analysis to develop formal, dedicated training that contains clear objectives for newly commissioned officers. Their report discussed the positives and negatives of division officer training post 2008. It is important to note that after 2008, the Navy went back to a formalized classroom curriculum for newly commissioned officers. Their analysis is that the current Basic Division Officer Course is a good start, but it is not where it should be as of yet. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 23

The current structure is that some ensigns acquire better familiarization on fundamentals than was possible under computer-based training. The traditional classroom environment has provided the opportunity for camaraderie among junior Surface Warfare Officers. The current structure of the Basic Division Officer Course does have its drawbacks. Currently the course does not fill all desired results for entry level officers. The study found that ensigns and senior leadership would like to see a longer initial course. The current course provides too much information in too short a time period. The curriculum does not meet the desired level of preparation for junior officers. On the job training is discussed throughout the report. A cornerstone of division officer training is the shipboard experience. However, effective and meaningful training is lacking aboard ship. Senior leadership believed that junior officer training aboard ship was inconsistent and the depth of knowledge being taught was not available to produce the skill sets needed of a Surface Warfare Officer. The conclusions from the report show that when the Navy reintroduced an introduction course the provided familiarization and

Basic Division Officer training was an improvement of the previous computer-based training.

However, the current system still has its drawbacks and can be improved. It was found that the course was worse than the previous six-month SWOS course or any other form of formalized training. Ensigns and ATG instructors believed that the course length was too short. The training provided by the five-week INTRO did not meet the benchmarks of the previous six-month

SWOS. The six-month SWOS course provided more depth in curriculum. The overall conclusion of the Naval Postgraduate report was a need for continued improvement for newly commissioned Surface Warfare Officers.

In 2007, CAPT Stephen Davis wrote an article about the U.S. Navy creating the next

Nelson, a Surface Warfare Officer qualified in warfighting, navigation and seamanship. While IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 24 serving as an Executive Officer he became concerned with newly commissioned officers’ relatively poor level of preparation (2007) after completing the Basic Division Officer Course.

When the Navy eliminated the Basic Division Officer Course and went to CBT, CAPT Davis found it to be error plagued and unpopular. CAPT Davis believed that computer-based training was a disservice to junior officers. The CBT placed a heavy burden on operational ships to train and educate new officers. He points out that no” other first-rate Navy in the world pushes newly commissioned officers out the door and directly to combatants without the benefit of formal training or underway familiarization” (2007). CAPT Davis found that computer-based training did not address fundament operational issues that officers face aboard ship. He notes at the end of his article that it is difficult for a wardroom to make a substantial commitment to training and educating junior officers. He points out that a ship’s operational commitments and unknown schedules make structured training problematic. He believes that there are few things more essential than effective training.

The 2017 Navy Strategic review the U.S. Navy found that:

The surface fleet aggravated experience loss by eliminating the sixteen-week Surface

Warfare Officer School basic course in 2003. The basic course was removed in favor of

on-the-job and computer-based training, colloquially known as “SWOS-in-a-Box,” for

new surface warfare officers. The elimination of the course and its instructor billets

meant fewer officers returned to sea with the enhanced in-depth knowledge derived from

that teaching experience. Accordingly, junior personnel with minimal training and

experience were expected to provide on-the-job training to those who entered the fleet

after them. Formal training for Surface Warfare Division Officers has been restored to IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 25

fourteen weeks but the generation most affected by the lack of formal training is now

serving as executive and commanding officers (2017).

The Strategic Review highlighted the training issues and problems with computer-based training model. The Review points out that there is a need to increase the core educational requirements of safety, seamanship and training. The Navy should become a true learning organization according the Comprehensive Review.

In 2008, Arron Wilson and Christopher Olsen wrote a paper for the Naval Postgraduate

School on initial training for surface warfare officer for future success. Their paper discusses problems within the Naval Education Training Command process used in the training for Surface

Warfare Officer School and its weaknesses in the methodology for training. They conclude that the Basic Division Officer Course and the Surface Warfare Officer School can improve their training regime. The areas they focus on are concerned with adding more situational and interactive learning to the course. The Basic Division Officer Course is the foundation for

Surface Warfare Officers to set them up for a successful career.

RADM Scott Jones has written about the recent fiscal austerity of the Navy that forced a cost cutting way to train Surface Warfare Officers. The Navy has moved to focus on fundamental naval skill and deck plate training. The Surface Warfare Officer School identified areas of professional core competencies from fleet assessments in 2010. The fleet assessments provided feedback that junior officers needed more training in ship handling, navigation, seamanship, and other Navy leadership skills. RADM Scott also discusses the SWOS command- at-sea department. The command-at-sea department handles training for prospective executive and commanding officers. The curriculum focuses on improving training on navigation, seamanship and ship handling. He believes that in 2010 the upgraded Surface Warfare Officer IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 26

School curriculum has been largely successful. RADM Scott believes that a solid educational foundation is the core to competent warriors. He explains that this is the reason why the Surface

Warfare Officer School went back to basics on training. He points out that by focusing on basic skills through better training at each career level sets Surface Warfare Officers up to better succeed in their follow-on assignments.

In his article on professionalizing the surface force CAPT Ted Hontz, USN writes the leaders of the Surface Warfare community have embraced the generalist philosophy to the point of destruction (2018). He believes that the surface force has become an institution of mediocracy and largesse. CAPT Hontz points to the manning and training decisions of the early 2000s as playing a role in the problem. He points out that the U.S. Navy is the only major navy in the world that does not employ professional marine engineers aboard ships. The British, Canadian and Australian navies all have professional marine engineers, as well as combat system engineers and professional navigators. He notes that U.S. Navy Officers are second string mariners when compared with their NATO counterparts. He believes a solution to the continual issues is a technically professional Surface Warfare Officer.

Mark Faram in his Navy Times article believes that the Navy’s new plan to modernize training is doomed to fail (2018). The reason for the failure is the Navy not properly funding the training. The Navy has cut the new training budget by 30 percent. In addition to cutting funds the Navy is cutting instructor billets. He believes that the Navy has not learned from history and is at risk at repeating recent training issues. The continuation of funding cuts could impact fleet readiness. He reiterates the point that failure to maintain funding and resources to implement and sustain proper training will create the same situation as in the past. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 27

Midshipman Paul Kenny, a Miami University of Ohio student, was one of 12 midshipmen who served onboard the U.S.S. Fitzgerald when it collided with the commercial ship

ACX Crystal. He recently wrote for the Naval Institute on the current state of surface warfare officer training. The Navy has become focused on having officers take STCW (Standards for

Certification and Watchkeeping) courses in Radar, Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) and

Electronic Chart Display and Information (ECDIS). However, the new curriculum is lacking in the basics of ship handling, navigation, and seamanship. He believes that the Navy needs to create a baseline for all newly commissioned officers regardless of commissioning source. The

Navy needs to strengthen the traditional skills of their mariners prior to being assigned to a ship.

He believes that a training program modeled after the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy would improve the navigation, seamanship and ship handling skills of Navy Surface Warfare Officers

(Kenny, 2019).

Surface Warfare Officer Training

U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer training has evolved over the past 250 years from strictly hands on training aboard the first frigates to computer-based training to finally shore- based training. Computer-based training was the result of Navy cost cutting. Due to the failure of computer-based training to adequately train officers, the U.S. Navy has gone back to shoreside training. The CBT eliminated the 16-week Basic Divisions Officers course in 2003. Originally known as SWOS, at sea training transformed the classroom-based training into a two-part program. The computer-based training model eventually became known as “SWOS-in-a-box”.

The idea of the new program was to reduce training costs and the time required for officers to attain their Surface Warfare Officer qualification, incorporate at-sea training and enhance fleet- wide standards for SWO qualification (Crawford, Stoker, 2010). SWOS in a box led to a IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 28 haphazard training system. Newly commissioned ensigns were given a set of 21 CDs to learn the basics of seamanship on their own and without formal classroom training. It was believed that this would also reduce the number of permanent changes of station. It was also up to a ship’s Commanding Officer and Executive Officer to ensure junior officers received the training and competency needed to be successful mariners. Officers would progress through SWO qualifications at their own pace with the CBT and OJT. Prior to earning their SWO qualification, an officer would attend a three-week resident course at the SWO school in

Newport. There are currently 284 surface ships as of 2018, which means that there are 284 different training programs. Each officer was to learn on their own with no fleet-wide standardization. A Naval Postgraduate School study found a multitude of problems with the

CBT training. The study found that the self-paced CBT training was less effective than face to face traditional training. The study revealed that officers lacked formal division officer-related training prior to reporting to their first ship (Crawford, Stoker, 2010). Officers were reporting to their first ship feeling unprepared to perform their job as a division officer. New officers felt that inadequate time was given towards training and when it was it was of poor quality and inconsistent.

Recent and highly publicized incidents of poor ship Inspection and Surveys (INSURVs)

and ship mishaps added fuel to concerns over the CBT based training; suggestions

mounted that troubles in the Navy’s Surface Force were at least partly due to inadequate

officer training and to the increased burdens placed on the already strained ship manning

(Crawford, Stoker, 2010).

Policy changes and fiscal restraints by the Navy moved to reduce ship manning with minimum crews. The Navy also made a move to have fewer sailors perform condition-based IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 29 maintenance on ships rather than regularly schedule maintenance checks. The Navy then changed its standard work week, which increased available work time for sailors. In realty this meant fewer sailors to perform work. These changes placed an undue training burden on an already strained crew. Due to recent maritime accidents, work rest issues, and training problems, the U.S. Navy has reinstituted shore-based training for new ensigns.

Modern Surface Warfare training dates back to the post World War II era. Prior to this timeframe Surface Warfare training was a journeyman process (Wills, 2016). During the 1940s and 50s’ the Navy started to embrace new advanced technological changes to the surface fleet.

These changes required that commissioned officers obtain greater professional and technical competency. The early post war training programs did not keep up with the technology advancements. The Navy had few professional training courses during this time frame. It was found that officers coming from NROTC programs from civilian colleges did not have the same level as training as their Naval Academy peers. Newly commissioned officers were coming aboard ships with little to no training. To address the lack of professional training, the Navy created the Naval Destroyer Officers School in July 1961. The mission of the school was to improve combat readiness and tactical knowledge for junior naval officers on all ships (Willis,

2016). The school became highly successful. This success caused senior leadership to provide similar training to new division officers prior to reporting to their first ship (Willis, 2016). The first Surface Warfare Division Officer School opened their doors in September 1970 (Wills,

2016). The school focused on training the newly commissioned officer who was required to know how to function as a junior officer of the watch and division officer. The course was approximately six months in length. The six-month course included courses in fundamental surface warfare topics (Drage, 2010). Students also participated in underway training aboard a IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 30 yard patrol craft. The underway training ceased in 1993, when the Surface Officer Warfare

School was moved from Coronado, CA to Newport, RI.

The original Surface Warfare Division Officer Course consisted of leadership, engineering, weapons systems, ship handling, Rules of the Road, organizational structures, staff planning, operations security, damage control, firefighting, message drafting, administrative operations and maintenance and material management (Drage, 2010). The course provided all newly commissioned officers with the fundamentals. The training ran until about 2003. Due to a 2001 Navy survey and a 1997 Rand Report, Surface Warfare Officer training would undergo a significant change. The Navy found that the solution to the survey problems was to have a radical shift to computer-based training. Newly commissioned officers would then report to their first ship with 21 computer disks to learn the basics of the position from other ship’s officers and on their own. This program was designed to be a cost savings to the U.S. Navy. It was estimated that it would save the Navy $15 million a year (Wills, 2016). The Navy did produce some studies that showed that the computer-based training would require the Navy to improve the quality of instruction at various commissioning sources and an improvement in midshipman training cruise with formalized qualification goals. By 2009, the Navy realized that computer- based training had problems.

To solve the failures of computer-based training, in 2012 the Navy stood up the eight- week Basic Division Officer. This course was run until the collisions of the U.S.S McCain and

U.S.S. Fitzgerald. The recent maritime incidents have forced the Navy to adjust their professional training.

Currently newly commissioned Surface Warfare Officers attend the Basic Division

Officer Course. The Basic Division Officer Course is nine weeks long. It consists of leadership IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 31 training, Division Officer (DIVO) fundaments, administration, engineering damage control, maritime skills and maritime warfare, and Billet Specialty Training. Billet Specialty Training ranges in length from 0-18 weeks, due to Navy technical requirements. Officers also now attend

Officer of the Deck training. Officers will then go to sea for their first division officer tour.

After completion of their first division officer tour officers will be eligible for more shore-based training. This training is follow up training after approximately 18-24 months at sea and upon evaluation and approval from a ship’s Commanding Officer. The OOD training is six weeks long and consists of STCW courses in Radar, ECDIS (electronic chart display and information systems, and ARPA (automatic plotting aid). After the completion of the six-week OOD course, officers will attend the Advanced Division Officer course. This is a five-week course. During the ADO course officers will attend a 40-hour BRM (bridge resource management) course. The new officers will then spend an average of 30 months aboard U.S. Navy ships, learning and honing their craft. The officer will then typically spend 36 months in a shore-based assignment.

These assignments typically range from graduate school, flag officer aid, teaching or working with a major command. After completion of their shore-based tours, officers attend the 27-week

Department Head course which prepares officers for duty as Engineering, Combat Systems,

Weapons, Operations, and Deck department heads on all classes of Navy ships (Surface Warfare

Officer School, n.d.). During the Department Head course officers receive additional Bridge

Resource Management training. After completion of their training, officers will typically spend

36 months at sea, broken between two 18-month department head tours. These assignments can vary from Chief Engineer, Weapons Officer, Operations Officer or Tactical Action Officer.

After completion of their Department Head tours, officers will come ashore from 54-63 months. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 32

These assignments consist of the War College, Joint Billets, teaching or Congressional

Fellowships. Once their shore tour is completed, officers attend the XO/CO command course.

Officers getting ready for command or executive-officer billets attend the Surface

Command Course. The SCC (Surface Command Course) is a combination of the Senior Officer

Ship Material Reediness Couse and the XO/CO Fleet Up Course (U.S. Navy, n.d.). The course was originally 13 weeks but due to a change has been reduced to 10 weeks. The change was to allow for officers to have more opportunity for personal leave or temporary duty time. It is important to note that the Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and ship handling portions of the course have remained unchanged. The SSC is broken into four modules. These modules cover navigation, seamanship, ship handling, material readiness, maritime warfare, and command management. There are nine weeks of classroom instruction followed by a one-week ship ride along in a fleet area of concentration. The course contains two weeks of ship handling.

The ship handling section is broken down in to a combination of class room instruction, Bridge

Resource Management, Rules of the Road, simulator, and a ship handling assignment. The

Navy found it beneficial for all officers attending the course to receive mentoring from a post command officer. The overall goal of the SCC is to identify areas that an officer is weak in and needs to improve prior to arriving at their prospective command. After completion of the SCC course officers are assigned to a ship where they spend 18 months as an executive officer. After successful completion of their XO tour an officer will attend the Prospective Commanding

Officers Course. The PCO is designed for prospective commanders and captains prior to their first command. The course is three weeks long. One week is a mariner skills refresher course.

The mariner skills refresher course consists a Rules of the Road test and a high traffic situation.

Officers who have completed one command and are selected for a second command tour are IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 33 enrolled in the Major Command Course. The Major Command Course is the final course that a

Surface Warfare Officer will take during their career to drive ships. The MCO is a three-week program of instruction. The course focuses on communication, self-awareness, ethical standards and team work. The Major Command Course also has a one-week mariner skills refresher. This consists of a competency check assignment, a Rules of the Road test and a high traffic scenario.

After completion of the course, officers are sent to their Major Command assignment. The

Navy’s goal with their professional mariner training is have adequate resources to support

STCW/U.S.C.G. standards, have clear, established and enforced training standards, assessment mechanisms at all levels, a culture of continuous feedback and leverage Navy and Industry best practices (U.S. Navy, n.d.).

Surface Warfare Officers are trained to be generalists. They do not formally specialize in their billets. The idea is that a Navy officer can fill any position or billet aboard ship. This forces junior officers to multitask with other duties and responsibilities while training to learn the basic skills needed to be proficient mariners. The multitasking takes away from the ability of officers to properly learn the needed skills. Officers are required to oversee the respective divisions or departments that they are assigned to lead. This consists of overseeing sailors, equipment, operations, and maintenance, all while still performing their watch duties. Surface warfare officers also during their career spend time as both navigational watch officers and engineering duty officers along with lengthy tours ashore. In 1977, VADM Bryan head of Naval

Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM), a career Navy engineering duty officer, removed engineering officers from shipboard assignments. This led to Surface Warfare Officers filling the void. The career path of a Surface Warfare Officer leads to an individual who has varied experience but no technical competency or proficiency. Congress is pushing legislation IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 34 to reform the professionalism of the Navy. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act language had the Secretary of the Navy submit to Congress a report on the description of Surface

Warfare Officer assessment process. The Secretary of the Navy is to also provide a list of courses that have been U.S.C.G. approved for merchant mariner credentials; and a gap analysis of the existing training and curriculum. Congress is taking an active role with reforming Navy recommendations to ensure safety at sea.

Figure 1.-Surface Warfare Officer Career Path

Brown, R. (2018). Surface Warfare Officer Career Training and Competency Continuum.

[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-

npc/officer/Detailing/surfacewarfare/Documents/SWO%20Career%20Path%20Brief%20

2018.pdf IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 35

Near Peer Training

Near peer sea services are organizations similar to the U.S. Navy. They have similar navigation, ship handling and seamanship skills and capability requirements. To further understand maritime training, it is important to discuss and evaluate near peer training. Near peer seagoing services that I will discuss are Royal Australian Navy, Royal Australian Navy,

National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Commissioned (NOAA) Officer Corps, and the

U.S. Army. Each service has its own unique training program; however, each share a common core of basic seamanship, navigation and ship handling based upon IMO standards. Each service also has their courses certified by their respective maritime authority.

The Royal Navy has its officers attend a six to eleven-month course at the Britannia

Royal Naval College. This is an officer’s basic training for starting their naval career as an officer. After graduating from the Britannia Royal Naval College, officers attend career track training. Unlike the U.S. Navy, Royal Naval Officers divide between Warfare Officer or Marine

Engineering Officers. Warfare officers attend an 18-month course consisting of both classroom and underway training. Officers spend three months studying a core curriculum in the theory of navigation and seamanship. The classroom training is then followed up with a year of underway watchstanding under the supervision of a qualified watch officer. After a year of underway bridge watchstanding the junior officer will then return to shore and undergo a week-long bridge simulator assessment. Upon successfully passing the bridge simulator assessment, the officer will attend a final three-month course in advanced seamanship and navigation. Upon successfully completing and graduating from the three-month course, the officer is issued a

Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) Navigational

Watch Certificate and logbook. STCW sets the minimum qualification standards for masters, IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 36 officers and watch personnel on seagoing merchant ships. After four years of service there are some officers that attend a four-month navigators’ course. After nine years of service, Warfare officers attend the Principal Warfare Officer Course. The PWO Course is a 13-month program training officers to be a commanding officer. A Royal Navy officer’s primary job is as an

Officer of the Watch. The Royal Navy trains their officers to be deck watch officers.

Royal Australian Naval officers attend the New Entry Officers’ Course (NEOC) at the

Australian Naval College. The Naval College serves as the training institution that imparts the standards and core military competences for all new officers. The New Entry Officers’ Course is a five-month course that teaches basic officer and leadership skills to be a naval officer. After the completion of initial training RAN officers attend a twenty-five-week mariner competency course broken into three phases. Phase I is 10 weeks, Phase II is 15 weeks. This is then followed by a Phase III 15-week mariner training program preparing officers for their first at sea training program. RAN officers spend Phase III at sea with 20 weeks under the supervision of senior watch officers aboard ship. After completion of their sea duty, officers come ashore for twenty-five weeks of simulator and classroom training. After completion officers are issued their Bridge Warfare certificate. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority has approved RAN

Seaman Officer competencies and training for the award of STCW officer qualifications after successfully passing their Bridge Watch Officer training.

U.S. National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the seventh uniformed service. There are 321 commissioned officers who support NOAA’s programs and missions.

Currently NOAA operates 16 hydrographic and marine fisheries vessels. NOAA Commissioned

Officers serve as Deck Officers aboard ships. U.S. Coast Guard licensed Marine Engineers serve as government civilian mariners aboard NOAA ships. All newly commissioned officers must IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 37 attend a 19-week Basic Officer Training Class at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Officers take

U.S.C.G. approved navigation, Basic Safety Training, seamanship, Rules of the Road, electronic navigation, ship handling, ARPA, RADAR and BRM. BOTC consists of three days of compass and Aids to Navigation, four days of deck operations, 10 days of terrestrial navigation, four days of navigation law (Rules of the Road), one day of communications, five days of RADAR, five days of meteorology, four days of ARPA, five days of electronic navigation, two days of small boats, five days of ship handling and steering, and five days of bridge watch keeping. Officers also compete a long cruise aboard the U.S.C.G.C. Eagle. After graduation from BOTC, NOAA officers sail aboard a NOAA ship to prepare them for their first sea tour. Upon completion of the course all officers receive a U.S.C.G. Able Bodied Seaman limited endorsement and all applicable Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping certificates. NOAA also offers a B school for mid-grade officers and a C school for senior officers prior to command. B

School is approximately two weeks of U.S.C.G. approved seamanship and navigation. C School is a three-day navigation and ship handling refresher for executive and commanding officers.

NOAA believes that U.S.C.G. approved training is the corner stone for their deck officers.

The U.S. Army currently operates a fleet of 118 watercraft. These vessels are crewed by soldiers and warrant officers. Army warrant officers serve as the mates and masters aboard these watercrafts. The Army divides its crews between deck and engineering ratings. An Army marine deck warrant officer will spend their career as navigators and pilots. Marine Deck

Officers are to command and operate Army watercraft in support of Army logistics operations.

The Army watercraft training division is the only military organization whose graduates can earn a U.S.C.G. Merchant Mainers credential with no additional testing. Most Army mariner courses are U.S. Coast Guard approved and satisfy the Code of Federal Regulations. The Army IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 38

Marine Deck Officer Basic Course is 31 weeks. The MDOB course is offered to newly appointed warrant officers. The Marine Deck Officer Advanced course is 16 weeks. The

MDOA course is offered to senior warrant officers as the move on to command larger watercraft.

The Marine Deck Officer Basic Couse consists of 165 hours of common marine subjects, 93 hours of deck seamanship, 77 hours of watchstanding, 137 hours of piloting, 114 hours of collision avoidance, 26 hours of electronic navigation, 160 hours of ship handling, 131 hours of celestial navigation, 176 hours of performance testing of piloting and celestial navigation and 40 hours of bridge resource management. The 16-week advanced course is a refresher and upgrade course for ship handling, navigation and seamanship. The U.S. Army’s strategy is to provide relevant, and realistic training. The fundamental basis of Army training is to meet IMO STCW standards and U.S.C.G. mariner credentialing. The Army believes that it is important to ensure their watercraft have highly skilled and capable crews that can support Army missions and operations.

Near peer seagoing services strive to ensure that their officers meet national and international training and certification standards. These programs have standardized training that ensures their officers have the knowledge to navigate ships. STCW standardization allows officer to be properly trained, educated and experienced. By adopting similar training standards and curriculum the U.S. Navy can ensure that their officers meet the same standard of training.

U.S. Maritime Academies

The six State Maritime Academies and the Federal Maritime Academy have been providing training to American mariners for over 144 years. The training programs have changed over the years. All the maritime academies offer similar academic programs. However, Great Lakes

Maritime Academy offers an associate’s degree and the chance to earn a Great Lakes pilot IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 39 endorsement. The programs are U.S. Coast Guard approved and currently meet IMO STCW standards. The Code of Federal regulations sets training curriculum. This includes how long the training will be, total time aboard a training ship and training aboard commercial vessels. Cadets must meet 46 Code of Federal Regulations 11.301, 11.309 and 11.407 requirements for STCW officer endorsements and Officer in Charge of a Navigational Watch (OINCW) of vessels of 500 gross tons or more at the operational level and service requirements for third mate of ocean vessels of unlimited tonnage. Cadets must also meet the subject requirements of 46 C.F.R.

11.910 for examination as third mate of unlimited tonnage vessels upon oceans. Training is also set by state authorities and ensure that maritime courses will be taught as prescribed by Federal authorities. Training lengths at state maritime academies are by law a minimum of three years and at least six months of sea time aboard a training ship. State Cadets/Midshipmen are able to obtain two months of sea time aboard a commercial vessel.

The course of instruction at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy is three years of course instruction and 330 days of sea time for deck cadets and 300 days of sea time for engineering cadets aboard commercial vessels. Students at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy have over

1504 in residence class hours to fulfill the requirements for bachelor of science, Reserve Officer

Commission and Deck Officer’s License. U.S. Merchant Marine Academy midshipmen must also meet U.S. Code 51306, 51309 and Code of Federal Regulations Title 46 Part 310.58, 310.9, and 310.65. The maritime academies provided MARAD approved training programs until 1998.

After 1998, maritime academies were required to meet IMO STCW standards. Each state school decided how best to meet STCW training. The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy had to meet

STCW training as approved by the U.S.C.G. and MARAD. The training programs at the maritime academies found it difficult to comply with STCW standards. It was difficult to add IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 40 more to an already packed educational experience. A big issue for the maritime academies was to ensure valid evidence that students meet the required standards for skill competency. It is important to note that all the maritime academies meet the standards for the IMO model course for an OICNW. The cadets are required to take; Radar, search and rescue, basic and advanced firefighting, proficiency in survival craft, visual signaling, BRM, terrestrial and celestial navigation, and electronic navigation systems, watchkeeping, including International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the IMO standard marine communication phrases (SMCP), cargo handling and stowage, ship handling, stability and ship construction, meteorology, ARPA, GMDSS, and ECDIS 46 C.F.R. 11.309 (2019). Cadets are required to also meet the minimum standard for ratings as Able Seaferer Deck. Upon successful completion of the Nautical Science curriculum and passing the U.S.C.G. license exam, students are issued a

Merchant Mariners Credential as Third Mate Any Gross tons upon Oceans. Students at the State

Maritime Academies and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy undergo hundreds of hours of navigational, seamanship and ship handling training with significant sea time prior to graduating.

The training program ensures that all graduates meet International and U.S. standards as an

OICNW.

Recommendations

The U.S. Navy Surface Officer Warfare community is undergoing transformation with regards to the recent string of accidents. Surface Warfare Officers are expected to be experts as both deck and engineering officers. Their primary job is as a warfighter. After time at sea, they are sent ashore. Once ashore, they are expected to become successful staff officers. To reach senior ranks, Surface Warfare Officers must seek joint operation tours. They can spend years ashore away from the bridge of a ship. The varied career background emphasizes the idea that IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 41

SWOs need a standardized training regime. Merchant Mariner standards and certification are comparable to the skills need by the U.S. Navy for watchstanding, navigation, seamanship and ship handling. Civilian standards provide the core skills for going to sea. The goal is to ensure that officers are properly trained, Navy ships are safer and that future Navy leaders are subject- matter experts. The proposed project plan for aligning Surface Warfare Officer training to

U.S./International standards will provide practical and executable recommendations to U.S. Fleet

Forces Command.

Mariners are required to be competent and well trained. Their job is to ensure safety of life at sea, efficient navigation, maritime security and protection of the marine environment. The

Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping provides the international standards necessary for training mariners. These standards can be easily adopted by the U.S. Navy. The

STCW is broken down into two distinct training regimes. The first training program is for entry level officers, known as OICNW. The second training program is for senior officers moving into the Chief Mate or Master position. The senior level program is the Chief Mate and Master course. These two courses can set the base line for Navy Surface Warfare training.

To properly train Surface Warfare Officers, the Navy should adopt U.S.C.G. and IMO standards at the operational and management level. Newly commissioned officers would receive approved training at the operational level. While officers approaching command, would attend

U.S.C.G./IMO training at the management level. The purpose of the training for newly commissioned officers is to ensure that officers are competent to carry out watchkeeping duties as an Officer in Charge of a Navigational Watch. At the management level, it is to ensure that senior officers have the background knowledge to support the function of navigation at the senior level. Adopting national and international standards at the operational and management level IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 42 ensures that Navy officers are properly trained in all aspects of going to sea. It ensures that officers have the required level of training to be an asset aboard ship rather than a liability.

In order to transition to U.S.C.G./STCW training standards the Navy will have to work with outside stakeholders. Senior leadership will have to accept and agree to outside help. This help would come from the Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, U.S. Merchant

Marine Academy, Navy Reserve Strategic Sealift Officer Force, and commercial contractors.

By utilizing outside resources, the Navy can quickly and successfully adopt and implement a new training regime.

The first phase of the project is for the Navy to adopt a baseline course for the officers at the operational level and management level. This project plan will propose courses based upon

U.S.C.G. and IMO standards. In order to ensure safety at sea the Navy must observe high standards of professionalism and competence. The training will be a combination of practical skill, and competence with an emphasis on theoretical knowledge. The intended courses will meet 46 CFR and STCW Code AII/1 and AII/2. The two courses would be part of the Basic

Division Officer Course and Surface Commanders Course. This ensures that Surface Warfare

Officers met national and international training requirements.

STCW course at the operational level sets forth standards and certification for mariners.

The course is broken into three sections. Section 1 consists of course work and exercises that provide the requisite knowledge of navigational proficiency at the operational level. Section 2 provides the new officer with an understanding and proficiency for cargo handling and stowage at the operational level. Section 3 is for controlling the operation of a ship and medical care for persons on board. The IMO model course 7.03 for an OICNW consists of 632 hours of lectures and exercise. The course is broken down into the following subject matter; celestial navigation, IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 43 terrestrial and coastal navigation, electronic systems of position fixing and navigation, echo sounder and speed measurement, magnetic and gyro compass, steering and control systems, meteorology, maintaining a safe navigational watch, responding to emergencies, responding to distress signals at sea, visual signaling and maneuvering a ship. Due to the unique functions of

Navy ships, certain material can be bypassed. The following training program is adapted from the IMO model course. It is intended that newly commissioned officers meet the professional requirements for an OICNW. This list is to provide the basic level of training to become a proficient watch officer. The recommended operational course length is 560 hours. The following recommended courses are:

- 120 hours - Terrestrial and Coast Navigation - Terrestrial and coastal navigation is

intended to provide officers with detailed knowledge in terrestrial and coastal

navigation. The course will satisfy STCW Code A-II/1 and 46 CFR 11.309(a)(4)(viii).

The course will cover the following; planning and conducting a passage and determine

vessel position, terrestrial and coastal navigation, charts, magnetic and gyro compass

deviation and variation, compass correction, position plotting, sailings, tides and

currents and chart work.

- 80 hours – Watchkeeping - The watchkeeping course is a comprehensive course to teach

officers watching keeping duties, voyage planning, COLREGS, marine

communications, and bridge team procedures. The course will meet 46 CFR

11.309(a)(4)(ix), 46 CFR 11.319(a)(4)(iii), 46 CFR 11.309(a)(4)(vii), 46 CFR

11.319(a)(4)(vii), and 46 CFR 11.321 (a)(3)(iv).

- 40 hours – Stability and Trim - Stability and trim is to provide officers with the detailed

knowledge related to stability and ship construction at the operational level. The course IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 44

will cover ship construction, basic stability, inspect and report defects and damage to

spaces, hatches and ballast tanks, and maintain vessel seaworthiness. The course will

meet STCW Code A-II/1 and 46 CFR 11.309(a)(4)(xii).

- 80 hours – Celestial Navigation - Celestial navigation is to provide officers with detailed

knowledge in celestial navigation at the operation level. The course will cover the

following subjects; nautical astronomy, nautical almanac, sextant and altitude

corrections, time of sunrise and sunset, meridian transit, identification of stars and

planets and position fixing. Celestial navigation will meet STCW Code A-II/A1 and 46

CFR 11.309(a)(4)(viii).

- 40 hours – Electronic Navigation - Electronic navigation will provide officers with the

request knowledge for electronic navigation at the operational level. The course will

consist of electronic systems of position fixing and navigation, echo sounders, GPS

(Global Positioning System), speed logs, radar navigation, ECDIS (Electronic Chart

Display and Information) and navigational software. The course will meet STCW Code

A-II/1 and 46 CFR 11.309(a)(4)(viii).

- 40 hours – Basic Ship handling - Basic ship handling will provide officers with the

training related to navigation at the operational level. The course will cover

maneuvering the vessel, steering and control systems, basic ship handling and

maneuvering the ship in different conditions and situations. The course will meet

STCW Code A-II/1 and 46 CFR 11.309(a)(4)(xi).

- 40 hours – Meteorology - Meteorology will provide officers the basic knowledge in

meteorology. The course will consist of; meteorological instruments, atmospheric

properties, atmospheric pressure, wind, clouds and precipitation, visibility, climatology, IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 45

weather systems, weather observations and reporting, weather forecasting, weather

routing and services. The course will meet STCW Code A-II/1 and 46 CFR

11.309(a)(4)(xiii).

- 40 hours – Radar - Officers will take a U.S.C.G. approved unlimited radar observer and

ARPA course as per 46 CFR 11.480 and 46 CFR 15.816.

- 40 hours – Automated Radar and Plotting Aids (ARPA)

- 40 hours – Bridge Resource Management (BRM) - All officers will attend a U.S.C.G.

approved Bridge Resource Management Course as per STCW Code A-II/1 and 46 CFR

11.319(a)(4)(vii.).

- 40 Hours - Electronic Chart and Display and Information System Course (ECDIS) - The

Navy utilizes a proprietary electronic navigational chart system. The Voyage

Management System is unique to Naval ships. It is recommended that officers receive a

40 hours Electronic Chart and Display and Information System Course (ECDIS).

This curriculum would be added the Basic Division Officers Course. These courses ensure that officers have the training and education to be a watch officer. The training is to ensure newly commissioned officers meet the required standard for competency as a watch officer at the operational level.

The IMO created model course 7.01 for Masters and Chief Mates. It is to improve standards and training for merchant marine officers at the management level. The course served several functions at the management level. It is to ensure that senior officers are prepared to take responsibility for the safety of a ship and its crew. The course is broken into three sections.

Section 1 covers the functional elements for navigation at the management level. Section 2 covers the requirements for detailed knowledge of cargo handling and stowage at the IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 46 management level. Section 3 covers detailed knowledge of the operation of the ship and medical care for persons onboard at the management level. The Master and Chief Mate course is 451 hours of course work and exercises. The model course was created for senior officers prior to taking their chief mate or master’s exam and assuming those positions.

Senior Navy Officer prior to assuming an executive officer position or command position aboard a ship attend the Surface Commander’s Course. Due to the varied career paths and time away from sea it is recommend that senior officers receive additional training that meets the

STCW Chief/Masters course. The recommended management level course length is 280 hours.

The following is a list of recommended courses;

- 40 hours - Advanced Navigation - Advanced navigation will provide senior officers the

requisite knowledge of navigation at the management level. The course will teach

voyage planning to include appraisal, planning, execution and monitoring. It will teach

terrestrial navigation, GPS (Global Position System), great circle sailing and Mercator

sailing. The course will cover magnetic compasses, gyro compasses, compass error to

include amplitudes. Finally, the course will cover advanced tides and current

calculations. Advanced navigation will meet STCW Code A-II/2.

- 80 hours – Advanced Ship handling - Advanced ship handling will provide senior

officers with training in progressive ship handling techniques. The subject matter in the

course will consist of; handling characterizes of a vessel, ship handling forces, turning

ships, ship handling in restricted waters, picking up pilots, berthing and the use of

anchors, ship handling with tugs, dry docking, response in steam, diesel and gas turbine

plants, heavy weather, ice navigation and navigational emergencies. The course will IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 47

meet STCW Code A-II/2, 46 CFR 11.305(a)(3)(i), 46 CFR 11.307(a)(3(i), 46 CFR

11.311 (a)(3)(i) and 46 CFR 11.313(a)(3)(i).

- 40 hours – Advanced Stability - Advanced stability will provide senior officers with

training and knowledge in understanding the fundamental principles of ship construction

and theories and factors impacting stability and trim. Senior officers will be able to take

the proper procedures to preserve stability and trim. Officers will also gain knowledge

of the effects of stability and trim on a ship in the event of damage and consequent

flooding of a compartment. Officers will learn countermeasures to be used to maintain

stability. Senior officers will also learn U.S.C.G./IMO recommendations for ship

stability. The course will cover the subjects of; transverse stability, determining height

above the keel (KG), height of metacenter (KM), metacentric height (GM), inclining

experiments, stability at large angles and free surface effect. In addition, the advanced

stability will teach longitudinal stability, hull strength, damaged conditions to include

collision. Practical stability considerations will be part of the curriculum, which will

cover rolling, watertight integrity, and ice accumulation. The course will give special

consideration to dry docking. The course will meet STCW code A-II/2, 46 CFR

11.305(a)(3(ii) and 46 CFR 11.307(a)(3)(ii).

- 40 hours – Advanced Watchkeeping - Advanced watchkeeping will provide senior

officers with the detailed knowledge for watchkeeping at the management level. The

course will cover COLREGS and the Inland Navigational Rules. The course will meet

STCW Code A-II/@ and 46 CFR 11.910. Advanced watchkeeping will cover

understanding and applying the COLREGS and the Inland Rules. In addition, the

course will cover voyage planning, piloting, ship handling, electronic navigation, IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 48

ECIDS, radar use in accordance with COLREGS, overall bridge management, changing

watch conditions, preparations for entering a port or taking a pilot and watch keeping

techniques for different steaming conditions and areas.

- 40 hours – Advanced Celestial Navigation - Advanced celestial navigation will provide

senior offices with management level techniques of navigation. The course will cover

the following subjects; rising and setting phenomena, identifying and selecting stars,

compass error, times of meridian transit, latitude at meridian transit, ex-meridians,

correcting sextant altitude and position fixing. The course will meet STCW Code A-

II/2.

- 40 hours – Advanced Meteorology - Advanced meteorology will provide senior officers

with the requisite knowledge in advanced weather characterizes, systems and weather

routing. The course will consist of following subjects; synoptic charts, characteristics of

various weather systems, weather forecasting and voyage planning, ocean current

systems, ice navigation and advanced tide and current calculations. The course will meet

STCW Code A-II/2 and 46 CFR 11.305(a)(3(iii) and 46 CFR 11.307(a)(3)(iii).

The management level STCW courses offer practical skills and competency with additional theoretical lectures to Surface Warfare Officers prior to assuming command. The training ensures senior officers meet worldwide management professional standards.

The challenge for the U.S. Navy is obtaining course lesson plans, lectures and materials.

Course material and lessons plans can come from a collaborative agreement between the Surface

Warfare Officer School in Newport, RI and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy’s Department of

Marine Transportation. The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy can provide lesson plans and course material. The training program at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy is U.S.C.G. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 49 approved and meets IMO standards. This means that the new courses can be approved. The

U.S. Navy can utilize an intergovernmental agreement. The intergovernmental service agreement between the Maritime Administration and the U.S. Navy will allow for the dissemination of appropriate course material. The collaborative effort will also allow for the

Navy to go to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy for any updates and changes to curriculum.

There is also very little cost with the collaborative effort between the Navy and the U.S.

Merchant Marine Academy for the creation of the courses. The collaboration also creates a seamless integration of Navy and merchant marine training. All seagoing services will meet the same standard.

The increase of curriculum length for the Basic Division Officer Course and Surface

Commanders Course will require additional subject matter instructors. The Navy has a supply of licensed merchant marine officers in the Strategic Sealift Officer Force. The Strategic Sealift

Officer Force consists of 2,240 licensed mariners in the Navy Reserve. There are approximately

190 licensed Chief Mates and Masters in the program. The senior licensed officer breaks down into 74 individual ready reserve and 15 selective reserve licensed masters. There are 91 individual ready reserve and 10 selected reserve chief mates (U.S. Navy, 2017). These subject matter experts and professional officers can be utilized to teach the course material. The Navy can obligate the officers through one to three year recalls or 90 to 180 active duty training. This would give the Navy flexibility for the number of instructors throughout the year to meet training demands. The recommended number of course instructors is six to nine senior licensed officers.

Through utilization of current personnel assets, the Navy can ease the transition process and reduce the implementation time frame. During the phase in period all instructor will be required to take a U.S.C.G. Train the Trainer Course and Qualified Assessor Course. These courses can IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 50 be taken as part of an officer’s Annual Training (AT) Navy Reserve duty. All instructors will be

U.S.C.G. approved.

The implantation time frame for the introduction of the new courses and instructors will require approximately six months. The initial collaboration for course material and lesson plans between the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and the Surface Warfare School will allocate 120 days. During the 120-day time frame the Commander Surface Warfare Officer School will work with the Superintendent of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy to create a plan between academic departments to meet the 120-day frame. The heads of training and simulation and the head of learning standards at the SWOS will met with the head of Marine Transportation to identify the specific course material and lesson plans for associated courses.

The Navy will contact the Program Manager Strategic Sealift Officer Force to identify and contact the appropriate senior level licensed reserve officers to act as instructors. The SSOF will create long term active duty for service training assignments for the identified personnel.

Initially three SSOF officers will be put on six-month Active Duty for Training (ADT) orders during the initial 120 days. The Navy reservists will work with current SWOS instructors to finalize the courses and course material. The SSOF program will identify three additional officers to be placed on one- to-three year recalls to serve as additional instructors following the

120-day phase in period. The one to three-year recalls will be based upon funding and personnel commitments. All course materials, lesson plans, and additional teaching aids such as simulators will be finalized in the 120-day period. The Navy will have 60 days to prepare current instructors, Navy reservists on recall, classrooms and simulators for the new courses.

All courses and material shall be U.S. Coast Guard approved. At the completion of the initial 120-day period, all lesson plans shall be submitted to the National Maritime Center in IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 51

Martinsburg, WV for approval. U.S. Coast Guard approval can take several months to a year for course approval. The approval process shall not limit the start of course instruction.

All training shall take place at the Surface Warfare Officer School located in Newport,

RI. Courses will be held in Building 446/1268 Cushing Road. Training shall be held Monday-

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Students shall utilize the Full Mission Bridge (FMB) simulator and the Conning Officer Virtual Environment (COVE) simulator for simulator training. The

Surface Warfare Officer School is a U.S. Coast Guard approved training site.

This plan represents a detailed educational strategy for the U.S. Navy to meet U.S.C.G. and IMO standards for training and educating Surface Warfare Officers. Should the Navy adopt the new training regime for Surface Warfare Officers, they will have to develop an educational tracking system. The educational tracking system shall monitor officer’s knowledge, skills and morale. The system shall be utilized to recognize areas of officers’ strengths and weaknesses.

The tracking system shall also be utilized to analyze cohorts. The evaluations shall then be used to make revisions in the training program. Successful implantation of the new U.S.C.G./IMO training program depends upon officer and cohort evaluations and addressing training shortfalls, while adopting, developing and strengthen new training regimes.

The Navy must continually evaluate the operational and management level training program throughout the implantation phase. Proper oversight and leadership at the Surface

Warfare Officer School through a quality assurance program will aid instructors in their performance. The project plan’s goal is to ensure Surface Warfare Officers meet U.S.C.G./IMO standards. The educational program is focused on professional development and skills. It is important to continually evaluate the training program. The evaluations should include not only IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 52 students but instructors. The evaluation process will create performance standards and measures that will allow the Navy to assess the professional skill level and knowledge of their officers.

Summary

This paper reflects my 23 years as a licensed merchant mariner, former Army marine warrant officer and Navy reservist in the Strategic Sealift Officer program. I have worked as an instructor at the U.S. Army Transportation School writing and creating U.S.C.G. approved courses in the late 90s’. I worked as an instructor at the Global Maritime and Transportation

School (GMATS) located at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. During my time at GMATS, I taught and wrote lesson plans for the commercial industry and the NOAA Commissioned Officer

Corps. As a Navy reservist I served as an instructor during my Navy Annual Training (AT) at the Surface Warfare Officer School. My goal was to create a training program for surface warfare officers that train them to be better mariners. The U.S. Navy is the leading naval service in the world comprised of service members that are professional and dedicated to the nation.

This project reflects a desire to strengthen the professionalism of the U.S. Navy. Creating a standardized training regime based upon U.S.C.G. and IMO standards will have a positive operational impact on the Navy.

The project plan lays out a cost effective and non-intrusive path towards implementation.

All assets from lesson plans, course material, instructors, class rooms and simulators are within government or Navy inventory. Ideally this project plan will be submitted to head U.S. Fleet forces for review. U.S. Fleet forces is the naval component that trains and certifies Navy forces.

The most difficult hurdle is for senior leadership to be willing to adopt commercial standards for training. The only downside to adopting commercial training standards is the increase of an officer’s time in a school-house environment. Also, officers will be taken out of operational IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 53 areas to fulfill training requirements. However, this time in a school-house away from operations is a small price to pay in relations to continued maritime casualties. The costs to repair the U.S.S. Fitzgerald and the U.S.S. McCain is over $600 million. This does not consider any additional costs for the increased workloads placed on other Surface ships filling the gap left by two ships being out of service.

It is important to note the training and educational timelines for the Navy’s other career paths. Naval aviators typically spend 18 months to two years for initial training. The E-2

Hawkeye training timeline is three years. Seal, Air, Land Teams (SEAL) training timeline consists of eight weeks of Naval Special Warfare Preparatory School, 24 weeks of Basic

Underwater Demolition/SEAL training, three weeks of Parachute School, and 26 weeks of Seal

Qualification Training. Navy Officer Nuclear Power School is 24 weeks of classroom-based courses followed by 26 weeks of hands on prototype reactors. Navy Supply Corps School is 27 weeks. Finally, the Navy Chaplin school is 12 weeks of training. As an organization that embraces education, the Navy should seek to do the same for their ship drivers. Commercial standards not only ensure that the Navy continues to be the best operational navy in the world but meets a recognized and vetted training regime.

It is important to address the current officer shipboard structure aboard Navy ships. The current idea that a Surface Warfare Officer is a generalist should be addressed. The recent maritime incidents are a window into crewing issues. The Navy should conduct additional research into dividing its Surface Warfare Officers between deck watch officers and engineering duty officers. This structure aligns with near peer allies and commercial industry. The specialization offers the ability for officers to become technical experts and retain a higher skill set. However, addressing crewing arrangements in this paper would have made it cumbersome IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 54 as not to be practical. The idea of a structural change aboard Surface ships requires further discussion and research.

IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 55

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