Running head: IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS TRAINING 1 U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officers to Adopt U.S./International Merchant Mariner Training Joseph Schwartzstein California State University Maritime Academy IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 2 Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic CAPSTONE Project are those of the paper’s author (Joseph Schwartzstein) and the author’s quoted references, and do not reflect the official policy of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or Department of Transportation. This paper is used to suffice course and graduate program requirements. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 3 Abstract Today’s U.S. Navy is one of the largest and most technically advanced in the world. Officers and crew are the operational back bone of the surface fleet. Surface Warfare Officers are the sea bound warriors that serve on surface combatants that fulfill the Navy’s mission to maintain global maritime superiority (U.S. Navy, n.d.). The Surface Warfare Officer is considered the back bone of the Navy. They are the leaders and operators of surface ships at sea, with primary responsibilities of safe navigation and management of various shipboard systems. Recently the U.S. Navy has had a series of tragic maritime incidents. The incidents have included three collisions and one grounding. The results are the death of 17 sailors and repair cost estimates of nearly $367 million to $500 million per ship (LaGrone, 2018). The 2017 Navy Comprehensive Review found that poor seamanship and failure to follow safe navigational practices was a major contributing factor (U.S. Navy, 2017). The Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer Corps and U.S. Army have all adopted International Maritime Organization/U.S. Coast Guard Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping standards. This project outlines an international and U.S. approved training regime for the U.S. Navy to adopt to increase the maritime professional expertise and safety of their Surface Warfare Officers. Keywords: ARPA, bridge resource management, BRM, CBT, Coast Guard, ECDIS, IMO, MMC, Merchant Marine, mariner, navigation, Navy, rules of the road, ship handling, Surface Warfare, SWO, SWOS, STCW, training, U.S.C.G. IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 4 U.S. Surface Warfare Officers to Adopt U.S./International Merchant Mariner Training The U.S. Navy is the world’s leading sea power. U.S. Navy Surface ships are a visible presence throughout the globe. Surface ships provide readily available power projection and U.S. diplomacy across the global and maritime domain. The fleet has to respond to ever changing global challenges. The surface fleet assures U.S. allies that the U.S. has the ability to promote global stability with power projection. The Navy achieves its goals by deterring enemies with a forward and ready force, establishing maritime sea control and projecting national power. The U.S. Navy must be a credible power by having: capable and combat ready warships, tactically and technically proficient personnel, and realistic and integrated training. However, navigation and seamanship have become an issue within the Surface Fleet. The Surface Fleet has recently experienced a string of maritime incidents aboard their ships. These incidents have included: the grounding of the U.S.S. Antietam and U.S.S. Guardian, the collisions with commercial vessels of the U.S.S. Porter, U.S.S. McCain, U.S.S. Lake Champlain and U.S.S. Fitzgerald. The U.S.S. Antietam grounded in Tokyo Bay on 21 January 2017. The report for the U.S.S. Antietam grounding stated that senior leadership did not account for the effects of high winds and currents during the execution of the anchoring plan. The navigation team and the Combat Information Center failed to notify the commanding officer that the ship was moving towards a shoal. They also failed to provide recommendations for maneuvering the ship away from danger. The U.S.S. Guardian ran aground off Tubbataha Reef on 17 January 2013. The report issued by the U.S. Navy found that the grounding was caused by poor voyage planning, poor execution, and a series of unfortunate circumstances. The report stated that the crew failed to follow safe and sound navigation principles. The U.S.S. Porter was IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 5 damaged in a collision with the tanker MV Otowasan on 12 August 2012. The Navy released their findings that the crew demonstrated a lack of knowledge of rules of the road and a failure to act in accordance with accepted norms and rules. The U.S.S. Lake Champlain had a collision with the South Korean fishing vessel Nam Yang 502. In an investigation report released by the U.S. Navy, it was found that poor training, poor leadership and failures in watchstanding and navigation were causes for the incident. The reported cited problems made by the bridge watch team and the combat information center. The report found failures in executing basic watchstanding practices, adherence to sound navigational practices, failures to use navigational tools and failure to respond to an extremis situation. The U.S.S. McCain collided with the M.V. Alnic MC on 21 August 2017. The Navy’s comprehensive review found that the primary causes for the McCain collision were a loss of situational awareness in high traffic area and a failure of safe navigational practices. The report also found that there were failures in basic watchstanding and seamanship. The U.S.S Fitzgerald collided with the containership ACX Crystal on 17 June 2017. The Navy found that the collision resulted from a failure in leadership and watch standers. Leadership and watch standers failed to plan for safety and adhere to sound navigational practices. Watch standers failed to properly utilize navigational tools and basic watchstanding principles. Watch standers also failed to take deliberate and effective actions when put into extremis. The recent string of incidents has highlighted the Navy’s basic lack of seamanship, navigation and ship handling. The Navy has a lack of effective training and the diminution of individual and group professional skills. After the maritime incidents, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations led a comprehensive 60-day review of the accidents. The review led to a 122-page comprehensive report. It was used to determine changes and improvements for the Surface Fleet. The report recommended IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 6 “nearly” 60 dramatic changes to Navy operations and stated that officers had inadequate training that leaves crucial skills to be picked up through on-the-job learning (Seck, 2017). The report highlighted that the major contributing factor to the mishaps was a failure to observe safe navigational practices. “The proficiency in seamanship and navigation competes for time and attention with the expanding tactical duties of naval professionals at sea” (U.S. Navy, 2017). The costs of these accidents are on average $165 million dollars per ship (Tangaleaga 2017). This does not include operational-down time and impacts on the increased operations for other surface ships. Naval officers appear not to be receiving the prerequisite maritime foundation training prior to arriving in the fleet. The failure in basic seamanship and navigation fundamentals has led to shortcomings in Navy leadership. The purpose of this paper is to describe a way forward for the Navy is a comprehensive revamping of Surface Warfare Officer training focusing on the basics of seamanship and navigation. In 1978, the International Maritime Organization adopted the Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW). The standards came into effect in 1984. Amendments were made to the STCW in 1995 that came into effect in 1997. The IMO adopted further amendments in 2010 that came into effect in 2012. The STCW is the training standard for merchant mariners throughout the world and includes U.S. Mariners. The reason for the adoption of universal training standards was to raise the professional skills of mariners worldwide. The convention was created to ensure a minimum standard for ratifying countries to meet or exceed. It is important to note that these standards apply to all mariners engaged in international trade regardless of their country adopting the convention. Prior to 1978 there were no international standards for training and certifying mariners. The STCW ensured the practical skills, competencies and theoretical knowledge of mariners. They were also intended to ensure IMPROVING SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 7 safety of life at sea, protect ships and the environment. The additional amendments following 1978 were designed to improve training, address new technology and inconsistencies, and update outdated provisions. In addition to merchant mariners having to meet STCW standards, the Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer Corps and the U.S. Army have adopted and met STCW training and certification standards. To move forward, the Navy needs to revamp their training regime. The focus should be on the fundamentals of seamanship, navigation and ship handling. The question that has to be asked is: does the Navy need to align its training with IMO/U.S.C.G. training and certification of merchant mariners? This paper will show that the best course of action for the U.S. Navy is to adopt an internationally recognized and approved training regime. Near peer and commercial industry have found that IMO or U.S.C.G. standards are necessary to ensure the fundamental knowledge needed to operate a ship. A U.S.C.G./IMO approved officer in charge of a navigational watch and management level training would give Surface Warfare Officers the fundamentals in navigation and seamanship needed to run a ship more effectively. This paper will discuss the history of Surface Warfare Officer Training and its evolution.