Employee representatives in an enlarged Europe
Volume 1
European Commission
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit F.2
Manuscript completed in April 2008
1 This report was financed by and prepared for the use of the European Commission, Directorate- General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. It does not necessarily represent the Commission's official position.
Authors of this report: Javier Calvo, Lionel Fulton, Christophe Vigneau, Nataša Belopavlovič, Ricardo Rodríguez Contreras Coordination and project leader: Ricardo Rodríguez Contreras
© Getty, Belga/AFP-Pierre Verdy,MAXPPP-Harry Ray Jordan
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2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study has been carried out with the information collected by national experts, following the common guidelines issued by the coordination team, expanding on and correcting information as required. We would like to thank the following experts for the work they have carried out and for the several consultations they have answered:
AUSTRIA Ulrich Runggaldier, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration Linda Kreil, Vienna University
BELGIUM Patrick Humblet, Vakgroep Sociaal Recht, Department of Social Law, Ghent University.
BULGARIA Irina Terzyiska, European Labour Institute.
CROATIA Miljenko Cimesa, SAPIENTIA.
CZECH REPUBLIC Marketa Nekolova, Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs.
DENMARK Carsten Jørgensen, Forskningscenter for Arbejdsmarkeds- og Organisationsstudier, Sociologisk Institut, Københavns Universitet- FAOS, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhaguen.
ESTONIA Epp Kallaste, PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies
FINLAND Markku Kiikeri, Helsinki University
FRANCE Christophe Vigneau, Institut des Sciences Sociales du Travail, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne
GERMANY Eva Kocher, Hamburg University, Universität für Wirtschaft und Politik, Fachgebiet Rechtswissenschaft
GREECE Athanassios Papaioannou, Police Academy of Athens
HUNGARY Makó Csaba, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Béla Benyó, Semmeweis University
ICELAND Elín Blönda, Research Centre for Labour Law and Equality at the University of Bifrost
Maj Britt Hjördís Briem, University of Bifröst
IRELAND Josephine Browne, Trinity College Dublin
ITALY Edoardo Ales, University of Cassino
Giorgio Verrecchia, University of Cassino
LATVIA Daiga Ermsone, Advisor International Relations
LIECHTENSTEIN Bettina Drawitsch, Legal and Economic Affairs Unit, Arbeitsrecht, Vaduz
LITHUANIA Tomas Davulis, Faculty of Law, Vilnius University
LUXEMBOURG Marc Feyereisen, Court administrative
MALTA Saviour Rizzo, Centre for Labour Studies, University of Malta
NORWAY Inger Marie Hagen and Kristine Nergård, FAFO- Institute for Applied Social Science, Oslo
POLAND Piotr Korzuch, University of Warsaw
Agata Drabek, University of Lodz
PORTUGAL Catarina de Oliveira Carvalho, Portuguese Catholic University
ROMANIA Lumini a Dima, University of Bucharest
SLOVAKIA Monika Čambáliková, Institute of Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
SLOVENIA Nataša Belopavlovič, Institute of Industrial Relations Research.
SPAIN Javier Calvo, University of Sevilla
José María Miranda, University of Santiago de Compostela
SWEDEN Annika Berg, Arbetslivsinstitutet (National Institute of Working Life)
THE Robbert van het Kaar, University of Amsterdam NETHERLANDS
TURKEY Nurhan Süral, Middle East Technical University of Ankara
UNITED KINGDOM Lionel Fulton, Labour Research Department, London
Additionally, representatives from employers’ and trade union organisations, as well as other international institutions have also collaborated actively, providing direction, guidelines and specific texts. In particular, we would like to thank the following persons and institutions for their generous cooperation:
BUSINESSEUROPE (The Confederation of Peter Kettlewell. Communications Department European Business)
ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) Patrizia Grillo. Press and Communications.
EUROCOMMERCE Christel Delberghe and Ann Vervondel
ILO (International Labour Organization) Eddy Laurijssen. ILO Office in Brussels
Special acknowledgements are due to Malena Donato for her work in document management and to José María Miranda Boto and Andrea Oates for their work in revising and homogenising the information.
Volume 1 of the publication Employee Representatives in an Enlarged Europe provides a general overview of the basic characteristics of national systems of employee representation and participation in European undertakings within the framework of prevailing industrial relations in each country. It covers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland and Italy.
Please consult Volume 2 (ISBN: 972-92-79-08929-9) for the remaining countries as well as the European Social Partners, and the European and International Institutions.
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...... 11 PART ONE. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: AN OVERVIEW……………………………………………………………..…………15
I - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT...... 19
II - INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ...... 26
III - EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE COMPANY...... 45
IV- EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, SUPERVISORY BOARD OR OTHER CORPORATE BODIES...... 63
V- EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 63 V.1 RECOVERY AND BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES...... 68 V.2 OPERATIONS AFFECTING SHAREHOLDERS ...... 71 V.3 STATE AID...... 72
PART TWO. NATIONAL SITUATIONS…………………………………………………..…………75
AUSTRIA...... 77 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 77 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 78 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING ...... 82 IV. EMPLOYEES' PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE BODIES...... 86 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 87 BELGIUM...... 89 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT...... 89 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 90 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING ...... 94 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, SUPERVISORY BOARDS OR OTHER CORPORATE BODIES...... 99 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING ...... 100 BULGARIA ...... 102 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 102 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 104 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING ...... 109 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 115 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING ...... 116 CROATIA...... 117 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 117 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 118 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING ...... 122 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 125 CYPRUS...... 126 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 126
7 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 128 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING ...... 132 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 135 CZECH REPUBLIC ...... 136 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 136 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ...... 137 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING ...... 143 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 147 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 149 DENMARK...... 150 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 150 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 152 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE UNDERTAKING...... 157 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES...... 163 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 164 ESTONIA...... 166 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 166 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 168 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION SYSTEM IN THE COMPANY...... 176 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 182 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING ...... 182 FINLAND...... 184 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 184 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 185 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING...... 189 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 194 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING ...... 195 FRANCE ...... 197 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 197 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 198 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 204 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES...... 215 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING ...... 217 GERMANY...... 219 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 219 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ...... 222 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 228 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 240 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 244 GREECE...... 247 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 247 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 249 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 255 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES...... 260 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 261 HUNGARY ...... 262 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 262 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ...... 263 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 270 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 274
8 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 274 ICELAND ...... 275 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 275 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 276 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 281 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 286 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 286 IRELAND ...... 288 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 288 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 289 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 294 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 298 V. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE UNDERTAKING...... 299 ITALY ...... 301 I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ...... 301 II. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS...... 302 III. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN UNDERTAKING ...... 307 IV. EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN CORPORATE BODIES ...... 311
9
10 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to provide a general overview of the basic characteristics of national systems of employee representation and participation in European undertakings within the framework of the prevailing industrial relations in each country. A comparative analysis has also been carried out on the unique and significant elements that make up these complex systems of labour relations and employee representation with the aim of providing a cross-cutting perspective which highlights common features. As a complement to this national and transnational analysis, the study also provides a brief presentation of the main European and international actors, both institutions and private, which operate in this wide field.
The study covers a vast geographical, economic, social and labour area, which includes the 27 European Union Member States, EEA and candidate countries. In total, this report covers 32 countries and more than 50 million workers/labour force, analysed through their national systems of representation and participation in the undertaking.
The existence and recent evolution of the complex fabric of rights and prerogatives in these national systems makes direct reference to the core of the so-called European social model, although this may adopt several forms and expressions in keeping with diversity of history, culture, institutions and tax systems.
The subject addressed here has been previously published by the European Commission, and its results were published in 2001. The need to prepare an update of this previous work is generated by the concurrence of several factors:
1. The pressure of economic and market globalisation is constantly modifying the European entrepreneurial scene. Undertakings are in a constant state of adaptation to changes, generating a continuous and generalised process of mergers and acquisitions, the creation of groups of undertakings, production outsourcing and changes in the internal structure of undertakings. This process is also mirrored in how undertakings organise work, in the composition of staff and in labour conditions, including the recourse to subcontracting and temporary work agencies, among other means of internal and external flexibilisation that affect the real exercise of collective rights of employee representation.
2. EU enlargement has generated a significant change in the general picture of labour relations and systems of employee representation and participation. New productive and social realities belonging to former models that diverged from the European model have been openly included in the sphere of Community action. Moreover, there are national legislations and practices that are still deeply involved in an intense motion to assimilate the European heritage of social and labour issues. The existence of new candidate countries, some of them from very different historical and cultural backgrounds, deserves a preliminary investigation of the features of their labour relations in order to understand how they approach and converge with the European parameters on this subject.
3. The evolution and new approaches that have appeared in the nature and meaning of employee participation in the undertaking call for an update of the contents of the right of representation. We are witnessing deep changes in waged employment regulations, with the emergence of new atypical and flexible forms of employment and an increasing trend towards employment instability that affects labour conditions and the collective rights of employee representation. Advances made to effectively include certain democratic values in different spheres of the undertaking, such as specific equality and non-discrimination demands, fall within this context.
4. The establishment of a real body of supranational representation such as the European Works Councils. Although far from meeting expectations with regard to the number of EWC that potentially could have been established, in view of the number of groups and undertakings affected by this legislation, EWC have become a highly important instrument in the European arena.
11 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Approach and methodological characteristics of the study This study sets out to be a continuation of the 2001 publication ”Employee representatives in Europe and their economic prerogatives”, finalised in early 19991.
Our intention has been to respect both the spirit and logic of the former as much as possible. In terms of EU reality, and especially its “size”, this study has undergone transformations. We have made some minor changes to the structure of the former document with the aim of facilitating its rationality and comprehension. Thus, in the section on the 32 national monographs, we have decided to list the countries one by one, instead of grouping a number of them together.
The criteria to group certain countries together on grounds of a common history or the homogeneity of their labour relations models, although clear in some specific cases (for instance, Scandinavian or Baltic countries) is not as clear-cut in others. In our opinion this would lead to a final presentation that would be unbalanced and asymmetrical. Although within the EU prior to enlargement the reasoning behind “modelling” national industrial relations may have been logical, most of the 32 national systems of employee representation and participation contain enough features of their own to warrant an individual analysis. Hence, we believe that the individual presentation of each country will facilitate finding information quickly and avoid the risk of attributing criteria to countries that could surely be questioned by everyone involved.
Given that the final aim of the study is for it to be published, we have considered space limitations and the section regarding the analysis of potential similarities between countries is very summarised. The objective has been to point out, briefly, what is essential, considering that descriptive and detailed information can also be found in the section dedicated to the national monographs.
Sources of information Most of the work has been carried out in 2007 and includes the most recent amendments to national legislation on the subject concerned. Information contained in the monographs has been gathered by national collaborators and experts in industrial relations and labour law. Most of the sources used are national, both official and non-official, including literature on the doctrine and existing studies. In some cases, information has been completed with other sources from institutions that carry out transnational work and perform transnational studies (European Commission, European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions, European Trade Union Confederation, etc.)
Contents of the study The aim of this study is to serve as a source of information and consultation. To this end, it presents the characteristics of national systems of industrial relations and employee representation and participation in an orderly manner for the 32 countries, following a homogenous structure that facilitates comprehension. In this sense, the approach intends to provide an exhaustive description of the main elements of these systems, with updated legal information on national regulations.
As a complement to the study on each country, and as a result thereof, an analysis has been carried out on the main trends detected in each of the large subject areas that are studied here. The intention has not been to carry out a comparative analysis – a task that exceeds the ambitions of this study – which is always difficult when dealing with such particular national systems, and especially with such a large number of countries. Instead, the intention has been to briefly describe the most relevant and characteristic results for each country, with the aid of summary tables, and to highlight common elements that may provide clues to recent evolutions in each country.
We have taken into account that this study should last at least a few years. Therefore, any information that would soon become obsolete has been reduced to a minimum.
1 The study was undertaken by Evelyne Pichot and, in turn, is a reworking of the text of a study conducted by the same author in conjunction with Alpha Conseil in 1995 and published in Europe Sociale 3/96.
12 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
The approach of this study is focussed on national situations, that is, providing detailed and legally supported information on national situations with regard to the models of representation and participation of employees in the context of the systems of industrial relations. Working with 32 countries entails large volumes of information that are not always easy to summarise in comparative tables, where some detail is necessarily lost. In any case, we have used this tool as a means to visualize the essential and most relevant features of the most significant issues.
Structure The document is structured in three parts. The first part presents the results of an overview of the basic characteristics of systems of industrial relations and employee representation and participation and includes social and economic information within the European context. This global overview includes general comments on the current situation and highlights trends that may be observed in the last few years.
The second part presents the results of the national monographs for the 32 countries under study. The outline followed is the same as that of the first part, starting with basic information on the social and economic context, adding relevant notes for each country of a historic and institutional nature in order to contextualise the scene where industrial relations take place. The structure of the national monographs coincides with the treatment of the right of employee representation and participation, although the differences and complexities between some of them are highlighted. Finally, this part concludes with a section that looks at other forms of employee and employee representatives’ involvement in specific areas that do not affect the day-to-day running of companies but reflect the influence of external decisions (legal, at state level, in other undertakings, etc.)
The third part deals with the main institutional and private actors involved in the subject studied here, i.e., European and international employers’ organisations and trade unions, and provides an update on the movements that have taken place as a result of the impact of globalisation on collective action to defend professional interests. Finally, a bibliography, which is divided into two parts, national and transnational, is included.
Basically, this work is aimed at the actors involved in any of the different components that make up the systems of employee representation and participation in the undertaking: trade union members, undertaking managers and human resources managers in transnational groups, members of European Works Councils, institutional representatives in tripartite bodies or in social dialogue councils, etc. Given the breadth of this study, it may also be of interest to students of social and industrial relations or professionals working in this area. In any case, it intends to contribute to updating and to a better comprehension of the European dimension of employee participation in undertakings, the changes taking place in labour relations and, in general, in the labour world, which at this moment in time continues to shape the societies we live in.
This study has been prepared by a team made up of Nataša Belopavlovič, Javier Calvo, Lionel Fulton, Christophe Vigneau and Ricardo Rodríguez Contreras. The team has distrubuted the work on the national monographs prepared by national experts as well as the comparative analysis part. In addition to these tasks, the general direccion y coordination of the entire study was performed by Ricardo Rodríguez Contreras.
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14 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
PART ONE. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: AN OVERVIEW
15
16 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
PART ONE. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: AN OVERVIEW
The creation of worker representation bodies in companies dates back to the beginning of the last century. There are precedents in Germany going back as far as the end of the 19th century during the Weimar Republic. Internal committees sprang up in Italy in 1906 and, in France, staff delegates appeared in 1936 and works councils in 1945.
In theory, employee representation entails the involvement of employees in the daily running of the undertaking and, hence, their direct or indirect co-operation towards achieving profitability objectives. In exchange for this, employees and their representatives are taken into account, informed and consulted about management and production activities. In certain cases, this consideration can lead to playing a role in decision making. Employee participation thus becomes an expression of power sharing in the undertaking.
There are also other forms of worker participation in other financial/economic aspects of the business by granting workers certain economic rights over the capital (employee share ownership) or by awarding profit-related bonuses (profit-sharing). This study does not refer to these possibilities, nor to other forms of participation belonging to the so-called «Japanese model» of work organisation2, in which the workers’ aim is not to set up a counterbalancing power against the institutional channels, but rather to get involved, i.e. to individually participate in the production process, making team decisions in order to raise productivity and improve flexibility in personnel management in order to adapt business strategies to the prevailing circumstances.
Summarily, we could classify the systems of employee and employee’ representatives participation presented in this study into two types. On the one hand, the model based on the internal participation of employees in the administration and supervisory bodies of the undertaking, founded on collaboration between capital and labour and, on the other, the confrontation-negotiation model based on control through external participation bodies (basically, bodies of representation, works councils or trade unions) which do not have a commitment of co-responsibility with managers in charge of business administration.
Apart from the differences as to when they came about, worker representation and participation bodies have different organizational and functional profiles in the various European systems. The most basic distinction concerns “single channel” representation, in which one or more trade unions are involved and they and their representatives are the only channel through which the workers’ interests are represented; and the “double channel” system – trade union representation and “unitary” representation by the works committees and workers’ delegates-. However, this is a theoretical distinction that is often overshadowed by national complexity. Pure application of these two models is uncommon. In practice other factors combine to condition the operation of these systems (systems for electing representatives, negotiating powers, a collective bargaining structure for an entire sector or among a group of associations, the extent of representatives’ rights, etc.). Therefore, the usual case is for mixed systems of worker representation to coexist, largely due to the complex institutional, legal and social balance in each country.
Moreover, the appearance of new economic situations raises new problems and challenges for the operation of these systems of representation and participation.
Increasing global economic competition forces undertakings to permanently adapt to ever-changing environments. Financial markets, in their different expressions, are taking on significant weight in business activity. Capital concentration runs parallel to production deconcentration. The boundaries between undertakings are increasingly imprecise. Opposed to the easy identification that concepts such as productive unit, employer or capital ownership used to have, we are now witnessing the reconfiguration of undetakings where it is no longer easy to identify the employer, the owners of capital and what the undetaking is dedicated to. The legally-responsible employer in the labour relationship and the
2 Target setting or problem solving and other techniques such as “quality circles”, development groups, quality improvement or progress teams and independent work teams.
17 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
entrepreneur (or owner) making the decisions are increasingly dissociated. All of this has an effect on the exercise of employees’ right of participation, requiring its adaptation to be efficient in reality.
It is widely known that European competition, quite behind China and the United States in some figures, can not be based on certain natural resources it does not own. One of the greatest competitive asset in the EU is its human capital. The participation of employees in the decisions of the undertaking, including economic decisions, has an impact on the undertaking’s competitiveness, inasmuch as it implies the creation of relationships based on trust. In the long run, it is based on the definition of collective interests that usually provide stability to business strategies and the management of the undertaking. This is the case illustrated by some European economies such as the German and the Scandinavian, where the institutionalisation of employee participation in the governing bodies of undetakings has contributed towards solidity in activities and towards economic results. Employee participation in decision-making in the undertaking in this case becomes an essential profile, rooted in the institutional framework and the rationality of economic activity.
We shall briefly expound below some common and some differential elements that make up the national systems of employee representation and participation, including the basic framework of industrial relations on which they are built.
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I- ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
Throughout their history, the European countries’ industrial relations systems have reflected their economic, political, social and cultural contexts.
These systems are now facing common challenges: rapid technological progress, an increased competitive caused by international economic integration –the so-called globalization--, technological and organisational changes that deeply modify the traditional model of enterprises and even of employees, the necessity of find ways to build a flexible and inclusive labour market that could achieve the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy.
At the start of the 21st Century, some key issues arise in the debate on industrial relations in Europe and the systems of employee representation in the undertaking:
- In practice, the deep transformation of the undertaking becomes one of the main factors that are generating tensions with regard to the systems of employee representation and the future of industrial relations. Changes in work organisation, a greater focus on production processes than on specific individual tasks, outsourcing, restructuring or reorganisation as a permanent tool to manage adaptation, and other everyday events installed in the life of any undertaking require answers that Labour Law is not yet able to prepare. Labour regulations are thought out for a uniform and general implementation and, especially, for a different type of business organisation (post-industrial) that does not always correspond with the current needs of some undertakings (a specific excample would be the running of a networking undertaking).
- The trend towards the individualisation of the employment relationship by means of flexibilisation in contractual forms (atypical and non-standard contracts) influences the real capacity of employee representation. Trade unions find obstacles to represent, and to include among their membership, these new contingents of flexibilised employees who are structurally difficult to organise given the vulnerabilty and exposure to risk of their labour conditions. As a consequence of this, trade union weakening affects an essential part of the system of labour relations.
- Discussion with regard to the Europeanisation process of the national systems of industrial relations is still open. The transposition of Community social law directives has had a certain harmonising influence, an influence that still needs to be analysed in detail. Other changes are no less important, such as the development of the open method of coordination and new forms of soft governance. Despite some optimistic advances in this process, the reality of national diversity with regard to systems of industrial relations still appears insistingly evident. The potential fading out of the homogenising progress of the European social model as a result of the enlargement and integration of more reactive systems absorbed into the schemes of real participation of employees and their representatives, or the exercise of effective social dialogue, are also argued in this discussion.
- The last generation of Directives aimed at the involvement of employees and their representatives (Directive 2001/23/EC on the transfers of undertakings; Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the statute for a European Company and, particularly, Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees) entails an effort towards a homogenisation of standard information and consultation procedures. We must add to the europeising effect of these directives the phenomenon of an increasing presence of employee representatives as members of European Works Councils. Although not fully developed due to a lack of negotiated agreements in the affected undertakings or groups, these representatives (more than 11,000 in 2007 according to ETUC figures) constitute a real transnational network who may share information and structure their activity with a Community dimension.
- Simultaneous to the perceived evolution towards a decentralisation of collective bargaining and its potential consequences with regard to a decrease in coverage, the appearance of European intersectoral and sectoral agreements stands out. Sectoral social dialogue has also developed in a stable fashion, consolidating a structure of more than thirty committees that already form a reference network to consult certain issues. Also, undetakings and groups reach agreements at European level and worldwide
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with employee representatives, self-regulating elements that concern, in general, principles close to the respect of fundamental rights. The appearance of tools for the governance of industrial relations, although still limited, delves on the foundations on which transnational collective bargaining at European level may be based. In this scenario, the debate on the nature, legal basis and contents of this potential governance does not leave other discussions aside regarding the scope of the negotiating function of European Works Councils, which are claimed by some as the natural complement to their activities linked to information and consultation.
All of the abovementioned factors mix in with an increasingly complex world where work has transformed and, with it, individual and collective labour relations. Tensions reveal that something new is arising that isn’t quite born and that, at present, in the framework of this study on 32 countries, national differences are still perceived more than the similarities.
Although not an exact indicator, Gross Domestic Product per capita (see Table 1) provides a rough idea of living standards. GDP is lowest in Romania and Croatia, where in 2006 it stood at 36% and 48% of the Community (EU-25) average, respectively, and highest in Luxembourg, Norway and Iceland in terms of standardised purchasing power. Ireland has made considerable progress in catching up.
20 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Table 1: GPD per capita PPS and Real GPD growth rate evolution
GDP per capita in PPS* Real GDP growth rate** 1997 2006 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 EU (27 countries) : 96.2 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.9 2.0 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.8 3.0 EU (25 countries) 100.0 100.0 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.9 2.0 1.2 1.3 2.4 1.8 2.9 EU (15 countries) 110.2 107.8 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.8 1.9 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.6 2.8 Euro area 111.0 106.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.8 1.9 0.9 0.8 2.0 1.5 2.7 Belgium 117.6 118.1 3.5 1.7 3.4 3.7 0.8 1.5 1.0 3.0 1.1 3.2 Bulgaria 25.6 (e) 35.8 -5.6 4.0 2.3 5.4 4.1 5.6 5.0 6.6 6.2 6.1 Czech Republic 69.2 (e) 76.1 (f) -0.7 -0.8 1.3 3.6 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.1 (f) Denmark 124.9 122.0 3.2 2.2 2.6 3.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 2.1 3.1 3.2 Germany 116.5 109.2 1.8 2.0 2.0 3.2 1.2 0.0 -0.2 1.2 0.9 2.8 Estonia 38.4 (e) 64.8 11.1 4.4 0.3 10.8 7.7 8.0 7.1 8.1 10.5 11.4 Ireland 112.4 138.8 (f) 11.7 8.5 10.7 9.4 5.8 6.0 4.3 4.3 5.5 6.0 (f) Greece 70.9 85.4 (f) 3.6 3.4 3.4 4.5 5.1 3.8 4.8 4.7 3.7 4.3 Spain 87.5 98.4 3.9 4.5 4.7 5.0 3.6 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.9 France 114.1 109.0 2.2 3.5 3.3 3.9 1.9 1.0 1.1 2.5 1.7 2.0 Italy 114.6 100.2 1.9 1.4 1.9 3.6 1.8 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.9 Cyprus 79.6 (e) 90.0 2.3 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.0 2.0 1.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 Latvia 33.0 (e) 53.9 8.4 4.7 3.3 6.9 8.0 6.5 7.2 8.7 10.6 11.9 Lithuania 37.3 (e) 55.8 8.5 7.5 -1.5 4.1 6.6 6.9 10.3 7.3 7.6 7.5 Luxembourg 192.4 268.8 5.9 6.5 8.4 8.4 2.5 3.8 1.3 3.6 4.0 6.2 Hungary 49.8 (e) 63.1 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.1 3.9 Malta : 74.0 : : : : -1.6 2.6 -0.3 0.1 3.3 3.3 Netherlands 122.0 126.1 4.3 3.9 4.7 3.9 1.9 0.1 0.3 2.0 1.5 2.9 Austria 124.5 124.4 1.8 3.6 3.3 3.4 0.8 0.9 1.2 2.3 2.0 3.3 Poland 44.6 (e) 51.1 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.1 Portugal 76.6 71.9 (f) 4.2 4.8 3.9 3.9 2.0 0.8 -0.7 1.3 0.5 1.3 Romania : 36.4 (f) : : -1.2 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.1 7.7 Slovenia 71.0 (e) 83.8 4.8 3.9 5.4 4.1 2.7 3.5 2.7 4.4 4.0 5.2 Slovakia 47.4 (e) 60.6 5.7 3.7 0.3 0.7 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.4 6.0 8.3 Finland 109.5 113.0 6.1 5.2 3.9 5.0 2.6 1.6 1.8 3.7 2.9 5.5 Sweden 115.3 116.2 2.3 3.7 4.5 4.3 1.1 2.0 1.7 4.1 2.9 4.2 United Kingdom 112.6 114.8 3.1 3.4 3.0 3.8 2.4 2.1 2.8 3.3 1.8 2.8 Croatia 40.9 (e) 48.3 (f) 6.8 2.5 -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.6 5.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 (f) Macedonia 25.3 26.4 (f) 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.5 -4.5 0.9 2.8 4.1 3.8 (f) 3.1 (f) Turkey 32.3 (e) 28.4 (f) 7.5 3.1 -4.7 7.4 -7.5 7.9 5.8 8.9 7.4 6.1 Iceland 127.5 128.8 4.8 6.4 4.1 4.3 3.9 -0.1 2.7 7.6 7.2 2.6 Norway 140.5 180.3 5.4 2.7 2.0 3.3 2.0 1.5 1.0 3.9 2.7 2.9 Switzerland 139.4 128.2 (f) 1.9 2.8 1.3 3.6 1.0 0.3 -0.2 2.3 1.9 2.7 United States 152.9 148.2 (f) 4.5 4.2 4.4 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.9 3.2 3.3 Japan 121.5 108.5 (f) 1.6 -2.0 -0.1 2.9 0.2 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.2
21 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Employment In the European Economic Area, total employment rose to more than 200 million persons in 2006. Nevertheless, five countries account for 67 % of those 200 million persons: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain.
With the renowned objectives fixed by the Lisbon Strategy, the recent evolution of the main figures of the European Labour Market can be described briefly as follows:
First of all, the employment rate (percentage of economically active persons in the working age population) has increased by 4.1 points in the last ten years in the EU-25: from 60.6 in 1997 to 64.7 in 2006 (forecast), but still with a large gap between male and female employment as illustrated in Graphic 1.
Graphic 1: Employment rate (% population aged 15-64. EU 25 1997-2006
75,0
72,0 71,0 71,2 71,3 71,0 70,8 70,9 71,3 70,0 70,2 70,6
64,7 65,0 63,8 62,8 62,8 62,9 63,3 61,9 62,4 60,6 61,2 60,0 57,3 55,7 56,3 55,0 54,3 54,7 55,0 53,6 52,9 51,8 51,1 50,0
45,0
40,0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All Female Male
Source: Eurostat *Information forecast for 2006
By countries, this rate normally rises –with some exceptions—and varies widely between 4.5% (Poland) and 77.4% (Denmark). But there also remains a big gender gap.
22 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Table 2. Employment rates 1997-2006
All Female Male 1997 2006 1997 2006 1997 2006 EU (27 countries) 60.7 64.3 (p) 51.4 57.1 (p) 70.0 71.6 (p) EU (25 countries) 60.6 64.7 (p) 51.1 57.3 (p) 70.2 72.0 (p) EU (15 countries) 60.7 66.0 (p) 50.8 58.4 (p) 70.6 73.5 (p) European Union 60.7 64.7 (p) 50.8 57.3 (p) 70.6 72.0 (p) Euro area 58.6 64.5 (p) 48.0 56.4 (p) 69.2 72.6 (p) Euro area (13 countries) 58.5 64.5 (p) 47.7 56.5 (p) 69.3 72.6 (p) Euro area (12 countries) 58.4 64.5 (p) 47.7 56.4 (p) 69.3 72.6 (p) Belgium 56.8 61.0 46.5 54.0 67.1 67.9 Bulgaria : 58.6 : 54.6 : 62.8 Czech Republic : 65.3 : 56.8 : 73.7 Denmark 74.9 77.4 69.1 73.4 80.5 81.2 Germany (including ex-GDR from 1991) 63.7 67.2 (p) 55.3 61.5 (p) 71.9 72.8 (p) Estonia : 68.1 : 65.3 : 71.0 Ireland 57.6 68.6 45.9 59.3 69.1 77.7 Greece 55.1 61.0 39.3 47.4 72.1 74.6 Spain 49.5 64.8 34.6 53.2 64.5 76.1 France 59.6 63.0 (p) 52.4 57.7 (p) 66.9 68.5 (p) Italy 51.3 58.4 36.4 46.3 66.5 70.5 Cyprus : 69.6 : 60.3 : 79.4 Latvia : 66.3 : 62.4 : 70.4 Lithuania : 63.6 : 61.0 : 66.3 Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) 59.9 63.6 45.3 54.6 74.3 72.6 Hungary 52.4 57.3 45.4 51.1 59.7 63.8 Malta : 54.8 : 34.9 : 74.5 Netherlands 68.5 74.3 58.0 67.7 78.8 80.9 Austria 67.8 70.2 58.6 63.5 77.1 76.9 Poland 58.9 54.5 51.3 48.2 66.8 60.9 Portugal 65.7 67.9 56.5 62.0 75.5 73.9 Romania 65.4 58.8 59.1 53.0 71.9 64.6 Slovenia 62.6 66.6 58.0 61.8 67.0 71.1 Slovakia : 59.4 : 51.9 : 67.0 Finland 63.3 69.3 60.3 67.3 66.2 71.4 Sweden 69.5 73.1 67.2 70.7 71.7 75.5 United Kingdom 69.9 71.5 63.1 65.8 76.6 77.3 Croatia : 55.0 : 48.6* : 61.7 Turkey : 45.9 : 23.9 : 68.1 Iceland : 83.8 : 80.5* : 86.9 Norway : 75.4 : 72.2 : 78.4 Source: Eurostat
On the other hand, unemployment fell in the second half of the nineties, it increased in the early years of the new century, and fell again in the last three years. But the gender gap clearly remains.
23 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Graphic 2: Unemployment ratio: evolution (1994-2006)
12,0
11,0
10,0
9,0
8,0
7,0
6,0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU 15 EU 25 All EU 25 Male EU Female
Source: Eurostat
Table 3: Unemployment ratio: evolution (1998-2006)
1998 2005 2006 EU 15 9,3 7,9 7,4 EU 25 All 9,4 8,7 7,9 EU 25 Male 8,0 7,9 7,1 EU Female 11,2 9,8 9,0
By countries, this ratio is especially high in Poland, Slovakia and Croatia, whilst particularly low in Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark.
In any case, in this context we can affirm that perhaps one of the most important factors or characteristics in the recent evolution of the European labour market is the increasing importance of the so-called atypical forms of labour relations: especially part-time and fixed term-contracts. By contrast, self- employment is largely in decline, whilst it continues to play an important role in countries like Italy, Greece, Spain and Poland.
Table 4: Self-employment; part-time employment and fixed-term contract (1997-2005)
EU-25 EU-15 Part-time Part-time Self-employed Fixed term Self-employed Fixed term employment employment (% total contracts (% total Contracts (% total (% total (% total employment) (% total employment) employment) employment) employment) employment) 1997 16,6 16,0 11,7 15,6 16,7 12,4 2004 15,8 17,7 13,7 14,8 19,4 13,6 2005 15,6 18,4 14,5 14,7 20,2 14,3 Source: Employment in Europe
24 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
In any case, it is also plain to see that, for instance, part-time work is very common in the Netherlands, while it is much less so in southern European countries, where it accounts for only one or two in ten jobs. Instead, fixed term contracts are especially common in countries like Spain.
In terms of productive structure, the services sector continues to grow. It is the largest employer in all countries, accounting for three-quarters of jobs in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The industrial sector has declined in all the countries, and the agricultural sector continues to decline everywhere.
Table 5: Employment by sectors EU 15 and EU 25 (1997-2005)
EU-15 EU-25 Employment Employment Employment in Employment Employment Employment in in Services (% in Industry (% Agriculture (% in Services (% in Industry (% Agriculture (%
total total total total total total employment) employment) employment) employment) employment) employment) 1997 68,7 26,7 4,6 66,1 27,9 6,0 2004 72,2 24,0 3,8 70,0 24,9 5,0 2005 72,5 23,8 3,7 70,4 24,7 4,9 Source: Employment in Europe
25 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
II- INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
As is common knowledge, national systems of industrial relations are strongly rooted in the institutional, cultural, social and economic characteristics of each country. They constitute a fundamental pillar in most European countries for the normal running of democracy and the participation of social partners (trade unions and employers’ organisations), as well as for the regulation of the macroeconomic environment by means of collective bargaining at both national and sectoral levels.
Therefore, the systems of industrial relations influence and are influenced by these interconnections with their national environments, and are manifested through the types of labour legislation and through its practice (collective bargaining, social dialogue), both bilateral, between social partners, and tripartite, when an active role is played by the State.
Trade union and employers’ organisations are the main actors in this complex institutional framework which also has a significant development in practice. Their relations are not always smooth and the existence of tensions and disputes, reflected at their maximum degree as the exercise of the right to strike, also includes regularly the mechanisms to direct conflicts through mediation systems. These main characters of national and European social dialogue have faced and shared some common processes in the last few years, such as the need to provide an efficient response to the challenges of globalisation, including organisational modifications such as the recourse to mergers or the deepening of sectoralisation. The European Union enlargement has also involved an added effort towards organisational, and at times ideological, integration of the new member organisations.
However, besides affiliation figures, which are always difficult to obtain and sometimes unreliable or not updated, and the density rate of different national structures, the reality nowadays is that both sides of industry are firmly set at the heart of the European system of labour relations, actively contributing to the functioning thereof.
Given the particular nature of labour relationships in the public sphere and the specific features of its collective barganing system, when it exists, we shall not deal with industrial relations in the public sector in this section. To these reasons we may add the singular nature and the extension that an analysis of the characteristics of this sector would entail, given the deep transfornations that have taken place as a consequence of the liberalisation of European markets and the privatisation processes of public undertakings, as well as the intense processes of internal transformation of these organisations. Key issues such as the right to collective bargaining or the right to strike, and even the limitations to trade union membership in certain categories of public employment, have a very different treatment at national level, which dependes foremost on the historic, institutional and legal construction of public administration and the figure of the civil servant.
Literature on industrial relations is relatively abundant, fortunately, although perhaps not as much as to cover all 32 countries simultaneously. This study is probably different as it tries to provide a more integral perspective on the cornerstones of the functioning of industrial relations as a whole and, in particular, on the rights and prerogatives of employees and their representatives within the undertaking. Although the approach taken is a description of the legal state of the issue, we have tried to present it in such a way that it allows us to obtain an overall understanding of the situation as a whole.
Social partners
Unions European trade union organisations continue to face the challenges derived from the deep changes in work organisation which affect membership. Despite the increasing importance of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and its active institutional role, the lack of a European framework of industrial relations entails difficulties in its capacity for coordinated response and mobilisation. The last few decades of transformation in national and European economy, including privatisation processes that have had a great sectoral impact and the market deregulations (energy, post) that are still taking place,
26 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
have weakened its former strength. In general, the trade union density rate in Europe has decreased in the last ten years3, and is now placed at around 25-30%. The national rate varies greatly between Scandinavian countries – from 80% in Denmark or 70% in Sweden – and the lower values in Mediterranean countries or the new Member States.
Membership data, however, must be read within the national context, where other factors (the measure of representatives, the interventionist role of the State, institutional participation in trade unions, including co-management of certain public aspects) help us to understand the role that trade union organisations play in reality.
It is significant that in some countries – Germany and United Kingdom, amongst others – the trade unions that currently have higher membership levels are those bringing together public sector workers to the detriment of other, more classical, sectors in the industry (car, metal, chemical industries). Also, as a consequence of changes in occupation and social structures, trade unions that group employees in the services sectors (white-collar) tend to grow more than those that group the working class (blue-collar).
The basis for the structure of trade union organisations continues to be mainly sectoral or professional, often organising National Confederations. The plurality of these peak organisations is the dominant feature at national level. National trade unions in Europe are organisationally structured into a single confederation, as in Austria, UK, Ireland or Latvia, or in more than one, as in Spain, Portugal and Greece. In other countries such as France, Italy or Hungary, there are several. Depending on how this is established in the national institutional and legal representativity framework (when such a framework exists by means of systems that measure membership or through counting results in trade union election processes), plurality usually entails competition between organisations.
This organisational configuration does not condition its functioning in practice, which may largely depend on the power and capacity to mobilise certain member organisations, generally sectoral or professional. In many cases, the composition and denomination of these structures point at their ideological or religious origin, although these features represent historical identity signs rather than present bonds. Despite the State interventionism that exists in some countries, a common, generalised, characteristic of national trade union organisations is the autonomy they exercise with regard to the political powers and, more specifically, political parties. This does not prevent some of them from acknowledging their political origins and to underline their ideological principles, something which is quite common in Central and Southern Europe.
The essence of trade union work in most European countries, is the capacity to undertake collective bargaining and to reach agreements at the corresponding level: sectoral, territorial or at undertaking level. In other countries, this essential role, which is typical of the single channel model, coexist alongside the right to bargaining of other unit representations of employees, through works councils or other bodies of representation. The variety of formulae that allow this unit-trade union game simply confirms the richness as regards national solutions and the predominance of mixed representation systems in the undertaking, with common elements and particular requirements, operating with regard to collective bargaining.
The pressure exerted by changes in work organisation has also affected the ways in which trade unions are organised to defend the workers’ interests. New forms of representing the diversity in the labour force (immigrants) are tested to include also new society demands (gender equality, non-discrimination) or to attract collectives (young people) that enter into a labour market that is increasingly fragmented and atypical and, in any case, different than fifteen or twenty years ago. Experiences to organically affiliate important social and labour groups such as the self-employed – until now distanced from trade unions that did not consider them real waged workers – have formally taken place in Spain and Portugal. This bears witness to the dispute with employers’ organisations to take over a space that, according to the most conservative figures, could add up to 30 million employees in the EU. In parallel to the changes that have taken place in the productive structure and within undertakings, sectoral or professional trade union organisations have merged to increase in size and in their capacity for representation and institutional acknowledgement.
3 European Commission. Industrial Relations in Europe 2006. Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities.
27 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
The activity of trade unions in Europe can be differentiated not only by their national strategies, which depend largely on the institutional, legal, historical, social and economic environment in each country, but also by the ways in which they operate. Rendering services to their members stands out as a guideline that may live alongside an approach that is rooted at the work centre itself, serving as the engine to expand trade union power through its representativity. The recent establishment of trade union members who are members of European Works Councils is also a novelty, as we can start to see networking systems with a transnational perspective.
Employers´ organisations National employers’ organisations play an active role in national and European industrial relations. As in the case of trade unions, their base is predominantly sectoral in most countries, with strong organisations that are clearly representative at that level. Similarly, their density rate4 varies significantly both in sectors and from one country to another, influenced by the presence of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the productive structure, which are also organised at national level: from the Benelux countries with a very high rate – approximately 80% -, or the case of Austria, where membership is compulsory through Chambers5, to the new Member States that show a limited capacity for representation.
SMEs are organised as differentiated bodies in many countries (in Southern Europe, where they have a great weight in the productive structure, and also in new Member States such as Poland and Hungary), and they have an acknowledged institutional protagonism as a consequence of their specific nature as undertakings.
In general, employers’ organisations do not seem to face a problem in decreasing membership; quite the opposite, the trend shows stability or the appearance of new sectoral or professional organisations.
In most countries there is more than one national confederation or federation established. In some cases, the principle underlying the grouping of employers’ organisations is of a general nature, basically aimed at institutional representation and the coordination of strategies unto the political power. In other cases, representation is very large and fragmented (Italy, Hungary), as a consequence of the characteristics of the productive structure or due to the historical background of the country. The existence of strong sectors that are widely active and have strategic importance in national economy strongly influences the grouping or not of organisations into a suprasectoral instance (confederation), independent of the fact that both situations, belonging to an institutional confederation and sectoral prominence, may exist. In other countries, employers’ organisations also group together bodies of a territorial nature together with sectoral organisations. In composite states such as Germany, Spain, Austria or Belgium, the federal structure seems to correspond with a greater relevance of territorial or regional organisations.
A decisive element in the establishment of national employers’ structures is their capacity to take part in collective bargaining. In most countries this takes place with a sectoral perspective or bound by economic activity, which favours the existence of sectoral or subsectoral employers’ organisations that group into federations or confederations with the aim of achieving certain degree of coordiation. Obviously, the mechanisms to extend collective agreements, when they exist in national legislation or practice, significantly influence the establishment and characterisation of the activity of organisations in the sector. Central coordination may involve the formulation of recommendations or control on the negotiation of salaries, or adopt a more active and monitoring role on the evolution of bargaining at national level.
In other countries, employers’ organisations are more centred around involvement in national social dialogue, playing an essential part in the institutional balance of industrial relations, negotiating and undersigning agreements. It is worth pointing out that, in several countries, the approach of their representation activity in undertakings seems to have a strong sectoral component. In this sense, the peak
4 In te case of employer´s organisaton, density rate is defined as the perecentage of emplyees working in the country for empoyers that are members of an employer organisation. 5Employers’ organisations have substituted the old Chambers in their role representing business interests. In the countries where the latter still exist, they have in general moved on to render specific services of an adiministrative nature to their member organisations. Only in Austria and Luxemburg do they maintain a prominent instituional position of representation.
28 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
organisations defend the interests of sectors with great intensity, carrying out internal and external activities to this end, a role that is compatible with the consolidation of their prominence in the inter- sectoral sphere. The activity of sectoral organisations is more directed to collective bargaining in their own sphere despite the trend in decentralisation of collective agreement at undertaking level.
In some countries such as Spain, France and Hungary social economy has started to organise itself, bringing together those undertakings in which employees themselves participate in their ownership as major stakeholders, and other institutions of a varied nature (foundations, social institutions) that carry out economic activities – sometimes of an important nature at sectoral level – and that maintain labour relationships with employees.
The following table provides details of the main employers and unions organisations. Trade Union membership figures differs depending on the way it is calculated. Union density rate is defined as the ratio of actual to potential membership (excluding inactives, unemployed, students, retired…). More details can be found in the correspondent national monographs.
Countries Main employers´ Membership details Main trade unions Data on Union rate confederations and confederations and membership associations organisations reported* WKO Main private ÖGB 1,385,000 (2003) 35% Visser 1. Austria6 employers´organisation ABVV/FGTB (2003) ACV/CSC 32% IRE** VBO/FEB -Largest confederation ACV/CSC 1.7 million (2007) 49% IRE ABVV/FGTB) 1.2 million “ 55% Visser 2. Belgium UNIZO -SMEs ACLVB/CGSLB 230,000 (2002) UCM NCK-CNC <50,000 BTPP, 70 sectoral orgs. KNSB 393,843 ( 2003) 28% UCL 3. Bulgaria BSK, SCHSI, KT 106,309 “ SCHP, KRIB-GBB Promiana 58,613 “ HUP 5,000 members, 21 SSSH 211,205 (2004) 40,5% sectoral orgs. covering NHS 87,313 “ estimated 4. Croatia 400,000 emps. HUS 53,000 “ KHIP URHS 50,000 “ KUSP MSJP 49,875 “ OEB 51 professional PEO 63,871 (2001) 53% EC (2002) associations and 4,500 SEK 64,733 “ and IRE; 5. Cyprus enterprises PASYDY 26,498 “ DEOK 7,500 CMKOS 850,000 (2003) 27% Visser Largest employers’ ASO 200,000 (2001) (2001) 6. Czech KZPS organisations CAC 22% IRE Republic SPD KOK 30% (2005) own data 30.000 companies, LO 1,3 million (2006) 70% Visser 650,000 emps. FTF 363.000 (2003) 7. Denmark DA AC 166,000 80% IRE 78% own sources ETK 23 branch, 1500 EAKL 43,776 (2005) 8.5% LFS7 companies, TALO 30,000 (2005) 8. Estonia EKTK -145 000 emps ESEA EVEA EK Largest employers’ SAK 1.000.000 74% Visser 9. Finland orgs. confederation STTK 600.000 (2003) AKAVA 486.000 (2007) and IRE MEDEF -Largest confederation CFDT 803,635 8,2% Visser 85 federations sectors CGT 700,000 (2003) 10. France CGPME -SMEs CGT-FO 600,000 5% IRE UPA CFTC UNAPL CGC 11. Germany BDA -51 sectoral orgs. DGB 6.8 million (2005) 20%8 (2005)
6 Obligatory membership system to the Chambers 7 Estonia Labour Force Survey 2005
29 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
BDI -39 regional and DBB 1.25 million 23% Visser sectoral groups CGB 290,150 (2003) SEV -Largest confederation GSEE 766,000 (for both 20% EC GSEVEE -SMEs: 70 federations, ADEDY GSEE and (2004). 12. Greece 1350 associations. ADEDY) (2004) Est.at 16% and ESEE -14 commercial 28% federations MGYOSZ -6.000 companies MSZOSZ 240,000 (2003) 20% Lado SZEF 270,000 “ (2001) VOSZ -individual and ASZSZ 120,000 “ 13. Hungary corporate members LIGA 100,000 “ 17% IRE ÉSZT 85,000 “ MOSZ 56,000 “ SA 2,000 businesses ASÍ 65% TU members 85% ASI 14. Iceland BSRB (public 19,000 (2004) (1998) services) IBEC 3,485 companies ICTU 784,277 (2006) 35% Visser 15. Ireland (2003) 36% IRE Confindustria -260 federations CGIL 5.5 million (2006) 34% (2004) 16. Italy CISL 4.3 million “ Visser, IRE ARAN -Public sector UIL 1.9 million LDDK 84 enterprises, 33 LBAS 165 000 16% LBAS. 17. Latvia sectoral associations (2006) 18. Liechtens LCCI 37 companies (2007) LANV 1,200 (2007) - tein LPK -37 branches and 8 LPSK, 120,000 (2007) 15% Chasard regional associations ‘Solidarumas’ 52,000 “ (2000); 13% 19. Lithuania LVDK -2000 companies and LDF 20,.000 “ IRE associated structures UEL 30,000 companies, OGB-L 50,000 (2006) 46% EC (2004) 20. Luxembo 80% emps. LCGB 40,000 “ urg
MEA 240 members CMTU 62.1% of TU 55% EC (2004) 21. Malta FOI 9 members (2005) VNO_NCW -150 branch FNV 1.2 million 22% Visser associations; 80,000 CNV 18% of TU (2003); 22. Netherlan enterprises MHP members 25% IRE ds MKB -SME FNV Bondgenoten 8.6% of TU LTO -Agricultural and members horticultural sectors AVV -NHO -Largest confederation LO 831,000 53% Visser 22 branch federations YS 201,000 ( 2004) (2003) -HSH -12,000 companies Akademikene 5% of working 152,000 emps. emps (2004) -Spekter (mainly -186 companies Unio 9% of working 23. Norway deregulated public 165,000 emps. emps (2004). enterprises) -KS ( Local - 896 authorities and Authorities) undertakings, 407,000 emps. KPP -Largest confederation NSZZ 722,000; 4.35% 15% Visser 6,000 companies “Solidarno ć” of TU members10 (2001) PKPP Lewiatan -3.000 companies, 17% IRE 24. Poland 600.000 emps OPZZ state-owned 11-13% own ZRP -craft chambers industry sector. sources BCC-ZP -1,200 companies . . FZZ 400,000. CIP Two federations, 42 CGTP-IN 40 % of TU 17% EC (2004) general and regional members AEP employers’ UGT 25. Portugal AIP associations 57 affiliated unions
ACPR 12 confederations, Cartel ALFA 1,000,000 55-60% UCL 26. Romania CONPIROM two associations of FRATIA . 800,000 (2004); CNPR representative BNS 44% own
8 Germany: Representative survey data. 9 Also Malta Chamber of Commerce and GRTU (for SMEs) 10 According to union data, Solidarity unites 900,000 members
30 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
CNIPMMR employers’ CSDR sources (2002) UPR organisations MERIDIAN RUZ Cov. 310,000 emps KOZ 400,000 (90% of 31% IRE 27. Slovak AZZZ 220,000 emps TU members) Republic
Chamber GZS11 -64,000 members ZSSS 300,000 44,3 % Chamber OZS - 47,000 members KNSS. 40,000 (2003) ZDS -1,400 members Pergam 87,000 28. Slovenia ZDODS - 3000 members Konfederacija ’90 40,000 KSJS 73,000 public sector CEOE -1 million . CC.OO 1,000,000 16% EIRO undertakings UGT 900,000 Spanish 29. Spain CEPYME - SMEs sources (2004)
SN 51 employer LO 1,831,385 77% IRE organisations and trade TCO 1,258,486 30. Sweden organisations. SACO 580,566
TISK. 22 employers’ TURK-IS 2.122.186 58 % National associations covering DISK 412.143 statistics 31. Turkey 1.1 million emps. HAK-IS 391.913 (2006)12
CBI -240,000 businesses TUC 6,463,000 (2007) Estimated 29% IoD -54,000 directors IRE; 32. United British Chambers of -135,000 businesses 16.6% LFS Kingdom Commerce private sector (2006) 13
*Data on membership: based on administrative sources, official census or certifications and self-reporting. ** IRE: Industrial Relations in Europe 2006 (European Commission). Chapter on trade unions drafted by Guy Van Gyes (HIVA Leuven). Usually sources of data and figures on union membership collected from EIRO, European Foundation, Dublin. TU members: % of unionised workers in the country who are membership of this Confederation; Emps. : employees covered by theorganisations, federations and undertakings members; Orgs.: organisations Bolds: most important confederation
Collective bargaining Collective bargaining continues to play a fundamental role in the economic and social balance of the EU. On the one hand, it acts as a local counterweight to the pressure exerted by the increase in world competitiveness and globalisation, socially compensating its impact on working conditions, especially in the sectoral or activity sphere – as well as territorial in some countries -. On the other, it works as a regulator that influences other macroeconomic benchmarks such as inflation, moderating the behaviour of wages or, alternatively, evolving in an anti-cyclical manner. However, collective bargaining, its structure and the number of collective agreements reached and the employees and undertakings covered by these agreements basically serves to assess the degree of articulation and the strength of the systems of industrial relations. Hence, it has an enormous transcendence at national level.
Collective bargaining is based on one of the principles that work as a preliminary requirement. Firstly, the freedom of association of employers and trade unions, acknowledged in all legislations. Secondly, the organisation of the main actors, their autonomy to formalise agreements, strength (representativity) and capacity to articulate the negotiation process, as well as the role played by the State therein. Historic and social traditions are important in this case, but also legislation or the agreements that regulate its development and the scope of its effects. In this sense, the compulsory nature of the agreements (the
11 Obligatory membership. At the end of 2006 some changes were introduced into the system of chambers in Slovenia and membership is no longer compulsory. 12 Official Gazette. Labour statistics issued by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to serve as a basis in the determination of the authorised union: of the 5,210,046 workers, 3,043,732 are unionised with a unionisation rate of 58.42%. 13 UK: According to Labour Force Survey: 58.8% in the public sector and16.6% in the private sector (2006).
31 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
agreements as a rule to be implemented), with varying degrees in the different countries, constitutes an essential element of this institution.
At times, social dialogue and collective bargaining tend to be confused and, perhaps with the view of simplification, are presented in studies as one, understanding the latter as a form of social dialogue within the undertaking. However, even if they share common features, collective bargaining has its own standing as an institution.
As mentioned earlier, the structure of negotiation, either centralised or multi-level, is conditioned by the type of existing social actors, their number and scheme of activities – trade union concurrence, cooperation, professional trade unions, single employers’ confederations or sectoral federations, etc. The social and productive characteristics of the country (presence of multinationals, prominence of small and micro-enterprises, etc.) also influence its configuration and, especially, extension procedures.
The attribution given to trade union representatives or unit representatives of employees (works councils) or both of the negotiating role constitutes another essential factor to understand the functioning of this basic institution. In general, it is trade unions that hold this power at undertaking level. Only in a few countries does the body of representation have this authority, although it may indirectly receive trade union influence or guidance (Spain, Italy). The model where a supra-undertaking level or sphere exists – usually, at sectoral level – for bargaining and setting framework conditions and, in particular, wages, between employers’ organisations and trade unions, is deeply rooted in Germany and Austria. This framework or macro collective agreement is completed beneath with agreements at undertaking level between employer and works council, establishing the regulation of issues such as work organisation. In several enlargement countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia), with the predominance of the single channel of trade union representation, unit representation bodies (works councils) are denied the possibility to negotiate. This is also the situation in other countries such as Greece, France and Portugal.
Collective bargaining may adopt several national forms. From bilateral or tripartite agreements, which act as frameworks generating guidelines – on the salary ranges to be applied – for implementation at lower, sectoral or undertaking levels (regular in Spain, Belgium or Ireland, for instance), to the signing of specific agreements on specific issues (pensions, sectoral employment conditions, minimum wage increases, main principles to implement equality policies in the undertaking, etc.).
With a more or less active role, State intervention in the framework of negotiation, in its process and results, is important in many countries. From this perspective, it may contribute to ensure a level of minimum protection (salary), apply mechanisms to extend the efficiency of agreements and enlarge the scope thereof and, in general, to guarantee the foundations for common game rules.
A trend towards decentralisation may still be appreciated, although the sectoral level is still a marked reference in most European countries – see the table below -. On the one hand, we may observe that despite an increase in the number of agreements at undertaking level, the link between articulation at this level and the sectoral level is still maintained (Denmark, Germany). This would suggest that the decentralisation process may be controlled by trade unions to limit the trend towards the individualisation of downward working conditions.
Agreements at undertaking level are used most in United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Turkey, amongst others. Differently to what happens in the voluntarist influence area, collective bargaining in Germany plays the role of setting macro-guidelines in working conditions for sectoral environments. The agreements reached have a limited scope and only oblige those who are members of the trade union and members of the employers’ organisation who subscribe it, although it is possible to extend this scope.
In the Netherlands, collective bargaining at national scale is undetaken in a tripartite manner through the Labour Foundation (STAR) and the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER). As a form of articulation, we may highlight the intersectoral model of negotiation developed in the National Labour Council in Belgium. This body is formed by employees’ and employers’ representatives and is chaired by a civil servant, who is not a party to the agreements. Below this level, negotiation is organised through joint committees that articulate the scope of economic activity sectors. Finally, at the bottom, agreements at undertaking level have the role of improving, possibly, working conditions as they can not contravene
32 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
what is stipulated at higher levels. Also in France, starting with a minimum that is guaranteed by legislation, each sphere of negotiation (sectoral, regional, undertaking) may add, with some exceptions, benefits in salary or extra-salary compensations and in employment conditions. The role played by collective bargaining to develop and specify regulations (for instance, working hours) has been fundamental in this country, which is historically characterised by an important legal influence in industrial relations, strengthening the contents thereof.
A singular situation arises in the Scandinavian countries – especially Sweden – where the sectoral agreement framework gives rise to local specification, although wages and employment conditions are increasingly agreed at undertaking level. As a differential element in this group of countries, the general scope of agreements is not implemented in Finland.
Decentralisation can not only take place vertically, from the sector to the undertaking level. The impact of flexibilisation and individualisation of employment relationships has effects at the level where collective bargaining that is still to take place is developed. The work centre and not the undertaking could, increasingly, become a new level for the agreement of employment conditions, as mentioned in some of the new Member States. Also, decentralisation in setting wages has increased, for instance in Germany, towards other regional levels.
The coverage of these agreements varies considerably depending on the structure and articulation of bargaining, as well as on the existence of procedures to extend collective agreements to other employees in the same undertaking, sector or territory. In some countries, figures are approximate and come from surveys rather than a system of records. The multi-annual duration of some agreements also makes their quantification more difficult.
An increasing trend in collective bargaining coverage has been observed in Hungary, Bulgaria or Lithuania, whilst a decreasing trend is detected in the Czech Republic.
Level and coverage of collective bargaining. Table 1: Collective bargaining in the private sector
Collective bargaining private sector Rate of Main type of State Country Predominan Tendency employee Source intervention t level coverage 1. Austria industry stable 98% EIRO14 framework/ partnership No data framework – the Government Significant rise Ministry of industry/ available. intervention is restricted to the 2. Belgium at sectoral and Labour, 2005. undertaking According to action of legally declaring the enterprise level (FOD WASO)15 EIRO, 96% CLA by Royal Decree Confederation of undertaking/ the independent 3. Bulgaria increasing 38% consultation/tripartism nationwide trade unions in Bulgaria –2006 undertaking/ National 4. Croatia decentralization low framework industry monograph mainly 5. Cyprus stable 68% EIRO minimum wage setting undertaking The Czech- Moravian 6. Czech industry declining 30% Confederation of framework/autonomy Republic Trade Unions - 2005 industry/ company level Confederation of 7. Denmark 77%16 framework/consultation undertaking is strengthening Danish
14 Hereafter in this table: EIRO. “Industrial Relations in EU Member States 2000-2004” (2007) based on country profiles in 2006. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 15 H. Bocksteins, “Het collectieve onderhandelen in cijfers” in Cox, G. Rigaux , M. and Rombouts, J. Collectief onderhandelen, Mechelen, Kluwer, 67-84, 2007 16 Total, including public sector: 85%
33 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining private sector Rate of Main type of State Country Predominan Tendency employee Source intervention t level coverage although still Employers: linked to the labour Market industry level report 200617 Some surveys No framework no essential and estimations 8. Estonia undertaking administrative change not fully data gathered reliable18 industry/ 9. Finland stable 90% EIRO framework/consultation nationwide Ministry of industry/ 10. France decentralization 97, 7 % employment- extension/ Important role nationwide DARES, 2006 some tendencies to IAB- undertaking 65% West 11. Germany industry Betriebspanel framework/ support level and job- 54% East 2006 specific negotiation 2006, National Slow but visible Industry/ Trade Union framework/ tripartism 12. Greece de- 60-70% professional Confederation’s centralisation Institute Growing (owing to the 13. Hungary workplace 42,6% 2006 tripartism extension procedures) industry/ 14. Iceland decentralization high consultation/ tripartism nationwide National level bargaining Central Statistics nationwide/ 15. Ireland based on 35% Office (CSO) partnership/ tripartism undertaking Partnership 2006 agreement Industry/ local agreements 16. Italy in the stable 43,3%19 ISTAT 200720 consultation/ autonomy framework of sectoral agreements 17. Latvia undertaking21 stable 20% EIRO Framework/tripartism undertaking / industry / implementation No data 18. Liechtenstein undertaking / No data available. framework / tripartism new, increasing available (n.a.) nationwide next year slightly 19. Lithuania undertaking 15 % (estimate) EIRO framework/ tripartism increasing industry/ 20. Luxembourg decentralization 58% EIRO framework/ tripartism undertaking 2000-2002 National Office 21. Malta enterprise stable 33% (est.) framework of Statistics (NSO) 22. Norway Industry stable 55% (est.) Fafo22 2004/2005 framework /consultation
17 Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening: Arbejdsmarkedsrapport 2006 18 Estonia: Some estimates can be drawn from population surveys, but they are not accurate. i.e..Estonian Social Survey (Statistics Estonia 2005) provides the following figures: 17% of employees replied that a collective agreement has been signed in their workplace and around 60% of the employees are covered by the agreement. Thus, the coverage could be 11% of employees. However, there are two industry level agreements, which are not addressed in the survey, thus the coverage is probably higher. Earlier estimates of collective bargaining coverage are based on expert opinions. 19 67% in the industry; 51%-services 20 Contratti collettivi, retribuzioni contrattuali e conflitti di lavoro.2007 21 23 collective agreements at sectoral level; 2.045 at undertaking level. 2006. LBAS (Latvian Free Trade Union confederation)
34 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining private sector Rate of Main type of State Country Predominan Tendency employee Source intervention t level coverage /undertaking 23. Netherlands industry decentralization 80% 2006 framework/tripartism 24. Poland undertaking stable 35% EIRO framework 25. Portugal industry increasing 91% (est.) DGEEP23/2005 framework/ tripartism nationwide/ Decentralizatio 26. Romania n.a. framework industry n Decentralizatio 27. Slovak industry/ framework/ tripartism25 n towards 35% - 40% EIRO 2006 Republic undertaking undertaking24 Industry/ Almost all 28. Slovenia decentralization ETUC 200727 framework/tripartisme nationwide workers26 Economically industry/ Significant rise 68% Active Population in the number nationwide; Survey 2005. 29. Spain of enterprise framework/ tripartism National industry/ collective Statistics agreements county level Institute28 Mainly Decentralised industry – bargaining. framework Wage and 92 % 29 (est.) Ekonomifakta, 30. Sweden agreement working time framework/consultation 2006 leaving scope are increasingly for local dealt with at adjustments. company level. Ministry, publication year - Workplace(s) 31. Turkey stable 4,2%30 2007 according to framework / autonomy /undertaking 2006 data
Undertaking/ 32. United individual 33, 5%31 Labour Force decentralised voluntary system/autonomy Kingdom workplace Survey-2006
The increase in coverage is usually carried out using mechanisms to extend existing agreements which are used in several countries with a social aim as an antidumping mechanisms and the complement of income policy for workers. In general, it contributes also to one of the government objectives expected from collective bargaining, which is the control of inflation (in this sense, extension plays the role of automatic stabilizer).
Indeed, the possibility of extending the effects of an agreement is intimately related to the membership density of trade unions and employers’ organisations. In principle, extension works towards affiliation. Another conditioning factor, also related to density, is the structure and coverage of collective bargaining.
22 Estimate by Fafo based on surveys and register based information 2004/2005 23 Direcção Geral de Estudos, Estatística e Planeamento, Estatísticas em síntese – Quadros de pessoal, 2005, p. 7. The islands of Madeira and Azores are not included. 24 In Slovakia, extension procedures have recently been legally enabled and maybe also industry level will be strenghtened. It depends on the Ministry of Labour whether it will use its renewed competence to extend collective agreements at branch level. 25 Tripartite agreements (if signed) cover only the principles of social and labour law policies. Collective bargaining and collective agreements are bilateral and autonomous, although the State may intervene in conciliation or mediation procedures when required. 26 Slovenia: Official Statistics shows 95% (estimate) due to the employers´ obligation to be members of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Recent (2006) legislation on collective bargaining provides that in future -three year transitional period- only employers or employers’ associations will be able to sign collective agreements, and that the Chambers will no longer be signatories. 27 Slovenia: worker-participation.eu, an information service of the ETUI-REHS 28 Spain. Statistics from Yearbook of Spanish Labour Ministry 29 Sweden: According to LO (2007) it might be less. 30 Turkey: for the private sector: 187,015 out of 4.384.651 workers covered. 31 UK: 69 % public sector;19,6% private sector
35 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
In those countries with greater sectoral articulation and coverage, it is easier to use the extension mechanism than in those where bargaining takes place centrally.
In general, extension is based on the compulsory application of all or certain aspects of a collective agreement to all employees and undertakings, even when their representatives do not undersign it (erga omnes principle). Although this type of extension usually has a sectoral nature, the extension that is carried out in certain cases, such as enlarging the scope of functional or geographical application to certain areas, territories or economic activities where no articulated representation exists through trade unions and/or employers’ organisations, is particularly important in economic and social terms.
Although this procedure is usually present in national legislations and practices, the way in which it is implemented usually varies, from a limited extension (to employees of a specific sector or territory) to an extension in the sphere of the undertaking or group (see Table 2). In turn, the procedure requires an express request, for instance, of the organisations signing the agreement, if the requirements are met; or from employees and their representatives. The type of authorisation and the authority that issues the extension also differentiate the national casuistries.
In Italy, collective agreements are, in principle, only binding for the signing parties; however, in practice, Italian case law of the Corete de Cassazioni has established that any employer who is a member of any employers’ association signing a collective agreement, is also obliged to implement the contents thereof to all employees in his or her undertaking, even if they are not members of the signing trade unions and as long as they wish it voluntarily. From a different perspective, the membership principle also rules in Portugal, although in practice agreements are applied to all employees in the category within the undertaking, even when they are not affiliated.
In Spain, statutory agreements (negotiated pursuant to the Statute of Workers’ Rights, the Labour Code) are generally effective; that is, they oblige all employers and all employees included in their scope of implementation and throughout the time they are enforced. Extra-statutory agreements have the nature of a private contract between the signing parties and only obliges these parties.
No extension procedures exist in Denmark or Romania, nor in those countries with a voluntary system (UK, Ireland, Malta).
The obligation to negotiate collective agreements is usually prominent in EU countries. No legal obligation exists in countries such as Germany, Croatia or Netherlands. Even in countries with voluntary systems, an obligation may exist to renegotiate existing agreements even if only to cancel them (Denmark), or agreements at national level may favour and recommend the start of negotiations (Ireland).
Table 2: Obligation to negotiate, legal binding and compulsory nature
Collective bargaining in the private sector Country 3. Obligation 1. Capacity 2. Basis 4. Legal binding 5. Extension to negotiate Some provisions - Chambers of Due to the Chambers´ Yes. (normative part) Commerce32. system, the agreements Works Internal become legally - Voluntary signed have a very wide 1. Austria Constitution company binding for all representations of application, covering Act (ArbVG) agreement is individual employers interests (including most of the workforce. obligatory33. and employees. TU and EO)
Employers and employees reps at Binding for the 2. Belgium national, sectoral Legal Non existent Customary 35 employers of a sector (and undertaking level34
32 Austria: approximately 95 % of all collective agreements are concluded by organisational units of the Chambers of commerce. 33 The internal company agreement is different from the collective agreement. It concluded between the company owner and the works council. Pay is mostly excluded from the regulatory framework of internal company agreements. 34 Belgium: a) employers: national: representative employers’ organisations VBO/FEB, UNIZO, UCM, Boerenbond/FWA; sectoral (joint committees): representative employers organisations; undertaking(s): one (or more) employers
36 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining in the private sector Country 3. Obligation 1. Capacity 2. Basis 4. Legal binding 5. Extension to negotiate At sectoral and Yes. municipal level: Negotiations The CA has effect for employers’ reps and start at the Only binding for the the employees who are EO request of the signatories of the 3. Bulgaria Labour code members of the TU TUs and no agreement organisation signatory Enterprise level: later than 1 to the agreement36. employer and TU month after the request National and sectoral Minister of Labour can, employers’ on suggestion of one 4. Croatia Legal No No organization. party, extend a CA to a TUs whole sector Gentlemen’s Not being legally Agreement: TU confederations binding, but CA play Industrial 5. Cyprus and employers No a leading role in No regulation relations organisations regulating minimum code, not standards binding. Legal; TU organisations and Act No. Extension to additional Yes employers 2/1992 Coll., employers only at high On the written organisations; on collective No obligatory scope, level CAs in the course 6. Czech request –a bargaining; law sets certain of agreement validity; Republic proposal of CA- Individual employers Act No. limitations This possibility is by one social and TUs at enterprise 262/2006 applied at enterprise partner level Coll., Labour level and higher level Code Voluntarism, Employers: but there is an Confederation level obligation to re- Agreements are and sectoral level negotiate an binding and cover the 7. Denmark CAs existing level at which the No extension Employees: agreement agreements are Confederation and whether the aim signed37 TU level is to renew it or to cancel it. Employees: employees union or Yes. A CA may be CA applies to federation or extended on agreement employers and authorised between the parties employees representative of with respect to wages, Yes38 belonging to an 8. Estonia employees; Legal working hours and rest organisation which central federation of time conditions. The has entered into a employees scope of the extension CA, unless the CA Employers: employer is determined in the prescribes or EOs at central or CA39. federal level The system is Legal and Yes Binding 9. Finland orientated towards collective Yes
differentiation by agreements
b) employees: national: representative employers’ organisations ABVV/FGTB, ACLVB/CGSLB, AVC/CSC; sectoral: (joint committees) idem; undertaking(s): idem 35 The individual regulatory provisions of a sectoral CLA are binding for the employers of a sector (article 26 CLA Act); The individual and collective regulatory provisions of a national and sectoral CLA declared generally binding are applicable to all employers and employees represented in the joint body in which the CLA was concluded (National Labour Council or a joint committee) 36 Employees who are not members of a trade union organisation which is a party to a CA may accede to a CA concluded by their employer through a written application to the employer or the leadership of the trade union organisation which has concluded the agreement. 37 Denmark: i.e. confederation level (e.g. the cooperation agreement), sectoral level and company level (agreements on pay and working conditions) 38 The party which initiates negotiations gives another party a notice. Negotiations shall commence within seven days after receiving such notice. 39 Estonia: A collective agreement entered into between an association or federation of employers and a union or federation of employees and a collective agreement entered into between the central federation of employers and the central federation employees may be extended on agreement between the parties with respect to wages, working hours and rest time conditions.
37 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining in the private sector Country 3. Obligation 1. Capacity 2. Basis 4. Legal binding 5. Extension to negotiate branch Employers’ Yes on various Binding and with organizations at issues. Burden erga omnes effect 10. France Legal Yes, at sectoral level appropriate level lies on the within the scope of TUs employer. the agreement Legal (Act No legal Any EO and on Collective obligation to Limited to affiliates Extension on industry 11. Germany individual employer; Bargaining, negotiate of the signatory level possible Representative TUs “Tarifvertrag (enforceable by parties sgesetz”) strike only) The CA covers the Extension by Individual Statutory workplace(s) to ministerial decree for employer+any EO; obligation to which its level industry and bargain in good corresponds. It is 12. Greece Law professional level TU at enterprise, faith at the mandatory for all the agreements to the industry, professional request of either members of the whole industry and and national level of the parties signatory EOs and profession40 unions At undertaking: TUs, a.) Signatories New draft Extension procedure: on the criteria of b) members of law: TUs and the minister of the representativeness signatories, provided EO should Ministry of Labour and based on votes Upon the it is included in the meet the Social Affairs is received during request of both constitution of the criteria of authorised on the 13. Hungary works council (TU and organisation representativ request of most elections employer) c.) or based on single eness based significant TUs and EO employer parties authorisation 41 on complex at branch level Branch level: most d.) to whom it is calculation significant TUs and extended by the on both sides EO branch State. Legal. Act Legally binding as Centralized. Only on Trade the minimum right of one level, nation or Unions and Under certain the worker. The 14. Iceland Possible local of bargaining Industrial requirements worker can negotiate exist42. Disputes No. for better wages and 80/1938 terms. Partnership model: Not binding. -Employers: Irish However CA may be Business Employers CA do not have legal Voluntary incorporated into Confederation No obligation44 effect, and are not 15. Ireland system employment (IBEC); applied nationally45 contracts to enable -Unions: Irish the agreement to Congress of TUs become binding. (ICTU)43 At undertaking: TUs, Tripartite Any employer who is a Protocol of member of any Employer Legally binding for July 1993 employers’ association Yes the signatory parties 16. Italy laid down signing a collective Branch level: branch and their members the agreement, is also TUs and employer only46 fundamental obliged to implement organisations rules for the contents thereof to
40 Greece: Only if the agreement is signed by employers employing at least 51% of the labour force of that industry or profession. 41 Hungary: there is a new draft law (not yet in force) concerning the right to initiate the extension procedure: they should meet the criteria of representativeness based on complex calculation on both sides 42 The most common form is joint CAs negotiated on behalf of several or all unions belonging to the same national federation. 43 A significant feature of the Irish model has been a gradual widening of the partnership approach to include not only the traditional social partners - trade unions, employers' associations and farming organisations - but also the organisations of unemployed people, women's groups and others working to counter social exclusion. 44 Since 1987, a succession of ‘Partnership Agreements’ has enabled the main parties to engage in the collective bargaining process. 45 However, it is possible that the bargaining coverage is greater than union density suggests because some non-union employers might use the national agreements as a guide to pay increases, but there are no empirical data on the extent of such an effect. 46 Italy: Nevertheless, a consolidated case law recognises wages defined by national collective agreements as a reference point for the judge in deciding whether the constitutional principle of sufficient wage laid down in art. 36 Cost. has been respected by the employer, also in case he/she has not signed the collective agreement or is not a member of the employers’ associations which have signed it.
38 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining in the private sector Country 3. Obligation 1. Capacity 2. Basis 4. Legal binding 5. Extension to negotiate collective all employees in his or bargaining her undertaking Undertaking: Legally binding to all employer, TU or Yes. Employer employees employed authorised employee is not entitled to by the employer Legal. reps, if no TU exist. refuse to start signatory part. Constitution 17. Latvia Sector: employer, negotiations, Sectoral or regional Possible and labour employer though no CAs appliy to all law organizations obligation to members that have and TU or conclude CAs. concluded the association of TU agreement47. The government, on Employers: member suggestion of both National Employers of signatories parties and when the and employees CAs legal requirements (for 18. Liechtenstein 48 no representatives example the quorum) Employees: all are fulfilled, can extend a CA to the whole sector. Compulsory - National, sectoral, applicable to all territorial CA: EOs Yes. employees in an and TUs; Legal enterprise and in all - enterprise level – obligation to enterprises – Yes, sectoral and 19. Lithuania employer and local Labour Code negotiate after members of the territorial level TU, in their absence presentation of employers’ – sectoral TU or another party organization – works council. signatory party to the
agreement - Unions: negotiating committee made up of nationally Yes. representative unions, Applies to all the plus unions who are CA may be extended employees of sector representative Law. Yes (declared “generally 20. Luxembourg employers belonging Labour Code binding”) to the whole to a signatory - Employers’ : profession 49 employers’. national and sectoral employers organisations
- General Manager Once the period Although collective and Human Resource covering the bargaining is on a Manager No legal agreement No. voluntary basis, once 21. Malta - Secretary of basis. elapses, parties CAs are specific to a CA is signed it is relevant union Procedural are bound to company involved. legally binding for section and shop renew both parties. steward. negotiations. - Organised Companies Extension may take employers: National covered by place only in special EOs at confederatate Collective Basic CA are situations. level and/or agreement obliged to Agreements are Extension may be federation level (no legal negotiate if binding and cover the 22. Norway demanded if proven - In non-organised rules as to demanded by members of signatory that foreign workers are companies, single representativ TU covering at parties subject to substandard EOs ity) least 10% of the wage and working - Employees: employees. conditions. Confederations and
47 Latvia: If members of an organisation of employers or an association of organisations of employers employ more than 50 per cent of the employees in a sector, a collective agreement (general agreement) entered into by such organization and trade union shall be binding on all employers of the relevant sector and shall apply to all employees employed by the employers. 48 Liechtenstein: Employers: Liecht. Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI); Liecht. Chamber of Trade and Commerce; Liecht. Civil Engineering Authority (LBA). Employees: Liecht. Employees and Workers Association (LANV) 49 Luxembourg: professon affected by a Grand Ducal regulation, following a proposal agreed by the two parties to the National Conciliation Service (ONC)
39 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining in the private sector Country 3. Obligation 1. Capacity 2. Basis 4. Legal binding 5. Extension to negotiate TUs Non-organized companies: no obligation Binding for the signatories and their Sectoral unions; Legal (very members. individual employers limited Signatory employers 23. Netherlands and sectoral no Yes requirements have to offer same employer ) terms to non-union organisations members in their firms A supra-establishment CA may be extended by -Employers: the Ministry of Labour Binding for the employers and EOs to other employees in 24. Poland legal Yes signatories and their cases of social interest members - Employees: TUs. upon the demand of an appropriate EO or union. -Employers: employers and EOs Only binding for the CA can be fully or 25. Portugal Legal Yes50 signatories of the partly extended 51 - Employees: TUs. agreement
- Employers and EOs Limited to scope of representatives that Employers CA . meet representation hiring at least criteria established by 21 employees At industry and law; 26. Romania legal have the group of companies No procedure - at undertaking level, obligation to level, the companies in case no such TUs start are expressly exist, the EOs negotiations mentioned in the especially elected for agreement the purpose - Undertaking At undertaking level: level:covers all TU and employer CA at branch/sector Legal (Act Yes, on request employees. 27. Slovak At branch level: level can be extended on Collective of the other Republic branch-level TUs’ on the decision of the Bargaining) party -Branch level organisation and Ministry of Labour 52 covers/applies to branch-level EOs signatory parties. It can be proposed to Representative trade Legal Legally binding for the Minister of labour unions or their (CA Act the partners to the to extend the CA to all 28. Slovenia confederations; adopted in CA and their the employers within Employers’ 2006) members the sector53. organizations
Yes. Undertaking: works Sections 37.1 CA can be extended to Legally binding for council or the TU and 28.1 of Obligation to other undertakings, all employees and 29. Spain reps (if there are any) Spanish start sectors or territorial employers of the when these branches Constitution negotiations on levels on the decision undertaking or sector of the Labour hold a majority in the request of one entity with Administrative
50 Portugal: if the petitioner does not receive a reply he can request conciliation, which is mandatory for the other party. 51 The scope of collective agreements may be extended through an extension regulation issued by the Labour Minister when the economic and social circumstances justify in relation to: a. employers of the same sector of activity and employees of the same or similar profession, as long as they perform their activity in the geographic area and within the professional and industrial scope determined in the agreement b. employers and employees of the same sector and profession, as long as they perform their activity in a geographic area different from that in which such agreements apply, and there are no unions or employer’ associations and the identity of the social and economic circumstances is verified 52 Slovak Rep: CA at branch/sector level can be extended to undertakings which did not sign the respective collective agreement (are not members of the branch level employers’ association) but are operating in the same branch/sector of the economy. 53 Slovenia: the decision of the minister has to be based on the fact that one or more representative trade unions and one or more representative employers’ organizations – that employ more than half of employees in the sector – concluded the agreement.
40 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Collective bargaining in the private sector Country 3. Obligation 1. Capacity 2. Basis 4. Legal binding 5. Extension to negotiate works council. Legal: bargaining Authority Statute of capacity; Sector or branch Workers’ agreements: most Rights representative TUs at national level or autonomous community level.54
Employers: No extension in An EO or an principle. However, an employer. Yes employer who is not a 30. Sweden Law and CA Legally binding Employees: member of an EO can EO or a TU join a CA through a representative separate agreement Legally binding for Employers: EOs / Yes the workplace/ Yes, partial or total unaffiliated employer Obligation on undertaking. extension under certain 31. Turkey Law the request of Legally binding for requirements Employees: the authorized the signatories and 56. authorized TU union member workers of the signatory union55. No legal requirement for the employer to negotiate CAs Not legally binding One or more unions except where on the parties unless Voluntarism 32. United there has been a the two sides system No regulation Kingdom One or more legally binding specifically state in
employers or EO decision that writing58. the unions should be “recognised”57
CA: Collective agreement; EO: Employers´ organisations; TU: Trade union
Industrial disputes
54 Spain: legitimacy to negotiate and also trade unions with a minimum of 10 per cent of the members of the work council in the company, or delegates appointed to represent personnel within the territorial area or within the implementation field of the agreement. For this type of branch agreement, employers’ associations are also entitled to negotiate provided that they include at least 10 per cent of the employers within the implementation field of the agreement, and who, moreover, can count on at least 10 per cent of the workers in the area concerned.
55 Turkey: Workers who are not members of the signatory union may benefit through paying solidarity dues, no need for the signatory union’s consent. 56 Turkey: One of the CA concluded by the sectoral union with the largest number of member workers among TU, representing at least 10% of the total number of workers employed in the concerned branch, could be extended totally or partially or with the amendments deemed essential to one or more or all the workplaces without CA. Extension done by the Cabinet upon the proposal of the Minister of Labour, a union or an employers’ association founded in that sector, or an unaffiliated employer 57 UK: In the cases that the union has been recognized, it has the right to bargain over pay, hours and holidays. However, such cases are rare and generally it is the balance of forces between union and employer at the workplace that determines whether bargaining takes place.
58 UK: state in writing a collective agreeent use to be a very rare occurrence. However, items within the agreement that can be incorporated into an individual’s contract – such as pay rates, hours or holidays – become binding conditions of the contract. Items which cannot be included in this way – such as procedural arrangements for redundancy – are not normally legally binding.
41 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
The right to take industrial action is acknowledged in all legislations of the countries analysed. In many of them, the legal rank thereof is the highest, that is, constitutional. However, regulation varies from one country to another depending on the procedure used (the requirements established to call industrial action, for instance, the need to vote or the approval of workers or trying to reach prior conciliation) and the treatment given to the exercise of this right in the essential community services. The consideration of unlawful strike due to solidarity or other reasons also sets a difference between countries.
On the other hand, the right to lock-out is not so widely acknowledged and its exercise is subject to significant limitations.
Conciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures exist in practically all the countries studied. Their aim is to maintain social peace, considered as a collective good. These mechanisms seek to favour the solution to industrial conflict prior to the judicial sphere and to the appearance of the problem itself (industrial action).
In general, collective labour conflict is usually related to the application – or non-application – of collective agreement and, therefore, to the different interpretation thereof made by both sides of industry, employers and employees’ representatives. Mediation and arbitration are usually of a voluntary nature, although the option exists for compulsory mediation or arbitration with State intervention. The system by which these mechanisms are carried out, either autonomous – regulated by the parties – or with the intervention of a specific body or labour authority, is another aspect that sets a difference between countries with regard to how these mechanisms are used.
The mechanisms to solve these conflicts basically differ in the procedure used, although the terms used do not fully coincide in their meaning and scope in some countries. Thus, although they are conceptually different, conciliation and mediation are used in several countries in a very similar way, conceived as the intervention of a third party to try to favour communication between the parties, placing the problems in a hierarchical order with the aim of bringing the different positions closer.
42 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Table 3: Prevention and settlement of trade disputes
Prevention and settlement at national level: Country mediation, conciliation and arbitration systems 1. Austria Voluntary conciliation by Federal Conciliation Office. Dispute resolution procedures in collective labour agreements 2. Belgium The NLC and the joint committee are assigned the task of conciliation. The joint committee sets up a conciliation bureau A National Institute for reconciliation and arbitration is created. The mediation procedure can be used by mutual agreement between the parties, or at the request of one of the parties. 3. Bulgaria When a collective labour dispute has not been settled through direct negotiations or a mediation procedure, the parties may request its resolution by an individual arbitrator or an arbitration commission. Decisions or agreement reached are binding for the parties. The arbitration decision is final and not open to appeal. The Social Partnership Office, which operates at national level, supervises the conciliation process and provides 4. Croatia logistic support. Act, in the event of a dispute, if the parties do not come to an agreement they must initiate a conciliation process. There is no conciliation system. The Department of Labour Relations is responsible for mediating in labour 5. Cyprus disputes in the private and semi-government sector. All collective conflicts are dealt with by the Ministry of Labour and the main procedure for conflict resolution is mediation. Arbitration exists but is not dominant. 6. Czech The law on collective bargaining regulates agreement settlement disputes and the fulfilment of agreement Republic obligations. Mediation and Arbitration Institutes are used In the event of a breakdown in negotiations, the Public Conciliator intervenes and draws up a compromise proposal. If unsuccessful in bringing the parties to sign the compromise, the conciliator can postpone the 7. Denmark scheduled general conflict. If in the end the compromise is rejected by ballot by the trade union members, the state can intervene and legally enforce the compromise proposal. If an agreement is not reached through negotiations and the threat of work disruption arises, the parties shall consult the Public Conciliator, who initiates the conciliation procedure. 8. Estonia Failing agreement, the employers and the employee reps have the right to call to of employers and employees federations in order to form a committee on a parity basis for settling the labour dispute (very rarely used) 9. Finland Compulsory mediation provided by the Conciliation service. State intervention possible. Little use of voluntary procedures for dispute settlement, except in the public sector; informal intervention of the 10. France labour inspectorate or the courts. Many sectoral collective agreements make provision for conciliation and mediation procedures. 11. Germany Breakdown of negotiations between a works council and an employer may or must, depending on very limited factors, be submitted to a conciliation committee. Mediation provided by OMED (independent) since 1990. In the event of failure, any party may seek arbitration 12. Greece unilaterally if the other party has refused mediation. A trade union may also seek arbitration unilaterally if it accepts the mediator’s proposal and the employer has not accepted it. In the event of a breakdown in negotiations, the negotiating parties invite a voluntary mediator from the state 13. Hungary operated “Labour Mediation and Arbitration Service (LMAS). 14. Iceland Recourse to public mediator compulsory. The Industrial Relations Act 1990 requires all industrial relations disputes to be referred to the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) for settlement (in exceptional circumstances a dispute may be referred to the Labour Court). 15. Ireland The LRC Annual report (2006) states that the Conciliation Service recorded a high level of voluntary settlement (81%), and likely to continue in 2007. 16. Italy Settlement by negotiation, with court or State mediation if necessary. The Law on Labour Disputes (2002) provide a speedy and efficient resolution of labour disputes. It emphasises the role of mutual consultations of parties as the main instrument for resolution of collective disputes. 17. Latvia The law provides for three procedures of peaceful conflict resolution: conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration. The different procedures are used depending on the nature of the collective dispute. Latvian legislation differentiates between ‘rights dispute’ and ‘interest dispute’. 18. Liechtenstei There is a tripartite office of mediation (state, employer representative and employee representative). n After breakdown in negotiations, conciliation in the joint commission is compulsory. The subsequent non- 19. Lithuania compulsory option of arbitration is seldom used. 20. Luxembour The legislation stipulates conciliation by the national conciliation office; the parties are free to accept the proposed g settlement. Arbitration is voluntary. No distinction made between conciliation and mediation. Conciliation services offered, with ministerial intervention, by the Department of Industrial and Employment 21. Malta Relations. When a deadlock is reached, the Minister may appoint a court of Inquiry to establish causes and circumstances of dispute. The Minister, on the request of either or both parties, may refer the case to an industrial tribunal. Compulsory mediation provided by the State Mediator. Parliament may intervene ad hoc, compulsory arbitration 22. Norway in essential services. No system for collective bargaining. Some agreements provide for settlement procedures. In case of major 23. Netherlands conflicts (which are rare) sometimes mediation. For conflicts between works councils and employers there is a binding mediation system Many collective agreements establish dispute settlement procedures. However, parties usually prefer to apply the 24. Poland Collective Disputes Settlement Act, which provides for three procedures: negotiation, mediation and voluntary
43 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Prevention and settlement at national level: Country mediation, conciliation and arbitration systems arbitration to be applied in that order59. Legal mechanism for conciliation and mediation provided by the Ministry of Labour at the request of one or both 25. Portugal parties. Whenever requested by one of the parties it is compulsory for the other to attend. Voluntary arbitration is less frequent. For settlement of disputes associated with the negotiation of collective agreements, the law provides the following procedures: conciliation (mandatory) organised by the Ministry of Labour, Family and Equal 26. Romania Opportunities upon request of the parties, mediation and arbitration (both voluntary). Usually, disputes associated with the rights of employees established by law or in labour contracts are settled by the courts. Negotiation between the parties to settle such disputes is rare. The parties may ask a mediator to propose a solution appointed by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family from candidates. The proposal of the mediator is only a recommendation, not a binding decision. 27. Slovak Failing this, the parties may either agree to ask an arbitrator to decide on the dispute (decision of an arbitrator is Republic binding to both parties) or initiate a strike (trade unions) or a lockout (employer). Arbitrators are elected by the Ministry of Labour in the same way as mediators. Disputes related to the rights of individual employees (not as a result of a collective bargaining agreement) are settled by the district courts. Out-of-court conflict resolution procedures exist for resolving disputes and are included in collective agreements (at national level) as obligatory. Conciliation procedures are mostly initiated to interpret the content of a CA 28. Slovenia (interpretation committees) Arbitration is a voluntary procedure. Arbitration solutions and settlements can be appealed only through legal action National and regional extra-judicial systems for dispute settlement are in place since 1996. Implemented by the 29. Spain Inter-Regional Mediation & Arbitration Service (SIMA). Compulsory arbitration is exceptional to strikes that pose a danger to the national economy Mediation: the National Mediation Office mediates in disputes occurring in the Swedish labour market. The National Mediation Office appoints mediators in the event of a dispute between the parties in the labour market 30. Sweden during bargaining over pay and terms of employment. The National Mediation Office has six regional mediators at its disposal. They are called in when local disputes occur at company level. In the event of a breakdown in collective negotiations: compulsory mediation, mediator from Official Mediation 31. Turkey Organization. Private arbitration in contract and grievance disputes. Compulsory arbitration where industrial action is prohibited Voluntary conciliation undertaken by ACAS (independent service). ACAS can provide voluntary arbitration; 32. United disputes concerning trade union recognition and the information required for negotiations are submitted to a Kingdom Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).
59 The information on Poland has been taken from “Social dialogue and conflict resolution in the acceding countries”. Christian Weltz and Timo Kaupinen. European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions. 2004
44 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
III- EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE COMPANY
In European countries, two different institutions contribute to represent employees in the workplace: the works councils and the trade union representatives. Studies traditionally differentiate national systems between those characterised by a single structure and those adopting a dual one. On the one hand, those where employee representation is achieved exclusively through the union channel and, on the other, those also providing representation through works councils. In many ways, this classification appears too systematic.
Firstly, in a growing number of countries both types of institutions exist. The question that remains is which of the two is the prevailing channel for employee representation. It is important to determine their respective competences and, in particular, which plays the most important role in economic issues. Furthermore, in some countries, the works council as an institution does not exist although they may have a subsidiary system in place consisting of electing employee representatives (Latvia, Romania).
Secondly, trade unions may also be active in the works council. In many cases, trade union representatives have been elected as members of the works council. National law sometimes establishes the structure of this interaction. In France, only trade unions may stand in the first round of the election of the works council. In some countries, the two bodies may compete, such as in the case of Greece, where trade unions are against the creation of works councils in undertakings where a local trade union exists. The Hungarian situation also shows a reluctant attitude by trade unions towards works council. Trade unions try to enter into works council. In other words, there is a process of “trade-unionization” of works councils. In Norway, the creation of the works council in undertakings with a workforce of less than 100 workers requires the agreement of the trade unions. With a body composed of trade union members and elected employee representatives, the Italian system provides a good illustration of a joint institution.
In a few countries, the trade union is the only institution representing the workers in undertakings (Sweden, Malta, Turkey). However, in most countries a dual channel exists, even if one appears more competent to deal with economic issues. In some countries the works council is the dominant institution dealing with economic issues, and it must be informed and consulted on such matters (Belgium, Croatia, France, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal). In other countries, trade union representatives play a central role (Denmark, Norway, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, UK, Estonia, Romania). In Lithuania, works councils are established when no trade union is in place in the undertaking. Finally, in another group of countries, the works council is the only representative institution and it therefore has economic prerogatives (Germany, the Netherlands). In Italy, a single institution exists which combines union and non-union representatives.
The threshold for establishing a representation body varies substantially from one country to another. This diversity refers both to the thresholds for unions and elected representatives. By contrast, the term of office is quite similar from one country to another (3 to 4 years). In most countries, the chairman of the works council is elected, with the exception of France and Denmark where the chairman is the employer. This issue only concerns the mode of representation via elections. When representation exists through unions, the workers’ representatives are either nominated or elected according to the rules governing the union.
Most countries provide employee representatives with perks to fulfil their tasks. Time off is generally allowed, although the number of hours varies from one country to another. In the UK, the law speaks of “reasonable” time off. In addition, many countries impose on the employer the duty to put premises and material at the disposal of employee representatives. In the UK, this is a matter of agreement between the employer and the union. By contrast, only a few countries entitle employee representatives to training paid by the employer (Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Slovenia, France). One major issue is the budget of works councils. Only a few national legislations (France) establish the allocation of a specific and independent budget to the works council paid by the employer. The absence of an independent budget is considered by workers representatives an obstacle for the missions of the works council. As regards the protection of employee representatives, its scope mainly covers dismissal and sometimes discrimination. However, in a few countries no specific protection exists (Sweden, UK).
45 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE
Economic prerrogatives As to their economic prerogatives, there is a clear distinction between, on the one hand, information and consultation, and, on the other, codetermination. Information and consultation to employee representatives appears to be a common feature in national representation systems (Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, UK). However, the scope of this information and consultation differs between countries. Collective redundancies and the transfer of undertakings constitute the most common events that give rise to information and consultation. This might be a direct consequence of European standards on such issues. Often, information and consultation have a broader scope which ranges from economic data (production, turnover, prospects), legal aspects (company structure and corporate body) and employment information (structure of employment, wages, changes in working conditions).
Codetermination Information and consultation rights can be completed with other prerogatives affecting to the making- decision processes within the undertaking. Codetermination systems show a largest diversity between European countries and may have a different meaning according to each national system. It ranges from the employer’s obligation to submit decisions to the works council to the duty to negotiate with unions on specific matters. The weakest form would be limited to consultation of the employees’ representatives. Under this form, it exists in most of the countries and covers economic and social issues.
The strongest forms of codetermination correspond to those of a possible veto in the hands of employee representatives and the need to take join decisions in some matters (Germany, Austria). Under this specific meaning, it is absent in most of the EU Member States.
However, another forms of codetermination consist of compelling the employer to negotiate with workers representation on specific issues (France); or the right of the representative body to intervene on the essential modifications on the work activities, for instance, by giving its consent and failing this, having the capacitiy to put in stand-by the execution until the decision of the competent court as the Netherlands, Slovenia or Croatia; o the obligation on the employer to take the initiative in negotiating with a union before deciding with regard any major change to the business or to the employment and working conditions as in Sweden (where trade unions may veto outsourcing practices); or definitely the prerogative of the employees´ representatives to take the final decision as regards social and cultural activities as in Finland.
In Belgium, the works council has decisive competence in a number of cases defined by law, e.g. drafting and changing the work rules or setting the dates of annual holidays if necessary; also in Luxembourg, the joint committee has decision-making capacity on some measures affecting health, safety and risk prevention as well as internal regulations. Certain codetermination rights also appear in the legislations of the new MS, basically with regard to social issues (training, holiday periods, funds) or related to work organisation (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania) or wage compensations (Poland) exercised by trade union representatives.
46 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES EMPLOYEE ANIN ENLARGED EUROPE
Table 4: Main body of representation with economic prerogatives
Chair/internal Main body of representation with a say in economic matters Threshold Members Duration of office rules elected by the Betriebsrat Austria 5 elected 4 years members of work Works council council Conseil d’entreprise Belgium 100 Elected + employer 4 years employer Works council Bulgaria Trade Union representatives (predominant) - Appointed Union rules - 50 or 20 (workplaces) for the Employee reps for information and consultation purpose elected by the general meeting purpose of I&C - - (EU directive effect) of all the employees RADNIČKO VIJEĆE Croatia 20 Elected 3 years elected Works council Cyprus Trade Union Representatives 10 Elected - elected 3 individuals to set the body Trade Union representatives(predominant) Appointed up Czech Republic elected from Rada zam stnanc elected Elected 3 years members of works
4 Works council in the absence of trade union council 7
deputy chair, if Tillidsrepraesentanten 5 Elected by the trade union rules unions have elected - Trade union representatives and the CA of the industry a joint Denmark representative Samarbedjdsudvalg 35 Employer
½ Management 2 years Cooperation committee ½ Elected /management Union or non-union trustee 5 Elected 3 years - No threshold, but 10% of the Estonia Employees’ representatives employees elected 3 years - or union decision to set up Elected by the trade union Luottamusmies (predominant) members at the work place by collective No legal requirement by collective agreement Trade Union representatives (shop steward) according to legally binding agreement Finland collective agreements Henkilöstöryhmien edustajat 20 Elected by the groups of 2 years - Representatives of the personnel groups personnel Comité d’entreprise/Délégués du personnel Employer (for France 50/11 Elected + Employer 4 years Works council/personnel delegates works council) Betriebsrat Germany 5 Elected 4 ans elected Works council “Symvoulia ergazomenon” Greece 50 Elected 2 years Elected Works council EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES EMPLOYEE ANIN ENLARGED EUROPE
Chair/internal Main body of representation with a say in economic matters Threshold Members Duration of office rules Electing an Union Trade union representatives at” primary level” (predominant) 20 Appointed 3 years executive committee local trade unions Union rules - - - Hungary Üzemi tanács Elected Elected from 50 3 years Works council Members : employees members) None in the private Trúnaðarmenn stéttarfélaga Iceland 5 Appointed sector, 2 years for the - Shop stewards (Trade union representatives) public sector Trade unions (predominant) “reasonable" relationship Recognition procedure - - Process only begins if 10% of employees, with a lower limit Ireland Work councils of 15 and an upper limit of - - - (new law transposing the directive 2002/14/EC) 100, ask for information and consultation rights or the employer takes the initiative Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie 2/3 elected Italy 15 3 years No legal provision Unitary trade union representation 1/3 appointed Elected according to the rules of
4 Trade union representatives (predominant) - - -
8 the trade union
Latvia Darbinieku pilnvaroti p rst vji 5 Elected - - Authorised employees’ representative The size of employee representation is established No duration established No statutory Liechtenstein Employees’ representatives 50/20 jointly by employers and by law provision workers. At least 3 Members are elected Trade union representative (predominant) - Appointed Union rules - Mon s profesin s junga Lithuania Works council in the absence of trade union 20 Elected 3 Employee (elected) Darbo taryba Elected (for staff Elected delegates) Luxembourg Works council/staff delegates 150/15 + 5 years Employer (for Employer works council) According to statute of union. 2 years. Malta Shop steward No threshold Elected according to statute of In some unions every - the largest union. year Ondernemingsraad/personeelsvertegenwoordiging/personeelsvergadering Elected (for works Netherlands 50/10 Elected 3 years Works council/personnel delegate/personnel meeting councils) Tillitsvalgt Norway - Elected by local union branches 1 year Elected Shop steward (predominant) EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE - - - - - 250 rules set up labour labour Elected Elected Elected councils) councils) commettee work placework form a union form Chair/internal representative at management and management Joint consultative committee can be Elected (for works Alternatively from Several unions can Several Elected trade union rules rules - - years years years years 1 year 4 4 years 4 years Nominated 2 years 4 4 Union rules Union rules Union rules Union rules Union Union foreseen by law Duration of office office of Duration No specificNo duration - Elected 4 ½ Elected Members Members workplace trade unions trade the trade union ½ Management ½ Management In theory elected In practice appointed practice In Elected by the trade union Elected by the trade union members in the members workplace members in the members workplace Elected but priority given to but priority Elected Elected according to the rules of Elected by union members in the by union members Elected - - Elected - 50 50 Appointed 20 Elected 20 compulsory) (non Elected 2 years - 100 250 50/6 Elected process process No limits limits No Threshold Threshold Union rules - - - 21 employees 21 employees 5 for works trustee enjoying protection protection enjoying 50 for works council council works 50 for employers can only be can only employers compelled to recognise No threshold – although – although threshold No Unions decision but a legal decisionUnions but No preciseNo rules as toit how should be structured, though should be structured, some indications for the I&C the I&C indications for some limit for thelimit number of those unions where there are at least
(predominant) ilor
ly in order to implement the ly in order to implement EU tion (in workplaces without unions) without unions) workplaces tion (in , employees’representatives ii salaria