. • >"" • » I ' " »->..4^. - -V'l" • Jr' —s*' vKJS =^gV-' fOP SECRET
MWM. KSOUOMK*» SURRT „1XEP — XTiLI
Ftylac fraa Mab—, GOMS*1 Itaihawar anrivad in Bwa an Id Jannatr
and MU tM 3M«r eonfaraneas with tba Italian Ktniatair «ni tba QUafk aff
Staff. Dwrioc M* ba MI «IM raealTad Ir PrMitet KUBawU. In tba
first MStlng ULd at tba Palaaaa Vlninala, Qananl ElnnhaMt Mt tb«
•inistsrlal groap.1
1 Praatat vara Ganaral Gruaathor, Prina XlnUtar Ba Oaapori, Conot Sfbraa,
Dafanaa Klnlatar Pacdardl, Traanur Mlniatar Pall*, Mr. Canal«, XA. Calaaal
Walton.
Pfina KinUtar Sa Gaspari apanai tha naating by thaaJdng Gnaral
EUsntMMr for taking up tba baatvy burdan of IaaAarahlp and Mld that tharo
no aat «gante for tba naating, which was thought of as s dlaouaaiaa *f
policy. Ba than osllad on Coaot Sfor**, wt» strsssad Ganarel XLMnhomrtS
•eraatian of atnoaphara" or oUait* of seca^Jiahiant« Ha said ba waa «agar
to bara Gaoarsl Elsanhowar go bade to tba QtadLted Stataa with tho lnprasalca that
an IMIIIIII najorlty of tha Italian paapl* sill follow tho gommant. Ha
IlMt ha iiasH aaaur^Qanaral BUemhowar that, «van without daflaito
of aid, ItsliSM would folly naot all tbalr aogagMsnts, tat that tha rlaa of
Italian lafeatxy would allaviat« uMaplojaent and lnoraaaa Italy's capability
to prodwo both for barsalf and har aillas.
Ganoral SUanbowar saiA that his pnrpoM in oaning to luopa bad
wall ondsrstood, that his first task on roturning to tha Dnltad Statas
wwtlit ba to nako tho AMirloan paopl« milt* that tba sslmtlM of tba £m
world Has in Ita unity, aad to demonstrate that tba fra* world cannot bo
aarad by ignoring hangar and adsaxy in sano part of It. Ha urgad ths Italians
to tabs up tbalr MM with tho Coonoil DqpwUaa and aaid ba NMU point ont
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ta tba Chaixnan, Kr. Spafford^that apaady ootloa would banoflt ofoiysM in
HMD> Qaoaral Klsanbcwwr said that MS «f Ids strong wlabas WM to bo abl« to
tall tba V. 3* CangTMs that Ioropa Mdscvtood tba nrgMsj of tba altsatloa and / TOP SECRET ma
to tatt^tbM that «Mh IUO ooontiy wi randy to oontribote Ita rasowrcas and
Its spirit to tba task.
Tlw Iilalator of tba fraasac^Ssnor P alla, rariawad tba tedgat far
VMIMMUt and dafanaa. In addition to theregular M|ft for dafsase af
billlao Ura ( M-), Italr b«d ondnrtakM * ratrag»wit prograa af
250 UllloB Ura («00 allHcn dalla»), waking » total budget for Aafaua far
twelve Mthar 575 MJJLloa lira (950 KllUvn dollars). TbU warn anoontad to
8% af tha Italian national laeons, and 3Sjt af Italian ezpMHlitwrM. Sasar
Palla painted oat that th» annual Individual IAOOM waafcBO.OO a year «260.00
bsfor* taxas) and asked that Uila fact be leapt In nind vfatn Italy'» contribution
waa oaaparad with that af other antlapa. tha Itallana, Sanor Palln said, fait Iwtt fa™**"*-
tba noral ecapnlnion to (MkH^iilthwt waiting for 0. 3. help, knowing tbat
tUa help wwld osas.2
2 fhac «xpeodtfctu»rif 400 nLliion dollaïs tn «Aiitlon to the regalnr
dafanaa tadgafcrepresente d an lnoreaaa of apprcacinately SOjf In fand* available
to tbe Italian ariwd forces.
Alang idUi tola mnMWt prograa tha Italians will go abaad with
their civil lnreatnanta, both far IndnatrUl raaaona and baoMaa they feel
that Cnnmriian will ba defeated If thay dafaat unoaploynent» Furthermore, tba
Italian «awwawit haa aaked tba ParllMant for fall power« in tha aooncnic
field, a pelltioal net af first IaportMM and * prelude to aany things Mdt M
restrict!*« of consunptlon, farther taxas, and tba nobillsation of all class aa
to support this effort in the civil and nilltaiy field.
Defense KlaUtar Paoolardi than aasurad Gaciaral EUMtwmr tbat tba
will to defend existed In Italy. Hs pointed out tbat Italy tas a «oTsrvMnt
nads af «f MH ready and willing to Ogbt CaaMmiM. Bayoad tba dafanaa budget,
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE there war* otbar expenditures, abargad to tha Dspartnirt of tba Interior «ad to
tha SmaHamt of Indnatoyj which were In affect oontpilatie&a tonacda national
security, such M civil dafenaar.preparetieos and stockpiling. Ba fait tbat tba a TprI ^^inrfc iTAix I Ur" OLUi il r
Mfetrth «f UM rfâllan UM< FORE— WM MMthSac "little sheet of :
Flmaart Italy, though mw twaty UMTTATLONS,2 WM ready to sLvs Qsnsrsl
3 the nllltsty IiMtstlMis wm declared BMHMlstsnt ths Itsllsn
Goraranaat at tbs «ad of 1951, after tba Unttad SUtM, Graaft Britain, and
Franse, and a nwfeor of other countrlee agreed « 21 DseMbsr 1951 ta ItSjy1S
nota of 6 DsoanlMir 1951 to all algnatorlee salting for ollntnstlcn of tba artidaa
which restricted ItalytS right Md capacity to provide for har own dofOMO.
(SM 0. 3. Dspsrtnant of Ststo InfonsUtm Ueno. 114* 9 Fobrasxy 1952.)
d&visiMS MW and five IF Jsm 30 M a : TtMra vara «any sbortagee, Ssnor Fseolsrdi »aid, tat not In good will or tha will to rebuild ths aned foroM fron ths ground up to fulfill tbalr nissloa. Seaor Fseeiaxdl than reviewed tho official figuras an military aid to Ioropo and to Italy, which, ho said, would canse dlacourfigMMxt to offloors of tha Ixnad Forces.
478,000 tones of »AP aid bad been delivered to Europe, of wbicb Italy get 17,670. 1600 tanks, of which Italy got 79. 750 pieces of heavy artillery, of which Italy got 87.
6000 Tehielas, of which Itsly got 13* 400 slreratt, of which Italy got 159.
50 ships, of which Itsly got 3*
THOM dellTarlea to Italy, Sanor Faoolsrdi said, wore not In proportion to the ItallM good/will, Imt ba WM .sura that Qanaral SUsnhowar would realise tM tXM Talno of the XtaliM Ai^. General SUanbowar said ha bad not heard of these figures sad weald take the Mttor up.
Ganaral Elsenhower thm discussed the strength of Madltorranaan MMtrlas nlileh adght bo opposed to tbs U.S.S.R: Tkrtay, Qreaoe, Tugoslavla, Italy, and Spsln — ooontrUs which frcn a MUitary point of view could have DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE great inflMWfio In the HsdltsrrsaeM whore a gnat* naval and sir force oould bo Mdo available speedily to assist than In oase of aggreaalcn. Qsnaxal Klsenhower then Impaired if friendly dlptaantto- oalatlana botwaM
Fnga 3 of IMgM TOP SECRET Copy JL. ot 3 copiée ^ " '-TW® # TOP SECRET # it mr* possible for tho Italians to think in favorable taras about Iugoalarla
in ordsr that they might be helped In protecting their southern flank. Such
help ba recognised, could not ba given If there ware great political influences
at M>riE against it.^
4 Sinca the Meting Great Britain, Prance, and tha United Stataa have
gi.v«n sons economic and nlUtaiy aid to TugosIavia. United States Aid since
1950 is described in the Foorth Seai-Annual Beport to Oongraas on tha WH+JI^I
Pafansa Ayalstanoo Prograa. pp. 65-66.
Priae Minister do Gasperi asked Count Sforsa to reply. Xn an eloquent
speech Count Sforza reviewed Italy's relation with Greece and Torkay and w^h, W* > Yugoslavia. Toward Jugoslavia, all Italians were In basic agreement in their A bitter memories of Yugoslav occupation, in their disapproval of collectivization,
and in religious repression vhich run counter to the tradition of tha Chrlatlan
democratic people who lived there. A few days before, be pointed out, tba
Italians bad signed economic treaties solving all problems left over fron the
war, including reparations with the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs, he said, had
told hin that they understood the need for an agreement but that the spirits
wer« not yet ripe.
In a orne concluding remarks Count Sforsa acknowledged the noral and
econcacLc help of the United States. In his final coansnts he made a plea for
an elinin&tion of red tape in the Council Deputies. General Eisenhower thanked
the group for the frank discussion, and said that, although he was not acting
in a political field, he would in the service of the twelve nations urge the
reduction of unnecessary Council Machinery.
On the sane day at the Ministry of National Defense in Eoae, General
Eiaenhowwr net tba Defense Minister Signor Pacciardi, Oeneral Marras, Chief
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE of Staff, Kational Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff of ths Italian Araed
Forces.5 TOP SECRET - • TOPSECREf
5 Pracub wart; Dsfsnss Htnister Psccisrdij Chief of Stoff, ltationsl
Dsfanss, General Marraa ; Chief of Staff of tha Army, Ganaral Cappa ; Chief of
Stsff of tha Air Force, Ganoral Arnona-Cat ; Chief of Staff of the Havyj Adnlral
Farrorii General Eisenhower, Gonsral Gruanther, Lt. Colonel Walters* Staff Offlcors
and Seerotarlat of the Hinlstry of National Defense*
After welcoming General Elsenhower, Slgnor Paoclardl asked General Eisen-
hower for his proposal for tha conversations. Ganaral SLsaohower replied that
ha would like to have a general statement on capabilities, syst am of conscription,
and a broad outline of their plans. General Harras theo reviewed the luportance
of Italy in the defense of the Vest. Tbe possession of the Italian peninsula
and the Alps would give solid support to a general defense of the West and
would provide an excellent base for counter offensive operations. The possession
of the Italian Peninsula and Islands would give freedom of maneuver in the
Hedlterranean. On the land front, such defense would not require eoccsssivsly
lsrgo forces. The border runs largely through the Alplno areas and ths plain
area is only 60 kilometers wide as compared to the overall frontier line of
sons 500 kiloneters on the North and in the East* A defensiv« stand in the
Gsrnan area could only increase the importance of the Italian area. He also
noted the financial effort Italy was a^iH^g for defense end her extraordinary
drive to improve as soon as possible the quality of the Italian ArnQr In all fields
where speed could be achieved. Qualitative improvement was especially directed
towards training specialists, officers and non-comissioned officers as wsll
u towards the development of training methods* The principal weaknesses lay in
the field of anti-aircraft and territorial defense, and also in the scarcity
of fighter aircraft and AA guns.
General Harras said tbat the Armed Forces of Italy were very grateful for
the direct aid which had bean received — IBjOOO tons up to the present. He
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE assured General Elsenhower that the Italians would use to the best advantage
whatever equipment was given then. Further, be hoped that the training of
Italian personnel in TKalted Schools, both in the United States and in Germany,
which was being so well used in Italy, would be continued and expanded.
TflP RFRRFT % ITAtr # TOPSEGREf Following tb*s« opening raurin, Meh Chief of StaCT briefed General
Eieenhower on the position of his branch of the service. Iho statements are
summarised hero
Oonscal Cappa reviewed tho strategic and geographic situation, and pointed
out that the Italian General Staff considered 21 divisions (not 20 as in the
Hadlun Tom Plan) represent an initial «dninun for the dofensa needs until
B plus 90, including reserves. For the Short Tona Plan, ten Italian divisions
are envisaged plus one French.^ Of the 21 Divisions which are considered
necessary 19 would be Italian and two, French. The Italian General Staff
foresaw having the occupation forces stationed in Austria and in the Free
Territory of Trieste coaie under the Italian Front when they entered Italian
national territory on the north, where a superior headquarters of the Frontier
Force« has bean sot up.
The build-up of the Arroy, General Cappa said, was based on the financial
support of the Italian government and on the timely arrival of HDAP material.
On the basis of such a program and starting fron this data Italy could put at
tba disposal of tbe Supreme Allied Cowiand the Fifth Corps Headquarters* the
nHantonn and "Folgore" Divisions, the nJulla" Alpine Brigade, and the "Arieten
Amored Brigade. General Cappa stated that for the units just Matlonod and for
units that must function in OMS of war orders have already bean issued for their
being brought up to strength.
s General Cappa stated that the "Legnano" Division was already complete in its
organic structure, having about SOjE of its organic strength» and almost complete
in »atorlel (?) in contrast to war equipment. For remaining shortages in war
equipment the Italians rely en réquisition.
Within the year three infantry divisions and «to Alpino brigade should bo
n n ccaplete in organization and équipaient ( "Cremona", Frluli t and "Granatierl"
InCantxy Divisions and the tlTrldenbia11 Alpine Brigade). By 1 July 1952 it U
expected that the peacetime organic structure of three aore Infantry divisions
1 tt n n DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE and an armored brigade. ("Trieste* , Arellnlo 1 and Austa Divisions and the
"Centaaro" Armored Brigade). It should be noted that the Italian InAntiy
division is not furnished with Mdlum or heavy tanks. um
Mafri»1. Infais revie w of Batsrislj General Captpa strsssod tbs necessity and importance of spooding up ths KMP materiel, for only Kitb this
aid and Italian ne ans can the units already Mntlonsd be strengthened. Further-
noro the acceleration is necessary for the development and proper timing of
training prograas. Of 17,670 tons of Materiel received to date by Italy, 9,990
baie bean assigned to the Arny. Italian production of American type annunition
still awaits construction designs.
In the field, of defensive organisation, Oenoral Cappa said that tba
restoration of k0 permanent defensive obstacles with particular anti-tank function
was being taade in order to block tho most dangerous conouni cation routes. In
addition, the Togllamsnto defensive line was being strengthened in order to
cover assenbly operation.
To protact national territory against sea and air landings and to provide
defense against possible fifth cdw activities, the use of appropriate forces
separate fron the field anqr Is planned, Including all the mobile carabinier!
and police forces. Ftor anti-aircraft defense, the Array is planning a gradual
build-up In peace-time and a rapid mobilization in wartime.?
7 General Cappa gave General Eisenhower written documents which covered
in some detail the following topics; Efficiency of Units Already at the
Disposal of SHAPE (Annex I); Heasures Taken for the Personnel for Strengthening
the Amy (Annex II); Training (Annex m).
For tbe Italian Air Force, Gmeral Anone-Cat commented on and suxaiariaed
a status report. He stressed the critical importance of the air forces to ground
and sea defense and the need to use still uneaploited personnel and industry
together with U. S. military aid in the development of this an.
The Italian Air Force for defense and tactical cooperation totalled 312
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE aircraft® and for transport some 30 planes? together with 227 miscellaneous
8 That is U standard squadrons with 194 planes (P51, F47» F36)l one
squadron of anti-subnarlne aircraft (18 Helldivers).
9 In two Squadrons (C47's, 3821 a, 0.12) ItAlJ TOP SEGRET'
aircraft Jtor training, liaison, and Ma reserve purpose«. At tha end of 1952
an IncreMe foreseen from WAF and the special allotment of 55 billion lira
(00 Billion dollars) the combat squadrons would rise to 17 (354 aircraft), tho
reconnaissance to two (30 aircraft), and the anti-submarine to two (32 aircraft),
plus transport liaison and rescue aircraft.
Oaneral Ajj^one1Cat also reported that 620 pilots were trained for day and
night flying, but that their coabat and cooperation training with tbe other
services was not yet completed. Further«»re, subject to the STaIIaMHty of
aircraft and fuel, 250 already rated pilot» could be retrained. It would also
be possible to obtain from the training centers an estimated 200 new pilots
within the present year and 300 during the next year. For the requirements of
the present snail force there were sufficient pilots.
At the end of 1952 the number of fighter pilots is planned to be 1370, 700
of these for jet aircraft* Other categories will number 1A20. It is estimated
Utat JtOO now pilots will be rated each year.
Air bases, of which the groat majority bave been destroyed or heavily
damaged have been rebuilt to the extent strictly necessary for the activity
of the units and for light, piston-powered aircraft. Through a special allotment
of funds sooke bases are being improved and arranged for jet operation; and it
is planned to have 31 in readiness by the end of 1952 with a possibility of
further increases, especially in Puglia and the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia)
regions, if additional funds are granted.
In cctnmating on deficiencies, Ocneral Armone-Cat listed ground maintenances
and serving shipment, radar suitable for wartime use, and reserve fuel and
«Munition stocks. Beconditioning fuel dumps to make then fully usable to their
190,000 cubic meter capacity will be completed during 1952} present working
capacity is only 75,000 cubic asters. Comounicationa, both cable and radio
links, were being reorganized to have an efficiency of 80£ by the end of 1952.
General Armone-Cat said that there was a large unused industrial capacity
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE for the manufacture of aircraft.
The tasks of the Italian Air Force wore United to tactical coopera-
tion with tbe Arny and Kavy, Air defense of tbe territory beyond tbe scne
of operation of the ground forces, naval escort and protection could be Page 6 of Jt pages TOP SECRET CqRy '/ of 3 COjplM > # # ITALT TOP SECRET;
«Uly ob «n occasional basis. Tbsrsfore, tbs cooperation of allied air units
would ba essential.
Ganaral Aiaone-Oat gumarlxed the situation, pointing out Insufficient
equipment (aircraft, services, axsunition, radar, and i KWIII ml 1 una),
available personnel in excess of equipment for -UM, the need of Allied Air
cooperation, unused labor and industry.
Adairal Ferreri, Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, outlined the tasks
of Uie Italian Mavy under the Heddun Tem Plan, «nphasieing tbs importance of
the defense of lines of cceminication that supply Italy and HIXO forces in the
Hoditorrsneaa.
The force required under the Hsdium Tarn Plan consisted of 703 craft,
including throe aircraft carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, and
67 escort vessels. A total tonnage of 12^,000 now existed, with 20,000 tons
authorised in the extra budget of the Italian government. Approximately
35,000 men, Including 3,000 officers and 6,000 petty officers were now in the
service, and, under a call up ovary two months for twenty-five months training,
the critical situations arising from discharges are avoided. Horale was good,
Admiral Perreri reported, but the only weak point was the lack of training In
the use of modern war equipment. A reserve of 11,000 officers, 30,000 petty
officers and 100,000 ratings still having a fair level of basic training
could be mobilised.
Kine naval bases (Anoona, Brindisi, Toranto, Messina, Augusta, Trapani,
Coglion, Kapoli, and La Speaia) could be used in the event of war, and would be
sufflelent for the Italian Havy and would also provide substantial logistical
support to Allied forces* Anti-aircraft defense, however, was weak and
antiquated} the present governmental budget was not sufficient and the needed
lnprovmnsnts would be possible only through MDAP.
Full stocks .now r-f1 (15,00), wore just suitable for currant needs, but
storage facilities totalling 1,000,000 tons were available. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Amnition for old-type weapons was in excess, but anwnltion was needed
for 0. S. type weapons although these weapons are obsolescent. XTALT
Tb« great deficiency in naval vessels was the lack of craft for
shipping protection, Adniral Perreri urged the fomation of DE and D.D.
units fro« KDAP author!zations. Qn a »ore general basis, there was need
for modern training materiel, radar, communication and anti-aircraft
equipment, amphibious and lagoon craft for the developoent of an
amphibious snips.
The Italian Navy, Admiral Ferreri said, had a large though not thoroughly
modern infrastructure, a group of naval forces under modernisation and a very
high number of reserve manpower. The Navy's morale could be trusted, he
assured General Eisenhower, and every effort to make the best use of the means
available will be made. Admiral Perreri felt that if this effort could
adequately be supported by MDAP that Italy could offer to SACEtIR a navy at a
desirable level of technical efficiency which could be relied on in any
circumstance.
After a few detailed questions on ammunition and the percentage of
operational aircraft, General Eisenhower thanked the Defense Minister and
the Chiefs of Staff for their thorough presentation. He stressed the
importance of field maneuvers to fit men to meet the initial shock of
battle.
In concluding remarks Mr. Pacciardi said that he was sure tbat, as
General Eisenhower came to know the Italian troops who were being placed
under his command, be would realise that this was no longer the Amy of
the defeat, but a force with an entirely new spirit which could be counted
on to fight stoutly in defense of Italy.
General Eisenhower's visit to Italy provided a review of the military
resources and strength of a country which was desperately trying to recover
from several years of war. The Peace Treaty was a limiting factor on the
sise and en the effectiveness of the Italian ArtMd Porces. ffeg^^i DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 10 Tbe total under the Treaty was 235*000 {tins 65*000 carabinier!. ms.
but General Elsenhowar found a strong Indication of tho willingness and
actual desire mi ths part of Italians to lncrssso their contribution to
defense should the Posco Treaty poli.de» be relaxed to permit it. The
period of National Service (increased from 12 to 15 months) was inadequate;
although the legal liait was XS months.
He considered the morale of tbs Armed Forces good and he had confi-
dence that they would fight in defense of their homeland. General Eisenhower
recognised the need for increased employment, for a large part of Italian
labor was idle or underemployed. He saw also the need for making use of
industrial facilities for defense production and the necessity for relatively
large amounts of outside aid to develop this unused capacity. Evan with
greatly expanded production, Italy will be dependent on outside sources for
mc h furnished military équipaient needed to make its own forces Into
effective military units.
General ELsenbower found an Increasing realisation among the Italians
that the development of a strong well—equipped fores within the Treaty
Units constituted Italy's best contribution to the defense effort. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE