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Winter Fireside Readings Leadership and High Technology Battle of the Bulge: Air Operati Professional Military Educati Winter Fireside Readings Leadership and High Technology Battle of the Bulge: Air Operati Professional Military Educati v Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch Commander, Air University Maj Gen David C. Reed Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise Editor Col Keith W. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Director and Illustrator The Airpower Journal, published quarterty, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro- duced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. Leadership and High Technology Brig Gen Stuart R. Boyd, USAF 4 Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge: A Theater Campaign Perspective Col William R. Carter, USAF 10 The Case for Officer Professional Military Education: A View from the Trenches Lt Col Richard L. Davis, USAF 34 Antisatellites and Strategic Stability Marc J. Berkowitz 46 The Bekaa Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned? ClC Matthew M. Hurley, USAFA 60 Interservice Differences in the United States, 1945-1950: A Naval Perspective Dean C. Allard 71 Ricochets 2 Letters Notams 8 9 Notices of Interest Index 9 0 Contributors 9 5 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre­ To clarify the specific points raised by Majoi spondence should be addressed to the Editor, Blow, we point out that “Real Tenets of Military Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB Space Doctrine" does not deny that satellites AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit the may become more flexible in the future. Cer material for overall length. tainly, technology can enhance the future sur vivability, endurance, and maneuverability ol each of our space systems. This is a purely COURSE CORRECTION FOR relative notion. The point is that "flexibility” is SPACE DOCTRINE not one of the key attributes of satellites which Editor's Note: The following letter is a re­ distinguish them as effective military assets. As sponse by the authors to Maj Thomas C. Blow's an example, airplanes can be reroled for dif- letter in the Spring 1988 issue. Major Blow’s ferent missions: strategic bombers can be letter was in response to the article “Real Tenets employed for high-altitude conventional or low- of Military Space Doctrine," which was pub­ altitude nuclear penetration missions; a pilot lished in the Winter 1988 issue. can land at a base of his choice and quickly alter his flight plan. Satellites do not do these types ol things well. Once a space mission is designed "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine" pro- and deployed, it is difficult, if not impossible, ti. vides basic space doctrine in the same sense as alter due to natural and system constraints. basic air doctrine in AFM 1—1, i.e., “the most Space control and space surveillance were fundamental and enduring beliefs which de- developed in the article as vital concepts for scri be and guide the proper use of . forces employment of space forces. As pointed out b\ in military action" (AFM 1-1, p. v). This con- Major Blow, warning times will decrease with trasts with operational doctrine that would an- future threats, but we believe this only reempha- ticipate “changes and influences which may sizes the point that surveillance and warning affect military operations, such as technological will continue as key elements for successful advances” (AFM 1-1, p. vi). This further con- employment of space forces. A strong space trasts with strategy which must consider future intelligence, surveillance, and warning network developments when implementing sound doc- could provide early threat assessment so tha! trinal concepts on how to employ systems in space systems would have time to react and certain environments. avoid threatening situations, regardless of the In the context of [Col Dennis] Drew ["Of Trees time frame considered. and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine,” Air Finally, a robust launch capability is just one University Review. January-February 1982], en- of the elements needed to sustain access to vironmental doctrine (developed in our article space, as discussed in the article. However, this for the space environment) “would seem to have is also only one part of the doctrine: another ke\ considerable staying power” as opposed to or- part is space control. Without an effective space ganizational doctrine which "concerns the use control system, the potential SDI-type threat of particular forces in a particular environment posed by Major Blow could very well “shut at a particular time— today” (p. 45). We therefore down US launches." The point remains that the submit that our tenets for basic and environmen- doctrine must be viewed as a whole, and with- tal space doctrine do not rest solely “upon the out access to space (or a robust launch capabil- current state of affairs,” as characterized by ity), it would be incomplete and ineffective. Major Blow, but offer also a "framework for We believe our article “Real Tenets of Military future application” in the sense of Drew (p. 42). Space Doctrine" does account for developing Once our basic concepts of space doctrine are threats and does accommodate the future. What understood, they may be applied in strategy and remains to be done, as our space capabilities operational doctrine as the threat and future evolve, is to place these basic doctrinal concepts technology evolve. in a time and technology perspective with the 2 RICOCHETS 3 development of operational space doctrine and vant points, but meant avoiding "direct" attack an integrated military strategy. If these concepts on the enemy where he is strong by concentrat- are ignored or subdued within existing official ing forces “indirectly” against his decisive vul- doctrine, we concede to a correct conclusion by nerability. Clausewitz also said to direct “all our Major Blow that "the US will have no option energies” against "the hub of all power and other than to react after the fact ... to poten- movement on which everything [in the enemy’s tial adversaries-a condition we would surely war effort] depends." And though Clausewitz wish to avoid." noted that the enemy’s military forces “will be a very significant feature” (which is quite obvious Col Kenneth A. Myers. USAF Lt Col John G. Tockston, USAF in wartime), he also specifically wrote that the Peterson AFB. Colorado center of gravity is often not the enemy army but an ally, an area (the capital), or a leader. Forbes incorrectly asserts that Clausewitz advocated "attacking where the enemy's power of resis- MORE ON CLAUSEWITZ tance is greatest”; Clausewitz. on the contrary, Editor’s Note: The following is a response by emphasized that only "by constantly seeking out the author to a letter concerning his article the center of his power [his center of gravity, not "Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach: Mis- his greatest strength] . will one really defeat reading the Master," Winter 1988. Mr Forbes's the enemy." letter appeared in the Summer 1989 issue. Mr Forbes also quotes J. F. C. Fuller to support his contention that Clausewitz misunderstood Napoleonic warfare and, since Clausewitz was I have read Joseph Forbes's critiques of other “influenced” by his experiences of such warfare, authors on other topics in other journals but was that his conclusions on warfare must be unreli- surprised he should choose my article on Lid- able. This argument is a logical fallacy. Further- dell Hart's misunderstanding of Clausewitz as more, without delving into a discussion of Major his latest target. His two main criticisms were General Fuller’s assessment (which I feel is echoes of Liddell Hart's own misunderstand- mistaken, based almost exclusively on a too- ings. which I shall endeavor to illustrate even rigid interpretation of Clausewitz’s concept of more clearly than in my article. “concentration”). I believe that the major lesson First. Clausewitz quite clearly did not advo- Clausewitz derived from Napoleon’s campaigns cate direct frontal attacks in preference to flank was that warfare is a great sociopolitical activity. attacks. Although Liddell Hart. Forbes, and oth- This conclusion forms one of the overarching ers drew this conclusion, a thorough reading of themes of On War. He also drew lessons regard- On War reveals this to be erroneous. Even dis- ing the strength of defense over offense from regarding the thrust of this entire work (which personal experience in two great defensive oper- does not support such a simplistic idea), one ations—the Russian retreat towards Moscow notes that Clausewitz very clearly stated in book and the battle of Waterloo. The validity of both seven, chapter seven ("The Offensive Battle") these assessments is hardly debatable. that "the main feature of an offensive battle is Finally, Mr Forbes read into my article things the outflanking or by-passing of th^ defender that were simply not there. He felt that my [emphasis added].” He further statecfthat since article was meant to adulate Clausewitz as the doubt about the enemy’s position” character- “inerrant authority on military affairs," that I izes most offensive battles, it becomes even claimed Clausewitz was the "ultimate, unchal- more imperative to "outflank rather than en- lengeable fount of military wisdom," and other velop the enemy." such nonsense.
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