Winter Fireside Readings Leadership and High Technology Battle of the Bulge: Air Operati Professional Military Educati

Home , Battle command, Boden Fortress, Kampfgruppe, Key West Agreement, Operation Bodenplatte, Pakistan Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Maj Gen David C. Reed

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Director and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterty, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. Leadership and High Technology Brig Gen Stuart R. Boyd, USAF 4 Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge: A Theater Campaign Perspective Col William R. Carter, USAF 10 The Case for Officer Professional Military Education: A View from the Trenches Lt Col Richard L. Davis, USAF 34 Antisatellites and Strategic Stability Marc J. Berkowitz 46 The Bekaa Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned? ClC Matthew M. Hurley, USAFA 60 Interservice Differences in the United States, 1945-1950: A Naval Perspective Dean C. Allard 71

Ricochets 2 Letters Notams 8 9 Notices of Interest Index 9 0 Contributors 9 5 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre To clarify the specific points raised by Majoi spondence should be addressed to the Editor, Blow, we point out that “Real Tenets of Military Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB Space Doctrine" does not deny that satellites AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit the may become more flexible in the future. Cer material for overall length. tainly, technology can enhance the future sur vivability, endurance, and maneuverability ol each of our space systems. This is a purely COURSE CORRECTION FOR relative notion. The point is that "flexibility” is SPACE DOCTRINE not one of the key attributes of satellites which Editor's Note: The following letter is a re distinguish them as effective military assets. As sponse by the authors to Maj Thomas C. Blow's an example, airplanes can be reroled for dif- letter in the Spring 1988 issue. Major Blow’s ferent missions: strategic bombers can be letter was in response to the article “Real Tenets employed for high-altitude conventional or low- of Military Space Doctrine," which was pub altitude nuclear penetration missions; a pilot lished in the Winter 1988 issue. can land at a base of his choice and quickly alter his flight plan. Satellites do not do these types ol things well. Once a space mission is designed "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine" pro- and deployed, it is difficult, if not impossible, ti. vides basic space doctrine in the same sense as alter due to natural and system constraints. basic air doctrine in AFM 1—1, i.e., “the most Space control and space surveillance were fundamental and enduring beliefs which de- developed in the article as vital concepts for scri be and guide the proper use of . . . forces employment of space forces. As pointed out b\ in military action" (AFM 1-1, p. v). This con- Major Blow, warning times will decrease with trasts with operational doctrine that would an- future threats, but we believe this only reempha- ticipate “changes and influences which may sizes the point that surveillance and warning affect military operations, such as technological will continue as key elements for successful advances” (AFM 1-1, p. vi). This further con- employment of space forces. A strong space trasts with strategy which must consider future intelligence, surveillance, and warning network developments when implementing sound doc- could provide early threat assessment so tha! trinal concepts on how to employ systems in space systems would have time to react and certain environments. avoid threatening situations, regardless of the In the context of [Col Dennis] Drew ["Of Trees time frame considered. and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine,” Air Finally, a robust launch capability is just one University Review. January-February 1982], en- of the elements needed to sustain access to vironmental doctrine (developed in our article space, as discussed in the article. However, this for the space environment) “would seem to have is also only one part of the doctrine: another ke\ considerable staying power” as opposed to or- part is space control. Without an effective space ganizational doctrine which "concerns the use control system, the potential SDI-type threat of particular forces in a particular environment posed by Major Blow could very well “shut at a particular time— today” (p. 45). We therefore down US launches." The point remains that the submit that our tenets for basic and environmen- doctrine must be viewed as a whole, and with- tal space doctrine do not rest solely “upon the out access to space (or a robust launch capabil- current state of affairs,” as characterized by ity), it would be incomplete and ineffective. Major Blow, but offer also a "framework for We believe our article “Real Tenets of Military future application” in the sense of Drew (p. 42). Space Doctrine" does account for developing Once our basic concepts of space doctrine are threats and does accommodate the future. What understood, they may be applied in strategy and remains to be done, as our space capabilities operational doctrine as the threat and future evolve, is to place these basic doctrinal concepts technology evolve. in a time and technology perspective with the

2 RICOCHETS 3

development of operational space doctrine and vant points, but meant avoiding "direct" attack an integrated military strategy. If these concepts on the enemy where he is strong by concentrat- are ignored or subdued within existing official ing forces “indirectly” against his decisive vul- doctrine, we concede to a correct conclusion by nerability. Clausewitz also said to direct “all our Major Blow that "the US will have no option energies” against "the hub of all power and other than to react after the fact ... to poten- movement on which everything [in the enemy’s tial adversaries-a condition we would surely war effort] depends." And though Clausewitz wish to avoid." noted that the enemy’s military forces “will be a very significant feature” (which is quite obvious Col Kenneth A. Myers. USAF Lt Col John G. Tockston, USAF in wartime), he also specifically wrote that the Peterson AFB. Colorado center of gravity is often not the enemy army but an ally, an area (the capital), or a leader. Forbes incorrectly asserts that Clausewitz advocated "attacking where the enemy's power of resis- MORE ON CLAUSEWITZ tance is greatest”; Clausewitz. on the contrary, Editor’s Note: The following is a response by emphasized that only "by constantly seeking out the author to a letter concerning his article the center of his power [his center of gravity, not "Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach: Mis- his greatest strength] . . . will one really defeat reading the Master," Winter 1988. Mr Forbes's the enemy." letter appeared in the Summer 1989 issue. Mr Forbes also quotes J. F. C. Fuller to support his contention that Clausewitz misunderstood Napoleonic warfare and, since Clausewitz was I have read Joseph Forbes's critiques of other “influenced” by his experiences of such warfare, authors on other topics in other journals but was that his conclusions on warfare must be unreli- surprised he should choose my article on Lid- able. This argument is a logical fallacy. Further- dell Hart's misunderstanding of Clausewitz as more, without delving into a discussion of Major his latest target. His two main criticisms were General Fuller’s assessment (which I feel is echoes of Liddell Hart's own misunderstand- mistaken, based almost exclusively on a too- ings. which I shall endeavor to illustrate even rigid interpretation of Clausewitz’s concept of more clearly than in my article. “concentration”). I believe that the major lesson First. Clausewitz quite clearly did not advo- Clausewitz derived from Napoleon’s campaigns cate direct frontal attacks in preference to flank was that warfare is a great sociopolitical activity. attacks. Although Liddell Hart. Forbes, and oth- This conclusion forms one of the overarching ers drew this conclusion, a thorough reading of themes of On War. He also drew lessons regard- On War reveals this to be erroneous. Even dis- ing the strength of defense over offense from regarding the thrust of this entire work (which personal experience in two great defensive oper- does not support such a simplistic idea), one ations—the Russian retreat towards Moscow notes that Clausewitz very clearly stated in book and the battle of Waterloo. The validity of both seven, chapter seven ("The Offensive Battle") these assessments is hardly debatable. that "the main feature of an offensive battle is Finally, Mr Forbes read into my article things the outflanking or by-passing of th^ defender that were simply not there. He felt that my [emphasis added].” He further statecfthat since article was meant to adulate Clausewitz as the doubt about the enemy’s position” character- “inerrant authority on military affairs," that I izes most offensive battles, it becomes even claimed Clausewitz was the "ultimate, unchal- more imperative to "outflank rather than en- lengeable fount of military wisdom," and other velop the enemy." such nonsense. My intentions were much more Second. Forbes apparently didn't understand modest: I merely wanted to illuminate the short- Clausewitz’s discussion of the “center of grav- comings in Liddell Hart's understanding of On ity" in book eight, chapter four of On War War as he presented it in Strategy: The Indirect ("Closer Definition of the Military Objective: Approach. That Mr Forbes read my article very The Defeat of the Enemy"). 1 devoted nearly superficially was obvious from that misunder- an entire page of my article (p. 50) to that standing, as well as his continual misspelling of concept, comparing it to Liddell Hart's "indirect approach." Obviously. Liddell Hart did not use "indirect" to mean attacking completely irrele- Continued on page 85 LEADERSHIP AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY

B rig Gen Stuart R. B oyd, USAF

N AUGUST of 1940. just a few months after the German army had swept through France and introduced the world to the power of a mechanized Iadvance, the US Army began large-scale training maneuvers in Louisiana. In the face of the success of the German blitzkrieg, you might have expected to see our forces searching out new wavs to counter the threat of the tank and technology. Such was not the case. As these troops gathered for LEADEHSI IIP AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 5

instruction, a serious logistics problem spent on research and development, al- soon developed: there were not enough though some people argue that such ex- horses to go around. As we approached the penditures remain inadequate to meet the dawn of the Second World War, we still challenges our country faces. Weapon sys- clung to the thrill of the cavalry charge. tems grow more complicated and expen- Technology was not yet an integral part of sive at an ever-accelerating rate. Today's our military force. Gen George S. Patton, F-16C has more than 10 times the computer a staunch advocate of the horse cavalry, capacity of the lunar landing module that wrote in 1926 that "it is the cold glitter in carried man to the surface of the moon only the attacker’s eye. not the point of the a short 20 years ago. As new technologies questing bayonet, that breaks the line. It is evolve, we need to decide how we, as the fierce determination of the drive to military leaders, are to interact with this close with the enemy, not the mechanical technical explosion. That is the purpose of perfection of the tank, that conquers the this paper—to explore some ideas concern- trench. It is the cataclysmic ecstasy of con- ing the relationship between leadership flict in the flier, not the perfection of his and technology. Let’s start with a definition machine gun, that drops the enemy in flam- of technology. ing ruin.”1 In the broadest sense, technology refers History is full of examples of reluctance to any enhancement of human ability: to to adjust to change, especially changes as- move faster, shout louder, hit harder, see sociated with the introduction of new tech- sharper, calculate faster, and so on. Tech- nologies. The French at the Battle of Crecy nology and weaponry have always been in- spent the flower of their knighthood against timately connected. I believe it was George the power of the English longbow. Millions Bernard Shaw who pointed out that man’s fell before the machine gun in World War I. genius is best observed, not in his housing Even Henry Ford, father of the Model T, or clothing, but in his weapons. We have was reluctant to introduce colors other than always needed weapons to ensure our se- black or to change to the six-cylinder en- curity and, in some cases, our survival. gine. Change is a key factor in effective leadership. New technology, however, has a greater impact than does the process of Editor’s Note: change that occurs inside an organization. This essay is drawn, with (hanks, from the Ira C. The importance of high tech to today’s Taker Center for Professional Development's decisionmaker has never been greater. Sig- forthcoming text Concepts for Air Force Leader- nificant portions of our defense dollar are ship edited by Dr Richard R. Lester. 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

Maintenance of external security is a re- scenes are shot in the command post where sponsibility that is assigned to the military a number of senior officers are staring at the in the United States—thus, military leaders electronically generated battle, helpless to will always have to deal with the technol- deal with the runaway computer that is ogy that is embodied in the new weapons bent on "winning the game.” Though the provided to them. situation itself is absurd, the idea of an The essential elements of military lead- electronic system isolated from any human ership do not change. There are many def- intervention is real. When people deal with initions of leadership, but one by E. M. high technology, they have a tendency to Flanagan, Jr., seems to capture most of the become isolated from reality. I recently saw critical components: “Leadership in the an advertisement for a computer designed Army, simply stated, is the ability to get a to assist ground planners in the North At- unit to accomplish a given mission effi- lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) envi- ciently (of time, resources, casualties) and ronment. The advertisement emphasized willingly or at least cooperatively.”2 Al- the idea that the maximum use of symbols though the essence of military leadership was a strong selling point since it allowed may never change, technology-—an essen- the decisionmaker to “avoid the need for tial instrument of mission success—is in person-to-person communication in a diffi- constant flux. The challenge for the mili- cult multilingual environment.” High tech tary leader is to recognize and use whatever can be impersonal. technology is available and to dominate With a computeryou get all the informa that technology—not to be dominated by it. tion you want—immediately. Speed was The problem is not technology per se; it often a critical factor in the classic military is the process of leaders adapting them- battles. The fastest horse decided many selves to technology that is the issue. We engagements. Now we have systems that have had to adapt to the longbow, the tank, instantly provide the logistic planner the the airplane, and now to the challenges and location and status of every part on the F-16 opportunities of outer space. Your role as a or B-l. Technology can provide real-time military leader is to integrate the technolo- information—regardless of the accuracy of gies of today into the accomplishment of the data loaded. Traditional methods of your mission—during peace or war. At the staffing, though sometimes bureaucratic same time, you must be ready to work with and frustrating, provided time to check the rapidly evolving technologies of the data before they went to the decisionmaker. future. With the introduction of applications of Let us now focus on some of the charac- expert systems using artificial intelligence, teristic.s of high technology. We frequently however, we will see an increased reliance concentrate on the wonderful things to on the computer. It can provide a great deal be gained by new technologies. However, of incorrect information very rapidly. the introduction of new developments also It must he correct: it's computed to the causes problems. Accordingly, this portion 10th decimal place. High technology pro- of the article could be aptly titled, “Pot- vides an impression of precision. Who can holes on the Road to the Successful Integra- argue with reams of computer printouts tion of Leadership and Technology.” being generated by a high-speed laser /ust load the data, and the computer will printer from a mainframe computer sup- give you the answer. Many of you will ported by banks of tape drives? When I recall the movie War Games. In this film a attended Squadron Officer School, we bright young teenager hacks his way into a had to complete a staff study. The format mythical computer system housed at North included sections that identified assump- American Air Defense Command (NORAD) tions as well as data sources. This infor- and almost starts World War III. The final mation clarified the logic of the decision LEADERSHIP AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 7

know how I arrived at my conclusions. In today’s world, though, the computer does all of that for you and draws a nice, smooth, multicolored graph—all at the speed of light. I really don’t understand these new technologies and techniques, but I don’t want to look stupid. High tech can be intimidating. Because it is complex and mysterious, the senior decisionmaker is faced with a new set of problems. As previously mentioned, the computational process can be difficult to understand. The people who do understand it are probably not on the senior staff, since the education needed to work with these new technologies is more readily available to junior personnel. How will you integrate tools such as marginal analyses, effectiveness ratios, or a weighted decision matrix into your decision process? Can you integrate these tools if you do not really understand them? Considering the history of the Eastern Front in World War II, no computer programmer in the world would “It is the cold glitter in the have given the German army more than attacker's eye, not the point three months to survive. The German forces were outnumbered, outgunned, and under- of the questing bayonet, that supplied. However, despite their eventual breaks the line.” defeat, they conducted a brilliant series of campaigns lasting almost three years. Training and discipline held out for a long period of time against overwhelming odds. Since technology continues to improve, process for the reader. Such an approach, if you can wait until tomorrow 1 c a n prom- however, is not available from many of our ise you a "better” answer. A significant por- current technologies. We now rely on soft- tion of my career has been involved in ware developed by someone else, for which research and development. One thing I we couldn't read the program code even if have seen time and again is the engineer it were available. How many people, even who can always make it (an aircraft, radar if they are comfortable with computers, system, etc.) just a little better. In peace- spend time “studying” the documentation? time, it is this allure of making “it" more The precision of a computer answer may combat effective, even with tight schedules lure you into a false sense of security. I can and limited funding, that has been the recall struggling with a french curve,* try- downfall of many programs. In wartime, ing to find a “fit" for some very scattered the appeal resides in the "promise” of turn- data points. Since the rules said the raw ing around an impossible tactical situa- data had to be plotted, the world would tion with “this new miracle weapon to be *A curved piece of flat, often plastic, material used as a delivered tomorrow.” Tomorrow’s leaders guide in drawing curves. must understand the risks associated with 8 AIRPOWER fOURNAL WINTER 1989 searching for the optimum solution instead to direct an F-16 squadron located halfwax of an effective solution. around the world is real. Modern commu- If you want more information, the com- nications systems allow us to make a deci- puter can turn out products as long as sion immediately. Sometimes an instant you want to ask for them. Future leaders decision may not be wise—the situation will have at their fingertips everything may change, or the weather may worsen. they could possibly want to know about Rapid communications can pressure a the status of their units. This information leader into furnishing an answer even if the will not be reserved solely for the unit answer could and should wait. commander. Every level of command can Technology is a tool, but it cannot con- look into what is happening at a par- sider everything—especially such intangi ticular location or in a particular situa- bles as discipline, motivation, and so forth. tion. Every dollar expended, every takeoff This last pothole can be the most dangerous aborted—everything can be reviewed and of the lot. Some of the best military deci- questioned. George Orwell's book 1984 in- sions have been based on what a leader troduced Big Brother, who can look into "felt” was the best course of action. For every aspect of our lives. The technology is all the controversy surrounding General now available to make 1984 a reality. A MacArthur, the Inchon landing was a mas- military commander no longer has to leave terpiece of military strategy. Almost every- the office to determine how things are going one said that circumstances did not favor in the tire shop or whether bombing scores the operation: the bay was too shallow', the are getting better or worse. As a com- tides too high. Everyone, including the mander, what will you do when you call up Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), reasoned that it a computer screen that shows nobody ate would fail. In the past, leadership was liver at the dining hall last evening? How developed in field exercises where the are the leaders of tomorrow going to use the smell of dust and sweat was part of the vast amount of information they will have learning experience. Leaders learned how at their disposal? How do you, as a leader, to “feel” the right u'ay to go and how to best operate in an environment of “total infor- motivate their troops, depending on the mation”? situation. Today, we are moving more to the In wartime the problems can become world of computer w'argaming. After you even more complex. Numerous sensors make your “decision,” the computer will feeding back to a central data bank can make the calculations and tell you whether provide a myriad of details to the com- you are an effective leader or not. In such mander. Even the pilot can become satu- computerized training, how does tomor- rated with dozens of inputs requiring rapid row’s leader learn to develop the “gut decisions.-The wartime implications of to- sense” that has led to many of the great tal information are even more challenging decisions of the past? than those of peacetime. At this point, you may be wondering how Instant communication is here today. you can get down the road at all since it is During several recent military operations, so full of potholes. Let me offer a few technology allowed direct communication suggestions to avoid some of the deeper with forces actually engaged in combat. ones. Was this capability more effective than the Develop a concept of "inner tennis. " One earlier methods of indirect, delayed com- of the current sports fads is to focus on a munications? One of the reasons for the key element of an activity in a "mind- German defeat at Stalingrad is attributed to over-matter” mode. You picture yourself as attempts by Hitler to direct the battle from a great skier or a par golfer. In tennis, you his bunker in Berlin. The role of future discipline yourself to always keep your eve communications is critical. The capability on the ball. You can use the same technique LEADERSHIP AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 9

as you try to function effectively in the tend to drive you away from your people. world of high technology. Keep your eye on Don't forget the basic adage: the effective the objective. Don’t drive off the road be- leader spends at least 25 percent of his or cause of the potholes. No matter how se- her time "out with the troops.” The need to ductive the technology, don't lose sight of discipline yourself to be in the organization vour organizational goals. Practice inner is more difficult in an information-rich, tennis. rapid-communications world. The military Use a "technology telescope." A tele- histories of tomorrow are not going to focus scope allows you to search ahead and better on who wrote the most vivid electronic define where you are going. It makes things message. Your most critical resource is peo- clearer. Today’s technology can provide ple. You must gain their confidence, stim- tools not available five years ago. Find out ulate their productivity, and reward their what tools can be used, and integrate them accomplishments. The only way you can into your organization. One set of tools will do these things is by getting out from be- not work for everyone, however, because hind your computer terminal. some organizations are unique. Where, then, do you fit into this environ- Understand ivhat technology can and can't ment of technology? More important, what do for you. Because technology changes are you going to do to better adapt your rapidly, you are not going to be able to keep leadership strengths and weaknesses to the up unless you make an effort. Therefore, changes ahead? As a leader, you will be the importance of education to both you expected to understand and shape the tech- and your unit will continue to grow. With- nologies you are using to meet mission out periodic updates, you cannot expect to requirements. No matter what kind of be capable of making prudent decisions. Technology comes loaded with all sorts of organization you are with—from fighter seductive charms. If you don’t take the time squadron to system-program office—there to understand the underlying principles, are technological tools that can improve you just might fall in love with the slick productivity and develop a happier, harder allure of all those high-tech bells and whis- working unit. tles. This article has discussed a number of Technology is a micromanager’s dream— potential problem areas associated with don't get caught in the trap. These new high tech. A complete list would be quite technologies provide an opportunity to long. You and your staff could spend some drive a staff crazy with dozens of questions, valuable time exploring this area and de- all developed by paging through computer ciding how you will avoid some of the screens, and all delivered by electronic potholes. I have also shared a few ideas that mail. Centralized management and infor- will make your adaptation to new technol- mation saturation can result in organiza- ogies easier and more effective. Keep in tional self-destruction. Tomorrow's leaders mind that we are currently experiencing must discipline themselves to stay out of major funding reductions. The old days of this mode. They must also establish an "doing more with less” are gone. The new environment that does not force their staffs days of "working smarter” are here. I chal- to operate in this mode. lenge you to get on board: high tech can High tech-high touch. Technology will save you—or sink you. □

Notes 1. Martin Blumenson. The Patton Papers. 1885-1940, vol. 1 2. E. M. Flanagan. |r.. "Before the Battle." Army 38. no. 4 (Boston Houghton Mifflin Company. 1972), 797. (April 1988): 83. AIR POWER IN THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE A Theater Campaign Perspective

C ol W illiam R. C arter, USAF

The sixteenth of December 1989 is the 45th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. This battle placed tough demands upon our soldiers and airmen, and they met the challenge with competence and courage. To date much has been written concerning the ground operations. For it was on the ground that the ultimate outcome was mea sured. In contrast, the contributions of air power to the success of the battle have been largely presented in either shallow descrip tions or individual flying unit tactical analyses. Missing has been an examination of air power as it was applied to achieve the goals of the theater strategy.

OPULAR lore of the Battle of the Bulge evokes images of surprised Allied commanders. Gen George S. Patton's wheeling Third Army, gal- lantryP at Bastogne, and answered prayer for good weather that brought the wrath of Allied air power on German forces.1 How did air power support theater objectives and contribute effectively to the defeat of Hitler’s 1944 Ardennes offensive? To gain an appreciation of the air commander’s

10 BATTLE OF THE BULGE 11

Muj Gen Ehvood R. Pete" Quesada lleft). commander of IX TAG during the Dottle of the bulge Above. C-47s resupply Baslogne after the 'vealher improved The layered air defense of the bulge enabled un- armed C-47s la deliver supplies directly into combat areas with the loss of onlv 19 car go aircraft ston Churchill at Casablanca, Morocco. Ai this conference the Anglo-American leaders and their staffs defined the alliance's grand strategy, established the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and agreed on both a strategic bombing and tactical support policy.5 ll was the successful, battle-honed model ot Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgom- ery and Air Vice Marshal Coningham that defined the principles of air support that became US Army Air Corps doctrine on 21 July 1943 in FM 100-20.6 These intellectual tools forged early in North Africa served the Allied air commanders well in the Battle of the Bulge. Genera/ Que.suda ivos instrumental in the success of The key concepts incorporated in FM the air battle tar the bulge. Flexible use of air doctrine 100-20 were and a close narking relationship ivith Army ground commanders made a significant contribution to the 1. Land and air power are coequal and defeat of the Germun offensive. interdependent forces; neither is an auxil- iary of the other. 2. Land forces operating without air su- perspective, vve must understand the prin- periority must take such extensive security ciples of air power as they were understood measures against hostile air attack that in 1944. After setting the background for their mobility and ability to defeat the the battle, we can then see how Allied enemy land forces are greatly reduced. commanders applied air power in support Therefore, air forces must be employed of a theater campaign to first blunt then against the enemy’s air forces until air su- smash Hitler’s last gamble. periority is obtained. 3. The inherent mobility of modern land and air forces must be exploited to the The Principles of fullest. Air Power The missions of air power employment as spelled out in FM 100-20 were The United States entered World War 11 as a “third-rate air power" at best.' As far 1. First priority. To gain the necessary as our knowledge went with regards to degree of air superiority. This will be ac- supporting ground operations with air complished by attacks against aircraft in power, we entered North Africa in late the air and on the ground and against those 1942 with an “abundance of ignorance."3 installations that the enemy requires for the However, American airmen learned quick- application of air power. ly from the British experience in North 2. Second priority. To prevent the move- Africa. Under the wing of Air Marshal Sir ment of hostile troops and supplies into the Arthur W. Tedder and Air Vice Marshal theater of operations or within the theater Sir Arthur “Maori" Coningham. Generals (air interdiction). Carl “Tooey” Spaatz. Elwood R. “Pete" 3. Third priority. To participate in a com- Quesada, Laurence Kuter. and others were bined effort of the air and ground forces, in seasoned.4 the battle area, to gain objectives on the On 31 January 1943. President Franklin immediate front of the ground forces (close D. Roosevelt met with Prime Minister Win- cooperation). 12 BATTLE OF THE BULGE 13

The basic doctrine of employment in FM against the Soviets. However, the Germans 100-20 called for the following: had not launched an offensive outside the 1. Air power operations should almost Soviet Union in nearly three years, and it invariably precede the contact of surface was the first time an offensive had been forces. The purpose of this action is to attempted in the face of an opponent who disrupt the orderly mobilization and stra- had achieved air superiority. On the other tegic concentration of the enemy’s field side, this was the first time American air forces. power had been assigned a large-scale bat- 2. Air operations are conducted in a joint tle mission not planned in advance as part Army and Navy operational plan focused of an offensive. ’ on the strategic and tactical objectives. In the fall of 1944, two Allied army 3. Only total destruction of the enemy’s groups faced Germany's “West Wall"; a aviation can gain and maintain complete third was in Alsace-Lorraine. The Allies control of the air. Since this is seldom paused to allow logistics to catch up in practical, counterair operations and air de- preparation for their next offensive phase, fenses in the theater must be carried on their attention being focused on planned continuously to provide security from hos- attacks in the Aachen area and the Ruhr tile air operations. valley. They gave little regard to the possi- 4. Centralized command of air forces bility of a significant German counter- enables air power to be constituted in mass attack. especially in the Ardennes Forest and enables it to be switched quickly from area, where four US divisions were one objective to another in a theater of stretched along an 80-mile front. Gen operations. Dwight D. Eisenhower had thinned his 5. Facilities are required for tactical con- strength in this region to provide the trol and planning, administration, mainte- "mass” required to the north (map 1). nance. repair, supply, and rest. Air bases, On 16 December 1944 Hitler struck this suitably located and secure, are essential "quiet sector" with 24 divisions and 2.400 for the sustained operation of military avi- tactical aircraft, creating a 60-mile-wide ation. Aviation engineers are essential. break in the Allied line.1" The number of 6. Adequate communications for the con- aircraft dedicated to this operation was trol and direction of air operations and for more than the Luftwaffe had used in 1940 liaison are required. to conquer France or successfully defend, though at great cost, the skies over Kursk in 1943.11 Within a week these forces would The Setting be engaged by elements of two Allied army groups supported by 6.000 tactical aircraft When the disproportion of Power is so great and heavy bombers. Though the Allies had that no limitation of our own object can both numerical and qualitative superiority ensure us safety from catastrophe . . . forces in the air in 1944, the threat of 2,400 enemy will, or should, be concentrated in one des- aircraft in one operation could not be dis- perate blow. . . . missed. Carl von Clausewitz The German operational objective was to On War drive quickly through Gen Omar Bradley’s Hitler alone conceived the Battle of the 12th Army Group to collapse the right flank Bulge. His purpose was to knock the West- of Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army ern Allies out of the war with a great Group. The ultimate goal was to capture victory that would “bring down the artifi- Antwerp and "trap” 35 Allied divisions cial coalition with a crash."8 With this and possibly create another Dunkirk. objective accomplished, he would turn Hitler believed that a successful offensive to the east and “effectively" concentrate through the American sector would trap 14 AIRPOWER IOURNAL WINTER 1989

Allied Focus

— Front line as ol 16 December 1944

21 st ARMY GP ENGLAND (Montgomery) BELGIUM German Supply Buildup

A«fe*neS,

FRANCE 12th ARMY GP (Bradley)

6th ARMY GP (Devers)___

Map 1. The position of the Allied lines on 16' Decem Hitler began laying the groundwork for ber 1944. the day the Battle of the Bulge begun. The an offensive in the Ardennes in late July focus of the Allies ivas in the north, while the German 1944.11 This was at a time when the Allies buildup was in the center. Hitler's plan was to use the German Heeresgruppe B (Army Group Bl to drive were breaking out of Normandy at Saint through Gen Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group to Lo. In August, as the Allies raced toward collapse the right flank of Field Marshal Bernard Paris. Hitler began stockpiling equipment Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. The Sixth Panzer and materiel for the attack in the Eifel Army was to conduct the primary attack. region and along the Rhine.14 Hitler was setting his “trap” well ahead of Allied thinkers, and he was positioning his scarce Montgomery’s forces and drive a political resources to ensure adequate support. The wedge between the British and the Ameri- Germans did not intend to depend on cap- cans. He hoped that it would create enough tured Allied supplies for success in this tension between London and Washington operation.13 to make possible a negotiated armistice on In his all-out attack, Hitler guaranteed his the Western front. Thus. Hitler’s blow was ground commanders that they would have aimed at the will of the Allied high com- strong fighter support. Since air forces took mand.1' He reasoned that Churchill and time to build, he conceived the ruse of a Roosevelt would have to consult to counter massive defensive air campaign against Al- his attack, and that this delay would in turn lied strategic bombers to build up his air give the Wehrmacht the time needed to seal power. An attack on the planes that were the fate of the Allied front. Hitler did not blasting German cities daily would most believe that Eisenhower had the authority certainly motivate even the most reluctant to act on his own. Luftwaffe officers into full and enthusiastic BATTLE OF THE BULGE 15

support. Only later would Hitler tell them combat was not very effective when di- of their true purpose.Ib rected to support combat on the ground. Behind this facade of deception. German With this fault at the base of Hitler’s plan- air commanders prepared for a large de- ning, his air commanders built the wrong fensive counterair operation, der Crosse force structure. Deceived by Hitler, they Schlag (the Great Blow). Their plan was constructed their air forces in isolation to engage in overwhelming strength the from the ground units that they would be bombers of the Eighth Air Force. These required to support. Precious gasoline was airmen ardently designed a force of 18 used to train for air-to-air combat, not for ighter wings consisting of 3,700 aircraft, a air-to-ground attack. Tactics were devel- fighting force such as the Luftwaffe had oped for bomber intercept, not for ground never possessed before.”1' Planning, train- support tasks. Munitions were procured for ing, equipping, and basing all proceeded aerial combat, not for ground attack. Air with the single focus on air defense. Al- bases were located east of the Rhine River ’hough Hitler understood, very well, how for security and were consolidated to facil- to elicit his soldiers’ devotion, he did not itate centralized control and timely mass- understand air power and distrusted the ing. Forward deployed and dispersed fields Luftwaffe leadership. needed to support ground operations were Hitler did not realize that a fighter force not prepared. Everything was designed for prepared solely for the mission of air-to-air “the special task of defense of the Reich.”18 On the ground the operational plan was Map 2. The German attack on 16 December 1944, simple though overextended. The Sixth ivhich split Gen Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group. Panzer Army (mostly SS divisions) was to

ntwerp

21st ARMY GP ENGLAND Second TAF (Br)

12th ARMY GP Ninth Air Force (US) Third Army Paris XIX TAC

6th ARMY GP First Air Force (Provisional) Basfogne ivas resupplied by air from 23 December until 26 December 19-t4. During that time, IX Troop Carrier Command flew 962 sorties and dropped 850 tons of supplies to the surrounded town.

Fighter aircraft of IX TAC were stationed in Belgium, close to the front. This gave them a significant advantage over the Luftwaffe forces, which had a short combnf radius and were stationed some distance from the fighting.

16 BATTLE OF THE BULGE 17

conduct the primary attack with strong the axis of advance and the preparation support on its left flank by the Fifth Panzer areas.” Only key points were to be sup- Army, comprised of regular VVehrmacht ported due to limited air assets. Second troops. The Fifteenth Army was to pin priority was to "attack against the airfields Allied troops in the Aachen area on the of the enemy tactical units close to the penetration's northern shoulder, and the front."20 Planning for this second objective Seventh Army was to block Patton on began in late November, but because of the the southern flank.10 extensive "veil of secrecy" surrounding the In the air the operational planning was as land attack, command indecision, and poor flawed as the force structure. The opera- weather, it was not exercised until 1 Janu- tional order for the attack of Heeresgruppe ary 1945.21 B (German Army Group B) toward Antwerp No consolidated Luftwaffe-German army stated that the first priority of the Luftwaffe command structure, planning staff, or op- was “ground support for Panzer spear- erations staff existed. All integration of heads." Air was “to attack the roads along air activity went through a liaison headquarters of Luftivaffen-Kommando West attached to Heeresgruppe B. This liaison U'hiJe the bad iveather hindered Allied air support in the early days of the battle, it ensured the availability group communicated by radio or land line of a rested and ready combat air force once the to appropriate Luftwaffe headquarters. All weather cleared. air attack requirements were passed to this 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

liaison office through army headquarters. mention of the buildup.24 In addition, Coordination between German air defense heavy cloud cover and dense foliage in flak units and Luftwaffe fighters was ex- the buildup area as well as German decep- tremely poor. Besides the recognition lights tion activities contributed to the con- on Luftwaffe fighters, the only attempt to cealment. The plan intentionally took ad- reduce fratricide was the use of Goldregen vantage of the poor seasonal weather and rocket signals. Luftwaffe ground liaison the long winter nights. A bogus headquar- personnel fired these signals to alert nearby ters, Gruppe von Manteuffel, was created to German ground forces and Flakkorps that shroud the command structure. Even the low-flying Luftwaffe aircraft would be ap- code name IVcicht urn Rhein (Watch on the proaching from the rear. Returning flights Rhine) was structured to convey a “de- were on their own.22 fensive” nature, while all movements and The Ardennes attack obtained its in- preparations had to be justified by another tended surprise. The Germans had pro- code name Abwehrschlacht im Westen (De- duced an effective veil of secrecy and fensive Battle in the West).25 To feed Allied prepared for the offensive in almost total misperceptions about these “defensive” radio silence.21 Even Ultra revealed no preparations, the first paragraph of every movement order contained the words “in preparation for the anticipated enemy Map 3. The disposition of the US armies and air commands on 20 December, after Field Marshal Mont o f f e n s i v e . . . . ”26 Mo r e o v e r , th e de g r e e of gomery took command of the north side of the bulge surprise achieved was compounded by Al- and Patton the south. lied overconfidence, preoccupation with

Eighth Air Force (Strategic)

Antwerp -"^Montgomery ENGLAND 21 s t A rm y G ro u p eoqnd Tactical AirFbrce (Br)

Patton

12th Army Group Ninth Air Force (US)

Normandy Paris

(Provisional) BATTLE OF THE BULGE 19

their own offensive plans, poor aerial re- tive. Instead of pressing the ground-attack connaissance. and the relative lack of com- mission "in mass,” it divided its effort bat contact by the US First Army. Allied equally between ground attack and bomber intelligence failed completely to detect the intercept. With this split purpose, the Luft- offensive.27 The Allies "had looked in a waffe did neither well.33 Moreover, hitting mirror for the enemy and seen there only a the heavy bombers focused Allied attention reflection of their own intentions.”2" on the potential problem that such a large The Germans had attained surprise, and number of enemy planes could pose. their tempo of advance became the center of gravity for Hitler’s offensive. While con- suming supplies at a very high rate.29 they had to quickly seize key roads, communi- Allied Counterstrategy cations hubs, and bridges. Hitler’s forces By 20 December General Eisenhower required hard, frozen ground to support had formed a counterstrategy and modified their off-road armor tactics, to support sup- his command structure to meet the threat. ply movements around obstructions, and Eisenhower had focused his responding to bypass Allied strong points. They also battle strategy on the German vulnerabili- needed low clouds and fog to ground Al- ties of tempo and logistics—to restrict Ger- lied air forces. Unhindered movement was man resupply by confining the penetration essential. to as narrow a one as possible.34 To accom- It was not to be. Constricted and ever- plish this, he built strong defensive shoul- lengthening transportation routes com- ders at the base of the salient, established pounded the German logistics problem.20 This was a condition magnified by malpo- "impenetrable” flanks to contain the pene- sitioned war materiel and gasoline. Nearly tration’s width, and defended key commu- half of the German supplies were located nications centers along the axis of the east of the Rhine—more than 60 miles German advance (fig. 1). Holding the cross- from the attack’s starting point. Hitler had roads at Saint Vith and Bastogne was the directed this positioning as a security mea- key element of the strategy designed to sure, so as not to draw unnecessary atten- increase German logistics requirements tion to the Eifel buildup area prior to and slow the German advance. Next, Eisen- the attack. It became a serious flaw in the hower established a blocking position to face of Allied air interdiction. Addition- limit the depth of the penetration, relying ally, above-freezing temperatures com- primarily on Montgomery’s 21st Army bined with the wet weather to make off- Group. Once the Germans were contained, road traffic a muddy impossibility through he would counterattack.*’ the first critical week of the offensive. The General Eisenhower’s air commanders poor weather channeled the German attack placed first priority on air supremacy to to the already limited number of east-west prevent the Luftwaffe from giving direct roads in the Ardennes—a situation that left support to the advancing German ground their army even more vulnerable to disrup- troops. Allied ground forces required com- tion by air attack.31 plete freedom of maneuver to withdraw, During the first three days of the offen- reinforce, and counterattack. Due to the sive, the Allied air forces and the Luftwaffe immediate threat of enemy armored spear- met in the skies over the cloud-covered heads, the second priority became close battlefield as the Luftwaffe attempted to get cooperation with ground forces to “destroy under the low ceilings to support Wacht am the weapons committed by the enemy to Rhein. The fighters of the Ninth Air Force the attack.”*1’ Targets to be attacked were engaged them, claiming 136 kills.32 On 23 “German tanks, aircraft, motor transport, December the Luftwaffe changed its objec- and guns.” The third priority was an in-

BATTLE rit l ilt: BULGE 21 terdiction effort designed to “knock out The Air Operation the facilities necessary to replenish the enemy's supplies—the rail roads, bridges, marshaling yards, and communications Along with the Ninth and First US centers, as well as the supplies them- Armies went their respective tactical air selves.”3 commands—XXIX TAC with the Ninth The Allies quickly adjusted their com- Army, and IX TAC under General Quesada mand structure to execute General Eisen- supporting the First Army. These com- hower's strategy. General Quesada. then mands were changed from the operational commander of the IX Tactical Air Com- control of the Ninth Air Force to the control mand (TAC).38 described these adjust- of the Second Tactical Air Force of the ments: Royal Air Force (RAF). At that time. Air Marshal Coningham appointed General The Germans in their Bulge effort had defi- nitely put a dividing line within Bradley's Quesada responsible for controlling all Al- army group area. Bradley would have had one lied air efforts on the north side of the part of his army group north of the Bulge and bulge.40 another part of his army group south of the Throughout the entire continental cam- Bulge. And Eisenhower felt that it would be paign from the Normandy beachhead to the better to have the north side of the Bulge be fall of the Reich, there was neither a theater under one army group, which in this case air component nor ground component com- would be Montgomery. Because Montgomery mander (an exception to the specific letter was contributing British units to this force. of FM 100-20). General Eisenhower, with Eisenhower thought it would be better for Air Chief Marshal Tedder as his deputy, Montgomery to have command of the U.S. Ninth and First Armies.31* (See maps 2 and 3.) assumed the positions of both, as well as that of exercising overall theater command. Innovative uses of radar and other command and The tasks of determining the amount of control systems (at left, a "Pundit Light") enabled the Allies to gain and maintain air superiority. Despite resources that should be placed against heavy snotv (below), runways were kept clear to keep which individual target group and allocat- aircraft flying. ing resources among the operational com- 22 AIRPOWER IOURNAL WINTER 1989 mands were accomplished by a balance ing over the Eifel region. Finally, to thi of Allied air force components working west, the German fighters faced the IX closely together. The need was apparent, and XIX TACs directly over the bulge itself and the mission was clear. Organizational To get home the German pilots had to structure did not stand in the way of cen- negotiate these same barriers while con- tralized direction and unity of the air cam- templating the prospect that Allied air- paign.41 craft might be waiting to jump them when The Ninth Air Force coordinated all sup- they returned to their airfields. Aided by port activities and assigned fighter and ground-based radar and “Y-Service”49 ra- bomber groups to appropriate tasking and dio intercepts, Allied fighter groups timed controlling authorities—in most cases their airfield attacks to coincide with re- either the IX or XIX Tactical Air Com- turning Luftwaffe aircraft that were low on mands.4” The TACs then executed the air fuel and ammunition. This tactic worked battle and coordinated closely with their especially well against jet aircraft, which respective armies to maintain cohesion were also restricted to concrete runway with the land battle. The Eighth Air Force operations. Forced to engage Allied fighters coordinated its ground support attacks while attempting to land, many Luftwaffe through the Ninth Air Force, and the TACs pilots ran out of fuel and crashed.50 coordinated their operations along army Despite losses, the Luftwaffe managed to boundary lines with each other. fly as many as 1.200 sorties on some days. "Inoperable” flying weather closed in on However, the effort was one of "despair.”51 the entire battle area from 19 until 23 Shifting operational priorities, the lack of December.41 During this period, the Ger- coordinated air and ground planning, no man penetration expanded to a 50-mile clear doctrine of air power employment, bulge— its maximum depth. Saint Vith was and poor leadership at the top crippled the evacuated: but Bastogne, although sur- Luftwaffe's effective use. Other major con- rounded, still held. On 23 December the tributing factors to the ineffectiveness of skies cleared. Allied air and ground power the Luftwaffe were (1) the inexperience of were ready to strike.44 Allied ground move- most of the German pilots compared to ments had secured the flanks of the their American and British opponents, (2) penetration and blunted its expansion fuel shortages, (3) the short operational westward. Rested and ready, Allied air range of their aircraft, and (4) the distance forces attacked.4:5 In the next five days, they of their air bases from the area of the flew more than 16.000 sorties.40 offensive. The Allied effort maintained air suprem- The clear weather of 23 December un- acy to the point that the Luftwaffe did not leashed the full power of the Allied air significantly hinder a single Allied ground forces, and the Luftwaffe faced another di- movement or operation during the battle. lemma. Allied interdiction was having a The Allied air forces constructed a layered serious impact on German logistics.’1 Yet. defense that Luftwaffe pilots had to negoti- Luftwaffe orders were to support the Ger- ate just to get into the "battle area.” First, man army with ground attack sorties. They in response to heavy Luftwaffe attacks on had to choose whether to comply with the bombers on 23 December. Eighth Air Force air operations plan issued by Army Group heavy bombers carpet-bombed the German B at the beginning of the offensive or to forward bases around Frankfurt on 24 engage Allied air power. Once again the December.4 The Eighth’s fighters engaged decision was split and reactionary. Pilot the Luftwaffe’s airborne fighters and strafed prisoners captured between 23 and 31 De- their airfields daily.48 cember stated that they had been ordered to The next barrier was the RAF’s Second attack ground targets but that these attacks Tactical Air Force and the XXIX TAC roam- had “not been pressed with skill or deter- BATTLE OF THE BULGE 23

mination."54 It had become too deadly to side of the bulge. The XIX TAC ran opera- challenge the Allied air forces’ layered de- tions in relief of Bastogne and along the fense protecting the bulge. Meanwhile, southern s i d e . 56 T h e s e cond ob j e c t i v e was other aircraft were sent to attack the heavily to “isolate the Ardennes-Eifel area from rail escorted medium and heavy bombers. The traffic.” Responsibility for this “classic in- Luftwaffe achieved mass on neither objec- terdiction” went to the light and medium tive. bombers of the Ninth Air Force's 9th Bom- With air superiority achieved. Allied air bardment Division, the XXIX TAC, and the forces executed their air-to-ground opera- RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force.57 (See tions to obtain four specific objectives. map 4.) In addition to ground attack, the First, fighter-bombers were assigned to at- Ninth’s fighters supported the 9th Bom- tack armored spearheads.” The IX TAC bardment Division in the Eifel region with directed air action against the Germans’ air escort, flak suppression, and follow-up primary attack axis, which was the north attacks after bomber raids. The third objective of the ground attack Map 4. The maximum extension of the bulge. Also plan called for delaying, harassing, and shown are the mission assignments of the air assets. obstructing road traffic. The medium and

Cologne

IX TAC

Frankfurt' Second TAF ® Weisbaden

XIX TAC Mainz Darmstadt! 9th BD XIX TAC

Luxemboui

— Allied Line 16 Dec 1944

Maximum Penetration of Attack Zweibrucken » ■ » Heavy Bomber Line Medium Bomber Line Saarbrucken 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989 heavy bombers of the Ninth and Eighth Air nition and supplies.61 Between 0930 hours Forces accomplished this objective both on 23 December and the afternoon of 26 in the Eifel region and within the bulge December, the day the US 4th Armored itse lf.T o streamline the responsiveness of Division broke the siege, the IX Troop strategic bombardment assets, the Eighth Carrier Command flew 962 sorties and Air Force passed direct tasking authority of dropped 850 tons of supplies to the defend- its 2d Air Division to the Ninth Air Force.59 ers. Heavily protected from air attack and The final objective was to isolate the battle ground fire by the fighter-bombers of the area by the "destruction of storage, rail XIX TAC, the entire operation resulted in heads, and supplies around the perimeter the loss of only 19 C-47s.62 of the isolated area." This was the primary The Luftwaffe’s attempted aerial resup- task of the Eighth Air Force, which attacked ply to the overextended Kamp/gruppe river bridges, rail yards, and marshaling Pei per of the Sixth Panzer Army’s 1st SS areas along the Rhine. Eighth Air Force Panzer Division and the paradrop of Col fighters, after completing bomber-escort duties, strafed rail and road traffic east of the Rhine.60 Also with the clear skies came the oppor- A German half-track (below) and a Mark IV tank (opposite page) destroyed in Hauffalize. Belgium. tunity to resupply Bastogne, which by 23 This area ivas repeatedly struck by Ninth A ir Force December had run critically low on ammu- bombers. BATTLE OF THE BULGE 25

Friedrich von der Hevdte’s commandos achieved surprise. However, poor tactical were complete failures.63 However, the execution and planning cost the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe’s night bombings of Bastogne on more than 300 of their attacking aircraft.66 Christmas Eve and again in January had More important, they lost 232 pilots—of their effect. Conducted under flare iilumi- which 18 were unit commanders and 59 nation from Luftwaffe pathfinder aircraft, urere leaders; this was the life’s blood of the attacks exposed a weak point in the the Luftw'affe. As a pitiful epitaph, German Allied air defense—night fighters. General flak gunners shot down as many as 100 of Bradley said, “Enemy air was able again their own returning Luftw'affe aircraft.67 and again to get through to attack the de- In contrast, the Allies replaced the 127 fended city with serious results. [Allied] aircraft lost on the ground in less than a night fighter activity was inadequate.”64 day, and the skies of 1 January 1945 saw' the As the bulge was compressed, the Luft- second largest Allied sortie rate of the waffe attempted one last effort to reduce the battle.68 The Luftw'affe w'as rarely seen effectiveness of Allied fighter-bombers. In a again in any appreciable strength.69 Boden dawn raid on 1 January 1945, 900 Luftwaffe platte w'as more than a total defeat. "The aircraft attacked Allied airfields in Bel- Luftwaffe [had] received its death blow'."70 gium. Holland, and France—operation During the Battle of the Bulge, Allied air Bodenplatte (Base Plate).63 The Luftwaffe power doctrine and its conceptual under- and the German command had once again pinnings had reached full maturity in the 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

European theater of operations. Command- and ground target identification difficult ers of ground and air forces worked along- to impossible.77 General Quesada’s opera- side each other every day, participating tion solved the problem.78 Radar operators together in the planning process from con- helped fighters get under and through the cept to execution.'1 Forward air controllers weather both in the target areas and at re- worked with army maneuver elements covery bases and validated targets by cor- to ensure effective tactical coordination. relating ground locations with tracked The Army used distinctive panels to mark fighter positions. Furthermore, IX TAC its vehicles and fired artillery routinely to used the SCR-584 to “blind bomb” through suppress enemy antiaircraft fire. It also overcast skies such area targets as Saint fired smoke rounds to help fighter pilots Vith and to direct night aerial recon- identify targets. Even Army balloon compa- naissance flights.79 As a result, the fighter- nies helped by identifying friendly positions and assisting in fighter target area navigation." A key element of Allied air control was ground-based radar—a capability that the Luftwaffe ignored. Luftwaffe leaders real- ized neither its importance nor its vulnerabilities. Although they understood the technical capabilities of radar, they never put it to use in the manner employed by the Allies. They saw its use only through the “lens” of their own application—as a facil- itating tool for air defense operations.73 In contrast, General Quesada innovated. He used the microwave early warning (MEW) radar and the SCR-584 antiaircraft radar in several new and unplanned ways, building an entire command and control network centered around this new technology. He put radio intercept operators (Y- Service) with MEW and radio controllers to help win the air battle.73 To assist ground- attack missions, MEW operators coordinated with SCR-584 operators to provide navigation and precise control to fighter- bombers.The wide-band MEW was used for long-range and area control, while the SCR-584, with its narrow beam, was used for close-range, precision work.'6 Throughout the battle, the thick, low clouds, the snow-covered land, and the fluid ground situation made navigation

S(. Vi(h. the vital communications center and choke point captured by the Germans after fierce fighting, is seen under aerial attack on Christmas Day. 1944. This operation was part of the systematic effort to isolate the Germans from their much-needed supplies. BATTLE OF THE BULGE 27

bombers controlled by the IX TAC effec- infancy, “permeated every phase of air tively supported Allied ground forces, even warfare.” It provided for the control and in times of poor weather and confusing direction of "virtually every day or night g r o u n d t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . 811 sortie flown by the TACs.”8J The IX TAC's Had it not been for radar, the coordina- radar-centered command and control sys- tion of effective air-to-ground operations tem became a decisive factor in the battle would have been “incredibly difficult and outcome.84 impossible under the weather conditions” • hat prevailed.81 The effective use of radar Analysis in attacking ground targets was devastating on the enemy, while Allied fratricide was Allied air power’s success and Hitler’s minimal.82 The use of radar, though in its defeat during the Battle of the Bulge vindi- 28 AIRPOWER IOURNAL WINTER 1989 cated the principles of FM 100-20.85 The TAC directed close cooperation through Allies kept the Luftwaffe out of the ground poor weather and confusing ground battle battle and by January had knocked it out of situations—achieving a degree of effective- the war. German ground forces suffered ness that would have been impossible oth- severe delays and heavy losses to their erwise. The TACs’ command and control armored spearheads, which were denied system adjusted to and met the challenge of the tactical mobility of daylight maneuver. a massive, unplanned operation. Field Mar- And Allied air interdiction crushed the shal Gerd von Rundstedt, the nominal com- German logistics effort. In contrast, force mander of the Ardennes offensive, said that structure, doctrine, and leadership prob- Allied air power "made impossible the re- lems doomed the Luftwaffe. shuffling of troops and robbed us of all The Allied command had withstood the mobility.”8' In the words of another Ger- test, and the Allied air commanders had man general, it was like playing chess met the challenge. Exceptions were made where your opponent took three moves to to the "letter'’ of the doctrine to fit the need your one.88 of the battle. Command lines were tailored Though third in priority, air interdiction to fit General Eisenhower’s organization. crushed the German army’s logistical effort. Centralized control was accomplished by The German army had not been underpro- relying on the battle-honed, close-working visioned: rather, the Ardennes attack had relationships of the air force commanders. provided ideal circumstances for interdic- Mission priorities were adjusted to address tion. The tempo of the German Ardennes the threat. The mission of close coopera offensive required supplies in large quanti- tion with ground forces, as prioritized by ties, which in turn had to be transported FM 100-20. was moved ahead of interdic over restricted and ever-lengthening routes tion as a necessity of battle. In addition, the to meet critical timetables. Furthermore, close working relationships of the air and the “malpositioning” of large stockpiles land commanders developed by their col behind a major river barrier, the Rhine, located headquarters proved to be an es- created a significant vulnerability and a sential element of the combat synergism of lucrative target. When executed against the combined air and land power. The doctrine direct Allied ground and air counterstrate- of FM 100-20 proved to be as flexible and gies, Wacht am Rhein failed. responsive as air power itself. The Allies had prepared complementary Allied air forces maintained air suprem air and ground strategies against the Ger- acy over the battle area, which in turn man logistics vulnerability. On the ground, facilitated unhindered Allied ground obstacles like Bastogne frustrated German movement. They had constructed a layered supply and created targets vulnerable to air fighter defense supported by ground con- attack. In the air. the firepower and mobil- trollers and radio intercept operators. ity of Allied air forces slowed resupply to a Meanwhile, they attacked Luftwaffe air- nighttime-only trickle. The Allied attack fields with both fighters and bombers, and on the German logistics system from the the Allies timed their attacks to hit when Rhine, across the Eifel region, and through- the Luftwaffe was most vulnerable—during out the bulge crippled the tempo, timing, landing operations.88 and sustainability of the offensive. With air supremacy achieved, the Allies German supplies were disrupted during successfully executed both the close coop the critical high-usage-rate periods of the eration and interdiction phases of their offensive. The German 2d Panzer Division plan. Innovations in radar used became a of the Fifth Panzer Army ran out of gas just key factor in successfid air-to-ground attack as the US 2d Armored Division attacked it as well as combat in the air. With the MEW on 24 and 25 December at the westernmost and the SCR-584, General Quesada’s IX tip of the bulge salient.8M In other German BATTLE OF THE BULGE 29

divisions, tank and motorized crews aban- prehend the changes that had taken place doned hundreds of vehicles with empty in air power during the five years of war. gas tanks.90 Finally, German morale was Technology, doctrine, and leadership had deflated—and Allied morale boosted—by flourished in air forces other than in the the constant swarming of Allied aircraft Third Reich. The Luftwaffe command had over the battlefield. German ground forces so segregated itself that it became crippled had felt the full impact of successful air by the lack of creative thought. Thus, it interdiction.91 failed to realize either the potential weak- Despite Hitler's success in maintaining nesses of the enemy (i.e., the Allies’ limited secrecy and executing deception, his air number of radar sets) or the strengths of the operations were flawed from the start by Allied doctrine, organization, or command his naive view of air warfare and his dis- and control system. Hitler’s commanders trust of the Luftwaffe leadership. He had had relied solely on their own perceptions deceived his own airmen into posturing the and understood neither their enemy nor air wrong force for the task. The Luftwaffe, power. knowing it had prepared its force structure and basing to fight a totally different conflict. began the Battle of the Bulge demor- alized and disillusioned. The domination of the Luftwaffe's air support system by Epilogue senior ground commanders further fragmented its efforts and diluted any concen- In mid-January 1945, the Soviets launched their final offensive against the tration that could have been achieved with Reich—an attack that by May took them to its scarce resources. Thus, with poor lead- Berlin. To counter it, Hitler ordered all ership at the very top, the wrong force available forces to the east. On 22 January structure, and the lack of unity in the com- near Dasburg, Allied aircraft caught Ger- mand structure, the Luftwaffe misapplied man divisions moving in broad daylight to the basic principles of air power. the Eastern Front. Troops and equipment When examining the Luftwaffe opera- were spread along columns 10 miles long. tions in detail, one finds poor execution Allied air exploited the situation. The IX as well as planning. The senior Luftwaffe TAC alone destroyed more than 2,800 ve- commanders diluted the potential effec- hicles, tanks, and wagons and killed large tiveness of their air assets by shifting oper- numbers of troops.93 ational priorities on an almost daily basis. The Allied air campaign—air superiority, This "flexibility,” which allowed the Luft- close cooperation, and interdiction—had waffe to move from one mission to another, succeeded in full. In a document captured contributed to the lack of adequate air after the war. Cerman Field Marshal power on any one objective. Furthermore, Walther Model, commander of Army Group the Luftwaffe lost the potential to mass its B during the Battle of the Bulge, wrote the forces and brought destruction on its own following statement concerning the effec- airfields when half of its forces were shifted tiveness of air power during the battle: away from Wacht am Rhein to attack the "Enemy number one is the hostile air force, strategic bombers early in the battle. Later, which because of its absolute superiority when the Luftwaffe tried to execute the tries to destroy our spearheads of attack Bodenplatte portion of its prepared air op- and our artillery through fighter-bomber eration, tactical errors and fratricide cost attacks and bomb carpets and to render them the heart of their air force.92 movements in the rear areas impossible.’’94 Moreover, the Luftwaffe leadership and Shortly thereafter, he put a pistol to his the German high command did not com- head and committed suicide. 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

Conclusion wrong. General Quesada’s skillful leader ship provides a rich case study of the History is the only laboratory that we have in vision, flexibility, and innovation required peacetime to develop and try theories of of a great air commander. Furthermore, war. . . . the battle demonstrated the effect of tech- John A. Warden III nology. with increased capabilities, which The Air Campaign could not only improve the tactical effectiveness of forces but directly influence the The air operations during the Battle of the war-fighting concepts and overall force em- Bulge reveal the effect of air power’s mis- ployment. The cohesion of the Allied air sions in the context of a theater-level con- and land forces, working in concert with flict. The contrasting strategies, doctrine, each other, continues to relate how air and organizations of the Allies and the power is synthesized “jointly” in a theater Luftwaffe continue to give us insight into campaign. The “Air Battle of the Bulge” the force structure and decision process validates the foundation of current air of air power employment—both right and power doctrine. □

Notes X. Patton summoned Army Chaplain James H. O'Neill to See Parker, 35. Postwar records show that of this number only "get God on our side for a change" and to pray for good 1.376 were ever operational at any one time, and the Luftwaffe weather. The chaplain complied. On 23 December the skies averaged less than 50 percent operationally ready on any cleared; Chaplain O'Neill earned a medal. Danny S. Parker. given day. Craven and Cate. vol. 3. Europe: Argument to V-E "Battle for the Ardennes. May 1940 and December 1944." Day. January 1944 to May 1945. 673. Strategy and Tactics 71 (November-December 1978): 38. 11. MacDonald. 45. At Kursk the Luftwaffe possessed ap- 2. Lt Gen Lewis H. Brereton. USA. The Brerefon Diaries: proximately 1.850 aircraft against more than 3.000 Soviet The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle fast and Europe. 3 planes. |ohn F. Kreis. Air Warfare and Air Base Defense October 1941-8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow and (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1988), 199. Company. 1946). 7. 12. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. Report bv 3. Michael L. Wolfert. "From Acts to Cobra: Evolution of the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff ori Close Air Support Doctrine in World War Two,” Report the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary' Force. 6 88-2800 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (Washington. D.C.: US Government 19881. 21. Printing Office. 1946), 75. 4. General Spaatz commanded the Northwest African Air 13. "The intention to go over to the offensive in the west Forces, one of the three major subordinate commands under already existed at the end of July." Adolf Galland. The First the Mediterranean Air Command headed by Air Marshal and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces. Tedder Air Vice Marshal Coningham ran the Northwestern 1938-1945 (New York: Holt. 1954). 242. African Tactical Air Force under which both Generals Que- 14. "Strategic Air Wins in Europe," Impact 3. no. 7 (July sada and Kuter served. Frank Craven and James L. Cate. eds.. 1945): 67. The bulk of the gasoline was stored east of the The Army Air Forces in World War II. vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Rhine. Operational History' of the Ninth Air Force, bk. 1. Battle Point August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: Uni- Blank. of the Ardennes: 1 December 1944-31 January 1945, sec. II. 4 versity of Chicago Press. 1948). 162-64. 15. loseph A. Wyant. "Material in Response to Telephone 5. Richard H. Kohn and loseph P. Harahan. eds.. Air Request of 28 September 1945 Concerning Allied Air Effort in (Washington. D.C.: Superiority World War II and Korea during the Battle of the Bulge." an undated reply to Brig Gen Office of Air Force History, 1983), 30. R. C. Candee by the Office of Ninth Air Force History on file at 6. "U.S. Tactical Air Power in Europe." 3. no. 5 (May Impact the Air Force Historical Research Center. Maxwell AFB. Ala 1945): 4; see also Wolfert. 49. Stringent rationing, drawing from existing stockpiles, and 7. War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20. Command importing oil from Hungary had resulted in a 5-million-gallon and Employment of Air Power, 21 July 1943, 1—11. petrol stockpile for the attack in the Ardennes. Any captured 8. Charles B. MacDonald, A Time (New York: for Trumpets Allied gas would be a bonus. MacDonald. 46. William Morrow and Company. Inc.. 1985), 47. 16. Galland. 241-M2. 9. "U.S. Tactical Air Power in Europe.” 45. 17. Ibid.. 241. 10. The German air order of battle on 16 December 1944 18. Ibid. consisted of the following: 19. Vincent J. Esposito, ed.. West Point Atlas of American Jet Aircraft 40 Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959). 60. Level Bombers 55 20. jean Pallud. Battle of the Bulge: Then and Now (London. Ground Attack Aircraft 390 Battle of Britain Prints International. Limited. 1986). 33. Single-engine Fighters 1,770 21. Michael J. F. Bowyer. 2 Group R.A.F.: A Complete Twin-engine Fighters 140 History'. 1936-1945 (London: Faber. 1974). 403-4: see also Reconnaissance Aircraft 65 Galland. 241. TOTAL 2.460 22. Pallud. Battle of the Bulge. 33. BATTLE OF THE BULGE 31

23. MacDonald. 61. Bomber Command accounted for the remainder of the 16.000 24. "Ultra" refers to the German high command encoded sorties. For Allied sortie totals correlated against weather messages that had been intercepted and decoded by the Allies. conditions, see "Another Tactical Air Triumph," 5. This information only went to the commanders ol Allied field 47. Because of the poor weather over the bulge area in the armies, tactical air commands, and above. The lack of any early days of the offensive (16-23 December 1944), the Luft- Ultra information about the impending Cerman attack contrib- waffe leadership decided that aircraft dedicated to the Ar- uted to a dismissal of what little tactical information was dennes offensive would be "reroled" to attack Allied bombers becoming available. Lt Gen Elwood K. Quesada. USAF. Re- that were striking targets deep in Germany. These attacks were tired. interview with author. 9-11 April 1988 (hereafter re- unrelated to the Ardennes campaign. Though this use of ferred to as Quesada. 1988 interview); see also MacDonald. aircraft could have been interpreted as using flexibility of air 60-61. power—or a use-it-or-lose-it philosophy—it resulted in an 25. MacDonald. 40. undesirable Eighth Air Force reaction for the Germans. The 26. Ibid. Eighth “carpet bombed" their airfields. This activity reduced 27 Parker. 38. On 15 December some 18 hours before the the Luftwaffe's support of their primary objective, the Ar- Germans launched their attack. Eisenhower's G-3. in briefing dennes attack. The German air commanders had violated the the air commanders on the ground situation, dismissed the first principle of war. objective. In addition, the Luftwaffe had Ardennes with a simple "nothing to report." See also Craven tipped its hand by "telegraphing" to the Allies the increased and Cate 3:682; and MacDonald. 56—67. numbers of aircraft that were brought into the theater before 28 MacDonald. 79. they could be decisively used. This action squandered scarce 29. An estimation of the tons of supplies per day for a resources. The decision to go against the strategic bombers division in contact can be made by examining the logistics was probably influenced by the Luftwaffe’s intensive plan- requirements for sustaining an equivalent Allied division, ning. positioning, and training for the "cover story" of the adjusted for size and motorized composition. Using this "Great Blow." Galland. 242. yardstick." German logistics requirements in the Ardennes 48. Eisenhower. 77. should have been between 400 and 550 tons per day per 49. The Y-Service was a radio intercept operation, first division in contact and about two-thirds that number while in devised by the British, to monitor and intrude on Luftwaffe movement. To meet this need, a minimum of 2.000 truckloads ground-to-air communications. General Quesada refined the of materiel had to reach the front each day just to sustain the system by collocating this capability with his MEW radar German armv group. 30. Wyant! 23. units. By doing so. the IX TAC gained the information it 31. Ibid.. 23-26. needed to time its airfield attacks to the most vulnerable 32. Ibid.. 16-18. periods of air operations—landings and takeoffs. Quesada. 33. Operational Histon• of the Ninth Air Force, bk. 1. sec. III. 1988 interview. 58. 50. Ibid. 34. Craven and Cate 3:685. 51. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. IV. 35. "Another Tactical Air Triumph." Impact 3. no. 2 (Feb- 39. ruary 1945): 8. 52. General Quesada said that of all the Luftwaffe's short- 36. Note that "close cooperation with ground forces" moved comings. "stupid leadership" was its primary deficiency. to the second priority task from its stated priority in FM Generalleutenant losef Schmid, (Commando West, ran all 100-20. This action at the command level demonstrated that Luftwaffe support for the Ardennes offensive. The German pragmatic Allied decisionmakers had learned to take advan- commander of jagdkorps 11. the Luftwaffe's fighter forces tage of the flexibility of air power. supporting the offensive, was Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz. 37. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I, sec. II. Quesada. 1988 interview. See also Pallud. Battle of the Bulge. 5. 655. 38. The IX. XIX. and XXIX Tactical Air Commands (TACs). 53. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. 111. along with the 9th Bombardment Division were the major 59. subordinate combat commands under the Ninth Air Force. 54.Ibid. Each TAC was assigned to work with a US field army, while 55. Ibid., sec. IV. 6. the Ninth Air Force worked with the Allied 12th Army Croup. 56. Ibid., sec. III. 13. The 9th Bombardment Division, comprised of heavy and light 57. Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations, bombers, worked directly for the Ninth Air Force. vol. IV. Headquarters Ninth Air Force. 1945. 72. 39 Quesada. 1988 interview: see also MacDonald. 419-24: 58. Eisenhower. 77. and Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. II. 59. This change of operaiional command lines was accom- 26. 29-30 plished in a single day. The use of the Eighth's heavy bombers 40. Eisenhower, 76. had not been so easily obtained for General Eisenhower's 41. Quesada. 1988 interview. D-day support. However, the bulge support by the Eighth 42. Operational His ton- of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. I. demonstrated common vision of mission that existed among 2. the air commanders during this phase of the war. It also 43. Ibid.. 26-27. highlighted the flexibility of bomber aviation in its ability to 44. Of the 800 German fighter sorties flown that day. over contribute to the close cooperation and interdiction battles. half were defensive and directed against strategic bombers. Craven and Cate 3:686. See also Operational History of the This activity reflected the confusion that existed within the Ninth Air Force, bk. 1. sec. 111. 12. Luftwaffe as to what its real mission was supposed to be— to 60. History of the Eighth Air Force: Invasion and Victor)'. support the Ardennes offensive or to attack bombers. Craven Headquarters Eighth Air Force. 1945, 144. and Cate 3. 689. 61. MacDonald. 511. 45. Quesada. 1988 interview, 62. Ibid.. 522. 46 Approximately 8.500 sorties were flown by the Ninth 63. Pallud. Battle of the Bulge. 86-89: and MacDonald. 458. Air Force between 23 and 27 December 1944. Operational 64. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. III. History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. III. 62. The British 7. Second Tactical Air Force, the Eighth Air Force, and RAF 65. Lt Gen John K. Cannon. “The Contribution of Air Power 32 A/RPOIVER JOURNAL WINTER 1989 lo (he Defeat of Germany." a report prepared by the assistant under the TACs. Quesada. 1988 interview. chief of staff. A2. Headquarters United States Air Forces in 78. Frisbee. 197. Europe, on file at the Air Force Historical Research Center. 79. Garland. 10. Maxwell AFB. Ala . vol 4. 8 May 1945. 7C(2)(e|. See also 80. Quesada. 1988 interview. Werner C.irbig. Six Months to Oblivion: The Eclipse of the 81. "U.S. Tactical Air Power in Europe." 34. Luftwaffe Fighter Force (New York: Hippocrene Books. Inc.. 82. Two Allied air strikes on Malmbdy (both by the 9th 1975|. 112; Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I, Bombardment Division), one on the Arlon marshaling yards sec. IV. 15—16. 39—4 1. and Pallud. Hattie of the Bulge, 433—36. in Belgium and one on Vcrvicrs. were the most significant 66. Allied antiaircraft artillery (AAA) fire shot down be- events of fratricide by Allied aircraft. Maj Gen Blair E. Gar- tween 80 and 150 aircraft One of the reasons that Allied land. USAF. Retired. 8 February 1989. telephone interview antiaircraft fire was so effective and "not one Allied plane was with the author at Maxwell AFB. Alabama Although both lost” can be attributed to the high state of readiness of the civilian and military casualties occurred at these locations, AAA positions during aircraft takeoff and recovery' cycles. All none had a significant impact on Allied operations. Quesada. sites were manned to alert status, and fighter pilots stood duty 1989 interview. Fighter group leaders were very reluctant to as aircraft identification officers with every gun crew during attack targets on the ground, not knowing whether they were these periods of vulnerability. This was a standing procedure friendly or enemy. The SCR-584 procedures resolved this directed by the commander of the IX TAG, General Quesada. problem. Fighter group leaders would be tracked and vectored After all. these were the very times that Allied air command- by the SCR-584 in the battle area. As Ihev flew over vehicles ers attempted to attack German airfields. It only seemed on the ground they would notify the radar controller. The reasonable that the Luftwaffe might try to imitate the success- controller, knowing the position of the aircraft and the loca- ful tactic. Quesada. 1988 interview. See also John L. Frisbee. tion of friendly positions that were plotted on his X-Y table, ed., Makers of the United States Air Force (Washington. D.C.: could validate whether the target was friendly or enemy. This Office of Air Force History. 1987). 197. was a routine, "day in and day out process" throughout the 67. Adolf Galland. The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall entire Battle of the Bulge. United States loint Board on o) the German Fighter Forces 1938-1945 (New York: Ballan- Scientific Information Policy. Radar. A Report on Science at line Books. 1954). 243; see also Operational History of the War (Washington. D.C.: Office of Scientific Research and Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. IV. 40: and Girbig, 112. Development. 1945), 39. See also MacDonald. 464—65; and 68. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. IV. Quesada. 1988 interview. For more information on Allied 40. and sec. V. 12. fratricide, see Craven and Cate 3:692: Pallud. 388; and lean 69. Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations. Paul Pallud, Ardennes 1944: Peiper and Skorzenv (London: 73: see also "Another Tactical Triumph," 5. Osprey Publishing. 1987). 13. 70. Galland. 242. 83. “U.S. Tactical Air Power in Europe," 34. 71. Gen lames Ferguson. USAF. Retired, interview. 14 June 84. One early example of radar's impact on the battle 1988 at Air University television studio, on file at AU/TV. occurred near Stavelot. Belgium. On 18 December German Maxwell AFB, Alabama Kampfgruppe Peiper approached the bridge over the Linne at 72. Quesada. 1988 interview. Hamiemont. Belgium. This was the last bridge before open 73. Only six radar sets formed the nucleus of the Allied air ground leading to the Meuse River. General Quesada ordered control system. Had these sets been knocked out of action. a spotter plane reconnaissance airborne, despite the dangers Allied air power would have been severely affected. This of fog and cloud ceilings below 100 feet. Capt Richard H could have been an "A chilles' heel" to the entire air support Cassidy and 2Lt Abram |affe volunteered to fly the mission battle. Ibid. Using guidance information from a MEW radar, then an 74. In December 1944. MEW-assisted intercepts were cred- SCR-584 radar, the pilots were guided to the vicinity of ited with 161 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed and 72 damaged. Kampfgruppe Peiper's breakthrough. Breaking a 200-foot ceil- Blair E. Garland. "Radar in ETO Air-Ground Operations." ing in the target area, they quickly discovered the enemy Signals 3. no. 4 (M arch-A pril 1949): 11. column and called for fighter-bomber support. The 365th 75. Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada. USAF. Retired, telephone Fighter Group, under the command of Col Ray Stecker. along interview with author. 14 lanuarv 1989 (hereafter referred to with a squadron each from the 366th and 404th Fighter as Quesada. 1989 interview). Groups were launched through the weather, again under radar 76. General Quesada had modified three SCR-584 antiair- control. The fighter group descended through the clouds and craft radars with Norden bombsights. w hich were placed to a rendezvous with the spotter plane. The attack on KampL upside down and backwards. Mounted on the radar's X-Y axis gruppe Peiper destroyed only a few vehicles. More important plotting table that projected a light beam of the tracked aircraft though, it resulted in a two-hour delay in the column's through a 1:1.000.000-scale ground map. the bombsight-radar movement— just enough time for Army engineers to destroy innovation provided navigation accuracy to within 300 yards the bridge, literally in the face of Peiper's troops. The Battle of of a ground target over 30 miles away. Quesada. 1988 inter- the Bulge was the only lime during the war in which radar was view. See also Garland. 10: and "U .S. Tactical Air Power in so heavily depended on. Reasons for this were improving Europe,” 38. weather, less fluid lines of advance, and shortness of the war 77. At this time there was no distinct forward edge of the after the Battle of the Bulge. Quesada. 1988 interview. See also battle area (FEBAl line, and the situation tasked the Allies Operational History' of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. II. 81. with fighting a significant rear battle for the first time since Craven and Cate 3:687; and MacDonald. 241^14. D-day. Coordinating air power around the pockets of Allied 85. Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations. resistance and in concert with the retreating and reinforcing 45^16: see also “U.S. Tactical Air Power in Europe." 48. ground movements stressed the existing command and con- 86. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. III. trol elements of the TACs' to their limits. The manpower- 44. intensive nature of command and control was one of the major 87. "Strategic. Air Wins in Europe." 63. shortfalls of the pre-D-dav force structure planning. To correct 88. The "chess" analogy was a popular way of describing this deficiency. General Quesada "broke-up" the fighter wing the effects of tactical air power on ground maneuver. General organizations (roughly equivalent to today's air divisions) and Frido von Senger und Etterlin, commander of the Xl\ Panzer reallocated their manpower to the tactical air control system Corps in Italy, is given credit for first use of the phrase. F M BATTLE OF THE BULGE 33

Nalagar. Operation " S tr a n g le " /Italy. Spring 1944): A Case the units in need. Ralph F. Bennett. Ultra in the West The tody of Tactical Air Interdiction (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Normandy Campaign (New York: Scribner. 19801, 217. orporation. 19721. 62; see also Frido von Senger und Etterlin. 92 As stated in FM 100-20. "Counter air force operations Neither Fear Nor Hope (New York: E. D. Dutton. 1964). 224. and air defenses in the theater must be carried on continu- 89. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. I. sec. HI. ously to provide security from hostile air operations," As 4. executed on 1 (anuary 1945. Operation Bodenplatte was 90. Ibid.. 53. designed us a "single blow" of decisive strength. It was a 91 Ultra intercepts during the Battle of the Bulge described woeful underestimation, and it only served to exemplify that he immensely destructive effect of air interdiction. Rein- the Luftwaffe's leadership had very little understanding ol rcements and supplies were cut from the impetus of the how to execute a counterair operation. (tensive. The destruction of rail lines in the Eifel area 93. "Smashing Windup to the Ardennes Bulge Battle Was a made rerouting impossible. Telephone facilities hardly ex- Costly Experience for the Germans." Impact 3. no. 3 (March ited. Supplies had to be hand-loaded and unloaded along the 1945): 2 hine. a condition that seriously delayed them from reaching 94. Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, bk. 1. sec IV. 5. THE CASE FOR OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION A View from the Trenches

Lt C ol Ric h a r d L. D avis, USAF

INCE August 1988 the Air Force has us and of how well we fulfill our profes- been using its new officer evalua- sional obligations along the way. tion system (OES) to measure of- At least one important question remains ficer performance. Although no unanswered, however. What will the em- systemS is perfect, this one attempts to pro- phasis on performance do to our percep- vide a more realistic and balanced assessment of our utility to the service than the, previous version did. In particular, the stress on performance tries to make the rules of the game a little clearer. The basic structure—feedback, evaluation, recommenda- tion for promotion— promises to give us a better understanding of what is expected of OFFICER PM £ 35

tions about the role of professional military eral education was even more necessary to education (PME) for officers? No one actu- ensure sound judgment and high-quality ally says there is no role for PME. Senior decisions by Air Force officers.4 Early Air Air Force leaders, for example, clearly Force leaders knew that winning a war stress its importance and have defended was a complex task, requiring mutual sup- its value before Congress.1 At the same port among the services and broad-thinking time, though, a great deal has been said leadership. They placed high value on PME about reducing the distractions caused by as a key vehicle for preparing officers of all PME by making it more job-related or de- grades: emphasizing its reputation as a necessary square-filler for promotion. Although these It is quite clear that our national security suggestions have some merit, the purpose becomes ever more dependent on the minds of PME can be confusing to the rank and of men rather than their brute strength. Par- file. ticularly is this evident in the United States The question really involves what we Air Force which is faced with periodic crises and realignments of power politics as well as think PME should do for us. If PME has no tremendous technological advances that con- value, we should dismantle Air University stantly modify its mission, its capabilities, and shift its 1 percent of the Air Force and its operations. ... It is essential that budget to more productive uses. However, every effort be made to maintain and enhance PME does have value, and our reasons academic vitality for it is one of the keys to for needing it are implicit in that value. the enormous advantages of gaining the future Writing in the Air University Review. Col first.5 Thomas A. Fabyanic asked, “What is the However, the average officer today may purpose of an AWC [Air War College] edu- not hold this view. Perceptions of nonresi- cation? Do we seek to graduate senior staff dent PME for officers, for example, are officers or senior combat commanders? Do telling. In the past, large numbers of officers we educate colonels or future generals?”2 I enrolled in nonresident courses, but the want to broaden these questions consider- emphasis was on completing PME rather ably. What do we think the purpose of PME than learning from it. The surge of course is for any officer? How does PME fit into completions prior to promotion boards in- the professional development of officers? dicated that these officers considered PME What should PME teach us? And what important for advancement but not partic- should we look for in a sound PME pro- ularly relevant to their jobs. Of course, our gram? new officer-development policy now re- stricts nonresident enrollment until after The Problem of Perception appropriate promotion boards occur.1’ But officers still think that PME courses are a Since 1946 the Air Force system of PME necessary part of the competition for higher has been consolidated at Air University rank. and has consisted of three isolated edu- Meanwhile, officers persist in their per- cational episodes at the junior, interme- ception that selection for intermediate and diate, and senior stages of an officer’s senior service schools in residence is good, career. Air Force leaders in the 1940s but that actual attendance confers no real wanted PME to encourage “forward think- benefit aside from encouraging collegiality ing” with courses taught by “great teacher among select peers. Attendance in resi- types."1 These leaders expected Air Uni- dence is a necessary evil, largely incidental versity to produce graduates with broad to the concerns of the real world. Taken views and a deep, thorough understanding together with the utilitarian view of nonres- of their profession. Although a good tech- ident programs, we can perhaps conclude nical education was important, a good gen- that Air Force officers view PME only as a step toward promotion. Rarely do they ac- Air University, citadel of A ir Force PME. Is it produc knowledge its intended function—a means ing knowledgeable professionals or simply providing of enhancing professional competence. a square that off icers seeking higher rank must fill? A comparison may suggest what is wrong with this perception of PME. In the Soviet Union, officer PME is available through school, attend for two to five years—much about 20 military “academies” roughly longer than our usual 10 months. In order equivalent to the US military staff and war to graduate, they must defend a thesis on a colleges. As in the United States, gradua- military subject.' tion from a Soviet academy is generally The Soviets stress “the ability to think considered a prerequisite for advancement broadly, deeply and quickly, to see the rela- to senior military positions. There the sim- tionship between the part and the whole, ilarity ends, however. The faculty of Soviet to accept high goals and to find effective PME schools, unlike that in our system, is means of achieving them."" We say we directly involved in the development of value the same qualities, but the Soviets military doctrine and strategic planning. provide their officers with an obvious Soviet officers, including flag ranks, must "graduate school" environment for PME. pass a competitive entrance examination to This difference in approach has an interest- qualify for selection and. depending on the ing effect:

36 OFFICER PME 37

The most rigorous critics of Soviet military begin with a specialty. Personnel shall, in weaknesses thrive within their own uni- general, continue with that specialty until formed defense establishment. . . . Self- elimination from the service or selection for criticism plays an institutional role in the greater responsibilities which will be as- Soviet military system. ... In contrast, with signed to those persons who demonstrate the few exceptions, American military officers fundamental characteristics of good judge- are relatively minor players in the world of ment, initiative, common sense, and the over- strategic ideas. Institutions of higher learning all ability to evaluate a problem and effect the in the West pay little heed to military matters best solution.11 as art or science.9 These are good thoughts, and a portion of Contrary to our popular image of the Soviet this philosophy—born of the lessons of system, it directly challenges and expects World War II—has been resurrected in Air officers to think in depth about their pro- Force OES policy, which states in part that fession. Uniformed critics and skeptics— the right focus at the lieutenant and captain at least on military issues—appear to be level is in their career area. The primary con- lauded rather than discouraged. The Soviet cern of all officers should be doing the very military also urges its officers to publish best possible job in their primary duties.12 their views about doctrine and strategy. But General Wilson also spoke of officers Can we say the same about the intellectual having “good judgement,” the "ability to environment of the Air Force? evaluate,” and the ability to find “the best Despite the ambitions of our founding solution." Developing sound professional Air Force leaders, somewhere along the judgment and the ability to think flexibly way we have lost sight of the real useful- should be the highest aspiration of the ness of PME. The advent of the Project professional development of officers. The Warrior program—a type of professional measure of PME’s value, in turn, should be education—reflects a partial recognition of the degree to which it enhances our ability this loss. And the need for a better under- to develop as professionals throughout our standing of what PME should be doing for careers. Yet, the Air Force’s stated objec- us is underscored by the fact that formal tives for PME—at least on paper—fall Air Force PME programs have faced a good somewhat short of the mark. deal of serious criticism over the years, According to AFR 53-8, USAF Officer ranging from poorly qualified faculty and PME System, the purpose of PME is to help superficial instruction to the failure of us become “experts in aerospace power." graduates to understand the doctrine and The subsequent objectives in pursuit of basic aspects of their profession.10 But, as expertise involve broadening our perspec- the founders of Air University well knew, tive and knowledge about aerospace power, PME should not be a square-filler. It should preparing us for higher command and staff play a key, if not vital, role in the profes- duties, increasing our understanding of war sional development of officers. Why? and military forces, and developing creative thinking and "a systematic approach to solving military problems.”11 These PME and the Professional words sound good, but broadened perspec- Development of Officers tive and knowledge can fall short of full comprehension. Preparation for command One answer lies in the words of Maj Gen or staff duty is not necessarily the same as Donald Wilson, who provided direction to preparation for real leadership in war. And the 1945 Army Air Forces (AAF) board increased understanding can fall short of responsible for outlining a postwar PME the ability to analyze and evaluate, just as system for airmen. To General Wilson, a creative thinking and systematic problem young officer should solving may not constitute true profes- Col Viktor Kozlov. Soviet deputy air attache. The The broad philosophy behind OES is a Soviet professional m ilitary schools have a much step in the right direction. Far from de- more thorough curriculum than do American schools and expect their students to perform at the graduate emphasizing PME, our new stress on pro- level. Could ive be doing more to enhance the profes fessional performance should reinvigorate sional knowledge of our senior officers? PME. A careful reading of guidance on officer evaluations, for example, shows sional judgment. In other words, someone that—although training, experience, and who meets the regulation’s criteria for an PME are each important—PME holds a spe- expert in aerospace power may not neces- cial place.14 Training and experience aug- sarily be able to use that power to best ment our immediate performance, helping advantage, especially in war. Judging from us do well in our daily jobs, but PME the regulations alone, we do not challenge programs are oriented toward an officer’s ourselves enough as we learn the profes- future. For good or ill. they will define the sion of war. tenor of officer professional development. The solution is not to change the words One respected practitioner of the art of but to improve our attitudes toward PME. war, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, understood the importance of proper professional development. He felt that battles Far from de-emphasizing PME, our new (and wars) were won by "flexibility of stress on professional performance should mind, eager acceptance of responsibility, a reinvigorate PME. fitting mixture of caution and audacity, and the greater control [compared to the oppo-

38 OFF1CEH PME 39

nent] over the fighting troops."1 ' Rommel motion and to convert the highly trained identified five elements important in devel- crewmember, engineer, or technician into a oping the mental agility required of the professional officer. What, then, should we professional officer (fig. 1). In his view, study and know? these elements combined synergistically to enable the officer to confront and master the challenges of war.16 Underlying that The First Principle of War: synergy is education—PME. Pay Attention In the Air Force our training gives us knowledge of our specialty, and our assign- Given the importance of our profession, ments give us experience in what we are PME should teach us to pay closer atten- trained to do. But if we confine ourselves tion, not only to procedures for using our to the narrow areas of training or experi- individual weapon systems, but also to the ideas and techniques that help us accom- ence—whether as rated or nonrated officers— plish the mission quickly, effectively, and we become merely technical specialists. at the lowest possible cost in terms of lives Once we attain positions of senior lead- and resources. In short, PME teaches us the ership, we will not have the foundation operational art. Yet, effective PME is one necessary to successfully prosecute the op- of those strange, paradoxical commodities erational art of wfar or develop the strategies whose real value becomes apparent only as that require much broader thinking. Thus, we begin to benefit from it. Therefore, we PME’s role is to stretch our thinking well have to begin PME-type studies with a beyond our current assignment or next pro- certain amount of faith in the outcome. But

Rommel’s Five Elements for Officer Professional Development

• Comprehensive instruction in technical and organizational matters, with the specific object of cultivating independence of mind and the ability to think critically. Rommel wrote that "respect for the opinion of this or that great soldier must never be allowed to go so far that nobody dares to discuss it." • Encouraging the ability of a creative intellect to use energy and initiative in employing forces. • A complete understanding of the psychology of the troops, acquired in part by personal contact with them. Rommel felt that leadership by example was vital. • An understanding from military history that battles have rarely gone as planned, since opponents inevitably have plans of their own and the resulting clash of wills creates a multitude of unpredictable results. Strategies that proceeded according to plan were successful because the victor had absolute qualitative or quantitative superiority or “the loser [was] utterly incompetent.” • The greatest efforts must be made to teach officers to avoid both interservice and intraservice rivalries, which hurt unity of purpose and the will to pull together toward a common goal: "[Interservice] struggling for power is rather like sawing off the branch on which one is sitting."

Figure 1 40 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989 there are several important, broad elements By comparison, war is infinitely more that can serve as guides to what is signifi- intangible and complex. How much more cant, including the complex environment important is it, then, that we officers try to of war, the dynamics of the human element, understand the environment of war? Like the value of military history, and the role the pilot, we should try to foresee the types played by individual intuition. of problems we may face in war, asking “what-if” questions about the operational art: How do our opponents think? Why do Knowing the Environment they think that way? What motivates their Probably the most important lesson to gain political leadership and their troops in the is an insight into the environment in which field? What are their most likely decisions? war operates— that amorphous mix of eco- Their least likely decisions? How much are nomics and politics, constraints and ambi- they willing to fight for their cause? Why tions, human reason and human emotion. If are they fighting in the first place? But the we do not understand this environment, pilot has an advantage: an aircraft engine we will not operate successfully in it. To failure is a tangible problem with a rela- stretch the point, the environment for fly- tively fixed set of solutions. Not so in war. ing includes weather and air currents. If we Success in war requires lengthy and careful do not understand how this environment study of possible conflict scenarios, opera- functions, the airplanes we design may not work—at least while in flight. To cope in this environment, pilots study aircraft sys- Air Force PME has always been treated as three tems to enhance their understanding and isolated episodes in an officer's career. Indeed, many “hanger-fly” emergency procedures to an- officers will never seriously study their profession ticipate solutions to potential problems. again after Squadron Officer School. OFFICER PME 41

tional requirements, strategies, and the is- has been made. Without the competin sues that motivate people to war. Such is wills of men prosecuting the conflict, tl the stuff of real PME. most sophisticated weapon system we h. is useless—it cannot will itself to fig Chess Games Even with a highly computerized, rob<> system, some person has to turn it on ai As we begin to understand the environ- point it in the desired direction.1'1 ment of war. it very quickly becomes clear War is not an exercise of the will direcli that moral factors—morale, courage, dedi- against a detached, inanimate object. 1 cation. and the will to fight—have an in- war, our will opposes that of living oppo credible effect on the outcome of a war, let nents who think and react as they choose.“ alone a battle. These elements are impor- Rommel alludes to this situation in hi tant because the dynamics of war primarily fourth element. Our weapons—whether involve competition between the minds of tanks, ships, airplanes, or cavalry sabers- the participants. Someone once said that are only inanimate extensions of ourselves the true victory in a game of chess is not to Focusing on things like technology, paper achieve the mate but to compel the oppo- wrars, or quantities of weapon systems— nent to resign. As Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart put it, the goal is to convince our although these factors certainly should be opponents that they cannot win—not nec- considered—lowers our thinking below the essarily to mercilessly crush them.1' Con- level of operational art and makes war versely, it is possible to crush opponents something it is not. but fail to defeat them; they will be back as soon as they are able. The Value of Military History The significance of the psychology of war underlies our efforts toward “defeating the A third element that should emerge from enemy will.” To force our opponents “to PME is a sound appreciation for military resign,” we must understand and evaluate history. Even a cursory review of the record their psychology and military thinking as will show that almost every great military well as our own. Success directly depends leader recognized that, in prosecuting war. upon how well we evaluate our opponents, one must accept the fact that there are few ourselves, and our potential responses in a quick and easy answers to very complex given situation. If we are successful in this dilemmas. We must be prepared for the endeavor, we have mastered the art of war. unexpected by studying how other military And it is through PME that these aspects of professionals handled the confusion and war become apparent. complexities of combat. Knowing military This line of reasoning leads to another history, in other words, directly benefits point, which to the tactically oriented will the professional soldier. Napoleon was sound like heresy. Since war is a competi- blunt: "Read and meditate upon the wars of tion between minds, the conduct of war— the great captains. This is the only means of the operational art—has very little to do rightly learning the science of war.”21 We with weapon systems or technology, per can also learn from mistakes; history is se. Weapons and technology are important replete with examples of the results of only as tools. The conduct of war uses a military leaders failing to fully understand given set of weapons to accomplish some the complexities of their profession. end.1B Technology does not answer ques- It is important to realize that the purpose tions such as when, where, or why we here is not to quantify knowledge by enu- should fight: how much we should spend; merating battles, wars, dates, names, and how far we should go; or how often we places—though these details may provide a should strike. Technology simply enables framework for comparison. The purpose us to pursue the solution once a decision is to develop flexibility in our thinking. 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

Rather than concentrating on facts or con- parent—politics.23 We may argue with spe- tent, we should learn our lessons by exam- cific points that Clausewitz makes, but we ining how men have tried to dominate each must understand military history and the other in war. Understanding history thus rationale behind his ideas in order to argue prevents us from viewing war in a vacuum, intelligently about those ideas.24 alerts us to its unquantifiable aspects, and One of his more compelling conclusions helps provide the degree of mental agility is that commanders must rely on their essential to any comprehensive critical as- “imaginative intellect” to succeed. This in- sessment. As professional Air Force offi- tellect, a sort of internal guide or insight cers, we are not limited to the 78 years that to action, must be developed by a careful delimit the history of air power. We share and reasoned study of history and military with the Army and Navy the same age-old theory—subjects that should be included in warrior heritage. Truly learning the lessons PME.2:’ However, the mental requirements of this history requires career-long reflec- differ according to the various stages of an tion and is based on the insights or broad officer’s career. For the young, energetic impressions gained from continuing study. officer—such as a fighter pilot—boldness, Our experience in Vietnam provides just audacity, and quick reactions are prerequi- one example of what might be learned. sites for success. But a theater commander While we were in the proverbial alligator- dealing with operational problems needs a infested swamp in Vietnam, our approach different degree of mental agility, insight, favored the tacticians—the alligator eaters. and intellect. The boldness of the aggres- As the attention of senior military leaders sive young pilot must, in the general officer, focused on the tactical level, we gradually be tempered by insight, intelligent assess- lost sight of the real reason for the fight. ment, and broader professional judgment.26 Counting alligators became the standard of Due to the danger, chaos, and fog of war, success, rather than ensuring that opera- the moment of combat—like the moment of tions successfully proceeded toward the engine failure in an aircraft—is the wrong larger policy objective of draining the time for a lengthy contemplation of alterna- swamp. Eventually, the pursuit of combat tives. Therefore, in order to assure at least became an end in itself. Our collective some measure of success, we must develop failure to acknowledge ineffective leader- professional insight by thinking about fac- ship, inefficient tactics, or the limitations of tors affecting a possible war when we are air power led to defeat.22 Analyzing situa- still at peace. Our opponents have their tions like this one does not equip us with own perception of conflict, based on the formulas for solving problems, but it can conditioning of their culture, social values, help us understand relationships, reevalu- military heritage, and history. They are ate priorities, and exercise our intuitive “animate objects” who will respond to our skills when we deal with the inevitable fog actions just as we will respond to theirs, of war. based on the limits of our conditioning, perceptions, and intuition. Success in war depends on retaining some element of ini- Clausewitz on PME tiative over our opponents, keeping them Carl von Clausewitz clearly saw the value off balance, and manipulating deployment of a regimen of professional study. In par- and employment of forces to our advantage. ticular. he drew his lessons on the art of Understanding how we and our opponents war directly from military history, which think serves this end directly. provided the basis for his most pertinent By the time we assume responsibilities as and eloquent prose. This writing dealt senior officers, we must be used to think- not with facts and figures but with the ing. reading, and writing about broad mil- attitudes and thinking behind war and its itary concepts and have expanded our OFF1CEH PME 43

thoughts well beyond the tactical level.' professional football player eats, breathes, Likewise, it should be apparent to us that and thinks his sport. Professional soldiers war offers no simple keys to success. Clause- should be just as eager to understand and witz’s chief principle of war was that there absorb the art of war. Yet, war is not as clear are no abiding principles of war.2B Every- cut as a game of football: there exists no thing is circumstantial. Successful fighting neat line of scrimmage. One has to antici- cannot depend solely upon lists of maxims, pate things like the equivalent of enemy as though war could be run with checklists Spetsnaz linebackers standing next to the and neat procedures. Checklists, of course, quarterback. It takes time to understand have their advantages—they are relatively war, an intelligent approach to study the easy to write, and they do not require much right things, and reflective thought to pre- thinking to implement. But good checklists pare for war’s uncertainties. have a lot behind them. Those for flying, for Since our minds are formed by the knowl- example, are based on extensive flight man- edge and ideas we receive over time, it uals. To learn to fly, we study the flight is very important that we design a long- manuals—not the checklists. Similarly, re- term PME program that properly develops lying solely on lists of "principles of war” our professional thinking. If ideas taught ignores the need to understand the history through PME are limited to accepted and experience that inform these princi- dogma, established models, or mastery of ples. rote procedures, or if the goal of a PME program is to provide only a superficial familiarity with a wide range of topics, then Can We Do Better? we will be poorly prepared for the unexpected or for situations that do not fit the As the previous discussion suggests, mil- patterns we have learned. A good PME itary professionals need a sound educa- program, therefore, should help provide us tion that requires considerable reading and with the ability to see the combat situation study so that they can learn the proper in a comprehensive fashion and to exercise concepts and ask the right questions. Cur- the mental freedom necessary to dominate rently, the Air Force provides reading ma- events and not be dominated by them.11 A terial, including books and key periodicals, good PME program should help us learn to to all general officers and encourages com- question the basic assumptions we make pany- and field-grade officers to participate about the issues affecting our profession. If in Project Warrior. Further, an Air Univer- our assumptions are sound, they will be sity suggested guide to professional reading vindicated by such questioning. If not. we lists 33 good titles.29 However, unlike other need to discover their shortcomings before professionals—such as lawyers or physi- we fight the next war. cians—we do not have formal reading re- Although officers do the learning, the Air quirements beyond commissioning, and Force as a corporate body has a clear re- officers are not seriously challenged to responsibility to ensure that its PME program flect upon some of the basic assumptions of truly serves the profession by presenting a their profession of arms. curriculum that is cohesive and effective One of the more common responses to in challenging officers to think. It is not this last observation is that there is no time enough just to “have a program." The pro- to do much professional reading. It is diffi- grams we select must be susceptible and cult to be a professional, however, if one responsive to recurring critical assessment. does not think about the elements of the The historian Daniel Boorstin once wrote profession. Inevitably, we reserve our best that the greater obstacles to discovery thinking for our favorite interest or spe- and progress are not ignorance but “the c i a l t y . 10 To be s u c c e s s f u l , for e x a m p le , the illusions of knowledge.’’12 This defect is 44 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

not exclusively the fault of academics, as pursue PME for its own sake, to improve shown by similar criticism closer to home: our ability to question and analyze, to re- The [military services' PME] schools permit main receptive to alternatives, and to un- their charges to range over vast expanses of derstand as well as we can the context subject matter but keep the herd moving so within which we employ aerospace power. fast that there is scant time for intellectual Each of us should want to be perpetually grazing. The danger of this approach is that challenged in this way. After all. it is our it creates an unjustified sensation of exper- own capacities—or incapacities—for judg- tise.*3 ment that will be tested in time of war. Thus, PME is critical to the quality of This statement is similar to the often- leadership we provide as Air Force officers. heard complaint that the Air Force’s PME And its success depends on our percep- curriculum is "a mile wide and an inch tions of its value. We benefit most from deep." Yet it is clear that our requirement PME by treating professional education as for intelligent military thinkers and first- a way of life that involves a desire to rate leadership is becoming more impor- continuously study and reflect upon the tant, not less. Is our current approach various aspects of our profession. As Rear sufficient for future needs? Actually, we Adm Ronald ). Kurth put it, the intent is probably do not need a PME program in not to create ivory-tower intellectuals, but order to fly and fight; our specialized train- to develop within ourselves an ability to ing programs serve us quite well in that exercise sound professional judgment respect. But I suggest that we must have a and enlarge our focus over time from nar- good PME program if we expect to fight and row tactical thinking to broad strategic win. We officers must recognize and accept thinking.14 It is a necessary professional the real value of PME and be willing to step. If we do not take the lead in such pursue lifelong professional study. thinking about the uses of aerospace power, This last point is of paramount impor- we will end up following a lead determined tance. As professionals, we should want to by others. □

Notes 1. For example. Gen |ohn T. Chain. Jr., commander in chief Education and Training of Soviet Air Force Officers." Strate- of Strategic Air Command, recently presented to a Mouse gic Review. Spring 1977. 86-87. Armed Services Committee panel excellent statements about 8. Gen-Maj A. S. Milovidov and Col V. G. Kozlov, eds.. The the importance and purpose of PME. See AFRP 190-1. Air Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Con Force Policy Letter for Commanders, October 1988. temporary War (A Soviet View), translated and published 2. Col Thomas A. Fabyanic. USAF. Retired. "War. Doctrine, under the auspices of the US Air Force. Soviet Military and the Air War College: Some Relationships and Implications Thought Series, vol. 5 (Washington, D C.: Government Print- for the U.S. Air Force." Air University Review. January- ing Office. 1975), 183. February 1986. 4. 1 recommend that all officers carefully 9. Ll Col C. Murphy Donovan. "Military Vulnerabilities: reread this article. Why We Ignore Them.” Strategic Review, Summer 1988. 41 3. These terms were used by Maj Gen David M. Schlatter, The Soviet approach contrasts markedly with that of the US first deputy commanding general of education at Air Univer- armed forces, who basically abdicate strategic thinking to sity. in First Report of the Board of Visitors (BOV) (Maxwell civilian think tanks and "beltway bandits.” See also Harriet Field. Ala.; Air University. Spring 1946). 11. 20. 22-23: and Fast Scott and William F. Scott. Soviet Military’ Doctrine: Third Report of the BOV (Maxwell Field. Ala.: Air University. Continuity. Formulation, and Dissemination (London: West- 1947). 33-34. view Press. 1988). 218-20. 4. Second Report of the BOV (Maxwell Field. Ala.: Air 10. Lt Col Harvey J. Crawford et al.. "CADRE Officer University. Fall 1946). 4-6. Professional Military Education Study" (Maxwell AFB. Ala.. 5. Thirteenth Report of the BOV (Maxwell Field. Ala.: Air Airpower Research Institute. Center for Aerospace Doctrine. University, 1957), 3. Research, and Education. June 1988). 4—6 to 4-14. 5-9 to 5-30. 6. AFR 53-8. USAF Officer Professional Military' Education The latest criticism, which echoed many concerns from earlier System. 24 October 1986; change 1. 16 November 1987. 11. 14. studies, came from the report of a committee chaired by 16-17. Rep Ike Skelton (Democrat. Missouri): House Committee on 7. Col Richard G. Head. "Military Affairs Abroad: Soviet Armed Services. Report of the Panel on Military Education of Military Education." Air University Review. November- the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong.. 1st sess.. 21 April December 1978. 45-57; and Lt Col Michael P. Murray. )r.. "The 1989. OFT1CEH PME 45

11. Memorandum by Mai Gen Donald Wilson to the presi- remains the main element in a control system, although his dent. Army Air Forces Board, subiect: Army Air Forces functions constantly change (Milovidov and Kozlov. 182) Postwar School System. 9 August 1945 20. Clausewitz. 149. 12. AFP 36-20. OES: Officer Evulunfion System. 4 April 21. Quoted in David G. Chandler. The Campaigns of Napo- 1988. 2 leon (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.. Inc.. 19661. 138. 13. AFR 53-8. USAF Officer PME System. October 1980, 8. "Science ol war" has also been translated "art of war " See 14. AFP 36-30. 2 See also AFM 1 I. Basic Aerospace Robert Cowley, "A Note to the Reader." The Journal Doctrine United Slates Air Force. 16 March 1984. 2-4: Quarterly of the of Military Autumn 1988. 2. Clausewitz echoes the "There is no simple formula to learn warfigbling. Gaining that History. same sentiment as Napoleon in On War, 185. knowledge is a continuous process that is the product ot 22. For the sake of argument, this statement of the problem institutionalized education and training, experience, and per- ignores the question of whether the objective was well defined sonal effort.- in the first place. See Lawrence E. Grinler and Peter M Dunn, 15. B H. Liddell Hart. The Homme! Papers IN'ew York: eds.. The American War in Vietnam: Lessons. Legacies, ami Harcourt. Brace and Company. 1953). 517. Rommel also Implications for Future Conflicts (New York: Greenwood complained of the tendency to be trapped by tradition, even in Press. 1987). 69-81 matters of science and technology. Following World War 1. tor 23. Clausewitz. 75-123. 603-10. example. 24. See, for example. Charles C. Petersen. "Soviet Strategy many of the European General Staffs became rigidly doctri- in the Arctic," Wings of Cold. Fall 1988. 31. naire in their outlook. While unquestioningly accepting the 25. Clausewitz. 140—11. views of great men in matters of principle, they themselves 26. Ibid.. 190-91. became lost in the detail, tangled it all up into a dreadful 27. Gen Charles L. Donnelly. "A Theater-level View of Air complexity, turned warfare into an exchange of memoranda Pow'er." Air Clues, October 1988, 378. and stuck to their ideas through thick and thin. Soon they 28. Clausewitz, 140. were unable to see even the simplest possibilities of a 29. The Air University Suggested Professional Heading situation, and they never failed to find in their followers Guide was last printed in 1989. OPR: AU DCS PIans and and fellow-thinkers a sounding-board for their theories Programs, Maxwell AFB. Alabama. (516). 30. See. for example. Allan Bloom. The Closing of the 16. Ibid.. 518-19 American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.. 1987). 16 31. Clausewitz. 578. 17. B. H. Liddell Hart. Strategy (New York: Praeger Publish- ers. Inc.. 1974). 352. 32. Daniel I Boorstin. The Discoverers: A History of Man's 18. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. ed and trans. Michael Search to Know His World and Himself (New York: Vintage Howard and Peter Pare! (Princeton. N.|.; Princeton University Books. 1983). xv. See also Fabyanic, 13. 33. Maureen Mylander. "Graduate School for the Generals." Press. 19841. 144-15. 148. Washington Monthly. October 1974. 46—17. An interesting 19. Steven M. Shaker and Alan R. Wise. War Without counterpoint was made earlier by Maj Gen David Schlatter, Men Robots on the Future Battlefield (Washington. DC.: first deputy commanding general ol education at Air Univer- Pergamon-Brassev's International Defense Publishers. Inc.. 1988), 10. Autonomous robotic systems are possible, but even sity: these would be directed “like pieces on a chessboard." and Our success is not going to be measured by the quantity or constrained by the limits of their programming (ibid.. 48. number of students we put out. It is going to be measured by 63-65. 173-761. Perhaps a more interesting conclusion is the quality of those students and on the correctness of our reached by the Soviets: doctrines and concepts (First Report of the BOV, 20|. We cannot place any limits beyond which control automa- 34 Rear Adm Ronald ). Kurth. "President's Notes." Naval tion is impossible. (However.] the deciding word in expand- War College Review, Summer 1988. 4-5. Admiral Kurth is ing capabilities of automation goes to man. who was and president of the Naval War College. ANTISATELLITES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

M arc J. Ber ko w it z

UTER space is popularly per- The proposal for a major new antisatel- ceived as the “final frontier.” lite (ASAT) program contained in the US People see it as a pristine envi- defense budget request for fiscal years 1990 ronment untouched by the polit- and 1991 has aroused antipathy in Con- icalO enmities and military rivalries that gress and the arms control community. The burden mankind on earth. As Thomas budget seeks funding for a mix of ground- Schelling observed some 25 years ago, based kinetic and directed-energy ASAT there is "an aesthetic prejudice against con- taminating the heavens with military objects and activities . . . a sense of awe and mystery, [and] general uneasiness at letting the arms race spill into space just because space is there waiting to be occupied."1 This continues to be a deeply held sentiment for many people today. Although space has been "militarized” for over 20 years, the prospect of the United States and the Soviet Union “weaponizing” space and potentially ending its status as a sanctuary from conflict elicits strong criticism.

48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

capabilities as well as for upgrades to the atoria on testing the F-15-launched mini- existing space surveillance network. Objec- ature homing vehicle ASAT against an ob- tions to ASAT weapons go beyond a mere ject in space, which ultimately led to visceral preference for preventing the fur- cancellation of the system last year, was an ther militarization of space. A central argu- effort to legislate such restraint. ment against the acquisition of dedicated Debate over the new program can be ASAT weapon systems is that they would expected to focus on whether a US ASAT undermine strategic stability and increase capability would be “destabilizing." This the probability of war. article examines critically the argument Critics argue that ASATs could spark a that ASATs would undermine strategic sta- competition in space weaponry in which bility. It discusses the concerns of people the superpowers would be racing to achieve who oppose US acquisition of dedicated dangerous unilateral advantages and could ASAT capabilities and assesses the validity be the proximate cause of war in an acute of premises underlying the argument that political crisis. In their view, rather than ASATs would promote strategic instability. acquiring dedicated ASAT weapons, the United States should be attempting to ar- The NAVSTAH global positioning system (GPSJ is rest the development, testing, and deploy- designed to provide precise positioning for weapons platforms on earth. It is part of the ever-increasing US ment of space weaponry either through reliance on space-based systems. Although the US tormal negotiation with the Soviet Union or considers the CPS nonlethal. the Soviet Union may in unilateral restraint. The congressional mor- fact perceive the system as a direct m ilitary threat. A defense satellite program (DSP/ satellite. Critics of ASAT technolog}' argue that because of L'S reliance on such satellites, we have more to lose by developing ASAT technology than we have to gain. ASATs and Strategic Instability The centerpiece of the case against ASAT acquisition is that it would have pro- foundly malign consequences for strategic stability. Critics assert that certain satellites, such as reconnaissance satellites for monitoring arms control compliance and has been diminished by the unilateral test- early warning satellites for detecting ballis- ing moratorium announced by then Gen tic missile attack, perform nonthreatening Secretary Yuri Andropov in August 1983. military support functions that contribute US satellites in geosynchronous orbit, to stability and peace. They claim that moreover, remain invulnerable to attack acquisition of a US ASAT weapon would since the co-orbital ASAT can threaten only increase the vulnerability of such military those satellites in low earth orbits. space systems and thereby erode arms race In effect, critics claim that the technolog- and crisis stability. ical sophistication of potential US ASAT capabilities would pose a far more serious threat to vital Soviet satellites.4 Indeed, the Arms Race Instability United States could field an ASAT weapon The first part of the instability case is that that could negate Soviet satellites in high ASATs promote arms race instability. Crit- orbits. US acquisition of ASAT capabilities, ics argue that neither the United States nor they argue, thus will promote arms race the Soviet Union presently has an opera- instability because the Soviet Union will tional system that could be considered a be forced to respond by developing and very significant threat to the other's satel- deploying a new and more sophisticated lites. The superpowers thus have been able ASAT weapon capable of placing critical to conduct their space activities in a rela- US satellites at greater risk.' tively benign environment for nearly three A general refrain of this argument is that decades. The contention, however, is that the United States has more to lose in an this situation will change if the United unrestrained ASAT competition than the Soviet Union because it is more dependent States acquires ASAT weapons. In short, on military space systems.b The argument critics allege that the United States will asserts that the United States, as the leader stimulate a new and expensive round of the of a global maritime alliance, is reliant on arms race by moving forward with an ASAT satellites to maintain command, control, and program.2 communications with its overseas bases A key assertion is that the Soviet Union's and forces. The Soviet Union, however, is dedicated co-orbital (or coplanar) ASAT able to rely primarily on interior lines of system, which must be launched into the communications because it is a continental same orbital plane as its target satellite, is a (Eurasian) land power that has fewer mili- crude and ineffective weapon system.3 The tary forces deployed beyond its borders. An contention is that the satellite interceptor is ASAT competition, therefore, would place the product of 1960s-vintage technology the United States ultimately at a disadvan- and that Soviet confidence in the system tage.

49 The directed-energy research facility at Sary Shagan, a similar price in reduced security if ASATs USSR, used to test ground-based lasers. The Soviets are not constrained either by arms control are developing a variety of new technologies for space defense, regardless of US activities. or unilateral restraint.

Critics often cite US deployment of mul- Crisis Instability tiple independently targetable reentry vehi- The second part of the instability case cles (MIRVs) as a relevant historical against ASATs is that they promote crisis analogy.' They argue that the “destabi- instability. Critics argue that prevention lizing" nature of MIRVs was recognized at of armed conflict erupting out of a deep the time of the Strategic Arms Limitation United States-Soviet political crisis could Talks (SALT) I negotiations and that a bi- depend to a considerable extent on the use lateral United States-Soviet agreement to of satellites as instruments for monitoring prohibit their deployment could easily and assessing the adversary’s actions as have been reached. Instead, the United well as for maintaining reliable communi- States declined to explore arms control cations.8 In an acute crisis where both super- seriously and chose to deploy MIRVs in powers possessed sophisticated ASAT weap- order to gain a temporary military advan- ons, according to this reasoning, knowledge tage. The unexpected consequence of that that the opponent had an effective capabil- decision was that the United States con- ity to neutralize or destroy vital satellites tributed to the vulnerability of its own could undermine crisis-management efforts land-based intercontinental ballistic mis- and contribute to crisis escalation.9 Indeed, sile (ICBM) force. The lesson to be learned, awareness that critical satellites were at of course, is that the United States will pay risk could undermine confidence in deter-

50 M could depend on the continuous flow of flow the continuous on depend could a orcon- limiting ofdifficulty controlling preemptive produce overwhelming could strikeit might since become self-fulfilling satellite communications. ASAT employ- communications. satellite of chance touse avertingnuclear escalation argueCritics rence. thatfear of a surprise employment andwould add toproblem the employment ties broke out during a crisis, whatever ties whatever broke out during a crisis, flict itonce was under way.11If hostili- weapons increase the could significantly incentives.10 a first with inconjunction attack ASAT ons could exacerbate instabilities inherent instabilities onsexacerbate could limitation.12 of conflict nuclearHence, forces.loss the of satellites of control and command the subsequent andwouldgreatly complicate information thement stream of woulddisrupt such would make it difficult to restrain nuclear would to makenuclear it restrain difficult andcontrol command for strategic utilized Furthermore, they argue thatFurthermore, ASAT A related contention is weap- that ASAT A related contention This action could weaken centralized com- could weaken action centralized This byquickly the other superpower andwould be recognized would ever, most likely how status, alert heightened The raised. “decapitation' anuclear against precaution it systems.13 to argument, this According when the alert level of strategic forces is forces of strategic level the when alert within the military command structure as authority launch to diffuse necessary is Thus, it is asserted that ASATs could con- could itASATs that is asserted Thus, tribute to fear of “decapitation” and, at and, totribute fear of “decapitation” rized precipitating escalation. launches, unautho- or inadvertent inmand andresult and control command inand US Soviet would greatly increase the difficulty of difficulty the increase greatly would Similarly, loss of satellites surveillance ers tonegotiationsconduct or bargaining. and the of constrain ability the superpowr- im- would satellites of communications termination.15flict Widespread destruction could reduce of the likelihood early con- compliance with the terms of terms the an agree- with compliance would side neither since after an armistice mand instability.14 aggravate levels, com- alert heightened prompt aresponse. precautionary similar be able to gauge the extent of the other’s other’s of the tobe gaugeable extent the and negotiations during w'ar-termination ASAT capabilities would undermine stra- undermine would capabilities ASAT monitoring the adversary’s behavior both behavior adversary’s the monitoring order of any cease-fire pede transmission ment.16 gic instability case concern (1) the cause (1)ofthe cause concern case gicinstability prem- underlying several on isof warbased probability the increase and tegic stability tion, control, andtermination. control, tion, and(4) criteria; the defined)crisis-stability of (3) bilities; (Western- acceptance Soviet competition; arms States-Soviet United the strate- the framing assumptions Basic ises. (2) the threat posed by Soviet ASAT capa- (2) ASAT the posedbythreat Soviet importance of satellites for conflict limita- importancefor of satellites conflict In addition, critics argueIn thatASATs critics addition, The argument that US acquisition of acquisition US that argument The InstabilityArgument STRATEGIC lw i the in Flaws STABILITY 51 52 A/RPOIVER IOURNAL WINTER 1989

“The Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans. Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions . . . on either side . . . necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon which fuels the arms race." Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

Causes of the United States-Soviet that “the Soviet Union and the United Arms Competition States mutually influence one another’s The concept of arms race stability pro- strategic plans. Whatever be their intentions. whatever be our intentions, actions pounded by people who oppose the acqui- . . . on eith e r sid e . . . n e c e s s a r ily trigger sition of a US ASAT capability holds that reactions on the other side. It is precisely the engine of the United States-Soviet arms this action-reaction phenomenon which fu- competition is the first-strike fears pro- els the arms race.”17 duced by weapons programs designed to The history of the last two decades threaten an opponent's deterrent. They ar- should have discredited this simplistic the- gue that the Soviet Union would build a ory as an adequate explanation for the new and more sophisticated ASAT weapon United States-Soviet arms competition. in response to the threat posed by US ASAT In the 1960s. for example, critics of the capabilities and that this would initiate a US Safeguard/Sentinel antiballistic missile new “spiraj" of the arms race wherein both (ABM) program argued on the basis of the superpowers would be seeking to gain a action-reaction model that deployment of a unilateral military advantage in space ballistic missile defense would prompt re- weaponry. The problem with this concept active Soviet offensive deployments.18 The of arms race stability, however, is that it is corollary to their argument was that arms based on a theory of arms race dynamics control could intervene in this cycle of that historical evidence suggests strongly to force procurements. The 1972 ABM Treaty, be false. of course, was based in part on such logic. Critics of a US ASAT capability are es- It was presented to the American public sentially repeating the hypothesis that US and Congress as the means for constraining and Soviet force-acquisition programs are strategic offensive forces (i.e., “stabilizing’ locked in an "action-reaction” cycle. This the arms race). hypothesis, as elaborated by former Secre- The subsequent record of Soviet force tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, holds acquisitions, however, did not validate STRATEG1C STABILITY 53

the action-reaction hypothesis. While the sents the threat posed by Soviet ASAT United States leveled off ICBM procure- capabilities. It is incorrect to portray the ment and virtually ceased strategic defense co-orbital satellite interceptor as a crude efforts, the Soviet Union proceeded with a and ineffective weapon. The Soviets con- military buildup. As former Secretary of tinued to test, refine, and incorporate new Defense Harold Brown observed. “Clearly components into the system after complet- over the past 20 years they have kept growing its initial design. As the Defense De- ing at a steady rate. When we did more, partment has stated, “Given the complexity they kept building at a steady rate. When of launch, target tracking, and radar-guided we cut back, they kept building at a steady intercept, the Soviet ASAT is far from prim- rate.”19 itive. Soviet ASAT tests have been largely In short, the action-reaction model is not successful, indicating an operational sys- a satisfactory explanation for Soviet arms tem fully capable of performing its mis- behavior. Despite the lack of empirical evi- sion.’’21 Between October 1968 and June dence, critics of a US ASAT capability 1982. the system was successful in nine out confidently predict that it would promote of 14 tests (64 percent) in a radar-guided arms race instability on the basis of a spe- configuration. cious theory of arms race dynamics. They In addition, it is specious to claim that fail to consider seriously the possibility Soviet confidence in the ability of the co- that Soviet weapons programs are driven orbital ASAT to perform its mission has primarily by their own internal logic and been undermined as a result of the unilat- objectives. Thus, they overlook the evi- eral testing moratorium. Testing of the system was interrupted twice previously dence that doctrinal requirements are the (December 1971-February 1976 and May principal driving forces behind the Soviet 1978-April 1980) without any deleterious Union's military space posture.211 effect on its performance. During these stand- Fear of the effect of reactive Soviet ASAT down periods, improvements were likely deployments on arms race stability should incorporated into the system’s design.22 not lead people to oppose a US ASAT The co-orbital ASAT, moreover, probably program. Opposing this program in the does not require integrated testing in order belief that responsive Soviet ASAT deploy- to maintain confidence in the system. Com- ments would degrade stability is predi- ponents could be tested on the ground or cated on the assumption that the Soviet exercised in the numerous launches, ren- Union will not pursue additional ASAT dezvous, and dockings in space that the capabilities unless motivated by US ac- Soviet Union conducts each year. The ren- tions. Yet. acquisition of a US ASAT capa- dezvous and dockings, of course, are essen- bility would not lead to reactive Soviet tially the resolution of intercept problems. ASAT deployments. As discussed below, Soviet confidence in the reliability of the the Soviet Union has been actively devel- system is also reinforced by the fact that the oping ASAT capabilities for years in accor- SL-11 booster used to launch the satellite dance with military doctrinal requirements interceptor continues to be successfully for attaining and maintaining military employed five or six times per year. space superiority in order to deny the People who oppose US acquisition of a United States and its allies the use of space. dedicated ASAT also misrepresent the threat posed by Soviet ASAT capabilities Soviet ASAT Capabilities by focusing almost solely on the co-orbital interceptor to the exclusion of other capa- The assertion that the Soviet co-orbital bilities that could interfere purposefully ASAT interceptor does not pose a very with the timely functioning of a “space significant threat to US satellites misrepre- system.” The ASAT mission can be per- 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989 formed by any weapon capable of disrupt- on ground- and space-based particle beam, ing or destroying any one of a space radio-frequency (high-power microwave), system’s three (orbital, link, and terrestrial) and kinetic-energy weapons technologies segments. These critics generally overlook as part of its strategic defense program, the fact that the Soviet Union presently has which could provide additional ASAT capa- several other weapons available for use in bilities.24 These exotic-technology weap- an ASAT role and is vigorously developing ons programs may come to fruition in the additional ASAT weapons technologies. In future. Indeed, Rear Adm Thomas Brooks, addition to the co-orbital satellite intercep- the director of naval intelligence, recently tor armed with a nonnuclear warhead and disclosed that the introduction of a more capable of negating satellites at low alti- powerful, compact nuclear-power module tudes, Soviet ASAT capabilities include may be a critical step toward Soviet deploy- Galosh exoatmospheric ABM interceptors ment of a space-based ASAT by the mid- inherently capable of being employed as 1990s.25 direct-ascent ASATs; ground-based, high- energy lasers that could irradiate satellites; and ground-based, electronic-warfare sys- The current, operational Soviet ASAT system can tems that could interfere with satellites at attack only low-orbit satellites. Critics argue that the all altitudes.23 system is not a significant threat, but continuous Moreover, the Soviet Union is working technology updates have made it a viable weapon. STRATEGIC STABILITY 55

Thus, it is incorrect to assert that Soviet deterrence based on consensual vulnerabil- ASAT capabilities represent an insignifi- ity. Soviet military theoreticians have long cant threat to US space systems. It is a derided this notion as “incorrect bourgeois fallacy, moreover, to believe that moving thinking.”26 They believe that it would not forward with a US ASAT program will pro- be prudent to place their security in the mote arms race instability when the Soviet hands of their adversary. Union has been investing substantial re- The Soviet Union has designed its force sources in a range of ASAT capabilities for posture without regard for Western consid- years. Critics of a US ASAT capability erations of crisis stability. The USSR has should take into account the potential im- attempted to make its homeland, strategic plications of ceding to the Soviet Union a forces, and associated command and con- unilateral ability for asserting space control trol systems invulnerable to nuclear attack. and exploiting it to enhance the combat It has also consistently sought to make the effectiveness of its terrestrial forces. United States homeland and deterrent vulnerable. Indeed, the Soviet Union continues to pursue an effective, damage-limiting, The Soviets Accept (Western-Defined) strategic force posture. In addition to Crisis Stability Criteria the fifth generation of ICBMs being added The crisis stability theory propounded by to the inventory of hard-target counter- people opposed to US acquisition of ASAT force weapons, the USSR is maintaining capabilities holds that the character of robust strategic air defense and leadership the superpowers’ military force postures hardening/relocation programs. Moreover, should never be the proximate cause of as President Reagan reported to Congress in war. Force postures should be designed to December 1987 and reaffirmed before leav- dampen, rather than create, incentives to ing office, “The aggregate of the Soviet initiate the use of military force in an acute Union’s ABM and ABM-related actions crisis. Stable deterrence in a crisis, accord- (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing to this theory, depends on the mutual ing, SAM [surface-to-air missile] upgrade, vulnerability of the superpowers’ home- ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility and de- lands and the mutual invulnerability of ployment of ABM components to Gomel) their retaliatory forces and associated com- suggests that the USSR may be preparing an mand and control systems. Proponents of ABM defense of its national territory” in this theory argue that the existence of violation of the ABM Treaty.27 The Soviet ASATs during a severe crisis could under- Union prefers to seek stability through a mine crisis management and contribute to unilateral ability for crisis control rather crisis escalation. In particular, the concern than rely on the reciprocal restraint of an is that awareness of the vulnerability of adversary. strategic command and control satellites Furthermore, Soviet military theoreti- could lead to fear of a surprise ASAT attack cians do not accept the notion that military in conjunction with a first strike and that technology in itself might cause a crisis to this apprehension could produce over- erupt into war. This position is in direct whelming preemptive incentives. contrast to the assertion that the mere pres- The basic problem with such theorizing ence of ASATs and the corresponding vul- about crisis stability is that it presumes that nerability of vital satellites could in itself the Soviet Union is interested in stability as be the source of conflict. Soviet military it is defined by Western arms control theory theoreticians reject such reasoning out of and has structured its force posture accord- hand as being overly mechanistic and di- ing to a comparable paradigm of deter- vorced from strategic political consider- rence. The USSR, however, has not given ations. According to Soviet military theory, any indication that it accepts the concept of war is an issue of politics and not a func- 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

tion of technology. A basic premise of sider, given the contrasting Soviet view of Soviet military thought is Clausewitz’s dic- stability, is that the ability to hold Soviet tum. modified by Lenin, that “war is a force-enhancement satellites at prompt risk continuation of politics by other (namely could be extremely important for maintain- violent) means.’’"8 From the Soviet per- ing deterrence in a crisis. Indeed, since the spective, stability does not rest on specific Soviet Union evidently believes that the technical characteristics of the military bal- quality of deterrence rests on the relative ance. Rather, political factors are the main war-fighting prowess of its armed forces, determinants of crisis stability. Indeed, deterrence stability should be strengthened Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, former by confronting Soviet defense planners chief of the Soviet General Staff and advisor with the prospect of being denied surveil- to General Secretary Gorbachev, has em- lance, targeting, navigation, and communi- phasized that Soviet national security pol- cations information from space to support icy is “based on the fact that, in the nuclear their terrestrial forces. space age. maintenance of security appears more and more to be a political problem. It Conflict Control, Limitation, cannot be guaranteed just through military- Termination, and Satellites technical means or through the creation of Critics of a US ASAT program also argue even the most powerful offensive or defen- that such weapons would exacerbate the sive forces.”29 problems of controlling, limiting, and ter- Perhaps an even greater indictment of the minating a superpower conflict. They are crisis instability charge is that it is un- concerned that ASAT employment would founded even with respect to the critics’ greatly complicate strategic command and own stability criteria. The principal crite- control, wartime negotiation or bargaining, rion for the stability of deterrence in a and the ability to monitor compliance with crisis, as noted above, is mutual societal an armistice. These concerns, however, vulnerability to strategic retaliation. Ac- are the result of an overestimation of the cording to Western arms control theory, importance of satellites for long-distance neither the United States nor the Soviet communications and surveillance. It is Union would be likely to calculate that the true that both the United States and the potential political or military benefits of Soviet Union are continuing to increase resorting to force in an acute crisis out- their peacetime use of space for such activ- weigh the costs of a conflict so long as both ities. But neither country is now, or is ever countries are vulnerable to nuclear attack. likely to become, entirely dependent on Thus, unless one side had an ASAT capa- satellites for long-distance communications bility that could effectively deny the other in wartime or postattack surveiliance-at the ability to use—or order use of—its stra- least to the point where the other side was tegic offensive force, it is difficult to see 100 percent confident that a successful how the presence of ASATs during a super- ASAT campaign would effect a paralysis in power crisis could precipitate nuclear esca- command. lation. Since neither the United States nor Both the United States and the Soviet the Soviet Union completely relies on sat- Union have devoted substantial resources ellites for strategic command and control to to the development of redundant and sur- the degree that space could be considered vivable means of strategic communica- either side’s Achilles’ heel, fear of an ASAT tions. Indeed, strategic command, control, attack in conjunction with a first strike and communications have had the highest should not, by itself, produce overwhelm- priority in the US strategic modernization ing incentives to preempt in an acute crisis. program. The superpowers utilize almost What the critics leveling the crisis insta- all communications technologies and fre- bility charge against ASAT should con- quencies for strategic communications. But STRATEGIC STABILITY 57

satellites generally have become a favored for monitoring an adversary’s behavior dur- means for long-haul communications being a war and after an armistice is also cause they permit the reliable transmission misplaced. Both the United States and the of large amounts of information. Conse- Soviet Union are aware that satellites in quently, both superpowers have improved near-earth orbits would be vulnerable to passive survivability measures for satel- direct attack. Thus, it is unlikely that either lites. country would plan to rely exclusively on Satellites are not the only means of stra- satellites for such missions in wartime. tegic communications utilized by the Aircraft and/or drones, for example, could United States and the Soviet Union. Land- be used as interim means for gathering lines and (non-space-dependent) radio re- information or monitoring compliance lays are also used to connect command with an armistice. authorities with strategic forces. Both superpowers have constructed fixed, hard- ened command centers as well as airborne, Conclusion ground-, and sea-mobile command posts. They have connected these command cen- The deterrence and arms race instability ters to their strategic forces with redundant case against the US ASAT program is communication links comprised of above- flawed. Critics charge that US acquisition and below-ground cables and radio-relay of dedicated ASAT capabilities would be systems in addition to communications sat- destabilizing and could increase the prob- ellites. Thus, given the availability of alter- ability of war. They argue that moving native means of strategic communications, forward with an ASAT program will ignite it is unlikely that ASAT employment a dangerous space arms race. In addition, against satellites used for strategic com- they argue that ASATs could be the proxi- mand and control would in itself lead to mate cause of war in an acute political uncontrolled or inadvertent escalation. crisis. As the foregoing analysis has shown, Similarly, it is unlikely that ASAT em- however, the premises underlying these ployment against communications satellites charges are not valid. could significantly impede the transmis- First, Soviet force-acquisition behavior sion of a cease-fire order and thus reduce has not conformed to the action-reaction the likelihood of early conflict termination. model of the arms race. The presumption This is not to underestimate the difficulty that US acquisition of ASAT capabilities of maintaining strategic command and con- would lead to reactive Soviet ASAT de- trol in a nuclear wartime environment. But ployments is based on a specious theory of it is to suggest that satellites may not be arms race dynamics. Rather than being a such crucial communication links that reaction to prospective US ASAT deploy- their disablement or destruction effectively ments, the Soviet Union’s development of would result in decapitation and spasm space weaponry is more likely the product retaliation. In addition, redundant commu- of doctrinal requirements for achieving nication links between the superpowers are military space superiority to deny the available for wartime negotiations. The United States and its allies the use of space 1963 Hot-Line Agreement established a du- and enhance the combat effectiveness of its plex telegraph circuit linked by cable be- own terrestrial forces. tween Moscow and Washington and a high- Second, the Soviet Union's ASAT capa- frequency radio backup. When the hot line bilities pose a significant threat to US space was upgraded in 1971 with the addition of systems. The co-orbital ASAT is opera- satellite circuits, the cable link became the tional, and Soviet confidence in the system backup, and the radio link was eliminated. most likely has been maintained despite Concern about the implications of ASATs the unilateral test moratorium. Moreover, 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

focusing almost entirely on the Soviet co- ities with strategic forces. Thus, ASAT orbital satellite interceptor overlooks the employment against satellite links should range of other military capabilities that the not in itself lead to uncontrolled or inad- Soviet Union either has already deployed vertent escalation. Redundant communica- or is developing for the ASAT mission. tion links between the United States and Third, the Soviet Union neither accepts the Soviet Union also exist for wartime Western-defined criteria for crisis stabil- negotiations. Similarly, means other than ity nor structures its force posture in satellites (aircraft and/or drones) could be accordance with Western considerations of available for monitoring compliance with stability. It has rejected as a policy consid- an armistice. eration the Western concept of deterrence The faulty assumptions that underpin based on mutual vulnerability to strategic retaliation. Instead, the Soviet Union has the argument that ASATs are destabilizing pursued a comprehensive damage-limiting should not influence the debate over the posture. Even if the USSR accepted the proposal for a new US ASAT program. The Western notion of stable deterrence, how- United States should not deny itself a ded- ever. it is difficult to see how the presence icated ASAT capability on the grounds that of ASATs in an acute crisis could precipi- it would promote arms race and crisis in- tate nuclear escalation unless one side had stability. Moving forward with an ASAT an ASAT capability that could deny the program can hardly spark a space arms other the ability to use, or order use of, its race when the Soviet Union has been in- retaliatory force. vesting substantial resources in a range Fourth, since neither the United States of ASAT capabilities with the aim of con- nor the Soviet Union is entirely dependent trolling space for the enhancement of its on satellites for long-haul communica- own military forces. Rather than promot- tions or surveillance. ASAT employment ing instability in an acute superpower cri- would not necessarily preclude conflict con- sis, it may well be essential for the stabil- trol. limitation, or termination. Both super- ity of deterrence—and the prevention of powers utilize (non-space-dependent) radio war—that the United States acquire and relays and landlines as redundant commu- maintain capabilities to hold Soviet force- nication links to connect command author- enhancement satellites at prompt risk. □

Notes 1 Thomas C. Schelling. "The Military Use of Outer Space: 7. See, for example. Harkin. 3. Bombardment Satellites." in Outer Space in World Politics, 8. See. for example. Richard L. Garwin. Kurt Gottfried, and ed. Joseph M. Goldsen (New York: Praeger. 1963). 110. Donald L. Hafner, "Antisatellite Weapons," Scientific Ameri- 2. See. for example. Sen Tom Harkin, “Star Wars: A Trojan can 250. no. 6 (July 1984): 45-55. Horse for ASAT Weapons.” Arms Control Today, March 1989. 9. See. for example, Paul B. Stares. "Anti-Satellite Arms 3-9; and Union of Concerned Scientists. Anti-Satellite Weap- Control in a Broader Security Perspective," in Seeking Stabil ons Arms Control or Arms Race? (Cambridge. Mass.: Union of ity in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Concerned Scientists. 30 June 1983). Regime, ed. Joseph S. Nye and James A. Schear (Lanham. Md.: 3. See. for example. Kosta Tsipis and Eric Raiten. "Antisat- Aspen Strategy Group and University Press of America. 1987). ellite Weapons: The Present Danger." Technology Review. 109-24; Paul B. Stares. Space and National Security (Wash- August/September 1984. 55-63; and Anti-Satellite Weapons. ington. D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1987). 136-41; Donald L. 6- 8 . Hafner. "Negotiating Restraints on Anti-Satellite Weapons; 4. See. for example. Aspen Strategy Group. Anti-Satellite Options and Impact." in Nye and Schear. 87-108: and Donald Weapons and U.S. Military Space Policy (Lanham. Md.: L. Hafner, “Approaches to the Control of Antisatellite Weap- University Press of America, 1986|, 9-13. ons." in National Interests and the Military' Use of Space, ed. 5. See. for example. Harkin. 4; and Anti-Satellite Weapons. William |. Durch (Cambridge. Mass.: Ballinger. 1984), 239-70 12-13. 10. See. for example. Paul B. Stares. "Nuclear Operations 6. See. for example. Donald L. Hafner. "Averting a Brobding- and Anti-Satellites." in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. nagian Skeet Shoot: Arms Control Measures for Anti-Satellite Ashton B. Carter. John D. Steinbruner. and Charles A. Zraket Weapons." International Security 3. no. 5 (Winter 1980-1981): (Washington. D C.: Brookings Institution. 1987), 694-97. 41-60. 11. Ibid. STRATEGIC STABILITY 59

12.Ibid. Printing Office. 1985). 4315: and Senate Committee on Armed 13. See. for example. Kurt Gottfried and Richard Ned Services. Department of Defense Authorization for fiscal Year Lebow. "Anti-Satellite Weapons: Weighing the Risks," Dae- 1985, 981 h Cong.. 2d sess. (Washington. D C : Government dalus 114. no 2 (Spring 1985): 147-69 Printing Office. 1984). 3566. 14. Ibid. 24. Department ol Defense and Department of State. Soviet 15 See. for example. Stares. "Nuclear Operations.” 697. Strategic Defense Programs (Washington. D.C.: Government 16. See. for example. Gottfried and Lebow. 162. Printing Office. 1985). 12-16. 17. Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense, address to the 25. Rear Adm Thomas A. Brooks. USN. director of naval editors and publishers of the United Press International. San intelligence, statement before the Seapovver. Strategic and Francisco. California. 18 September 1967. Critical Materials Subcommittee ot the House Armed Services 18. See. for example. George W Rathjens. "The Dynamics of Committee on Intelligence Issues. 101st Cong.. 1st sess.. 22 the Arms Race.” Scientific American 220. no. 4 I April 1969): February 1989. 24-25. 15-25. 26. See, for example. V. Kulakov et al.. Marxism Leninism 19. House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Depart- on War and Army, translated and published under the aus- ment of Defense Appropriations for 1981.96th Cong.. 2d sess. pices of the US Air Force (Washington. DC.: Government (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 19801. 493. Printing Office. 1974). 28 20. See. for example. Department of Defense. The Soviet 27. The President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncom- Space Challenge (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing pliance with Arms Control Agreements (Washington. D.C.: Office 1987), iii; and Defense Intelligence Agency. Soviet The White House. 2 December 1987). 10; and The President's Military Space Doctrine. DDB-1400-16-84 (Washington. D.C.: Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Government Printing Office. 1984). 32. Control Agreements (Washington. D.C.: The White House. 2 21. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An December 1988). 18. Assessment of the Threat. 7th ed. (Washington. DC.: Govern- 28. For Lenin's comments and marginal notes on Carl von ment Printing Office. 1988). 65. Clausevvitz's On War. see Donald E. Davis and Walter S. G. 22. Robert daCosta. "A Response to the Union of Concerned Kohn. "Lenin's 'Notebook on Clausewitz.'" in Soviet Armed Scientists." Defense Science 2002. August 1984. 30-39. Forces Review Annual, ed. David R. )ones. vol. 1 (Gulf Breeze. 23. Soviet Military Power. 65; Senate Committee on Armed Fla.: Academic International Press. 1977), 188-229. Sendees. Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal Vear 29. Sergei F. Akhromeyev. "The Glory and Pride of the 1986. 99th Cong.. 1st sess. (Washington. D.C.: Government Soviet People," Sovetskaya Rossiya. 21 February 1987. 1.

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C 1 C M atthew M. H url ey, USAFA

ILITARY analysts are always cant. Many of the lessons from the Bekaa eager to derive “lessons” from were rather short-lived in their usefulness, recent military conflicts, but and others—while of great interest to mili- our perceptions of such les- tary historians— simply do not apply to the sonsM are often clouded by national biases; American military situation. interservice rivalries; incomplete informa- It is, of course, essential to first summa- tion; and differing needs, desires, and view- rize the events preceding and during the points. For example, the Bekaa Valley battle, as well as the factors contributing to (Lebanon) air battle of June 1982 is widely the Israeli victory. The circumstances that regarded as a significant development in determined the outcome of the Bekaa Val- modern warfare. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) ley battle can easily be traced back to 1967, achieved a remarkable military victory, and when the Israelis launched a devastating certainly there are lessons to be learned surprise air attack on Egyptian airfields to from it. Unfortunately, most literature on begin the Six Day War. The Arab states, the battle suffers from distortions resulting particularly Egypt, responded by establish- from the above factors. The problem lies in ing a system of surface-to-air missiles determining which lessons are applicable (SAMs) to deal with any future Israeli in- to the US military and which merely draw cursions into their airspace.1 During the attention away from what is truly signifi- War of Attrition from 1967-70 the IAF BEKAA VALLEY AIR BATTLE 61

to remove the missile batteries by force, the crisis was defused by diplomatic means; Syrian missiles and troops, however, remained in Lebanon.6 For the next year the IAF conducted extensive air reconnaissance over the Be- admitted losing at least 22 aircraft to the kaa and trained in the Negev Desert against new Arab missile defenses, though Egypt mock SAM sites identical to those in claimed 21 in July 1970 alone.2 Even so, it Lebanon.9 Meanwhile, Defense Minister was not until the three-week-long October Ariel Sharon and Lt Gen Rafael Eitan, chief War in 1973 that SAM warfare came of age of staff of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), de- in the Middle East. Egyptian SAMs (SA-2s, veloped the plans for an invasion to rid SA-3s. and SA-6s) along with 23-mm ZSU- northern Israel of Palestine Liberation Or- 23-4 antiaircraft cannons destroyed some ganization (PLO) raids and shelling from 40 Israeli aircraft in the first 48 hours of the southern Lebanon, which had killed 25 war. or 14 percent of the frontline strength Israelis and wounded 250 more between of the IAF.3 In contrast, only five Israeli July 1981 and June 1982.10 aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat On 3 June 1982 Palestinian terrorists during the entire conflict.4 Coupled with made an assassination attempt against the the high number of aircraft lost to ground- Israeli ambassador in London. After three based air defenses in Vietnam, the results of years of frenzied shelling and countershell- the October War prompted some analysts to ing, the IDF launched the long-planned, ask whether tactical aircraft had outlived often-delayed invasion Operation Peace for their usefulness on the modern battlefield.5 Galilee.11 Its goal was to destroy the infra- In retrospect, it appears obvious that the structure and bases of the PLO in southern Israelis were not prepared to counter the Lebanon and remove the artillery threat 'missile umbrella” Egypt had erected be- to northern Israel.12 Although Israel pro- fore and during the 1973 war. Instead, their claimed a desire to avoid any unpleas- doctrine reflected the experiences of the antries with Syrian forces in Lebanon, Six Day War, in which SAMs were not a Damascus decided to reinforce its Lebanon factor. But after sustaining heavy losses in contingent, including the 19 Syrian SAM the October War, the Israelis adjusted with batteries now deployed in the Bekaa.11 a coherent SAM-suppression doctrine.6 Though Syria intended this action as a Should hostilities resume, the IAF would deterrent gesture, the Israelis decided that now be prepared for SAM suppression and the batteries must be destroyed, for by now could adapt as necessary to meet new con- hostilities had erupted between Syrian and tingencies. Israeli forces.14 During the spring of 1981, the Israelis Reports of what happened next vary. It is came close to putting their new doctrine generally accepted that in the course of the and capability to the test. On 28 April the first attack against the Bekaa on 9 June IAF shot down two Syrian helicopters 1982, the IAF destroyed 17 of the 19 Syrian while providing air cover for Christian mi- SAM batteries and their radar sites, as well litiamen in Zahle, Lebanon. Damascus re- as 29 Syrian Air Force (SAF) fighters, with- acted by deploying three SA-6 batteries to out loss.15 The following day, the IAF de- Lebanon's Bekaa Valley the next day.7 The stroyed the remaining two missile batteries. Israelis regarded the newly emplaced The SAF once more challenged the Israelis SAMs as a violation of a tacit Syrian-Israeli and lost approximately 35 more aircraft, agreement regarding the Syrian presence in again without downing an Israeli aircraft. Lebanon and as a threat to vital air recon- By the end of July, Syria had lost at least 87 naissance. Although the Israelis threatened aircraft, while Israeli losses amounted to a 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

The Bekaa Valley. Lebanon. The Israelis' fam iliarity aircraft had been destroyed, while no men- with this area, resulting from repeated overflights for tion was made on either day of any damage an extended period of time, gave them an advantage to their SAMs.17 The Soviets went even not normally available to attacking forces. further in extolling the SAF’s combat vir- tues: the military newspaper Red Star announced triumphantly that “sixty-seven few helicopters, one RF-4E, and an A-4 Israeli aircraft, including modern US-made Skyhawk downed by a PLO SA -7.16 F-15 and F-16 fighters, were downed" in Naturally. Arab claims differed from the fighting.18 Further Soviet reports in- Western and Israeli accounts. The Syrian cluded an account in Red Star about a news agency SANA claimed that 19 Israeli meeting with a Syrian airman who eagerly and 14 Syrian planes had been downed on recounted an engagement in which he shot 9 June. The next day, the Syrians main- down an Israeli F-15: “The victory had not tained that six Israeli and seven Syrian been easy: the enemy had been subtle."11 BEKAA VALLEY AIR BATTLE 63

These claims met with great skepticism, enemy and the delivery of undetected even within Soviet ranks. After the Bekaa shots.27 Valley debacle, for example, a story circu- These shots were quite lethal because lated around the Soviet military about how of the high reliability of US-made AIM-7F the Syrian Air Force maintained a depar- Sparrow radar-guided missiles, AIM-9L ture control but no approach control.20 Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles, and Even the Syrians themselves privately ad- computer-aimed 20-mm cannons. The mitted defeat. After the Bekaa turkey shoot, AIM-9L, which accounted for the majority Gen Mustafa Tlas, the defense minister, of the kills, was particularly effective with told President Hafez Assad and other gov- its “all-aspect capability.”28 Simply put, ernment leaders that "the Syrian Air Force the missile could be launched at an oppos- was outclassed, the ground-to-air missiles ing aircraft from any angle, including head- useless, and that without air cover, the on, thus eliminating the need to maneuver army could not fight on.”21 Indeed, it seems behind the enemy to shoot.20 The AIM-9L a bit odd that the Soviets would celebrate a had been used earlier during the Falklands great Syrian victory by sending the first campaign, where British Harriers scored 25 deputy commander of the Soviet air de- kills for 27 launches against faster aircraft fense forces to find out what went wrong. It in marginal weather. The resulting 93 per- seems even stranger that they would con- cent success rate was quite an improve- clude that a new SAM system of SA-8s, ment over the 10-19 percent kill rate for SA-9s, and long-range SA-5s was neces- earlier models of the AIM-9 in Vietnam.10 sary, manned by some 1,000 to 1,500 Soviet The Syrians had no comparable ordnance, "advisers.”22 relying instead on the 1960s vintage AA-2 The lopsided results of the battle stem “Atoll.”31 from a number of factors. The most visible The Israelis also demonstrated consider- in any air engagement are the quality and able technical prowess in command, con- capabilities of the weapon systems em- trol, and communications (C3). The Bekaa ployed, especially aircraft and air-to-air ar- Valley battle was the first combat involving mament. The IAF had a definite qualitative the use of modern airborne warning and advantage in both. The primary Syrian control system (AWACS) aircraft, specifi- fighter during the Lebanon War was the cally, the US-made Grumman E-2C Hawk- relatively obsolescent MiG-21, with consid- eye. The AWACS is an airborne radar erable numbers of export model MiG-23s platform responsible for vectoring fighters and Su-20s also deployed.2* The Israelis, to their targets and managing the overall on the other hand, were flying new- air battle situation.32 The E-2C has an APS- generation McDonnell Douglas F-15s and 125 radar mounted in a “dish” above the General Dynamics F-16s, as well as older fuselage, with which it can scan 3 million but still effective McDonnell Douglas F-4s cubic miles of airspace. It can monitor over and Israeli Aircraft Industries Kfirs.24 200 aircraft simultaneously and control up The F-15 and the F-16. which were spe- to 130 separate air-to-air engagements at cifically designed for air superiority,25 both ranges up to 250 miles.33 In addition, the have a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than E-2C includes an ALR-59 passive detection one (i.e.. the thrust provided by their en- system that can pick up radar signals 500 gines exceeds their loaded takeoff weight, miles away, effectively doubling the Hawk- thus allowing the aircraft to accelerate even eye’s early detection range.34 This capabil- while maneuvering or climbing).26 In addi- ity enabled the IAF to detect Syrian aircraft tion to better acceleration and maneuver- as they took off, allowing it to determine ability at combat speeds, the F-15 and F-16 how many hostile aircraft were inbound have superior radars and cockpit visibility and from what direction.35 The Israelis also that often resulted in early detection of the used F-15s in the rear as “mini-AWACS” to 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989 help manage air-to-air engagements.16 This the appearance of random switching.42 overall Israeli AVVACS capability allowed Given the superior Israeli jamming capabil- the IAF to vector its fighters into “blind- ity. such an innovative radio system would side” attacks on the Syrian MiGs, which have been useful to the Syrians; however, had only nose- and tail-threat warning re- they had no such equipment. ceivers to warn the pilot of a missile attack. Another technological innovation that SAF pilots were thus denied any advance contributed to the Israeli victory was the warning of an attack bv the IAF's all-aspect remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). The IAF AIM-9Ls or AIM-7Fs: the latter could be used this drone aircraft in the months fired well beyond visual range.37 Israeli preceding the invasion to “fingerprint" aircraft could thus fire shots at their Syrian surface-to-air radar, providing information opponents—often undetected from launch vital to Israeli countermeasures.43 When until impact—and deny the Syrians any the battle actually began, RPVs were used opportunity to evade or return fire. as “decoys” to simulate electronically the The IAF worked to obstruct Syrian C3 radar signature of full-size strike aircraft while enhancing its own, making espe- and trick the Syrians into activating their cially effective use of modified Boeing SAM target acquisition and tracking 707s. These aircraft were equipped with radars.44 This ruse provided ample targets standoff jammers capable of disrupting sev- for the AGM-78 Standard antiradiation eral enemy frequencies at once with very missile (ARM) and AGM-45 Shrike air- little out-of-phase disturbance, thereby launched ARMs that followed.45 Other minimizing self-jamming of frequencies RPVs served as cheap and survivable intel- used by the IDF.38 Effective jamming of ligence platforms because they were con- Syrian communications and radar systems structed out of aluminum and composite cut off SAF MiGs from ground control, materials for a minimal radar and infrared leaving them isolated and vulnerable to signature.46 Once launched, they were AYVACS-directed attacks from F-15s and employed most often as photographic plat- F-16s.3'' The result was chaos within the forms or "real-time” video intelligence sys- Syrian formations. According to one West- tems whose fields of view, zoom ratios, ern military observer. "I watched a group of and flight plans could be preprogrammed Syrian fighter planes fly figure-eights. They or changed at the discretion of the com- just flew around and around and obviously mander.4, Once the tactical reconnaissance had no idea what to do next.”40 and deception functions were completed The Israelis were also intent on preserv- and strike aircraft were directed to the SAM ing the integrity of their own C3 against sites, air-launched laser-guided ordnance Syrian electronic countermeasures (ECM). was guided to the target by laser designa- Israeli fighter aircraft were equipped with tors mounted on the RPVs.48 ECM pods, including the indigenously pro- Despite their technological advantages, duced EL/L-8200 series, which provided the Israelis placed considerable priority on protection against ground-based and air- the human element, maintaining that high borne radar threats.41 To protect their digi- technology is useless without the ability to tal and voice communications from Syrian employ it successfully. According to Gen- interference, the IDF developed a very high eral Eitan. “Training is of greater impor- frequency (VHF) FM radio system that tance and significance than the means of changed radio frequencies across a 30 to 88 warfare, the weaponry systems, and the megahertz (MHz) band. Before the Syrians technology.”49 It was precisely this philos- could identify and jam a utilized frequency, ophy that allowed the IAF to exploit fully the radio would switch to a different fre- the capabilities of their equipment during quency and continue to do so according to the Bekaa Valley battle.50 Pilots and ground a complex mathematical formula that gave crews were so well trained that the aircraft BEKAA VALLEV A/R BATTLE 65

The Israelis destroyed numerous Soviet-made SA-6 there were plenty—were equally important surface-to-air batteries during the /une 1982 fighting. in determining the outcome of the Bekaa But they ivere aided in this destruction by the enemy's Valley battle. In air combat, for example, poor doctrine—an advantage that SATO forces will probably not have in potential future engagements the Syrians displayed a marked inferiority with Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces. to the Israelis in tactics and training. The fact that they were largely dependent on turnaround rate (the time it took to refuel, ground control not only limited pilot ini- reload, and service an aircraft before the tiative and independence but also encour- next mission) was in some cases reduced to aged the Israelis to continually jam their less than 10 minutes. ’’ Furthermore, Israeli communication links.53 The constraints pilots were for years exposed to the most thus imposed on the Syrian pilots degraded realistic training of all—combat. Besides their already inferior technological capabil- conducting simulated strikes against mock ities. An anonymous senior IAF officer con- SAM sites in the Negev Desert, the IAF had cluded, “They could have flown the best fought three major wars against their Arab fighter in the world, but if they flew it the opponents since 1967. including consider- way they were flying, we would have shot able combat experience between the wars. them down in exactly the same way. It The IAF had also been flying virtually wasn’t the equipment at fault, but their unopposed over Lebanon and the Bekaa tactics.”54 General Eitan echoed this atti- Valley for years,52 affording it a familiarity tude, complaining that although the IAF with the target area and deployment of encountered the MiG-25 during the Leba- enemy forces unprecedented in modern non War. it was difficult to assess the air- warfare. craft’s capabilities because “the Syrians Qualitative advantages in equipment and don't know how to fly or operate the MiG- manpower, however impressive, are rela- 25. If we could have been sitting in a tive: therefore. Syrian deficiencies—and MiG-25, nobody could have touched us.”55 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

Syrian SAM operators also invited disas- Even the Syrian defense minister had to admit that the ter upon themselves. Their Soviet equip- Syrian air force could not compete with Israel's and ment was generally regarded as quite good; that without air cover, the army could not successfully engage the enemy. The Israelis' air superiority al- Syrian handling of it was appalling. As lowed them to destroy enemy forces such as this noted by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director Soviet-made tank virtually at w ill. of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, “ 'The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed configuration: they put the radars in easier to spot from the air. ’8 It is ironic that the valley instead of the hills because they the Syrians, who have been criticized for didn’t want to dig latrines—seriously.’”56 their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, The Syrian practice of stationing mobile chose to ignore the viable doctrine that missiles in one place for several months emphasizes the utility of maneuver and allowed Israeli reconnaissance to deter- camouflage. According to a 1981 article in mine the exact location of the missiles and Soviet M ilitary Review, alternate firing their radars, giving the IAF a definite tacti- positions, defensive ambushes, regular re- cal advantage on the eve of battle.57 Even positioning of mobile SAMs to confuse so. the Syrians might have been able to enemy intelligence, and the emplacement avoid the complete destruction of their of dummy SAM sites are fundamental con- SAM complex had they effectively camou- siderations for the effective deployment flaged their sites; instead, they used smoke and survivability of ground-based air de- to “hide” them, which actually made them fenses.59 BEKAA VALLEY AIH BATTLE b7

Three lessons of special relevance to the incorporated into the ground forces staff at United States may be drawn from the Bekaa the national level.63 This integrated com- Valley battle. First is the overwhelming mand structure allows a strict division of importance of winning the war in the responsibility and gives the IAF an easily fourth dimension (i.e.. electronic warfare defined mission—control of the air. both to and C3). It is generally accepted today that support the ground forces and to protect to win the land and sea battle, a fighting Israel from air attack. Therefore, the IAF force must first control the air. This con- controls all the helicopters and since 1971 cept—revolutionary in its genesis—was has controlled all the air defense forces as demonstrated numerous times in World well, including air defense artillery.64 In War II and subsequent conflicts. Now. in short, the IAF controls all assets used in order to win the air battle, one must first gaining and maintaining control of the air conquer the electromagnetic spectrum. and in projecting power from the air. Per- What used to be "a minor side show to the haps this total control is due to the limited real battles that raged on the land, on the and specifically defined roles of the sepa- sea. or in the air” is now a prerequisite for rate Israeli services, but the United States modern warfighting.60 The Bekaa Valley could nonetheless learn some valuable les- has shown that an effective electronic war- sons from the Israeli example. Warren A. fighting capability is no longer a luxury, but Trest has noted that in the US armed forces, a necessity. That point was emphasized in the Anglo- military air power, perhaps irrevocably, has Argentine conflict over the Falklands only been severed four ways. This fragmenting has a few months earlier. HMS Sheffield, for led to overlap in all roles and mission areas, example, was destroyed by a single Exocet even to the conceptual extreme of extending antiship missile fired by an Argentine rotary-wing operations into the realm of interdiction. Each service has developed its own Super fitendard, with substantial loss of air doctrine, oftentimes with disregard for the life. Had the Royal Navy had an E-2C at its total air situation.*35 disposal, it would have been able to destroy the Argentine aircraft before it was with- Recent American military history reflects in firing range.61 As Soviet missile and the results of this fragmentation. Names aircraft capabilities continue to grow, it such as Rolling Thunder, Desert One, becomes evident that without adequate and Grenada recall misapplications of air electronic preparation the US Air Force power caused by insufficient interservice may also suffer unacceptable losses in the coordination—a coordination that should event of war. Certainly, the Syrians were have already existed. The US raid on Libya outthought and outflovvn over the Bekaa in 1986 provides an even more recent ex- Valley, but it must be noted that they were ample of the complexities and problems also outperformed in the electronic arena.62 that result when different services each For more evenly matched forces, that ad- want a “piece of the action.” The US naval vantage (or the lack thereof) will make a force in that operation included 14 A-6s. considerable, if not decisive, difference. six A-7s, six F-18s. several F-14s and EA- The Bekaa Valley air battle also demon- 6Bs, and four E-2Cs from two carriers that strated the need for effective doctrine and based 155 aircraft.66 The 24 US Air Force organization. The Israelis had suffered in F-llls in the operation required the sup- this respect between 1967 and 1973. but by port of over 30 more aircraft, including 1982 had reorganized themselves into the five EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft and effective fighting force that dominated the some 28 KC-135 and KC-10 tankers; even Bekaa Valley battle. Interservice coopera- so, nine of the F-llls did not complete the tion has become the standard for the IDF; mission.67 The Air Force aircraft were fur- indeed, the Israeli Air Force and navy are ther handicapped by the length of their 68 A/RPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1989 mission—a round-trip of 5,600 miles last- ground control, and less realistic than ing 14 hours and 34 minutes.68 It might American training, recent trends in the have been easier, given the Navy assets Soviet military press indicate a change to- described, simply to use carrier-based air- ward more realistic training and tactics craft, which had the advantages of proxim- designed to enhance and encourage pilot ity and relative immunity from such initiative and independence.70 Moreover, political prerequisites as overflight rights. every third pilot in a Soviet fighter regi- But perhaps the most important lesson ment is designated as an “aerial sniper,” from the Bekaa Valley is not to try to infer with experience, flight time, and some too many lessons. There are many factors skills comparable to those of Western that make the Lebanon War in general and fighter pilots.'1 In short, the Soviet pilot of the Bekaa Valley battle in particular of 1982—though far superior to his Syrian limited relevance to the LIS military. counterpart—Is himself overshadowed by The US Air Force may take comfort from his 1989 successor. the fact that its premier fighters and other Other factors make the Bekaa Valley bat- equipment performed so well. However, tle unique in the history of air power and these aircraft had been greatly modified by limit its relevance. In addition to their the relatively small but competent Israeli qualitative advantage, the Israelis enjoyed aircraft and electronics industry. The Is- numerical preponderance over the Bekaa raeli F-4, for example, had undergone 600 Valley, outnumbering the Syrian Air Force modifications, and the E-2C AWACS was by a ratio of about three aircraft to two./J specially modified by Elta—the electronics NATO air forces cannot count on this nu- division of Israel Aircraft Industries—to fit merical advantage against the Warsaw Pact. the unique requirements for Middle East- The IAF also enjoyed the advantage of ern air warfare.69 Perhaps even more signif- superior combat experience, having fought icantly. the Soviet-supplied Syrian aircraft the Syrians in 1967, 1973, and in other were stripped-down export models. One engagements before the 1982 affair: US Air cannot predict from the IAF’s overwhelm- Force pilots have not fought any likely ing victory against Syrian MiG-23s and enemy so often or so recently. MiG-21s in Lebanon that NATO would Furthermore, the IAF had been flying achieve a similar tally against Warsaw Pact unopposed over the Bekaa Valley for years, air forces in central Europe. NATO pilots familiarizing itself with the terrain and the will face the latest models of older Soviet location of Syrian SAM emplacements.' * fighters, as well as increasing numbers of The Israelis also trained a full year for their next-generation fighters: the MiG-29, one specific mission, fought a well-known MiG-31, and Su-27. Of course, that is not and less-than-capable foe in a relatively saying that the technological advantage small area, and had the opportunity to the West has traditionally enjoyed is no employ strategic initiative and surprise. longer present, but a quality differential of These considerations simplified the Israeli the magnitude demonstrated over Lebanon SAM-suppression situation immensely, will most likely not be repeated in a Euro- but. again, the US Air Force can seldom pean warfighting environment. hope for such advantages. No US Air Force Similarly, although Syrian pilots showed pilots have routinely flown reconnaissance severe shortcomings in tactics and initia- over Czechoslovakia or East Germany. De- tive in battle, it is dangerous to assume that spite considerable experience in West Ger- their Soviet sponsor’s performance in fu- man airspace, US pilots woidd certainh ture air-to-air combat will be as poor. In benefit from familiarity with enemy air- fact, the past few years have seen a revolu- space in preparing themselves for deep tion in Soviet tactics. While Soviet training strikes, rear-area interdiction, and SAM- may be more rigid, more dependent upon suppression operations beyond the Fulda BEKAA VALLEY A1H BATTLE b‘J

Gap (West Germany). In addition, the SA- apply to a given nation or armed service. To 10. SA-11. SA-12A. and SA-13 systems make this vital distinction, the US Air now deployed with Warsaw Pact forces are Force needs to abandon any tendency to- considered to be marked improvements ward self-aggrandizement and realize that over their predecessors deployed in the the Israelis had a much easier task than LJS Bekaa. They are far more mobile, more Air Force pilots can ever hope to expect accurate, harder to jam. and are in the against their chief potential adversaries. hands of competent personnel who know Instead of merely praising the performance how to use them.'4 NATO pilots can thus of its equipment and allies, the US armed expect a greater concentration of superior forces must focus on those lessons that missiles than those faced by the Israelis. truly do apply to the future possibilities Additionally, the potential area of SAM of air war, rather than on self-serving suppression and counterair operations in "lessons" that merely highlight the dangers Europe is likely to be somewhat larger of living in the past. If the US Air Force than the Bekaa Valley and its surround- focuses on the latter, it may find itself bur- ings. which roughly equate to the size of dened with outdated doctrine and weapons. Luxembourg. ' ’ In that case, rather than following the Is- There are obviously many possible interpretations of any military event, hence raeli example of victory, the US Air Force many different “lessons." The problem, might find itself conforming to the Syrian again, lies in determining which lessons model of humiliation and defeat.

Notes 1 Lon O. Nordeen, |r.. Air Warfare in the Missile Age 23. Ll Col David Eshel. IDF. and Brig Gen Stanley M (Washington. D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press. 1985). 125. Ulanoft, USAR. The Fighting Israeli Air Force (New York 2. Ibid.. 141. Arco Publishing, 1985). 137. 3. M I. Armitage and R. A Mason. Air Power in the Nuclear 24 Ibid.. 137-38. Age iChicago: University of Chicago Press. 1985|. 127 25. Frank J. O 'Brien. The Hungry’ Tigers: The Fighter Pilot's 4. Air Commo M. Mahmood Alam. Pakistan Air Force. Hole in Modern Warfare (Blue Ridge Summit. Pa.: Tab Books. Tactical Air Power Evolution and Employment from an 1986). 225. Historical-Analvtical Perspective.'' Islamic Defense Review 6. no. 2 11981): 6. 26. Ibid., 227. 5. Ibid.. 4. 27. Ibid., 226-34. 6. Dr Karl Schnell. "Experiences of the Lebanon War," 28. M. G. Burns. "Sidewinder 3." Armed Forces, |anuarv Military Technology. |uly 1984. 32 1983. 26. 7. Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martell. Flowed Victory: The 29. Dov S. Zakhein, "New Technology and Third World Arob-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax, Conflicts." Defense 86. luly-August 1986. 9. Va.: Hero Books. 1986). 62-63. 30. Burns. 25-26. 8. Ibid.. 63. 31. International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Mili- 9. Benjamin S. Lambeth. Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 tary Balance: 1981/82," Air Force Magazine. December 1981. Lebanon Air War (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Corporation. 84. September 1984|. 5. 32. O'Brien. 250-55. 10 Lt Col David Eshel. IDF. Retired. The Lebonon War, 33. David M. Russell, "Lebanon Proved Effectiveness of 1982. 2d ed. IHod Hasharon. Israel: Eshel-Drarnit. Ltd.. 19831. Israeli EW Innovations," Defense Electronics. October 1982, 12 . 44. 11. Ibid 34. Ibid. 12. Dupuy and Martell. 81 13. Ibid.. 117. 35. Maj Charles E. Mayo. USA, "Lebanon: An Air Defense 14 Ibid Analysis." Air Defense Artillery. Winter 1983. 23. 15. Ibid . 120. 36. Anthony H. Cordesman. "The Sixth Arab-Israeli Con- 16 Ibid., 145; and Eshel. 47 flict: Lessons for American Defense Planning," Armed Forces 17. "The Rape of Lebanon (Special Issue)." Monday Morn- /ournal International. August 1982. 30. ing. 14-20 June 1982. 14-16 37 |ohn V. Cignatta. "A U.S. Pilot Looks at the Order 18 Lambeth. 15. of Battle. Bekaa Valley Operations." Military Electronics/ 19. Ibid., 16-17. Countermeasures. February 1983. 108. 20 Ibid.. 17 .38. Ibid., 1 0 7 -8 . 21 |ohn Bulloch. Final Conflict (London: Centurv Publish- 39. Ibid. ing. 1983). 33. 40. Lambeth. 9. 22. Cynthia A Roberts. "Soviet Arms-Transfer Policy and 41. Cignatta, 108. the Decision to Upgrade Syrian Air Defenses." Survival. 42. Ibid luly-August 1983. 154: and Lambeth. 13. 43. Paul S. Cutter. "ELTA Plays a Decisive Role in the EOB 70 AIRPOWER [OURNAL WINTER 1989

Scenario." Military Electronics Countermeasures, lanuary Washington. D.C.: AF Intelligence Service. 1982). 78. 1983. 136. 60. Cignatta. 107. 44 Philip J. Millis. "RPVs Over the Bekaa Valley." Army, 61. Adm Thomas H. Moorer and Alvin |. Cottrell. "ECM lune 1983. 50. in the Falklands Proves Its Point the Hard Way." Military 45. Mayo. 22. Electronics/Countermeasures. November 1982. 48. 46. Cignatta. 110. 62. Armitage and Mason, 140. 47. Ibid. 63. Mark Urban. "Fire in the Calilee. Part 1: Israel," Armed 48. Millis. 50. Forces. April 1986. 169. 49. Paul S. Cutter. "Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan: 'We Learned 64. Ibid.. 171. Both Tactical and Technical Lessons in Lebanon,'" Military' 65. Warren A. Trest. "The Legacy of Halfway Unification.' Electronics/Countermeusures, February 1983. 96. Air University Review, September-October 1986. 71. 50. Dupuy and Martell. 145. 66. Anthony H. Cordesman. "After the Raid." Armed 51. Schnell. 32. Forces. August 1986. 358. 52. Dupuv and Martell. 120. 67. Ibid. 53. Schnell. 33. 68.Ibid. 54. Lambeth. 9. 69. Cignatta. 108. 55 Cutter. "Lt. Cen. Rafael Eitan.” 102. 70. Capt Rana J. Pennington. USAF. "Another Look at the 56. Marshall Lee Miller. "The Soviet Air Force View of the Soviet Pilot." Air Force Magazine. April 1985. 88-89. Bekaa Valley Debacle." Armed Forces /ournul International, 71. Miller. 56. lune 1987, 54. 72. Lambeth. 8. 57. Mayo. 22. 73. Dupuy and Martell. 120. 58. "IAF vs. SAM: 28-0." Defense Update International. 74. US Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power 1987 December 1986. 54. (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1987). 60-61. 59. Col A. Korytko, "Batallion Air Defense on the Defen- 74: Cordesman. "The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conflict." 31. sive." Soviet Awareness Red Eagle Reader (Bolling AFB. 75. Cordesman, "The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conflict." 29. INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1950 A NAVAL PERSPECTIVE

D ea n C. Allard 72 AIRPOWER IOURNAL WINTER 1989

T THE end of World War II, an and rapid, long-range communications intense rivalry erupted between were unknown, detailed orders could not the US Army. Navy, and Air Force be given to naval forces. To be sure, broad that continues to echo in the policy guidance was issued in periodic minds of many observers of the nation’sletters of instruction, but implementation defense. This bureaucratic conflict resultedof these goals had to be left to the decision from interservice differences regarding the of the operational commander. This decen- Aprinciples of organization and of national tralized management style, based upon re- strategy. It also was influenced by a level of spect for the independence and initiative of defense spending that increasingly fell subordinate commanders, was shared by short of matching America’s security obli- many of the world’s navies. In the United gations. The resulting acrimony often was States, as elsewhere, it carried over into the sharp and sometimes highly emotional. In era of rapid electronic communications and the last analysis, however, this article ar- helps to explain why the Navy opposed the gues that the defense debate of 1945-50 led US Army’s proposal of 1943-44. An addi- to a better understanding between Ameri- tional factor was the fear of being domi- ca’s armed forces. nated in a unified organization by Army A logical starting point for this story is a and Army Air Forces officers who repre- plan advanced in November 1943 by Gen sented a larger and, in the Navy’s opinion, a George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, more politically powerful service. Those and elaborated upon in congressional hear- leaders were not expected to understand ings during the spring of 1944. Marshall the nature of naval power, including the and his Army colleagues called for the superior mobility of navies in comparison elimination of the existing Department of to ground forces. Nor were they likely to the Navy and the Department of War, which appreciate the Navy’s success in integrating then contained the nation’s army and the its own sea, air. and marine ground ele- largely autonomous Army Air Forces. In ments into a single organization.' In fact, lieu of civilian secretaries and military the Navy’s aviators had long suspected that chiefs for each of these services—and the the leaders of the Army Air Forces sought addition of comparable officials for an Air to take over their organization, as Great Force that was expected to become entirely Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) had ab- separate at the end of the war—these men sorbed the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm after proposed creating one Department of the World War I. in order to achieve unifica- Armed Forces, headed by a secretary of tion. At the same time, the US Marine defense. The Marshall proposal also called Corps knew that at least some Army leaders for a single chief of staff commanding a saw their service as another competitor that unified service divided into ground, air, needed to be merged with the larger ground and naval elements and a common supply force, or at least reduced in size to the point department. Typical of the Army’s organi- that it would become a minor force incapa- zational philosophy, the plan provided a ble of undertaking its mission of amphibi- tight system of centralized control. This ous warfare.1 was the way in which the Army organized The Navy supported the need for cooper- its own forces. The plan also reflected the ation with the other services, including dependence of the Army upon naval and unity of command for joint operations, and air support and its view that this could be felt that this approach—as opposed to a guaranteed only by a single chain of com- merger of the armed forces—could con- mand for all of the armed services.1 tinue to be effective. Naval officers could The Navy had a different administrative point out that their service worked with the tradition. In the era of sailing ships, when Army for almost four decades after 1903 forces were deployed throughout the world on the Joint Army-Navy Board, which for- INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES 73

mulated broad policies for both services, to line control. And the arena in which this including the preparation of joint contin- cooperation would take place was enlarged gency plans. In 1942 that board's strategic beyond the Army’s relatively narrow mili- planning function was taken over by the tary definition to include the diplomatic Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), consisting of the and economic aspects of national security. uniformed chiefs of the Army, Navy, and A key institution for this purpose was Army Air Forces, and the chief of staff to the presidential advisory board, eventually the president. In addition to offering strate- known as the National Security Council gic advice to the nation’s political leaders, (NSC), consisting of representatives from the JCS established and controlled joint the armed forces, State Department, and operational commands. The commanders other civilian agencies designated by the of those organizations normally controlled president. A Central Intelligence Agency all service components assigned to them. (CIA) was proposed to assure coordination Hence, during World War II in the South- of all of the government’s intelligence of- west Pacific and the European theaters, US fices. The Forrestal-Eberstadt scheme also naval units reported to Gen Douglas Mac- called for the continuation of separately Arthur and Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, administered military services, which now respectively. In the same way. Army and would grow from two to three with the tactical Army Air Forces units in the Cen- establishment of the Air Force as an inde- tral Pacific were under Adm Chester W. pendent organization. The civilian secre- Nimitz, who commanded the Pacific Ocean taries of these military departments were to Area. In this case, however, there was an retain their seats in the president’s cabinet. exception. Although the Army Air Forces Finally, the Navy’s plan called for interser- generally supported the Army’s approach vice boards and committees, including to unification, bomber generals normally the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to coordinate the demanded independence from outside armed forces.5 control in conducting strategic bombing campaigns. Army Air Forces officers, who doubted that the other services could understand the requirements of this special type of warfare, sought recognition that strategic bombardment campaigns required a separate theater of operations under its own commander in chief. For that reason, in 1945 the Twentieth Air Force and its bombing campaign that launched against Japan from bases in the Marianas were removed from Nimitz’s control, except un- As might be expected, Army leaders op- der emergency situations.4 posed the Navy’s demarche. Their basic A major development in the organiza- outlook was shared by President Harry S tional debate between the Army and the Truman, a US Army veteran of World War I Navy was Secretary of the Navy James and a former member of the Army’s over- Forrestal’s recognition that the Navy could sight committee in the US Senate. Hence, not oppose all change to the national de- the forces were arrayed for the first phase of fense structure. Instead, with the assistance this dispute, lasting from the fall of 1945 of his longtime associate Ferdinand Eber- until the passage by Congress of the Na- stadt, Forrestal developed his own reform tional Security Act of July 1947. Despite the plan and unveiled it in October 1945. The stiff opposition it faced, the Navy displayed Forrestal-Eberstadt proposal was typically considerable political skill for an organiza- naval in stressing coordination as opposed tion that was not always noted for this ability. The National Security Act included The B-36 intercontinental bomber. Navy concern over every basic element advanced in the Navy's the portion of the defense budget that this aircraft original plan. Although the authority and absorbed was a major point of interservice conflict during the late 1940s. identity of the individual services were preserved and no single chief of staff was established, the Navy did not entirely have seemed to achieve another important goal its way. It was forced to agree to a new level by inserting specific language in the Na- of authority between the president and the tional Security Act guaranteeing the reten- services, known as the National Military tion of its carrier- and land-based naval Establishment, headed by a secretary of aviation forces and protecting the Marine defense. This organization can be seen as Corps, including that organization’s special a step toward the single Department of responsibility for amphibious warfare. A Defense that was the cornerstone of the final indication of the Navy’s apparent Army’s unification plan. Nevertheless, the success was President Truman’s eventual Navy succeeded in diluting the power of choice for the first secretary of defense, the secretary of defense by limiting his role who was none other than James Forrestal.^ to policy coordination and other controls of Even though the Navy largely won this a very broad nature, and by restricting the campaign, it had not won the war. The size of his staff. In addition, the Navy Army continued after 1947 to seek a cen-

74 INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES 75

tralized defense apparatus that was con- from the ocean’s edge and its claim to use sistent with its style of administration. Jf nuclear as well as conventional weapons anything, the Army was more persistent in for this purpose were considered by the Air advancing its views now that the Air Force Force to be threats, since those capabilities had won its complete independence, a de- implied that resources would be diverted velopment that raised obvious questions from the new service.M Marine Corps lead- regarding the degree to which American ers were equally concerned by the Army's ground troops could expect to receive tac- attitude toward their service. They believed tical air support. There also would be dis- that the Army General Staff hoped to limit putes between the services regarding the Marine effectiveness by preventing the for- execution of other tasks. Yet, as one former mation of units larger than regiments and Department of Defense historian noted, a by achieving sharp cuts in the 100,000-man separate Air Force—combined with the strength authorized for the corps in 1947. loose coordinating authority of the new In addition, the Marines charged that the National Military Establishment—indi- Army aimed to transfer to itself primary cated that "triplification" rather than unifi- responsibility for amphibious warfare.10 cation had taken place.' In the absence of James Forrestal. as the first secretary of strong central authority and the continua- defense, needed to resolve these differ- tion of interservice differences, the National ences, especially in order to allow prepara- Security Act of 1947—far from ending tion of the nation’s strategic plans for a the defense dispute—actually marked the possible war with the Soviet Union—the opening of its second stage. The principal debate after 1947 involved the allocation of roles and missions between the individual services. The Na- tional Security Act and an executive order issued by President Truman when that law was passed, attempted to settle this issue by giving the Army, Navy, and Air Force primary responsibility for operations on the land, at sea. and in the air, respectively. But, as General Eisenhower later stated. “Modern weapons and methods of war have scrambled traditional service functions.” Separate ground, sea. and air warfare was “gone forever.”8 An excellent illustration of this complexity was the new ability of navies to project power ashore, far beyond the range of ship guns, by employing carrier air strikes or sea-based bombardment missiles. The Air Force may have accepted the validity of naval carrier- and land-based air units’ controlling the air over maritime areas. But the Navy knew that its ability to strike inland targets far

The conflict in Korea brought the military services closer together as they fought a real enemy on the battlefield, but at home the budget and organizational battles between the services continued.

Air Air

par- thought After After least — unlike States. was at at was bias

Twining. The Navy United States

and that this United States. responsible for canceling forconstruction canceling ofresponsible the etary of Defense Louis A. Johnson is greeted by greeted is A. Johnson Louis Defense of etary The disagreement between the Navy and and The disagreement Navy between the that Secretary fohnson favorthat was prejudiced in Secretary of Secr (thenI Lt Gen Nathan F. Nathan Gen Lt (thenI tially Force programs programs Force supercarrier tives of themilitary tives of services—called for amendments to the National Security Act SecurityAct National the amendments to that wouldsecretarythe give defenseof authority.11 greater much Air F’orce on carrier on aviation was of the role F’orce Air one of the disputes that was extremely extremely was disputes that the of one reconcile. the difficultto The symbol of ambitions Navy’s was its first postwarcar- rier, the 65,000-ton United 65,000-ton United the rier, down in April 1949. As part of its campaign campaign its of part April 1949. As in down several years ofplanning, this ship was laid vessel, Navy this the securesupport for to emphasized the that 47 to defend the preroga- the defend 47 to onlymajor potential enemy United the that initial His years. States postwarthe faced in nonauthoritarian consistent the with was approachresolving to interservice conflict principles on which Nationalthe Military Establishment style own hisand based was fective way carry to out programa was to hard so worked man—who had 1948 this of leadership.of Convinced that most ef-the making key decisions, he sought to achieve achieve to sought decisions, he key making team they felt that were participants in interests. Hence, reasoned negotiations negotiations reasoned Hence, interests. 76 assure that all members the management of trary orders. Forrestal soon discoveredBut orders. trary intransigent defendingin their individual didalways not work.theOne of ironies throughout 1945— throughout a groupa consensus instead ofissuing services were arbi-somethe respects in that associated with James Forrestal is that by by that is Forrestal James associated with jf'/ INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES 77

its predecessors—could operate the large they foresaw a vessel that provided tactical aircraft required to carry nuclear weapons, air support for air and amphibious forces, each of which then weighed some 10,000 that had the ability to achieve sea control, pounds. The Navy was well aware that and that allowed such additional missions atomic bombs were the glamor weapons of as oceanic mining. Further, insofar as nu- the day and that a capability to deliver clear warfare was concerned, the Navy these devices could further its claims for sought to supplement—not supersede—the large appropriations. But the Air Force Air Force. For the admirals, the integration viewed the Navy's nuclear aspirations as an of nuclear weapons into the fleet was not attempt to create a second strategic air intended to undercut the Air Force; it was force. This competition seemed especially only another effort to develop the most threatening to a service that was still rela- modern and effective weapon systems. As tively new and insecure. Further, in this one scholar has noted, this attempt was period the inability to produce large quan- consistent with the Navy’s belief that "the tities of fissionable material severely lim- critical new component of the military ca- ited the number of nuclear weapons. pability of states would be the technologi- Hence, Air Force leaders saw the use of cal quality of their arms." Unfortunately, as these precious devices bv an untried naval the Navy reached this position and under- strategic air arm as a foolhardy gamble. took an internal debate on the issues in- After all. they argued, only their long-range volved. some of its officers gave contrary bombers actually had demonstrated—in signals—a situation that explains why the their World War II missions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki—that they had the ability to B-29s preparing for takeoff. The Air Force believed wage nuclear war.12 that only its long-range bombers had proven their Recent historical studies demonstrate effectiveness in waging nuclear war. But the Navy felt that by 1949 the mainstream of the Navy’s that tight budgets placed too much emphasis on strategic air power. Thus. Europe would be aban- leadership viewed the United States as doned in favor of a “fortress Am e ric a " defended by much more than a platform for atomic long-range air power instead of forward-based naval bombing.11 In addition to that function, forces. 78 AIR POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

Air Force could conclude that the United for strategic air warfare, and the Air Force States was primarily a platform for long- agreed that the Navy could continue to range nuclear bombardment.14 operate carriers. The Air Force also recog- In a more general sense, the Navy's de- nized that the Navy might contribute to its velopment of the carrier United States sup- strategic bombing mission and support na- ported the claim that it could play an val and ground campaigns by attacking effective role in waging war against the other shore targets. Naval leaders under- Soviet Union, despite the absence of a stood that in both of these functions nu- major Soviet surface fleet. The maritime clear weapons were available. The Navy strategy developed for countering this great also assumed that through its chief of naval continental power was based on the for- operations, who was a member of the Joint ward deployment of naval forces off the Chiefs of Staff, it shared in the control of shores of northern and southern Europe. atomic weapons, including the selection of Here, naval aircraft could attack opposing their intended targets. As it developed, Soviet submarines and other naval units at however, the Air Force, which continued to their home bases, rather than wait for them be very sensitive to outside interference in to deploy into the broad seas. Naval forces its conduct of air warfare, agreed with nei- would also meet the Soviet air threat by ther of these assumptions. Several months striking those aircraft at their home bases. after the Key West conference, Air Force At the same time, naval planners foresaw Secretary Stuart Symington demanded that cooperation with the Air Force in provid- his service have exclusive control of nu- ing tactical air support to the Army as it clear weapons, especially because of the repelled a Soviet invasion of Western Eu- great scarcity of these devices and the rope. In addition, the landing of amphibi- promise that land-based aircraft could em- ous forces to counter the enemy was an ploy them more effectively.16 In an attempt once again to reach interservice accord, Forrestal chaired a second conference of the nation’s military leaders in August 1948 at Newport. Rhode Island. Here the Air Force agreed not to block the Navy’s access to nuclear arms, while the Navy reaffirmed that it had only secondary or collateral interest in strategic bombing. Since the relative effectiveness of aviation weapons now was a central issue in the Navy-Air Force dispute, the conferees at Newport also agreed to establish a Weapons In retrospect, it is evident that neither the Systems Evaluation Group that could pro- Navy nor the Air Force fully understood vide independent assessments. But neither each other’s position. If misperceptions can this accord nor the other agreements reached lead to wars between nations, they also at Newport ended the acrimony between may promote conflicts between bureaucra- the Navy and the Air Force. cies. This situation may explain why For- While the Navy and Air Force attempted restal’s attempts to achieve Navy-Air Force to come to terms on aviation, the Navy- harmony came to naught. To be sure, the Army dispute regarding the future of the so-called Key West agreement, resulting Marine Corps also continued. Despite the from a conference of senior military leaders corps’ suspicions that the Navy might bar- in Florida that Secretary Forrestal convened gain away its rights in order to maintain a in March 1948. produced some degree of strong maritime aviation arm. naval leaders understanding. The Navy recognized that supported Marine interests at the Key West the Air Force had primary responsibility conference. In the accords emerging from INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES 79

that meeting, the Army stated plainly that noted—that the only offensive the United it had no intention of eliminating the States could undertake in the event of a Marines, while the Marines acknowledged war with the Soviet Union was a strategic that they did not aspire to create a second bombing campaign launched by B-29 airland army. More specifically, the Army craft based in the British Isles.1’1 recognized that the Marines could have It was obvious that the faith James For- division-sized formations, while Marine restal and the Navy had in maintaining a leaders agreed that for "planning purposes" broad range of defense capabilities was their corps had a maximum size of four being eroded by the harsh discipline of na- divisions. At the same time, the Army con- tional finance, which increasingly tended tinued to recognize that the Marines had to leave aerial bombardment by land-based primary responsibility for amphibious op- aircraft as the only viable option in the erations and that the Army’s own efforts in nation’s arsenal. This development also that field of warfare were of secondary promised to stimulate even more interser- importance.17 In the aftermath of the Key vice acrimony as the services vied with West conference, major public disputation each other for their share of a shrinking on this matter subsided for almost a year. defense dollar. Under these circumstances, But. as was true for the aviation contro- Truman’s increasingly conservative stance versy, it soon became evident that this issue on the budget after the fall of 1948 laid the was not permanently resolved. basis for the third and final chapter in this The Navy’s position on its aviation and history. Marine arms implied a balanced defense In March 1949 James Forrestal was re- posture for the nation. This stance was placed with a new secretary of defense, consistent with the Navy’s view that flexi- Louis A. Johnson. Tragically, shortly after bility was an essential attribute of military Forrestal’s resignation, the accumulated force, since it was impossible to foretell the pressures of his long service to the nation exact nature of future armed conflicts. led to mental breakdown and eventual sui- James Forrestal agreed fully with this out- cide. For the Navy, Johnson’s appointment look, as can be seen in the rather elaborate dramatized the new bureaucratic perils it system developed at Key West and New- faced. Johnson believed as firmly as Tru- port by which the services were assigned a man that defense budgets needed to be broad array of primary and secondary reduced in order to promote the nation’s functions.18 The Navy and Secretary For- overall strength. He also was perceived by restal also assumed that adequate funding the Navy as a special partisan for the Air would be available to implement these Force. And Johnson took office at a time functions. By the fall of 1948, however, the when amendments to the National Security American defense budget was starting to Act of 1947 were pending in Congress. shrink, despite the expanding security ob- These changes would give the secretary of ligations the United States faced in Western defense much greater power and a larger Europe and elsewhere. This austerity re- staff in an organization that would be reflected President Truman’s deep conviction named the Department of Defense. In what that excessive spending threatened the was interpreted by the Navy as a partial strength of the United States. Perceiving step toward the establishment of a single the economic well being of the nation to be, chief of staff, the amendments added a in itself, one of the pillars of national chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the strength, Truman established a budgetary same time, the civilian secretaries lost limit of $14.4 billion for defense in the fiscal membership in the president’s cabinet, a year beginning in July 1949. That restraint move that revealed the declining power of had a profound strategic consequence, for the individual services. These provisions, it meant—as Defense Department officials which had the endorsement of a frustrated 80 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

James Forrestal, as well as of President by 1949 to deliver nuclear strikes against Truman, seemed certain to be enacted, as in the Soviet Union from bases in North fact they were in August 1949. But, even America. This plan was in contrast to the before that event, Louis Johnson demon- forward strategy of the Navy, based around strated decisive if perhaps arbitrary leader- forces operating in European waters to ship by announcing in April that he was lend support to the defense of Western halting construction of the carrier United Europe, or to the Army’s policy of develop- States. Johnson was supported by an advi- ing ground defenses within the developing sory poll of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in NATO alliance. Instead, the B-36 implied a which the Army and Air Force voted for the Fortress America concept. It suggested that ship’s cancellation, leaving the naval mem- the United States might ignore its allies and ber in the minority. The enormous impor- assure American security interests by using tance of this action for the Navy was the almost magical technology represented dramatized when Secretary of the Navy by the atomic bomb and the B-36 in attack- John L. Sullivan, who had not been con- ing the Soviet homeland. A few air power sulted on Johnson’s decision, announced extremists suggested that no other means of his immediate resignation. Sullivan charged military power was needed to deter the that Johnson’s action was the “first attempt Soviets from going to war or, if deterrence ever made in this country to prevent the failed, to assure the enemy’s destruction.22 development of a powerful weapon sys- All of these developments aroused pro- tem." He added. "The conviction that this found naval concern that the distinctive will result in a renewed effort to abolish capabilities of maritime forces and the ad- the Marine Corps and to transfer all naval vantages of a forward strategy were being and marine aviation elsewhere adds to my sacrificed on the altar of the new system anxiety.”20 known as unification. The reactions of the Sullivan’s protest appeared to have little Navy included some steps that cannot be effect, for more bad news for the Navy was justified. One of these was an anonymous to come. In July 1949 Johnson placed a new document prepared by Cedric Worth, a ci- ceiling of $13 billion on the defense budget, vilian aide to the under secretary of the starting one year hence. In the next month, Navy, which included the charge that Louis he began to plan further economies, includ- Johnson and Secretary of the Air Force ing major cuts in the Navy and Marine Stuart Symington stood to gain personally aviation arms. Specifically, he proposed from the purchase of the additional B-36 reducing the number of attack carriers from aircraft. This memorandum was circulated eight to four and eliminating 11 of the 23 in Washington during the spring of 1949 Marine aviation squadrons. Yet, while the and led Congressman Carl Vinson, the in- Navy suffered from Truman’s program of fluential chairman of the House Armed austerity, it noted that the Air Force re- Services Committee, to schedule investiga- ceived funds for 75 B-36 bombers in addi- tive hearings in August. Vinson’s hearings tion to the 100 airplanes then on order.21 demonstrated that Worth’s charges were Although the B-36 was not operational at entirely false, and his immediate dismissal that time and was destined to be super- was recommended by the committee. The seded in the 1950s by the much more Navy obviously was embarrassed, even capable B-52 aircraft, it served as the sym- though it was evident that Worth acted bol of the Air Force’s strategy, much as the entirely on his own rather than in collusion United States epitomized the Navy’s strate- with naval authorities.23 gic outlook. Originally conceived in 1941 But the cause celebre created by Worth when German victories threatened to deny and other naval partisans also led Vinson to European bases to the United States, this schedule a second set of hearings that were extremely long-range aircraft was intended of much greater significance. These were INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES 81

held in October 1949 and featured testi- World War II. Another admiral, Arthur Rad- mony from almost the entire high com- ford, charged that the American people mand of the Navy, including such notable were being misled by the Air Force and World War II leaders as Ernest J. King and its friends to believe that the B-36 and the Chester W. Niinitz. These highly publicized “atomic blitz” theory of warfare it sym- proceedings soon became known as the bolized could promise a cheap and easy "Revolt of the Admirals." That catchy title, victory.'1 however, conceals the valid purpose served In lieu of that approach, the Navy ad- by these hearings in allowing a public dis- vanced its own strategy. As noted previ- cussion of key issues in defense organiza- ously. that plan involved the use of carrier tion and national strategy that previously and amphibious forces working closely were the subject of internal debates within with ground forces and land-based tactical the Pentagon.'-4 aviation elements to frustrate a Soviet offensive against NATO. As noted by Adm Louis E. Denfeld, chief of naval operations, this strategy was consistent with the Navy’s primary missions—after it had won control of the sea—of exerting “steady, unrelenting pressure” against the enemy ashore. The political significance of this approach was recognized by another key naval leader, Vice Adm Forrest Sherman. Although he did not appear before Vinson’s committee, testimony prepared by Sherman—in the Some of the most sensational naval testi- event he was called—pointed out that mony consisted of attacks upon the effectiveness of the B-36 bomber and the overall Americans were committed to aiding their concept of strategic bombing. In the pro- allies. The admiral obviously had Western cess. the Navy addressed a number of is- Europe in mind when he stated, “We can sues that had been or were being assessed not in good faith . . . base our military in highly classified Defense Department preparations on abandoning these peoples, studies. Specifically, naval officers sug- and relying on exchanging destructive air gested that it was unlikely the B-36 could attacks.”26 Yet. naval witnesses pointed out penetrate Soviet air defenses. Even if a few the apparently concerted efforts by the aircraft should do so, they claimed that Army, Air Force, and secretary of defense these airplanes were incapable of precision to eliminate or gravely weaken the Navy’s bombing from the high altitudes at which air and amphibious arms, which provided they operated. As a result, a B-36 campaign the Navy with the capability to contribute could accomplish little more than area to ground campaigns. The cuts imposed in bombing. Aside from the immorality of this those areas were disproportionate to the style of warfare, due to the heavy civilian reductions in the overall defense budget. casualties involved, the Navy felt that this As was reflected in the cancellation of the effort could not prevent a Soviet invasion of United States, the cuts also were very spe- Western Europe, a prime objective of the cific, leading to a situation in which the nation’s strategy. Nor could it act as a Navy—which best knew its warfare spe- deterrent to Soviet adventurism. One cialty—was being told by the other services spokesman, Rear Adm Ralph A. Ofstie, how it should achieve its mission. Because suggested that the Air Force’s belief in the of the failure by other defense officials to potency of strategic bombing rested on the heed the advice of naval professionals, the doctrines of the Italian air theorist Giulio Navy charged that it was being treated as an Douhet, which had been proven false in unequal member of the unified defense 82 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

team. One result was the failure to develop sulted from the understanding that the su- the nation’s maritime capabilities in the percarrier was primarily a platform for most effective way. Another was the impo- strategic bombing. In an era of declining sition of a faulty national strategy depen- defense budgets and acute scarcity in the dent almost solely upon land-based strategic number of nuclear weapons, it made no bombing. sense to duplicate a mission that the Air Marine leaders gave full support to this Force performed with greater efficiency. In position. One major witness, Gen Clifton B. any event, they noted, the austerity faced Cates, commandant of the corps, charged by the Navy was shared by the other ser- that “the power of the budget, the power of vices and reflected tightened levels of fund- coordination, and the power of strategic ing throughout the Defense Department, direction of the armed forces have been rather than an attempt to diminish mari- used as devices to destroy the operating time strength. Several Army and Air Force forces” of the Marine Corps. He noted that witnesses suggested that the admirals’ ob- his organization was especially vulnerable jections, aside from being mistaken, re- since it lacked direct representation on the sulted from personal pique. For example, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Behind the deep cuts Gen Omar Bradley, the new chairman of the suffered by his ground and air arms, Cates Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the Navy’s asserted, was the continuing animosity of witnesses could be compared to the “fancy the Army General Staff, which was deter- dans” on a football team who refused to mined to circumvent the provisions of the National Security Act protecting the corps play unless they alone could be the stars.28 and its amphibious warfare mission. This In March 1950, five months after these enmity also reflected the inability of Army hearings were concluded, Representative and Air Force leaders to recognize the Vinson submitted the committee’s final re- value of sea power in a global war, includ- port. It sided entirely with none of the ing "the necessity for land action incident services. Thus, Vinson and his associates rejected the Navy’s suggestion that the B-36 was a defective weapon system. Pending completion of a study by the independent Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, the committee used one of the Navy’s own arguments by observing that credence should be given to the views of the uniformed experts in the field, who in this case happened to be Air Force officers.29 On the other hand, the Navy could take comfort from other points made in the report. Any suggestion that Navy and Ma- It is not surprising that the testimony rine aviation might be integrated into the presented to the Vinson committee by Air Force or that strategic bombing was the Louis Johnson and Army and Air Force only valid aerial mission was denied when officers rebutted the Navy’s basic assump- the committee stated that the “Air Force is tions and its motives. There were outright not synonymous with the Nation’s military denials that the Army sought to sabotage air power.” Instead, US air strength “con- the Marine Corps or to undermine its sists of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps primary responsibility for developing am- air power, and of this, strategic bombing is phibious warfare. Air Force officers and but one phase.” The committee deplored Secretary Johnson stated that they did not the manner in which the carrier United oppose naval aircraft carriers, as such. States was canceled. In criticizing Secre- Their position on the United States re- tary Johnson's decision, the report once INTERSERVICE DIFFERENCES 83 again stated that “sound policy" called for States to match growing Soviet strength— the Department of Defense to “follow the prompted a change of course. The programs advice" of the appropriate professional outlined in NSC 68 would have required leaders. So far as carriers were concerned, annual expenditures of $35 to $40 billion those experts wore naval uniforms. The per year, approximately three times the committee also seemed to bear in mind level authorized by the president in the Navy and Marine Corps testimony when it first half of 1950.33 concluded that the structure of the Joint The era of dramatic change came only Chiefs of Staff failed to ensure "adequate with the outbreak of the Korean War in June consideration for the views of all services.” 1958. Despite the fascination of many Air Vinson’s committee stated that it planned Force and Navy officers with nuclear war- to sponsor legislation requiring that the JCS fare, this limited conflict required the em- chair be rotated among the services every ployment of conventional forces, including two years. It also called for adding the large armies, land-based tactical aviation, commandant of the Marine Corps as a naval carrier and surface forces, and Ma- member of that body. Finally, the Armed rine amphibious elements. Further, since Services Committee observed that it had the Korean War was evaluated as a Soviet- asked the Navy to provide witnesses to inspired feint to divert attention from the testify on the “fundamental disagreements" critical European zone, the United States on defense policy. The report denied that undertook a massive buildup in conven- these witnesses “were performing in any tional and nuclear arms designed to assure manner unbecoming their positions in the the defense of Western Europe. government." an apparent attempt to put to The requirement to defend South Korea, rest the charges that the Navy’s admirals combined with rearmament in Europe, led were revolting against civilian authority. to an almost fourfold expansion in Ameri- More particularly, this statement can be can defense expenditures after 1950. These seen as a defense of Admiral Denfeld, chief increased funds allowed the nation to of naval operations, who was dismissed achieve the balanced defense posture that peremptorily by Secretary of Defense the Navy long had sought, including a Johnson soon after his testimony to Vin- major expansion in conventional ground, son’s committee.30 sea, and air forces. For the Navy, that pro- Although not specifically addressed in gram featured the large Forrestal-class car- the final report, the hearings included tes- riers built after 1952. The Marine Corps timony from all of the services that demon- was greatly expanded and after 1952 had its strated the obvious inadequacy of President own representative on the Joint Chiefs of Truman’s budgets to meet the nation's se- Staff. In the strategic warfare area, a key curity needs. This concern was echoed by development was the dramatic increase in Representative Vinson, who observed at the supply of raw material for nuclear one point in the proceedings that arbitrary bombs, which ended the scarcity of these budget levels, rather than strategic factors, weapons. At the same time, other technical were determining the American defense advances led to the development of com- effort.31 Despite these statements, the finan- pact nuclear weapons that could be deliv- cial policy and hence the strategy of the ered by relatively lightweight tactical Truman administration remained essen- aircraft. As a result, both the Navy and the tially unchanged in the aftermath of the Air Force developed formidable capabili- B-36 hearings. Not even the famed National ties to deliver nuclear weapons against the Security Council policy statement of April Soviet Union. Ironically, it is now evident 1950—NSC 68, which called for an imme- that despite the heated Navy-Air Force de- diate expansion of the conventional and bate discussed in this article, the United nuclear warfare capabilities of the United States had an extremely rudimentary abil- 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

ity to undertake atomic warfare before the leading up to the Korean War. At times, as Korean War.1'* the admirals and generals argued their The new age of generous defense budgets respective cases with such emotion, it and technical breakthroughs meant that the seemed that the contestants were not listen- Army. Navy. Air Force, and Marine Corps ing to one another. Despite the divergent could implement the roles and missions outlooks and interests that were revealed, assigned to them after World War II. As a this process promoted recognition that it was essential for military leaders to work result, interservice acrimony became less together to achieve their common goals of pronounced. This new comity resulted, in maintaining an effective national defense.34 part, from the fact that the services now had This positive effect is one of the most several years of experience in working with encouraging lessons that can be drawn one another in the new, unified defense from the bureaucratic conflict that was so structure. But the process of adjustment intense in the years between 1945 and was aided by the intense debate in the years 1950. □

Notes 1. For general accounts of the 1944-1947 period that in- 10. See testimony of Gen Clifton B. Cates in House clude insights into the Army's outlook, see Steven L. Rearden. Armed Services Committee. The National Defense Program- History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 1. The Unification and Strategy: Hearings. 81st Cong.. 1st sess.. 1949. Formative Years. 1947-1950 (Washington. D.C.: Office ot the 367 (hereafter cited as The National Defense Program). Secretary of Defense. 1984); Lawrence Legere. |r.. "Unification 11. Rearden. 31. 36. 40. of the Armed Forces" (PhD diss.. Harvard University, 1950); 12. For the nuclear capabilities of the carrier, see Rosenberg. and John C. Ries, The Management of Defense (Baltimore. "American Postwar Air Doctrine." 252. Air Force views are discussed in Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: Md.; lohns Hopkins University Press. 1964). The basic docu- A History Basic Thinking in the ments on this subject appear in Alice C. Cole et al . eds.. The of United States Air Force. 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Aerospace Studies institute. Documents on Establishment Department of Defense; and 1971). 169-241; )ohn T. Greenwood, "The Emergence of Organization. 1944-1978 (Washington. D.C.: Office of the the Postwar Strategic Air Force. 1945-1953." in Hurley and Secretary of Defense. 1978). Ehrhart. 215—14; and Herman S. Wolk. "The Defense Unifica- 2. For carrier aviation developments, see Clark G. Reynolds. tion Battle. 1944-1950: The Air Force." Prologue 7 (Spring The Fast Carriers; The Forging of an Air Navy (New York: 1975): 18-26. McGravv Hill. 1968); and Norman Friedman. Carrier Air Potver 13. An important new study of strategic thinking in this (Annapolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1981). The basic ac- period is Michael A. Palmer. Origins of the Maritime Strategy: count of amphibious developments is |eter A. Isely and Philip American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade (Wash- A. Crowl. The Lr.S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton. ington. D.C.: Naval Historical Center. 1988). See also Rosen- N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1951). berg. "American Postwar Air Doctrine." 254-55, 258, 260-61; 3. See Edwin B. Hooper, The Navy Department; Evolution and Rearden. 411. and Fragmentation (Washington. D.C.: Naval Historical Foun- 14. The technology quotation is from Vincent Davis. Post- dation. 1978); and Gordon W. Reiser. The U.S. Marine Corps war Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy. 1943-1946 (Chapel and Defense Unification. 1944-1947 (Washington. D.C.: Na- Hill. N.C.: University of North Carolina Press. 1962). 258. For tional Defense University Press. 1982). the internal naval debate, see Palmer. 33-52: and Rosenberg. 4. E. B. Potter. Nimitz (Annapolis. Md.: Naval Institute "American Postwar Air Doctrine," 252—54. Press. 1976), 356. 15. See Palmer, passim: Kenneth W. Condit. The Joint Chiefs 5. Hooper. 23-24. A basic source on Forrestal is The of Staff and National Policy: 1947-1949 (Washington. D.C.: Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York; Viking Press. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1978). 333-37; Norman Friedman. The 1951|. Postwar Naval Revolution (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 6. See the sources cited in footnote 2. Press. 1986). 17-19. 23-25: and Paul R. Schratz. "The Admi- 7. Rudolph A. Winnacker as quoted in Rearden. 27. rals' Revolt." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (February 8. Dwight D. Eisenhower. The White House Years: Waging 1986): 70. Peace (Garden City. N Y.: Doubleday. 1965). 246. 250. 16. See Condit. 173-81: and Rearden. 393-402. 9. General assessments of the Navy's views are in David A. 17. Rearden. 395—96. Rosenberg and Floyd D. Kennedy. |r.. U.S. Aircraft Carriers in 18. Ibid.. 37. 403; Coletta. "The Defense Unification Battle," the Strategic Hole (Washington. D.C.: Lulejian Associates, 9. Palmer argues that some, but not all. naval leaders sup- 1975); David A. Rosenberg. "American Postwar Air Doctrine ported a balanced defense posture (50-52). and Organization: The Navy Experience." in Air Power and 19. Rearden. 341-45; Futrell. 222-23. Warfare, ed. Alfred F Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart (Washing- 20. In addition to the general works cited above, see the ton. D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979). 245-90: Paola E following accounts of this period: Paul Y Hammond. "Super Coletta. The United States Navy and Defense Unification Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations. Strategy and (Newark. Del.: University of Delaware Press, 19811; and Paola Politics." in American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of E. Coletta. "The Defense Unification Battle. 1947-1950: The Case Studies, ed Harold Stein (University. Ala : University ol Navy." Prologue 7 (Spring 1975): 6-17. Alabama Press. 1963). 465-564: leffrev G. Barlow. " The JNTERSEflVICE DIFFERENCES 85

Revolt of the Admirals' Reconsidered" (Paper delivered at the gram. 353. Sherman’s comments appear in "Statement of US Naval Academy, September 1987): fames C. Freund. "The Forrest P. Sherman . . Before the Artnefl Services Commit- •Revolt of the Admirals.'" The Airpoiver Historian 10 Ilunuary tee," Records of Op-23 (File E-l|. Operational Archives. Naval and April 1963): 1-10. 37—12; Arthur W Radford. From Pearl Historical Center, undated. 1 am indebted to Dr Michael A Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur VV Palmer, who drew this document to my attention. Radford, ed. Stephen lunk.i. Ir (Stanford. Calil : Hoover 27 The National Defense Program. 365-73. Institution Press, 1980|; Arleigh A. Burke. "A Study ol OP-23 28. Ibid.. 536 and passim. and Its Role in the Unification Debates ol 1949." oral history 29. House Armed Services Committee. Unification and series manuscript. US Naval Institute; fames A Field. Ir.. Strategy: A Report of Investigation ul the Committee on History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washing- Armed Services, 81st Cong.. 2d sess.. 1950. 56. ton. D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1962). 21-34: and Keith D 30. Ibid.. 9. 53-56. McFarland. "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals," Parameters 11 31. The National Defense Program. 474. (June 19811: 53-63. The Sullivan quotation is from Colelta. 32. Rearden. 527—36. "The Defense Unification Battle." 12 33. F'or the impact of Korea and the post-1950 buildup, see 21. Condit. 263-71. 323-24. See also Rearden. 378-79 (table Rosenberg. "American Postwar Air Doctrine." 262-69. and 6). Dean C. Allard. “An Era ol Transition. 1945-1953." in In 22. See. for example. Futrell. 220-21. But Futrell observes Peace and War Interpretations of American Naval History. that this view was not shared by all senior Air Force officials 1775-1984. ed. Kenneth I Hagan (Westport. Conn.: Green- (236-37). Radford notes that Gen Curtis E. Le.Way denied that wood Press. 1984). 299-302. The extremely limited atomic strategic bombing alone could win wars (167). capability prior to 1950 is discussed in Harry R Borowski. A 23 House Armed Services Committee, Investigation ol the Hollow Threat. Strategic Air Power and Containment Before B-36 Bomber Program: Hearings. 81st Cong.. 1st sess.. 1949. Korea (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Davis. 24. This point is made, for example, in Barlow. 1. 252-56. 25. An excellent summary of the Navy's case appears in 34 This need for cooperation is suggested by the scientific Radford. 175-208. The Radford and Ofslie testimony appears leader Vannevar Bush, who was a relatively neutral observer in The National Defense Program. 39-52. 183-89. of interservice conflict, in his Pieces of the Action (New York: 26. The Denfeld quote is from The National Defense Pro- William Morrow and Co.. 1970). 67-68.

Ricochets witz's first name) that yet again seeks to clarify continued from page 3 his thought for the average officer (“Clausew'itz for Beginners,” Summer 1989). Interestingly, my name in his letter (it’s "Davison," not "Da- however, in the “Ricochets" section of the same issue there is a letter from an irate individual vidson"). wrho complains of a recent APJ article regarding Liddell Hart himself later admitted that he Clausewitz (“Clausew'itz and the Indirect Ap- had misunderstood Clausew'itz. I. too. must ad- proach: Misreading the Master,” Winter 1988) mit that one correction should be made to my that had thrown rocks at Basil H. Liddell Hart article: Peter Paret assures me that Clausewitz and his apparent inability to understand Clause- wrote very clear and concrete German. Since 1 w'itz. Mr Forbes’s complaint had a kernel of read Professor Paret’s translation (as most of us validity but falls short of the mark. In rejecting do), 1 withdraw my offhand remark that Clause- the investiture of Clausew'itz as Master, he sub- witz wrote in a confusing, cumbersome style stitutes one of his own—J. F. C. Fuller. Why this and in my ignorance bow to an expert opinion. inordinate need of late to build and destroy Capt Kenneth L. Davison, Ir., USAF icons? Colorado Springs. Colorado An even more interesting example of this tendency is a recent book edited by Michael Handel of the Army War College. In the intro- It seems that every time I pick up a journal of duction to Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, military history or theory it contains an article Handel argues that Clausew'itz is one of the true dealing with the writings of Carl von Clause- geniuses of history and On War one of the witz. Invariably, these articles are highly re- greatest books ever written. Unfortunately, spectful of the late Prussian and score instead according to Handel, the Master has been repeat- those lesser mortals who have foolishly "misin- edly misread and misinterpreted by unimagina- terpreted" him over the past 165 or so years. tive dullards and incompetents. Included in the Now1 comes the latest Airpoiver Journal and yet list of unworthies are Henri de Jornini, Helmuth another missive on the "Master" (the use of this von Moltke (the elder), Alfred von Schlieffen. sobriquet is becoming so widespread that the Ferdinand Foch. Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Lu- uninitiated might think it is actually Clause- dendorff. Ludwig Beck. Hans von Seeckt. Fuller, 86 A/RPOWEfi JOURNAL WINTER 1989

and Liddell Hart—to name a few. Well, what provokes the mind to think and challenge. But is one to make of this? Are we to presume that he is only one of many military thinkers deserv- men with lifetimes of military experience—who ing of study. It is fruitless, indeed it is worse, to commanded great armies in battle (Clausewitz seek answers in Clausewitz or to compare oth- never did command, by the way), who fought in ers, always unfavorably, to him and his ideas. great wars and small wars (those with total goals Clausewitz should be seen as an intellectual and those with limited ones), who were men of exercise, one who can be read to generate intelligence and culture—all "misinterpreted” thought and discussion and who trains the Clausewitz and did so in such remarkably di- mind. But it must be remembered that Clause- verse ways? Is this not an incredible presump- witz is not the answer; he is the question. tion? Is it really possible they were all so puerile In sum, let us all please refrain from getting and thick that not one of them read the Master into literary punch-ups over what Clausewitz correctly? Is it not even more presumptuous to said about this or that and what he probably believe that we have succeeded today where so meant by it. What is truly important about him, many before have failed? Those who worship at indeed fascinating, is what so many think he the shrine of the Prussian argue that they now said and how they then acted upon those beliefs. have a new translation (by Peter Paret and There is a classic book waiting—needing—to Michael Howard) that makes things clearer. But be written on “The Effect of Clausewitz’s Ideas one wonders how an American and an English- on Military Commanders.” The emphasis would man can take the pedantic and complex German be on how Foch, for example, devised the strat- prose of a man dead for 175 years and retranslate egy of World War I based on his readings of it to make it more readable. Bear in mind also Clausewitz-never mind if his readings were that what Clausewitz left behind was a manu- “correct" or not. The result is the key. script of 126 chapters— 125 of which were in draft. Now. I know how miserable my drafts are; Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF Washington, D.C. why do we suppose Clausewitz’s were any better? Moreover, how do we know that in making him “more understandable” than the earlier AN EVEN GREATER PARADOX translation by J. J. Graham. Paret and Howard have not induced their own brand of distor- Air base operability (“Paradox of the Headless tions? Horseman,” Spring 1989) remains in a “quick Where does ail this lead? In my opinion, it is fix” mode, with a "rush” to get on the books foolhardy to rely upon the literal translation of a without the insight of consolidated manning. 175-year-old draft and to assume that Carl von EOD manning has a different baseline than NBC. Clausewitz is the standard by which all other [Other problems include] depth of involvement, military theorists should be measured. It is sim- paper taskings, and a decided lack of coordina- ply not logical to believe that dozens of noted tion [between] deployed sites and deployable and successful commanders and politicians assets, especially in the areas of fragmented have “misinterpreted" his writings over the de- taskings rather than full unit taskings. Beddown cades. If so many people have misunderstood plans are usually not provided to the fragmented his words, then perhaps they are not capable of tasked mobility positions, and they must beg for understanding. Like the Bible, On War can be direction. A good article, but it only scratched many things to many people, so contradictory the surface. and so obtuse that anyone can pick out "rel- Turney D. Williams evant" quotes and ideas. (I have seen colonels Tyndall AFB. Florida teaching classes on military history and theory to other colonels with a copy of On War lying on their desks, quoting passages to “prove" points, SUPPORTING BARRAGE BALLOONS in much the same way that television preachers abuse the Bible.) If a book is full of truisms, then Major Hillson (“Barrage Balloons for Low-Level it contains little truth. Air Defense,” Summer 1989) promotes a poten- Am I therefore advocating that we not study tially effective “fix" for low-level air attacks Clausewitz? No, that is not my point. He is an against USAF airfields. Of course, the principal intelligent and thoughtful writer: more impor- advantage of fixed balloon emplacements is tantly, he is provocative, in the sense that he their low cost. For the price of a single Rapier H1COCHETS 87

system literally dozens of balloons can be ar- would deploy, the weight of the cable causing ranged to deny an attacker free choice of attack the parachute to inflate. The cable would remain altitudes. aloft for up to 30 seconds. The other end of the 1 wish to make another point regarding this cable was moored to the ship itself. The rocket kind of static defense: balloons will serve to cable system gave ships an "instant," albeit route attacking forces into certain low-level cor- temporary, cable air defense system and was ridors. An attacking force will of necessity direct responsible for aborting a number of low-level its efforts to ingress as low as possible, and will, attacks on British vessels. As with balloons, for the reasons stated by Major Hillson, avoid such a system could provide a cheap, reliable, balloon concentrations. and effective means of airfield defense in future Thus balloons will serve as a means of en- conflicts. hancing the efficacy of point defense SAM There are several distinct advantages to this and AAA weapons by allowing them to concen- system: the temporary nature of the defense trate on those areas where balloons are not allows the target defenders to literally fill the deployed. Should the attacking force elect to airspace above with cables as the attackers ap- overfly balloon emplacements, its presence will pear within range, yet not advertise the presence be noted by radar and the ground weapons can of a high-value target; the rockets will add to the be reaimed as required (if far enough away), or confusion of the attacking force because they are the attacking force will have its attack geometry likely to be taken for SAMs, with resulting scrambled from its last-minute adjustments to evasive actions; and the rockets are less of a altitude. threat to friendly aircraft since they are fired There is one other aspect to the balioon/cable only when attacking aircraft are in the immedi- defense strategy. During World War II the British ate vicinity. Added to this is the intangible value used a variant of the balloon/cable defense sys- of creating one more concern for the attacking tem to protect ships that came under attack at pilot—the sudden appearance of a rocket cable sea. These vessels did not or could not deploy in front of his aircraft. balloons and were instead outfitted with rocket- I applaud Major Hillson for raising (excuse the propelled cables with a small parachute at- pun) the idea of balloon defense. The concept is tached at the rocket end. As the attacking plane certainly valid and in the era of doing more with made its target run, several rockets were fired, less, a valuable lesson from history. A rocket/ each carrying a cable. At some predetermined cable defense system to augment balloons offers height, usually 1.000 feet, the cable would pull another potentially useful lesson from our im- free from the rocket and a small parachute mediate past. Maj John J. Michels, Jr., USAF Maxwell AFB. Alabama FALL 1989 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Major Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF

for his article “Aggressive Vision”

Congratulations to Maj Charles M. Westenhoff If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker on his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award Award, submit an article of feature length to the winner for the best eligible article from the Fall Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, 1989 issue of the Airpower Journal. Major AL 36112-5532. The award is for the best eligi- Westenhoff receives a $500 cash award for his ble article in each issue and is open to all US contribution to the Air Force’s professional di- military personnel below the rank of colonel or alogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and equivalent and all US government civilian em- is made possible through the support of the ployees below GS-15 or equivalent. Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester. Massachusetts. notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and for articles ranging from 100 to 4,000 words. other professional notices of a noncommercial Inquiries should be sent to Mr David T. Zabecki. nature should be sent to the Editor. Airpower Am Alten Turnplatz 9, D6652 Bexbach, West Journal, Walker Hall. Bldg 1400. Maxwell AFB Germany. AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content. Korean War Encyclopedia Air University Review Index The publishers of a compact encyclopedia on The Air University Press is in the process of the Korean War are seeking contributors for publishing a complete index of the Air Univer- articles ranging from 50 to 5,000 words. Inqui- sity Review (1947-1987). This two-volume in- ries should be sent to Dr Stanley Sandler, 507 S. dex will contain an author index, a title index, 5th Street. Spring Lake NC 28390. and a cross-referenced subject index. Any Air Force or other government organization, college or university library, or similar organization School of Advanced Airpower Studies: with a need for this index can be placed on Military Faculty Openings and distribution. Requests for distribution and other Student Information inquiries should be addressed to Maj M. A. Kirtland. CADRE/RI, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB Openings are available now for qualified Air AL 36112-5532. Major Kirtland can also be con- Force officers on the faculty of the School of tacted at AUTOVON 875-6629 or (205) 293- Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Maxwell 6629. AFB. Alabama. Reporting will be in August 1990. One year later. 25 officers from the grad- Psychology in DOD Symposium uating classes of the intermediate service The Department of Behavioral Sciences and schools will begin their studies at the SAAS. Leadership at the US Air Force Academy will The objective of the school is to educate Air host the Twelfth Biennial Psychology in the Force officers to develop and implement sound Department of Defense Symposium on 18-20 air strategy. The curriculum will include an April 1990 at the Air Force Academy. Inquiries intensive study of military history and theory, concerning attendance or submission of papers with an emphasis on air power. High-quality, should be addressed to Lt Col Dave Porter or Maj relevant faculty research will be essential in Lee Lever, USAFA/DFBL. US Air Force Acad- maintaining the quality of the curriculum. The emy CO 80840-5701. Telephone inquiries to Air University intends to pursue accreditation AUTOVON 259-3860 or (719) 472-3860. of the program and the authority to award a master’s degree. Applicants for military faculty Space Logistics Symposium positions must be in the rank of lieutenant colonel. A doctorate degree or equivalent in the The Third Space Logistics Symposium will be areas of history, political science, systems anal- held from 30 April to 2 May 1990 in Colorado ysis, operations research, technology, public Springs, Colorado. The topic of the conference is policy, or similar fields is required. Experience "Space Logistics in Transition—The Shift from in flying or missile operations, intelligence, lo- R&D and Experimental to Operational Systems.” gistics, space, weapons testing, or munitions is Inquiries concerning the conference should be desirable. Faculty and students must be able to sent to Mr David P. Martin, Science Applica- qualify for a top secret clearance and compart- tions International Corporation. 2860 S. Circle mented access. Students will be nominated by Drive, Suite 2400, Colorado Springs CO 80906. their parent command and selected by a central board, based on their performance and academic World War II Encyclopedia qualifications. For more information, contact The publishers of a compact encyclopedia on Col George Tiller or Lt Col Jerry Crawford, World War II in Europe are seeking contributors AUTOVON 875-5421 or (205) 293-5421.

89 AIRPOWER JOURNAL Volume III AUTHOR INDEX Allard. Dr Dean C. "Interservice Differences in the Knowles. Brig Gen Billy M., Sr. “Hold. Withdraw, or United States. 1945—1950: A Naval Perspective.” no. Advance: The Role of Tactical Airlift in AirLand 4 (Winter 1989): 71-85. Battle," no. 2 (Summer 1989): 41-47. Bell. Brig Gen Raymond E., Jr. "To Protect an Air Krieger. Col Clifford R. "Air Interdiction.” no. 1 Base . . ." no. 3 (Fall 1989): 4-18. (Spring 1989): 4-15. Berkowitz. Marc J. "Antisatellites and Strategic Stabil------. “Air Interdiction" (Fire/Counterfire!), no. 3 ity." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 46-59. (Fall 1989): 86-90. Krisinger, Capt Chris J. "Operation Nickel Grass: Air- Bingham, Lt Col Price T. "Air Interdiction" (Fire/ lift in Support of National Policy," no. 1 (Spring Counterfire!), no. 3 (Fall 1989): 86—90. 1989): 16-28. Borofskv, Maj Clifford R., and G. F. Matecko. "Solving Matecko. G. F., and Maj Clifford R. Borofsky. “Solving the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation." the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation,” no. 3 (Fall 1989): 74-85. no. 3 (Fall 1989): 74-85. Boyd. Brig Gen Stuart R. "Leadership and High Tech- Mittelman. Capt Greg K., and Lt Col Joe Boyles. nology,” no. 4 (Winter 1989): 4-9. "Paradox of the Headless Horseman," no. 1 (Spring Boyles. Lt Col Joe. and Capt Greg K. Mittelman. 1989): 29-33. "Paradox of the Headless Horseman." no. 1 (Spring Newton. Maj Richard D. “US Air Force Role in Coun- 1989): 29-33. terinsurgency Support, A." no. 3 (Fall 1989): 62—72. Cannon. Maj Michael W. "Clausewitz for Beginners,” Ogan, Maj Andrew ). "Thinking about Air Power,” no. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 48-57. 1 (Spring 1989): 43-49. Carter. Col William R. "Air Power in the Battle of the Parker. ClC Steven A. “Targeting for Victory: The Bulge: An Operational Perspective," no. 4 (Winter Rationale behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in 1989): 10-33. America's First Air War Plan,” no. 2 (Summer 1989): Davis. Lt Col Richard L. "Case for Officer Professional 58-70. Military Education, The: A View from the Parrington. Lt Col Alan J. "US Space Doctrine: Time for a Change?" no. 3 (Fall 1989): 50-61. Trenches." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 34-45. Schubert, Wing Comdr David J., and Wing Comdr Geiger. Col Keith W. "Magnificent Staff, A” (editorial), Brian L. Kavanagh. “ ‘One-a-Penny, Two-a- no. 1 (Spring 1989): 2. Pennv . . no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. ------.“Matter of Mission. A” (editorial), no. 2 (Sum------. "Royal Australian Air Force Writes Its Doc- mer 1989): 2. trine. The," no. 2 (Summer 1989): 16-26. Harrell, Col A. Lee. "Weaseling in the BUFF." no. 1 Smith, Maj Gen Perry M. "Developing a Long-Term (Spring 1989): 36-42. National Strategy: Shifting Imperatives,” no. 2 Hillson. Maj Franklin J. "Barrage Balloons for Low- (Summer 1989): 4-14. Level Air Defense," no. 2 (Summer 1989): 27-40. Tilford. Maj Earl H.. |r. "Right Reaction, The: A Con- Hurley, ClC Matthew M. "Bekaa Valley Air Battle. sideration of Three Revisionists." no. 2 (Summer June 1982, The: Lessons Mislearned?" no. 4 (Winter 1989): 72-79. 1989): 60-70. Udemi. Capt Joseph F. "Modified to Meet the Need: Kavanagh, Wing Comdr Brian L.. and Wing Comdr British Aircraft in the P'alklands," no. 1 (Spring David J. Schubert. '“ One-a-Penny. Two-a- 1989): 51-64. Penny . . no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. Westenhoff, Maj Charles M. “Aggressive Vision," no. 3 ------. "Royal Australian Air Force Writes Its Doc- (Fall 1989): 34-49. trine, The." no. 2 (Summer 1989): 16-26. Kirtland, Maj Michael A. “Rare Feeling of Satisfaction. A" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1989): 34.

TITLE INDEX "Aggressive Vision." Maj Charles M. Westenhoff. no. 3 "Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge: An Operational (Fall 1989): 34-49. Perspective," Col William R. Carter, no. 4 (Winter "Air Interdiction." Col Clifford R. Krieger. no. 1 1989): 10-33. (Spring 1989): 4-15. "Antisatellites and Strategic Stability." Marc ). "Air Interdiction” (Fire/Counterfire!). Lt Col Price T. Berkowitz, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 46—59. Bingham and Col Clifford R. Krieger. no. 3 (Fall "Barrage Balloons for Low-Level Air Defense. Maj 1989): 86-90. Franklin J. Hillson. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 27-40.

90 INDEX

Bekaa Valley Air Battle. June 1982. The: Lessons tional Policy." Capt Chris J. Krisinger. no. 1 (Spring Misleamed?" ClC Matthew M. Hurley, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 16-28. 1989): 60-70. "Paradox of the Headless Horseman," Lt Co) Joe Case for Officer Professional Military Education. The: Boyles and Capt Greg K. Mittelman, no. 1 (Spring A View from the Trenches." Lt Col Richard L. Davis, 1989): 29-33. no. 4 (Winter 1989): 34—15. “Rare Feeling of Satisfaction, A" (editorial). Maj Clausewitz for Beginners." Maj Michael W. Cannon, Michael A. Kirtland, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 34. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 48-57. "Right Reaction, The: A Consideration of Three Revi- Developing a Long-Term National Strategy: Shifting sionists.” Maj Earl H. Tilford, Jr., no. 2 (Summer 1989): 72-79. Imperatives." Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, no. 2 (Sum- “Royal Australian Air Force Writes Its Doctrine. The." mer 1989): 4-14. Wing Comdr David J. Schubert and Wing Comdr Hold. Withdraw, or Advance: The Role of Tactical Brian L. Kavanagh. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 16-26. Airlift in AirLand Battle." Brig Gen Billy M. "Solving the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Knowles, Sr., no. 2 (Summer 1989): 41^17. Equation," G. F. Matecko and Maj Clifford R. Borof- Interservice Differences in the United States, 1945- sky. no. 3 (Fall 1989): 74-85. 1950: A Naval Perspective." Dr Dean C. Allard, no. 4 “Targeting for Victory: The Rationale behind Strategic (Winter 1989): 71-85. Bombing Objectives in America's First Air War Leadership and High Technology." Brig Gen Stuart R. Plan," ClC Steven A. Parker, no. 2 (Summer 1989): Boyd, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 4-9. 58-70. Magnificent Staff, A” (editorial). Col Keith W. Geiger, “Thinking about Air Power," Maj Andrew J. Ogan, no. no. 1 (Spring 1989): 2. 1 (Spring 1989): 43-49. Matter of Mission. A" (editorial), Col Keith W. Geiger, “To Protect an Air Base . . ." Brig Gen Raymond E. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 2—3. Bell, Jr., no. 3 (Fall 1989): 4-18. 'Modified to Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the "US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support, Falklands,” Capt Joseph F. Udemi. no. 1 (Spring A." Maj Richard D. Newton, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 62-72. 1989): 51-64. "US Space Doctrine: Time for a Change?” Lt Col Alan 'One-a-Penny, Two-a-Penny . . Wing Comdr J. Parrington. no. 3 (Fall 1989): 50-61. Brian L. Kavanagh and Wing Comdr David J. Schu- “Weaseling in the BUFF," Col A. Lee Harrell, no. 1 bert. no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. (Spring 1989): 36-M2. Operation Nickel Grass: Airlift in Support of Na-

SUBJECT INDEX Air Base Survivability Air Force Organization Bell. Brig Gen Raymond E.. Jr. "To Protect an Air Boyles, Lt Col Joe, and Capt Greg K. Mittelman. Base . . ." no. 3 (Fall 1989): 4-18. "Paradox of the Headless Horseman," no. 1 (Spring Boyles. Lt Col Joe. and Capt Greg K. Mittelman. 1989): 29-33. "Paradox of the Headless Horseman." no. 1 (Spring Matecko, G. F., and Maj Clifford R. Borofsky. "Solving 1989): 29-33. the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation," Air Defense no. 3 (Fall 1989): 74-85. Newton, Maj Richard D. "US Air Force Role in Coun- Hillson. Maj Franklin J. “Barrage Balloons for Low- terinsurgency Support. A," no. 3 (Fall 1989): 62-72. Level Air Defense," no. 2 (Summer 1989): 27-40. Air Force History Airlift Allard, Dr Dean C. "Interservice Differences in the Knowles, Brig Gen Billy M., Sr. “Hold, Withdraw, or United States. 1945-1950: A Naval Perspective." no. Advance: The Role of Tactical Airlift in AirLand 4 (Winter 1989): 71-85. Battle," no. 2 (Summer 1989): 41-47. Carter, Col William R. “Air Power in the Battle of the Krisinger, Capt Chris J. "Operation Nickel Grass: Air- Bulge: An Operational Perspective," no. 4 (Winter lift in Support of National Policy,” no. 1 (Spring 1989): 10-33. 1989): 16-28. Parker. ClC Steven A. "Targeting for Victory: The Rationale behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in Air Power America's First Air War Plan," no. 2 (Summer 1989): Carter, Col William R. “Air Power in the Battle of the 58-70. Bulge: An Operational Perspective," no. 4 (Winter Parrington, Lt Col Alan J. "US Space Doctrine: Time 1989): 10-33. for a Change?" no. 3 (Fall 1989): 50-61. Kavanagh, Wing Comdr Brian L., and Wing Comdr 92 A1RPOWER /OURNAL WINTER 1989

David J. Schubert. '“ One-a-Penny, Two-a------. "Matter of Mission. A." no. 2 (Summer 1989): Penny . . no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. 2 . Ogan. Maj Andrew |. "Thinking about Air Power." no. Kirlland. Maj Michael A. "Rare Feeling of Satisfaction, 1 (Spring 1989): 43-49. A." no. 1 (Spring 1989): 34. Schubert. Wing Comdr David J.. and Wing Comdr Electronic Warfare Brian L. Kavanagh. "Royal Australian Air Force Writes Its Doctrine, The." no. 2 (Summer 1989): Harrell, Col A. Lee. "Weaseling in the BUFF," no. 1 (Spring 1989): 36-42. 16-26. Hurley. ClC Matthew M. "Bekaa Valley Air Battle, Westenhoff, Maj Charles M. “Aggressive Vision." no. 3 |une 1982. The: Lessons Mislearned?” no. 4 (Winter (Fall 1989): .34-49. 1989): 60-70. Airships Fire/Counterfire! Hillson, Maj Franklin ). "Barrage Balloons for Low- Bingham, Lt Col Price T.. and Col Clifford R. Krieger. Level Air Defense." no. 2 (Summer 1989): 27-40. "Air Interdiction.” no. 3 (F’all 1989): 86-90. Arms Control Foreign Military Forces Kirlland. Maj Michael A. "Rare Feeling of Satisfaction, Kavanagh. Wing Comdr Brian L., and Wing Comdr A" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1989): 34. David |. Schubert. "'One-a-Penny. Two-a- Aviation Technology Penny . . .'" no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. Schubert. Wing Comdr David J., and Wing Comdr Hillson. Maj Franklin ). "Barrage Balloons for Low- Brian L. Kavanagh. "Royal Australian Air Force Level Air Defense." no. 2 (Summer 1989): 27-^10. Writes Its Doctrine, The." no. 2 (Summer 1989): Udemi, Capt Joseph F. "Modified to Meet the Need: 16-26. British Aircraft in the Falklands." no. 1 (Spring Udemi, Capt )oseph F. “Modified to Meet the Need: 1989): 51-64. British Aircraft in the Falklands," no. 1 (Spring Clausewitz 1989): 51-64. Cannon. Maj Michael W. "Clausewitz for Beginners," Interdiction no. 2 (Summer 1989): 48-57. Bingham. Lt Col Price T., and Col Clifford R. Krieger. Computer Technology "Air Interdiction” (Fire/Counterfire!), no. 3 (Fall Bovd, Brig Gen Stuart R. "Leadership and High Tech- 1989): 86-90. nology," no. 4 (Winter 1989): 4-9. Krieger. Col Clifford R. "Air Interdiction,” no. 1 (Spring 1989): 4-15. Counterair Operations International Relations Hurley, C1C Matthew M. "Bekaa Valley Air Battle. |une 1982. The: Lessons Mislearned?" no. 4 (Winter Smith. Maj Cen Perry M. "Developing a Long-Term 1989): 60-70. National Strategy: Shifting Imperatives,” no. 2 (Summer 1989|: 4—14. Counterinsurgency Interservice Conflict Newton. Maj Richard D. "LIS Air Force Role in Coun- terinsurgency Support, A," no. 3 (Fall 1989): 62-72. Allard. Dr Dean C. “Interservice Differences in the United States. 1945-1950: A Naval Perspective," no. Doctrine 4 (Winter 1989): 71-85. Boyles, Lt Col Joe. and Capt Greg K. Mittelman. "Paradox of the Headless Horseman," no. 1 (Spring )oint Operations 1989): 29-33. Bell. Brig Gen Raymond E.. )r. "To Protect an Air Kavanagh, Wing Comdr Brian L.. and Wing Comdr Base . . ." no. 3 (Fall 1989): 4—18. David (. • Schubert. " ‘One-a-Penny. Two-a- Latin American Affairs Penny . . no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. Udemi. Capt Joseph F. “Modified to Meet the Need: Krieger. Col Clifford R. “Air Interdiction," no. 1 British Aircraft in the Falklands." no. 1 (Spring (Spring 1989): 4-15. 1989): 51-64. Ogan. Maj Andrew (. "Thinking about Air Power." no. 1 (Spring 1989): 43-49. Leadership/Management Parrington. Lt Col Alan I. “US Space Doctrine: Time Boyd. Brig Gen Stuart R. “Leadership and High Tech- for a Change?" no. 3 (Fall 1989): 50-61. nology.” no. 4 (Winter 1989): 4—9. Schubert. Wing Comdr David J.. and Wing Comdr Geiger. Col Keith W. "Matter of Mission. A" (editorial), Brian L. Kavanagh. "Royal Australian Air Force no. 2 (Summer 1989): 2. Writes Its Doctrine. The." no. 2 (Summer 1989): Westenhoff. Maj Charles M. “Aggressive Vision." no. 3 16-26. (Fall 1989): 34-49. Editorial Management/Organization Geiger, Col Keith W. “Magnificent Staff, A." no. 1 Geiger. Col Keith W. "Magnificent Staff, A" (editorial), (Spring 1989): 2. no. 1 (Spring 1989): 2. INDEX 93

Matecko. G. F.. and Maj Clifford R Borofskv. "Solving Principles of War the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation," Cannon. Maj Michael W. "Clausewitz for Beginners." no. 3 (Fall 19891: 74-85. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 48-57. Middle East Affairs Professionalism Hurley. ClC Matthew M. "Bekaa Valley Air Battle. Davis, Lt Col Richard L. "Case for Officer Professional June 1982. The: Lessons Mislearned?" no. 4 (Winter Military Education, The: A View from the 1989): 60-70. Trenches," no. 4 (Winter 1989): 34—45. Krisinger. Capt Chris J. "Operation Nickel Crass: Air- lift in Support of National Policy." no. 1 (Spring Royal Air Force 1989): 16-28. Udemi. Capt loseph F. "Modified to Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the Falklands.” no. 1 (Spring Military Education 1989): 51-64. Davis. Lt Col Richard L. "Case for Officer Professional Military Education. The: A View from the Space Operations Trenches," no. 4 (Winter 1989): 34—15. Berkowitz. Marc ). "Antisatellites and Strategic Stabil- ity." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 46—59. Military Thought Farrington. Lt Col Alan |. "US Space Doctrine: Time Cannon. Maj Michael VV. "Clausewitz for Beginners." for a Change?" no. 3 (Fall 1989): 50-61. no. 2 (Summer 1989): 48—57. Davis. Lt Col Richard L. "Case for Officer Professional Special Operations Military' Education. The: A View from the Newton. Maj Richard D. "US Air Force Role in Coun- Trenches." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 34-45. terinsurgency Support. A," no. 3 (Fall 1989): 62—72. Missile Operations Strategic Bombing Kirtland. Maj Michael A. "Rare Feeling of Satisfaction. Parker. ClC Steven A. "Targeting for Victory: The A" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1989): 34. Rationale behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in America's First Air War Plan," no. 2 (Summer 1989): National Security Policy 58-70. Berkowitz. Marc |. "Antisatellites and Strategic Stabil- Strategic Defense Initiative ity." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 46-59. Krisinger, Capt Chris ). "Operation Nickel Grass: Air- Berkowitz. Marc |. "Antisatellites and Strategic Stabil- lift in Support of National Policy," no. 1 (Spring ity." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 46-59. 1989): 16-28. Strategic Operations Smith. Maj Gen Perry M. "Developing a Long-Term Harrell, Col A. Lee. “Weaseling in the BUFF,” no. 1 National Strategy: Shifting Imperatives." no. 2 (Spring 1989): 36-42. (Summer 1989): 4—14. Strategy Pacific Region Affairs Smith. Maj Gen Perry M. "Developing a Long-Term Kavanagh. Wing Comdr Brian L., and Wing Comdr National Strategy: Shifting Imperatives." no. 2 David J. Schubert. '“ One-a-Pennv, Two-a- (Summer 1989): i-14. Penny . . no. 3 (Fall 1989): 20-32. Schubert, Wing Comdr David ).. and Wing Comdr Tactical Air Power Brian L. Kavanagh. "Royal Australian Air Force Bingham. Lt Col Price T., and Col Clifford R. Krieger. Writes Its Doctrine. The." no. 2 (Summer 1989): "Air Interdiction” (Fire/Counterfire!). no. 3 (Fall 4-14. 1989): 86-90. Planning Carter. Col William R. “Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge: An Operational Perspective," no. 4 (Winter Matecko. G. F.. and Maj Clifford R. Borofsky. "Solving 1989): 10-33. the Wartime Combat-Support Manpower Equation," Hurley, ClC Matthew M. "Bekaa Valley Air Battle, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 74-85 |une 1982, The: Lessons Mislearned?" no. 4 (Winter Parker, ClC Steven A. "Targeting for Victory: The 1989): 60-70. Rationale behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in America's First Air War Plan." no. 2 (Summer 1989): Technology 58-70. Boyd. Brig Gen Stuart R. "Leadership and High Tech- Smith. Maj Gen Perry M. "Developing a Long-Term nology." no. 4 (Winter 1989): 4-9. National Strategy: Shifting Imperatives." no. 2 Theater Warfare (Summer 1989): 4-14. Bell, Brig Gen Raymond E,. |r. "To Protect an Air Political-Military Relations Base . . ." no. 3 (Fall 1989): 4-18. Allard. Dr Dean C. "Interservice Differences in the Bingham. LI Col Price T.. and Col Clifford R. Krieger United States. 1945—1950: A Naval Perspective," no. "Air Interdiction" (Fire/Counterfire!), no. 3 (Fall 4 (Winter 1989): 71-85. 1989): 86-90. 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1989

Krieger. Coi Clifford R. "A ir Interdiction,” no. 1 Bulge: An Operational Perspective," no. 4 (Winter (Spring 1989): 4-15. 1989): 10-33. Vietnam War Hillson, Maj Franklin J. "Barrage Balloons for Low- Tilford, Maj Earl H., Jr. "Right Reaction, The: A Con- Level Air Defense.” no. 2 (Summer 1989): 27^0. sideration of Three Revisionists," no. 2 (Summer Parker, ClC Steven A. "Targeting for Victory: The 1989): 72-79. Rationale behind America's First Air War Plan," no. 2 (Summer 1989): 58-70. World War II Westenhoff, Maj Charles M. "Aggressive Vision," no. 3 Carter, Col William R. "Air Power in the Battle of the (Fall 1989): 34--19.

Basis of Issue

AFRP 50-2, Airpower Journal, is the professional journal of the Air Force. Requirements for distribution will be based on the following:

1 copy for each general on active duty with 3 copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit the US Air Force and Air Reserve Forces. down to squadron level. 1 copy for every 5 active duty US Air Force 3 copies for each air attache or advisory officers in grades colonel through captain. group function. 1 copy for every 15 active duty US Air Force I copy for each non-US Air Force, US gov- officers in the grade of first lieutenant. ernment organization. 1 copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve 1 copy for each US Air Force or US govern- Forces office of public affairs. ment library facility.

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staff positions in the Pacific Air Forces. Tactical Air Command, and Air Training Command. Colonel Carter has had other assignments at Headquarters US Air Force and at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, and Education (AUCADRE). His combat decorations include the Air Force Cross, Silver Star, and Distinguished Flying Cross. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War College.

Brig Gen Stuart R. Boyd (USAFA; MBA. Golden Gate University) is commandant of the Air Force Insti- tute of Technology and commandant Marc J. Berkowitz (BA, George Wash- of the Defense Institute of Security ington University; MA. Georgetown Assistance Management. VVright- University) is director of space stud- Patterson AFB. Ohio. General Boyd ies at National Security Research. has served as an operations officer, as Inc., Fairfax, Virginia. Previously, he commander of the International Lo- was on the professional staff of SRI gistics Center, and in numerous man- International in Arlington, Virginia. agement positions related to the F-16. He has published in the Naval War He is a graduate of Air Command and College Review. Strategic Review, Staff College and the Industrial Col- Armed Forces Journal international, lege of the Armed Forces. and US Naval Institute Proceedings.

Lt Col Richard L. Davis (BA. Univer- sity of Redlands: MA. California State University, Sacramento) is a military doctrine analyst at the Airpower Re- search Institute. Air University Cen- ter for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE). Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Colonel Davis is a former B-52 pilot and flight commander. and a political-military affairs officer. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Com- mand and Staff College, and Air War College.

Col William R. "Roger" Carter (BA. MA. Texas Tech University) is the deputy commander for operations. ClC Matthew M. Hurley is assigned 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. Kunsan. to Cadet Squadron 04 at the United Korea. His flying assignments have States Air Force Academy. Colorado included wing-level, command and Springs. Colorado.

95 Dean C. Allard |BA. Dartmouth Col- lege: MA. Georgetown University: f’hD. George Washington University) is the director of naval history at the US Naval Historical Center. Washing- ton. D.C.. where he has served in various capacities since 1956. Dr Al- lard. an adjunct professor at George Washington University, was an officer in the US Navy and has published numerous books and articles concerning US naval and maritime history. BOARD OF ADVISERS Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Office of A ir Force History Brig Gen fames L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Inspector General, M ilitary A irlift Command Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr„ USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley. fr„ USAFR. Retired, Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History

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