U·M·I University Microfilms International a Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. liMI films the text directly from the original or copysubmitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send liMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrightmaterial had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sectionswith small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UM! directly to order.

U·M·I University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, M148106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 9506282

The proletarianization process and the transformation of Taiwan's working class

Sen, Yow Suen, Ph.D. University of Hawaii, 1994

V·M·I 300N. Zeeb Rd. AnnArbor,MI48106

THE PROLETARIANIZATION PROCESS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TAIWAN'S WORKING CLASS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIOLOGY AUGUST 1994

By Yow Suen Sen

Dissertation Committee Hagen Koo, Chairperson Herbert R. Barringer Gene G. Kassebaum Alvin Y. So Robert B. Stauffer iii

Most directly responsible for the completion of this dissertation are the members of my dissertation committee. In particular, professor Hagen Koo, my adviser, whose teaching, encouragement, and patience have made this dissertation possible. His detailed reading and comments on several drafts of this dissertation not only helped to refine my writing but more importantly helped to clarify my thinking. Special thanks to professor Bob Stauffer who graciously agreed to serve on my committee as a last moment replacement for Dr. David Wu who was teaching in Hong Kong in the final stage of my long career as a graduate student. Professors Alvin So, Gene Kassebaum, Herb Barringer, and Bob Stauffer offered constructive criticisms and invaluable editorial suggestions at various stages of my research. It is through their collective effort that this dissertation is a better work than it would otherwise have been. Thanks are extended to the Department of sociology, and especially the administrative staff, Jessie and Jan, for their support and understanding throughout my stay in Hawaii. There are countless people who I am indebted to for their intellectual and emotional support, but the following persons deserve at least a token of my gratitUde by mentioning their names: Barry Barnes, Franz Broswimmer, Val v Burris, Fo-Gwo Chen, Wen-Ling Chen, Jeffrey Chern and family, Sung-Nam Cho, Dorothy Goldsborough, Shi-Jen He, Karen Joe, Jen-Chieh Lien, Carol Lin, Wei-Chih Lin and family, James Liu, Peter Manicas, stephen Philion, Emma Porio, Gwo-Shyong Shieh, Gerard SUllivan, and Ya-Ko Wang. Finally, my greatest gratitude goes to my family, especially my parents, for their unfailing support and tremendous patience throughout my graduate study. vi ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the structural conditions of Taiwan's working-class formation. It seeks to answer the following questions: What is the dominant pattern of proletarianization that has accompanied Taiwan's export-led industrialization since the 1960s, and what was the specific role of the female labor force? What are the demographic and social characteristics of the industrial wage workers? How is Taiwan's working class internally divided? What is the economic situations, especially income situations, of the working class as compared to other classes? And how has class formation at the macro structural level been manifested in the arena of the labor movement? It is observed that the proletarian experience in Taiwan is extensive in the sense that it involved a majority of the labor force, yet it is not intensive in the sense that for many workers wage work represents only a transitory stage or part of the overall household income earning strategy. One important factor that sustains this pattern of proletarianization is the way in which women were incorporated into the labor market. Young women went to factories While older women became the unpaid family labor to support men:s entrepreneurial ventures. vii With three decades of rapid proletarianization, internally, the working class has changed from a class consisting predominately of male blue-collar workers to a class that consists of workers in blue-, white-, gray-, and pink-collar appearances. Underneath these diverse appearances, nonetheless, is their shared position in the production and distribution processes. Demographically, this working class has matured as its members have become more educated, older, less transient, and increasingly coming from a proletarian background. Politically, the working class has shown signs of translating its members' common economic and social predicaments into collective actions. The structural constraints--the disperse and decentralized industrial structure, the repressive political system--that prohibited the social and cultural formation of the working class have softened, though by no means disappeared. The future trajectory of the working class movement in Taiwan will be determined by the actions of capital and the KMT-state as much as by the actions of the working class. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••• •• i V

ABSTRACT. •••••••••••• • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• vi

LIST OF TABLES. Cl ••••••••••••••••••••••• xi

LIST OF FIGURES •••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• xiv

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ••••••••••••••••• •••• 1 Approaches to Class•••••••••••••••••• • ••• 3

Agenda Ahead••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 11 Notes on Data•••••••••••••••••••••••• ...... 14 Notes••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• u 23 CHAPTER 2 APPROACBE8 TO LABOR IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE... 25 Labor as Manpower: The Economistic Account on Taiwan's Labo~•• e _ 25 Labor as Wcmanpower: Female Factory Workers in Taiwan•• 29 Labor in Petty Production: ManUfacturing Bosses and Consent. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33 State and the.corpo~atist System of Labor Control... 38 SummaryNotes...... and D1Scuss10n...... 4845 CHAPTER 3 PROLETARIANIZATION IN TAIWAN--AN OVERVIEW... 50 Sectoral Transformation of the Labor Force...... 52 Proletarianization in Taiwan: Extent and Pace•••••••••• 57 Demographic a~d soc~al Characteristics of Wage Workers. 66 Summary and D1Scuss1on••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 77 Notes •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 81

CHAPTER 4 GENDER AND PROLETARIANIZATION PATTERN ••••••• 84 Women and Self Employment•••••••••••• 88 Women and unpaid Family Workers•••.•• 92 Women and Wage Employment•••••••••••• 96 Women and Mobility opportunities..... • •••.••• 104 Summary and Discussion•••.•••••••••••••••••••••••.•••• 107 Notes••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 110 CHAPTER 5 COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE WORKING CLASS 112 In Search of the Working Class(es)...... 114 st~cture and Composition of the Working Class in Ta1wan., •••••••••••• a •••••••••••••••• •••••••• 126 Summary and Discussion.•••••••.•••• 139 ~ Ol:es ••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••• " •••• 147 ix CHAPTER 6 WORKERS IN THE DISTRIBUTION PROCESS •.•••••• 149 Wage Behavior in Postwar Taiwan•••••••••••••••••••• 151 Wage structure among the Wage and Salary Workers••• 158 Income Distribution••••••••••• 165 Summary and Discussion•• 173

Notes.••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 176

CHAPTER 7 UNIONIZATION AND LABOR HOVEMEHT •••••••••••• 178 The Growth of Labor Unions--A Quantitative Survey•• 179 Labor Movement and the KMT-State••• 187 Labor Awakens •••••••••• 195 Summary and Discussion••••••••• 204

Notes•.••••.•.•••. 0 ••••••••• 206 CHAPTER 8 CONCLUDING REHARU •• 208 Summarizing the Past•••••••• 208 Contemplating the Future•••• 215 Notes....••.•.•••.••.••••••. 221

APPENDIX A TABLES •• • ••••• 0 D •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 222 APPENDIX B FIGURES. · . 272 REFERENCES •••••..•• · . 282 x

L:IST OJ!' TABLES

Table page

3.1 Sectoral Distribution of Employed population, 1956- 1990 .....•.•..•..•.••...... ••...... •.....222 3.2 Farm and Nonfarm Households Income Differentiation and Income Sources of Farm Households, 1964-1990••••••• 223 3.3 Employment Structure in the Labor Force, 1956-1990 · 224 3.4 The Number and Percentage of Wage Workers within Each Sector, 1956-1990•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 225 3.5 Percentage of Income Derived from Wage Employment in Farm and Nonfarm Households, 1975-1990••••••••••••• 226 3.6 Female Labor Force Participation and Labor Market Distribution Pattern, 1956-1990•••••••••••••••..••• 227 3.7 Age structure of the Wage and Salary Workers, 1966-

1980 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 228 3.8 Employment status of Each Age Cohort by Adult Population in Taiwan, 1970-1990•••••••••••••••••••• 229 3.9 Distribution of Employed Persons and Wage Workers by Size of Establishments, 1980-1990•••••••.•••••••••• 230 3.10 occupational Composition of Wage Workers, 1956-1990

• ••••••••••• 8 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • 231 4.1 Self Employed by Gender, 1956-1990.•.•.••.••••••••. 232 4.2 Self Employed by Gender in Nonagricultural and Agricultural Labor Force, 1956-1990•••••••••••••.•• 233 4.3 Unpaid Family Workers by Gender, 1956-1990••••••••• 234 4.4 Unpaid Family Workers by Gender in Nonagricultural and Agricultural Labor Force, 1956-1990•.•••••••.•••... 235 4.5 Wage Workers by Gender, 1956-1990•••••••••••••••••• 236 4.6 Gender and Class Factions of Wage Workers, 1956-1990 • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 237 xi 4.7 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Class l"actions of Wage Workers and the Labor Force, 1956- 1990 ..•....•...... •..•....•.. e _ •••••••••••••••••• 239 4.8 Sex Ratios of Selected Teaching Profession, 1950-1990 .•.....•...... •...... •••...... 240 4.9 Sex Ratios of Students in Medical and Health Related Field of Study by Level of Education, 1975-1990•••• 241 4.10 Age and Employment Status of Male and Female Adult population in Taiwan, 1970-1980•••••••••••••••••••• 242 5.1 Distribution of Wage and Salary Workers by Manual and Nonmanual occupations, 1956-1990•••••••••••••••.•.• 243 5.2 Distribution of Wage and Salary Workers by Supervisory and Nonsupervisory positions, 1956-1990•.•••••••••• 244 5.3 Industrial Distribution of Wage Workers, 1956-1990.245 5.4 Civilian Wage workers in Industrial Sector by Occupation and by Size of Workplace, 1990•••••••••• 246 5.5 Civilian Wage workers in Tertiary Sector by Occupation and by Size of Workplace, 1990••••••••••••••••••••• 247 5.6 Civilian Wage workers in Industrial Sector by occupation, 1980 and 1990•••••••••••••• s ••••••••••• 248 5.7 Distribution of Own-Account Workers by Occupations, 1956-1990...•...... ••.....•....•.....••.••...... 249 5.8 Distribution of Unpaid Family Workers by Occupations, 1956-1990 250 5.9 working-class Categories in Taiwan, 1956-1990 (by total labor force) 251 5.10 Working Classes in Taiwan, 1956-1990 (by total labor

force) II ••••••••••••• 253 5.11 Comparison of Selected Market and Demographic Characteristics of Nonagricultural Occupations••••• 255 6.1 ManUfacturing Wages and Household Expenditure, 1964- 1990 (in 1975's $NT) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 257 6.2 Wage Differentials between Gender, 1960-1990 (female as percentage of male) ••••.•••..•.••••••.•••••..••• 258 xii 6.3 Wage structure in Industrial Sector by Size of Establishments, 1971-1990•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 259 6.4 Monthly Wages By occupation and Firm Size in Nonagricultural Sector, 1990 (at current price) •••• 260 6.5 Monthly Wages By occupation and Firm Size, Manufacturing Industry 1980-1990 (at current price)261 6.6 Description of Class positions••••••••••••••••••••• 263 6.7 Educational Expenditure Per Minor in Selected Class Households, 1975-1990 (at 1975 Price) •••••••••••••• 264 7.1 composition of Union Membership in Taiwan, 1987-1990

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• CI ••••••••••••• 6265 7.2 Unionization by Geographic Areas in Taiwan, 1957 and 1990..•...... •.•.•.•.••..••..•...•...... ~~7 7.3 Frequency and Intensity of Labor Disputes in Taiwan, 1950-1990 (five-year average) ••.••••••••••••••••••• 269 7.4 Causes of Labor Disputes in Taiwan, 1950-1990•••••• 270 xiii LIST OF FIGURES

6.1 Index of Real Wage Increases in Manufacturing, 1952 1990 (at 1975's price) •••••••••••••••••••••••.••••• 272 6.2 Index of Real Wage Increases i.n utilities, 1952-1990 (at 1975' s price) 273 6.3 Indices of Real Wages, Value of Production, and Working Hours Increases in Manufacturing, 1952-1990

•••••••••• 0 ...... • 274 6.4 Wages as Percentage of Value of Production Per F,mployed Person in Manufacturing, 1952-1990•••••••• 275 6.5 Primary Income Distribution, 1975-1990 National Average = 100•••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••.•..• 276 6.6 Absolute Income Differentiation, 1975-1990 (differences with national average in 1975 NT$) •••• 277 6.7 Property Income Distribution, 1975-1990 National Average = 100•.. e _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 278 7.1 The Growth of Union Membership in Taiwan, 1952-1990 •.•...... •.•..•...... •..•...... 279 7.2 The Rate of unionization in Taiwan, 1952-1990•••••• 280 7.3 The Growth of Industrial and Occupational Unions in Taiwan, 1957-1990•.•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••• 281 1

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Concomitant with the rapid industrialization in Taiwan is the growing number of wage workers, or what can be broadly defined as an increasing proletarianization of the labor force. The four decades of industrialization have not only drawn in a large number of people (either willingly or unwillingly) who had not been in the labor force but also has altered the way the production process is organized. Given this profound transformation of Taiwan's economic and social structure, it is very important to document systematically the growth and structural change of the working class in post-war Taiwan. The origins and changing composition of the working class, its demographic and social characteristics, its patterns of mobility, and its potential internal differentiation all have important implications for the understanding of this newly emerged class in Taiwan and, by generalization, of the nature and impact of the new Asian industrialism in general. This dissertation aims at providing a systematic, empirical grounded analysis of these issues. This study starts with the premise that proletarianization and the emergence of a modern working class are central processes of modernization and industrialization. The formation and transformation of 2 that class, furthermore, are intimately linked to other social and political changes in the industrializing society. The major emphasis of this study is, however, to provide a careful, descriptive analysis of the class structural change and its impact upon the emerging working class. Although it explores certain social and political aspects of the working class, the issues of class consciousness, class organization, and class conflict are only of secondary importance in this study. These are, of course, vital issues in the study of social class, but given the relatively incipient state of the literature on Taiwan's working class, it is not possible to deal with both structure and consciousness in sufficient detail in a single study, especially since the data on these are extremely limited. Of the two, we believe that a thorough empirical analysis of the structure of the working class is more urgently needed. The study of social class as an agency (its consciousness, organization, and class actions) must build upon a careful study of the structural configurations that impinge on the subjective experiences of the workers. Thus this dissertation deals with only the structural aspects of Taiwan's working class formation, focusing on the pattern of class structural change, the nature of proletarianization process, demographic composition, the internal segmentation of the working class, and the trajectory of the labor movement. 3

Approaches to Class A study of the working class inevitably faces the question of what one means by working class (or social class in general). This is not simply a conceptual issue regarding the boundaries between classes but also a theoretical issue concerning the relationship between structure and agency. Should classes be defined as structural locations in the production system, or a collectivity of individuals who have acquired some collective consciousness and who act accordingly? The questions of how class should be defined and how the relationship between class structure and class formation should be understood have generated heated debates and divided students of social class into two camps: those who look at class primarily as a structural entity determined by an objective position within the social organization of production and those who take class as an agency with some shared disposition and collective consciousness. On the one hand, class is seen as a structural phenomenon primarily, although not exclusively, dictated by the economic structure of the society in question. 1 The delineation of class structure, it follows, takes priority over the study of the actual process of class formation. structure is a pivotal determinant of social conflict and 4 that therefore an adequate conceptualization of class structure is essential for a correct theory of social change." When carried to its extreme, the consciousness, disposition, and action of a given class become the logical outcome of its position in the class structure (Katznelson 1986:6-7). The danger of this, of course, is to lose sight of the human being as an agent of social change and to reduce class analysis to an exercise of minute classification. In such an approach, as Marshall comments (1983:275): "The concrete activities of real people or of groups of people and, more importantly, how they themselves define these activities are nowhere to be found." On the other hand, to borrow E.P. Thompson's famous phrases, class may be seen as "a process" and "a happening. ,,2 Instead of being structurally determined, class is a historical and cultural formation that reveals itself in people's experience of everyday life. In the words of Thompson (1963:9), "class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs." Class is made when its members acquire an in group cOtlsciousness, develop a class-based organization, and engage in collective actions. When carried to its extreme, class becomes "exclusively a matter of class 5 consciousness" (Calhoun 1982:21), existence of which depends on its members' subjective feeling (Clegg et ale 1986:204-206; Giddens 1987:205; Johnson 1978:92-96; Murphy 1986:255-257). a'One danger with this approach," is that it "may lead us to lose sight of class as a structural, enduring order of relationships which link the disparate situations of one's lived experience as a coherent whole." (Clegg et ale 1986:204) Clearly, each approach captures some critical aspects of class structuration that the other tends to miss,3 but the crucial issue is not which approach is more correct but how to conceptualize class in such a way that can adequately deal with issues raised by both perspectives. It is here that Katznelson's (1986) conceptualization of class as a mUlti-layered, interconnected processes is very useful. As an attempt to break down the dichotomous conceptualization of class as "in-itself" versus "for itself," Katznelson proposes a conception of class in the capitalist society with four connected layers of "theory and history,,,4 involving: 1) a structural position, 2) a common way of life, 3) a shared disposition, and 4) collective actions (1986:14-22). As a structural position, the first level, class is an "experience-distant" analytical ccnstr~ct needed to depict the st~~ctural configuration of the capitalist society. At this level, 6 classes are empty places fixed in the systems of production. At the level of ways of life, the second level, class "refers to how actual capitalist societies develop at work and away from it." (p. 16) Class is understood h.ere as a group of individuals sharing a common way of life partly conditioned by their common position in the system of capitalist production. simply put, while the first level defines class in the relations of production, the second level defines class in terms of its occupants' market and work situations. At the level of dispositions, "classes are formed groups, sharing dispositions." (p. 17) This is close to what Giddens calls "class awareness" (1973:112-117) and to E.P. Thompson's class as a "social and cultural formation" (1968:357), in the sense that a group of people perceive and share similar social experiences, interests, traditions, and define themselves in relation to other classes. To quote Katznelson more directly, class dispositions "are plausible and meaningful responses to the circumstances workers find themselves in." (p. 19) These cognitive constructs, furthermore, "define the boundaries between the probable and improbable" of collective actions. (p. 17)

The fourth le~~el, class as a collective action, "refers to classes that are organized and that act through 7 movements and organizations to affect society and the position of the class within it." (p. 20) Moreover, .. [t]his kind of behavior is self-conscious and reflects to activity that is more than just the common but unself conscious shared behavior of members of a class." (ibid.) Class at this level, for lack of a better term, is a self conscious political organization active in protecting and promoting its interests. Class formation, then, is "concerned with the conditional (but not random) process of connection between the four levels of class." (p. 21) It is not an all-or nothing matter and it does not have to come in the sequence presented above. Class formation can happen when all four layers of structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective actions occur simultaneously, or it may occur unevenly across layers. Class analysis is the analysis of class structure as well as class formation--each penetrates and limits the outcome of the other, and both are contingent on, and conditioned by, diverse social and historical forces that are specific to society under study. Now it should be clear that this dissertation is a study of class at the first two levels of Katznelson's conceptualization. Class at these two levels represents a structural position and the work and non-work experiences associated with this structural position in the production system. While class is not understood purely as a 8 structural property or as an "experience-distant" phenomenon, at these levels of analysis a person's consciousness and class-oriented actions do not enter the definition of his/her class position. "This level of analysis may tell us how workers exist and live in certain circumstances," Katznelson (1986:17) writes, "but not how they will think or act in those experienced circumstances." Nonetheless, as Katznelson points out, it is most appropriate to construct classification of class positions at these two levels of analysis. Classes at these levels do not necessarily correspond to classes as social and cultural formations, which mayor may not "happen." But, clearly, "classes as formed groups" must have definite relationships, however complicated and conjunctual they are, with classes formed at the level of structure and work relations. Approaching class formation at the structural level of capitalist production, the most important arena to look into is the proletarianization process. proletarianization, broadly understood as the creation of wage workers, is a pivotal process of capitalist development, and in Tilly's words, "the single most far reaching social change that has occurred in the Western world over the past few hundred years and that is going on

-~--=,-- in the world as a whole today!! (1981;179). Iii Cl- ;:).1.W.1..1.ClL vein, Katznelson (1986:15) argues that proletarianization 9 "provides a necessary, indeed the necessary condition for class formation in the more thickly textured senses of ways of life, dispositions, or patterns of collective action." The pace and form of proletarianization process are, therefore, of central concern for the study of class formation. And so is the macro-structural contexts in which it occurs. Thus, a major focus of this study is to delineate the pattern of proletarianization process in Taiwan over the past three decades and to examine how this process has transformed Taiwan's class structure. Proletarianization involves two interrelated processes: 1) the increasing dependence of workers on the sale of their labor power--wage work, and 2) the separation of workers from control of the means of production- expropriation (Tilly 1981, 1984; Walton 1987). A significant variation can occur in the form of proletarianization among economies that undergo the same trajectory of industrial transformation, as manifested in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea. While South Korean industrialization has produced a more spatially and organizationally concentrated pattern of proletarianization, Taiwan's economic process has been accompanied by a more dispersed and decentralized pattern of proletarianization, with a large number of "part-time

___ ,_",,", __ : __ 111 ••__1.: __ -= __• __ , :_...:1•• _._:__ m"''':'- ~ J:I.LU.J.c"",aL~a,--· WU.LA~.IIY .L.l1 LULQ.L .L~IUU.i::t'-.L..LC:i::t. .L1..ese ..... l.Vergen"'" patterns of proletarianization, as Koo (1990) suggests, are 10 responsible, to a great extent, for the different levels of labor conflicts and working-class formation that the two countries experienced in the past. In short, this study aims to provide the first, systematic analysis of Taiwan's class structure and its transformation since the 1950s. While class is understood as a multi-level process, involving structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective actions, the focus of the present analysis is on the formation of class at the structural level, with only secondary interest in its manifestations in the arena of labor conflicts and labor organizations. More specifically, this study seeks to answer the following questions: What is the dominant pattern of proletarianization that has accompanied Taiwan's export-led industrialization since the 1960s? Where were the emerging proletariat predominantly drawn from, and what was the specific role of the female labor force? What are the dominant demographic and social characteristics of the industrial wage workers, and how are they distributed across industries and across rural-urban areas? Is the neWly emerged Taiwan's working class relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous? How is Taiwan's working class internally divided, by what major axes of division? What is the economic situations, especially in~ome situations, of the blue-collar workers, as opposed Does there exist a meaningful class boundary between white- 11 collar and blue-collar workers or along other dimensions? Lastly, how has class formation at the macro-structural level been manifested in the arena of the labor movement? Or, reversely, how can we account for the pattern of labor conflicts observed in the past decades with reference to the nature of proletarianization and class formation at the structural level? Collectively, answers to these questions will significantly enhance our understanding of Taiwan's class structure and class formation process. Although this study remains at the level of "thin" definition of class formation, borrowing Tilly's phrases, its ultimate aim is to provide a necessary groundl work for a more "thickly textured" understanding of class formation in Taiwan.

Agenda Ahead Chapter 2 reviews four general approaches to the role of labor in Taiwan's post-war economic development. It is argued that while they have made important contribution to our understanding of the working class in Taiwan, none of them has offered a systematic documentation of the nature of the proletarianization process and the associated structural transformation of the working class in Taiwan. Chapter 3 examines the changing forms of production

__,_• ..: .:_ m_.: ....__ n •• " • ..:1 _ .... _ ••__ ~ __,.: .&: ...... _ .LC.La'-.LUII~ .L1I ~Q.LWCUI. UVC.LQ.L.L '-.LCUU O:>UUWO:> a UC"'... .LIIC V.L ,-uc family-labor system and a corresponding growth of the wage- 12 labor system. There are, however, great variations in this trend across sectors. An absolute reduction of the agricultural labor force leads to a relative decline of family-labor system in the labor force as a whole. within the agricultural sector, although the balance between family- and wage-labor system has remained the same, the dispersion of industry into rural Taiwan generates a marked increase of semiproletarian households. outside agriculture, we also observe a resilience of the informal sector, existing in variable forms and employing varied strategies of survival. This unique pattern of proletarianization was clearly linked to the industrial structure dominated by small- and medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan. Chapter 4 focuses on women's status in the process of proletarianization. The female labor force experienced a much faster rate of proletarianization than male labor force. A rapid increase of women workers in the labor market does not mean that women are becoming less dominated by men. within the family-labor system women are much more likely to be unpaid family workers while men are over represented in the propertied class. within the wage-labor system, women are also likely to be excluded from managerial and high status professional jobs. By actively participating in the labor market, ironically, wOmen are actively reproducing their own domination by men. 13 Chapter 5 looks into the differentiation and internal composition of the wage and salary workers. This chapter examines the various ways in which working class has been defined in the literature and presents numerical estimates of the size of working class in postwar Taiwan. Increasing complexity of the wage and salary workers coincides with rapid proletarianization. While the traditionally perceived working class of blue-collar workers grew rapidly during the first phase of export-led industrialization, industrial development in the past decade was most significantly marked by heavy increase of the low-level, white-collar workers. Chapter 6 delineates the material conditions of the working class in Taiwan. Comparison between the long-term wage-rate increases and other indexes (production increase, median household income etc.) confirms that the material condition of wage workers in general has improved substantially in postwar decades. While wage gaps between male and female workers have persisted, wage differentials between white- and blue-collar workers have narrowed over time. The wage differentials within blue-collar workers are also examined in terms of firm size and skill levels. The findings indicate a trend toward reduced wage gaps between different sizes of firms but not between different levels of skill. Finally, the individual income differentials indicate a gradual narrowing gap between 14 propertied and nonpropertied classes. Among the nonpropertied classes, the income gaps also narrowed over the years. There is indirect evidence, however, that suggests that the wealth distribution between propertied and nonpropertied classes is widening. Chapter 7 addresses the issues of the labor movement and labor politics in Taiwan. It will be shown that the number of unions and the unionization rate grew rapidly in the postwar period. This union growth, however, was not accompanied by any growth in their political strength, mainly due to the party-state's effective corporatist control of the existent union organizations. The transition from the "hard" to the "soft" authoritarian regime in the 1980s (Winckler 1984) enlarged the political space for the growth of the independent labor movement in the late 1980s. The momentum of this newly emerged labor movement was quickly halted, however, under the pressure of a state-capital coalition from without and by the internal fragmentation within the labor movement. The concluding chapter provides a summary of the study and some reflections on the future of working class in Taiwan.

Notes OD Data Population censuses provide the only source of information regarding the historical trend of 15 proletarianization in the early years of postwar Taiwan. Later, as comprehension of "manpower" becomes important to economic growth, various kinds of surveys concerning the characteristics of the labor force became available. This stUdy makes extensive use of these published census and labor force survey materials. In general, neither the population census nor the labor force survey were designed to tackle the questions of proletarianization and the composition of the working class. And due to the changing practices of census taking, there are inconsistencies between censuses, thus makes the use of these data more problematic. Nonetheless, they contain information relating to a population's economic and demographic characteristics that are valuable for mapping out the pattern of proletarianization and the contour of the working class in a longer time frame. This section discusses some general issues about these materials, more specific points are covered in the relevant chapters where the information appears. There were three series of popUlation and housing censuses conducted and fully published in Taiwan since World War II: 1956, 1966, and 1980. Also, part of the 1990's census was published recently. In addition, two sample censuses were conducted in 1970 and 1975 which provide the same range of information but on a 5 percent sample of the population. In all censuses the population 16 was classified according to their economic (employment status, industrial affiliation, and occupation) and demographic (sex, age, and education) characteristics. While the overall coverage of each census is quite similar, there are several inconsistencies among them which are relevant to the current study. One major discontinuity concerns how each census defines the economically active population. In the 1956 and 1966 censuses, the economically active population was defined as those who were 12 years of age and over and who were capable and willing to work, including both the employed and the unemployed; since 1970 the age criterion was raised to 15 and over. No adjustment was made in this study regarding this age discrepancy for lack of detailed information on whom to exclude among those in the 12 to 14 age group from each population sub-group. This should not affect the overall trend significantly, because the number of persons involved is relatively small. By raising the age criterion to work, it should be noted, may deter the pace of proletarianization.

A more serious discontinuity concerns the inclusion or exclusion of the military personnel in the economically active population. The 1956 census includes only those military personnel living outside the military bases; while the 1966, 1975, and 1980 censuses include all armed forces. 5 A related problem concerns the occupational 17 classification of those military personnel. The 1956 census classified the off-base military personnel as "occupation which cannot be elsewhere classified"; the 1966, 1970, and 1975 censuses classified all the armed forces, along with police and firefighters, as "protected workers" under the service occupation; whereas the 1980 census once again classified all the armed forces under the "occupation cannot be elsewhere classified." The 1990 data are derived from the Yearbook of Manpower statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China, ~990 which excludes the armed forces all together. That is, it only includes the so called "civilian population." In this study, in order to make each year's figures compatible, the armed forces were added to the 1956 and 1990 data and all armed forces were classified as service workers. Adjustment for the 1956 data (400,000 men and 1,000 women) is my personal estimate after comparing the estimates given in Ho (1978:131 notes for Table 8.7), Kuznets (1979:67-69), and Kallgren (1964:93).6 Along with the military personnel living off-base, the armed forces in 1956 is estimated to be 451,000. For 1990, the number of persons in the armed forces (438,000 men and 3,500 women) are derived from the 1990 Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book Table 7 (Executive Yuan, Ministry of Interior 1991:293). In addition,

Taiwan's armed forces was estimated as 600 thousand in 1960 18 and 424 thousands in 1987 (Sivard 1991:51). Except for the income figures in Chapter 6, all tables in this study that derived their figures from other sources refer to civilian population only. There are also changes in the overall classification scheme of occupations and industries. For the occupational classification, the major break occurred in 1970. In 1956 and 1966, the employed population was classified into 10 one-digit occupational categories: professional, technical and related workers (0); managerial and administrative workers (1); assistant and clerical workers (2); sales workers (3); workers in agriculture, fishery, forestry and related fields (4); workers in mining and related fields (5); transportation and communication workers (6); production and other manual workers (7/8); service workers (9); and occupation cannot be elsewhere classified (10). since 1970 the category of transportation and communication workers (6) was eliminated so that pilots and supervisors of aircraft and ships were reclassified as professional workers, the supervisors and operators in railways and communications were reclassified as assistant and clerical workers; the category of workers in mining and related fields (5) was also eliminated as a separate one-digit category and put into the new enlarged category of production and transportation operatives and ether manual laborers. In addition, athletes and photographers in the 19 service occupation (9) were reclassified as professional workers. The new (post-1970) one-digit occupational code is as follows: professional, technical and related workers (Oj1); managerial and administrative workers (2); clerical and assistant workers (3); sale workers (4); service workers (5); workers in agriculture, husbandry, fishery, and forestry (6); production and tranoportation equipment operatives and other manual workers--including miners (7/8/9); and occupation cannot be elsewhere classified (X). All figures presented in the related tables are adjusted according to the post-1970 categories. The industrial classification changed little over the years. The main break once again occurred at the 1970's census in which the finance and insurance industries were separated out from commerce as an independent category. Since they all belong to the tertiary sector and since this study does not delve into the details of the transformation of this sector, no particUlar adjustment was made. Another set of widely used data in describing Taiwan's workforce characteristics is the Census of Industry and Commerce (1954-1986). Because it provides information on the distribution of workforce by size of workplace (both in terms of number of persons employed and assets possessed), of data is commonly used to portray the industrial centralization or decentralization in Taiwan. 20 By using establishment as a unit of data collection and covering only those establishments that are registered to the proper government agencies, this industry census undercounts or misses the very small-scale and informal business units. Any trend of industrial centralization and workforce concentration in Taiwan derived from this data set, therefore, should be treated with caution. A further problem, as the title "Industry and Commerce" suggests, is that it did not LncLude the agricultural labor force. For these reasons, this study does not make extensive use of this data set. A better picture of Taiwan's workforce concentration in recent years can be derived from the Monthly Bulletin of Labor statistics which collects its data from interviewing individual workers and covers all economic activities inclUding agriculture. Unfortunately, it can only provide information on the workforce involved but not the number of establishments. And because it has only collected this particular information since 1979 we can only look at the most recent trends. Information on income distribution is derived from Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area of the RepUblic of China. The survey started first in 1964 and was conducted every other year and since 1972 it was conducted annually. The survey was based on a random sample of total households in Taiwan? and covered the composition of household, economic and demographic 21 characteristics of household head and individual income recipients, sources of household and individual income, and household consumption patterns. While not all information has been published and certainly not in the form this study would prefer, it is nevertheless a good (and only) source of information that can give us some idea of the pattern of income distribution at the national level. As the discussion in Chapter 6 indicates, even with imperfections this data set is still useful in dissecting some important trends in income distribution among different classes in Taiwan. In accordance with the data some terms that are used in this study are defined as follows: Employers: those who operate their own enterprises (solo practice or in partnership with other owners) with paid employees. OWn-Account Workers: those who operate their own enterprises without employing workers other than unpaid family workers. Self Employed: all those who operate their own enterprises with or without paid employees. Unpaid Family Workers: those who work without pay for more than 15 hours a week in a profit-seeking establishment operated by any member of the family. 22 Employees or Wage and Salary Workers: those who work for government or private employers and received remuneration for their work in money or pay in kind. Economically Active population or Labor Force: those who are 12 to 15 years of age and over and who are capable and willing to work, including both the employed and the unemployed. S 23

Notes 1. within Marxism, this approach to class analysis is best examplified by the writings of structural Marxists inspired by Louis Althusser (see, for example, Carchedi 1977; Poulantzas 1973, 1975; Urry 1973; szymanski 1983; wright 1979, 1985), who see classes as e'functions of the process of production as a whole. They are not its subjects, on the contrary, they are determined by its form." (Balibar 1972:267, quoted from Katznelson 1986:8 emphasis original). It can also be found in the writings of some critical school sociologists (Marcuse 1967). Within the mainstream sociology, it is best represented by the post-industrial theorists like D. Bell's The End of Ideology (1962) and The Coming of post-Industrial society (1973), and the Weberians like Goldthrope (1982). 2. This approach is best represented by the writings of "social historians" inspired by Thompson's seminal work The Making of the English working Class (1963). The closure theory of Frank Parkin (1974, 1979), Pierre Bourdieu's cultural theory of class (1984, 1987; see also Joppke 1986), and functionalist perception of class (Szymanski 1983:624-35) can also be included. 3. There are crossing comments from both sides to each other's terrain. For instance, Eric Wright, one of the most influential structural Marxists in recent years, is very much aware of the interdetermination among class structure, class formation, and class struggle (1979:97 108). Edward Thompson, the leading critique of structural Marxism, also recognizes the importance of structural influence on human agency when he makes the comment: "The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born--or enter involuntarily." (1963:9) Neither, however, tends to emphasize this awareness in their empirical investigations. 4. Refers to the Althusserian structuralist emphasis and Thompsonian historical emphasis on class analysis. 5. There are some confusions as to whether the armed forces (or what part of them) should be included in the regular census. Except the 1956 census, according to the description on census taking procedures in each census report, all armed forces should not be included in the census. A careful look at the popUlation according to their economic and demographic classifications, nonetheless, indicates they were included in all subse~~ent censuses. The prelimarary reports for the 1990 census, however, indicate it does not include the armed forces. 6. Ho gives the estimate for 1966 as 450,000. Kuznets gives the estimate of 540,000 for the period between 1951- 24 1960. In Kallgren's article several estimates were given for the late 1950s and earlY' 1960s ranging from 580,000 to 600,000. 7. Between 1964 and 1970 the sampling ratios were in the range from 0.13 to 0.16 percent of the total households; between 1972 to 1974 the ratio was 0.18 percent; between 1975 and 1977 the ratio was 0.3 percent; between 1978 to 1983 the ratio was 0.4 percent; and since 1984 the number of samples was fixed at 16,434 households. 8. Before 1968 the age criterion was 12. 25

CHAPTER 2

APPROACHES TO LABOR lli THE TAIWAN HlRACLE

studies of the development experience of Taiwan have not paid much attention to the role of labor. It is true that hardly any writing on Taiwan's development has failed to notice that an abundant supply of cheap, docile, hard working, and relatively well educated labor was one of the main ingredients of Taiwan's economic success. Similarly, many studies have given attention to the changing sectoral and occupational composition of the labor force, usually as an indicator of how successful Taiwan has become industrialized. Some writers commented, albeit in passing, on the mechanisms that created and maintained this pool of labor. Only a handful of studies, and only in recent years, have focused their attention on the nature and the characteristics of the labor market and the labor process in Taiwan.

Labor as Manpower: The Economistic Account on Taiwan's Labor Most economists interested in the Taiwan experience treat labor as a factor of industrialization. Samuel Ho's Economic Development of Taiwan: ~860-~975, which represents the standard account from the neoclassic economic 26 perspective, summarizes the process of economic growth as follows (197S:xvii-xviii): Economic process in Taiwan during the twentieth century has been attained largely through the growth of peasant agricultural production made possible by the intensive application of modern inputs. • •• An important dynamic element in Taiwan's economic development has been the government, which has played a central developmental role in the colonial period as well as during the period since independence. Government investments in material and human capital and the economic pOlicies of the government have affected all aspects of Taiwan's economic development. In Ho's book, the deployment of labor in postwar Taiwan appeared in two contexts. First, the changing industrial distribution of Taiwanese labor force was documented (pp. 131-132), along with the shifting composition of national products and trade, as indication of "changes in economic structure. ,,1 It is pointed out that the drastic increase of manufacturing employment was the result of rapid industrialization, especially that of the rapid expansion of labor-intensive industries (i.e. food, textile, and electrical machinery) in postwar Taiwan (pp. 20S-211). Second, labor was considered as a "source of growth." ThUS, in the chapter titled "Postwar Industrialization," the quantity and quality of labor, along with capital investment, was assessed as inputs to industrial growth. Quantitatively, women and a large number of underutilized agricultural laborers provided a ready pool of labor supply for industrial development (pp. 15S-159, 211). More 27 crucial to the rapid industrialization in Taiwan, however, was the relatively high quality of its labor force as indicated in the skill and educational composition of the labor force (pp. 212-214). Labor, in short, was reduced to one of the factor inputs to industrialization. Ho's approach is snared by most economists. For example, Lin in his Industrialization in Taiwan (1973) discussed labor in the chapter titled "The Basis of Export Growth"; and discussion of labor occurred in Kuo's The Taiwan Economy in Transition (1983) under the chapters "Labor Absorption and Full Employment" and "Female participation in Economic Development.,,2 In general, their main interest is in the demand and supply of labor power and how it could affect the process of industrialization. The social and political aspects of how industrialization affects laborers as a distinct group of people, the formation and transformation of the working class, is none of their concern. A byproduct of this kind of "economistic" concern, however, is a proliferation of labor force statistics that inadvertently help our inquiry into the understanding of working class. These labor statistics also form the basis for several studies within this approach that pay more focused attention to the changing labor force composition and labor market conditions in Taiwan (Galenson 1979, 1992; Djang 1977). Their main emphasis, however, is still on how 28 industrialization was possible given the structure of labor market which in turn experienced changes due to economic growth. As Galenson concludes in his Labor and Economic ~rowth in Five Asian countries (1992:111-113): The first thing to be observed is that manpower has not been a constraint on development•••• High rates of population growth combined with high rates of labor-force participation served to keep the manpower pool full •••• All the countries were fortunate in having good educational systems fairly early on, particular at the elementary level. The continuing supply of workers who could acquire skills quickly fueled the growth process•••• The contribution of women was another major factor•••• Lack of skills is sometimes cited as an obstacle to development, but this does not appear to have been the case•••• Investment in secondary and higher education was sufficient to provide an adequate flow of the manpower required by changing technology•••• One of the most impressive achievements of economic growth is to reduce and eventually eliminate underemployment•••• People in marginal occupations are drawn into productive employment, labor supply and demand become more balanced. Wages rose naturally due to the rise in productivity as well as the attainment of full employment (the unlimited supply of labor became limited) induced by economic growth. 3 The changing nature of industrial relations is then explained, though not exclusively, by this lIbalanced" labor market (1992:11S-116): Why should a developing country concern itself with trade unions, collective bargaining, and labor relations legislation? South Korea and Taiwan achieved almost Unbelievable rates of economic growth by letting entrepreneurs manage their working forces as they saw fit•••• Should not their experience provide a labor model for less developed nations? One answer to this question is that entrepreneurs devoted to rapid expansion of their firms and backed by authoritarian governments 29 can indeed follow the Asian model •••• But the situation changes when a balanced labor market is attained, making it more difficult for an employer to replace dissident employees, when wages have reached a level enabling workers to sustain themselves on their savings for at least short periods of time and to support unions by dues payments. Demands for greater political democracy begin to emerge as people become more affluent. Resentment over working conditions that were stifled in the past can now be expressed openly. strikes and other forms of job action, sometimes violent, multiply. (emphasis added) The quantity and quality (mainly education) of labor were once again treated as the chief ingredients in achieving economic growth. Successful industrialization/economic growth, in turn, induces a balanced labor market that increases the well-being of workers which provides the material base for them to voice their further economic and political demands. The issues of under what conditions were production and labor process organized and with what social and political consequences are of secondary concern in their analyses.

Labor as Womanpower: Female Factory Workers in Taiwan "For both local entrepreneurs, and for foreign industry seeking the advantages of Taiwan's low-cost labor supply, women are ideal workers in that neither they nor anybody else considers it necessary or desirable that they receive an independent wage." (Diamond 1979:319) In part due to their growing presence in the labor force, in part due to their heavy concentration in certain export-oriented light 30 manufacturing industries (textile, garment, and electronics in particular), there was increasing interest in female factory workers in Taiwan since the 1970s (Arrigo 1980, 1984, 1985; Diamond 1979; Gallin 1982, 1984, 1990; Hsia 1993:83-145; Huang 1977; Kung 1976,1981, 1983, 1984). utilizing both survey interviews and participant observations these studies provide valuable information regarding the demographic, economic, and social backgrounds of female factory workers and their adaptations to and perceptions of the factory work. In general, these studies show that the majority of these young (most of them between age 15-24) female factory workers were from either farm or blue-collar families. They are "filial proletarians" in the sense that "going out to work in the factories is a family strategy, not an individual attempt to shape one's life. Virtually all of the young women had entered the work force with parental support or encouragement, in order to contribute to household finances." (Diamond 1979:331) While the majority of them did perceive factory work as an opportunity to be (relatively) free from familial control and to be "independent," the rigid schedule and harsh discipline inside the factory, however, quickly tarnished their excitement of being independent and instead led to

~- -~ ~. ------~-_. --- .n'.Ul~· alienation from factorx work. ftl:> VUIC V.L __ .-l:> .&.Cl:>t-'U1U.lOC:U,," 31 commented: "At this job, each worker is more like a machine than a person." (Kung 1981:191) The wide-spread personal anxiety and dissatisfaction that associate with alienation in work, however, did not generate collective consciousness but was translated into interpersonal feuds with co-workers or with immediate supervisors which led to unusually high mobility among female factory workers. "Women in factories certainly share enough of the same disabilities to permit the development of class consciousness; but rather than developing class consciousness, women direct their resentments at group leaders, supervisors, co-workers, or office staff. Women are more concerned about opportunism in social relations and fine gradations in status and rank (concerns that undermine their solidarity as workers) than with the union and how it actually might be made to serve them." (Kung 1981:209) That is, the potential danger of translating collective alienation to collective consciousness and collective action was diffused by individualistic assessment of the situation. Kung's observation is suggestive here (1981:205-206): Rather than seeing themselves as the largest class of employees in the factory, women see only the factory's size: "there're so many people in the company, why should they listen to us? We're just one among many." ••••The majority of workers are thus resigned; they recognize that submitting suggestions or complaints is futile because there are no effective channels for transmitting them••.• There are, of course, union representatives; but despite a general understanding that the union's 32 purpose is to protect workers, few workers could tell me who their union representatives were. The idea of seeking out a union representative was inconceivable to most women: "The way the system works now, the union only knows the opinions of the foremen and the people above them and hears nothing from the women workers themselves. So how can it do anything for us?" This perception of powerlessness within the factory and the understanding that factory work is only of temporary nature, to help fill the gap when younger members in the family can take up the slack, before one's marriage further serve to deter the development of working-class consciousness among women workers. As commented by Diamond (1979:337): "The temporary nature of women's employment makes it unlikely that they will risk losing present day gains by engaging in what the government regards as illegal activity. For the time being, at least, the bettering of their futures lies in making the ideal middle-class marriage, and it is there that their concerns are focused." The muting of class consciousness among women factory workers, therefore, was not simply because of the institutional constraints (see Arrigo 1985), but because female factory workers themselves developed a pragmatic perception of factory work as a necessary interlude in their life. These observations of women workers as transitory proletariat who are incapable of developing working-class consciousness partly eA~lain the political domination of 33 Taiwanese working class in the postwar period. Another mechanism that serves to mute the working-class consciousness can be found in the proliferation of petty production in Taiwan that has the effect of "manufactl~ring" consent of the (male) working class.

Labor in Petty Production: Manufacturing Bosses and Consent While aspiration of moving from industrial wage work to self-employment is universal among workers, the labor intensive nature of industrialization oriented toward export market makes it possible for a proliferation of petty production in Taiwan. "The large number of small manufacturing enterprises we see are the consequence of economic growth and prosperity, not of the lingering hand of tradition." (DeGlopper 1979:285-286) As DeGlopper clearly stated, in contrast to early experience of advanced economies, one feature of Taiwan's path to industrialize is the ubiquitous of petty production. And it is here, many observers believe, that one finds the economic base of a politically quiescence Taiwanese working class (DeGlopper 1979; Gates 1979, 1987; Hu 1984:73-98; Niehoff 1987; Shieh 1992; stites 1982, 1985). Workers in Taiwan are "part-time proletariat" (Gates 1979) in the sense that they treat "industrial work as an entrepreneurial strategy" (Stites 1985). The most recent and in-depth analysis of 34 is accomplished can be found in Shieh's study of subcontracting networks in Taiwan (1992). Shieh's "Boss" Island: The SUbcontracting Network and Micro-Entrepreneurship in Taiwan's Development (1992) asks the question: "Why does dependent capitalism [in Taiwan] persist? Facing the possible resistance from workers and competition from other developing countries, how is export oriented industrialization (EOl) •••able to sustain itself?" (p. 1) His answer is that "the EOl in Taiwan is sustained through network labor processes (i.e., the subcontracting systems) and a micro-entrepreneurial mechanism which is unfolded in network labor processes." (p. 1) More specifically, Shieh argues that dependent capitalist development in Taiwan "is characterized by rapid expansion and wide fluctuation of export of light industrial goods, the production processes of which is simple, divisible and labor-intensive" (p. 1). This production process makes the subcontracting system possible to proliferate. This system in turn generates two effects. First, it ensures the manufacturing of light industrial goods cheaply and flexibly, enhancing the international competitiveness of export products. The subcontracting system cheapens the cost of production by utilizing semiproletarian labor (part-time workers), by activating

__..::I '-_. !!unutilized" labor (housewives and children), CUi.... uy spreading the potential losses throughout the 35 subcontracting chains. By dividing the task into several simple and easy-to-learn steps, the subcontracting chains can easily switch from one product line to another; it also means that labor can be activated or deactivated swiftly. That is, the subcontracting system increases the flexibility of both labor and capital. Second, subcontracting system "manufactures" consent among workers. Since it requires little capital and labor, it is relatively easy for workers to set up their own workshops. This has the "political effect of calming down the wage workers, for the option for 'exit' to become their own bosses reduces the need to 'voice' out their grievance as wage workers in the shopfloor." (p. 2) The low capital and labor requirements also ensure the continuation of subcontracting system. The network labor system, therefore, maintains and reproduces the viabilities of dependent capitalism in Taiwan. On the one hand, it "brings about swift mobilization and reallocation of resources to cope with rapid expansion and wide fluctuation of exports of light industrial goods" (p. 6). On the other hand, it creates mobility opportunities through which workers voluntarily consent to authority relations by exploiting themselves. Or as observed by Gates (1979:382): •.• a combination of external demand for low-cost labor, combined with a pattern of petty bourgeois self-eA~loitation, has produced a society with an able and cheap part-time industrial labor force which substitutes for a full-time proletariat. In consequence, the social and economic costs of 36 reproducing the class most essential to the evolution of a fully industrialized society•••are passed on to an inflated petty bourgeoisie. As noted earlier, the main objective of Shieh's study was to explain the reproduction of Taiwan's early phase of dependent capitalism under EOI. An ensuing question, then, is to what extent can the same mechanism (network subcontracting system) be effective under a different phase of industrialization that is no longer based on low-tech, low-cost labor. Some hints can be found in his comment on ChoWs (1987) study of the Korean labor process under EOI that generated obstacles to the next phase of industrialization (p. 19): My focus of study and argument are different from ChoWs. First of all, it is the reproduction, not the obstacles to the reproduction of EOI that is my object of explanation. Indeed, what she describes as the dilemmas of EOI are manifested only in the new phase of industrialization. The fact that dependent capitalism, whether in South Korea or Taiwan, had been sustained for almost three decades before if encountered structural contradictions still needs to be explained. (emphasis original). Two things should be noted. First, South Korea adopted a different labor regime in its reproduction of dependent capitalism that did not manufacture consent among workers (see also pp. 216-219). The labor was controlled by coercion. The fact that South Korea is as much "successful" as Taiwan, economically at least, in its dependent capitalist development in the last three decades points to the fact that dependent capitalism can be 37 reproduced or sustained for a long period of time without workers' consent. Second, structural contradictions are encountered in the new phase of industrialization that create obstacles to the reproduction of dependent capitalism. The obstacles are appearing in South Korea (lack of consent among workers according to Cho), and Shieh suggests that they are occurring or may occur in Taiwan, though the kinds of obstacles may differ. Of special interest here is that the South Korean case indicates the limitation of a particular reproduction mechanism. Shifting emphasis on industrialization exposes the failure of a previous mechanism of reproduction. Taiwan is also at this time shifting its economic base, then, what impact will it have on the reproduction mechanisms in Taiwan? The claim that the subcontracting system was the dominant reproduction mechanism of Taiwan's dependent capitalism in the EOI period is sustainable since in that period Taiwan's economy was geared toward the export-oriented light manufacturing industry. But can we still make the same claim when the relative weight of export-oriented light manufacturing sector is declining in Taiwan's economy? This is not to question the viability of the subcontracting system in today's Taiwan and there are numerous studies documenting the resurgence of subcontracting system allover the globe. This 1S, however, to question how many bosses and consenting workers 38 are manufactured by this system of production for it to reproduce the Taiwan dependent capitalism. Certainly, subcontract system still has its impact, but by itself it may only reproduce a fraction of that dependent capitalism.

state and the corporatist System of Labor Control Since the late 1970s, in reaction against the neoclassical economic explanation, there are increasing attempts to examine the Taiwan miracle from a state centered perspective (Amsden 1979, 1985; Clark 1989; Deyo 1987; Gold 1986; Haggard 1990; Wade 1990; White 1988; Winckler and Greenhalgh 1988). Although successful in refuting the neoclassical account of the Taiwan experience, these studies tend to neglect the role of labor (Stauffer 1993). Labor was recognized as making a great contribution to development but at the same time is being repressed, demobilized, and dominated by a strong state. The actual mechanisms of domination were either never specified or discussed only in passing. Only since the late-1980s, coupled with a loosening of political control over society in general, there appeared a number of studies produced by scholars in Taiwan that aim to specify these mechanisms (Cheng 1988; Hsu 1987, 1989a, 1989b; Nan 1987; Shen 1992; Wang 1993; Wang and Fang 1992). Through examining the state!s and the party!s (which in Taiwan are difficult to separate) policies regarding labor, 39 these studies argue that the KMT state has traditionally adopted a corporatist approach towards society in general and towards labor in particular. Hsu (1987:1-2) argues: liThe typical characteristics of Taiwanese labor as hard working, highly productive, peaceful, docile, easy to command and control•••are basically molded by the corporatist policy toward labor that practice through state's administrative and legal apparatuses, and through party organization." Through periods of inclusion and exclusion labor was manipulated and rendered docile. While valuable in specifying the mechanisms of state domination over labor, one danger of this kind of top-down statist approach is that labor disappeared, once again, in the analysis, being replaced by the actions or inactions of the state and party apparatuses. As Shieh observes (1992:14): Of course, workers are recognized by the statist approach•••• utilizing abundant labor, for instance, is a key factor in the genesis and the reproduction of EOl. Yet it is "a set of economic policies," an "effective economic management," that makes for this•••• The process of transforming labor power into labor and its organizational contexts are taken as given. • ••workers are treated as the residual to the developmentalist state: they are closely controlled by the state either through repression or the corporatist mechanism, and their consequent quiescence and weakness as collective actors contribute to East Asian development•••• A miracle without direct producers in it, as depicted by the statist approach, is really a miracle in every sense of the word. The challenge was partially met by Deyo's attempt to delineate the "dark underside of the East Asian 'miracles': 40 the extreme political subordination and exclusion of workers." (1989:1) In his Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, Deyo sets out "to clarify the larger context of the changing occupational, community, and political circumstances shared by large numbers of workers as they have entered and endured the industrialization process." More specifically, he seeks to explain "how these circumstances have inhibited and distorted the development of trade unions and labor movements that elsewhere [i.e., Latin American NICs] have enfranchised and empowered workers." (p. 2)4 Deyo begins his argument by dismissing three conventional explanations on the ground of historical timing and/or comparative evidence (pp. 6-7). The cultural explanation, which emphasizes the shared Confucian cultural tradition (paternalism, respect for hierarchy, subordination of the individual to the state, etc.) in enhancing the managerial and state authority and thus undercut the opposition labor movement, was refuted because it fails to consider the following facts: 1) comparatively, there are other cultural traditions that were equally supportive of authoritarian acquiescence (e.g. Iberian corporatism in Latin America) but did not produce the same level of labor subordination; and 2) historically, the levels of labor militancy were much higher during the 41 earlier periods of industrialization when, supposedly, those traditional values were more powerful. "Equally problematic is the link between economic performance and weak labor movements" (p. 7), Deyo further argues. He maintains that the causal relation between economic prosperity (full employment, rising standard of living, relative income equality, etc.) and the political subordination cannot be sustained since the former enhances the "economic resource base for strong labor movements." While he recognizes, in some cases (like in South Korea), there occurred a higher frequency of industrial conflict among the lowest-paid workers than among those better-paid workers, he also argues that lithe actual power and autonomy of workers' movements in East Asia, as in Latin America, are greater among more advantaged workers than among those materially worse off." (p. 7) In short, the relationship between material well-being and weak labor movement is complex and intervened by other factors. Finally, the political explanation that points to the presence of a repressive state as the cause of labor quiescence was deemed inSUfficient, though important. Here, presumably comparing the East Asian and the Latin American experience, Deyo points out that "equally stringent controls have been imposed elsewhere with far less long-term effect in containing labor militancy .. " He also points out the internal variations among East Asian 42 NICs, especially those between South Korea and Hong Kong: " •••how is it that labor protest was more widespread under South Korea's earlier repressive regimes than under Hong Kong's more permissive internal rule?" (p. 7) His study does not cover the post-1987 period where one observes an obvious correlation between political liberation and drastic increase of labor protests in Taiwan and South Korea. Deyo's conclusion is "that neither the generalized weakness of East Asian labor nor the varied impact on labor of cultural, economic, and political factors can be adequately understood without consideration of the economic and social structural context within which these variables operate. Of particular importance are the social organization of production and the characteristics of the communities where workers live." (pp. 7-8 emphasis original) The arqument goes as follows. First, within the nonproletarian sector, the employment relations in East Asian development are based on patriarchal, paternalistic, and patrimonial systems of labor control. Since the economic conflict under these systems usually assumes a form of "more individualistic, less overt conflict in nonpublic arenas" (p. 210) than collective organization and public protest, a proper understanding of East Asian labor movements needs to 43 "the diverse forms of protest appropriate to these various employment systems" (p. 8). Second, until recently, East Asian industrialization has been based on the rapid growth of light, labor intensive export manufacturing industry recruiting young, low-skilled, and often female workers into the jobs with low pay, minimal security, and scarce chances of career mobility. All these lead to low job commitment, high levels of turnover, and lack of attachment to work groups or firms which discourage independent unionization in this

"hyperproletarian" sector (i.e., the female factory workers). The skilled and secured male workers in heavy industry--the "stable proletariat"--are more likely to be successfully organized. In short, even within the proletarian sector where collective organization and public protest are the assumed forms of economic conflict, the majority of the workers are not suited for the organized labor movement. 5 Third, the absence of strong, supportive, and organized working-class communities in East Asia, as compared to Latin America, inhibited the growth of labor movement. Two theses can be distinguished: one is the lack of support from the community in general, and the other is the absence of strong, organized working-class community. Two are interrelated and, to a certain extent, the confusion stems from how one interprets the term "community." Deyo seems 44 to opt for the second thesis (pp. 204-208). Unfortunately, partly due to lack of information, Deyo did not offer an in-depth analysis on this matter. In general, he argues that an export-oriented industrialization impedes the development of working-class communities. Even in some cases where the structural conditions favor the formation of such communities (working-class housing estate in Singapore, or mining and heavy industry districts in Korea and Taiwan), Deyo is quick to point out that the preemptive penetration from the state into community life has prevented those communities from developing into the support base of the independent labor movements in Singapore and Taiwan. Once again, the strong state wins. Finally, the timing of political control, not the political control per se, impedes the development of independent trade unions. "The imposition of tight political controls prior to industrialization imparts a preemptive power to East Asian labor regimes. Exclusionary labor regimes preceded, rather than followed, industrial transformation and thus precluded the emergence of independent trade unions where structural and community factors might otherwise have fostered them." (pp. 9-10) While this line of argument distinguishes the East Asian from the Latin American NICs, it does not explain the variations within the East Asian To do the latter Deyo reserves to the effectiveness of state penetration to 45 community life that differentiates singapore and Taiwan on the one side (penetrated deeply) and South Korea on the other. The incorporation of state effectiveness as explaining factor, however, points to the possibility that what distinguishes the comparatively weak labor movements in the East Asian NICs from their Latin American counterparts may not be their timing but their respective effectiveness of political control. In sum, Deyo identifies four factors to account for the weakness of East Asian labor movements: a large nonproletarian sector, a proletarian workforce that was divided (by hyper and stable proletariat), the absence of working-class communities, and the timing and effectiveness of the state. But as the above discussion showed, only two factors loom large: diverging systems of labor control and an omnipresent state. The two factors he emphasizes at the outset of the study, the social organization of production and the characteristics of the working-class community, are relatively slighted in the subsequent analysis. 6 summary and Discussion The four types of literature on the Taiwan's labor reviewed above provide a useful background for the present study of the structure of the Taiwanis working class. The economists' analyses of the labor market describe the basic contour of economic transformation and how labor was 46 deployed accordingly. Research on female factory workers brings out the fact that the muting of class consciousness among them is a "rational" response based on their perception of factory work as a transitory period in their lives. Studies on petty production, on the other hand, highlight the situation that for many male workers factory work was looked upon as a strategic step to exit from the world of factory work. While the studies on female workers in large factories and on male workers in petty production emphasize the workers' responses to industrialization from below, the statist approach brings out the mechanisms of political demobilization of the Taiwanese workers from above. Deyo and Shieh, in particular, provide useful frameworks that allow us to organize these insights in a more systematic way. Moreover, closer examination of their respective analyses points to areas that have not been examined thoroughly. For example, when Deyo links the systems of labor control in determining the characteristics of labor movements, and when Shieh concentrates on subcontracting labor process and its subsequent effects on manufacturing workers' consent, each singles out a special group of workers in Taiwan's export-oriented industrialization that contribute to a quiescent working presence divided and pacified the labor movements. For 47 Shieh, they are workers employed in the subcontracting networks who develop their own consent to the system. Both groups chose "exit" rather than "voice," though for different reasons and to different destinations. Ultimately, the power of their explanations of either the weakness of the labor movement or the reproduction of dependent capitalism depends on the quantitative significance of the particular segment of the working class that they stress respectively. The validity of their claims is, in other words, related to the composition of the working class and the transformation of Taiwan's industrial structure. Closely related to the preceding issue is the need to delineate the contour of working class in Taiwan. What is surprisingly lacking in the above mentioned studies is that none of them made a serious effort to actually tell us who are the working class in Taiwan? As the traditional conception of working class as (male) industrial workers became obsolete a careful analysis on the constituents and composition of working class is needed. A major concern of this study, thus, is to investigate the structural change of the working class in Taiwan over the past three decades of rapid industrial development, and to draw a sociological profile of this newly emerged class in Taiwan. 48 Notes 1. This is the section heading in which the discussion takes place in Chapter 8 "Economic Growth and structural Changes, 1952-1972: A Quantitative Record." (pp. 121-146) 2. Other examples include Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1979), Ranis (1979), Kuznets (1979); also see the comparative studies by Chen (1979) and Lau (1986). 3. This, however, does not entail that income distribution improves according. Except in Taiwan which "for reasons that are not entirely clear", Kuznets' hypothesis "that income distribution worsens in the early stages of development and turns toward equality later on" is repeated (p. 119). 4. One question immediate comes to mind: have the trade unions and labor movements elsewhere really enfranchised and empowered workers? It is one thing to argue that "elsewhere" has more powerful labor movements, but it is another thing to argue that it "empowered" workers. It can be argued that while labor unions and labor movements enfranchised and empowered certain fractions of the workers on the expenses of others. It can also be argued that the enfranchisement of workers into a collective entity actually impeded the "power" of the workers since it bureaucratized that power--Michels' iron law of oligarchy. This issue, of course, has less to do with the contents of Deyo's study, but it does caution us about its basic assumption. It is one thing to say labor subordination was due to a weak labor movement, it is another thing to equate the two. 5. It should be noted that Deyo's distinction of workers in the proletarian and nonproletarian sectors are quite unconventional since all of them are wage workers. The logic of differentiation seems to based on the labor market characteristics each group of workers found themselves in and the respective disciplinary strategy adopted by the management. Thus, workers in the two proletarian labor systems are "characterized by narrow economic employment relations, at least moderate labor market competition, total expropriation both of means of production and of property rights in the disposal and products of labor, and very minimal opportunity for upward career mobility." (p. 158) Workers in the nonproletarian bureaucratic paternalistic labor system includes those high-status technical and white-collar wOLkeLS in mUltinational corporations who were sheltered from external labor market competition and bond to the firms through the mechanisms of internal labor markets, job tenure and seniority system, and non-performance based welfare benefits (p. 158). Workers in the nonproletarian patrimonial labor system, 49 identified as highly skilled blue- and white-collar workers in large South Korean firms, are subjected to harsh, arbitrary, and personal disciplinary actions from their supervisors (pp. 158-159). Communal paternalism, as prevailed in large and mid-sized locally owned firms in Taiwan and Hong Kong, "implies significant noneconomic 'claims' by workers in matters of training, job placement, and economic security." (p. 159) These characteristics, while useful in distinguishing different strategies of labor control, can hardly serve as the criteria to distinguish proletarian from nonproletarian labor. 6. The discussion of the social organization of production (pp. 37-42) appears in chapter 2 "Export-oriented Industrialization: the Asian NICs" which was intended to document "the continuing weakness of East Asian Labor movements and their failure to achieve a degree of organizational and political power consonant with advanced levels of industrialization." (p. 10) And the social organization of production, which I originally thought to mean the various labor systems, turns out to represent "the degree of organizational and geographical concentration of the industrial work force." (p. 37) It is certainly important to note the differences among the East Asian NICs since they may indicate their possible diversion in labor systems and in the formation of working-class communities. But the social organization of production, as Deyo defines it, only exerts indirect influence to the development of labor movement. The great emphasis on the social organization of production, at least in the way Deyo uses it, is misleading. 50

CHAPTER 3

PROLETARIANIZATION IN TAlWAH--AH OVERVIEW

If we now look at global empirical reality throughout the time-space of historical capitalism, we sUddenly discover that the location of wage workers in semi-proletarian rather than proletarian households has been the statistical norm. Intellectually, our problem suddenly gets turned upside down. From explaining the reasons for the existence of proletarianization, we have moved to explaining why the process was so incomplete. (Immanuel Wallerstein 1983:27) Concomitant with the rapid industrialization in Taiwan is the recomposition of her labor force. By recomposition we mean not only the shifting of the labor force from agrarian to non-agrarian production but also the restructuring of the organization of work from family-labor to wage-labor. The first process, commonly called the sectoral transformation of the labor force, has received much attention in the literature on Taiwan's road to industrialization. The second process, the process of proletarianization, has received little if any attention. The current chapter first recounts the sectoral transformation of the labor force in postwar Taiwan. The main concern of this chapter, however, is to document how the forms of organizing labor have changed in Taiwan during her course of rapid industrialization. It traces the form and pattern of proletarianization: how fast is the increase of wage employment compared to other employment categories? 51 what are the variations of the process of proletarianization among different economic sectors? and what are the characteristics of the proletariat thus created? Proletarianization, broadly understood as the process of losing control over the means of production and selling one's labor power to others for survival, has broad and far-reaching implications for the individuals and for society. It transforms not only the ways in which people work and make a living but also the organization of society and politics, it brings new perspectives to society, new sources of economic interest and social conflict, and the development of new institutional arrangements (Tilly 1981:181-184). Proletarianization, in short, provides Ita key theme of modernity" (Katznelson 1986:5). While the centrality of the proletarianization process in shaping people's lives has been widely acknowledged, recent research on the development of peripheral and semi peripheral capitalism has cast some doubt on the universality of this process. It is maintained that a full-fledged process of proletarianization is either unlikely or unnecessary to capitalist development in the peripheral region and may even be dysfunctional to capital accumulation on a world-scale (Wallerstein 1983, 1991). It is, instead, the proliferation of the informal economy and the associated process of semi-proletarianization which 52 dominates the deployment of labor and capital in the developing world (see, for example, Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989; Portes and Walton 1981; Bromley and Gerry 1979). In the case of Taiwan, as the following analysis will show, postwar industrialization has been accompanied by a drastic increase in wage work. To the extent that proletarianization means the replacement of family labor by wage labor Taiwan's postwar proletarian experience is impressive. To the extent that prOletarianization indicates the relative and absolute decline of self- employed independent producers, Taiwan's postwar experience shows ambiguous trends. On the one hand, self employment did decline relatively as well as absolutely in relation to the overall labor force. On the other hand, this overall decline of self employment can be attributed, almost entirely, to the decline of the agricultural sector. Outside agriculture, the self-employed producers more or less held their own in the midst of rapid industrialization in Taiwan.

Sectoral Transformation of the Lahor Foree The most widely observed occupational change associated with industrialization is a sectoral shift of the labor

_____ ...:1 __• .: _~•• _~_.. force from agriculture ~C"'UU\.&Q .... :t ...... \.&....~ ...... :t. This is taken as a norm from the standpoint of Western 53 experience of industrialization, whereas the new experience of most Third World countries tends to suggest a different pattern (Browning and Roberts 1980). Rather than a direct shift of the labor force from the primary to the secondary industrial sector, the labor force released from agriculture is most likely to be absorbed into marginal scale service and commercial activities. The proliferation of "informal" income earning activities and the "abnormal" growth of the tertiary sector has thus received prime attention in the literature on the labor force in the Third World (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989; Armstrong and McGee 1985; Portes and Benton 1984; Evans and Timberlake 1980; Bromley and Gerry 1979). The industrial structural change we observe in Taiwan clearly conforms to the pattern established in the Western industrial countries, only much faster and more dramatic than the latter. According to data compiled in Bairoch and Limbor (1968:332-333), between 1880 and 1960, the relative share of the agricultural labor force in the former European Economic Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) dropped from 51 to 21 percent and the manufacturing workforce grew from 25 to 34 percent; in North America (United states and Canada), the agricultural workforce decreased from 51 to 13 percent, while the manufacturing workforce increased from 19 to 29 percent. Data presented in Table 3.1 indicate that it took 54 Taiwan roughly one-third of the time to reach the same level of industrialization. Between 1956 and 1990, the labor force in the agricultural sector declined from 48 to 12 percent, while that of the secondary industry increased from 18 to 44 percent (the manufacturing workforce alone increased from 11 to 30 percent). comparatively, the tertiary sector labor force increased slowly from 33 to 44 percent.1 The flow of the labor force has been predominantly from primary to secondary industry. According to one estimate, between 1964 and 1979, approximately 91,000 workers moved out of agriculture annually, while the secondary industrial sector gained 71,000 workers yearly to its labor force (Lee 1980:37-38). Liu and Speare (1973), to take another example, report that among the 1.1 million net entries to the labor market recorded for the 1967-1972 period, only 11 percent entered the agricultural sector, while 56 percent entered the industrial sector, and another 33 percent entered the tertiary sector. Consequently, the secondary industrial workforce increased about 7 times between 1956 and 1990, from 554,000 to 3.8 million; the tertiary workforce grew close to 4 times, from 1 million to 3.8 million; while the agricultural labor force declined, from 1.5 million to 1.2 million. This large-scale sectoral shift is a direct consequence of the rapid growth of export manUfacturing industry. The 55 growth of export industry in Taiwan since the early 1960s has been phenomenal: in 1960, Taiwan exported u.s. $164 million worth of merchandise, the figure increased to $1,481 million in 1970, and to $39,789 million in 1986. The content of exports also changed significantly, from primary goods to manufactured products; thus while the manufactured products constituted only 32 percent in 1960, it increased to 79 percent in 1970, and to 94 percent in 1986 (Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics 1987:213). This robust growth of export manufacturing industry created a large demand for the new labor force, operating as a strong pull factor for labor mobility from the agricultural sector where limited land and small farm size compounded with continuous population growth2 had created a large amount of underemployment in the 1950s through the 1960s (J. Liu 1988:35; C. Liu 1972:404-5). A large-scale labor migration from agriculture to industry was not simply the function of the large labor demand from the export sector and the existence of the surplus labor in the agricultural sector. A factor that played a crucial role in further facilitating this process was the state's agricultural policy, especially its grain price policy. The Taiwan government's early industrial policy was to "squeeze" the agricultural sector t.o promote industry (Lee 1970), and its primary policy tool was to 56 maintain government control over grain prices and keep them low relative to wage goods in order to keep wage levels down and to keep inflation in check (Hsiao 1981; Hsu 1974; Lee 1970). The unfavorable agricultural policy deteriorated farm household incomes significantly in the 1960s relative to nonfarm household; in 1964, the average disposable income per farm household was 97 percent of the nonfarm household, but in 1970 it was only 67 percent. After 1972, despite a more favorable government agriculture policy (Liao, Huang, and Hsiao 1986:53-73), the average income per farm household has fluctuated between 75 to 83 percent of the nonfarm household (see Table 3.2). While scholars and laymen alike have put grave emphasis on how this transition from agrarian to industrial base of production has altered people's work experience and everyday life, an equally important, and perhaps more profound, transformation that usually accompanied the process of industrialization has received less attention, the process of proletarianization. Although these two processes often occurred simultaneously and interactively, it can be argued that a mere change of job from CUltivating land to making tools, clothes, or other non-agrarian commodities may have little effect on a person's perception on work and rhythm of life so long as that person still has substantial control over the circumstances of how those commodities are produced. It is through the process of 57 proletarianization, instead, that people's control (or the sense of that control) over the production process was lost which in turn affected their life and work experiences. The remaining task of this chapter is to provide some understandings of this process of proletarianization in Taiwan.

Proletarianization in Taiwan: Extent and Pace Proletarianization, here, refers to 1) the increasing dependence of workers on the sale of their labor power- wage work, and 2) the separation of workers from control of the means of production--expropriation (Walton 1987; Tilly 1981, 1984). Analytically, these two processes are not identical as the expropriation of the means of production can lead to forms of organizing production other than wage work. Historically, at least jUdging from the Western experience, the two are highly correlated as the concentration of land and capital had commonly led to an increase in wage employment (Gordon et al. 1982; Przeworski et al. 1980; Szymanski 1971-72). The experience of capitalist industrialization in the Third World countries, however, tends to suggest otherwise. Instead of proletarianization, the capitalist development in most developing economies has generated an active process of semi-proletarianization, characterized by "the combination of wage labor and subsistence/commodity production based on 58 the incomplete separation of direct producers from their means of production." (Veltmeyer 1983:209; see also Wallerstein 1983:13-43, 1991) Portes and Benten (1984:602 605), for example, find that the growth of wage employment varies greatly between the united states and Latin America in comparable periods of industrial development. Industrial development in the united states between 1900 to 1930 reduced the proportion of informal workers (defined as the sum of self-employed, unremunerated family workers, and domestic servants) from 51 to 31 percent of the labor force. Industrialization of Latin America between 1950 and 1980, a comparable period to the United states between 1900 to 1930, on the other hand, has only reduced the relative size of the informal workforce from 47 to 42 percent (see also Castells and Portes 1989:16-19). Taiwan's proletarianization experience, as the following analysis suggests, exhibits characteristics found in both developed and developing countries. During the colonial period (1895-1945), although the economy grew rapidly, there was little change in the industrial distribution and employment pattern of the Taiwanese labor force. In 1905, when the first island-wide population census was taken, 42 percent of the total employed persons in Taiwan was classified as wage and salar; workers and another 43 percent was classified as self-employed. 3 In comparison, by 1956, when the first 59 postwar census was taken, the proportions were 37 and 39 percent respectively (Executive Yuan, Population Census Office 1982:137).4 If anything, these figures indicate a gradual reversal of the proletarianization process in the colonial period. Contrary to this trend, however, is the drastic increase of wage employment inside the manufacturing industry. The number of factories, for example, grew from 1,323 in 1915 to 8,940 in 1940 and the workforce engaged in factory employment increased from 29 thousand to 129 thousand in the same period (Taiwan Provincial Government, Bureau of Accounting and statistics 1946:763-66). As a result, the proportion of wage work in the manufacturing sector increased from 25 percent in 1915 to 75 percent in 1940 (Ho 1978:79). But note that in 1940 the manufacturing industry employed only 7.7 percent of the total workforce in Taiwan compared to 64 percent in the agricultural sector (Ho 1978:131). Even this limited industrialization, however, came to an abrupt halt due to the destruction of World War II and the aftermath that followed (Lin 1973:27-33).5 The growth of wage employment in Taiwan is mainly a post World War II phenomenon. In postwar Taiwan, as in the early industrializing countries of the West, the sectoral shift out of agriculture signified the creation of a large number of industrial wage workers. In the period between 1956 and 1990, the number of wage workers increased 4.3 times, from 60 1.4 million to 6 million, while the total labor force increased 2.6 times, from 3.4 million to 8.7 million. As shown in Table 3.3, the proportion of wage workers in the total labor force increased from 41 percent in 1956 to 55 percent in 1975 and to 68 percent in 1990. Although direct comparisons are difficult to make, data on Europe indicate that the proportion of proletarian population in Europe (excluding Russia) increased from 58 percent of the total population in the mid-18th century to 71 percent in the mid-19th century (Tilly 1984:33). This rapid growth of wage and salary workers in Taiwan was naturally accompanied by a large reduction of the self-employed6 and family workers whose relative size declined form over one-half of the labor force in 1956 to less than one-third in 1990. The unemployed population also declined from 9 percent in 1956 to less than 2 percent of the labor force in 1990. Yet it is important to recognize that the reduction of the self-employed and the family workers occurred only in the agricultural sector, not in the nonagricultural sector. The size of self-employed has remained stable as a proportion of the nonfarm labor force, a trend observed only in the more recent stage of development in the advanced capitalist economies. In the united states, for instance, the self-employed independent producers has declined continuously between 1900 and 1970--from 36 to 9 percent in the total labor force and from 24 to 7 percent 61 in the nonfarm sector. Only since the 1970s, caused by processes associated with de-industrialization, do we observe a stabilization of the size of self employed around the 1970's level (Sen and So 1991:4-5). Actually, in relation to the total labor force, the Taiwanese non agrarian self employed have experienced gradual but continuous increase since the mid-1950s: from 9 percent in 1956, to 11 percent in 1975, and to 15 percent in 1990 (Table 3.3). These data demonstrate one interesting feature of Taiwan's proletarianization process. Proletarianization that occurred in Taiwan did not usually mean lifetime occupational change of urban artisans or other independent workers losing control over the means of production and becoming factory workers. 7 Rather, it was most likely to involve inter-generational occupational mobility in which sons and daughters of farmers become factory hands. A sharp reduction in the proportion of the self-employed or family employed population essentially meant a large-scale labor mobility from the agricultural to the industrial sector; and those who entered urban wage work from farm background were predominantly young workers (see below). The data also reveal the remarkable resilience of Taiwan's informal, small business sector; it more than survived the stzong trend toward wage amplo~~ent actually prosper from economic changes brought about by industrialization. 62 The pace of proletarianization has been uneven across different economic sectors. The increase of wage workers was most impressive in the industrial sector (Table 3.4). Between 1956 and 1990, wage workers employed in the secondary industry increased close to 8 times, from 416 thousand to 3.3 million, while those employed in the tertiary sector increased 3 times, from 807 thousand to 2.6 million. The wage-earning population in the agricultural sector increased between 1956 and 1975, but then began to decrease thenceforth in absolute number. Therefore, between 1956 and 1990, 65 percent of the increase in wage and salary employment in Taiwan was accounted by growth in the secondary industrial sector. It is also useful to look at change in the proportion of wage workers in each sector, because this figure reveals the way in which work is organized in different sectors of the economy. The data in Table 3.4 indicate no significant change in the organization of agricultural production over the past three decades: since the mid-1950s, the proportion of wage workers within the agricultural sector has fluctuated around the 10 percent level. Farming on a tiny plot of land utilizing family labor has always and remains the predominant pattern of agricultural production in Taiwan. The proportion of wage workers in the secondary industrial sector increased significantly between 1956 and 1975 from 75 to 87 percent, and then remained more or less 63 stable over the following decade (with a slight decline recorded between 1975 and 1980). In comparison, the tertiary sector reveals a reverse trend away from wage employment from about 79 percent in 1956 to 71 percent in 1975 and to 68 percent in 1990. This decline is primarily due to the reduction of wage workers claimed by the state sector8 and a proportional increase of workforce engaged in small-scale commercial and service activities within the tertiary sector. Clearly, the primary site of proletarianization in Taiwan has been the secondary industrial sector. Although the data displayed in Table 3.4 indicate little change in the organization of production in the agricultural sector, many significant changes have actually occurred in the rural economy of Taiwan. It is very important to understand clearly that in Taiwan the rural is not equivalent to the agricultural. In fact, one of the most important changes that have evolved in the process of Taiwan's industrialization is that rural areas in Taiwan have increasingly become less agrarian, as more and more rural population became engaged in nonagricultural activities. In 1956, about 71 percent of the rural labor force was engaged in agricultural activities, but in 1980 only 33 percent was engaged in farming; during the same

.."' --'- ~ __ _~ "''- __.. __ , ....__t...t____ _ ...:J .:_ period, ...u~ 1"..."'1""'...... "'u "'...... u~ ...... Q .... WU"'A"'U.&."'~ ~UYClY~U ..LU industrial activities increased from 12 to 37 percent, 64 while those engaged in commercial and service activities increased from 17 to 30 percent (Shih 1983:3; see also Ho 1979). The general trend is a growing number of rural households engaged in farming only on a part-time basis. Thus, whereas in 1960 almost 48 percent of the agrarian households identified agriculture as their sole economic activities, in 1980 only 9 percent of them did so. Conversely, those part-time farm households who derived a majority of their income from agricultural production grew from 30 to 36 percent and those who derived more income from nonfarm economic activities than from agricultural production increased from 22 to 55 percent (Liao, Huang, and Hsiao 1986:342).9 The sources of farm household incomes changed accordingly: the share of income derived from farming dropped from 65 percent in 1964 to 20 percent in 1990 (see Table 3.2). This occupational trend among farm households is a direct consequence of a dispersed pattern of Taiwan's industrialization. In sharp contrast to the concentrated pattern of industrialization in South Korea, the Taiwan government pursued a decentralized pattern of industrialization, promoting a wide geographical dispersion of industries among different regions and across urban and rural areas (Ho 1982). The spread of industrial production into the ~~ral areas created a large number of "semi- proletarian" households, which are simultaneously engaged 65 in farming activities and nonfarming wage employment (Lavely 1990). As the data in Table 3.5 indicate, wage income, though declining in the 1980s, constituted over one-third of the total income10 in the agricultural self employed households. The nonagricultural self-employed households, in comparison, derived less than one-sixth of their income from wage employment, despite an increase in the 1980s. At the same time, the growth of nonfarm income opportunities in rural areas helped in reducing the pressure for rural migration to a few large urban centers (Speare, Liu, and Tsay 1988). Those who left for urban jobs tend to maintain close ties with family members remaining in rural areas, and in times of economic troubles they could fall back on the support from their rural family members (Wu 1976:605). In this sense, the effect of proletarianization in Taiwan has been less deleterious on the individuals than in a society like South Korea where becoming wage workers usually meant permanent migration to a few industrial centers with no expectation of returning to rural areas (Koo 1990). Members of the semi-proletarian households are only partially subjected to the logic of capitalist relations of production, and thus their reactions to proletarianization may be significantly different from those located in the fully proletarianized households. 66 Demographic and Social Characteristics of Wage Workers The demographic characteristics of the newly emerged stratum of wage workers closely reflect the pattern of Taiwan's industrialization. Broadly speaking, Taiwan's industrialization has gone through three stages: import substitution industrialization in the 1950s, labor intensive export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s through the mid-1970S, and capital-intensive export oriented industrialization since the mid-1970s with growing emphasis on import-substitution industries. Each stage is characterized by a different form of labor mobilization and proletarianization. While the 1950s was characterized by a relatively small labor market for disproportionately skilled workers employed in the predominantly state-run enterprises, the development of labor-intensive export industries in the 1960s greatly expanded the labor market for semi-skilled factory workers in the private sector. This early stage of export-oriented industrialization created a huge demand for semi-skilled workers, absorbing a large number of hitherto underutilized popUlation into the active labor force. Naturally, the largest pool of this new labor force was provided by the agriCUltural popUlation and young unmarried women. The transition toward more capital-intensive industrialization since the mid=1970s was accompaniad slow growth of blue-collar, semi-skilled workers and of 67 female workers, producing a shifting balance between male and female, and between blue-collar and white-collar, workers in the industrial sector. Clearly, the early stage of export-oriented industrialization in Taiwan depended heavily on the utilization of young female workers. This, of course, is not unique to Taiwan's industrialization. Female labor was also widely utilized in the early phase of industrialization in the advanced capitalist countries. As historical studies demonstrate, a primary reason why a large number of women were brought to industry was not due to a shortage of male labor but primarily due to the fact that female labor is cheaper and easier to control (Tilly and Scott 1987). The strong patriarchal family structure and the labor intensive character of export-oriented industrialization in Taiwan enhanced the role played by women workers in the 1960s and 1970s. As shown in Table 3.6, the female labor force participation rate increased from 21 percent in 1966 to 34 percent in 1975 and to 45 percent in 1990. In comparison, the male labor force participation rate increased only slightly from 73 to 78 percent between 1966 and 1975, and then began to decline afterward, partly due to a longer periOd of schooling among males. Consequently, the proportion of females in the statistic, moreover, is most likely to underestimate the 68 extent of women's economic participation because a large proportion of them is engaged in a variety of subcontract production activities which are usually not captured in the government statistics. This form of "informal" employment is particularly significant among married women, a phenomenon which became more important in the 1980s as there occurred a growing shortage of labor in Taiwan (Shieh 1992). While both male and female workers were subjected to the pressure of proletarianization, female workers experienced a much faster rate of proletarianization. Wage workers constituted 26 percent of the female labor force in 1956 but the proportion increased to about 50 percent in 1975 and to 71 percent in 1990. comparatively, the proportion of wage workers increased more slowly among the male labor force, from 44 percent in 1956 to 58 percent in 1975, and to 67 percent in 1990. As a consequence of these differential rates of proletarianization, an increasing proportion of the wage earning popUlation is made of female workers, and this trend is particularly noticeable in the manUfacturing sector, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.6. The age structure of Taiwan's wage workers reflects both the nature of its proletarianization and the general demographic structure of its labor force. industrializing countries, Taiwan benefited tremendously 69 from the possession of a predominantly young labor force. In 1966, when Taiwan embarked on export-oriented industrialization, 29 percent of the labor force was under age 25; the proportion changed little, to 31 percent in 1980.11 The age structure of the wage workers was substantially younger, as shown in Table 3.7: in 1966, one third of the wage workers was under age 25, and in 1980 two-fifths were in the same age category. Female wage workers were even younger, with 63 percent under age 25 in 1966 and 57 percent in 1980; in the manufacturing sector, 83 percent of women workers were under 25 in 1966 and 77 percent in 1975. One important factor which accounts for the youthfulness of Taiwan's wage earning population is a relatively high rate of job mobility out of wage employment at the individual's mid-career. As several authors (Shieh 1992; stites 1985; Gates 1979) observed, for many Taiwanese factory workers wage employment often represents a transitional stage in their pursuits of becoming one's own boss. Indeed, as Shieh (1992:2) observes, "[b]ecoming one's own boss is the dominant motif of workers and the opportunities to do so exist," largely because the extensive subcontract networks provide many opportunities for "spin-offs. ii Workers employed in small-scale enterprises acquire necessa~~ skills and business ~,ow-how and with the help of family members frequently spin off to 70 set up single-task subcontract units. Thus, as stites (1985) suggests, for many Taiwanese workers, especially for those employed in small-scale industries, factory work often represents an "entrepreneurial strategy" for building independent business later on. 12 The realization of this dream of "becoming one's own boss," though more likely for men than for women (see next chapter)-, is indicated in the information in Table 3.8. Although the census data used in this table do not allow a rigorous cohort analysis, we can obtain an approximate picture of how each cohort changes in its employment status as it grows older. In 1970, 4 percent of the total adult popUlation between age 15 to 24 was self-employed, 19 percent between age 25 to 34, and 24 percent between age 35 to 44. Ten years later in 1980 the comparable percentages for self employed in each age group are: 17 percent between age 25 to 34 (the 1970's 15 to 24 age group), 28 percent between age 35 to 44, and 27 percent between age 45 to 54. The proportion of wage employment, increased from 31 percent in 1970's 15 to 24 age group to 42 percent in 1980's 25 to 34 age group, declined as people getting older. On the other hand, only when people began large scale exodus from the labor market did the self employed decline relative to the total popUlation. For example, while the proportion of self employed in the age group between 45 to 54 declined from 26 percent in 1970 to 21 71 percent in 1980 in the age group between 55 to 64, the labor force participation rate dropped from 65 to 46 percent. The availability of many "exit" opportunities from wage employment in Taiwan is closely linked to its industrial structure and has important implications for the formation of the industrial working class. An interesting feature of Taiwan's industrialization, as pointed out by several analysts of East Asian industrial organization (Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991; Hamilton and Biggart 1988; Koo 1987), is that it has been based on the vitality of small scale manufacturing units rather than a few giant firms. The Taiwan's industrial structure is highly decentralized in terms of organizational and capital concentration. The great majority of manufacturing industry in Taiwan are small familistic enterprises: in 1986, 64 percent of the enterprises employed less than 10 workers and 86 percent employed less than 30 workers, while only a tiny proportion (0.4 percent) of enterprises employed more than 500 workers (Executive Yuan, Committee on Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan 1988:162-163). And this small-business oriented structure has changed little over the years. In 1971, for instance, 87 percent of the enterprises in manufacturing industry employed less than 30 workers 72 workers (Executive Yuan, Committee on Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan 1973:22).13 This pyramid shape of Taiwan's industrial structure determines the distribution of Taiwan's labor force across different sizes of establishments.14 The data in Table 3.9 show that throughout the 1980s, more than one half of the civilian workforce was in very small-scale workplaces with less than 10 workers, and about two-thirds were in workplaces with less than 30 workers. 1S A similar pattern is observed in the proletarian sector where almost one third of all wage workers were employed in small establishments hiring fewer than 10 workers, while those employed in establishments with fewer than 30 workers increased from 46 to 51 percent between 1980 and 1990. The workers employed in large private sector firms with 500 or more workers comprised a very tiny portion--7 percent in 1980 and 5 percent in 1990. Within the manufacturing sector, the trend has been a growing concentration of wage workers in small-scale factories: between 1980 and 1990, the proportion of wage workers employed in workshops with less than 10 workers increased from 19 to 22 percent, and those employed in workplaces with less than 30 workers increased from 34 to 42 percent. Correspondingly, the workers employed by large manufacturing firms (hiring 500 or more workers) decreased from 14 to 10 percent in the same period. The resilience of small-scale production 73 units in Taiwan is remarkable, given the dominant trend of industrialization toward more capital- and technology intensive industries. This decentralized pattern of Taiwan's industrial growth, coupled with a wide geographically dispersion of industrial activities we observed already, helped the first generation of industrial workers adapt to industrial work relatively smoothly, while deterring the development of worker identity and working-class community in Taiwan. with a large number of factory workers located in semi proletarian households and many workers with a transitory commitment to wage work, it is difficult to develop a strong labor movement, especially under the state's tight control over union activities (see Chapter 7). The fact that the labor movement in Taiwan has been much slower to develop and much less politically oriented than the labor movement in South Korea can be attributed, in large part, to this decentralized pattern of industrial development in Taiwan in comparison with a highly centralized pattern of industrialization in South Korea (Koo 1990; Deyo 1989). While the decentralized and dispersed proletarian population deter the development of a homogeneous working class, a rapidly differentiated occupational structure within the wage earning population further complicates the issue. Historically, proletarianization produces different structures of the wage workers with varying consequences 74 for class boundaries and class formation. While proletarianization that occurred at the early stage of European industrialization produced predominantly semi skilled production workers, with white-collar workers growing rapidly only at a later stage from the early 20th century (Braverman 1974; Szymanski 1971-72; Bairoch et ale 1968), proletarianization in Taiwan reveals a highly compressed pattern in which the growth of white-collar workers quickly caught up with the growth of blue-collar workers. Despite a popular image of Taiwan's export oriented industrialization being primarily based on low skill and low-wage export platforms, the occupational composition of the wage workers thus produced reveals a highly differentiated structure. Table 3.10 indicates that from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s, when Taiwan pursued the labor-intensive stage of export-oriented industrialization, the prOletarianization process involved primarily the growth of blue-collar production workers and a relative shrinking of the agricultural and service workers. Between 1956 and 1975, production workers increased from 26 to 44 percent, while service workers decreased from 41 to 23 percent (a large proportion of service workers are government employees). White-collar workers (both managerial/professional and clerical/sales workers) increased modestly during this period, from 23 to 27 75 percent (with a slight aberration shown by the 1966 figure for clerical and sales workers). The occupational change in the capital-intensive stage of industrialization presents a markedly different pattern. During the 1980s, the growth rate of production workers slowed down substantially, resulting in a relative decline from 47 to 44 percent in the wage earning population, while that of clerical and sales workers accelerated from 21 to 27 percent. The proportion of managerial and professional workers grew slightly, while those of service workers and agricultural laborers continued to decline. This pattern of occupational change raises an important question about the boundary of the working class, and specifically about the class position of routine white collar workers. This is, of course, one of the thorniest issues in class theory and there is no consensus about this question among class theorists. Most class analysts do tend to agree that in an earlier era of capitalist development the clerks and the sales assistants might be closer to the present-day managerial and professional workers both in terms of their superior work situations (broadly defined as their physical conditions of work and their position in the production and labor processes) and their advantageous market situations (education, career advancement, income) vis-a-vis the working class (Burris 1986; Braverman 1974:293-295; Lockwood 1958). The 76 disagreement, instead, centers on whether the increasing social and technical division of labor that accompanied the continuous capitalist development process depressed their work and market situations. Unfortunately, there is no study in Taiwan that helps us to confront this issue directly. But as the subsequent analyses indicate (Chapter 4, 5, and 6), although there still exist important gaps between clerical workers and blue-collar workers, both in terms of market and status situations, these gaps seem to become increasingly narrower with routinization of the labor process and with an accelerating trend toward feminization of clerical occupations. The past three decades' rapid industrialization has not only expanded the size of the proletariat but also changed its social and demographic characteristics. As the agricultural population declined continuously and as the nonagricultural population increased proportionately, an increasing number of the industrial wage workers will come from nonfarm backgrounds. Although few systematic analyses are available to determine the occupational mobility pattern among the industrial proletariat, there is some evidence that points to an increasing reproduction of the working class in Taiwan (Sheu 1989).16 The educational level of the industrial workers increased noticeably, too. Census data indicate that in 1990 about 60 percent of the blue-collar production workers received secondary 77 education, while they only constituted 15 percent in 1966 (see Table 5.11). The second-generation proletariat that has emerged in Taiwan is, then, quite different from the first-generat:ton factory workers who were just from rural areas, feeling their way into a new world of industrial employment. Apart from their changed demographic profile, the social and economic context in which these second generation industrial workers find themselves in has been altered significantly, with decreasing opportunities to return to rural villages or to open independent business. 17 Whether they like it or not, an increasing proportion of the industrial workers will find wage employment as their more or less permanent way of living and must find ways to improve their living conditions within the proletarian world of work. The "transitory" or "part-time" character of the Taiwan's working class seems to be fading with the deepening process of industrialization. summary and Discussion In several important aspects, the consequences of Taiwan's industrialization resemble those of the classical nineteenth century industrialization in Europe. It involves large-scale labor mobility from agrarian to nonagrarian sector, absorption of a large proportion of the labor force into the factory system of production, mobilization of young female workers to meet the huge labor 78 demand from labor-intensive industries, and drastic alterations of family and community life. Taiwan's economic development differs significantly in its consequences from "dependent development" in Latin America or Africa. While students of Latin American development most frequently stress the "blocked" process to proletarianization (Roberts 1989), "semi proletarianization" (Veltmeyer 1983), the "bloated tertiary sector" (Evans and Timberlake 1980), or more generally the growth of "informal economies" (Portes and Walton 1981; Bromley and Gerry 1979), the most striking feature of economic change in Taiwan has been the rapid proletarianization of its labor force. The growth of wage workers in Taiwan has been directly linked to the expansion of the manufacturing sector, not to the growth of the governmental bureaucracy or public services, as is often the case in many other Third World countries. In the early stage of export-oriented industrialization in Taiwan, proletarianization involved a disproportionate number of hitherto underutilized population, primarily from the farm sector and the female population. The rapid growth of industrial wage employment did not sacrifice the independent business sector in urban areas. Nonfarm self employment increased, both in absolute and relative terms, in tandem with the growth of urban industries. ThUS, proletarianization in Taiwan typically involved inter- 79 generational mobility whereby sons and daughters of farmers became industrial wage workers. The clashes between artisan production and the factory system of mass production, that determined the dominant character of the early European working-class movement, were generally absent in Taiwan's late industrialization. The first generation of Taiwanese industrial workers adapted to their industrial work rather smoothly and peacefully.lS What further facilitated this smooth adaptation among the proletarianized workers in Taiwan was its decentralized pattern of industrialization. Industrial development in Taiwan was not concentrated in a few urban centers but dispersed widely across urban and rural areas. The rural economy has been transformed as much as the urban economy, as a large proportion of rural households was engaged simultaneously in agricultural and nonagricultural activities, thereby becoming "semi-proletarian" households. This rural development helped slow down rural exodus and encouraged close ties between urban migrants and their rural families of origin. It also plays a crucial role in keeping industrial wages relatively low, because an important function of the semi-proletarian households is to assume much of the reproduction cost of their proletarian family members (Wallerstein 1983). The decentralized pattern of Taiwan's industrial development is also found in the dominance of small- and 80 medium-size production units and extensive networks of subcontract production. Although such an industrial structure is mainly the outcome of Taiwan government's industrial pOlicy, it is also closely related to Taiwanese workers' strong inclination toward independent business. An impressive array of small production units that developed in close linkages with large industrial firms was fueled by strong entrepreneurial desire among many industrial workers and provided opportunities for them to achieve their dreams. This dispersed and decentralized pattern of industrialization had the effect of retarding the development of strong worker identity and working-class community, let alone class consciousness. A rapidly differentiated occupational structure among the wage and salary workers is certainly no help in forging the working class unity either. The absence of any strong working class movement in Taiwan, despite such a drastic process of proletarianization, is accountable partly by the government's repressive labor policy (chapter 7) and partly by this particular form of proletarianization which failed to encourage workers' strong commitment to the proletarian world of work. 81 Notes 1. The secondary industrial sector includes: 1) mining; 2) manufacturing; 3) construction; 4) electricity, water, and gas; and 5) transportation and communication. The tertiary sector includes: 1) commerce; 2) finance, insurance, and real estate; and 3) public, social, and personal services. 2. Between 1952 and 1970, for instance, the average land holding of farm households in Taiwan decreased from 1.37 hectare to 1.02 hectare, while the average number of persons in farm households increased from 6.26 to 6.81 (Huang 1977:29). 3. These figures are quoted from the abstract report for the 1980 popUlation census. The accuracy of the figures is not certain since all the censuses taken before 1956 did not include question regarding employment status, and nowhere in that report mentioned the source of these figures. 4. Note that the 1956's figures are different from the preceeding tables because these were based on the unadjusted total employed popUlation not the adjusted total labor force (see Chapter 1). The main reason that I decided to use these unadjusted figures is because the unadjusted figures represent a closer coverage between two censuses which both included only those military personnel living outside the military bases (see Ho 1978:267). 5. The wholesale price index in Taipei, just to mention one example, rose from 177 in December 1944 (1937=100), to 97,462 in December 1947, then to 13,214,952 in June 15, 1949. The annual rate of increase was 1,189 percent between end of 1944 to mid-1949 (Lin 1973:30). 6. The self-employed workers here include the employers and the own account workers. 7. This is a common belief regarding the proletarianization experience in the Western countries. But as Tilly (1981) points out, this might not be the dominant pattern. 8. In 1956, state employees in tertiary sector (includes the armed forces) represented 78 percent of the tertiary wage workers and 46 percent of the total wage workers. By 1990, the respective percentages decreased to 43 percent and 19 percent. The state employees as a whole constituted 23 percent of the total wage employed popUlation in 1990, a huge drop from 59 percent ~n 1956. 9. According to the Agricultural and Fishery Census, the farm household is defined as "engaged in crop CUltivation, animal husbandry, and raising of poultry, bees and 82 silkworms in conformity with one of the following criteria: A. Having cultivated 0.02 hactre and over of land. B. Having raised 3 head and over of hogs, each weighing 60 Kg and over. c. Having raised 1 head and over of cattle, not including draft cattle. D. Having raised 100 head and over of poultry. E. Having sold and self-consumed farm products valued at over NT$17,000. The above-mentioned criteria except item E were the same as those used in the previous census." (Directorate General of BUdget, Accounting and statistics, Executive Yuan 1982:2) The farm households are further differentiated into three categories: "The general farm household all the members of which earn all their living solely on farm production is called a full-time farm household, while that whose incomes are derived from both farm and nonfarm sources is called a part-time farm household or farm household with sidelines. Furthermore, in case the farming income is more than that from sidelines, it will be a part-time farm household with agriculture as main pursuit; and it will be a part-time farm houseld with sidelines as main pursuit in case the farming income is less than that from sidelines." (p. 8) 10. The total of compensation of employees, entrepreneurial income, and net property income. 11. The percentages are calculated from statistics presented in the same sources shown in Table 2.7. 12. Although a desire for becoming one's own boss is more or less universal among wage workers in all countries, most tend to believe this entrepreneurial aspiration is particularly strong in Taiwan because of the labor intensive nature of export industries and the small-scale, decentralized structure of industries, which allow an easy entry with small capital and technical expertises. Furthermore, the absence of a nation-wide social security system makes factory employment a highly undesirable choice for Taiwanese workers. 13. Note that these statistics included only "registered" enterprises, which means that the number of small-scale factories is underestimated because many of them do not bother to register to avoid government regulation and taxation. 14. The following figures are based on the size of establishments not enterprises on which the figures in last paragraph were based. According to the official definition one enterprise can include one or more establishments so the former figures are likely to overestimate the size of the small-scale industries. When both sets of information 83 are compared, which only available in the 1961, 1981, and 1986 Census of Industry and Commerce, however, the differences are negligible--another indication of the predominance of small-scale business units in Taiwan. 15. There is no information concerning the concentration of wage and salary workers before 1979. Another relevant set of information is the Census for Industry and Commerce that started in 1954 and has been conducted regularly since 1961 for every five years. The major problem with these sources is that the data referred only to those registered business units and exclude a large number of small-scale enterprises that did not register. Furthermore, it did not classify the employed persons by firm size in terms of their employment status. 16. Sheu's study (1989) suggests that the occu~ational inheritance rate among the blue-collar product1on workers is the highest among all occupational groupings. 17. The changing national and international economic climate in recent years--Iabor shortage, rising wages, currency appreciation, tighter government control on "pirating", growing concern on environment, sharp competition from other low-wage developing countries, and increasing protectionism from the core--though affecting Taiwan's economy as a whole inevitably hit the small business sector the hardest (Common Wealth 1992: Huang 1992). While the big- and medium-sized firms venture out to China or to Southeast Asia in search of a better "business environment", the small firms neither have the capital nor the technical know-how to engage in similar strategy. The rapid rise and collapse of stock market in the late 1980s also tight-up family saving that could otherwise finance the small business venture. 18. Another important factor for this smooth transition can be traced to the colonial legacy which provided wide spread formal schooling for all strata of the Taiwanese popUlation which changed the perception of time in a still predimianatly agrarian popUlation. 84

CD~ER4 GENDER AND PROLBTARIAHIZATIOH PATTERH1

Women constitute half of the world's population, perform nearly two-thirds of its work hours, receive one-tenth of the world's income and own less than one-hundredth of the world property. (1980 united Nations Report, quoted from Pahl 1988:349) •••the manner in which the class structure is (at least in part) constituted through relations between the sexes is••• intrinsic to class analysis. Class structures, and the market processes behind them, are (to use the current terminology) 'gendered.' It is not 'social actors' that are distributed via the market through the places of the structure: it is men and women. Their differing experiences are interdependent, so that the distribution and situations of men are powerfully influenced by those of women, as well as vice versa. The fact that women are routinely constrained in this way serves only to highlight the obverse side of the structure; namely, that the collective effect of women's employment on the occupational system would seem to be one of privileging men. (Marshall et ale 1988:84) Taiwan's industrialization process, like in many other advanced as well as developing economies, involved a large scale deployment of female labor. It is widely acknowledged that an abundant supply of cheap and docile female labor was essential to the rapid development of the labor-intensive light manUfacturing industry--a cornerstone of the Taiwan miracle. While their significance in the Taiwan miracle has been recognized, there has been little effort to explore how this rapid inflow of women into the labor market figures in the transformation of Taiwan's class stratification system. 85 In the West, the recent controversy on integrating women into class analysis was initiated by Goldthorpe's (1983, 1984) defense of the "conventional view" of class analysis in bypassing women. Goldthorpe's defense can be broken down into three parts. First, family is the basic unit of class analysis. Second, the class location of the family is decided by the structural location of the household heads in the labor market, or more specifically, their position in the occupational structure. Third, since women traditionally play a subordinate role in the social and familial division of labor, the family class position is decided by the man in the family. In short, married women do not make a difference in determining the class position of the family because they are either outside the labor market or only participate in it intermittently. Even when women's position in the labor market may have some impact, their class trajectory is conditioned by the men in their life. "The labor market participation of married women," Goldthorpe contends, "is typically of an intermittent and limited kind, and is moreover conditioned by the class context in which it occurs." (1983:472) The conventional view of focusing on men in the class analysis, thUS, cannot be charged as academic sexism but only reflects the "reality" in society. The issue of gender inequality, important as it is, is outside the scope of the class analysis proper (see also Lockwood 1986). 86 Not surprisingly, this position, or what it implies, spurs a wide variety of responses: Heath and Britten argue women's jobs do make a difference (1984), Dale, Gilbert, and Arber propose the individuals should be the appropriate unit of class analysis (1985), and Graetz basically reconfirms Goldthorpe's position (1991). criticisms abound, one basic phenomenon seems to skip the attention of most of the participants in the debate--the structure of the labor market itself is made up of both men and women. Granted that, as Goldthrope argued, women's participation in the labor market is intermittent and of a limited kind, it is nevertheless the case that they are an integral part of that structure. And men's more persevering and prominent position in the labor market is sustained by the intermittent and limited employment of women. As Marshall et al. (1988) point out: 2 •••while it ma¥ be true that, at the level of individual fam1lies, women's class experiences are (in some part) dependent upon their husbands, it is also the case that the mobility chances of men are themselves dependent on a pronounced degree of sexual differentiation in the social division of labor, that is at the level of class structure as a whole. Class and class phenomena are conditioned by the peCUliar pattern of women's participation (how intermittent) in the market for paid labor. (p. 73) •••the distribution of people to places across time is forcefully conditioned by gender, so that the career trajectories (and thereby life-chances) of men are inexplicable without reference to the highly particularistic ways in Which, and conditions under which, women also participate in paid employment. (p. 83) 87 To define a given class structure with reference solely to men is by definition to present an incomplete and skewed image of the class structure of that society (Hindess 1981:197-201). The uneven concentration of women in certain class categories, in other words, presupposes men's uneven presence in the class structure as a whole. The pattern of proletarianization, likewise, is conditioned by this large-scale inflow of the hitherto un- or under utilized female population. The current chapter aims to illustrate in what way have women shaped the proletarian experience in Taiwan. Before we begin, however, a brief explanation on the tables is necessary. Tables 4.1 to 4.6 are constructed in a similar manner for different groupings in the labor force. The first two panels represent, for the particular employment category concerned, the proportion of women and men in their respective labor forces. The third panel represents the percentile differences between respective women's and men's percentages: a figure of zero means there is no difference between male and female in their representation of that particular class of workers in their respective labor forces, a negative figure indicates women are under-represented relative to men, while a positive figure suggests the reverse. The fourth panel presents the sex ratios (women as a percentage of men) of the class category concerned: a figure of zero indicates an equal 88 proportion of women and men, a figure of 100.00 indicates a complete absence of women, the lower the figures the more women are under-represented. The fifth panel presents the percentile differences when sex ratio of that particular class is compared to sex ratio of the overall labor force: a figure of zero means the absence of any difference in sex ratios between the labor force and the particular grouping in the table, a negative figure indicates a under representation of women in the category relative to their representation in the labor force, a positive figure means a greater representation of women in this class relative to their representation in the labor force.

Women and Self Employment Table 4.1 presents the self-employed men and women as a percentage of the male and female labor force. In general, the data show no consistent trend among different periods, though the relative shares of both self-employed men and women seem to be in decline for the postwar period as a whole. The proportion of self-employed women has been relatively stable between 1956 and 1980, varying around 13 to 15 percent of the female labor force, while in the 1980s a sharper decline was observed. The similar trend occurred among self-employed men whose relative share in the male labor force varied between 28 to 34 percent in the period covered. A more consistent pattern emerged as we compared 89 the relative shares of self-employed men and women in their respective labor forces. Men, as shown in the third panel in Table 4.1, have traditionally had better access to own the means of production than women. Moreover, this greater representation of Taiwanese men in the self employed, weakened in the early phase of industrialization; has been in steady increase since the mid-1960s. The under-representation of Taiwanese women in the self employed is further substantiated by the sex ratio (women as a percentage of men) in this employment category. Women, as shown in the fourth panel of Table 4.1, have represented at the utmost one-fifth of the self-employed population; the dominance of men in this property owning class is obvious. The rising ratio of women as a percentage of men, nonetheless, seems to suggest an increasing presence of women in this category. with the exception of 1980, women have doubled their relative number from 10 to 20 percent in the self-employed population between 1956 and 1990. However, these percentage changes are deceptive once they are situated in the context of overall changes in the gender-biased labor force participation rates. The last panel in the table presents the percentage differences between the sex ratios of the self employed and the labor force. It is clear that women's position in the self employed category worsened through the postwar years. As reflected in the negative 90 figures, women have much lower participation in the self employed than might be expected on the basis of their overall participation in the labor force. More important, the gap has widened from -11 percent in 1956, to -22 percent in 1975, and to -35 percent in 1990. A slight improvement of women's position was recorded between 1975 and 1980 but this gain was drastically negated in the 1980s. It is apparent from the above description that: 1) women are under-represented in the self-employed population in Taiwan; 2) the participation of women, relative to men, in this employment status has eroded over time; 3) self employed men, despite a gradual decline relative to the male labor force themselves, have become more dominant over women within this class. In light of the drastic shift of labor force composition from agricultural to nonagricultural activities and the traditional dominant role of nonwage employment in Taiwan's agriculture (see Chapter 3), it is important to examine the evolution of agricultural and nonagricultural self-employed population separately. Self-employed women and men as a percentage of the female and male agricultural and nonagricultural labor forces3 is presented in Table 4.2. The persistence of the male self employed is clearly evident. In fact, the proportions of self-employed men have proliferated in 91 postwar Taiwan in both agricultural and nonagricultural labor forces. In the nonagricultural sector, after a slight decline between 1956 and 1966, self-employed men experienced steady increase in relation to the male labor force. Self-employed women, in contrast, experienced gradual decline since the mid-1970s in relation to the female nonagricultural labor force. The gap between their relative positions, in consequence, widened from -4 percent in 1956 to -13 percent in 1990 (panel 3). Examining the sex ratio of self employed in the nonagricultural sector reveals the same trend. In spite of a rising tendency of female presence in the self-employed population, when compared to the overall sex ratio of the nonagricultural labor force, women have become increasingly under represented. The percentile differences have widened from -4 percent in 1956 to -34 percent in 1990 (panelS). The dominance of male in the agricultural self employed is even more severe than their counterpart in the nonagricultural sector. While women inside the agricultural sector have a better chance than those outside of it to be in self employment, men in the agricultural sector are overwhelmingly self-employed. In 1990, close to three quarters of the male agricultural workforce were self-employed compared to 58 percent in 1956. As indicated in the differences between sex ratios of the two self employed populations (panel 4 and 9), women are also less 92 represented in the agricultural than in the nonagricultural self employed, though in the 1980s there seems to be a reversal when the overall labor force sex ratios were taken into consideration (compared the figures in panel 5 and panel 10). Several observations can be made based on the above description. First, male dominance in the self-employed population is strong both within and outside agriculture. Second, while this male dominance is far stronger in the agricultural than in the nonagricultural sector, it has become more severe in the latter. The increasing male dominance within the nonagricultural self-employed population suggests that men were in a better position either to maintain their position as self-employed or to seize the opportunity to become one in the course of rapid economic development in Taiwan. Even within a declining sector like agriculture men can still maintain, if not increase, their domination in self employed vis-a-vis women.

Women and unpaid Family Workers The employment category of unpaid family workers has received little attention in the literature on class analysis (some notable exceptions are Cuneo 1985, 1984; Przeworski et al. 1980; and, of course, the literature on the informal economy is especially relevant). Most studies 93 either ignored it or subsumed it under the category of petty bourgeoisie (see, for example, Burris 1992, 1980; Szymanski 1983). It is generally believed that unpaid family workers are usually the sons/daughters or wives working under the self-employed fathers or husbands. Based on tne assumption that family is the proper unit of class analysis, it is argued that because unpaid family workers occupied the same class position of their boss and family member--the self employed, one would superficially inflate the size of self employed (and thus deflate the size of the working class) by double-counting them in the class structure. 4 It is important, however, to point out that it is these unpaid family workers who sustain the viability of the self employed. Like in the relationship between women and class structure, to ignore the unpaid family workers is likely to distort the general picture. It is exactly here, moreover, where the family seems to be a "natural" unit of class analysis, that we observe the sharpest segregation between women and men. The proportions of women and men unpaid family workers to the female and male labor forces are shown in Table 4.3. contrary to the self employed, unpaid family workers have constituted a larger share of the female labor force than the male. As a proportion of the female labor force, unpaid women workers dropped sharply from 44 to 30 percent between 1956 and 1966, remained stable between 1966 and 94 1975, then again dropped sharply from 30 to 12 percent between 1975 and 1980. In the span of less than three decades, unpaid women family workers have declined from the most to the least numerous category of women employment. In the 1980s, however, we see a revival of women unpaid work as their relative size in the female labor force grew from 12 to 17 percent. Male unpaid family workers, on the other hand, decreased steadily from 14 percent of the male labor force in 1956, to 9 percent in 1975, and to 4 percent in 1990. The decline of unpaid family work as a percentage of the overall labor force (Table 3.3), while consistent with the trend revealed in the male labor force, is less true in the case of female. Women, once again in contrast with the self employed, dominate the unpaid family workers. The sex ratios display in Table 4.3 (panel 4) clearly demonstrate this. Unpaid women family workers increased in proportion to unpaid men family workers, from 63 percent in 1956 to 142 percent in 1975, declined to 93 percent in 1980, then rose sharply to 274 percent in 1990. A similar trend is found in the percentile differences between sex ratios of the unpaid family workers and the overall labor force. Not only were women over-represented in the category of unpaid family work, the data also suggest this over-representation intensified in recent years. That is, a male dominated world of self employed is increasingly sustained by a 95 female dominated world of unpaid family workers. To argue that they belong to the same family or household only serves to mask this huge disparity and inequality between male and female within the nonwage employment. When gender differences among unpaid family workers were examined separately within and outside agriculture (Table 4.4), a similar pattern prevailed. As expected, the unpaid family workers occupied a much larger proportion of the agricultural labor force than of the nonagricultural labor force. Within the agricultural sector: unpaid women family workers as a percentage of the female labor force fluctuates around 73 percent between 1956 and 1975, declined sharply between 1975 and 1980 from 73 to 60 percent, than increased to 66 percent in 1990: while men unpaid family workers declined steadily from 32 percent in 1966 to 14 percent in 1990. outside agriculture, the zig-zaging pattern continues for the women unpaid family workers, but note that the 1990'S figure of 12 percent is the highest percentage unpaid workers have ever occupied in the female nonagricultural labor force, and even the male unpaid family workers increased slightly between 1980 and 1990 after decades of decline. The reason for this recent increase of nonagricultural family work is not clear, but one possible factor may be the influence of the inauguration of Labor standard Law in 1984,5 which may have 96 the effect of boosting informal/nonwage employment. Despite the recent increase, nevertheless, it is clear that in both the nonagricultural and the agricultural sectors, women not only have been over-represented among unpaid family workers category but tend to extend this over representation in recent years.

Women and Wage Employment For both women and men, there have been a marked increased in wage employment relative to their respective labor forces. As shown in Table 4.5, women wage and salary workers grew rapidly from 26 percent of the female labor force in 1956 to 67 percent in 1980. The proportion of wage and salary workers in the male labor force also increased from 44 percent in 1956 to 60 percent in 1980. In the period between 1956 and 1980, the pace of proletarianization was apparently faster in the female than in the male labor force. The percentile differences between women's and men's share in wage employment subsequently changed from negative 18 percent in 1956 to positive 8 percent in 1980. In the 1980s, however, while men continued their steady pace, the rate of increase was relatively slow for women, suggesting a certain leveling of differences between men and women in the rank of wage and salary workers. 97 The greater proletarianization among women than men is also evident in the changing gender composition of the wage and salary workers. The sex ratios within the wage and salary workers increased from 12 percent in 1956, to 35 percent in 1975, and to 58 percent in 1990. Compared to sex ratios of the overall labor force, women have grown from under- to over-represented in less than three decades: from minus 9 percent in 1956 to positive 5 percent in 1980 (panel 5). The slight decrease of percentile difference in sex ratios between the wage laborers and the labor force in the 1980s, once again, suggests a leveling of gender differences in the wage earning population. This trend of diminishing gender difference, however, needs to be qualified as we explore the internal structure of the working class. Women and men occupied different locations in the working class. A greater proportion of female labor force than the male labor force is found among wage and salary earning professionals and clerical and sales occupations (since the mid-1970S), while the reverse is true among the managerial and blue-collar manual jobs. 6 As shown in Table 4.6, while the proportion of the men managerial personnel has remained small at around 1 percent of the male labor force, the respective percentages for women have never exceeded 0.3 percent of the female labor force. Women professional workers, on the other hand, occupied a higher 98 percentage in the female labor force than their male counterpart, and it has been in gradual but constant increase: from 4 percent of the female labor force in 1956 to 8 percent in 1990. The most impressive increase of women wage and salary workers in the female labor force occurred in the clerical and sales category. From 4 percent in 1956, the proportion of women clerical and sales workers in the female labor force increased to 13 percent in 1975, then to 27 percent in 1990. The men clerical and sales workers, in comparison, increased slowly from 7 percent of the male labor force in 1956, to 9 percent in 1975, then to 14 percent in 1990. Women manual workers (operatives and service workers) also increased rapidly from 18 percent of the female labor force to 39 percent between 1956 and 1980, while men manual workers grew from 35 percent to 44 percent in the same period. Despite a more rapid increase of women factory workers between 1956 and 1980 as denoted in the manual category of operatives, women are less likely to become manual workers as compared to men. In the 1980s, women manual workers actually recorded a relative decline in the female labor force while men continued to grow. This uneven distribution of men and women in the wage and salary earning population can be more clearly observed in Table 4.7. The information in Table 4.7 displays the sex ratios of these different groupings of the wage and 99 salary workers and their differences with the overall labor force. Between 1956 and 1975, women increased their proportion of men in the managerial occupation from 3 percent to 13 percent, then staggering around 10 to 11 percent since the late 1970s. In contrast to the salary earning managerial position, women outnumbered the men in the salary-earing professionals and this numeric domination seems to increase over time. The dramatic increase of women among clerical and sales personnel is reflected in the rapid rise of sex ratios, from 13 percent in 1956 to 105 percent in 1990. Women also increased rapidly in the manual occupations as indicated in the rising sex ratios in both operatives and service occupations. In general, women seem to increase their representation in every category of the wage and salary earing population. When compared these changing sex ratios to that of the total labor force, however, the picture changes. Within the managerial workers, the percentile differences declined from -18 percent in 1956 to -45 percent in 1990, indicates a widening gap of gender difference relative to the labor force. That is, not only were women outnumbered by men in the managerial salary earners, but their position also deteriorated over time. The professional workers was the only category in which women have traditionally enjoyed a better representation vis-a-vis the total labor force, though it also shows sign of deterioration in the 1980s. 100 This, however, conceals the fact that men dominate such prestigious positions as physicians and university professors while women are more numerous in such less prestigious positions like social workers, primary school teachers, and nurses. Unfortunately, the published census data used in this study do not allow for such a detail classification.7 Some supporting evidence, however, can be found in the education statistics of Taiwan. The following discussion focus on the two largest groups of professional workers--teaching and health related workers. 8 The gender composition of the teaching profession has changed drastically in postwar Taiwan. Table 4.8 presents the sex ratios of different levels of teachers and of the teaching profession as a whole between 1950 to 1990. From a predominately male occupation in the 1950s, the teaching profession has become an overwhelmingly female dominated occupation in the 1980s as indicated in the changing sex ratios (from 36 percent in 1950-1951 school year to 120 percent in 1989-1990 school year). When we broke down this profession into different ranks of teaChing jobs, though the trend of increasing feminization holds true in all the categories identified, we also observe great disparity among them. The lower the rank of the education institution, the data suggest, the higher the sex ratio between female and male teachers. 9 Women are well represented in both the elementary and the secondary school 101 teaching staff. The sex ratio of the elementary school teachers, for example, increased rapidly from 44 percent in 1950-51 to 146 percent in 1989-90 school year. The sex ratio of the secondary school teachers also increased rapidly from 19 to 103 percent in the same period, though women are still under-represented when compared to the overall sex ratio of teaching profession. Among the university and college professors, on the other hand, despite a constant increase of female professors, women are very much under-represented. The seemingly impressive increase of sex ratios from 9 to 44 percent in the postwar period paled in comparison to the increase in other ranks of the teaching profession. Indeed, when compared to the sex ratio of the teaching profession as a whole, the under representation of women in the rank of university and college professors seems to worsen over time as suggested in the widening percentile differences between the two: from -27 to -76 percent between 1950 and 1990. There is no such comprehensive information regarding the gender composition of physicians and other health related workers. The data on the gender composition of students in the health related fields of study in tertiary education, however, provide a glimpse of the picture. As shown in Table 4.9, the gender composition of the overall health related student body favored women. The over representation of women in this field of stUdy, moreover, 102 seems to intensify over the years as the sex ratio grew from 103 to 160 percent between 1975-76 and 1980-90 school year. When we consider the internal differentiation in tertiary education, however, different pictures emerge. At the university level, where the training for future physicians and other specialists took place, women are clearly a minority. The increase of sex ratio from 33 percent in 1975-76 school year to 47 percent in 1989-90 school year actually represents a regression of female presence when compared to the overall sex ratio of students in tertiary education. At the junior college level, where the training for nurses and other subaltern health workers took place, women are an overwhelmingly majority and are becoming increasingly more so. From 208 percent in the 1975-76 school year, the sex ratio has grown to 430 percent in the 1989-90 school year. The numerical dominance of women in the professional category, as the two cases suggest, can hardly serve as an indication for decreasing gender inequality in Taiwan. Among the clerical and sales category, the percentile differences between sex ratios have changed from negative 7 percent in 1956 to positive 49 percent in 1990 (Table 4.7). In other words, women have totally reversed their position from under- to over-representation when gender differences in the labor force are taken into account. Women's position in the manual occupations are less easy to sum up. 103 In the manual occupational category of operatives, increased presence of women was observed in the period between 1966 to 1980 due to heavy employment of female in light manufacturing industry. In the 1980s, however, a reverse trend was observed as the weight of light manufacturing industry declined in Taiwan's economy. The only improvement of gender difference occurred in the late 1970s as the percentile differences decreased from -12 percent to -5 percent between 1975 and 1980, but then it widened to -12 percent in 1990 due to the relative decline of women manual workers in the female labor force. The trend in the service occupation, on the other hand, indicates an increasing participation of women in this occupation. Several implications can be drawn from the above analysis of wage and salary workers. First, proletarianization in the sense of increasing wage and salary earning population has become greater for both men and women. Second, the pace of proletarianization is faster among women than men in every period examined except in the 1980s. Third, women and men displayed different patterns of proletarianization. Before the mid 1970s, the dynamics of women proletarianization lay in manual factory work, whereas after the mid 1970s the dynamics shifted to clerical and sales occupations. Men, on the other hand, displayed a more even pace of proletarianization in every 104 occupational category. Fourth, proletarianization in the sense of exclusion from decision-making authority at the workplace has been more severe for women than men. The increasing presence of women in the labor force has not led to a corresponding increase of women in the managerial positions but its opposite. The similar pattern was observed in the professional and technical workers where men are increasingly clustered around the upper echelon whereas women are increasingly clustered around the subaltern of this occupational grouping. In short, the process of proletarianization strengthens men's domination over women in the labor market.

Women and Mobility opportunities It is argued in the last chapter that in Taiwan there existed relatively abundant opportunity to exit wage employment and become self employed. This dream of "becoming one's own boss," however, as the following discussion indicates, is more likely to be realized for men than for women. For the latter, exiting wage work leads more likely to marriage or motherhood than to self employment (Kung 1976, 1981: Diamond 1979). Information in Table 4.10 displays these different patterns of mobility between men and women. For men, the chances of becoming self-employed increase as people aged. In 1970, 5 percent of the total male 105 population between age 15 to 24 was self-employed, 33 percent between age 25 to 34, and 38 percent between age 35 to 44. Ten years later in 1980 the comparable percentages for self employed in each age group are: 28 percent between age 25 to 34 (the 1970's 15 to 24 age group), 46 percent between age 35 to 44, and 42 percent between age 45 to 54. The proportion of wage employment in the male population increased sharply from 40 percent in 1970's 15 to 24 age group to 59 percent in 1980's 25 to 34 age group due to a substantial increase of people entering the labor market between these age groups. wage employment in all other 1970's age groups, in contrast, declined as compared to the coparable age groups in 1980 (25-34 to 35-44, 35-44 to 45 54 etc.). On the other hand, only when men began a large scale exodus from the labor market did the self employed decline relative to the total population. For example, while the proportion of self employed in the age group between 45 to 54 declined from 38 percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1980 in the age group between 55 to 64, the labor force participation rate has dropped from 94 to 69 percent. For the female population, the most significant change is a substantial drop of labor force participation rate between the age group 15 to 24 and the age group 25 to 34. As shown in Table 4.10, despite a release of more than 20 percent of the female population from attending school 106 between the two age groups,10 the number of persons engaged in the labor market actually declined. In 1980, the labor force participation rate for women under 25 was 47 percent compared to 25 percent for women over 25 year of age. Even for those women who remained or re-entered the labor market it is less likely for them to achieve self employment when compared to men. The proportion of females classified as housekeeping, on the other hand, doubled from 32 to 65 percent between 15 to 24 and 25 to 34 age groups. Keeping house, of course, can include a variety of activities and certainly, though not officially recognized, does not exclude women from participating in economic production (Beneria and Roldan 1987; Portes, CastelIs, and Benton 1989; for Taiwan see Hu 1984; Shieh 1992).11 But the information does suggest that women's participation in the formal labor market tends to be "of an intermittent and limited kind." This attribute of women employment, nevertheless, does not mean one can then discard women in class analysis but only to highlight their role in shaping the class structure. Furthermore, to the extent that capitalist accumulation in Taiwan's export oriented industrialization requires a cheap and flexible labor supply, women certainly played a critical part. As nicely summarized by one of the chief architects of Taiwan economic miracle K.T. Li (1985:5): •••during the period 1975-1976 and 1980-1982, overall employment opportunities shrank due to the 107 impact of world economic recession. At the time, the growth rate of female employment dropped sharply. •• But when economic recovery came, women again quickly supplied the increase demand of labor. In 1977, during a period of rapid expansion, female employment jumped by 8.2 percent; and in 1983, another year of high economic growth, it soared 9.0 percent. Thus the stabilizing function of female employment saved this country from the serious effects of unemployment during economic recession and reduced upward pressure on wages reSUlting from rapid increases in demand for labor during periods of economic prosperity. What is clearly outlined and acknOWledged in the above passage, though may not be intended by the author, in other words, is women's role as the reserve army of labor.

Summary and Discussion This chapter examines the different patterns of how women and men have been incorporated into the labor market in postwar Taiwan. The aim is not merely to identify women proletarianized faster than men but to show in what ways women have become more proletarianized. It is observed that in the nonproletarian sector women are increasingly concentrated in unpaid family work while men are increasingly concentrated in the self-employed propertied class. This trend, moreover, occurred both within and outside the agriCUltural labor forces. Women, on the other hand, have made great inroads in paid employment which led to a narrowing of gender disparity among the wage and salary workers. 108 Women's pattern of proletarianization, however, is closely conditioned by the pattern of industrialization. In the period of light manufacturing export-oriented industrialization women were recruited in large number as factory operatives, their relative share declined as light manufacturing lost its dynamics. The locus of women proletarianization then switched to clerical and sales occupations as more and more cheap labor is needed in the areas of capital realization than production. Men's trajectory, in comparison, shows a more even distribution and growth. Also important is the trend that women have become increasingly absent, relative to men, in the upper echelon of the occupational structure in Taiwan. Men not only dominate the top managerial positions but also occupied a majority of the more prestigious professional jobs. Women, in other words, are subjected to double proletarianization in the sense that they have been expropriated from the means of production and expropriated from the control of the labor process. This gender-biased proletarianization process also means class structure in Taiwan is polarized in terms of gender with men dominating the propertied and managerial-professional classes and women the subordinated classes. One cause of this disadvantaged position of women in the labor market may be their more intermittent pattern of work as suggested in their cohort employment pattern. 109 Exclusion from paid employment, however, may have a detrimental effect on women's position in the family. That is, women's positions in the labor market and their role outside it seem to form a vicious cycle that impedes improvement of their status in either spheres. 110 Notes 1. Analysis in this chapter is largely borrowed from Carl J. Cuneo's article "Have Women Become More Proletarianized Than Man?" in Canadian Review 0:£ Sociology and Anthropology, 1985 22(4):465-495. 2. It is interesting to note that Goldthorpe himself makes a similar observation: "the long-term change in the occupational distribution of males, and especially the growing proportion found in professional, administrative, and managerial positions, which emerges as the key dynamic element in mobility over the period we have studied, cannot be understood other than in relation to the trend and character of female employment." (1980:295) 3. The agricultural labor force does not include the unemployed popUlation who, for the lack of detail information, are classified as part of the nonagricultural labor force. The term agricultural labor force, as used in the heading in the tables, should be properly named the agricultural employed popUlation or the agricultural workforce. This inperfection of the data, though may create some distortion on the precise proportions of the self employed in the 1950' and 1960s when unemployment population were relative large and might be more prevalant in the agricultural sector and among women, should have no effect in the overall trends reveal in the table. The available figures on the unemployed popUlation classified by their jobs before becoming unemployed suggest no apparent imbalance between agricultural and nonagricultural sector. 4. It is in1:eresting to note, however, that "double counting" the petty bourgeoisie may be necessary since a lot of the studies on class structure aim at, explicitly or implicitly, explaining and predicting the political behavior that so oftenly (and so conviently) is expressed by people's voting patterns. So why shouldn't we "double-· count" the petty bourgeoisie? Or, for that matter, why shouldn't we "double-count" the women? 5. The Labor standard Law is a set of protective measures that aims to layout the minimum working conditions for labor. The main feature, also the point where the employers opposed the most, is a clause that forces employers to set up the pension funds, and actually put money in them, for their employees. 6. The exception was in the civilian service occupation where we found a greater proportion of women wage workers in the female labor force than men in the male labor force. 7. Only in the 1966's census did it break down the health 111 related professionals into 1) ~hysicians, 2) veterinarians and biologists and scientists 1n agriculture, 3) nurses, midwives and related workers, and 4) other medical technicians and personnel. The sex ratios (women over men) are as followed (wage workers only): for group 1--5.37 percent fro grouy 2--0.94 percent for group 3--224.85 percent for group 4--16.76 percent. 8. The "engineers, architects, and related workers" is another group whose numbers are substantial. The three professions constituted 78 percent of all professional workers in 1956, 78 percent in 1975, and 79 percent in 1990. Teaching was and remains the largest group, health related workers came in second until 1980 when the engineers (which was the third largest group till then) outnumber them. 9. The sex ratio of the kintergarden teachers (not shown in Table 4.8) is the highest among all ranks of teachers. The imbalance is so large which makes the calculation of sex ratio meaningless. For example, in 1960-61 school year there were 2020 kindergarten teachers and 99.7 percent of them (2014) was female. That is, a sex ratio of over thirty thousand percent. 10. The category other in Table 4.10 mainly includes two groups of people, those who attend school and those who retired or are incapable of working. In 1970, 32 percent of the total male population in the age group 15 to 24 were attending school and 65 percent of the total male population aged 65 and over were retired or not capable to work; the respective percentage for female are 23 percent and 63 percent. In 1980, 32 percent of the total male population in the age group 15 to 24 were attending school and 61 percent of the total male population aged 65 and over were retired or not capable to work; the respective percentages for female are 28 percent and 56 percent.

11. The same thing can be said for those retired or attending school population, both women and men. 112

CHAPTER 5 COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE WORKING CLASS

A rapid growth of white-collar workers and an equally rapid feminization of this occupational grouping, as discussed in the last two chapters, are two of the most distinguishing features of the proletarianization process in postwar Taiwan. This changing composition of the wage and salary workers not only reflects important structural changes in Taiwan's economy but also raises the issue of who constitutes the working class proper. Depending on how working class is understood, our perception of the past and present may be altered and our view of the future may be changed. The progressive working-class movement in the early phase of Western industrialization may be interpreted as a reactionary current of self-employed artisans fighting to go back to the traditional way of life. Or the coming of post-industrial society where the working class will be replaced by the middle classes, may be perceived as the dawn of late capitalism where the working class will continue increase in size and in strength through the continuous process of proletarianization. All these disparate interpretations involved how the working class is conceptualized. with all its significance, naturally, there is a sea of literature concerning what or who constitutes the working 113 class (good summary statements can be found in Abercrombie and Urry 1983; Burris 1990; Parkin 1979; Wright 1980). While t!iere is a general agreement that manual wage laborers directly engaged in the production process belong to the working class, there is little consensus on the class position of other wage and salary earners. To complicate the issue further, and this is especially prevalent in 'the developing world, some nonwage employment is actually working class jobs "disguised" as self-employed and unpaid family workers. The current chapter explores the issue of how many working classes exist in Taiwan. After a brief review of how the working class was perceived in the existing literature, this chapter examines the structure and composition of the working class in postwar Taiwan. Adapting the information published in census and nation-wide labor force survey reports, this chapter provides estimates of the size of Taiwanese working class(es) according to different criteria. While tedious, it is important to point out on the outset that this exercise is not intended to pigeon-hole the working popUlation into fixed categories, but to delineate the contour of working-class popUlation in Taiwan based to their structural attributes. 114 In SQarch of the working Class(es) Studies of the working class explicitly or implicitly involved the question of what or who constitutes the working class. Whether we treat working class (or social class in general) as a structural construct or real people living in real world (or a world constructed by us), we have certain criteria in mind that inform us where to look. What all students of class analysis tend to agree are two things. First, the wage and salary workers are not a coherent whole and there are, potentially and/or realistically, severe and persistence cleavages among them. How are they divided and to what extent these differences represent inter-class division or intra-class fractionalization, however, are the locus of controversy. Second, all tend to agree that manual wage workers directly engaged in the production of material goods are part of the working class. Whether the working class is constituted exclusively by them or there are other members, once again, have generated heated debates. The most common division within the wage and salary earners is the distinction based on manual and nonmanual work. 1 Most Weberians, focusing on "market" as the site of class formation, argue that since the nonmanual white collar workers have traditionally and continuously enjoyed better life chances due to their superior market, work, and status situations2 vis-a-vis the manual blue-collar workers 115 they should not be considered as part of the working class (Gagliani 1981; Giddens 1973; Goldthorpe 1980; Lockwood 1958; Parkin 1971). Giddens, for example, argues that three kinds of "market capacity" are important in the structuring of classes in advanced capitalist societies: "Ownership of property in the means of production; possession of the educational or technical qualifications; and possession of manual labor-power" (1973:107). The market capacity of middle-class occupations is conferred by educational and technical qualifications, while the working class possessed only manual labor-power. By themselves, however, these three sets of market capacity are not capable ofcreating discrete classes with definite boundaries because market capacities tend to vary infinitely thus generating a great variety of class locations. Indeed, one urgent problem facing the Weberian class analysis noted by Giddens is how to transit these numerous potential classes to social classes as "structured forms." For Giddens, the transition is through the mechanisms of class "structuration." Four sources of class structuration are identified: 1) the inter- and intra generational mobility chances; 2) the technical division of labor within the enterprises; 3) the authority relationships within the enterprises; and 4) distributive grouping (meaning those groups created by neighborhood segregation and enjoying a common way of life). And clear 116 distinctions on each of these dimensions, Giddens maintains, are to be found in the division between manual and nonmanual occupations. Compared to manual workers, white-collar workers with their superior educational and technical qualifications receive higher earnings and fringe benefits and enjoy better job security; they are relatively resistant to mobility form manual occupations; they are physically and socially isolated from the shop-floor; they tend to, or pretend to, participate more fully in the delegation of authority in the enterprises; and they tend to form distinct residential communities or neighborhoods. In short, the division between manual and nonmanual work represents the most appropriate boundary to distinguish between working-class and middle-class positions. Or as Lockwood puts it (1958:81): Because of the rigid division between the 'office' and the 'works' it is no exaggeration to say that 'management' from the point of view of the manual workers, ends with the lowest grade of routine clerk. A common response to this kind of explication is that these white-collar workers (especially those located at the lower end of the occupation hierarchy), though they enjoyed better market and work conditions in an earlier era, were subjected to the same de-skilling and rationalization process that was forced upon the blue-collar workers since the advent of capitalism and eventually, if not already, they will share similar work and life experiences of the 117 latter (see, for example, Abercrombie and Urry 1983; Braverman 1974; Hill 1981; szymanski 1971-72; Westergaard and Resler 1975). In the words of Abercrombie and Urry (1983:118): With the rationalization of the labor process, the fragmentation and standardization of tasks, and the increasing bureaucratization of administration, the mental labor content of the white-collar jobs passes further up the hierarchy. The process of rationalization has undermined the traditional sociological distinction between manual and non manual work; clerks are manual workers. (emphasis original) Furthermore, the separation of "office" and "works" that Weberians see as a clear demarcation between working and middle classes, can actually lead to a decline in white collar workers' superiority since now they themselves are at the bottom of the authority hierarchy with no blue collar workers to look down on (Jelin 1974). The working class, therefore, should include those routinized white collar workers, a conclusion shared by some Weberians and endorsed by most Marxists. Within the Weberian tradition, for example, Dahrendorf's (1959) assertion that authority rather than property relations should be the determinant criterion in defining classes in the modern societies would virtually exclude most of the routine White-collar workers from a middle-class position because they do not share any authority in the modern corporation structure. A similar proposition can be found in the Marxist camp. Carchedi 118 (1977), for one, proposes that in advanced capitalism due to the separation of ownership and managerial function in the modern corporation, those who perform the "global function of capital"--managerial, control, surveillance etc.--should be excluded from membership in the working class regardless of their employment status. The working class thus defined includes not only the routine white collar workers but most of the professional and technical workers who neither possess nor perform this global function of capital. A more exclusive definition of the working class is presented by Wright (1979), who posits that three processes are at the heart of the capital-labor relation: control over the physical means of production, control over the labor power, and control over the investments and resource allocations. In the capitalist mode of production, the bourgeoisie is in control of all three processes, the prOletariat is controlled within each. In between, there is an array of "contradictory class locations" that partake in some kind of control in one or several of these processes. Managers is a typical example who exercise some control over the working class in all three processes, but at the same time are subjected to similar control from the capitalists. In the early phase of capitalist development when clerks performed similar function like present-day managers they might be classified as occupying a 119 contradictory location distinct from the working class. The majority of present-day clerical and sales workers, however, no longer perform this managerial function. The routinized white-collar workers, therefore, are as exploited and dominated as the traditional blue-collar workers which together constitute the working class in contemporary capitalist societies. The professional and technical workers, on the other hand, cannot be considered as working class, despite that they share with the latter the same predicament as having no control over the means of production nor having control over investments and resource allocations, because they do have some control over their own labor process. An even more exclusive definition of working class is provided by Poulantzas (1975) who excludes the white-collar wage workers from the working class because they exercise ideological and/or political domination over the manual wage workers. Members of the working class are politically dominated because they are at the bottom of the authority hierarchy and they are ideologically dominated because they do not share the "secret knowledge" of production. The most important criterion for Poulantzas in determining working-class position, nevertheless, is the distinction based on productive and unproductive labor, which leads him to exclude some manual workers from the working class. For Poulantzas, beside being ideologically and politically 120 dominated, the members of the working class foremost have to perform productive labor. 3 Consequently, only those productive (directly engaged in the production process of material goods), manual (ideologically dominated), and nonsupervisory (politically dominated) wage workers can be considered as working class proper. All other wage and salary employees (except the top-rank managers who belong to the bourgeoisie) constitute what he called "the new petty bourgeoisie," a fraction of the petty bourgeoisie in general. On the other end of this array of definitions is the approach that sees virtually all wage and salary employees as working class (Friedman 1975; Hunt 1977; Edwards 1979). The only waged and salaried workers being excluded from the working class are those in top managerial positions in big corporations who exercise actual control over the means of production. Common to this approach, however, is a recognition of the internal division within the working class that was created, by design as well as by default, in the course of capitalist development. Edwards (1979), for example, argues that, corresponding to three different methods of controlling labor by capital--simple, technical, and bureaucratic control, three distinct labor markets--secondary, subordinated primary, and independent primary--coexisted in the contemporary united states. This segmented labor market, in turn, 121 fragmented the American working class into three fractions: the working poor, the traditional proletariat, and the middle layers "each with its distinct job experiences, distinct comm\1j~ity cUltures, and distinct consciousnesses." (p. 184) Despite these distinctions, which may imply they are separate classes instead of merely fractions within a single class, Edwards contends that they are nonetheless working class because "they are all composed of wage and salary workers dependent upon capital for employment." (p. 185) Such a broad definition of the working class, though faithful to Marx's dichotomy model of social division, is hardly convincing in arguing working class as a class in light of those "enduring, deeply anchored, institutionalized" divisions. 4 As Edwards himself commented: "The inability of working-class based political movement to overcome these divisions has doomed all efforts at serious structural reform." (p. 184) But the real issue is how can one realistically expect these so diversely different popUlation groupings to have or want to have the same objective? Notwithstanding his definition of the working class, Edwards' observation on the segmented labor market is sound. Although there is no clear-cut dividing line, numerous studies have established that there are major differences among blue-collar workers in terms of wages, 122 job security, and career opportunities based on their employment sectors. In general, the workers employed in the large, monopolistic sector enjoyed higher economic rewards and security than those in the small, competitive sector. This is not to say, it should be pointed out, that those workers in the monopoly sector are less exploited, since their labor may generate much more surplus value than those workers in the competitive sector. Although no one has suggested these cleavages represent a class division within blue-collar workers, their presence can certainly hamper the solidarity of the working class. And as demonstrated by Gordon et al. (1982), the working-class history of the united statlas is marked by struggles to overcome these internal ruptures. While there are few agreements on who constitutes the working class, most class analysts would agree there is a portion of the wage-earning population that could not be treated as simply proletarian. Disagreements abound, although there seems to be a growing consensus that the salaried professional and managerial workers do occupy a unique position in the contemporary societies (Burris 1990). This unique position, whether based on their better market and work situations (Goldthorpe 1980, 1982), or based on the functions or services they perform for capital (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979), or based on their strategic locations in the production process (Wright 123 1985), has qualified them to be separated from the regular blue- and white-collar workers. More important, this professional and managerial class, though small in size, seems to grow in tandem with the proletarianization of other population groupings. In other words, they are the product of successful, long-term capitalist development and proletarianization (Lash and Urry 1987: Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979). Even without deciding the class position of clerical and sales workers, therefore, there seems to be at least two distinct classes in the waged and salaried population--the working class and the professional managerial or service class. The discussions so far have focused on workers in the advanced capitalist societies: as one moves to the developing economies more complexities follow. One of the most prevailing observations concerning the developing economies is the coexistence of different forms of production. To the extent that wage labor is the only way for capitalism to organize production, capitalism has never completed its historical mission. In the advanced capitalist economies, the petty bourgeoisie, though small in numbers, has yet to disappear and there is no sign that it ever will (Bechhofer and Elliott 1985, 1981: CUrran and Burrows 1986: Granovetter 1984: Steinmetz and Wright 1989: Wright and Martin 1987). 124 In the developing economies the situation is more pervasive not only in terms of the number of people involved but also in terms of the nature and relationship between these various forms of production. The extensive subcontracting system in some peripheral and semiperipheral societies has transformed the nature of family labor, which once was considered as outside the capital-labor relation, to become an integral part of the capital accumulation mechanisms (Portes and Walton 1981). Besides assuming the commonly acknowledged role of subsidizing the reproduction of wage workers, it is argued that some nonwage laborers in the developing economies are themselves proletarian workers disguised as self-employed and family laborers (Beneria and Roldan 1987; Birbeck 1978; Bromley and Gerry 1979).5 Once again there is no clear-cut criterion to differentiate these disguised wage workers from the "real" self employed. The more important point, however, is that there is also no clear-cut dividing line between wage and nonwage labor--a cardinal rule in determining working-class position in the advanced economies. And it is observations like these which lead Lloyd (1982) to question the validity of using a Western-embedded concept of proletariat to describe the Third World workers. Lloyd's point is of special interest here not only because his focus is on workers in the developing world but also because of his reservation on the applicability of a 125 concept like proletariat in studying them. It is certainly correct to argue that we cannot simply transfer a concept like proletariat, with its loaded connotations embedded in the historical experiences of the West, to study the now developing economies with their own historical contexts. However, it is certainly too naive or simply wrong to assert, as Lloyd himself cautions us, that there is a single Third World. The general suspicion that Third World workers are different from the Western proletariat is based on the assumption, though sometimes unstated, that there was a lack of proletarianization in the former. That is, while there is no denying that Western-like wage emploYment exists in the developing world, it is such a tiny minority compared to other types of work experience which in turn generates doubt about its significance. However, one crucial difference between Taiwan and most developing economies, as noted in Chapter 3, is that wage work increased rapidly and has become the dominant emploYment pattern in Taiwan. Thus, it is the contention here that while we should be aware of the ideological baggage of the term proletariat, it is without doubt there is a large group of workers in Taiwan that are in a similar structural position as the Western proletariat. The issue that Taiwan's wage workers were brought into existence under conditions distinct from advanced countries should be underlined, but it should not obscure the fact of their 126 significant presence in Taiwan. The problem in front, instead, is to depict their pattern of growth and their collective characteristics. structure and composition of the working Class in Taiwan To simplify the above discussion, several dividing lines were propagated, singly or in some kinds of combination, in order to delineate the internal complexities among the wage and salary workers: 1) manual versus nonmanual workers; 2) supervisory versus nonsupervisory workers; 3) productive versus unproductive workers; and 4) professional-managerial versus regular workers. The task in this section is to examine the composition and pattern of growth of the Taiwanese working class according to these criteria. It starts with the simple demarcations and moves to more complicated ones as data allow. Due to the limitation of data the following figures should be viewed as the best estimates of each position. Table 5.1 displays the evolution of manual and nonmanual wage and salary workers according to the census occupational break down. The nonmanual category includes the traditional white-collar occupations like professional and technical workers, managerial and administrative workers, clerical workers, and sales workers. The manual category includes the traditional blue-collar occupations 127 like operatives and production related workers and service workers, plus the farm workers. As shown in Table 5.1, except the aberration in 1966, the white-collar workers are in constant increase relative to their blue-collar counterparts. From 23 percent in 1956, the proportion of the white-collar workers in the total wage employment has increased to 27 percent in 1975, and to 38 percent in 1990. The manual workers as a whole (blue-collar and agricultural workers), in contrast, declined form 77 percent in 1956, to 73 percent in 1975, and to 62 percent in 1990. Before 1980, however, the relative decline of the manual positions was partly a result of the decline of agricultural workers and partly caused by the decline of service workers (especially the state protective workers). Between 1956 and 1980, for instance, the proportion of agricUltural workers in the total wage-earning population declined from 10 to 3 percent and the service workers declined from 41 to 19 percent respectively; while the proportion of blue collar production workers increased from 26 to 47 percent. separating the state protective workers from the rest of the service workers also indicates the latter have remained relatively stable in size over the years. It is only since 1980 that we witnessed a meaningfUl decline of blue-collar workers relative to the growth of the white-collar workers. Information in Table 5.1 also allows us to distinguish the professional-managerial class from the rest of the 128 working-class positions. The professional-managerial class, measured here by combining the managerial and administrative and the professional and technical employees, has experienced some modest increase in postwar Taiwan. From 7 percent in 1956, its share in the total wage workers has grown to 11 percent in 1990, mainly due to an increase of professional workers. The relative size of nonfarm regular workers also increased between 1956 and 1980 from 83 to 88 percent of the total wage workers, but stagnated in the 1980s due to a relative decline of the blue-collar workers. The clerical and sales workers, however, continued to grow in the 1980s. considering these trends together it seems unlikely that we will see a rapid rise of the professional-managerial class in the near future. The transformation of working- and middle-class positions in terms of their places in the authority hierarchy is presented in Table 5.2. To approximate the division between supervisory and nonsupervisory workers a more detailed break-down of the job titles is used. Here, the supervisory workers include the managerial and administrative workers; the proprietors, managers, and supervisors in sales and service; the clerical supervisors; the production foremen; and the farmers and farm managers in agriculture. The rest of the waged workforce was classified as nonsupervisory. Due to inconsistencies of 129 early censuses in classifying detailed occupation categories, meaningful comparison can only start at 1970. In general, between 1970 and 1980, the relative share of workers with some managerial and/or supervisory function within the wage-earning labor force expanded from 3 to 8 percent, while the share of nonsupervisory workers dropped from 97 to 92 percent. The decline of the nonsupervisory workers, however, was mainly caused by a decline of agricultural and service workers as rest of the nonsupervisory workers actually increased their share from 58 to 71 percent of the total wage and salary workers. A similar trend is observed in the 19808, albeit at a much slower pace than the previous decade. The productive and unproductive division shown in Table 5.3 is based on the industrial classification of the wage and salary workers. The productive workers include those who are employed in the primary agricultural sector and the secondary industrial sector; the nonproductive workers are represented by those in the tertiary commercial, finance, and service sector. As disclosed in Table 5.3, the share of productive workers in the total waged and salaried workforce increased from 41 percent in 1956 to 59 percent in 1980, despite a decline of agricultural workers from 11 to 3 percent in the same period. The relative share of the nonproductive workers, in contrast, declined from 58 to 41 percent between 1956 and 1980. In the 1980s, however, we 130 witnessed a reversal of this trend. Between 1980 and 1990, as workers in the productive sector experienced a relative decline, their counterparts in the unproductive sector grew from 41 to 44 percent of the total waged workforce due to a rapid increase of wage employment in commerce and finance. To the extent that one accepts Poulantzas' distinction between productive and unproductive labor, one can argue that Taiwan's labor is becoming increasingly less productive. Working class in Poulantzas' conceptualization, one should remember, is more than just performing productive labor, it is also subjected to political and ideological domination from the bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie. Using job characteristics as proxies, the following tables explore the contour of the Taiwanese working class in this specific regard. Before we begin, however, a word of caution concerning the data is necessary. The data used here are derived from a nation wide wage survey conducted by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics, the sampling unit was industrial and/or commercial establishment rather than individual worker which creates an under-representation of workers in the small and very small scale workplaces (a similar problem discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the Industrial and Commercial Census). As shown in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, the smaller establishments tend to have a 131 higher proportion of workers classified as manager but a lower proportion of supervisory and professional workers. In the tertiary sector, there is also a discrepancy between the proportion of clerical and sales workers between the smaller and larger establishments but they tend to even each other out if one treats them as a single category of lower white-collar workers. In the industrial sector, the smaller establishments tend to have a higher proportion of skilled workers but lower proportion of service and unskilled laborers than their larger counterparts. OVerall, the occupational structure presented here, although it did not derive from a random sample of the wage and salary workers, should give us a general picture of the internal composition of the proletarianized workforce in Taiwan. As displayed in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, the industrial and tertiary sectors show an opposite pattern of occupational structure with blue-collar workers predominated the former and white-collar workers predominated the latter. The tertiary sector, as expected, not only has a much higher proportion of clerical and sales workers (49 versus 12 percent), it also possessed a higher proportion of managerial and supervisory workers than the industrial sector (15 versus 8 percent). Close to one-half of the tertiary wage workers were clerical and sales workers compared to 12 percent in industrial sector. On 132 the other hand, more than two-thirds of the industrial wage workers were blue-collar skilled or semiskilled workers compared to 7 percent in the tertiary sector. The occupation structure is also affected by the size of the workplace as the largest establishments (500 or more workers) clearly show a pattern different from other small and medium scale establishments. The large workplaces not only employed proportionately more supervisors, more professional and technical workers, but also more clerical workers. Consequently, the proportion of white-collar employees in the industrial sector rises from under 30 percent in establishments with less than 500 workers to 38 percent in establishments with more than 500 workers. A similar pattern, though not of the same magnitUde, can be observed in the tertiary sector. Within the blue-collar occupations, the large-scale establishments also have proportionately less skilled workers than the smaller establishments. within the industrial sector, the internal composition of the working class while clearly favoring the blue-collar manual workers, has shown a tendency to become more white collared in the last decade (Table 5.6). In 1980, 81 percent of the wage and salary workers in this sector can be classified as Poulantzas' narrow definition of the working class of productive-nonsupervisory-manual workers compared to 71 percent in 1990. This extraction, as 133 clearly shown in Table 5.6, was mainly due to a decline in the semiskilled workers. The white-collar jobs, in contrast, grew in every category: those who performed managerial or supervisory function grew form 5 to 8 percent, those who control the "secret knowledge" of production (the professional and technical workers) grew from 5 to 9 percent, and those who performed routine nonmanual work grew from 9 to 12 percent. Extrapolating these trends to the patterns observed in Table 5.3, the working class in Taiwan declined from about one-half of the total wage workers in 1980 to about two-fifths in 1990. 6 By definition there is no way to measure the size of the disguised wage workers. But since all discussions related to this issue located them as part of the so called informal economy, it seems reasonable to start our search in looking into this "informal" working population in Taiwan. While the exact definition of the informal economy varies with researchers, there is a general agreement that most of the Third World self-employed and nonwaged family workers are in this sector. 7 A conservative approximation of the informal sector, then, is to begin with the nonwaged own-account and unpaid family working population. Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 present the internal composition of the own-account and unpaid family workers in Taiwan respectively. If we adopted the PREALC (Regional Employment Program for Latin America, a United Nations 134 organization) of excluding self-employed professional and technical workers from the informal sector (see Portes and Benton 1984; Castells and Portes 1989), there is about 98 percent of the own account workers belong to informal sector. Among them, of course, include people who are genuine self employed. Excluding those who performed, according to their occupational characteristics, some managerial and/or supervisory function leave us about three quarters of the own account workers as possible disguised wage workers who performed routine manual and nonmanual work in 1990, a relative decline from 90 percent in 1970. The nonfarm disguised wage workers, however, increased from about one quarter (23 percent) of the own-account workers in 1970 to more than one-third (35 percent) in 1990. Their absolute number, likewise, increased from 290 thousand in 1970 to 541 thousand in 1990. Adopting a similar division among the unpaid family workers indicates that an overwhelming proportion of them are disguised wage workers: 99 percent in 1970, 98 percent in 1980, and 99 percent in 1990. Once again, the nonfarm disguised wage workers increased rapidly from 15 percent in 1970, to 26 percent in 1980, and to 57 percent in 1990. As a result, their absolute numbers increased from 122 thousand in 1970 to 422 thousand in 1990, despite a decline in total number of unpaid family workers from 829 to 742 thousand in the same period. As a whole, while we 135 witnessed a general decline of possible disguised wage workers in the nonwaged sector, we also discovered two opposite trends within it: a relative and absolute decline of the agricultural disguised wage workers on the one hand, and a relative and absolute increase of the nonagricultural disguised wage workers on the other. Table 5.9 displays the transformation of working-class positions as proportion of the labor force in Taiwan according to various criteria suggested above. The professional-managerial class, though in constant increase, is relative small in Taiwan as it only accounted for about 7 percent of the labor force in 1990. The rapid industrialization in the past three decades did not create a large number of professional and managerial employees, partly due to its labor-intensive character and partly due to a lack of concern in social and human services in the public as well as in the private sector. The routine whi.te-collar occupations increased slowly between 1956 and 1975 from 6 to 10 percent of the total labor force, then grew rapidly to 13 percent in 1980 and to 19 percent in 1990. In contrast, the blue-collar production workers increased rapidly between 1956 and 1980 from 11 percent to 29 percent of the labor force, but have since then stagnated in terms of their relative size. Taking these two contrasting trends together they are indicative of a shift in the pattern of proletarianization from the blue- 136 collar to white-collar world in Taiwan that we alluded earlier in Chapter 30 The service workers in general decline over the years from 17 to 11 percent of the labor force between 1956 and 1990. But as one can clearly see in Table 5.9, this slide was entirely due to a relative decline of the state protective workers, while the rest of the blue-collar service workers have actually increased gradually over the years: from 3 percent in 1956 to 5 percent in 1990. The disguised wage workers--measured by nonwaged own account and family workers in nonsupervisory clerical, sales, production, service, and farm occupations--declined from 38 to 21 percent of the labor force between 1970 and 1990 mainly due to a rapid decline of people working on the farms. Corresponding to the conclusion derived from the above examination of the internal composition of the nonwaged sectors, the nonfarm disguised wage workers increased from 8 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1990, whereas their farm counterparts decline from 30 to 10 percent. Table 5.10 summarizes the above categories into several potential working classes in Taiwan. First, if one defined the working class as manual wage workers, it has experienced gradual but constant increase from 32 percent of the total labor force in 1956, to 38 percent in 1970, to 43 percent in 1980, but has stagnated between 1980 and 137 1990. If we exclude the state protective workers, who are more than likely not a member of the working class, the rate of increase became more rapid (doubled its relative size between 1956 and 1980), but than again only increased modestly in the 1980s. Similar patterns can be observed in regard to the nonfarm manual workers, with or without the inclusion of state protective workers. Restricting the membership of the working class to include only those manual nonsupervisory workers, does not change the pattern either, as its size increased from 27 percent of the labor force in 1970 to 33 percent in 1980 but only to 35 percent in 1990. In short, the working class defined as manual wage workers, with or without the state protective workers, with or without the supervisory workers, and with or without the agricultural workers, occupied no more than one-half and no lees than one-third of the labor force in 1990. More important, working class defined as such shows no sign of rapid increase in the future. Second, extending the working-class membership to include both manual and routine white-collar clerical and sales workers, not only expands the size of the working class sUbstantially, but also reverses its trend of stagnation in the 1980s. As displayed in Table 5.11, the Taiwanese working class defined as such grew steadily in the postwar decades. From 38 percent of the labor force in 1956, it grew to 47 percent in 1970, then further increased 138 to 61 percent in 1990. Once again, if we exclude the state protective workers, the rate of increase is even more impressive as the relative share of the working class in the labor force more than doubled between 1956 and 1990, from 24 percent to 55 percent. Further restricting the working-class membership to exclude those supervisory workers shows a similar pattern as it grew from 34 percent in 1970 to 48 percent in 1990. The increasing disparity between these two figures from 1 percent in 1970 to about 7 percent in 1990, however, indicates that the supervisory workers also grew rapidly since 1970 (see also Table 5.10). To conclude, excluding the state protective workers, the numeric transformation of the working class in Taiwan can be summed up as follows. The traditional working class, conceived as nonsupervisory manual wage workers, grew from 27 to 35 percent of the labor force between 1970 and 1990. Working class defined as those who do not own the means of production and do not possess authority or autonomy at work, the nonsupervisory manual and routine white-collar workers, increased from 34 percent in 1970 to 48 percent of the labor force in 1990. To define the working class as a default category of nonprofessional and nonmanagerial wage workers suggests that more than one-half (55 percent) of the labor force belonged to this class in 1990, compared to 36 percent in 1970 and 24 percent in 1956. Working class defined as all wage and salary 139 workers, likewise, increased from 27 percent of the labor force in 1956, to 40 percent in 1970, and to 62 percent in 1990. Add the unemployed to the equation, the involuntary surplus population who more than likely would be a member of the working class if allowed the possibility, the size of the working class grew from 36 to 64 percent of the labor force between 1956 and 1990. To further extend the working class one adds the possible disguised wage workers to the definition, despite a precipitous drop of this group of workers from 38 to 21 percent in the period covered, the size of the working class still increased from 83 percent of the labor force in 1970 to 85 percent in 1990. In any event, one can safely conclude that the working class has been expanding continuously in Taiwan and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in the future. summary and Discussion Marx once described the working class as " •••a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself." (1906:837) Regardless of how one defines working class, however, "the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production" does not seem to create a working class that is simultaneously increasing in numbers and united, not to mention disciplined and organized. In the West, and usually in individual 140 countries in the West, the traditional working class, perceived as male manual workers in the productive sector, might in a brief moment in history fit the description. But the key words here are brief and in history. In recent decades this traditional working class is decreasing in numbers and being increasingly disorganized. Working class understood as all wage and salary workers, is certainly increasing in numbers but is marked by "enduring, deeply anchored, institutionalized" divisions. working class defined as deskilled and routinized wage workers, is increasing in numbers and may have become more organized, but not necessarily being more united and disciplined. All these, however, should not serve to discredit Marx but only to underline the diversity of the term "working class" and its subsequent implications on what the present and future is like or will be. Indeed, as indicated in the first part of this chapter, the spectrum of opinions concerning who constitutes the working class is extremely diverse. On the surface, what they all can agree to are two things: the waged and salaried population is not a coherent whole; and the manual production workers are part of the working class. A brief survey of the literature, nonetheless, suggests that most of them do tend to agree that there is a "middle group" that exists between capital and labor and its core is comprised by the professional and managerial workers. The 141 disagreements, instead, center on whether the regular clerical and sales workers are part of this middle group and on what ground it can be differentiated from the traditional blue-collar workers. A majority, but certainly not a great majority, of the literature also suggests the distinction between manual and clerical work, though real in the past, nowadays exists only in the sociologists' imagination. The growth of the informal economy as an integral part of the capitalist industrialization process in the developing economies presents another difficulty in defining the working class in these regions. It is argued that a clear demarcation between those who own the means of production and those who do not, a line that sets the outer limit of working-class position in the advanced capitalist economies, cannot be easily distinguished in the developing world. In other words, there are many "disguised wage workers" in the nonwaged sector of the economy. The second part of this chapter, with limited data and crude approximations, examines the contours of Taiwanese working class in light of the various perceptions. It is observed that the composition of the wage and salary workers changed as Taiwan industrialized. In general, the nonmanual workers increased in proportion to the decrease of manual workers mainly due to the decline of agriCUltural and service workers. A similar trend was found in the division between supervisory and nonsupervisory workers. 142 The distinction between productive and unproductive sector indicates that workers who performed productive labor increased relative to the decline of those who performed unproductive labor prior to 1980. In the 1980s, a reverse trend was observed mainly caused by a rapid increase of workers in the commerce and finance industries. An examination of occupational structure of the wage-employed workforce within the industrial and tertiary sectors, also suggests that the rise of White-collar workers in the 1980s can be attributed to a shift of the economy from industrial-production-oriented to commercial-service oriented and a rapid white-collarization within the industrial sector. Within the domain of nonwage-employed workforce, the evolution of potential disguised wage workers revealed two opposite trends: rapid decline of farm workers and substantial increase of nonagricultural workers. As a Whole, however, the disguised wage workers tend to decline as a proportion in the own-account and unpaid family workforce. Finally, this chapter also examines the transformation of working class(es) in Taiwan in relation to the total labor force. It is observed that with whatever definition one adopts, the working class has experienced substantial growth in postwar Taiwan. A conservative measurement, working class as composed of those manual nonsupervisory wage workers, suggests the Taiwanese working class 143 increased from about one quarter of the labor force in 1970 to more than one-third in 1990. Adopting a middle-ground definition of working class as made up by those wage and salary workers who have no control over the production and labor processes, suggests the working-class population occupied about one-half of the labor force in 1990, compared to little over one-third in 1970. Its internal composition, however, has shown a tendency to shift from blue-collar to white-collar proletariat in recent years. A broader definition of the working class that includes the unemployed and the disguised wage workers indicates that its relative size has declined in recent decades, from 77 percent of the labor force in 1970 to 71 percent in 1990. To argue that there are potential different classes within the waged and salaried population, however, implies that there are real cleavages among them. As mentioned above, one of the main yardsticks in arguing white-collar workers as part of the working class is through their deteriorating work and market situations. Table 5.11 summarizes some of the demographic and employment characteristics of different occupational groupings in Taiwan. The next chapter presents some data on the material conditions of working class and other population groupings. The available information, unfortunately, is sketchy and sporadic, and note that these statistics were based on the total workforce rather than the wage workers 144 in each occupation. The following discussion will focus on professional and technical workers, clerical workers, and production workers as they represented the three most proletarianized occupations in the labor force (each has over 80 percent of the workforce as wage and salary workers). According to Table 5.11, the age structure of the clerical and production workers has changed considerably. In 1970, 34 percent of the clerical workforce was under age 30 and 17 percent was over age 50; in 1990, the respective percentages were 43 and 11 percent. The production workers, on the other hand, have grown older with the proportion of workforce under age 30 dropped from 51 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1990. The age composition between clerical and production workers tends to converge in recent years. The same trend, however, is less apparent regarding the changing education level for these groups. While rising, the proportions of blue-collar workers who attended secondary and/or tertiary education have lagged far behind those workers in white-collar occupations. The proportion of the blue-collar workers who attended at least senior high school, for instance, rose from 7 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990, whereas the proportion for clerical workers rose from 61 to 86 percent in the same period. In 1990 only 3 percent of the blue-collar workforce has received some tertiary education compared to 145

36 percent for clerical workers. But note that the disparity between clerical and professional workers has remained huge and tended to expand over the years. Information regarding the physical conditions of work among occupational strata in Taiwan is scarce as most data were grouped according to industry rather than occupation. But there is little doubt that "[m]anual workers are exposed to fatigue, dirt, smoke and other harmful instances, noise, and heat, and to risks of disease, injury, and death unknown to nonmanuals." (Gagliani 1981:267) Although the actual statistics are lacking, the most common occupational diseases in Taiwan are all diseases closely associated with the manual occupations (Chang 1989). And as seen in Table 5.11, the manual workers have the highest accidental death rate among the nonagricultural workforce. Other employment characteristics, however, have shown no obvious bias against the blue-collar workers. The unemployment rate, for example, is actually higher for the clerical than the blue-collar workers in the 1990. The job change rates also show no significant variation. In short, comparing the changing demographic and employment characteristics of various occupational stratums over time indicates a converging trend among all occupations. The pace of converging, however, is much faster between the clerical and production workers than between them and the 146 professional workers. Thus, while differences between the regular white-collar and the blue-collar workers are rapidly disappearing, the professional workers have maintained their relative distance from both groups. It seems reasonable, therefore, to include the routine white collar workers as part of the working class in Taiwan, a conclusion further supported by the wage structure of wage and salary workers analyzed in the next chapter. 147 Notes 1. In this chapter the terms nonmanual and white-collar workers; regular, lower, rountinized white-collar, and clerical and sale workers are used interchangeably in their respective categories. The term blue-collar workers refers to workers in production and service occupations, while the term manual workers includes both agricultural and blue collar workers. 2. These criteria were first articulated by Lockwood in The Blackcoated Workers (1958). As he defines them: "First, 'market situation', that is to say the economic position narrowly perceived, consisting of source and size of income, degree of job security, and opportunity for upward occupational mobility. Secondly, 'work situation', the set of social relationships in which the individuals is involved at work by virture of his position in the division of labour. And finally, 'status situation', or the position of the individuals in the hierarchy of prestige in the society at large." Lockwood continues to argue that (though most Marxists would contradict it) "'[m]arket situation' and 'work situation' comprise what Marx essentially understood as 'class position'; 'status situation' derives from another branch of social stratification theory." (1958:15-16) The subsequent Weberian or Neo-Weberian class analyses, however, have focused more on the market and work situations than the status situation. 3. Defined as "labor that produces surplus-value wbile directly reproducing f;he .at:erial element:s 'that: serve as t:1le subst:.ratIDI of t:1le relat:ion of e1Cploit:a'tion: labor f;hat: is direct:ly involved in Jllat:erial product:ion by producing use-values f;b.at: increase mat:erial wealt:1l." (1975: 216 emphasis original) 4. "The mark of twentieth-century divisions in the working class is their enduring, deeply anchored, institutionalized nature." (p. 184) 5. The inside contracting system in the early stage of Western industrialization has the similar effect (Dawson 1980; Nelson 1975). 6. Assuming 81 percent of the industrial (Table 5.6) and 98 percent of the agricultural (Table 5.2) wage workers were manual-nonsupervisory lead to the conclusion that about 49 percent (46 industrial and 3 percent agricultural) of the total wage workers belonged to the working class in 1980. Similar method suggests 41 percent (39 percent industrial and 2 percent agricultural) of the wage workers belonged to the working class in 1990. 148 7. The most reasonable definition is provided by Portes who argues that workers in the informal sector should also include those wage workers who worked in small scale workplaces that are outside the government's regulation and protection. Also include in this sector are those casual workers in large scale enterprises, of course. since we are not trying to measure the size of the informal sector in Taiwan here, I adopted a more restricted definition of the informal sector that only includes those nonwaged workers. 149

mm~BR'

WORKERS ZH THE DZSTRZBUTZOB PROCBSS

The workers in Taiwan have long been characterized as hard working and poorly paid. This chapter surveys the changing material conditions of workers in postwar Taiwan. The first part examines the wage behavior of Taiwan's wage and salary workers. It is shown that the industrial wages in Taiwan, despite an absence of strong institutional forces, have risen sharply in the postwar period and that Taiwan's labor can no longer be considered cheap at the international level. Wage increase in Taiwan also compares favorably with other indicators such as rise of productivity and household income, although individual wage alone was still insufficient to support one's family at an average living standard. The second part of the chapter examines the wage structure and its changes among wage and salary workers in Taiwan. It is shown that inequality of wages between men and women has declined in some but not all sectors of the economy. Due to the uneven distribution of female workers in different industries it is doubtful that the overall wage status of women has improved significantly vis-a-vis their male counterparts. Occupational wage data suggest the clerical and sales workers are becoming increasingly like the blue-collar workers. Wage differentiations based 150 on firm size also indicate a segregated labor market is materializing in Taiwan. While the first and second part deal with the long term wage pattern and the internal wage structure, the remainder of this chapter focuses on how individual income of wage and salary workers aligned with other population groupings. It is observed that while the relative income inequality declined between working class and other classes, the absolute inequality has risen. Comparing income data also shows the only group that being left out in Taiwan postwar prosperity is the independent farmers whose income not only has fallen way below the national average but also to that of the working class. Distribution of the property income, the income generated from property owned by individuals, suggests inequality of wealth persisted and may have even worsened over the years. This much wider gap of property incomes not merely indicates a less equitable wealth distribution but also leads to, at least potentially, the maintenance and continuation of a more favorable economic position for the next generations of those more privileged classes. The disadvantage to working-class children that resulted from a less favorable income status is the potential education inequality that is reflected in the average available educational expenditure for each minor in different classes. 151 wage Behavior in Postwar Taiwan Late industrialization is characterized by a labor supply that is almost unlimited, an absence of a cadre of skilled workers who could provide trade union leadership, and a lack of opportunity for mass international migration. All these factors have favored a low rate of wage increase. Yet real average wages appeared to have risen, even if only deSUltorily, in most industrializing countries. They have risen sharply in Korea and Japan. (Amsden 1989:189) Amsden did not include Taiwan although in her comparative data Taiwan's wage increase was only second to Korea's and compared much more favorably with all the other late-industrializers (1989:196).1 Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 present the real wage increase between 1952 and 1990 in the manUfacturing and utilities industries, the only two industries where consistent long term wage data are available. These data, representing two opposite ends of wage rates in the industrial sector, provide some basic indications of the long term wage behavior in Taiwan. While fluctuating in the 1950s, real wages in Taiwan more than doubled between 1960 and 1973, in tandem with the rapid economic growth based on the export-oriented industrialization, only to decline a little in 1973-1974, corresponding to economic recession caused by the first OPEC oil embargo. Since the mid-1970s, due to an exhaustion of surplus rural labor force (see Chapter 3), real wages not only started to rise sharply but the pace of increase also tended to accelerate, despite the second oil 152 crisis in the early 1980s. Real wages in manufacturing, for instance, grew more than threefold between 1975 and 1990, compared to 2.6 times between 1952 and 1973. The average monthly wage for production workers, while following a similar pattern, grew even faster: 11 times in manufacturing and 16 times in utilities between 1952 and 1990. Compared with the Korean data the difference is negligible. According to Amsden (1989:197), real wages in the South Korean manufacturing sector increased 4.3 time between 1955 and 1980, while in Taiwan real wages in the manufacturing sector as a whole increased 4 times between 1952 and 1980, while the real wage for production workers grew more than 5 times. According to Wu and Hou (1985:16), between 1970 and 1982, the cost of labor in Taiwan rose at an annual rate of 13 percent after adjustment for the exchange rate, compared to 7.3 percent in South Korea, 3.1 percent in the Philippines, 9.4 percent in Singapore, 10.2 percent in Japan, and 7.2 percent in the united States. Only Hong Kong's 15.4 percent annual rate (for the textile industry only) is higher than Taiwan. Consequently, Taiwan's labor can no longer be considered cheap among the developing economies. In 1989, for example, the labor cost in the textile industry in Taiwan was 124 percent that of Korea, 146 percent of Hong Kong, 523 percent of Thailand, and 890 153 percent of China (Werner International 1989, quoted from Bello and Rosenfeld 1990:123, 259). This pace of increase was quite extraordinary. In Taiwan, as in South Korea, there was no institutional force to drive up the wages. The trade union as a wage bargaining institution was nonexistent in Taiwan. On the one hand, the outright banning of strike under martial law had taken away one of the most potent weapons of labor against management. Even today, after the lifting of martial law and under a more liberal political environment, the labor codes are written in such a way that it is virtually impossible to have a legal strike of any kind. On the other hand, since the organization itself was heavily penetrated and controlled by the KMT-state and the management, the potential conflictual situation that might be created by wage bargaining was never a concern in Taiwan's labor unions. Even when there were labor disputes regarding wage issues, they were more likely disputes involving the back-wage payment than involving wage increases. Only recently have we witnessed some labor disputes surrounding bonus payment but these hardly touch on the issue of wage structure as a whole (see Chapter 7). The state in Taiwan, unlike many third world states, also failed to act as a wage-driven institution (Fields and Wan 1986). One often cited example is the minimum wage policy in Taiwan. By setting the minimum wage far below 154 the market price (less than 50 percent of the average wage in manufacturing), the state has basically made this labor protection measure irrelevant to any demand for wage increases (Wu and Hou 1985:8), if not into a negative one. 2 This is not to say, of course, that the KMT state played no role in wage determination, albeit indirectly. The land reform is a case in point. The primary goal of land reform and the related state agricultural policies in the 1950s was obviously to stabilize the rural sector through a guarantee of land ownership and grain prices. By purchasing grain at a set price, receiving grain as land rent, and exchanging rice with fertilizer, however, the KMT-state acquired a virtual monopoly in setting the market price of basic food products. This in turn served the secondary but no less important purpose of land reform which was to stabilize the urban industrial sector. Or, in the current context, to keep the industrial wage down. In short, the two major wage-setting institutions, the trade unions and the state, did not play any substantial and direct role in driving wages upward. Unlike the South Korean case, however, wage hikes in Taiwan were not accompanied by an increase in working hours. In the 1950s, wages fluctuated independently to the fluctuation of working hours. In the first phase of export-oriented industrialization, wage increases were accompanied by the decline of working hours: between 1960 155 and 1972, the average working hours for workers in manufacturing declined form 243 hours to a postwar low of 194 hours per month: whereas the real monthly wage in manufacturing doubled from 1578 to 3340 NT$. Working hours increased rapidly in the early 1970s, the beginning of the second phase of export-oriented industrialization, but have declined since 1980 While wages continued to grow. Between 1975 and 1990, the real wage in manufacturing tripled from 3430 to 10832 NT$, while the monthly working hours declined from 220 to 202 (Figure 6.3). Consequently, the hourly wage rates, converted from dividing the average monthly wage by the average monthly hours of work, grew from 6.3 NT$ in 1960 to 17.2 NT$ in 1972, declined in 1973 and 1974, then increased from 15.6 to 53.7 NT$ between 1975 and 1990. The relationship between wage and productivity increases was not as linear as between the wage and working hour. According to Liu's calculation (1984:11), the growth of labor productivity outpaced the wage increase from 1953 to 1967 by 7.5 percent to 4.2 percent annually, but since then the wage has constantly outgrown the productivity increase. Between 1973 and 1982 the real wage in manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 8.4 percent, while labor productivity grew at an annual rate of 3 percent (see Wu 1984: wu and Hou 1985 for similar observations). Comparing the indexes of wage increase with the growth in value of manufacturing production per employed person 156 basically conveys the same result. As displayed in Figure 6.3, the growth of manufacturing production per employed person outpaced the wage increase in the 1950s and 1960s, but since the mid-1970s the former has constantly fallen behind the latter. Between 1960 and 1972, the real wage in manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 6.7 percent and the manufacturing production value per employed person increased at an annual rate of 8.3 percent. Therefore, despite a decent rate of increase, individual wages as a proportion of the manufacturing values per person dropped from around 32 percent to about 27 percent (Figure 6.4). Between 1975 and 1990, in contrast, real wages and production values per person in manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 8 and 5.5 percent respectively.3 The proportion of wage in manufacturing production values accordingly increased to 49 percent in 1990, a level comparable to early 1950s when Taiwan first began her postwar industrialization. To the extent that intensity of work can be reflected by hours of work and labor productivity, Taiwan's workers seem to have the benefit of enjoying wage increase without intensifying their effort. To the extent that the ratio of individual wage in manufacturing production per person expresses the degree of surplus extraction, though the situation has improved in the recent decades, workers in Taiwan were not relatively better off in 1990 than in 1952. 157 The wage increase also ranked favorably with the growth of household expenditure and household disposable income since the mid-1960s. Between 1964 and 1990, as presented in Table 6.1, while the annual average household expenditure tripled and the household disposable income quadrupled, the real wage in manufacturing for employees as a whole and for production workers rose by a factor of 6 and 7 respectively. Thus, in 1964 the average household disposable income was equivalent to 34 months of average wage paid in manufacturing, in 1975 it was 30 months, and in 1990 it has dropped to 23 months. Impressive as it is, this comparison also suggests the wage was relatively low contrasted to the annual household expenditure and household income. In 1975, for instance, a manufacturing production worker needed to work 29 months in order to earn the equivalent of the national average household expenditure, though already a great improvement from 1964 which would have taken the person 42 months. And the same worker needed to work 15 months just to earn the equivalent of the average household expenditure for the lowest 20 percent income group in 1975. Even in 1990, by which time the real wage had tripled over the previous one and half decades, the average national household expenditure was still 19 times of the monthly wage of the manufacturing production workers. But at least since 1980 a production worker's wage could cover the average expenditure of the 158 lowest 20 percent income group and was approaching the second lowest 20 percent group. wage structure among the Wage and Salary Workers Data in Table 6.2 reveal the wage differentials between men and women in the nonagricultural labor force. There is no uniform trend in the data. In manufacturing, the wage inequality between male and female worsened between 1960 and 1965, improved between 1965 and 1970, and worsened again in the 1980s. A segmented labor market in the manufacturing sector that absorbed women in low-wage, labor-intensive industries contributed greatly to this persistence of wage inequality. In 1990, for instance, wages in the apparel industry where 4 out of 5 workers were women, were about one-half of that in the basic metal industries where 3 out of 4 workers were men (Executive Yuan, Directorate General of BUdget, Accounting and statistics 1991). In mining, the wage differential improved throughout the period covered, but it continues to exhibit the highest inequality between sexes as in 1990 women only received about half of the men's pay. Wage differentials in construction, utilities, and transportation tend to narrow between 1960 and 1980, bloated in the first half of the 1980s, then narrowed again in the second half of the 1980s. For the industrial sector as a Whole, because women were 159 and continue to be heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector, the overall wage differentials between women and men may not improve in any substantial way. 4 Male and female wage differentials in the tertiary sector, as in the industrial sector, show no definite trend. The finance and service sector seem to follow opposite courses: female's wage as a proportion of male's improved from 53 percent in 1975 to 70 percent in 1990 in the finance sector, while the gap widened a bit in the service sector in the 1980s. In commerce, female wage as a proportion of male's dropped sharply between 1975 and 1980 (from 76 to 59 percent), remained relatively stable between 1980 and 1985, then rose sharply in the latter half of 1980s. But in 1990, the wage disparity between men and women workers was still wider than in 1975. The most likely conclusion for the tertiary workfoce in general is that, analogous to the industrial sector, wage disparity between men and women may not improve in any substantial way. Wage also varies according to size of the workplace. As shown in Table 6.3, an ascending wage rate in the order of the workplace size is apparent. The main dividing lines are: a) between the wage rates in establishments of 100 or more workers and those with less than 100 workers; and b) between establishments that hired 500 or more workers with 160 the rest. In 1971, for instance, there was hardly any difference among the different groups that hired less than 100 people. The wage in workplaces that employed between 100 to 499 persons, on the other hand, paid about 13 to 15 percent higher than those hired less than 100 people. The average wage in the large-scale establishments with 500 or more workers was at least 50 percent higher than those employed less than 100 people. These wage disparities diminished somewhat in the 1970s but only to heighten in the 1980s. Thus in 1990, the wage rate in establishments with more than 500 workers was 70 and 39 percent higher than in workplaces with less than 10 workers and those between 100 and 500 workers, compared to 37 and 12 percent in 1980. The information on wage differentials by size of the workplace, however, can be misleading due to the difference in the internal occupational structure between large and sma.ll-scale establishments. The larger firms with their more complex organizational structure and greater capital investment, it can be argued, would tend to hire more managerial and professional workers than the smaller ones and so to drive up the overall pay scale. That is, the labor market is actually segregated by occupation rather than by the size of the workplace. The information in the lower panel of Table 6.3, which includes only the production workers, helps to shed some light on this issue. 161 In 1980, there was not much difference of wages paid to the production workers in workplaces that hired less than 500 workers. The neat hierarchical order of wage rates according to the size of establishments disappeared. In fact, the workers in the establishments with less than ten workers were the best enumerated among the groups of establishments that hired less than 100 workers. The only discernible difference was between the largest firms (500 or more employees) with the rest, but even this was not substantial: ranging from 9 percent higher than establishments with 100 to 499 workers to 25 percent higher than establishments with 10 to 29 workers. compared with the same year data on total employees one may conclude that the main cause of the wage differentiation by size of the workplace was mainly a result of the different occupational structures among them. A decade later in 1990, however, the picture changed. Not only was the wage rate hierarchically ordered according to the size of the workplace but a more clear-cut wage differential between the large-scale and small- to medium scale firms appeared. The wage rate for production workers in the establishments wi'th more than 500 workers, for instance, was at least 30 percent higher than for those who worked in the establishments with less than 100 workers in 1990, compared to about 15 to 25 percent in 1980. The fact that wage disparities became more apparent in 1990 than in 162 1980, though still less severe than in the case of all employees, suggests a segmented labor market is forming between the small to large-scale firms in Taiwan. The occupational differentiation among them only serves to magnify this segmentation. A more detailed breakdown of wage structure of all nonagricultural paid employees by their occupational status and size of the workplace is presented in Table 6.4. Several observations can be made. First, the average wage rates rank nicely according to conventional occupation hierarchy with managerial workers on the top followed by professional and technical workers, clerical and sales workers, and manual workers. More important, the average wage of the clerical and sale workers is closer to those workers in the manual occupations than to their fellow white-collar workers in the managerial and professional occupations. The 2000 NT$ monthly wage difference between clerical and sales workers and manual workers paled in comparison with the differences between them and managerial and professional occupations (16000 and 8000 NT$ respectively). In fact, the skilled manual workers received higher wage than the clerical and sales workers. Second, when we examine wage differentials in terms of size of the workplace the major break seems to occur between those firms with more than 500 workers and rest of the small- to medium-sized firms regardless of occupations. 163 The distinction, furthermore, seems to be more severe in white-collar occupations than in manual ones. Between firms with 100 to 499 workers and firms with 500 or more workers, for example, the wage increased 24 percent for manual workers, 46 percent for clerical and sales workers, 41 percent for professional and technical workers, and 29 percent for managerial and supervisory workers. If there exists a segmented labor market in Taiwan, at least jUdging from the wage data presented here, it is certainly not limited to the manual workers. Third, wage disparities inside different sizes of operation increased as one moves from small to large scale firms. Using wage paid to the manual workers in each size of operation as a base, we can clearly see the wage disparity between them and the managerial personnel which increased from under 10000 NT$ in establishments with less than 10 workers, to 18000 NT$ in those with 30 to 99 workers, and to 28000 in establishments with 500 and more workers. A similar pattern is found between other occupational groups and the manual workers but with less severity. And it is only in those firms with more than 500 workers that we observed a noticeable wage differential between the clerical and sales workers and manual workers in general. But note that wage for the skilled workers is still comparable to those clerical and sales workers. A tentative conclusion, then, is that a wage differential 164 among the waged and salaried population mainly exists between the managerial and professional workers on the one hand and those lower white-collar and manual workers on the other. The market situation of the clerical and sales workers, as indicated by wages they received, is much closer to the manual workers than to those workers in managerial and professional positions. A similar conclusion can be reached when we examine the wage structure between 1980 and 1990. It is regrettable that only data for manufacturing industry are available but they should be sufficient to disclose the trend. According to Table 6.5, the relative wage differentials among occupations have declined between 1980 and 1990. While dropping, the managerial and professional workers still earned SUbstantially higher wages than the manual workers. The same statement cannot apply to the clerical and sales workers who, in 1990, only earned about 5 percent more than those workers in manual occupations. Even within the largest firms, where wage disparity among occupations is most salient, the difference between manual and lower white-collar workers declined from 22 to 17 percent in the 1980s. Wage differentials among different size workplaces, as also shown in Table 6.3, has soared. In 1980, for example, wage differentials for all wage and salary workers between the largest and the smallest firms was about 26 percent, while in 1990 it increased to over 50 percent. 165 Among the manual workers the respective percentage also grew from 15 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1990. In sum, although the information presented above can only be seen as very crude approximations to the market situations of different occupations, they do point in one general direction: the blue-collar and the lower white collar workers are becoming more alike over time, and the divisions between the professional-managerial workers and other manual as well as nonmanual workers have persisted. The wage data further reveal that a definite break of wage rates occurred between firms that employed more than 500 workers and the rest of the smaller firms. Not only are workers paid substantially higher wages but also it is in these largest firms that we observed the sharpest wage disparity among occupations. And it is in these firms that we found meaningful wage differentials between manual and lower white-collar workers. A comparison of wage structure across time, however, indicates these differentials are declining. Division within the waged and salaried popUlation, it seems clear, is between managerial and professional workers on the one end and the rest of the routinized white- and blue-collar workers on the other.

Income Distribution Two kinds of income distribution are considered here: the primary income and the net property income. 5 The J.66 primary income, which comprised the bulk of the individual income, has two components: for those who own the means of production (employers and own-account workers), entrepreneurial income is the main source; for those who do not own the means of production, compensation of employees is the main source. Compensation to employees includes wages as well as other receipts from employers such as overtime payments, bonuses, and allowances of all kinds. The net property income represents the net interests, dividends, and rents that are generated from the property owned by the individuals. Note that this is not the total property income but the net income generated by property after all expenses. Note too that these data refer to annual income and they are grouped differently than those in the previous tables. In light of the above discussion and the limitation of the data on hand, the wage and salary workers were grouped into two categories: the professional and managerial class (PMC) which includes managers, supervisors, professionals, and technical workers; and the working class which includes routine white-collar workers and manual workers. 6 Among the property-owning population three major categories were distinguished: the employers, the agricultural own-account workers, and the nonagricUltural own-account workers. Detailed description of each category is provided in Table 6.6. 167 Figure 6.5 displays the relative income status of various classes vis-a-vis the national average in Taiwan between 1975 and 1990. While the overall hierarchical order has remained stable, the long term income patterns for individual classes show movement toward different directions. First, despite some fluctuations, the employers and the professional-managerial class have maintained their high income status over the years. Second, the relative income for the working class has grown from 93 to 98 percent of the national average between 1975 and 1990. This increase, though limited, indicates the growth of working-class income has at least kept pace with the two high income groups. Third, in contrast to the working class, the relative income for the own-account workers has experienced constant decline. From 133 percent of the national average in 1975, the relative income for the nonagricultural own-account workers declined to 120 percent in 1990. The drop is even more dramatic for the agricultural own-account workers: from 88 to 44 percent of the national average in the same period. In fact, when deflated by the consumer price index, the agricultural own account workers are the only group in which the absolute income has declined in the late 1980s. 7 This relative decline in the own-account workers income position coupled with the rise in working-class income means that the income position between the two has become almost identical. The 168 narrowing income gap between the working class and the nonagricultural own-account workers, or the increasing income gap in the case of agricultural own-account workers, suggests that unless individuals can continue the mobility to the rank of employer, there seems to be few monetary advantages in becoming one's own boss. This seemingly lessening of income inequality between classes, however, needs to be qualified on two accounts. First, income inequality is perceived and felt, after all, not in relative but in absolute terms. It can be deceiving if one only looks at the changing percentage points and forgets the absolute amount involved. In 1975, for example, the 121 percent difference between the PMC and the national average translated into 71 thousand NT$ difference in real terms, compared to 1990, while the relative difference declined to 84 percent and the absolute amount increased to 122 thousand. This increment, furthermore, is not caused by inflation because all figures have been adjusted to constant 1975's value according to the consumer price index. In this respect, then, the relatively stable income structure or even some relative improvements of income inequality among different classes may only serve to conceal the existent inequality that lies buried beneath these percentages. Indeed, as revealed in Figure 6.6, which plotted the income differentials between various classes and the 169 national average in real amounts, the income gaps between classes have widened over the years. For instance, despite having one of the most rapid rates of increase among all classes, the working-class income has increasingly lagged behind the income of employers and the professional managerial class. Even when the relative income gap has diminished such as the case between working class and nonagricultural own-account workers, the absolute income gap has widened slightly from 23 to 32 thousand. This, of course, is trivial compared to the income differential between working class and the employers which almost tripled from 60 thousand in 1975 to 173 thousand in 1990; or the income differential between the working class and the PMC which stretched from 75 to 124 thousand in the same period. What this income gap translated into was not merely a more comfortable living standard or a more luxurious life style but the possibility to solidify the class boundaries for the generations to come. Second, the distribution on property income displays a pattern which shows increasing wealth inequality that is not directly apparent in the income data. As pointed out earlier, property income represents the income generated from personal ownership of property--wealth. The higher the property income, one can assume, the more property a person possessed. An increasing gap in the property income, then, indicates an enlarging inequality in wealth 170 distribution. More important, wealth not income can be more easily passed on to the next generation. Taiwan's individual wealth distribution, as indicated by the distribution of property income, is much more unequal than the working income. The long term pattern of property income distribution, relative to the national average, is presented in Figure 6.7. Note that each of the dotted lines above the 100% mark represents a 100 percent increment, while each below represents a 10 percent decrement. The reason to adopt this technique is to accommodate the high inequality between the employers and the professional-managerial class on the one hand and rest of the income earners on the other. Beside being highly unequal, the relative property income also varies a great deal within each class thus making it difficult to depict any consistent trend. In general, the relative position of the agricultural own account workers has improved and that of the nonagricultural own-account workers has deteriorated. The working-class property income tends to increase vis-a-vis the national average in the later half of the 1970s, then lost its momentum and experienced gradual decline. The trends for two high income classes are more difficult to comprehend: for the employers, a declining trend was observed in the late 1970s and the mid 1980s but every time it quickly bounced back; for the professional- 171 managerial class, the relative property income has its ups and downs before the mid 1980s then showed a tendency to decline in relation to the national average in the late 1980s. JUdging the whole picture, the best guess is that the distribution of property income among classes has remained stable at best and may have worsened in recent years. Notwithstanding this highly unequal property income distribution, it has little effect on the overall income structure since the amount involved was relative small compared to the primary income. It is important to remember, however, that the property income represents the profits generated from properties owned by the individuals, it does not represent the real value of those properties. To the extent that the actual value of property is hundreds or thousands times higher than the profits it generates, the scope of wealth inequality is bound to be immense. Furthermore, due to the nature of a nation-wide sample survey and the technique it used to collect the property income information, it is unlikely the data include those super-rich people in the sample. This, of course, further serves to deflate the perceived wealth distribution. In short, the property income figures here only reflect a partial picture of wealth distribution in Taiwan. The actual wealth inequality may be much higher. 172 Beside owning property, another way for the privileged classes to maintain their market capacity is through the possession and/or monopoly of credentials. Unlike property, however, credentials cannot be easily passed on to the next generation. One can inherit bonds, stocks, houses, or factories but cannot inherit a M.B.A. or a M.D. degree. To maintain a class line through credentials means investment on children's education, especially tertiary education in the contemporary world. Table 6.7 presents the average educational expenditure on each minor in different class households. 8 The distribution was and continues to disproportionately favoring the high income classes. Compared to the national average, the employers and the professional-managerial class invest consistently and increasingly more money on children's education, the working class and the nonagricultural own-account workers spend about the average, and the agricultural own-account workers consistently spend less. Like in the case of absolute income distribution (Figure 6.6), the gaps on education expenditure between classes are getting wider. The margin between what the PMC and the working-class family spent on education for each child, for example, increased from 1777 NT$ in 1975 to 4642 NT$ in 1990. A similar trend is observed in the difference between employer and working-class household in which the gap widened from 223 to 1261 NT$ per minor in the same 173 period. 9 Within the two high income classes, it is interesting to note, the PMC has put much more emphasis, at least in term of monetary investment, on children's education than the employers. The difference on education expenditure on each minor between these two classes more than doubled from 1554 in 1975 to 3381 NT$ in 1990, clear indication of the PMC's effort to transmit its cultural capital to the next generation. Certainly, spending more money on education does not guarantee a better and/or a higher education. What it does do, however, is to enhance the chances of achieving that goal. To the extent that entrance to the rank of PMC depends heavily on education (see Table 5.11 for the average education level of PMC), by out-spending all other classes by a large margin on children's education, the PMC stands a good chance to reproduce itself.

Summary and Discussion Relative and absolute wages rose rapidly in postwar Taiwan. There is no doubt workers in Taiwan worked hard for it, but, at least in recent decades, available information indicates they are getting a bigger piece in the growing economic pie. This is not to say that they have gotten their fair share, only to state they are getting more than they used to. Long term trend in wage differentials between males and females suggests declined 174 in certain sectors but worsened in others. As a whole, it is doubtful that the wage disparity between sexes has declined in any substantial manner. Wage data based on occupation revealed wages for the regular white-collar and the manual workers are almost identical and are considerably lower than for professional and managerial workers. Examination of wage structures between different sizes of workplace shows a clear distinction between establishments with 500 or more workers and the rest of the smaller firms. A comparison of the wage structure in manufacturing industry between 1980 and 1990 also suggests this segmented labor market in terms of establishment size is a very recent phenomenon. The emergence of this segmented labor market, however, does not seem to interfere with the converging trend between the manual and regular white-collar workers. There is a trend of homogenization as well as segmentation among the wage workers in terms of their wage behavior. Broadening the scope of comparison, the final section examines the patterns of income differentiation among different classes. It is argued that while the relative income status of all classes, except the agricultural own account workers, has shown a slight tendency to converge and the absolute income differentials have become more pronounced. To the extent that it is the absolute income that creates actual disparity on the patterns of 175 consumption this centrifugal trend can only serve to solidify any existing gap of life styles between classes. The pattern of property income distribution and its inference to the wealth inequality between classes also point to a similar conclusion. Besides being property rich, moreover, the two high income classes--the employers and the professional-managerial class but especially the latter--also invest more money on educating their heirs which further enhances the self reproduction of these class positions. 176 Notes 1. According to the comparative wage information compiled by Amsden Korea's real earings in manUfacturing sector increased 2.6 times between 1972 and 1984, while Taiwan's increased 1.9 times but she did not specify whether Taiwan's data are for the manufacturing sector or the industrial sector in general. When using the manUfacturing wage data (Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1), the difference between Taiwan and Korea in smaller in that wages rose 2.2 times in Taiwan. 2. comparatively, the level of minimum wage (measured by the minimum wage as the percentage of average wage in manUfacturing) in Taiwan is higher than U.K., U.S., Japan, and South Korea (Shan 1988). This is different, however, from arguing that the state could be a wage-driven institution by not following the neoclass1cal market approach, which a considerable number of the developing countries do not (see Fields and Wan 1986). 3. The rates of real wage increase for production workers are 8 and 8.2 percent respectively for the two periods identified. 4. In 1966, 58 percent of industrial wage workers were in manUfacturing, among them 17 percent were women. In 1975, 66 percent of industrial wage workers were in manUfacturing, among them percent 26 were women. In 1990, 70 percent of industrial wage workers were in manUfacturing, among them 43 percent were women. See Table 3.6 and Table 5.3. 5. There are four sources of personal income: compensation of employees, entrepreneurial income, net property income, and transfer receipts. The first two are called the basic or primary income Which, as the term indicates, is the major source of personal income. Combining the property income with the basic income we get distributed factor income. Combining the four we have gross income. Subtracting the gross income by transfer expenditure we get the disposable income. 6. The orginal income tables include five categories of wage workers: 1) the managerial and professional workers, 2) the clerical, sale, and service workers, 3) the indistrial laborers, 4) the agriCUltural laborers, and 5) the military personnel. The mixing of clerical, sale, and service workers into a single group makes it a less reliable source to represent the income for lower white collar workers and since we have already compared the wage differentials between them and manual workers, I have decided to combine this category with the industrial laborers to represent the working class. To simplfy the 177 comparison, the agricultural laborers and the military personnel were excluded from the figures. The national average income, however, includes all income recipeints. 7. Its real primary income dropped from 68 thousand in 1988, to 67 thousand in 1989, and to 64 thousand in 1990. 8. The household class position is determined by the class position of household head. Minor is defined as people under age 20. 9. Note that, once again, the 1990's figures were deflated by consumer price index to that of the 1975's value. If we used the current value as a base the 1990's margin will more than double and reach 9503 and 2582 NT$ respectively. 178 CHAPTER 7 UHZONZZATZOH AND LABOR KOVEHEHT

strikes are forbidden in Taiwan. Although every industry has its trade union••• , unions do not participate in the determination of wages and benefits. Members do not see themselves as in conflict with management, but rather look upon their organization as an aid to government policy and as an instrument for promoting employee welfare. Labor disputes are rare, and if they occur are usually settled through government mediation. (Investment Guide to Taiwan, First National Bank, USA, 1973 quoted from Ho 1990:11) Organization is a necessary, though not sUfficient, condition for any social group to realize its strength and achieve its goals, and the trade union is the basic working-class organization. This chapter traces the growth of trade unionism and examines the pattern of labor disputes in postwar Taiwan. It is observed that the number of organized laborers increased substantially but their collective strength has not grown in tandem largely due to active state intervention and manipUlation of union activities. At first, unions were organized and functioned as an administrative arm of state-party machinery. consequently, the industrial disputes and workers collective actions were constrained by this weakness of Taiwanese labor unions. Industrial disputes became more frequent but not more intense and were characterized by the lack of union involvement. The examination of reported industrial disputes reveals that most of the worker's 179 grievances were related to employers' violations of existing labor codes rather than to workers' demand of better payor working conditions. Only since 1987 have we witnessed the emergence of an independent labor movement (as different from the trade union movement that was dominated by the KMT state) that strives for workers rights and independent unions in Taiwan.

The Growth of Labor Unions--A Quantitative survey The establishment of trade unions is a postwar phenomenon in Taiwan. Under the Japanese colonial rule the practice of trade unionism was prohibited. 1 The restoration of Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalist government, while giving workers the legal right to unionize, however, did nothing to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the state or capital. The number of unions and their members increased but without social and political power. The long standing struggle with the Chinese communists on the mainland China has "taught" the Nationalists that the labor movement is something that needs to be contained and controlled. The defeat of the Nationalist government on the mainland further underlined its fear of uncontrolled social movements. The revival or initiation of any organized social institution in Taiwan since the end of colonial rule, thus, is tightly under the control and/or supervision of the Nationalist state (Tien 180 1989:59-61). It is within this context that the evolution of trade unionism in Taiwan should be understood. In the immediate post-restoration years union activities were not particularly encouraged by the government in Taiwan. In 1946, the first year that Taiwan's workers were organized under trade unions, there were about 12 thousand unionized workers in Taiwan--5 local industrial unions with 1346 members, 22 local craft unions with 7875 members (Taiwan Provincial Government 1970:17-19 - 17-20), and an estimated 2 thousand or so workers organized by the Taiwan Postal Workers' Union. 2 The number of unionized workers grew to 43 thousand in 1947 (Lee 1988:9) mainly due to an increase in craft unions membership (14851) and the forming of the Taiwan Railroad Workers' Union (estimated 20 thousand members). Yet in the same year the governor of Taiwan banned union activities in all public enterprises after several strikes organized by the miners unions (Ting 1965:576-577). Despite this setback, the number of unionized workers continued to grow to 84 thousand and their organizations increased to 175 in 1950 (Lee 1988:12). More important, while small in numbers, these unions seemed to enjoy more autonomy from state manipulation than their counterparts in later years (Lee 1988:9). The state's active involvement in unionization started in 1950 for the purpose of mobilizing workers in defense of 181 possible attack from the Chinese communist regime (Lee 1988:9-10). Due to this government effort, the unions and their membership increased rapidly in the 1950s: between 1952 and 1960 the number of unions increased from 326 to 683 and the number of unionized workers increased from 113 thousand to 280 thousand (Figure 7.1). The rate of unionization, as measured by either the proportion of unionized workers in the total civilian labor force or in the total civilian employees, also grew rapidly (Figure 7.2) . This momentum, however, did not last long as the threat from communist China was gradually reduced and there was less urgency in utilizing unions as an anti-communist organization. Although the unions and their membership continued to grow, the rate of unionization remained stable throughout the 1960s. The proportion of unionized workers in the civilian employees, for example, grew from 11 percent in 1952 to 20 percent in 1960 and only increased to 21 percent in 1970. In the 1970s, due to a series of setbacks in international politics, the state once again actively encouraged unionization as a mean of improving Taiwan's image as a democratic society and maintaining ties with nongovernment international organizations (Lee 1988:14). The number of unions increased from 865 in 1970, to 1675 in 1980, and to 3437 in 1990; the number of unionized workers doubled from 488 thousand in 1970, to 182 1103 thousand in 1980, then doubled again to 2757 thousand in 1990. consequently, the proportion of organized workers in the total employees also increased from 21 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1990. Two types of unions exist in Taiwan: craft or occupational unions and industrial unions. Membership for the former is based on workers' occupation in a confined administrative area and is not limited to wage and salary workers. Industrial unions, on the other hand, are organized on a factory or plant level that include wage and salary workers in various occupations who worked in the same workplace. 3 In the early period the growth of organized workers was concentrated in the industrial unions and of late the main locus of growth has shifted to the occupational unions (Figure 7.3). From little over one thousand in 1946, for instance, membership of the industrial unions increased to 104 thousand in 1956, while membership of the craft unions increased from 8 thousand to 75 thousand in the same period (Taiwan Provincial Government 1970:17-19 - 17-20).4 By 1957, 68 percent of the total unionized workers in Taiwan was organized under industrial unions. This dominance of industrial unions has remained relatively stable throughout the 1960s and 1970s, fluctuating between 64 to 68 percent, only to experience a drastic decline in the 1980s. 183 By 1981, despite the membership of industrial unions that had reached its postwar high at 721 thousand, its proportion in the total unionized workforce had dropped to 61 percent. While the membership of industrial unions stagnated in the 1980s, the membership of craft unions experienced a dramatic increase, fueled, in part, by a flood of self-employed craft workers to join unions in order to get insurance coverage (Lee 1988:16). From 404 thousand in 1980, the number of workers affiliated to craft unions ballooned to 2057 thousand in 1990. Consequently, the craft unions claimed three quarters of all union membership in 1990, compared to about one-third in 1957. Directly related to the stagnation of industrial union membership in the 1980s is the gradual but continuous decline of unionized workers in the manufacturing sector. As shown in Table 7.1, between 1987 and 1990 the union membership in manufacturing declined from 516 to 454 thousand while membership in other industries increased from 188 to 245 thousand. The transportation and communication industry has gained the most in terms of absolute numbers (26 thousand), whereas the finance and service industries have the most rapid proportional increase (each grew over 50000 percent). There seems to be a growing trend of unionization in the so called unproductive sector. 184 within the craft unions, membership increased across all major occupational groupings. While the traditional blue-collar workers unions still dominated (71 percent of all craft unions membership in 1990 was in production and related occupations) and recorded the biggest absolute membership increase between 1987 and 1990 (465 thousand), the white-collar unions of professional, clerical, and sales workers showed the highest rate of increase. Together, the number of white-collar unions increased from 129 in 1987 to 410 in 1990 and their membership more than doubled from 69 to 179 thousand in the same interval. A very impressive gain considering the fact that under the current Labor Union Act persons employed in all level of educational institutions and government administrative branches cannot join or organize their own unions. 5 The overall increase in the rate of unionization, however, disguises the uneven distribution of unionized workers across firm size and geographic areas. From the beginning, unionization was concentrated in public enterprises and large private firms (Ting 1965:577-582) and this trend has continued to present-day. In 1980, for example, a survey shows that the unionization rate in manufacturing industry in factories with more than 100 workers was 38 percent compared to under 10 percent in workplaces with less than 100 workers (Chang 1985:8). And in 1987 the same survey shows that 73 percent of those 185 workers in factories with more than 500 workers were unionized, 41 percent for factories with 200 to 499 workers, 29 percent for factories with 100 to 199 workers, and under 10 percent for those in workplaces with less than 100 workers (Lin 1988:6). Given the fact that the proportion of manufacturing wage workers in workplaces with less than 100 workers has increased from 57 to 66 percent between 1980 and 1987 (Executive Yuan, Directorate General of Accounting, statistics and BUdget 1981, 1987), it is little wonder that union membership in the manufacturing industry has stagnated in recent years. The geographical distribution of union membership in Taiwan, along with the distribution of employed population, is displayed in Table 7.2. Traditionally the union membership has disclosed a highly skewed pattern of distribution in favor of the northern region. with about one-fifth of the entire employed population this region possessed one-third of the total unionized workers in 1957 compared to, for instance, south-central Taiwan where 27 percent of the employed population resided but with only 14 percent of the unionized workforce. In 1990, partly due to a redistribution of the labor force, more than two-fifths of the unionized workforce was found in northern Taiwan. The metropolitan area of Taipei alone has 22 percent of all unionized workers while it only possessed 13 percent of the total employed population. The regional disparities are 186 further demonstrated by the union density ratio, calculated as the proportion of unionized workers in the employed population in each region, which eliminates the regional differences in labor force distribution. As shown in column 3 and 6 in Table 7.2, the density of unions declined as one moves form north to south only to rise a little in the southern region where the second largest industrial and commercial center in Taiwan-- Kaohsiung--is located. Yet even in the Kaohsiung metropolitan area, which in 1957 has a higher union density than Taipei, the rate of unionization is only a fraction higher than the national average. 6 The regional disparities in terms of union density, however, have decreased over the years. In sum, despite the existence of regional and firm-size variations, it is safe to say that unions and their membership have experienced rapid growth both in absolute numbers as well as in relative weight in the postwar Taiwan. At the same time, however, Taiwan's postwar experience was, as Hsu puts it, "a history of industrialization without labor movement." (1989:104) Not only were union activities heavily curtailed by external regulations imposed by the state, but internally unions were co-opted by the Nationalist party. As a result, party policy, which initially was to preempt autonomous growth of any civil association in Taiwan and of late focused on 187 maintaining a positive environment for capital accumulation, dominated union policy.

Labor Movement and the KMT-State In order to comprehend union submissiveness in Taiwan, it is necessary to understand the nature of the KMT state. It is commonly acknowledged that the state in Taiwan has enjoyed an enormous amount of autonomy viv-a-vis the civil society. But what was the basis on which and the mechanisms which the state utilized to reach this dominant position besides being an external entity with repressive forces? The unusual strength of the Taiwanese state, I believe, is based on an unusually strong party organization in Taiwan. A bourgeois party with a Leninist organizational structure, the pervasive penetration of Taiwanese society by the Nationalist party (KMT) can only be matched by the communist party in the communist countries. And the strength of the Taiwanese state is based on its fusion with the Nationalist party. The reason to adopt the term KMT state, therefore, is to underline this interpenetration and interwoven nature between the party and the state in Taiwan. The emphasis is not on the party control of state power per se but, more important, is that this fusion of the state and party apparatuses allows the two to be one and two separate institutions (legally at least) at the same time. That is, the party possesses real 188 control by virtue of its domination of the state machinery without submitting to the legal restrictions that a state has to abide by. This is not to say that the state always abides by the laws but only to underscore the fact that there are certain limitations regarding state activities that do not apply to party which is, technically, a civil institution. The state in turn extends its domination through an omnipresent party organization that penetrates every aspect of the civil society. This fusion of the state and party apparatuses, until recently, sUfficiently suppressed the emergence of any major independent social forces in the civil society. Two aspects of the state's intervention in the capital labor relation should be noted.? On the one hand, the state, through legislation, guarantees the basic political and economic rights of labor. Thus, formally, labor enjoys the rights of association, collective bargaining, collective action, and is protected in basic reproduction rights such as maternal leave, minimum wage, decent work conditions, etc. On the other hand, through other legislative and administrative measures, the state restricts or ignores these political and economic rights. Consequently, the right to form a union was conditioned by a single representative system that restricts the right to freely affiliate with one another. 8 The right to collective action was suspended under Martial Law and 189 related legislation or executive orders such as the Labor Arbitration Act, Mobilization Act, and the Promulgation on the Management of Agriculture, Mine, Industry, and Commerce in the Emergency Period. So even after the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, there were still regulations that gave the government authority to prohibit strikes by deeming the activity as harmful to "societal peace" (Cheng 1988:49 50).9 What constitutes activities that are harmful to societal peace, of course, is subjected to "official" interpretation. As to the protective regulations regarding labor's economic rights, they were either way below the existing standard (like the minimum wage) or only existed on the books. These external limitations imposed by the state, which are not uncommon in other societies, are reinforced by KMT's penetration into, and co-optation of, the unions. The KMT's approach to unions is nicely captured in the following description of Lenin's attitude toward trade unions (Hammond 1957, quoted from Larson and Nissen 1987:60): It is perfectly clear in Lenin's writings that from the first he wanted the trade unions to be under the influence of, and if possible controlled by, the Party•.• Lenin urged Party members to join the unions and strive to achieve the dominant role in them. Each union, he said, should establish connections with the local organizations of the Party, and the unions could, under certain conditions, affiliate directly to the Party. To ensure firm control by the Party over union activities, Party cells shoUld be established in the unions. These Party cells 190 would be expected to secure the election of Party members to all important offices, and see to it that the unions followed the Party line. Along this line, the KMT used the following mechanisms. First, if a union does not exist, KMT members will launch the drive to establish a union so as to preempt initiative from other individuals or groups. Second, if unionization is under way and is not under party control, the party will deploy members to participate in the process to gain control of the initiative. Third, it will seek to block the application of organizing a union by manipulating bureaucratic procedures through the Bureau of Social Affairs, the official agency that regulates the establishment of all civil associations in Taiwan. Legally the Bureau has limited power to turn down a workers' application but in reality it can delay or speed up the process, and occasionally it can break the regulations such as changing the date of submission, to guarantee that a "proper" group of workers gets the representation. It is also not uncommon for the non-KMT union organizers to be visited by government security agents to check on their family background and to "understand" their motive for organizing union. Fourth, if a union already existed, the KMT will try to recruit the existing leadership into the party or to mobilize rank-and-file party members in the union to usurp the leadership in a union election. Fifth, it establishes a matching party organization parallel to 191 the union structure to ensure total control. until the recent wave of independent union movement, most leaders in the local unions and all leaders in the union federations were KMT members (Yu 1977:84). As a result, the career of union leader is closely tied to their performance as party members but not to their effort as union officials. It is important to note, however, to the extent that unions are penetrated by the KMT it does not necessarily render them ineffective vis-a-vis management, since unions could, theoretically, strengthen their position through this affiliation with the party. In reality, however, since KMT's intention of promoting unionism in Taiwan was to keep the workers unorganized, there was no effort to support unions against management. The close linkage between party officials and local capitalists, of course, also help to suppress any union activities that are outside the party's directive. Unions are to serve the party not the workers. It is no surprise, then, the most common characterization of Taiwan labor unions are, as recognized by workers and critics alike, "token unions," "vase unions," "tofu unions,1I or "domesticated unions." It is not until the mid-1980s that the labor movement in Taiwan shows sign of breaking out from this tight KMT-state control. As shown in Table 7.3, the peaceful industrial relations in Taiwan have become more conflict prone since 192 the 1970s. From 49 cases annually in the period between 1955 and 1959, the numbers of disputes actually dropped to 30 in the period between 1965 to 1969, then began to rise averaging 444 disputes annually in the second half of the 1970s. In the 1980s, industrial disputes became even more frequent averaging more than 1000 cases annually between 1980 and 1984, over 1500 cases between 1985 and 1987, and over 1700 cases between 1988 and 1990. Judging from the frequency of disputes, the 1980s clearly marked a new era in Taiwan industrial relations. The number of workers involved in the disputes, while not showing a constant upward trend, also increased sharply in the most recent period. Consequently, the working days lost due to industrial disputes rose from 3442 days per year in the period between 1955 and 1959 to 11317 days per year between 1988 and 1990. These numbers, while clearly showing that industrial disputes have become more frequent, involve more workers, and result in more working days lost, tell nothing about the intensity of the disputes nor the effectiveness and the capacity of the workers organizations. The high frequency of disputes may actually indicate a lack of organized representation from the side of labor. Indeed, when one looks at the average working days lost or the average number of workers involved per dispute the intensity seems to be lacking, and this is especially true when subjected 193 to international comparison (see Deyo 1989:55-68 for a comparison with other Asian NICs). What this rising frequency of disputes in the 1970s and 1980s does indicate, however, is a changing labor-management relations from "harmony-keeping to tension-generating" (Hsiao 1992:157). Parallel to the rise of industrial conflicts, their pattern has shown signs of change too. As displayed in Table 7.3, one characteristic of Taiwan's industrial disputes is that most of them were centered either on termination of employment or on monetary compensation but not on workplace labor-management relations. The one category that shows some bearing on this issue, business arguments, has traditionally been of little significance in causing labor-management disputes in Taiwan. Also apparent in this table is that a majority of industrial disputes were caused by issues relating to labor rights rather than labor interests. In the 1950s and 1960s more than half of the disputes was caused by dismissal and lay-off, followed by disputes over arrears of wages; the two most immediate issues that relate to improving workers' material well being, wage and allowance increase, have played negligible role in causing the disputes. Similar patterns prevailed in the 1970s as we witnessed the growing importance of injury compensation, again regarding violation of workers' existing rights, along with the dismissal and arrears of wages as the main causes for industrial disputes. In the 194 1980s, especially since the mid-1980s, though the frequency of disputes caused by violations of labor rights (dismissal, arrears of wages, and injury compensation) remained high, we observed the rapid increase of claims for allowances as one of the main causes for disputes. l O In the late-1980s we also observed the increase of disputes related to work environment as indicating by the rising percentage of disputes caused by business arguments. Analyses based on cases from nongovernment sources further illustrate this changing pattern of industrial disputes in Taiwan. Based on a random sample of 202 labor disputes filed by the Taiwan Labor Legal Assistance Association, Lin (1987:233) found that between 1982 and 1986 over 90 percent of disputes (184 out of 202) were caused by management violation of existing labor regulations while only 10 percent involved workers' demands for increasing compensation. In the late-1980s, however, the situation changed dramatically as more and more workers demanded increases in wages and allowances. According to the information reported by Hsiao (1992:163) on workers collective actions in 1988 and 1989, out of the 104 demands from workers: 45 asked for an increase in the year-end bonus and 18 were for wage increases. That is, over 60 percent of the demands were centered on expanding workers' interests. 195 In short, the consistency and changing pattern of labor-management disputes in Taiwan represent, on the one hand, employers' continuous disregard of labor's legal rights, and rising workers' discontent regarding existing systems of distribution--economic reward as well as political power--on the other. In Hsiao's assessment: "the persistent 'disputes over labor rights' accelerated the frustration and resentment of workers against management, and the rising demand for allowance such as year-end bonuses, reflected the activism among the working class, who have begun to engage in 'disputes over labor interests.'" (1992:158) The deteriorating labor-management relations and the increasing discontent of workers in the 1980s provided a fertile ground on which the independent labor movement could flourish.

Labor Awakens The increasing discontent of the workers against the existing systems of distribution was put into motion in the mid-1980s by several factors. First, in 1984, the stubborn resistance of capitalists; the silence of union leaders; and the heated exchanges between scholars, legislators, and government officials that surrounded the legislation process and final passage of Labor Standard Law not only aroused workers' awareness of their basic rights but also showed to them, once again, the impotence of their existing 196 unions. The passage of the law, more importantly, gave workers a reference point from which to realize their rights and interests. Also in 1984, the Taiwan Labor Legal Assistance Association was established by concerned intellectuals aiming at assisting labor to fight for their legal rights. Second, facing increasing opposition from outside (the Democratic Progress Party and other social movements) and power struggle from within, the once highly disciplined internal control hierarchy of the KMT also began to loosen its grip over individual members (Wang 1989). In December 1986, for example, two KMT-nominated sure-win candidates representing organized workers for the national assembly and legislative Yuan were defeated in their respective elections by two no-name candidates backed by the DPp.11 This not only represents an open expression of wide spread workers' dissatisfaction toward the KMT, but also indicates the KMT is losing its tight grip on unions in Taiwan. Finally, in 1987 the external constraints on civil liberties were formally removed following the lifting of Martial Law and the ending of the emergency period. The workers now formally enjoyed some of their rights as proclaimed in the constitution. Since the mid-1980s, then, one observed an upsurge of workers' activities which was unprecedent in postwar Taiwan. 197 Not only, as discussed earlier, did industrial disputes become more frequent and the pattern of those disputes change, but workers in Taiwan also began to recapture their unions from the KMT and to engage in collective actions vis-a-vis management. Thus, while there were scattered instances of workers collective protests in the 1960s and 1970s, they became prominent in the 1980s. Between 1983 and 1987, for example, there were 243 cases of workers collective actions involving 136 firms that were important enough to be covered by major newspapers (Lin 1988); and in 1988 and 1989 Hsiao (1992) finds 88 major incidents using a similar method. Furthermore, as the labor movement develops, the demands, tactics, targets, and forms of protest in those collective actions have also changed. In the period from 1983 to 1987, only 10 percent of the cases of collective action demanded an increase in wages or year-end bonuses; but in 1988 and 1989, out of the 104 demands of workers, 45 asked to increase the year-end bonus and 18 were for wage increases, and 4 collective actions were staged for organizing unions and 1 for protesting the firing of union organizers. In terms of forms of collective action, between 1983 and 1987, out of 243 cases 120 were petition to the government, 55 street demonstrations, 12 sabotages, 11 strikes, and 6 picketing. In 1988 and 1989, out of 98 tactics adopted by workers there were 55 strikes and only 19 petitions to the 198 government. within a few years, the target of workers' collective actions had switched from the state to capital, their tactics have also become more confrontation-oriented switching from petition to strike. More important, there is a growing tendency of union involvement in initiating and organizing the collective action: between 1983 to 1987, only 13 out of 243 collective actions were led by unions, while between 1988 and 1989, 42 out of 88 were led by unions. In sum, coupled with the political liberation, the long-time discontent and frustration of workers to the existing systems of distribution was finally let out in the late 1980s. The workers in Taiwan not only were more active in pursuing their rights and interests but began to realize the importance of independent organization as a mean to win and/or to protect those demands. The following events highlight the transition: In May 1984, the first organization aims at assisting labor to fight for their legal rights, the Taiwan Labor Legal Assistance Association (Taiwan Labor Right Association),12 was established by concerned intellectuals. Initially set up to provide mainly legal assistance to workers, the organization became increasingly active in promoting an independent labor movement in Taiwan and changed its name into Taiwan Labor Movement Assistance Association (Taiwan Labor Movement Association) in July 1988. It is the major organization in supporting an independent labor movement in present-day Taiwan, and was the primary force behind the forming of the National Alliance of Autonomous Unions in 1988 (see below). In December 1986, two KMT-nominated sure-win candidates representing organized workers for the national assembly and legislative Yuan were defeated in their respective elections by two no-name candidates backed by the DPP. 199 This is commonly considered the first open expression of wide spread workers' dissatisfaction toward the KMT and an early sign of the KMT losing its tight grip on unions in Taiwan. In April 1987, the Declaration of Labor's Human Right was announced by 31 intellectuals reiterating labor's rights to organize, to collective bargain, and to strike without interference from the state. In August 1987, the Bureau of Labor Affairs under the Ministry of Interior was upgraded to Council of Labor Affairs, a ministerial level position directly under the Executive Yuan. While this move indicates a recognition of the KMT state to the potential upsurge of the working class in Taiwan, the Council has limited power versus other Ministries. Negotiation (with Ministry of Economic Affairs and the representatives of capital) of a minimum wage rate and regulating the immigrant workers according to the "market needs" seem to be the main chores of the Council. The current task of the Council is the amendment of the Labor Standard Law (to lower the minimum requirements under the existing version) and the amendment of the Union Act (to allow more administrative latitude in regulating union activities and collective actions). In September 1987, the Tao-Chu-Miao Brotherhood Union was established. It represents the first alliance of independent unions in Taiwan and was very active in the year-end bonus disputes from December 1987 to February 1988. It was one of the main organizers in the forming of the Labor Party in 1987. After the split of the Labor Party in 1988, most activists were involved in the formation of the Workers' Party in 1989. In 1988 some members also joined the National Alliance of Autonomous Unions. It once claimed to have 16 unions as its members (Lee 1991:108). In November 1987, with the support of the neWly formed or reformed independent unions and a group of socialist inclined intellectuals the Labor Party was formed with a former DPP legislator as chairman. As the first political party aims at promoting and defending workers' interests it was once considered to be the logical third force to compete with the KMT and DPP in the Taiwan polity, but it has yet to make any electoral gain at the national level. The party was actively involved in several labor-management disputes from late-1987 to mid-1988, but was split in June 1988 due to ideological differences and conflicts over labor movement strategies between fractions. The splitting fraction formed the Association for Workers' Human Rights 200 in August 1988 which became the backbone of the more socialist-oriented Workers' Party. In January 1988, the KMT lost control over several public enterprise unions. A majority of the KMT-backed candidates for union leadership in the China Petroleum Workers' Union, the Taiwan Power Workers' Union, and the Taiwan Postal Workers' Union were defeated in their respective union elections. This started a new wave of independent union movement as workers in many public and large-scale private enterprises either captured their union leadership or formed quasi-union workers' associations vis-a-vis the existing unions and the management. In January and February of 1988, a wave of labor-management conflicts regarding the year-end bonus erupted in Taiwan. On February 10, demanding more reasonable distribution of the year-end bonus, the union of the Far East Textile Company started the first sit-in strike in Taiwan involving more than a thousand workers. On February 16, the union of the Tao-Yuan Transport Company organized a work stoppage on the pretext of taking leave collectively during the three day Chinese New Year holiday which set a precedent to a subsequent wave of similar work stoppages around the island's mass transportation industry. In April 1988, the Kaohsiung Workers' Alliance (Federation of Union Cadres) was formed. Developed from an informal network of union activists in the Kaohsiung area as early as 1986, its main goal is to promote union autonomy among members' affiliated unions. In 1990 the name was changed to Taiwan Workers' Alliance to reflect its growing membership from other parts of Taiwan. In March 1991, due to increasing linkage with the Workers' Party, the DPP members in the organization split with the Alliance and formed the Taiwan Labor Alliance. In May 1988, the National Alliance of Autonomous Unions (National Federation of Independent Unions) was established. Backed by the Taiwan Labor Movement Assistance Association, it was the first federation of unions, "intended to challenge the vertical monopolistic control system set up by the KMT state." (Hsiao 1992:162) Some of its members overlapped with the Tao-Chu-Miao Brotherhood Union. It has 26 member unions representing about 15 thousand workers at the end of 1988 (Lee 1991:99).13 While the leadership formally advocate a nonpartisan strategy, some of its members were closely linked with the Workers' Party. In August 1988, the Association for Workers' Human Rights (Labor Rights Association) was established by the more 201 socialist inclined fraction in the Labor Party. It is now widely considered as the Labor Department of the Workers' Party. In November 1988, more than 2 thousand people from about 80 labor organizations participated in the so called "Two Laws and One Act Grand Rally" protesting the intended amendments of labor legislations and the prosecution of union activists. In March 1989, the Workers' Party was formed. Formally committed to democratic socialism it has a more radical political platform than the Labor Party. Like the Labor Party, however, it has little success in national and local elections. Its core components include the Association for Workers' Human Rights, the Tao-Chu-Miao Brotherhood Union, and the Kaohsiung Workers' Alliance. It has 5 local branches and about 2 thousand members in 1990 (Lee 1991:96). From individual protest to collective action, from demanding wage increases to reasserting the right of free association, from no organization to forming political parties, labor in Taiwan has matured a great deal in a short period of time. From passive acceptance to active involvement, to reiterate, labor in Taiwan has shown important signs of revitalization in the 1980s. It is too early, however, to claim any kind of victory. For one, the events transcribed above, exciting as they may be, only impacted a small proportion of the Taiwanese laboring popUlation. The internal conflicts due to diverse ideological orientations and movement strategies have fragmented this small core of organizations and activists which further saturated the already scarce resources. As the development of the above described events suggests, the growing number of labor organizations was more due to the 202 splitting up of existing organizations than to an expansion of membership. This lack of success in expanding the movement since its initial success means the state and capital can now concentrate their effort on crushing this small and fragmented core. Indeed, just as this new labor movement was gathering momentum in the late-1980s, we also began to witness coordinated responses from the state and capital. Not only was firing of the union leaders more frequent, there were also increasing complaints of a deteriorating investment environment and escalating threats of deinvestment from all sectors of capital. To fight labor, with the help from the state, capital also became organized. In order to break the strike of Miao-Li Transport Company in August 1988, for example, the state-owned and other private transport companies on the island combined to provide several hundred buses to run the company's routes. When labor engaged in a similar strategy it was either deemed as conspiring collusion or viewed as insidious infiltration of the labor movement by "outside" forces and prosecuted by the state. The state, at the same time, has accelerated its effort in tightening control of union activities through administrative interferences as well as legislative constraints (Chao 1991; Lee 1991:51-55). For example, in July of 1988, the then chairperson of the Council of Labor 203 Affairs Cheng Sui-Ge spoke openly regarding the direction of state labor legislation (quoted from Chao 1991:47): Since our country is moving toward the goal of liberalization and democratization, we cannot prohibit strikes legally. Hence, the future amendment of labor legislations is aiming at detailed regulations of strike activities. This is the only way to assure the highest interest of our country. More commonly, since amending laws would take too much time, the state simply twisted the existing laws to reassert its control over labor. Chao offers a good example of how this is done (1991:48): ••.When workers in the Kaohsiung Transport Company wanted to follow the previous tactic of "collective leave" as a pretext of strike, the state immediately responded by quoting article 40 of the Labor Standard Law that reads: "due to natural disasters, accidents or unforeseen events, when the employer deems necessary, the employer can suspend••. workers' vacation." By equalling the thousands-year old Chinese New Year to "natural disasters, accidents or unforeseen events" so as to prohibit the strike, the attitude of the state toward labor movement seems to leap backward to the Martial Law period. with the concerted effort by the state and capital, the newly-emerged labor movement has made little progress, if not regressed, since 1989. From "unlimited hope and possibility" in 1988 to "a period of extraordinary inertia" in 1989 (Chao 1991), indeed, the independent labor movement in Taiwan has experienced its first growing pains and its first lessons. A lesson in which the workers in Taiwan realized their potential power and a lesson Which taught them the potency of their opponent. 204 summary and Discussion Political liberation not only freed labor but it also freed capital. To the extent that the state becomes more vulnerable vis~a-vis civil society, it is usually capital that take the greatest advantage (Wood 1990). Taiwan's recent experience is no exception. The unspoken and implicit alliance between the state and capital in the past has become overt and explicit. This is a threat as well as an opportunity for labor, however. The threat, of course, is obvious. The combination of capitalist economic resources with the state's oppressive power can crush any labor opposition (organized or not), and sustain the status quo for a period of time. Taiwan's distant and recent history attest to it. Political liberation, furthermore, entails economic liberation of capital. The threat of deinvestment becomes real because now capital can freely move to other more favorable investment sites outside Taiwan. Coupled with the increasing outflow of capital, the numbers of plant-closings have also increased in recent years (Hsia 1993:9-16).14 The "liberation," therefore, not only strengthened capital's influence on the state but also increased its leverage against the working class. The opportunity, however, is not so easy to realize. For one, the possibility of the state as an arena for class struggle is now open. While capital is mobile, and 205 becoming increasingly so, the state is not. This is not to deny the fact that under capitalism the state cannot exist without the support of capital, but only to emphasize the fact that under a capitalist democracy the state also needs the support, or more properly phrased, the consent of labor to maintain its legitimacy. The passage of the Labor Standard Law in 1984 and the more recent proposals to provide basic national health insurance and old-age pensions can all be interpreted as the state's responses to its legitimation crisis. The very fact that the state is in the midst of labor-capital conflict also suggests the weakness of Taiwanese capital. The continuous offenses from the state to lower the working standard and to tighten its grip on organized labor has, on the other hand, had the effect of further politicizing labor. More important, as emphasized by Marx and his followers, it is through class struggle that the workers become united and it is through struggle that the true color of the capital and the state can be discovered. The recent rise and fall of labor in Taiwan only indicates the struggle has just begun and no doubt it, with advances and setbacks, will continue into the future. 206 Notes 1. There were labor movements and labor associations in the colonial period, mainly organized by the People's Party (Min Chung Tang), but they did not have legal protection. In 1930, at the peak of the labor movement, there were 109 unions with 25 thousand members. Thereafter, following the banning of the People's Party by the colonial government, the labor movement also became virtually nonexistence (Weng 1992:1-220; Wu 1991:56-58; Yang 1988:255-304). 2. This and the estimate on the membership of the Taiwan Railroad Workers' Union are based on data in various sources for the later years. 3. The exceptions are the Chinese Seamen's Union which was organized at the national level with two local branches located in Keelung and Kaohsiung; the five major unions in the public sector (Taiwan Postal Workers' Unions, Taiwan Telecommunication Workers' Union, Taiwan Railway Workers' Union, Taiwan Highway Workers' Union, and Taiwan Petroleum Workers' Union); and industrial unions in the export processing zones which were organized at the regional level. 4. For lack of information, the membership of industrial unions does not include unionized workers in the Chinese Seamen's Unions and the five major public sector unions (see note 2 above). 5. Article 4 of the Labor Union Act reads; "persons employed at the various levels within the administrative agencies of the government, educational institutions, and military (defense) industries should not organize labor unions." (quoted from Chang 1989:21) 6. The inclusion of unionized workers in the export processing zones (two in Kaohsiung and one in Taichun) would raise the rate of unionization higher but should not affect the general pattern since they only occupied less than 2 percent of the total unionized workforce (see Table 7.2) • 7. For the following discussion I am largely indebted to the studies by Hsu (1989), Cheng (1988), Lee (1991), Hsiao (1992), Ho (1990), Mu (1987), and Yu (1977). 8. The Labor Union Act mandates that only one union and only one federation of unions is allowed in one administration area (craft union) or in one factory or industry (industrial union). Lateral association among local unions is prohibited. Once a local union or federation has been established there is no alternative for workers to choose from. 207 9. For example, article 36 of the Arbitration Act prohibits workers in nongevernment public utilities and transportation industries to strike under any labor management dispute, and workers in other industries cannot strike if the disputes are in arbitration process; article 14 of the Mobilization Act authorizes the government to prohibit strikes or related activities when it deems necessary; and article 11 of the PromUlgation on the Management of Agriculture, Mine, Industry, and Commerce in the Emergency Period gives the Ministry of Economic Affairs the power to prohibit strike and related activities in the above industries (Cheng 1988:49). 10. While demanding more allowance, especially year-end bonuses, is a clear sign that workers are more actively involved in struggle regarding their interests instead of "merely" defending their rights under the law, it is important to point out that for the majority of the workers the year-end bonus is considered as a custom or part of their renumeration (therefore their right) not an extra benefit that they should fight for (Chu, Wu, and Wu 1988:29). 11. At that time the Constitution of the Republic of China still guaranteed seats in national representative bodies (National Assembly and Legislature Yuan) for various special interest groups (businessmen, labor, farmers, fishermen, women, oversea Chinese, and aborigines) each voted for by their respective organizations. Subsequent constitution amendment has eliminated all but the guaranteed seats for the women, oversea Chinese, and aborigines. 12. The English translation of organizations listed here varies with authors. Here, I choose to follow those translations which are closest to their respective Chinese title, the translations in the parantheses represent their alternative English titles. 13. Two of the member unions have since been disbanded due to company reorganization (Lee 1991:110). 14. The following figures indicate the impact of plant closing in recent years (CTV News September 1993): # of plants closed # of workers in manufacturing affected 1990 9877 167909 1991 7017 119289 1992 11484 160776 208

CHAPTBR 8 COIlCLUDI!1'G IlBIIARKS summarizing the Past In contrast to the "dependent development" in Latin America or Africa, Taiwan's industrialization process resembles that of the classical nineteenth century industrialization in the West in several important aspects. It involves large-scale labor mobility from the agrarian to the industrial sector, absorption of a large proportion of the popUlation into the factory system of production, mobilization of young female workers to meet the huge labor demand from labor-intensive industries, and drastic alterations of family and community life. While students of Latin American development most frequently stress the "bloated tertiary sector" (Evans and Timberlake 1980) or the growth of "informal economiesti (Partes and Walton 1981; Bromley and Gerry 1979), the most striking feature of economic change in Taiwan has been the rapid proletarianization of its labor force. Unlike the classical Western experience, however, the rapid proletarianization process in Taiwan did not sacrifice the independent business sector in urban areas. Nonfarm self-employment persisted and even increased, both in absolute and relative terms, in tandem with the growth of urban industries. The early prOletarianization process 209 in Taiwan typically involved inter-generational mobility whereby sons and daughters of farmers became industrial wage workers. The clashes between artisan production and the factory syste.m of mass production, which determined the dominant character of the early European working-class movement, were generally absent in Taiwan's late industrialization. The first generation of Taiwanese industrial workers adapted to their industrial work rather smoothly and peacefully. What facilitated this smooth adaptation of the proletarianized workers was its dispersed and decentralized pattern of industrialization. Industrial development in Taiwan was not concentrated in a few urban centers but dispersed widely across urban and rural areas. The rural economy has been transformed as much as the urban economy has, as a large proportion of rural households was engaged simultaneously in agricultural and nonagricultural activities, thereby becoming "semi-proletarian" households. The prevalence of these semi-proletarian households not only eased the pressure of hyper-urbanization but also helped to reduce the reproduction cost of the working class. Closely related to this dispersed pattern of industrialization is the predominance of small- and medium size production units and extensive networks of subcontract production in Taiwan. An impressive array of small-scale 210 production units that developed in close linkage with the labor-intensive, low-paid, export-led industrialization provided the opportunities for many industrial workers to fulfill their entrepreneurial desires. To the extent that a fUll-fledged proletarianization in the west entailed a working class that was increasingly concentrated in the large-scale factory system subjected to intense disciplines, Taiwan's proletarianization process mirrors this earlier pattern only in magnitude and extensiveness but not necessarily in depth and intensity. The proletarian experience in Taiwan is extensive in the sense that it involved a majority of the labor force; yet it is not intensive in the sense that for many workers wage work represents only a transitory stage or part of the overall household income-earning strategy. One important factor that sustains this distinct pattern of proletarianization is the way in which women were incorporated into the labor market. Women constituted not only the major source of cheap labor power for the export industries but also the backbone of the family-based production system. The young women went to factories while older women became the unpaid family labor to support men's entrepreneurial ventures. In either way they have no control over the means of production. The pattern of women's proletarianization, furthermore, is necessarily determined by the dominant pattern of 211 industrialization. In the early period of light manufacturing export industries, young women were recruited in large numbers as factory operatives: the rate of proletarianization was faster among women than among male workers. As Taiwan's industrialization moved from the light manufacturing stage to a more mature stage, women's share in this segment of the proletarianized population declined proportionately. Simultaneously, the locus of women's proletarianization switched to routine clerical and sales occupations as more and more cheap labor was needed in the areas of capital realization than production. Men's trajectory of proletarianization, on the other hand, was more evenly spread across different industrial and occupational sectors. What further distinguished the women's from the men's proletarian experience is the fact that women were more likely, compared to men, to be recruited into the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Women were not only heavily recruited into the routinized blue- and white-collar jobs, they were also less likely than men to occupy the prestigious positions within each occupational grouping. Among the professional workers, for instance, despite a rapid increase of women, men have traditionally and continuously occupied jobs that yield more economic, social, and political power. Women, in other words, were subjected to double proletarianization in the sense that 212 they were both expropriated from the means of production and excluded from the authority hierarchy in the organizations of production. The class structure in Taiwan, as a result of this gender-biased pattern of proletarianization, is polarized in terms of gender with men predominately occupying the property-owning positions in the nonproletarian sector and the more prestigious and higher paid positions in the proletarian sector. Concomitant with the rise of wage employment, the internal composition of the Taiwanese working class has become more complex and diversified. Contrary to the common belief that Taiwan is merely a manufacturing platform, the proletarianization process in Taiwan is marked by a rapid increase of white-collar workers in recent decades. As in other instances, this increase of white-collar workers is accompanied by the feminization of white-collar work. Coupled with this increasing feminization of white-collar work, is an enlarging gap between a predominately male professional-managerial stratum and a predominately female stratum of routinized clerical and sales workers. Although working in a safer and cleaner environment, the market situations of this lower stratum of white-collar workers have become similar to those of the blue-collar workers. The traditional division between manual and nonmanual, blue-collar and white-collar has become blurred. The working class in 21.3 Taiwan is now composed of those workers with blue-, white-, gray-, and pink-collar appearances. Underneath these appearances, nonetheless, is their shared position in the production and distribution processes. While the horizontal line between occupations is breaking down, a vertical differentiation based on employment sector has emerged within the working class as an enlarging disparity of market situations between workers in the large and small-medium sized enterprises was observed in the last decade. The internal structure of the working class has become more complex. The dispersion and decentralization of industrialization, the fluidity of class structure, the intermittent character of wage employment, and the increasing internal complexities of the working class all worked against the forging of a working-class identity and the development of any strong working-class movement in Taiwan. While these structural conditions set the background for the underdevelopment of working-class political power, a more powerful and more immediate deterrent, was provided by the state-party corporatist control over the working class. As we have seen in recent years, despite the fluidity of class structure, despite the presence of hyperproletariat, Taiwan's labor movement surged up as the political control of KMT-state dwindled. The transition from a "hard" to a "soft" authoritarian 214 regime in the 1980s (Winckler 1984) provided the political space for an independent labor movement to emerge in the late 1980s. While this "forward march of labor" has slowed down in the last few years due to subversive strategies used by the state-capital coalition from above, and by ideological fragmentations occurring within the working class, the seed for a potentially more explosive stage of labor movement was planted by these recent worker struggles and their politicizing effect on the working class. Coinciding with this changing political atmosphere is the changing economic environment in the last decade. As the decline of agriCUlture continued, as the opportunity to become one's own boss diminished, and as the income of independent producers continued to attenuate, the workers' expectations toward wage employment also changed. Wage work has become a more permanent way of life for an increasing number of people. Consequently, despite the temporarily setback of the newly emerged labor movement, the working class in Taiwan seems to have no other choices but to continue its struggle for political power so as to protect its basic economic well-being. To reiterate, three decades of proletarianization has transformed the working class in Taiwan from a class consisting predominately of male blue-collar workers to a class that consists of workers in diverse appearances. 215 Demographically, this working class has matured as its members have become more educated, older, less transient, and increasingly coming from a proletarian background. Politically, the working class has shown signs of translating its members' common economic and social predicaments into collective actions. The structural constraints--the disperse and decentralized industrial structure, the repressive political system--that prohibited the social and cultural formation of the working class have softened, though by no means disappeared. And the future trajectory of the working-class movement in Taiwan will be determined by the actions of capital and the KMT-state as much as by the actions of the working class. contemplating the Future Full-fledged proletarianization in the core economies in the twentieth century is as much a result of the capitalist strategy as a consequence of the labor market demand for wage labor. While the proletarian labor system may be the most efficient way to organize production, it is not the most cost-effective method, because the burden of reproducing the labor power has to be born exclusively by the buyers of the labor power. 1 The demands for higher wages and better working conditions heightened as workers became dependent on wage employment as their only means of supporting themselves and their families. Pressure to 216 intensify the proletarianization process, then, primarily came not from capital but from labor. It was the strength of the working class that determined the pace and the extent of proletarianization. In the core economies the outcomes of working-class struggles against capitalist expl.9itation were threefold: 1) the relative and absolute inctrease in wages as workers demanded a bigger share of the surplus value that they produced, 2) the expansion of indirect payments--fringe benefits, and most important, 3) the institutionalization of the wage-employment relation, limiting the freedom of employers to hire and fire workers arbitrarily (Portes 1983). In return, workers gave up their claims on autonomy in work relations and on control over the labor process. The result is a working class that has as much entrenched interest in the success of capitalism as the capitalist class has. For capital, this upgrading of material returns for the working-class was an acceptable compromise, since it paved the way for a mass consumption-mass production mode of development. That is, the strategy of capital accumulation changed but capital was still able to accumulate, at least for a limited period of time. Furthermore, so long as the "extensive" mode of accumulation can be exported to other low-waged (due to the incomplete proletarian process) areas, the capitalists (or at least the international segment of it) can enjoy the double benefits of "intensive 217 accumulation" at home and "extensive accumulation" abroad. This is, of course, a combination of Fordist and peripheral Fordist modes of accumulation as advocated by the now popular "accumulation school" perspective. since the 1970s, however, as many scholars suggest, this Fordist mode of development is breaking down and moving into a "flexible accumulation" mode of development (Harvey 1990; Lash and Urry 1987). Under this emerging mode of capitalist development, accumulation of capital is based on a more individualistic form of consumption, as contrasted to the mass consumption pattern under the Fordist mode of development. The production part of the equation, therefore, also shifted to accommodate this shift in consumption patterns, with increasing emphasis on the flexible deployment of capital and labor. In order to accomplish this, however, the old regime of Fordist accumulation (big capital and especially big labor) has to be dismantled, thus the so called deindustrialization and the onslaught on working-class power, reSUlting in the re peripheralization of the core (Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987; Sassen 1988; Sassen-Koob 1982). While this Western experience will not be simply replayed in a newly industrialized economy like Taiwan (see Amsden 1990), it serves to show the capacity of the working class to influence its own destiny and, unfortunately, its limitations as well. As mentioned in the last chapter, a 218 similar process is occurring in Taiwan. While the political liberation has removed some constraints on working-class mobilization, it has also enhanced the mobility of capital to a great extent. Insofar as Taiwan's working class has achieved some initial success in advancing their material returns and security, Taiwan's capital has quickly responded with counter-attacks that directly and indirectly (through pressuring the state) threatened those gains. The counter strategies of capital include such actions as moving production to other less industrialized and less proletarianized countries (Southeast Asia and China) in the name of diversifying markets and minimizing business risk, and importing labor from low-wage areas (Thailand, the Philippines, and China in particUlar), legally as well as illegally, in the name of a labor shortage. Insofar as the working class has gathered some political strength, the KMT-state showed little hesitation in renewing its grip on the working class. In response to the demands of capital, state officials' rhetoric and actions are increasingly focused on the "need" to maintain a business-friendly environment so as to safeguard the national interests, the "need" to have an open-shop so as to extend the liberty of the people. 2 Without doubt, some of these actions are partly in response to the pressures of increasing competition from other lower-wage countries, the escalating protectionism from the 219 core economies, and the heightening of environmental consciousness; but they are certainly a direct response to the rising cost of reproducing the working class. If the well-established working-class movements in the West are relatively powerless against this new wave of capitalist accumulation strategies, Taiwan's workers seem even more defenseless. The hopes, however, can still be found in the characteristics of the working class that is still in the process of formation. As capital is becoming internationalized, the working-class movement cannot stay within its national boundary. As the state and capital are forming an alliance, the working-class movement cannot stay isolated. While it is important for Taiwan's working class to improve its internal solidarity and collective consciousness in order to become a cohesive national movement, it is equally important to search and reach out for new allies from other social forces. A viable strategy for labor is to adopt what Waterman calls "social-movement unionism" (1991; see also Scipes 1992}, a new union movement characterized by increasing cooperation of the workers' movement with other local, national, and international progressive movements and organizations in public as well as in private domains. The future success and survival of an independent, autonomous working-class movement, therefore, lies in its ability to link its concerns with other social and political causes that are 220 emerging in Taiwan today. To borrow the now popular post structuralist language, the future for Taiwan's working class lies in its ability to articulate new terrains of struggles. 221 Notes 1. The increasing reponsibility of the state for education and welfare, in this respect, represents a redistribution of these costs back to the workers by way of increasing taxation for all the population. 2. The existing union Acts mandate that workers have to join the union if one exists in the workplace: the new KMT's version of Union Acts, still pending approval by the legislature, stipulates an open-shop pOlicy citing people's freedom of choice. 222 APPENDIX A TABLES

Table 3.1 Sectoral Distribution of Employed population, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Agriculture 48.30 38.20 30.83 20.39 12.21 Industry 17.97 21.12 33.66 42.93 44.05 Manufacturing 10.54 12.67 22.25 29.24 30.34 Tertiary 33.12 35.07 35.51 36.68 43.74 Service 26.66 25.49 22.54 21. 71 20.99 Unclassified 0.60 5.61 Total (in 1000) 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 3085 4164 5845 6667 8726

Sources: 1956, 1966, and 1980 from the Census of Population and Housing in Taiwan and Fukien Areas of respective years; 1975 from the 1975 Sample Census of Population and Housing in Taiwan and Fukein Areas; 1990 from the Yearbook of Manpower Statistics, 1990. 223 Table 3.2 Parm and Honfar.a Households Income Differentiation and Income Source. of Para Households, 1914-1990

1964 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Farm Households Income as % of Non-farm Householdsa 96.59 67.09 75.40 81.57 81.45 78.70 % of Farm Household Income Derived from Agriculture 64.70 48.69 45.26 24.81 24.76 20.10

Source: Report on the survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1990. aAverage Disposable Income Per Household. 224 Table 3.3 Employment structure in the Labor Porce, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Wage Workers 41.12 47.48 55.45 61.88 68.11 Non-Agricultural Wage Workers 36.65 44.63 51. 74 60.08 66.72 Self Employeda 30.77 26.71 24.57 26.94 21.92 Non-Agricultural Self Employed 8.75 9.25 11.03 14.26 14.82 Unpaid Family Workers 19.43 16.37 15.18 7.04 8.39 Non-Agricultural Family Workers 1.82 2.12 3.08 1.96 4.86 Unemployed 8.68 9.45 4.79 4.14 1.58 Total (in 1000) 100.00 100.01 99.99 100.00 100.00 3378 4598 6139 6955 8866

Sources: See Table 3.1. alncludes own-account workers and employers. 225 Table 3.4 The Humber and percentage of wage workers within Each sector, 19S6-ii90

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Agriculture No. of Wage Workers (in 1000) 150 131 228 125 123 % Wage Workers 10.10 8.22 12.66 9.21 11.55 Industry No. of Wage Workers (in 1000) 416 729 1704 2421 3287 % Wage Workers 75.00 82.86 86.60 84.60 85.51 Tertiary No. of Wage Workers (in 1000) 807 1094 1472 1757 2629 % Wage Workers 78.96 74.95 70.92 71.86 68.87

Sources: See Table 3.1. 226 Table 3.5 Percentage of Income Derived from Wage Employment in Parm and Nonfarm Households, 1975-1990

1975 1980 1985 1990

Agricultural Self-Employed 34.88 50.24 37.67 34.33 Nonagricultural Self-Employed 12.06 12.06 14.04 15.89 Agricultural Employees 83.31 86.34 89.65 89.11 Nonagricultural Employees .. 84.14 89.08 89.70 90.88

Sources: Calculated from Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, various issues. 227 Table 3.6 Female Labor Porce Participation and Labor Market Distribution Pattern, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Labor Force Participation Rate Male 84.09 73.00 77.97 76.26 75.47 Female 20.29 20.55 34.05 30.79 44.52 Percent Female among Labor Force 17.12 22.22 29.21 27.28 35.69 Percent Wage Workers among Each Gender Group Male 44.25 50.84 57.89 59.77 66.60 Female 25.97 35.66 49.55 67.48 70.82 Percent Female among all Wage Workers 10.79 16.69 26.10 29.75 36.92 Percent Female among Manufacturing Wage Workers 16.94 25.04 39.42 40.41 43.40

Sources: See Table 3.1. 228 Table 3.7 Age structure of the Wage and Salary Workers, 1966-1980

Wage Workers in Wage Workers Manufacturing ------1966 1975 1980 1966 1975

Total - 19 16.99 15.90 15.06 34.48 29.76 20 - 24 15.37 25.09 25.25 12.26 22.32 25 - 29 12.09 13.22 17.91 14.68 14.27 30 - 54 51.86 40.95 35.45 36.21 30.86 55+ 3.69 4.84 6.33 2.38 2.79 Male - 19 11.84 10.52 10.57 24.60 19.74 20 - 24 14.47 22.74 22.56 9.94 15.99 25 - 29 12.37 13.56 18.16 17.53 18.65 30 - 54 57.22 47.14 40.37 44.88 41.46 55+ 4.09 6.04 8.34 3.05 4.15 Female - 19 43.86 31.17 25.69 64.04 45.16 20 - 24 20.05 31.76 31.60 19.19 32.04 25 - 29 10.63 12.25 17.32 6.12 7.54 30 - 54 23.86 23.38 23.81 10.27 14.56 55+ 1.59 1.44 1.57 0.37 0.70

Sources: See Table 3.1. 229 Table 3.8 Employment status of Bach Age Cohort by Adult population in Taiwan, 1970-1990

Wage Self Family Unem- House Workers Employed Workers ployed Keeping Other

1970 15 - 24 30.63 3.77 13.98 6.48 15.78 29.36 25 - 34 30.58 19.21 11.68 0.88 35.37 2.28 35 - 44 35.73 24.88 7.32 0.41 30.27 1.39 45 - 54 33.53 26.23 4.62 0.95 30.44 4.23 55 - 64 16.54 26.47 2.90 0.58 32.42 21.09 65 - 3.03 10.36 0.91 0.16 19.82 65.72 1980 15 - 24 43.29 3.14 4.44 5.45 11.17 32.51 25 - 34 41.65 16.98 5.12 1.45 31.60 3.20 35 - 44 31.69 27.73 4.35 0.48 33.94 1.81 45 - 54 31.26 27.17 3.44 0.64 32.41 5.08 55 - 64 21.85 21.26 1.97 0.63 31.04 23.25 65 - 3.78 10.53 0.75 0.12 20.68 64.14 1990a 15 - 24 30.23 2.27 3.29 6.40 7.11 50.70 25 - 34 48.24 13.56 5.17 2.06 24.73 6.25 35 - 44 42.06 22.77 3.69 0.68 27.44 3.36 45 - 54 30.34 27.22 4.23 0.50 32.04 5.67 55 - 64 18.84 22.98 3.73 0.34 30.96 23.14 65 - 3.88 11.15 1.33 0.09 18.84 64.70

Sources: 1970 and 1980 see Table 3.1; 1990 from An Extract Report on the 1990 Census of Population and Housing. aOoe s not include armed forces. 230 Table 3.9 Distribution of Employed Persons and Wage Worker9 by size of Establishments, 1980-1990

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990

All Employed 1 9 54.30 55.61 55.59 54.63 52.06 52.88 10 - 29 10.57 10.76 11.67 10.99 12.96 13.71 30 - 49 4.58 4.24 4.81 4.78 5.66 5.70 50 - 99 5.17 5.50 5.12 5.39 5.48 5.59 100-499 8.76 8.17 8.08 9.00 8.85 7.13 500- 4.66 2.88 3.45 3.38 3.49 3.43 state 11.95 12.83 11.28 11.83 11.51 11.55 Total (in 1000) 6652 6950 7426 7868 8273 8371 All Wage Workers 1 9 31.14 32.75 32.89 31.70 31.43 31.91 10 - 29 15.04 15.54 16.55 15.75 17.64 18.98 30 - 49 6.82 6.40 7.23 7.13 8.08 8.25 50 - 99 7.87 8.38 7.90 8.17 7.87 8.14 100-499 13.48 12.57 12.51 13.81 12.95 10.52 500- 7.19 4.46 5.36 5.19 5.12 5.08 state 18.45 19.89 17.56 18.24 16.91 17.12 Total (in 1000) 4309 4485 4773 5104 5629 5648 Wage Workers in Manufacturing 1 9 18.58 21.38 22.70 22.89 21.87 22.28 10 - 29 15.04 18.34 18.38 17.55 17.76 19.75 30 - 49 9.96 9.40 10.89 10.69 12.29 12.34 50 - 99 13.45 14.70 12.87 12.99 13.09 13.00 100-499 24.23 22.87 21.60 23.43 21.83 19.44 500- 13.81 8.48 9.93 9.21 9.62 9.59 state 4.93 4.83 3.63 3.25 3.55 3.60 Subtotal (in 1000) 1948 1946 2176 2433 2506 2253

Sources: Monthly Bulletin of Labor Statistics, various issues. 231 Table 3.10 occupational composition of Waq. Workers, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Managerial and Professional 7.22 11.82 9.23 9.91 10.93 Clerical and Sales 15.44 20.01 17.98 21.33 27.46 Service 41.14 22.77 22.98 18.86 15.49 Production 26.19 39.97 43.50 47.35 44.18 Agriculture 10.01 5.41 6.29 2.55 1.94 Total (in 1000) 100.00 99.98 99.98 100.00 100.00 1389 2183 3404 4304 6039

Sources: See Table 3.1. 232 Table 4.1 Self Employed by Gen4er, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Women 15.35 15.39 13.38 14.11 10.31 men 33.95 29.94 29.19 31.76 28.37 Percentile Difference -18.60 -14.56 -15.81 -17.64 -18.06 Sex Ratio in Self Employed 9.34 14.68 18.92 16.67 20.16 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Self Employed and Labor Force -11. 31 -13.89 -22.35 -20.84 -35.34

Sources: See Table 3.1. 233 Table 4.2 Self Employed by Gender in Nonagricultural aDd Agricultural Labor Porce6 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Nonagricultural Labor Force Women 12.07 10.31 11.17 10.66 8.71 men 16.20 15.18 17.33 20.60 21.52 Percentile Difference - 4.13 - 4.87 - 6.16 - 9.94 -12.81 Sex Ratio in Self Employed 12.19 18.34 24.63 21.02 23.26 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Self Employed and Labor Force - 4.17 - 8.67 -13.58 -19.61 -34.21 Agricultural Employed Women 18.14 23.88 17.86 34.02 24.61 men 58.41 58.87 60.02 72.87 73.76 Percentile Difference -40.27 -34.99 -42.16 -38.86 -49.16 Sex Ratio in Self Employed 8.25 12.83 14.63 12.14 14.16 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Self Employed and Labor Force -18.32 -18.80 -34.55 -13.86 -28.28

Sources: See Table 3.1. 234

Table 4.3 Unpai4 Family Workers by Gen4er, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Women 43.60 30.06 30.49 12.46 17.23 men 14.38 12.46 8.87 5.00 3.49 Percentile Difference 29.22 17.60 21.63 7.45 13.74 Sex Ratio in Unpaid Family Workers 62.63 68.95 141. 91 93.39 273.87 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Unpaid Family Workers and Labor Force 41.98 40.38 100.65 55.88 218.37

Sources: See Table 3.1. 235 Table ..... unpaid Puaily Workers by Gender in Nonagricultural and Agricultural Labor porce, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Nonagricultural Labor Force Women 6.93 5.81 9.38 4.18 11.80 men 2.54 2.47 2.45 1.74 1.92 Percentile Difference 4.38 3.34 6.93 2.44 9.89 Sex Ratio in unpaid Family Workers 44.59 63.57 146.06 97.75 353.68 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Unpaid Family Workers and Labor Force 28.22 36.56 107.84 57.12 296.21 Agricultural Employed Women 74.74 70.64 73.12 60.14 65.93 men 30.69 32.03 25.53 17.04 13.92 Percentile Difference 44.05 38.60 47.60 43.10 52.01 Sex Ratio in Unpaid Family Workers 64.69 69.76 140.88 91.75 200.96 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between unpaid Family Workers and Labor Force 38.13 38.13 91.70 65.75 158.53

Sources: See Table 3.1. 236 Table 4.5 waqe Workers by Gender, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Women 25.94 35.66 49.54 67.48 70.82 men 44.27 50.85 57.89 59.78 66.60 Percentile Difference -18.33 -15.19 - 8.35 7.70 4.23 Sex Ratio in Wage Workers 12.10 20.04 35.31 42.34 59.02 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Waqe Workers and Labor Force - 8.55 - 8.54 - 5.95 4.83 3.52

Sources: See Table 3.1. 237 Table 4.6 Gender and Class Pactions of Wage Workers, 1956-1"0

1956 1.966 1975 1980 1990

Managerial Women 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.20 0.19 Men 0.65 0.51 0.89 0.79 1.00 % Difference - 0.56 - 0.43 - 0.62 - 0.59 - 0.81 Professional and Technical Women 3.86 4.98 5.40 7.56 8.19 Men 2.12 4.89 4.00 4.73 5.93 % Difference 1.74 0.09 1.40 2.83 2.25 Clerical and Sales Women 4.36 7.10 12.81 21.18 26.79 Men 6.76 10.19 8.80 10.20 14.23 % Difference - 2.40 - 3.09 4.02 10.98 12056 operatives Women 7.38 11.71 23.36 31.97 27.29 Men 11.47 21.46 24.44 28.30 31.66 % Difference - 4.09 - 9.75 - 1.08 3.66 - 4.37 Service Women 6.46 9.85 4.82 5.83 7.47 Men 19.09 11.09 16.02 13.87 12.26 % Difference -12.63 - 1.24 -11.20 - 8.04 - 4.79 238 Table 4.6 (continued) GeDder and Class Factions of Wage Workers, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Service (excluding Military Personnel) Women 6.08 9.65 4.55 5.54 7.33 Men 2.11 2.53 2.85 2.63 2.98 % Difference 3.97 7.12 1.71 2.92 4.35 Agriculture Women 3.79 1.95 2.88 0.74 0.92 Men 4.17 2.75 3.74 1.89 1.54 % Difference - 0.39 - 0.80 - 0.86 - 1.15 - 0.63 Manual Women 17.63 23.51 31.05 38.54 35.68 Men 34.73 35.28 44.19 44.06 45.47 % Difference -17.10 -11. 77 -13.14 - 5.52 - 9.78 Manual (excluding Military Personnel) Women 17.25 23.31 30.79 38.25 35.54 Men 17.75 26.72 31.02 32.82 35.19 % Difference - 0.50 - 3.41 - 0.23 5.43 - 0.65

Sources: See Table 3.1. 239 Table 4.7 Percentile Differences in Sex Ratio between Class Factions of Wage Workers and the Labor Force, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Managerial 2.72 4.29 12.70 9.53 10.53 Differences with the Labor Force -17.94 -24.30 -28.56 -27.98 -45.00 Professional and Technical 37.61 29.11 55.67 59.92 76.63 Differences with the Labor Force 16.96 0.52 14.41 22.41 21.10 Clerical and Sales 13.31 19.92 60.08 77.86 104.56 Differences with the Labor Force - 7.34 - 8.67 18.82 40.35 49.04 Operatives 13.29 15.60 39.45 42.36 47.87 Differences with the Labor Force - 7.36 -12.99 - 1.82 4.86 - 7.66 Service 6.99 25.39 12.42 15.77 33.83 Differences with the Labor Force -13.66 - 3.20 -28.85 -21. 74 -21. 69 Service (excluding Military Personnel) 59.49 109.22 66.03 79.15 136.47 Differences with the Labor Force 38.83 80.63 24.77 41.64 80.95 Agriculture 18.74 20.29 31. 73 14.76 32.95 Differences with the Labor Force - 1.91 - 8.30 - 9.54 -22.74 -22.57

Sources: See Table 3.1. 240 Table 4.8 Sex Ratios of Selected Teaching Profession, 1950-1990

1950-51 1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1989-90

Elementary School Teachers 43.82 59.82 74.40 102.76 145.88 Secondary School Teachers 19.10 24.60 50.15 83.55 102.88 University and Junior College Professors 8.55 20.60 27.78 38.06 44.45 Special Education Teachers 48.39 110.13 138.55 137.81 201,20 All Teaching Professiona 36.04 50.31 61.39 91.31 120.02 Percentile Differences of Sex Ratio with All Teaching Profession Elementary School Teachers 7.79 9.51 13.00 11.44 25.86 Secondary School Teachers -16.93 -25.71 -11. 24 - 7.76 -17.14 University and Junior College Professors -27.48 -29.71 -33.61 -53.25 -75.57 Special Education Teachers 12.35 59.82 77.16 46.50 81.18

Sources: Education statistics of Taiwan, various years. arncludes kindergarten teachers. 241 Table 4.9 Sex Ratios of Students in Medical and Health Related Field of Study by Level of Education, 1975-1990

1975-76 1979-80 1985-6 1989-90

University 33.43 38.85 36.54 47.26 Junior College 208.26 306.52 370.74 429.70 Total Students in Health Related study 102.81 123.67 127.29 159.88 Total Students in Tertiary Education 58.11 66.21 76.20 83.71 Percentile Difference in Sex Ratios with all Students in Health Related Study University - 69.38 - 84.82 - 90.75 -112.62 Junior College 105.45 182.85 243.45 269.82 Percentile Difference in Sex Ratios with all Students in Tertiary Education University - 24.69 - 27.37 - 39.66 - 36.45 Junior College 150.15 240.30 294.54 345.99

Sources: See Table 4.8. 242 Table 4.10 Age and Employment status of Male and Female Adult Population in Taiwan, 1970-1980

Wage Self Family Unem- House Workers Employed Workers ployed Keeping other

Male 1970 15 - 24 39.61 5.20 14.38 6.55 0.19 34.07 25 - 34 50.89 32.96 11.47 1.36 0.05 3.27 35 - 44 56.92 37.65 2.70 0.69 0.07 1.97 45 - 54 52.90 38.53 0.90 1.59 0.21 5.87 55 - 64 28.19 43.93 1.11 1.05 1.23 24.49 65 - 5.95 21.56 1.06 0.35 2.68 68.40 1980 15 - 24 48.94 4.63 5.62 5.85 0.16 34.80 25 - 34 58.90 28.17 6.34 2.00 0.16 4.43 35 - 44 47.70 46.01 2.64 0.80 0.20 2.65 45 - 54 48.38 41. 63 1.07 1.08 0.63 7.21 55 - 64 34.81 32.74 0.85 1.06 1.91 28.63 65 - 6.99 19.47 0.69 0.24 2.61 70.00 Female 1970 15 - 24 21.18 2.26 13.56 6.42 32.17 24.42 25 - 34 10.09 5.33 11.90 0.39 71.01 1.28 35 - 44 8.63 8.54 13.23 0.04 68.90 0.66 45 - 54 6.07 8.80 9.88 0.03 73.30 1.92 55 - 64 2.46 5.34 5.06 0.01 70.14 16.99 65 - 0.65 1.25 0.78 0.00 33.77 63.55 1980 15 - 24 37.40 1.58 3.21 5.03 22.65 30.13 25 - 34 23.39 5.12 3.83 0.87 64.90 1.89 35 - 44 14.89 8.56 6.14 0.14 69.33 0.94 45 - 54 8.94 8.30 6.52 0.06 73.85 2.33 55 - 64 3.85 5.33 3.52 0.03 71.46 15.81 65 - 0.58 1.61 0.81 0.01 38.72 58.27

Sources: See Table 3.1. 243 Table 5.1 Distribution of Wage and Salary Workers by Manual and Nonmanual occupations, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Nonmanual Workers 22.67 31.20 27.22 31.23 38.39 Managerial and Administrative 1.34 0.87 1.29 1.01 1.04 Professional and Technical 5.88 10.33 7.95 8.89 9.88 Clerical 12.73 17.13 13.98 17.17 19.39 Sales 2.72 2.87 4.00 4.16 8.08 Manual Workers 77.33 68.80 72.78 68.77 61.61 Production Workers 26.18 40.61 43.50 47.35 44.17 Service Workers 41.16 22.77 22.99 18.87 15.47 State Protective Workers 34.37 14.11 16.96 13.34 8.83 Farm Workers 9.99 5.42 6.29 2.55 1.97 Total (in 1000) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1389 2183 3404 4304 6040

Sources: See Table 3.1. 244 Table 5.2 Distribution of Waqe and salary Workers by supervisory and Nonsupervisory Positions, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1970 1975 1980 1990

Managerial and__asupervisory Workers 3.36 5.67 8.14 9.09 Managerial and Administrative 1.34 0.87 0.91 1.29 1.01 1.04 Supervisors in Clerical and Sales 1.73 2.93 5.11 6.61 Supervisors in service and Production 0.71 1.43 1.97 1.42 Farmers and Farm Managers 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 Nonsupervisory Workers 96.64 94.32 91.86 90.91 Professional and Technical 5.88 10.33 7.83 7.95 8.89 9.88 Clerical and Sales 15.47 15.05 16.22 20.86 Production Workers 34.91 42.41 45.56 42.88 Service Workers 27.47 22.64 18.69 15.34 Farm Laborers 5.41 10.96 6.27 2.50 1.95 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Sources: See Table 3.1. a __ denotes no data. 245 Table 5.3 Industrial Distribution of Wage Workers, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1975 1980 1990

Agriculture 10.83 5.99 6.70 2.91 2.04 Industry 29.93 33.38 50.06 56.27 54.43 Manufacturing 16.74 19.48 32.84 38.75 38.12 Other Industriesa 13.19 13.90 17.21 17.51 16.31 Tertiary 58.07 50.13 43.24 40.82 43.53 Commerce & Finance 3.75 5.63 8.16 10.72 17.27 Service 54.32 44.50 35.08 30.10 26.26 Unclassified 1.16 10.49 Total (in 1000) 99.99 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 1389 2183 3404 4304 6039

Sources: See Table 3.1. aOther industries include m~n~ng, construction, utilities, and transportation and communication. 246 Table 5.4 civilian wage workers in Industrial Sector by occupation and by Size of workplace, 1990

1-9 10-29 30-99 100-299 300-499 500- Total

White-Collar 25.28 27.52 26.86 26.28 24.64 38.40 29.07 Managerial 7.25 5.93 4.37 2.86 2.47 2.15 3.86 Supervisory 0.88 1.97 3.42 4.59 4.25 6.07 3.89 Professionals 0.84 2.11 2.24 2.41 2.73 5.80 2.98 Technicians 5.11 5.88 5.83 5.95 5.67 8.24 6.33 Clerical and Sales 11.20 11.63 11.00 10.47 9.52 16.15 12.01 Clerical 10.04 10.08 9.50 9.02 8.27 14.76 10.59 Sales 1.16 1.55 1.50 1.45 1.25 1.38 1.42 Blue-Collar 74.72 72.47 73.14 73.73 75.36 61.60 70.92 Skilled 38.01 35.16 33.81 32.76 37.93 25.34 32.66 Semi-Skilled 30.88 29.77 31.61 33.44 30.43 28.56 30.84 Services Workers and Other Laborers 5.83 7.54 7.72 7.53 7.00 7.70 7.42 Total (in 1000) 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.01 100.00 100.00 99.99 252 484 709 633 293 681 3052

Sources: Report on the Occupation Wage Survey 1990. 247 Table 5.5 Civilian Wage workers in Tertiary Sector by occupation and by size of Workplace, 1990

1-9 10-29 30-99 100-299 300-499 500- Total

White-Collar 74.04 80.21 78.16 80.73 83.71 86.34 79.17 Managerial 11.29 11. 73 10.57 8.72 8.31 5.56 9.97 Supervisory 3.85 4.50 6.48 7.09 7.15 6.14 5.20 Professional and Technical Workers 7.82 12.36 13.02 23.09 28.13 27.29 15.15 Clerical and Sales 51.09 51. 63 48.09 41.83 40.12 47.35 48.85 Clerical 22.28 25.39 27.84 29.68 31. 96 45.66 28.82 Sales 28.81 26.34 20.25 12.15 8.16 1.69 20.03 Blue-Collar 25.95 19.78 21.84 19.27 16.29 13.66 20.83 Skilled 10.48 7.67 6.32 3.70 2.47 2.69 6.95 Services Workers and Other Laborers 15.48 12.11 15.52 15.57 13.81 10.97 13.88 Service 14.20 10.40 14.00 12.75 11.87 9.07 12.18 Laborers 1.28 1. 71 1.52 2.82 1.94 1.90 1.69 Total (in 1000) 99.99 99.99 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 403 300 181 124 46 213 1267

Sources: See Table 5.4. 248 Table 5.6 Civilian Wage workers in xndustrial Sector by occupation, 1980 and 1990

1980 1990

White-Collar 19.21 29.07 Managers 2.10 3.86 Supervisors 3.34 3.89 Professionals 1.50 2.98 Technicians and other Paraprofessionals 3.29 6.33 Clerical and Sales Workers 8.98 12.01 Blue-Collar 80.79 70.92 Skilled 28.85 32.66 Semi-Skilled 44.88 30.84 Services Workers and Other Laborers 7.06 7.42 Service 3.45 Laborers 7.06 3.97 Total (in 1000) 100.00 99.99 2620 3052

Sources: Report on the Occupation Wage Survey 1980 and 1990. a __ denotes no data. 249 Table 5.7 Distribution of Own-Account Workers by occupations, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1970 1975 1980 1990

Nonfarm Workers 24.43 29.50 33.08 37.56 44.54 59.99 Professional and Technical 0.95 1. 01 1.20 1.18 1.50 1.88 Managerial and Administrative 0.01 0.83 0.26 1.65 0 0 Clerical and Sales 16.42 17.43 20.61 23.07 22.22 28.73 supervisors__a 7.37 7.95 11.77 10.86 17.45 Routine Clerical 10.06 12.66 11.30 11.35 11.28 Production 5.97 8.58 8.69 9.03 16.14 19.32 Production Foremen 0.08 0.02 0.49 0.32 Regular Production Workers 8.61 9.01 15.65 19.00 Service 1.08 1.64 2.30 2.63 4.68 10.05 Service Supervisors 0.30 0.77 0.33 5.25 Service Workers 2.00 1.86 4.35 4.80 Farm Workers 75.57 70.50 66.92 62.44 55.46 40.01 Farmers and Farm Managers 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.28 0.06 Farm Laborers 70.49 66.88 62.41 55.18 39.95 Total (in 1000) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 953 1109 1244 1284 1537 1542

Sources: See Table 3.1. a __ denotes no data. 250 Table 5.8 Distribution of unpaid Family Workers by occupations, 1956-1990

1956 1966 1970 1975 1980 1990

Nonfarm Workers 9.33 12.71 15.59 20.35 27.98 58.09 Professional and Technical 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.42 0.65 0.54 Managerial and Administrative 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.30 0 0 Clerical and Sales 4.53 6.91 8.27 11.66 13.38 31.80 Clerical Supervisors __a 0.43 0.30 0.78 0.93 0.54 Routine Clerical 6.48 7.97 10.87 12.45 31.26 Production 3.39 4.13 5.14 6.01 10.60 14.69 Production Foremen 0.05 0.16 0.31 0.13 Regular Production Workers 5.08 5.85 10.29 14.56 Service 1.10 1.31 1. 72 1.96 3.35 11.05 Service supervisors 0.05 0.04 0.06 0 service Workers 1.67 1. 92 3.29 11.05 Farm Workers 90.67 87.29 84.41 79.65 72.02 41.91 Farmers and Farm Managers 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.16 0 Farm Laborers 87.29 84.38 79.65 71.86 41.91 Total (in 1000) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 656 753 829 932 489 742

Sources: See Table 3.1. a __ denotes no data. 251 Table 5.9 working-class categories in Taiwan, 1956-1990 (by total labor force)

1956 1966 1970 1975 1980 1990

Professional-Managerial Workers 2.97 5.32 4.47 5.12 6.13 7.45 Clerical and Sales Workers 6.35 9.50 8.80 9.97 13.20 18.72 Supervisory and Semi-autonomous __a 1.71 0.94 2.07 3.31 5.70 Routine Clerical and Sales Wor)~ers 7.79 7.84 7.90 9.89 13.02 Production Workers 10.77 19.30 18.15 24.12 29.30 30.11 Supervisory 0.29 0.60 1.11 0.88 Nonsupervisory 17.86 23.52 28.19 29.23 Service Workers (exclude State Protective Workers) 2.83 4.15 3.21 3.49 3.70 4.85 Supervisory 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.09 Nonsupervisory 3.14 3.30 3.59 4.76 State Protective Workers (include Armed Forces) 14.10 6.66 10.92 9.26 7.97 5.69 Farm 4.11 2.57 5.61 3.49 1.58 1.34 Farmers and Farm Managers 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 Farm Laborers 2.57 5.60 3.48 1.55 1. 33 252 Table 5.9 (Continued) working-class categories in Taiwan, 1956-1990 (by total labor force) 253 Table 5.10 working Classes in Taiwan, 1956-1990 (by total labor force)

1956 1966 1970 1975 1980 1990

Manual Workers 31.81 32.67 37.89 40.36 42.56 42.00 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 17.71 26.01 26.97 31.10 34.59 36.31 Nonfarm 27.70 30.10 32.28 36.87 40.98 40.66 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 13.60 23.44 21.36 27.61 33.01 34.97 Manual Nonsupervisory Workers __a 37.52 39.56 41.30 41.01 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 26.60 30.30 33.33 35.32 Nonfarm 31.92 36.08 39.75 39.68 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 21.00 26.82 31.78 33.99 Manual and Routine White-Collar Workers 38.16 42.18 46.70 50.33 55.75 60.72 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 24.06 35.52 35.78 41.07 47.78 55.03 Nonfarm 34.05 39.61 41.08 46.84 54.17 59.37 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 19.95 32.95 30.16 37.58 46.20 53.68 254 Table 5.10 (Continued) working Classes in Taiwan, 1956-1990 (by Total Labor Force)

1956 1966 1970 1975 1980 1990

Manual and Routine White-Collar Nonsupervisory Workers 45.36 47.46 51.19 54.03 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 34.44 38.20 43.22 48.34 Nonfarm 39.76 43.98 49.64 52.70 (excluding the state Protective Workers) 28.84 34.72 41.67 47.01 Disguised Wage Workersb 38.40 32.62 26.02 21.33 Farm 31.29 30.26 25.15 17.26 10.46 Nonfarm 8.14 7.47 8.76 10.86 Unemployed 8.68 9.45 4.58 4.79 4.14 1.58

Sources: See Table 3.1. a __ danotes no data. blncludes own-account and unpaid family workers in nonsupervisory clerical, sales, production, service, and farm occupations. 255 Table 5.11 Comparison of Selected Market and Demographic Characteristics of Nonagricultural occupations

Prof- Manag- Produc- essional erial Clerical Sales Service tion

Sex Ratio (Female over Male) 1970 46.93 5.88 43.68 51.28 75.78a 29.80 1990 71.80 10.52 112.89 61.66 95.70 43.67 Percent of Workforce under Age 30 1970 37.63 9.47 34.05 31.55 46.36a 51.23 1990 37.23 6.85 42.93 30.84 34.17 43.62 Percent over 50 1970 12.82 28.01 16.92 17.89 9.77a 8.66 1990 12.59 30.14 11.28 16.45 21.53 9.91 Percent of Household Heads 1976 64.85 91.52 58.37 73.29 57.60 49.27 1990 58.78 91.13 47.55 65.63 56.03 59.02 Education Attainment Percent of Senior High School or Above 1970 78.56 53.09 60.92 12.80 31.82a 6.82 1990 95.96 84.15 85.95 52.81 37.55 29.60 Percent of College and Above 1970 38.44 24.75 16.70 2.03 8.47a 0.55 1990 73.33 56.10 35.72 15.73 7.10 3.07 256 Table 5.11 (continued) comparison of Selected Market and Demographic Characteristics of Nonagricultural occupations

Prof- Manag- Produc- essional erial Clerical Sales Service tion

Percent of Death Caused by Accidents and Adverse Effects 1985 13.66 7.36 15.23 12.74 15.90 27.46 1990 13.92 7.88 16.42 12.98 17.58 25.56 Unemployed Rates 1970 0.54 0.62 0.71 0.56 1.66 0.78 1990 0.86 0.85 1.33 1.32 1.26 1.28 Percent Involved in Job Changes 1980 7.5 6.3 8.7 7.6 7.6 11.1 1988 7.0 6.6 9.2 8.1 10.2 9.9

Sources: 1970's data on age, sex ratio, and education are from An Abstract Report on the 1970 Sample Census of population and Housing: 1990's data on age, sex ratio, education, and unemployed are from Yearbook of Manpower statistics: 1970's data on unemployed are form Yearbook of Labor statistics: data on household head are from Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution: data on death rate are from National Health Report: data on job changes are from Liu (1992:79). aIncludes armed forces. 257 Table 6.1 Manufacturing Wages and Household Expenditure, 1964-1990 (in 19751s $NT)

lS64 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Average Monthly Wage in Manufacturing All Employees 1856 2762 3430 5305 6917 10832 Production Workers 1313 2113 2985 4977 6237 9706 Average Annual Household Disposable Income National Average 62861 79107 101821 153805 174497 254089 Lowest 20% Income Group 25423 35383 45439 67808 73014 94614 Second Lowest 20% Income Group 41343 55632 69399 106685 118531 167937 Highest 20% Income Group 134986 162202 192858 282990 328435 490412 Average Annual Household Expenditure National Average 55804 72781 86849 118555 134088 180901 Lowest 20%__Incomea Group 43505 61497 69144 86920 Second Lowest 20% Income Group 64305 92740 103114 140179 Highest 20% Income Group 149543 189295 215595 293613

Sources: Yearbook of Earnings and Productivity statistics and Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution, various issues. a __ denotes no data. 258 Table 6.2 wage Differentials between Gender, 1960-1990a (female as percentage of male)

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Manufacturing 65.03 55.61 61.56 65.89 63.38 60.86 (1981) Mining 38.94 36.69 36.89 38.95 48.00 51.48 53.46 utilities 59.66 65.42 66.08 81.60 73.42 82.87 (1981) Construction 61.91 62.18 74.51 66.25 71.20 (1972) Transportation and Communication 70.04 73.75 77.24 84.72 82.26 75.86 79.71 Commerce 76.04 59.39 61. 72 69.48 Finance 53.11 63.90 66.89 70.31 service 72.17 70.55 69.03

Sources: 1960-1970, Report on Labor statistics; 1975-1990, Yearbook of Earnings and Productivity Statistics. apercentages between 1960 and 1970, except transportation, are based on daily wage; figures for transportation sector are based on monthly wage. Data between 1975 and 1990 are based on monthly wage of all employees. b __ denotes no data. 259 Table 6.3 Wage structure in Industrial Sector by size of Establishments, 1971-1990

1971a 1980 1990

9 100.00 100.00 100.00 10 - 29 101. 35 101. 82 104.13 30 - 49 102.54 103.02 110.08 50 - 99 101. 40 110.72 113.21 100 - 499 115.29 121. 45 123.19 500 and above 158.35 136.55 170.96 Production Workers in Manufacturing 9 __b 100.00 100.00 10 - 29 92.09 100.33 30 - 49 98.41 102.66 50 - 99 98.11 104.42 100 - 499 104.95 114.39 500 and above 114.91 137.09

Sources: 1971 Census of Commerce and Industry; Report on occupational Wage Survey 1980 and 1990. a1971's figures are calculated from the 1971 Commercial Census all persons engaged divided by total annual wages and salary paid excluding the enterprises that had 3 persons or less. b __ denotes no data. 260 Table 6.4 Monthly wages By occupation and Firm size in Nonagricultural sector, 1990 (at current price)

1-9 10-29 30-99 100-499 500- Ave.

Managerial & supervisory 26018 32813 36778 41028 52941 37906 Manager 26512 35044 41617 52354 65091 40260 Supervisor 24239 26627 30035 32573 47029 34795 Professional and Technical 21787 22685 24779 27474 38808 29359 Professional__a 35454 Technical 27012 Clerical and Sales 16704 18198 20072 21702 31673 21624 Manual 16271 17173 18364 19868 24614 19508 Skilled 19305 20517 22223 23263 31560 23393 Service 12096 11873 13103 18630 24088 15611 Other Manual (Semiskilled and Other Laborers) 14622 14867 15611 16843 19233 16553 Average 18022 19716 21045 22778 31281 22904

Source: Report on Occupational Wage Survey. a__ denotes no data. 261 Table 6.5 Monthly wages By occupation and Firm size, Manufacturing Industry, 1980-1990 (at current price)

1-9 10-29 30-99 100-499 500- Ave.

1980 Managerial & supervisory 11693 10570 13745 15840 21155 17620 Manager 12705 10911 16150 22484 33808 23499 Supervisor 6988 8944 10450 12634 17001 14546 Professional and Technical 11195 10970 10979 12064 14409 13538 Professional 11365 11876 15131 15719 17401 16872 Technical 11188 10874 10097 10967 13282 12401 Clerical and Sales 5340 5955 6786 822'7 10279 8852 Manual 7320 6741 7188 7682 8412 7989 Skilled 7457 8171 8360 8963 10895 9821 Other Manual (includes service workers) 7178 5884 6719 7219 7523 7312 Average 7478 7007 7644 8261 9392 8744 262 Table 6.5 (Continued) Monthly Wages By occupation and Firm size, Manufacturing Industry, 1980-1990

1-9 10-29 30-99 100-499 500- Ave.

1990 Managerial & supervisory 26859 30603 33212 38176 47186 36494 Manager 26907 32333 38840 50328 63134 40590 Supervisor 26415 25922 27052 32182 40415 32605 Professional and Technical 21215 21880 22519 25751 33363 26159 Professional 28696 25677 27360 31418 39717 32441 Technical 20404 20554 20811 23510 29778 23634 Clerical and Sales 14176 15967 17751 20386 26925 19763 Manual 16730 16785 17349 19137 22935 18827 Skilled 19577 20090 20605 23197 30508 22816 Other Manual (includes service workers) 14483 14530 15379 16989 19367 16514 Average 17551 18230 19116 21386 26482 21002

Source: Report on Occupational Wage Survey. 263 Table 6.6 Description of Class positions

Type of Class Description position of Categories

Employers Heads of unincorporated enterprises (Class I) who employed workers other than family workers. Nonagricultural Heads of unincorporated enterprises Own-Account Workers of non-agricultural activities who (Class II) has no employees except family workers. Agricultural Own Heads of unincorporated enterprises account Workers of agriculture, forestry, fishing (Class III) and hunting who has no employees except family workers. Professional Including professional, technical Managerial Class and related workers; administrative (Class IV) and managerial workers; and supervisors (including foremen) in all trades. working Class Non-professional and non-supervisory (Class V) employees in clerical, sales, service, transportation, production, and other related occupations. 264

Table 6.7 Educational Expenditure Per Minor in Selected Class Households, 1975-1990 (at 1975 price)

1975 1980 1985 1990

National Average 1247 1945 2967 5819 Employers 1558 2628 3922 6922 Agricultural Own Account Workers 829 1297 1893 3659 Nonagricultural Own Account Workers 1256 1763 2895 5670 Managerial and Professional Workers 3112 3854 5534 10303 Working class 1335 1983 3072 5661

Sources: Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution, respective years. 265 Table 7.1 composition of Union Membership in Taiwan, 1987-1990

1987 1988 1989 1990

Industrial Unions Agriculture 4152 7851 4900 5447 Mining 2293 4360 4733 3495 Manufacturing 515587 477049 474349 454030 Electric, Walter, and other utilities 36680 37077 37608 38542 Construction 2884 2263 2686 10443 Commerce 1268 1268 1453 Transportation 141654 156746 160419 167313 Finance, Real Estate, and Insurance 101 4017 5838 9357 Service 175 5884 6317 9292 Total 703526 696515 . 698118 699372 266 Table 7.1 (Continued) composition of Union Membership in Taiwan, 1987-1990

1987 1988 1989 1990

Craft Unions General 24940 29718 31711 34893 Professional and Technical 45112 64184 74175 100360 Managerial and Administrative 129 0 0 0 Clerical 3151 8977 12826 20887 Sales 21219 33440 36070 57753 service 300800 260989 286499 344760 Agricultural 11477 22213 31002 43934 Production Related 989459 1144549 1249263 1454661 Total 1396287 1564070 1721546 2057248

Sources: Yearbook of Labor Statistics, respective years. 267 Table 7.2 Unionization by Geographic Areas in Taiwan, 1957 and 1990

1957 1990 Share of Share of Share of Share of Unionized civilian Union Unionized civilian Union Workers Employed Density Workers Employed Density

Northern Taiwan (Taipei, Keelung, and Ilan) 34.17 19.13 13.17 43.30 31.06 46.39 Taipei Municipality 15.46 8.02 14.21 22.37 12.98 57.37 North-Central Taiwan (Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and Miaoli) 7.89 12.47 4.66 10.75 12.65 28.27 Central Taiwan (Taichung, Changhwa, and Nantou) 10.36 18.47 4.13 11.88 18.00 21.97 South-Central Taiwan (Yunlin, Chiayi, and Tainan) 14.27 27.48 3.83 10.30 17.96 19.08 Southern Taiwan (Kaohsiung, Pingtung, and Penghu) 10.94 17.70 4.56 12.54 17.17 24.31 Kaohsiung Municipality, 6.69 3.14 15.71 6.38 6.21 34.24 Eastern Taiwan (Taitung and Hwalien) 1.48 4.75 2.30 2.47 3.15 26.05 268

Table 7.2 (Continued) Unionization by Geographic Areas in Taiwan, 1957 and 1990

1957 1990 Share of Share of Share of Share of Unionized Civilian Union Unionized Civilian Union Workers Employed Density Workers Employed Density

National 4.98 0.99 Regional 15.9l. 5.85 Export Processing Zones 1.93 Total (in 1000) 100.00 100.00 7.37 100.01 99.99 33.28 229 3110 2757 8283

Sources: Data on union membership adopted from An Overview of Labor Administration (Ministry of Interior 1957:36-40) and Yearbook of Labor statistics (Council of Labor Affairs 1991:324-327); data on employed population adopted from Taiwan Province Essential Population statistics: 1946-1958 (Taiwan Provincial Government 1959:406-409) and Yearbook of Manpower statistics 1990 (Executive Yuan, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and statistics 1991:124-125). 269 Table 7.3 Frequency and Intensity of Labor Disputes in Taiwan, 1950-1990 (five-year average)

Number Number Workers Work day Number of of Involved Lost of Workers Work Days Per Per Disputes Involved Lost Dispute Dispute __ a 1950-54 24 319 13 1955-59 49 2045 3442 42 71 1960-64 35 1935 2977 56 86 1965-69 30 509 8196 17 277 1970-74 244 10395 9667 43 40 1975-79 444 9857 22 1980-84 1028 8899 9 1985-87 1572 14493 9 1988-90 1706 40239 11317 24 7

1984 1154 9761 8 1985 1622 16517 10 1986 1485 11307 8 1987 1609 15654 1614 10 1 1988 1314 24237 8967 18 7 1989 1943 62391 24157 32 12 1990 1860 34089 828 18 0.5

Sources: 1950-54, Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China (Ministry of Interior 1969); 1955-1972, Report of Taiwan Labor statistics (Taiwan Provincial Government); 1973-1986, Yearbook of Labor statistics (Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics); 1987-1990, Yearbook of Labor statistics (Executive Yuan, Council of Labor Affairs). a __ denotes no data. Table 7.4 Causes of Labor Disputes in Taiwan, 1950-1990

Claim Wrong- for ful Arrang- Arrears Claim Injury Dis- Sever- ing of Reduce for Compen- Business missal ance Wages Wages Wages Allowance sation Argument Others

1950-54 48.76 5.79 6.61 13.22 1.65 2.48 0.83 4.13 16.53 1955-59 54.51 2.46 2.87 8.61 0.82 5.33 1.64 7.38 16.39 1960-64 38.15 8.09 4.62 20.81 1.16 2.31 4.05 3.47 17.34 1965-69 36.99 21. 23 7.53 5.48 1.37 7.53 4.79 9.59 5.48 1970-74 35.46 19.00 7.86 7.45 4.42 3.77 7.37 3.36 11.30 1975-79 29.26 11.90 1.53 15.06 1.49 2.71 12.58 5.23 20.24 1980-84 21.55 17.34 0.80 18.92 0.53 7.96 12.20 2.53 18.18 1985-87 20.63 9.39 0.32 14.72 0.70 30.26 9.61 6.85 7.53 1988-90 34.71a 21. 79b 18.33 10.96 10.10 4.10

~ '-I o Table 7.4 (Continued) Causes of Labor Disputes in Taiwan, 1950-1990

Claim Wrong- for ful Arrang- Arrears Claim Injury Dis- Sever- ing of Reduce for Compen- Business missal ance Wages Wages Wages Allowance sation Argument Others

1984 22.79 23.65 0.60 21.05 0.43 1.99 7.79 3.03 18.63 1985 27.55 23.11 0.18 15.72 0.73 3.57 6.84 4.37 17.87 1986 15.75 3.16 0.20 17.44 1.07 40.00 9.29 9.96 3.09 1987 18.14 1. 30 0.55 11.18 0.31 48.16 12.67 6.46 1.18 1988 19.02 2.13 1. 75 12.48 1.59 31.12 12.40 13.62 5.85 1989 36.54a 25.16b 15.33 10.60 9.46 2.88 1990 42.36a 22.47b 12.41 10.32 8.27 4.13

Sources: See Table 7.3. aIncludes wrongful severance. bIncludes arrears of wages and reduce wages.

N ,•....J 272 APPENDIX B

FIGURES -- All Employees + Production Workers

1200 ..,.------,

400

200 __.._ _-.

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 2 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0

Year

Figure 6.1 Index of Real Wage Increases in Manufacturing, 1952-1990 (at 1975's price) Sources: Yearbook of Earnings and Productivity statistics various issues. 273

-- All Employees + Production Workers

1800 -,------,

1600 -- -.- -- - - ..---.----..-.------.---.--.-.-..- -.--

1400 -..- - ..- ---.-- - -.------.------.

1200------·-··--······-···---··------·-·-····-·-·...--..- ..- ..-.....-

1000 ..--.----..- - - - -.-.- - ..-..-- - - ..----..---.--- -.--- - ..--

800 - ..-- -.-.- - - - -.-.-.-.- -- --.- - ..----.---..---- -

60 0 ..-.- - - -.- -.-- - -.------.-.-.--.- -

400 - -- - .

Figure 6.2 Index of Real Wage Increases in utilities, 1952-1990 (at 1975's price) Sources: See Figure 6.1. 274

-- All Employees 4 Production Workers Production Value -8- Monthly Work Hrs

1200 .------~

1000 - - .

800 ..- -.-- - .

600 .-- _...... -...... _- -.

400

200

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 2 5 o 5 o 5 o 5 o

Year

Figure 6.3 Indices of Real Wages, Value of Production, and working Hours Increases in Manufacturing, 1952-1990 Sources: Yearbook of Earnings and Productivity statistics and Yearbook of Manpower Statistics, various issues. 275

Percent 60% ....------,

50~ -.-.-----.-----.. -.--.--.-.------.---..------..-

20% __.._ _._ ,__ - ---.-.------.----..--.-.- _-_ _ __ ._ -_ .._ - _ __ .

10% -I .

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 2 5 o 5 o 5 o 5 o

Year

Figure 6.4 Wages as Percentage of Value of Production Per Employed Person in Manufacturing, 1952-1990 Sources: See Figure 6.3. 270

+- Class III --*- Class II -B- Class IV -8- Class I -£- Class V

Percent 300% -,------,

250%

200% ·-··EJ--B··a --.-.-.-.. o 0 o 150% - - -.------..- ---..- ..--.- - -..-- .

1 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 9 999 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 999 7 777 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 899 5 678 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 901

Year

Figure 6.5 Primary Income Distribution, 1975-1990 National Average = 100 Sources: Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution, 1975-1990. 277

-l- Class III * Class II -a- Class IV -b- Class I ~ Class V

Thousands $200 -,------_

$150 .+ _ ,... -I·\··~~·

$100

$50

-$50

-$100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

Year

Figure 6.6 Absolute Income Differentiation, 1975-1990 (differences with national average in 1975 NT$) Sources: See Figure 6.5. 278

-I- Class ill ""* Class n -B- Class IV ---b- Class I -s- Clililil V

Percent 1000~ ,------,

...... ············0·..··················..0· ..·.. ·· ..··· .. ······ ..·...... ~ ~ ~ ····1~r···~··············6.·.·.·.·ii·.·.·.i~.·.·.·.·.· .

...... -8, l5,...... b. b. b.

...... *~~.~~::::;;.;;:::

10~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 'l 'l 'l 'l 'l BB 8 BBBBBBB 9 9 5 6 'l 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 '1 8 9 0 1

Year

Figure 6.7 property Income Distribution, 1975-1990 National Average = 100 Sources: See Figure 6.5. 279

Thousands 3000 .------.------,

2000 - - -.... -.. ...------._ ------.

1500 .-..--..--.-- -..- ---.---..------.. ------.-----.-- - -- .. -- -- -.. ---

500

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 2 5 o 5 o 5 o 5 o

Year

Figure 7.1 The Growth of Union Membership in Taiwan, 1952=1990 Sources: 1952-1986, Yearbook of Labor statistics (Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of BUdget, Accounting and statistics); 1987-1990, Yearbook of Labor Statistics (Executive Yuan, council of Labor Affairs). 280

-- 7. of Employees + 7. of Employed

Percent 60% ..,------,

50%

30% -.;...... -:/

20%

10%

0% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 2 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0

Year

Figure 7.2 The Rate of Unionization in Taiwan, 1952-1990 Sources: See Figure 7.1 281

_ Craft Unions • Industrial Unions

Thousands 3000

...... -... -...... _..._...... ~...... _.._.._.._..•...... -., .._.".-...... M ••••• 2500 - _ ·••••·....··_••···M• ...... _._ ·······...·••··_.·..·M.__._ _._ _._.__ ········M._ ......

• M •••••__• __ 2000 - .···.·.M•..····MM._•.•_ ••••••_M ...... _...... • •• · .. M· •• M •••••••M_ ••••••••_ •• __••••••••___., ••••_.M ...__"'_._." ___.M._. ··__·_·.H.·..··.·......

1500 - ...... _....

1000 ...... ,- ...... _...... __...•.. " .....

500 IW~ ~~ o II III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 99 9 9 9 999 9 9 9 9 55 6 6 6 677 7 8 8 9 78 0 2 5 8 0 2 5 o 5 o

Year

Figure 7.3 The Growth of Industrial and occupational Unions in Taiwan, 1957-1990 Sources: 1957: An Overview of Labor Administration (Ministry of Interior 1957:36-40); 1958-68: Abstract statistics of Republic of China (Ministry of Interior 1959, 1963-69); 1972-86: Yearbook of Labor Statistics (Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of BUdget, Accounting and statistics 1973-87); 1987-90: Yearbook of Labor statistics (council of Labor Affairs 1988-91) 282 REFERENCES

Abercrombie, Nicholas and John Urry. 1983. capital, Labour and the Middle Classes. London: George Allen & Unwin. Amsden, Alice H. 1990. "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182:5 31- Amsden, Alice H. 1989. Asia's Next Giant. New York: Oxford University Press. Amsden, Alice H. 1985. "The state and Taiwan's Economic Development." Pp. 78-106 in Bringing the state Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Pietrich Rueshemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. New York: Cambridge university Press. Amsden, Alice H. 1979. "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory." Modern China 5(3):341-379. Armstrong, Warwick and T.G. McGee. 1985. Theatres of Accumulation: Studies in Asian and Latin American Urbanization. London: Methuen. Arrigo, Linda Gail. 1985. "Economic and Political Control of Women Workers in Multinational Electronic Factories in Taiwan: Martial Law Coercion and World Market Uncertainty." Contemporary Marxism 11:77-95. Arrigo, Linda Gail. 1984. "Taiwan Electronics Workers." Pp. 123-145 in Lives: Chinese Working Women, edited by Mary Sheridan and Janet W. Salaff. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Arrigo, Linda Gail. 1980. "The Industrial Work Force of Young Women in Taiwan." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 12(2) :25-38. Bairoch, Paul and J-M Limbor. 1968. "Changes in the Industrial Distribution of the World Labour Force, by Region, 1880-1960." International Labour Review 98:311 336. Bairoch, Paul, T. Delycke, H. Gelders, and J. Limbor. 1968. The Working Population and Its Structure. New York: Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers. Balibar, Etienne. 1972. "The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism." Pp. 199-308 in Reading Capital by Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar. London: New Left Books. Bechhofer, Frank and Brian Elliott (editors). 1981. The Petite Bourgeoisie: comparative studies of the Uneasy Stratum. London: Macmillan. 283 Bechhofer, Frank and Brian Elliott. 1985. "The Petite Bourgeoisie in Late capitalism." Annual Review of Sociology 11:181-207. Bell, Daniel. 1962. The End of Ideology. New York: Free Press. Bell, Daniel. 1973. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books. Bello, Walden and stephanie Rosenfeld. 1990. Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in crisis. San Francisco: The Institute of Food and Development Policy. Beneria, Lourdes and Martha I. Roldan. 1987. The Crossroads of Class and Gender: Homework, SUbcontracting, and Household Dynamics in Mexico City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Birbeck, C. 1978. "Self Employed Proletarian in an Informal Factory: The Case of Cali's Garbage Dump." World Development 6:1173-1185. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987. "What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups." Berkeley Journal of Sociology 32:1-17. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. cambridge: Harvard University Press. Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. Bromley, Ray and Chris Gerry (editors). 1979. Casual Work and Poverty in Third World cities. New York: Wiley. Browning, Harley L. and Bryan R. Roberts. 1980. "Urbanization, Sectoral Transformation, and the utilization of Labor in Latin America." Comparative Urban Research 8:86-104. Burris, Val. 1992. "Late Industrialization and Class Formation in East Asia." Research in Political Economy 13:245-283. Burris, Val. 1990. "Classes in Contemporary Capitalist Sooiety: Recent Marxist and Weberian Perspectives." Pp. 55-74 in Organization Theory and Class Analysis: New Approaches and New Issues, edited by Stewart R. Clegg. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Burris, Val. 1980. "Class Formation in Advanced Capitalist Societies: A Comparative Analysis." Social Praxis 7(3/4):147-179. 284

Calhoun, craig. 1982. The Question of Class Struggle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carchedi, Guglielmo. 1977. On the Economic Identification of Social Classes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Castells, Manuel and Alejandro Portes. 1989. "World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy." Pp. 11-37 in The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, edited by Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren A. Benton. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Chang, ching-Hsi. 1985. "Chung-hua Min-kuo Lao Tzu Kuan Hsi." (Labor Relations in the Republic of China) Ching Chi Tsuan Lun (Economic Essays) 66. Taipei: Chinese Institute of Economics. [in chinese] Chao, Kang. 1991. "I-chiu-pa-pa Nien te Kuo-chia, Fa-lu, Tsu-pen yu Kung-yun." (The state, Law, Capital and Labor Movement in 1988: A Historical Descriptive) Cbung-kuo Lun-tan (China Tribune) 32(2):45-48. [in chinese] Chen, Edward. 1979. Hyper-Growth in Asian Economies: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. New York: Holmes and Meier. Cheng, Lu-Lin. 1988. "Tai-wan Lao-Tung Ti-chih Hsing-kou te Chieh-hsi." (An Analysis of Taiwanese Labor System) Unpublished master thesis, Department of sociology, National Taiwan University. [in Chinese] Cho, Soon-Kyoung. 1987. "How Cheap is 'Cheap Labor'? The Dilemmas of Export-Led Industrialization." Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California at Berkeley. Chu, Tein-Chen, Chia-Sheng Wu, and Hui-Lin Wu. 1988. "The Year-End Bonus System and Taiwan's Economic Development." Paper presented in Conference on Labor and Economic Development, Taipei. Clark, Cal. 1989. Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms. New York: Greenwood Press. Clawson, Dan. 1980. Bureaucracy and the Labor Process: The Transformation of u.S. Industry, ~860-1920. New York: Monthly Review Press. 285 Clegg, stewart, Paul Boreham, and Geoff Dow. 1986. Class, Politics, and the Economy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Cuneo, Carl J. 1985. "Have Women Become More Proletarianized Than Men?" Canadian Review 0:[ sociology and Anthropology 22(4):465-495. Cuneo, Carl J. 1984. "Has the Traditional Petite Bourgeoisie Persisted?" Canadian Journal of Sociology 9(3) :36-82. Curran, James and Roger Burrows. 1986. liThe Sociology of Petit Capitalism: A Trend Report." Sociology 20(2):265 279. Dale, A., G. N. Gilbert, and S. Arber. 1985. "Integrating Women into Class Theory." Sociology 19(3):384-409. DeGlopper, Donald R. 1979. "Artisan Work and Life in Taiwan. II Modern China 5 (3) : 283-316. Deyo, Frederic C. 1989. Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Deyo, Frederic C. (editor). 1987. The Political Econom¥ 0:[ the New Asian Industrialism. Ithaca: Cornell univers1ty Press. Diamond, Norma. 1979. "Women and Industry in Taiwan." Modern China 5(3):317-340. Djang, Tien Kai. 1977. Industry and Labor in Taiwan. Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. Edwards, Richard C. 1979. Contested Terrain: The Transformation 0:[ Workplace in the Twentieth century. New York: Basic Books. Ehrenreich, Barbara and John Ehrenreich. 1979. liThe Professional-Managerial Class." Pp. 5-45 in Between Labor and capital, edited by Pat Walker. New York: Monthly Review. Evans, Peter and Michael Timberlake. 1980. "Dependence, Inequality, and the Growth of the Tertiary: A comparative Analysis of Less Developed Countries." American Sociological Review 45:531-552. Executive Yuan, Bureau of Health. Various years. National Health statistics. Taipei: Bureau of Health, Executive Yuan. 286 Executive Yuan, Committee on Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area. 1988. Min Kuo Chi Shih Wu Nien Tai Min Ti Chu Kung Shang Pu Cha (The 1986 Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Republic of China). Taipei: Execute Yuan. [in Chinese] Executive Yuan, Committee on Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area. 1973. Min Kuo Liu Shih Nien Tai Min Ti Chu Kung Shang Pu Cha (The 1971 Industrial and Commercial Censuses of Taiwan and Fukien Area, Republic of China). Taipei: Executive Yuan. [in Chinese] Executive Yuan, Council of Labor Affairs. various issues. Yearbook of Labor statistics. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. 1991. Yearbook of Earnings and productivit¥ statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China, 1990. Taipe1: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of BUdget, Accounting and statistics. 1991. Yearbook of Manpower Statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China, 1990. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. 1987. Taiwan Statistical Data Book. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. 1982. The Report on 1980 Agricultural and Fishery Censuses, Taiwan-Fukien District, The Republic of China: Summary Report. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. 1981 and 1991. Chih Yeh Pieh Hsin Tsu Tiao Cha Pao Kao (Report on the Survey of occupational Wages). Taipei: Executive Yuan. [in Chinese] Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. 1976-1991. Report on the Survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. Various years. Yearbook of Labor statistics, Republic of China. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. Various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Earnings and Productivity statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Labor Statistics, Republic of China. Taipei: Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and statistics. various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Manpower Statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China. Taipei: Executive Yuan. 287 Executive Yuan, Ministry of Education. 1992. Educational statistics of the Republic of China 1990. Taipei: Ministry of Education, Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Ministry of the Interior. 1991. 1990 Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book, Republic of China. Taipei: Ministry of the Interior, Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Ministry of the Interior. 1957. Lao Kung Hsing Cheng Kai Kuang (An Overview of Labor Administration). Taipei: Ministry of the Interior, Executive Yuan. [in Chinese] Executive Yuan, Ministry of the Interior. Various years. chung-hua Min Kuo Nei Cheng Tung Chi Ti Yao (Abstract statistics of Interior Affairs of the Republic of China). Taipei: Ministry of the Interior, Executive Yuan. [in chinese] Executive Yuan, Population Census Office. 1992. An Abstract Report on the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, Republic of China. Taipei: Population Census Office, Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, population Census Office. 1983. Chung-hua Min Kuo Liu Shih Chiu Nien Tai Min Ti Chu Hu Kou Chu Chai Pu Cha (Report on the 1966 Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, Republic of China). Taipei: Population Census Office, Executive Yuan. [in Chinese] Executive Yuan, population Census Office. 1982. An Abstract Report on the 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, Republic of China. Taipei: Population Census Office, Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Population Census Office. 1976. An Abstract Report on the 1975 Sample Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, Republic of China. Taipei: Population Census Office, Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, Population Census Office. 1972. An Abstract Report on the 1970 Sample Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, Republic of China. Taipei: Population Census Office, Executive Yuan. Executive Yuan, PopUlation Census Office. 1969. Chung-hua Min Kuo Wu Shih Wu Nien Tai Min pi Chu Hu Kou Chu Chai Pu Cha (Report on the 1966 Census of PopUlation and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, RepUblic of China). Taipei: PopUlation Census Office, Executive Yuan. [in chinese] Executive Yuan, PopUlation Census Office. 1958. Chung-hua Min Kuo Wu Shih Wu Nien Tai Min Ti chu Hu Kou Chu Chai PU Cha (Report on the 1956 Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, RepUblic of China). Taipei: PopUlation Census Office, Executive Yuan. [in Chinese] Fei, John, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W. Y. Kuo. 1979. Growth with Equity: The Taiwanese Case. New York: Oxford University Press. 288 Fields, Gary S. and Henry Wan. 1986. "Wage-Setting Institutions and Economic Growth." Paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Institutions in Economic Development, Cornell University. Freedman, Francesca. 1975. liThe Internal Structure of the American Proletariat: A Marxist Analysis. II Socialist Revolution 5(4):41-83. Gagliani, Giorgio. 1981. "How Many Working Classes?" American Journal of Sociology 87(2):259-285. Galenson, Walter. 1992. Labor and Economic Growth in Five Asian countries: South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines. New York: Praeger. Galenson, Walter. 1979. liThe Labor Force, Wages, and Living Standards." pp. 384-447 in Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan, edited by Walter Galenson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gallin, Rita S. 1990. "Women and the Export Industry in Taiwan: The Muting of Class Consciousness." Pp. 179-192 in Women Workers and Global Restructuring, edited by Kathryn Ward. Ithaca: ILR Press. Gallin, Rita S. 1984. liThe Entry of Chinese Women into the Rural Labor Force: A Case Study from Taiwan. Ii Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 9(3):383-398. Gallin, Rita S. 1982. liThe Impact of Development on Women's Work and Status: A Case Study from Taiwan." Working Paper on Women in International Development #09. East Lansing: Office of Women in International Development, Michigan State University. Gates, Hill. 1987. Chinese Working-Class Lives: Getting By in Taiwan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gates, Hill. 1979. "Dependency and the Part-time Proletariat in Taiwan." Modern China 5(3):381-408. Giddens, Anthony. 1987. Social Theory and Modern Sociology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 1973. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. London: Hutchinson. Gold, Thomas B. 1986. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Goldthorpe, John H. 1984. "Women and Class Analysis: A Reply to Replies." Sociology 18(4):491-499. Goldthorpe, John H. 1983. "Women and Class Analysis: in Defence of the Conventional View." Sociology 17(4):465 488. 289 Goldthorpe, John H. 1982. "On the Service Class, its Formation and Future." pp. 162-185 in social Class and the Division of Labor, edited by Anthony Giddens and Gavin Mackenzie. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goldthorpe, John H. 1980. Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gordon, David M., Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich. 1982. Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformations of Labor in the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press. Graetz, Brain. 1991. "The Class Location of Families: A Refined Classification and Analysis. II sociology 25(1):101-118. Granovetter, Mark. 1984. "Small is Bountiful: Labor Markets and Establishment Size." American Sociological Review 49:323-334. Haggard, Stephan. 1990. Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hamilton, Gary G. and Nicole Woolsey Biggart. 1987. "Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far East. 1I American Journal of Sociology 94(Supplement):S52-S94. Hammond, Thomas Taylor. 1987(1957). "Lenin on Trade Unions." pp. 59-62 in Theories of the Labor Movement, edited by Simeon Larson and Bruce Nissen. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Harvey, David. 1991. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Heath, Anthony and Nicky Britten. 1984. "Women's Jobs Do Make a Difference: A Reply to Goldthorpe." sociOlogy 18(4):475-490. Hill, Stephen. 1981. Competition and Control at Work. London: Heinemann. Hindess, Barry. 1981. "The Politics of Social Mobility." Economy and Society 10(2):184-202. Ho, Samuel P. S. 1982. "Economic Development and Rural Industry in south Korea and Taiwan." World Development 10(11):973-990. 290 Ho, Samuel P. S. 1979. "Decentralized Industrialization and Rural Development: Evidence from Taiwan." Economic Development and Cultural Change 28(1):77-96. Ho, Samuel P. S. 1978. Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ho, Shuet Ying. 1990. Taiwan - After A Long Silence: The Emerging New Unions of Taiwan. Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Research Center. Hsia, Lin-Ching, 1993. Tai-pei Hsien Kuan Chang Wen-ti Tiao-cha Yen-chiu Pao-kao (Report on the Problem of Plant Closing in Taipei County). Department of Applied Psychology, Fu-Jen University. [in Chinese] Hsia, Lin-Ching, 1993. You WU-Shih-Chu-Hsiang Tao She-Hui Shih-Chien: Yu Kuan Tai-Wan Lao-Kung Sheng-Huo Te Tiao Cha Pao-Kao (1987-1992) (From Practical Oriented to Social Pract~ce: Survey Reports regarding Taiwan Workers' Life (1987-1992)). Taipei: Chang Lao Shih Chu Pan She. [in Chinese] Hsiao, Michael Hsin-Huang. 1992. "The Labor Movement in Taiwan: A Retrospective and Prospective Look." Pp. 151 167 in Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle, edited by Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael. 1981. Government Agricultural strategies in Taiwan and South Korea: A Macrosociological Assessment. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Hsu, Cheng-Kuang. 1989a. "Political Change and Labor Movement in Taiwan." Paper presented in the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco. Hsu, Cheng-Kuang. 1989b. "Tsung I-Hwa tao Mon-chu: Tai-wan Lao-kung Yun-tong te Chi-pen Hsing-ke he Chu-shih." (From Alienation to Autonomy: the Basic Characteristics and Trends of Taiwanese Labor Movement) Pp. 103-125 in Tai wan Hsin-Hsing She-Hui Yun-tong (Emerging Social Movements in Taiwan), edited by Cheng-Kuang Hsu and Wen Li Sung. Taipei: Chu-Liu. [in Chinese] Hsu, Cheng-Kuang. 1987. " Tung-He Cheng-'l'se Hsia te Thai Wan Lao Kung." (corporatist Policies and Labor in Taiwan) Paper present in the First Conference on Labor-Capital Relations, Taipei. Hsu, Wen-Fu. 1974. "Prices and Pricing of Farm Products." Pp. 86-94 in AgriCUlture's Place in the strategy of Development: the Taiwan Experience, edited by T. H. Shen. Taipei: Joint commission on Rural Reconstruction. 291 Huanl1, Bow-Chia. 1992. "Tai-wan Chung-Hsiao Chi-yeh Chang ch1 yu Tuan-chi Ching-yin Wen-ti te Fen-hsi." (Analysis of the Long- and Short-Term Management Problems in Taiwan's Small-Scale Enterprises) Tai-wan Yeh-hong Chi kang (Bank of Taiwan Quarterly) 43(2):276-326. [in Chinese] Huang, Fu-San. 1977. Neu Kung Yu Tai-Wan Kung Yeh Hua (Women Workers and the Industrialization in Postwar Taiwan). Taipei: Mu Tung. [in chinese] Hunt, Alan. 1977. "Theory and Politics in the Identification of the Working Class." pp. 81-112 in Class and Class structure, edited by Alan Hunt. London: Lawrence and Wishart. HU, Tai-Li. 1984. My Motber-In-Law's Village: Rural Industrialization and Change in Taiwan. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Jelin, Elizabeth. 1974. "The Concept of working-Class Embourgeoisement." Studies in Comparative International Development 9(1):1-19. Johnson, Richard. 1978. "Edward Thompson, Eugene Genovese, and Socialist-Humanist History." History Workshop 6:79 100. Joppke, Christian. 1986. "The Cultural Dimensions of Class Formation and Class Struggle: On the Social Theory of Pierre Bourdieu." Berkeley Journal of Sociology 31:53-78. Kallgren, Joyce. 1964. "Nationalist China's Armed Forces." Pp. 91-100 in Formosa Today, edited by Mark Mancall. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Katznelson, Ira. 1986. "Working -Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons." Pp. 3-41 in Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United states, edited by Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Koo, Hagen. 1990. "From Farm to Factory: Proletarianization in Korea. II American Sociological Review 55 (5) : 669-681- Koo, Hagen. 1987. "The Interplay of state, Social Class, and World System in East Asian Development: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan." pp. 165-181 in The Political Econom¥ of the New Asian Industrialism, edited by Freder1c Deyo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 292 Kun<1, Lydia. 1984. "Taiwan Garlllent Workers." pp. 109-122 in L~ves: Chinese Working Women, edited by Mary Sheridan and Janet W. Salaff. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kung, Lydia. 1983. Factory Women in Taiwan. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press. Kung, Lydia. 1981. "Perceptions of Work among Factory Women." pp. 184U'211 in The Anthropology of Chinese Society in Taiwan, edited by Hill Rohsenow and Emily Ahern. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kung, Lydia. 1976. "Factory Work and Women in Taiwan: Changes in Self-Image and Status." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2(1):35-58. KUo, Shirley W. Y. 1983. The Taiwan Economy in Transition. Boulder: westview Press. Kuznets, Simon. 1979. "Growth and Structural Shifts." Pp. 15-131 in Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan, edited by Walter Galenson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lash, Scott and John Urry. 1987. The End of Organized Capitalism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Lau, Lawrence J. (editor). 1986. Models of Development. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies. Lavely, William. 1990. "Industrialization and Household Complexity in Rural Taiwan." Social Forces 69 (1) : 235-251. Lee, Chaur-Shyan. 1980. 18Tai-wan Lung-yeh Lao-tong-li te Chien 1." (Farm Labor Migration in Taiwan) Lung-Yeh Ching-Chi (Journal of AgriCUltural Economics) 27:35-53. [in Chinese] Lee, Chien-Chang. 1991. "Ba-shih nien Tai te Tai-wan Lao Kung Yun Tung--Chieh-kou yu Kuo-chen te Fen Hsi." (Taiwanese Labor Movement in the 1980s--An Analysis of Structure and Process) Unpublished master thesis, Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University. [in Chinese] Lee, Joseph S. 1988. "Labor Relations and the stages of Economic Development: the Case of Republic of China." Paper presented in the Conference on Labor and Economic Development, Taipei. Lee, Teng-Hui. 1970. Inter-Sectoral Capital Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan: 1895-1960. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 293 Liao, Cheng-Hung, Chun-Chieh Huang, and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao. 1986. Tai-wan Lung-yeb cbeng-tsu te Yen-pen (Tbe Development of Agricultural Policies in Post-War Taiwan) . Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica Monograph Series B, No. 18. [in Chinese] Li, K. T. 1985. "contributions of Women in the Labor Force to Economic Development in Taiwan, Republic of China." Industry of Free Cbina LXIV(2):1-8. Lin, Ching-Yuan. 1973. Industrialization in Taiwan, 1946 72: Trade and Import-Substitution Policies for Developing countries. New York: Praeger. Lin, Chung-Cheng. 1988. "The Development of Labor Movement and Labor Disputes in Taiwan." Paper presented in the Conference on Labor and Economic Development, Taipei. Lin, Chunh-Cheng. 1987. "Tai-wan Te-chu Lao-tsu Chiu-fen te Fen-hsi." (An Analysis of the Labor-Management Disputes in Taiwan) pp. 224-240 in Te Wu Tzu Sbe-bui Ke-bsueb Yen tao-bui Lun-wen-cbi (Collecting Essays of tbe Fiftb Symposium on Social Sciences). Taipei: Institute of Three Principle of the People, Academia Sinica. [in Chinese] Liu, chang-Hwai Wang. 1992. "A Socio-Economic Analysis of Labor Force Development in Taiwan (1950-1988)." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Hawaii. Liu, Chin-Ron. 1972. "The Socia-Economic Significance of Increasing Part-Time Farmers in Taiwan." Tai-Inn Cbi Kan (Bank of Taiwan Quarterly) 23(4):103-126. [in Chinese] Liu, Jin-Chin. 1988. Tai-wan Cbing-cbi te Chuan-bsing (Taiwan Economy in Transition). Taipei: Kuo-Shien PUblishing Company. [in Chinese] Liu, Paul K. C. 1984. "Technological Progress, Employment Structure and Income Distribution in Taiwan." Industry of Free Cbina August:1-13. Liu, Paul K. C. and Alden Speare Jr. 1973. "Urbanization and Labor Mobility in Taiwan." Economic Essays 4:167-177. Taipei: Graduate Institute of Economics, National Taiwan University. Lloyd, Peter. 1982. A Tbird World Proletariat? London: George Allen & Unwin. Lockwood, David. 1986. "Class, Status and Gender." Pp. 11 22 in Gender and Stratification, edited by Rosemary Crompton and Michael Mann. Cambridge: Polity Press. 294 Lockwood, David. 1958. The Blackcoated Workers: A study in Class Consciousness. London: George Allen & Unwin. Marshall, Gordon. 1983. "Some Remarks on the Study of Working-class Consciousness." Politics and Society 12 (3) : 263-301. Marshall, Gordon, David Rose, Howard Newby, and Carolyn Vogler. 1988. Social Class in Modern Britain. London: Unwin Hyman. Marx, Karl. 1906. capital: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: Random House. Murphy, Raymond. 1986. "The Concept of Class in Closure Theory." Sociology 20(2):247-64. MU, Yu. 1987. "Tai-wan Lao-tong Ti-chih Wu Lun--Mai-Hsiang 'Tsai Sheng Chan Cheng-chih Hsueh'." (Five Theses on the Labor System in Taiwan--Toward 'Politics of Reproduction') Nan-Fang 14:8-35. [in Chinese] Nelson, Daniel. 1975. Managers and Workers: origins of the New Factory System in the united States 1880-1920. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Niehoff, Justin D. 1987. "The Villager as Industrialist: Ideologies of Household Manufacturing in Rural Taiwan." Modern China 13(3):278-309. Orru, Marco, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. Hamilton. 1991. "organizational Isomorphism in East Asia." Pp. 361 389 in The New Institutionalism in organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Parkin, Frank. 1979. Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. New York: Columbia University Press. Parkin, Frank. 1974. "strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation." Pp. 1-18 in The Social Analysis of Class Structure, edited by Frank Parkin. London: Tavistock. Parkin, Frank. 1971. Class Inequality and Political Order. London: Macgibbon and Kee. Pahl, R. E. (editor). 1988. On Work: Historical, Comparative and Theoretical Approaches. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Portes, Alejandro. 1983. "The Informal Sector: Definition, Controversy, and Relation to National Development." Review 7(1):151-174. Portes, Alejandro and Lauren A. Benton. 1984. IIIndustrial Development and Labor Absorption: A Reinterpretation." PopUlation and Development Review 10(4):589-611. 295 Portes, Alejandro, Manuel Castells, and Lauren A. Benton (editors). 1989. The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed countries. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Portes, Alejandro and Saskia Sassen-Koob. 1987. "Making it Underground: Comparative Material on the informal Sector in Western Market Economies." American Journal of Sociology 93(1):30-61. Portes, Alejandro and John Walton. 1981. Labor, Class, and the International System. New York: Academic Press. Poulantzas, Nicos. 1975. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: New Left Books. Poulantzas, Nicos. 1973. "On Social Classes." New Left Review 78:27-54. Przeworski, Adam, Barnett R. Rubin and Ernest Underhill. 1980. "The Evolution of the Class Structure of France, 1901-1968." Economic Development and Cultural Change 28:725-752. Ranis, Gustav. 1979. "Industrial Development." Pp. 206-262 in Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan, edited by Walter Galenson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Roberts, Bryan R. 1989. "Employment Structure, Life Cycle, and Life Chances: Formal and Informal Sectors in Guadalajara." pp. 41-59 in The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, edited by Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren A. Benton. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Sassen, Saskia. 1988. The Mobility of Labor and capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sassen-Koob, Saskia. 1982. "Recomposition and Peripheralization at the Core. 1I contemporary Marxism 5:88-100. scipes, Kim. 1992. "Understanding the New Labor Movements in the 'Third World': The Emergence of Social Movement Unionism." critical Sociology 19(2):81-101. Sen, Yow-Suen and Alvin So. 1991. "Class Structure and Class Struggle in Capitalist Society." Pp.1-14 in critical Perspectives in Sociology, edited by Berch Berberoglu. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall & Hunt Company. Shan, Chi. 1988. "Ju He Li Ting Wo Kuo Chi Pen Kung Tsu." (How to Stipulate Minimum Wage Levels in Taiwan, R.O.C.) 296 Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy 1(1):15-38. [in Chinese] Shen, Tzong-Ruey. 1992. "Kuo Chia Tung-He Chu-I yu Tai-Wan Lao Kung te Cheng-Chih Chuan-LL" (The state Corporatism and the Political Power of Labor in Taiwan) Kuo Li Tai Wan Tai Hsueh Chung Shan Hsueh Shu Lun-Tsung (Journal of Sun Yat-Sen) 10:109-122. [in Chinese] Sheu, Jia-You. 1989. "Tai Chien Liu-tong te Chu-pu Fen hsi." (A Preliminary study of the Intergenerational Mobility in Taiwan: Mobility Tables Analysis) Pp. 517-549 in Tai-wan She-hui Hsien-hsiang (Social Phenomena in Taiwan--An Analysis of Family, Population, policy, and Social Stratification), edited by Chun-Chun Yi and Cathy R. Chu. Taipei: Sun Yat-Sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica. [in Chinese] Shieh, Gwo-Shyong. 1992. "Boss" Island: The SUbcontracting Network and Micro-Entrepreneurship in Taiwan's Development. New York: Peter Lang. Shih, J. T. 1983. "Decentralized Industrialization and Rural Nonfarm Employment i.n Taiwan." Industry of Free China August:1-20. Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1991. World Military and Social Expenditures, 1991. Washington D.C": World Priorities. Speare, Alden Jr., Paul K. C. Liu, and ching-Lung Tsay. 1988. Urbanization and Development: The Rural-Urban Transformation in Taiwan. Boulder: Westview Press. Stauffer, Robert. 1993. IIReview Essay: Postcolonial Industrialization and NIC-dom--Myths and 'Lessons' from East and Southeast Asia." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 25(3):49-58. steinmetz, George and Eric Olin Wright. 1989. liThe Fall and Rise of the Petty Bourgeoisie: Changing Patterns of Self Employment in the Postwar United States." American Journal of sociology 94(5):973-1018. stites, Richard W. 1985. "Industrial Work as an Entrepreneurial Strategy." Modern China 11(2):227-246. Stites, Richard W. 1982. "Small-Scale Industry in Yingge, Taiwan." Modern China 8(2):247-279. szymanski, Albert. 1983. Class Structure: A critical Perspective. New York: Praeger. Szymanski, Albert. 1971-1972. "Trends in the American Class Structure." Socialist Revolution 2:101-22. 297

Taiwan Provincial Government. 1970. Tai-wan Kuang Fu Erh Shih-Wu Nien (25 Years after the Restoration). Taichung: Taiwan Provincial Government. [in Chinese] Taiwan Provincial Government. 1959. Tai-wan Shen Tung Chi Yao Lan 1946-1958 (Taiwan Province Essential Population statistics: 1946-1958). Taichung: Taiwan Provincial Government. [in Chinese] Taiwan Provincial Government, Bureau of Accountin~ and statistics. 1946. Tai-wan Shen Wu Shih I Nien L~e Tung Chi Ti Yao (statistical Summary of the Past 51 Years). Taiwan: Bureau of Accounting and statistics, Taiwan Provincial Government. [in Chinese] Taiwan Provincial Government, Institute of Labor Force Survey. Various issues. Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey in Taiwan, RepUblic of China. Taipei: Insti.tute of Labor Force Survey. Thompson, Edward Palmer. 1965. "The Peculiarities of the English.1: pp. 311-362 in Socialist Register, edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. London: Merlin Press. Thompson, Edward Palmer. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage. Tien Hsia. 1992. "Kao Chen~ Chang tsu Mi: 2." (The Myth of Rapid Growth: 2) Tien Hs~a (Common Wealth) 130:26-36. [in Chinese] Tien, Hung-Mao. 1989. The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. Tilly, Charles. 1984. "Demographic origins of the European Proletariat." pp. 1-85 in Proletarianization and Family History, edited by David Levine. New York: Academic Press. Tilly, Charles. 1981. As Sociology Meets History. New York: Academic Press. Tilly, Louise and Joan W. Scott. 1987. Women, Work, and Family. New York: Methuen. Ting, Yow-Chuen. 1965. Chung-kuo Lao-kung Wen-tie (Labor Problems in China). Taipei: Chung Hua. [in Chinese] Urry, John. 1973. "Towards a Structural Theory of the Middle Class." Acta Sociologica 16(3):175-187. Veltmeyer, Henry. 1983. "Surplus Labor and Class Formation on the Latin American Periphery." Pp. 201-239 in Theories of Development: Modes of Production or Dependency?, 298 edited by Ronald H. Chilcote and Dale L. Johnson. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1991. "Household Structures and Labour-Force Formation in the Capitalist World-Economy." pp. 107-112 in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities by Balibar Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein. London: Verso. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1983. Historical Capitalism. London: Verso. Walton, John. 1987. "Theory and Research on Industrialization." Annual Review of Sociology 13:89-108. Wang, Jenn-Hwan. 1993. "Labor Regimes in Transition: Changing Faces of Labor Control in Taiwan, 1950s-1990s." Paper presented in the Conference of East Asian Labor in Comparative Perspective. Lake Tahoe, California. Wang, Jenn-Hwan. 1989. "Tai-wan te Cheng-chih Chuan-hsing yu Fan-tui Yun-tong." (Political Transition and Oppositional Movement in Taiwan) Tai··wan She-hui Yen-chiu Chi-kan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in social Studies) 2(1):71-116. [in Chinese] Wang, Jenn-Hwan and Xiau-Ding Fang. 1992. "Kuo Chia Chi Chih, Lao Kung Cheng-Tse yu Lao Kung Yun Tung." (State, Labor Policies and Labor Movement) Tai-Wan She-Hui Yen Chiu Chi-Kan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies) 13:1-29. [in Chinese] Waterman, Peter. 1991. "Social-Movement Unionism: A New Model for a New World." Working Paper No. 110. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Weng, Chia-Yin (translator). 1992. Tai-Wan Tsung-Tu-Fu Ching-cha Yen-Ke-Chih Ti-Erh-Pien (Chung-Chuan) Tai-Wan She-Hui Yun-Tung-Shih: Lao-Kung Yun-Tung, YU-Pai Yun-Tung (History of Taiwanese Social Movements: Labor Movements, Rightist Movements). Taipei: Tao-Hsiang Chu-Pan-She. [in Chinese] Westergaard, J. H. and H. Resler. 1976. Class in a Capitalist Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin. White, Gordon (editor). 1988. Developmental States in East Asia. New York: st. Martin's Press. Winckler, Edwin A. 1984. "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" China Quarterly 99:481-499. 299 Winckler, Edwin A. and Susan Greenhalgh (editors). 1988. contending Approaches to the Political Economy or Taiwan. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Wood, Ellen Meiksins. 1990. "The Uses and Abuses of 'Civil society· ... pp. 60-84 in Soci.alist Register 1990, edited by Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch, and John Saville. London: Merlin Press. Wright, Eric Olin. 1985. Classes. London: New Left Books. Wright, Eric Olin. 1980. "Varieties of Marxist conceptions of Class Structure." Politics and Society 9 (3) : 323-70. Wright, Eric Olin. 1979. tiThe Class Structure of Advanced Capitalist societies." pp. 30-110 in his Class, Crisis and the state. London: Verso. Wright, Eric Olin and Bill Martin. 1987. "The Transformation of the American Class Structure, 1960 1980." American Journal or Sociology 93(1):1-29. Wu, Hui-Lin. 1984. Tai-wan Kung Tsu Chieh Kou yu Ching Fa Chan chih Kuan Hsi (The Relationship between Wage stirueture and Economic Development in Taiwan). Taipei: Chinese Institute of Economic study. [in Chinese] Wu, Hui-Lin and Chi-Ming Hou. 1985. "Tai-wan te Kung Tsu he Lao Tung Sheng Lie" (Wage and Labor Productivity in Taiwan) Economic Essays 73. Taipei: Chinese Institute of Economic Study. [in chinese] Wu, Rong-I. 1976. "Urbanization and Industrialization in Taiwan: A Study of the Specific Pattern of Labor utilization." in Conference on PopUlation and Economic Development in Taiwan. Taipei: The Institute of Economics, Academia ,Sinica. Wu, Wen-Hsing. 1991. Jih cbu Shih Chi Tsai Tai "Hua Chiao" Yen Chiu (Studies of Taiwan's "Overseas Chinese" in the Japanese Colonial Period). Taipei: Hsueh Sheng Publishing Company. [in Chinese] Yang, Pi-Chuan. 1988. Jih Chu Shih-Tai Tai-Wan-Jen Fan Kang-she (The History of Taiwanese Resistance Under Japanese colonialism). Taipei: Tao-Hsiang Chu-Pan-She. [in Chinese) YU, Hsing-chien. 1977. "Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang yu Chung-kuo Kung-hui Tsu-chih." (Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Union Organization) Unpublished master thesis, Department of Labor Study, Chinese CUlture University. [in Chinese]