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REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

Dakota Thomas University of Kentucky, [email protected] Author ORCID Identifier: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1186-7470 Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2019.191

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Recommended Citation Thomas, Dakota, "REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS" (2019). Theses and Dissertations--Political Science. 27. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/27

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The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above.

Dakota Thomas, Student

Dr. Emily Beaulieu, Major Professor

Dr. Justin Wedeking, Director of Graduate Studies

REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

DISSERTATION I

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By Dakota Thomas

Lexington, KY

Co-Directors: Dr. Emily Beaulieu, Professor of Political Science and Dr. Tiffany Barnes, Professor of Political Science

Lexington, KY

2019

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

Why do women protest? Why do women protest “as women”? Why do some women participate in protests but not others? In the wake of the Women’s March of 2017, perhaps the largest single day protest event in history, these questions are particularly timely and deserve scholarly attention. One important but understudied and undertheorized motivation for women’s protests is state sanctioned violence, particularly repression. This dissertation explicitly theorizes about how state perpetration of violence, particularly state use of repression, both motivates and shapes women’s protests on a global scale. In this dissertation, I argue that one key motivation for women’s protest is repression by the state, and I theorize that women will protest more frequently when the state uses repression. Repression negatively impacts members of the population, particularly relatives, friends, and communities of those targeted by the state, and this motivates those people to protest. However, I argue that the type of repression, and more specifically how gendered the state practices repression, matters. The more that gender plays a role in determining who states target with repression, the more gender matters in the societal response to repression. In particular, I examine the use of forced disappearances. Based on historical and contemporary accounts, I show that forced disappearance largely targets males, and thus motivates women’s protests but has no effect on protests by other groups. When the state makes use of forced disappearances, some women are motivated to protest due to their connections to victims of repression. Furthermore, opportunities to protest in these circumstances are more available to women than to men, due to their relatively lower likelihood of being targeted, as well as women’s distinctive positions in society and their ability to organize themselves as women. Not only do women have additional space relative to men to protest when the state is repressive, but individual women recognize that their gender can serve as a resource in such contexts. Thus, individual women are more likely to participate in protests themselves when the state uses repression, closing the gender gap in protest participation between men and women. I test my theory of women’s protest using two unique approaches. First, utilizing unique new data on women’s protests that is globally comprehensive for all countries from 1990-2009, I show that women’s protests are more frequent when the state is repressive, and that forced disappearances in particular motivate women’s protests, specifically, but do not have an observable effect on general protests. Second, I utilize

regionally comprehensive data on citizens in Latin America from 2006 and 2008 to show that women are more likely to participate in protests when the state uses forced disappearances, but that men are not more likely to participate in protests in repressive contexts.

KEYWORDS: women’s protest, women’s mobilization, gender, human rights, repression, forced disappearances

Dakota Thomas

March 22nd, 2019

REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

By Dakota Thomas

Emily Beaulieu Co-Director of Dissertation

Tiffany Barnes Co-Director of Dissertation

Justin Wedeking Director of Graduate Studies

March 22nd, 2019 Date

In loving memory of David, Whose love gave me a home.

And for my grandfather, who taught me how to read.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are innumerable people who have helped me along this journey. The following is an incomplete list of those without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. I humbly thank all of them from the bottom of my heart.

First, I must give thanks to my academic mentors and colleagues. Emily Beaulieu has served as my committee chair. She has taught me much by example about patience and diligence, provided immeasurable amounts of feedback on all my projects, kept watch over my progress, and came to my presentations at conferences to provide moral support and a kind face to look to in the crowd. Emily has also been a stellar mentor as I have steered through life’s many troubled waters. I could not have made it half so far in this program without her. For that, I offer her my deepest thanks.

Tiffany Barnes, who graciously agreed to co-chair my committee, has also been

an unswerving source of inspiration and guidance throughout my career. Tiffany taught

me the value of sitting down to write every single day. Her feedback and guidance was

critical in setting this project on the right path, and this dissertation would have been impossible without her. I owe her my sincerest gratitude for all she has done to help me these many years.

I have also benefitted immensely from mentorship from Clayton Thyne, who served on my committee, provided invaluable feedback on my theoretical perspective, and taught me the basics of statistics. In addition, Claire Renzetti has given this project a fresh perspective and helped to expand the implications of my argument far beyond my limited vision. My deepest thanks to both of them.

iii

Indeed, I owe much of my success to the entire political science department of the

University of Kentucky, who provided me with the opportunity to study a topic I care deeply about. In particular, I owe thanks to Jill Haglund, Abby Córdova, Jesse Johnson, and Justin Wedeking, all of whom have been critical to my development as a scholar.

Additional thanks are owed to many of my past mentors. To name a few, I thank

Eric Smith at my undergraduate alma mater, who believed in me, and sent me on the path to a PhD. I thank John Mark Adrian, whose guidance helped me feel at home in college.

I also thank to Robert McGraw, whose copy of Thucydides’ “The Peloponnesian War” sent me down the path to studying politics.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my family and friends. To mom and dad, thank you for believing I could be more than I was, and for teaching me the value of pushing myself forward. To my sister, Krislyn, thanks for always being the goofball you are, for being far braver than I could ever be, and for the uncontrollable belly laughs you have given me over the years. To my grandma, thank you for always taking care of me no matter what, and for teaching me to never be afraid of who I am. To my colleague and dearest friend, Jaclyn Johnson, I could have never survived graduate school without you. To my best friend, Evan, thank you for putting up with me these last ten years and for making me stick to it, even when I didn’t want to.

And finally, to David, who stood beside me when I could stand, and held me up when I could not, you have my love, my heart, and my deepest gratitude, forever. I love you and I miss you, sweetie.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii LIST OF TABLES ...... vi LIST OF FIGURES ...... vii Chapter 1 – Introduction ...... 1 The Puzzles of Women’s Protests ...... 4 Patterns in Women’s Protests ...... 7 What We Know about Women’s Protests ...... 10 Contributions of this Dissertation ...... 13 Chapter 2 – Theory ...... 17 What is a Protest? ...... 17 What is a Women’s Protest? ...... 20 Why do Women’s Protests Occur? ...... 23 Why do Women Protest “as Women”? ...... 24 Why do Women Participate in Protests? ...... 26 General Theoretical Framework ...... 27 Women Protest Repression ...... 33 Women Protest Forced Disappearances ...... 40 Women’s Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts ...... 51 Conclusions ...... 54 Chapter 3 – Empirics: Women Protest Repression ...... 57 Research Design ...... 57 Results ...... 67 Robustness Tests ...... 71 Chapter 4 – Empirics: Women Protest Disappearances ...... 80 Research Design ...... 80 Results ...... 85 Robustness Tests ...... 93 Chapter 5 – Empirics: Women Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts ...... 96 Research Design ...... 100 Results ...... 104 Chapter 6 – Conclusion ...... 108 Contributions of this Dissertation ...... 108 Avenues for Future Researh ...... 112 Why Still Study Women’s Protests? ...... 112 Appendices ...... 115 Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics ...... 116 Appendix B: Additional Robustness Tests ...... 120 Appendix C: Names of the Disappeared ...... 122 References ...... 159 Vita ...... 174

v LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Victims by Gender, Selected Countries ...... 48 Table 2: Hypotheses ...... 56 Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Repression ...... 69 Table 4: Correlation of Repression Measures ...... 73 Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Repression (PTS) ...... 74 Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Repression (Regions) 79 Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Disappearance ...... 87 Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression of Protest Type on Disappearance ...... 90 Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Disappearance (Regions) ...... 94 Table 10: Negative Binomial Regression of General Protests on Disappearance (Regions) ...... 95 Table 11: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Covariates ....106

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of Women’s March, January 2017 ...... 2 Figure 2: Women’s Protests over Time ...... 9 Figure 3: Theoretical Process of State Repression and Protest...... 31 Figure 4: Prevalence of Repression for All Countries by Repression Type ...... 31 Figure 5: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Repression ...... 63 Figure 6: Women’s Protests by Level of Repression ...... 70 Figure 7: Women’s Protests by Level of Repression (PTS Measures) ...... 76 Figure 8: Relation between Women’s Protests and Disappearance ...... 88 Figure 9: Predicted Number of Women’s Protests by Level of Disappearance ...... 92 Figure 10: Women’s Protests and State Repression in Latin America, 1990-2009 ...... 98 Figure 11: Effect of Respondent Gender on Likelihood of Protest Participation at Levels of Disapperance: ...... 107 Figure 12: Trust in Government over Ideology and Repression ...... 111

vii

Chapter 1 – Introduction

In 2017, just one day after the inauguration of controversial United States

President Donald Trump, millions of women, largely dissatisfied with the election

outcome, took to the streets in protest (Frostenson 2017). While largely focused on

Washington, D.C., this wave of protests affected countless US cities. According to

estimates by political scientists Jeremy Pressman and Erica Chenoweth (2017), over 4.2

million people participated in sister marches across the US, making it likely to be the

largest single day demonstration in United States history. At least nine cities in the US

had marches with crowds larger than 100,000, including Washington DC, Los Angeles,

New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Denver, Seattle, and Oakland (Pressman and

Chenoweth 2017).

Figure 1 illustrates the data on Women’s March protests gathered by Pressman

and Chenoweth (2017) graphically, showing the concentration of events. As you can see,

every state in the US had at least some protest activity. The lion’s share of protests took

place along the east coast of the US, with the largest concentration of protest activity in

DC. Indeed, though the incoming Trump administration was a prime motivation for

many participants in the Women’s March, the protest was not limited to the US and was global in scale (Frostenson 2017). Figure 1 also illustrates that every continent saw at least some protest activity from women. Women across the globe participated in

solidarity with the March, with sister marches on every continent (including Antarctica),

and current estimates of global numbers of participants reaching as high as 300 thousand

protestors worldwide (not including protestors in the US; Frostenson 2017).

Figure 1: Map of Women’s March, January 2017

Notes: Data on Women’s March activity from Pressman and Chenoweth (2017). Protest locations geocoded using Stata command opencagegeo and the Open Cage Data API. Map created with CartoDB web app.

Why did women organize such a massive protest event? Of course, there are

many reasons that motivated the Women’s March, including fears of reversals in

reproductive rights under a Republican administration, concerns over worker’s rights and

employment non-discrimination, and uncertainty about women’s rights more generally.

However, there was one key motivation for the Women’s March that has been under-

studied and under-theorized by the literature on women’s protests: the Women’s March

was an explicit protest against state-sanctioned violence. In fact, if we look at the “Unity

Principles” guiding the Women’s March, the very first item listed is entitled “Ending

Violence” and reads as such:

“Women deserve to live full and healthy lives, free of all forms of violence

against our bodies. We believe in accountability and justice in cases of police

brutality and ending racial profiling and targeting of communities of color. It is

our moral imperative to dismantle the gender and racial inequities within the

criminal justice system.” - Women’s March Unity Principles (2017).

In short, though the Women’s March arose for many reasons, state sanctioned violence, particularly police violence against minorities, was a key motivation for women who protested. In this dissertation, I examine the role of state sanctioned violence in motivating and shaping women’s protests worldwide, demonstrating that the Women’s

March of 2017 is not unique in this aspect: women’s protests frequently arise as a response to state violence.

Though the full consequences of the Women’s March are yet to be seen, this protest demonstrates that women are very involved in politics both in the US and worldwide, and are willing to take to the streets in order to make demands of their

3 government. The stated desire to end state sanctioned violence which helped to motivate the Women’s March in particular is just another timely reminder that women do not organize solely in favor of policies or reforms that explicitly favor women, or that relate to explicitly gendered forms of inequality. In fact, the Women’s March of 2017 is just the latest (and certainly largest) example in a long line of women protesting against unfavorable conditions.

History is rife with examples of women taking to the streets to demand change, from protests demanding women’s suffrage in the late 1800s (Teele 2014, Banaszak

1996), to the “Driving Protests” in Saudi Arabia in 2011 (Begum 2017). As another example, in Latin America women frequently played a huge part in pro-democracy movements from the late 1970s to the 1990s (Waylen 1994). In sub-Saharan Africa, women have disrobed in public as an act of protest against various social problems, such as rape culture (Thompson 2017). Women have also been critical participants and organizers in major recent social movements such as Black Lives Matter (Kaleem 2016), while numerous women’s groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving/MADD (Bilotta

1985) or Mom’s Demands Action for Gun Sense in America (Follman 2014) have also formed specifically to advocate for non-gendered purposes. In sum, women’s protests are a frequent occurrence, but are not always motivated by gender specific concerns, and understanding the role of gender in protest behavior more fully is critical to our understanding of contentious politics more generally.

The Puzzles of Women’s Protests

Not only are women’s protests relatively frequent, they are also puzzling for a number of reasons. In this dissertation in particular, I address three broad puzzles

regarding women’s protests. First, protests are costly and often risky endeavors

(Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). Taking part in a protest takes time and money at minimum. In some countries, taking part in a protest can be quite dangerous for demonstrators, particularly in places where the government does not tolerate open opposition or areas where threats of arrest or violence are commonplace. This is perhaps especially true for women, who often tend to have less access to networks of contacts and resources which enable them to protest (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). The costs

of protests are not purely born by participants, either: the government highly values

quiescence from the populace, and protests constitute a breach of social order that elites

would prefer to avoid if they can (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998). This raises the

question: if both sides would prefer to avoid protests, why do we see women protest?

Women’s protests are additionally puzzling because they are gendered. In other

words, when women and women’s groups choose to organize along explicitly gendered

lines (Baldez 2002), they could be placing something of a ceiling on participation.

Though men certainly can and do protest alongside women’s groups (e.g. the many men

who turned out for the Women’s March in 2017), framing a protest as a “Women’s

March” necessarily directs the messaging of the protest to one specific gender and could

potentially halve the number of likely participants, at least in theory. Taking the opposite

line of reasoning, women often protest as part of a mixed-gender group alongside men

and women. If organizers of a protest have the option to organize in a mixed-gender

way, including both men and women and possibly expanding the number of participants,

why do women organize “as women” rather than as part of a broader, mixed-gender

group?

Finally, women’s protests are puzzling because of how rarely many or most

women participate in protests. Typically, women are much less likely to participate in protests than men, due to a variety of factors, such as less access to resources to lower levels of representation among political elites (Córdova and Rangel 2016, Espinal and

Zhao 2015, Beauregard 2013, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Desposato and Norrander

2009). In spite of the lower likelihood of individual women participating in a protest

relative to men, women’s protests are not uncommon at the country level. This raises one final question: Why do women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but not participate at other times?

This dissertation seeks to shed light on these three questions. In particular, this work focuses on the relationship of women’s protests to state sanctioned violence, specifically state repression, and on how repression used by the state can both motivate protests and shape the types of protests we observe in society. I build on previous thought about the determinants of protest in a number of ways. Specifically, in Chapter

2, I present a theory of women’s protests in three parts. The first piece of my theory

addresses the question “Why do women protest?”. When explaining protests in general,

scholars have argued that, one of the key motivators of protest activity is state repression,

and that protests are more likely when the state uses repression (e.g. Moore 1998). I

argue that this applies to women’s protests as well, and that women will be more likely to

protest when the state uses repression than if the state does not use repression. The

second piece of my theory focuses specifically on the question of why women frequently

choose to protest “as women”, rather than seeking a potentially more inclusive non-

gendered protest strategy, when the state uses repression. To answer this question, I

argue that the type of repression the state practices, and more importantly, the way gender influences the state’s practice of repression, motivates protests by women specifically. In particular, the use of forced disappearances as a repressive tactic by the state often

motivates women to protest, and encourages them to do so along gender lines, because

women are less likely to be targeted for disappearance and because women are able to

effectively frame their activism in gendered terms. Finally, the third piece of my theory

addresses the question of why women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but other times do not participate. Here I argue that state repression changes the political environment in gendered ways, and the use of forced disappearances encourages women to participate in protests while discouraging men from participating.

Chapters 3 through 5 provide empirical tests of the implications of my theory.

Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship of women’s protests and repression, and finds that

women are far more likely to protest when the state is being highly repressive. Chapter 4

shows that women are particularly likely to protest when the state uses forced

disappearances, rather than other repressive tactics (e.g. extrajudicial killings). Chapter 5

shows that individual women in society are more likely to participate in protests, relative

to men, when the state uses disappearances. Finally, I offer some conclusions about how

this theory can illustrate other examples of women’s protest, such as the Women’s March

of 2017, and how future research can benefit from the theory I develop.

Patterns in Women’s Protests

Using data on women’s protests from Murdie and Peksen (2014), Figure 2 shows the trend for women’s protests over time, with the number of observed women’s protests globally on the y-axis and the year on the x-axis. Based on the available data, we see that

7 the absolute number of women’s protests peaked at around the year 1995. Since that year, there has been a steady decline in the number of women’s protests, with intermittent upswings in 2001 and 2004.

However, I should note two things regarding this time trend. First, the available data stops in 2010, meaning that our data does not capture recent waves of massive protest like the Women’s March in 2017. Second, throughout the entire time period under consideration, there are never fewer than 400 observed protests by women in a given year, which equates to roughly two women’s protests per year for every country on earth. Thus, even as women’s protests have declined over time, they are still a frequent and important global occurrence that merits scholarly attention. Recent events such as the Women’s March of 2017 have illustrated that this observed decline is likely not permanent, or at the very least, that it does not place an effective ceiling on the size and scope of women’s protests.

In sum, when we look at the available data on women’s protests, we observe that women’s protests are frequent on a global scale, but that the number of protests by women has declined from an observed peak in the early 1990s. Recent events suggest that women’s protests may be rising in frequency. In the next section, I examine what we know about women’s protest from previous works on the subject.

Figure 2: Women’s Protests over Time 2000 1500 1000 500 Total Number of Women's Protests 0

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year

Notes: Data on women’s protests comes from Murdie and Peksen (2014). The y-axis shows the total, global number of women’s protests for a given year.

What We Know about Women’s Protests

Why do women’s protests occur? Previous works have offered three major answers to explain contentious mobilization in general: grievance, political opportunity

structure, and resource mobilization (Beaulieu 2014, Murdie and Peksen 2014). In this

section, I outline each theory in turn, and explain the general expectations suggested by

each theoretical framework as they apply to women’s protests, specifically. In the next

chapter, I lay out my theory linking state repression to women’s protests, which builds

upon these previous approaches by examining the role of state repression in shaping

grievances, opportunities, and resources in gendered ways, and allows for new insights

into the causes of women’s protests.

The first major perspective on the origins of protests is grievance based.

Grievance based theories (sometimes called “relative deprivation” theories) focus on the

motivations to protest, and suggest that discontent with the current political system leads

to collective dissent (Gurr 1968, 1970, Davies 1962). Thus, individuals’ feelings of

discontent and dissatisfaction with the status quo are primary motivators for collective

mobilization. The feeling that one’s status is not in line with one’s expectations is a

necessary condition for dissent (Gurr 1970). To the extent that women perceive society

as unequal and explicitly biased against them, we should expect that women would

protest more and to organize as well (Simmons 2009). Explictly discriminatory laws and

policies against women have indeed motivated a large number of women’s protests. For

example, many women protested in favor of women’s suffrage (Teele 2014, Banaszak

1996, Costain 1992), in favor of legal protections from violence against women (Htun

and Weldon 2012), and in favor of economic equality for women (Craske 1999).

There are two key caveats to mention for this explanation of women’s protests.

The first is that unfairness in the status quo, on its own, does not consistently lead to

dissent. For example, research looking at marital satisfaction finds that women are not

less satisfied even when expected to take on much more household work, due to

socialization and low expectations (Greenstein 1996, Major 1989, 1993). Works on the

gender wage gap find similar patterns (Jackson 1989). The second caveat is that women

do not only mobilize in protest against gender discrimination. For example, women have

been critical participants in democratization movements (Alvarez 1990, Waylen 1994,

Craske 1999), women have protested general economic conditions (Safa 1990), and many women have even taken part in rebellions and led revolutionary groups (Kampwirth

2014, Jaquette 1973). In sum, though grievances caused by gender discrimination are

one key motivator for women’s protests, context seems to determine when objective

unfairness is perceived as unfair and thus leads to dissent, and women’s protests are often

motivated by non-gender specific goals.

Political opportunity/process theories focus on the opportunity to mobilize rather

than the motivation for doing so, and focus on the perceived ability to succeed in a

political goal. In other words, mobilization depends on a favorable political environment:

individuals must have some confidence they could succeed, and the government must be

somewhat tolerant of dissent (Costain 1992, Tilly 1978, Lipset 1963). In general, this

perspective suggests that we should observe more protests by women under open,

democratic societies that tolerate opposition, and wherein persuasion can more easily

result in reform. Past works have found that women’s protests are indeed more likely

during political openings, such as periods of partisan realignment (Baldez 2002,

Macaulay 2006, Costain 1992), during transitional periods when a state is democratizing

(Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Molyneux 1985), and when the state is at least somewhat open (Murdie and Peksen 2014).

One important thing to note, however, is that opportunities are not objective or static: activists must perceive an opportunity, and to an extent, activists construct opportunities to protest (della Porta and Tarrow 2004, Banazak 1996). For example, under the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America, the state was incredibly repressive, but women took to the streets in protest of both human rights violations (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). They were able to do this, in part, by strategically employing and manipulating the same cultural frames of motherhood and family used by the regime to quash dissent from other groups, such as labor unions

(Navarro 1989). In short, even apparently “closed” or repressive systems are still vulnerable to dissent from creative activists.

Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize

(rather than their motivations or opportunities for doing so). Access to resources mitigate the cost of mobilization (Boulding 2014, Bell et al. 2013, Cole 2013, Tilly 1978,

McCarthy and Zald 1977). Generally, scholars looking at the role of resources in protests have focused on either individual resources (e.g. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) or group/organizational resources (e.g. Boulding 2014). Individuals require things like free- time, money, transportation, communication tools, and organizational skills to protest

(Murdie and Peksen 2014, Murdie and Bhasin 2011). Groups facilitate protests by gathering, coordinating, facilitating, and distributing all the aforementioned resources to interested parties. For both individuals weighing whether to participate in protests and

12 groups trying to mobilize others for a protest, more resources, are thought to lead to more protests.

In the next chapter, I build on all three theories of mobilization to examine the causes of women’s protests specifically as they relate to practices of state repression.

The first two hypotheses I present reflect the consistency of effects of repression on protest activity across women’s protest and protest in the general population, while the third hypothesis reflects the distinctiveness of women protesting state repression as women. The final two hypotheses shift the unit of analysis from the country level to the individual level, and suggest that while it is generally the case that women are less likely to participate in protests, women actually become at least as likely as men to participate in protests when the state uses repression.

Contributions of this Dissertation

This dissertation contributes to our broader understanding of politics in at least four ways. First, our understanding of women’s protests is still relatively underdeveloped. While many authors have made important contributions to understanding women’s protests, works on this subject tend to focus on a single case or a small number of cases (Mooney 2007, Baldez 2002, Banaszak 1996, Alvarez 1990,

Molyneux 1985). This is partially because, until very recently, no globally comprehensive data on women’s protests existed at the cross-national level (Murdie and

Peksen 2014). In this project, I seek to provide a more globally comprehensive view of patterns women’s protests, particularly as they relate to repressive actions taken by the state. This approach is useful because it allows me to both build my argument with as

13 general a scope as possible, and to test its implications on as wide a range of data as is currently available.

I contribute to our theoretical understanding of women’s protests by developing a novel theory of women’s protests which builds on past perspectives of protest. First, I apply the logic of repression and dissent to women’s protests in particular. In this respect, I argue that women’s protests are similar to other protests in that they are a reaction against the negative actions of the state. However, building upon both grievance and political opportunity structure arguments, I also argue that women’s protests are distinct, and are different in many respects from general protests that include both men and women. Because the state practices repression in gendered ways, women are affected differently by repression and react to it in different ways. In particularly repressive contexts, women actually have additional advantages for mobilizing that give them agency to protest when other groups cannot. Thus, I show that under particular political contexts, certain identity categories (in this case, womanhood) confer additional resources for mobilization to potential protestors.

My theory not only contributes to our understanding of protests but also to the scholarly understanding of the effects of repression, by suggesting that not all repression is practiced the same way and different types of repression can meet very different reactions from the public. My research suggests that we should continue the process of opening up the “black box” of repression to think about specific types of repression in order to best understand the possible consequences of repression. To date, all of the quantitative human rights scholarship which looks at specific repressive tactics has focused exclusively on the practice of torture (Conrad 2014, Conrad, Haglund, and

Moore 2014, Conrad and Ritter 2013, Conrad and Moore 2010, Vreeland 2008)1. This dissertation represents a first step towards broader theorizing about the other types of repressive tactics by focusing predominantly on the practice of forced disappearance. I find that the state does not apply all types of repression equally to all groups in society, and so the type of repression used matters significantly for what reactions are likely to occur and from which social groups (like protests from women, in this case).

My theory aims to be general and can be used to think about other important questions. There are three main ways in which I anticipate future research can utilize my theory. First, my theory aims to be general, and can provide a framework for integrating future work on the subject of women’s protests. For example, in the conclusions of this project, I speculate about the ways in which my theory can help us to understand the

Women’s March of 2017. Secondarily, my theory can be used as a way to understand protests by other marginalized groups besides women. My theory can be applied to dynamics of protest by ethnic and racial minorities, religious minorities, and other groups where the state is using repression in a targeted manner, and it suggests that members of the group that are the most targeted may be the least able to protest, but that . Thirdly, my theory can be used to inform policy from international actors and advocacy groups concerned with human rights abuses. My research suggests that in certain repressive contexts, women and women’s groups are highly likely to protest, and thus organizations

1 For some conceptual/qualitative work on extrajudicial killings, see Kessler and Werner (2008), Ojie (2006), and Guiora (2004). For some similar works on political imprisonment, see Pohlman (2008) and Vo (2003). Note that none of these works are cross-national or quantitative in nature. 15

should anticipate women’s protests in those circumstances and provide additional support

and coverage to help keep women safe during protests.

Finally, I also contribute to our understanding of protests by empirically

examining an as-yet underutilized source of data on women’s protests collected by

Murdie and Peksen (2014). To date, only Murdie and Peksen (2014) have used this

wealth of data to empirically examine the determinants of women’s protests. In addition,

I also examine the determinants of women’s protests at two levels, using both country

level data and individual level data. This two-level approach allows me to better illustrate the nature of protests as a group and individual level activity, that require both organizational resources and individual willingness to participate.

Chapter 2 – Theory

In this chapter, I lay out my argument. The theory I present focuses on answering

three main questions. First, why do women’s protest occur? Or rather, in what ways are

women’s protests similar to other, non-gendered protests? Secondarily, why do women protest “as women”? In other words, why do women sometimes choose to organize around their gender identity, and other times take part in broader protests involving both men and women? Finally, why do individual women choose to participate in protests?

Put another way, in what contexts are women more likely to participate in protests,

relative to men?

In the following sections, I provide additional context to these questions based on

past works on contentious politics. I first define the key concepts used in this work,

namely protests and women’s protests. Then, I further elaborate on the three theoretical

puzzles this work seeks to illuminate. After fully setting up these theoretical puzzles, I

provide my answers to these questions, creating a new theoretical framework for

conceptualizing and explaining women’s protests which focuses on the role of state

repression in motivating and shaping women’s activism, while integrating and building

upon previous theories of repression and dissent, grievances, political opportunity

structures, and resource mobilization.

What is a Protest?

Before turning to the larger theoretical questions of this dissertation, it is worth

elaborating on the general conceptual framework and working definitions of key terms

used in my argument. In particular, first I wish to briefly define “protests”, draw

conceptual distinctions between protests and the related concept of a “social movement”.

I elaborate on the definition of “women’s protests” specifically in the following section.

Conceptually, I adopt the definition of protest from Barnes and Kaase (1979):

protests are direct, political actions that are “unconventional” and non-institutional,

taking place outside of formal channels for revising the status quo such as voting or legal

challenges to policy. Protests must involve a person or group of people gathered in a

specific location. There are various forms a protest can take, such as sit-ins, marches, vigils, rallies, or pickets. Protests are specific events, that occur over a defined time period, organized by a group of people, that seek to challenge the status quo. The key characteristic of a protest for my purposes is that it must be “revisionist” (Quaranta

2015): protests seek to change some aspect of social reality, for example, to raise wages or end child labor practices.

The major confusion present in some previous work is the distinction between a protest and a social movement. Protests are, in fact, conceptually distinct from social movements, but the distinctions between the two concepts is not always made clear in past works. Protests and social movements are herein defined as related but distinct sociopolitical phenomena. I adopt the definition of what constitutions a social movement originating within the resource mobilization perspective laid out by McCarthy and Zald

(1977): a social movement is defined as “a set of opinions and beliefs which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society”. In other words, social movements are abstract changes in public opinion or perception among groups of citizens, rather than specific gatherings of people with a concrete goal. For example, the US women’s suffrage movement was the broader

philosophical and political movement which aimed to change people’s preferences in

favor of giving women the right to vote, whereas the Woman Suffrage Procession of

1913 was a protest organized by members of that movement. Protests may occur in the

context of a social movement (e.g. members of the Black Lives Matter movement

coordinate a “die-in”), or they may arise spontaneously as a reaction to specific changes in the political environment (e.g. previously unorganized workers go on strike due to a new overtime regulation).

This work is intended to examine protests, exclusively, rather than social movements. My theory should apply equally to all protests regardless of whether they occur as part of a broader social movement or spontaneously. In this dissertation, I do not assume or hypothesize about any causal or temporal relationship between these

concepts: a protest may be organized as part of a social movement, a spontaneous protest

may gain momentum and eventually help to create a social movement, a social movement

may not be associated with any specific protests, and likewise a protest may or may not

be associated with any particular social movement. Broadly speaking, conditions thought

to give rise to social movements are thought to apply equally to protests, and vice versa,

and insights from scholars of social movements are critical for understanding protests.

If there are meaningful distinctions between the conditions thought to give rise to or encourage social movements and those that give rise to or encourage protests, a broad reading of the literature does not provide clues in that direction. Generally, authors who study women’s social movements or protests often treat the two concepts as essentially interchangeable. Naturally, this does not prove that there are not meaningful distinctions or differences in causal pathways between these two concepts, merely that if such

distinctions do exist, they are currently ill defined by the literature available. This work

does not seek to illuminate any such differences in conceptualization or differences in

causal pathways for women’s protests, movements, or both, nor to criticize past authors

for treating these two concepts as one, merely to point out this prevailing implicit

equivalence found in past works.

What is a Women’s Protest?

This dissertation is predominately an exploration of the factors that lead to women’s protests, specifically, and an attempt to situate women’s dissent in a broader understanding of social unrest. However, the definitional question of “what is a women’s protest?” deserves further consideration, because the definition used will have conceptual and theoretical implications for the rest of the work, and prior works tend to treat the meaning the concept of a “women’s protest” as self-evident. What characteristics distinguishes a “women’s protest” from the more general category of “protests”, as defined in the previous section? There are three possible attributes for defining a women’s protest.

The first condition is perhaps the most obvious. A women’s protest is a protest in which the participants are, primarily or exclusively, women. In other words, a women’s protest is a protest “of women”. I argue that this is a necessary but insufficient condition for defining a women’s protest. After all, women have enthusiastically participated in many protests that are not considered women’s protests, such as the pro-democratization movements in many regions of the world (Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Baldez 2003).

The heavy involvement of women in a protest, on its own, is not enough to delineate a women’s protest from other kinds of protest.

The second condition is the most important for this work. In order for a protest to

“count” as a women’s protest, it must be framed as a women’s protest (Baldez 2002).

Thus, a women’s protest is a protest “by women” – one that is characterized by both participants and outside observers as led by a “woman” or “women” (Murdie and Pekson

2014). In other words, a women’s protest is one in which the organizers of the protest choose to call it a women’s protest, specifically. This is arguably the most important qualification for defining women’s protests, and likely why previous authors treat the concept as given: A women’s protest is a protest that defines and frames itself as a women’s protest (leading to the “know it when you see it” approach adopted by some previous works). I argue that this, too, is a necessary but insufficient attribute for a women’s protest. It is reasonable to also require that at least some number of women be involved in a protest, on top of the protest being framed as a women’s protest. In conjunction with the first condition, these are the two conceptual conditions that I adopt to define women’s protests in this project. In other words, when I am speaking of women’s protests, I mean a protest that both involves women (primarily) and is framed as a women’s protest by the participants of the protest.

I adopt these first two conditions to define women’s protests for my purposes.

However, there is a third potential way to conceptualize women’s protests, which is worth mentioning here even though I do not adopt this conceptualization. This view looks at the stated goal of the protest to see whether it is focused on women’s issues. In other words, this view is that women’s protests are protests “for women”, where the explicit goal of the protest is to improve or change the status of women, specifically.

I do not adopt this “goal focused” definition of women’s protests, for two reasons.

The first is to avoid the trap of essentialism. Women have many and varied political interests (just as men do), not all of which are predominantly or even particularly gender specific. As Alvarez (1990) put it:

“When one considers that women span all social classes, ethnicities, religions,

nationalities, political ideologies, and so on, then an infinite array of interests

could be construed as women’s interests. Gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual

preference and other social characteristics determine women’s social posititioning

and shape women’s interests.”

Women often do protest for gender specific reasons or goals (for example, women’s suffrage), but a “women’s protest” could theoretically be about anything – police violence, economic inequality, education policy and so on.

In addition to avoiding definitionally flattening women’s protests into only protests about “women-specific” issues, there are theoretical reasons I do not adopt this condition as part of my conceptual framework. This project seeks, in large part, to illuminate the choice of framing a protest as a “women’s protest”, especially in circumstances where the goal of, or motivation for, the protest is not specific to women.

Such a question would not be possible if I defined women’s protests as only having gender specific goals, nor would such a conception capture the vast array of reasons for women’s protests. For these reasons, I reject conceptualizing women’s protests as protests about “women- specific” issues or with gender specific goals.

Why do Women’s Protests Occur?

Protesting is a costly activity. At a minimum, a participant has to have time off from work and other responsibilities, and transportation to an event that could be far from their home. Above that, there are the many activities needed to organize a protest, such as securing a location, registering necessary permits, spreading the message to as many people as possible. For women in particular, the costs for protesting can be particularly high, since women in many families are often expected to do unpaid work at home, such as childrearing and housekeeping, in addition to often working outside the home as well

(Craig and Mullan 2010, Craske 1999, Safa 1990, Stevens 1973). Protests can also carry high risks for participants: national governments and local police forces are often quite hostile to opposition (Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). Protestors can face arrest, physical harm, or even death when the political environment is unfavorable.

However, protests are not merely costly for those participating in them or organizing them – protests are also quite costly, and risky, for the state. Protests are a sign of weak political institutions – if the state is failing to respond to the needs of citizens, they are more likely to protest (Boulding 2014). States value quiescence from the populace, because obedience and peaceful order supports the extraction of taxes, the creation of wealth, and increases the legitimacy of the state (Davenport 2007). Protest can halt or interfere with business activity in affected areas, cause blockages of traffic or trade, and otherwise disrupt the daily activities of society. At the extremes, protest can foment into full scale revolution, encourage coups d’état, and otherwise lead to a complete breakdown of political order (Johnson and Thyne 2016, Casper and Tyson

2014).

Given all these costs and risks, it is reasonable to assume that both the state and protest participants would actually prefer to avoid protesting, if at all possible. In other words, we can think of protests as inefficient bargaining outcomes: both sides (i.e. both dissidents and the state) would prefer to come to an agreement without actually needing to pay the costs, or run the risks of allowing, protest, because protest is costly (Beaulieu

2014, c.f. Fearon 1995). However, we see that protests occur rather frequently within nearly every country. This begs the question: why do women protest? I return with an answer to this question in later sections of this chapter, focusing on the undertheorized but important motivation that state repression provides for women’s protests, but first, I elaborate on this question further by asking more specific questions about women’s protests.

Why do Women Protest “as Women”?

Women’s protests are not only puzzling because protests in general are thought of as ex post inefficient or failed bargaining outcomes. Women’s protests are also interesting because they are explicitly gendered. Why do women choose to protest “as women”, that is, on the basis of their shared gender identity (Baldez 2002)? In other words, why do women sometimes frame a protest as a “women’s protest”, but at other times women simply take part in broader, non-gendered protests (i.e. protests that make no reference to gender and do not use gender identity as a mobilizing factor)?

This is a particularly interesting puzzle to consider, because framing a protest as a women’s protest may well limit the potential number of participants to only women (and, perhaps, those sympathetic to women as a political group). This is not to say, of course, that people who are not women can’t participate in a women’s protest, but it seems likely

that they are less willing to do so. If we assume that, all else being equal, protest

organizers would prefer to organize the largest protest event possible (which seems like a reasonable assumption to make), limiting the potential number of participants by framing the protest as a women’s protest doesn’t make sense.

The most obvious answer from previous works is that women frame a protest as a women’s protest when the goal of the protest is gender specific. In other words, women may mobilize “as women” in service of their strategic gender interests (Molyneux 1985).

For example, we could think of protests by women in support of something like women’s suffrage as having goals specific to, and arguably primarily beneficial to, women. For protests where the goal of the protest is explicitly gendered, and thus the protest is already unlikely to attract participants who are not women, framing the protest in explicitly gendered terms might not be seen as limiting.

However, this ignores the reality that women’s protests have occurred with as many goals as any other type of protest. Women are not a monolithic group or a unitary actor, and women participate on all sides of almost every major political conflict that exists. For example, women participate heavily in pro-democracy movements (Waylen

1994, Noonan 1995), human rights protests (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), economic equality protests (Safa 1990), and even full-scale revolutions (Kampwirth 2014, Jaquette

1973). Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that women’s protests only occur for gender specific goals.

And so the question remains: given that women’s protests occur for all kinds of reasons, why do women frame protests as women’s protests? In the rest of this chapter, I argue that women’s protests are, in some ways, similar to other forms of protest, but that

gender also plays a significant role in shaping protest behavior in ways that are not

obvious. I argue that women dissidents frame some protests as “women’s protests”

strategically, choosing to make the trade-off of limiting the number of potential

participants in exchange for perceived benefits, but not always because the protest has

gender specific goals.

Why do Women Participate in Protests?

Up to now, I have focused largely on the protest behavior of women as a group,

and the collective framing of protests by participants. Women’s protests are fairly

frequent at the country level, and women’s protests are more common in some

circumstances than others. However, protests are made up of individuals, and without

participants, there can be no protest. As mentioned earlier, protests are costly for

participants, and women in particular can find it especially difficult to participate in

protests. This is partly because women often have less access to the resources necessary

to take part in protests (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994, Verba, Burns, and

Schlozman 1997). Economic marginalization leads women to participate less in civic life

compared to men (Craske 1999). Women are often expected to take on additional

responsibilities at home, even as more and more women have entered the labor force

(Craske 1999, Stevens 1973). The literature generally suggests that women will be less

likely to protest than men.

Empirical findings from recent works bear out this expectation. Much research

using survey data to compare men and women’s political activism has found a “gender

participation gap”, the consistent finding in survey-based research that women are less politically active than men. Specifically, women are less likely to participate in protests

26 than men (Desposato and Norrander 2009, Zetterberg 2009, Córdova and Rangel 2016).

Works like Córdova and Rangel (2016) have examined the conditions under which this gender gap shrinks or disappears, and women protest at roughly equal rates as men.

However, works seeking to elaborate on which political conditions can mitigate the gender gap in participation have largely focused on the role of certain institutional arrangements, namely proportional representation (Beauregard 2013), gender quotas

(Barnes and Burchard 2013), and compulsory voting (Córdova and Rangel 2016) on the gap between men and women’s political participation.

Comparatively less is known about the role of other state practices in shaping the gender participation gap. So, this puzzle still remains: why do individual women take part in protests? Why do women sometimes participate in protests, but at other times tend to stay home? Later in this chapter, I look at the role of state repression in shaping an individual’s choice of whether or not to participate in a protest. Though women are usually less likely to participate in protests than men, I argue that when the state is repressive, particularly when the state practices repression in a gendered way, gender identity can serve as a resource to women and provide women with additional space to protest relative to men.

General Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I have set up three major related theoretical puzzles: why do women’s protest occur, why do women protest “as women”, and why do individual women participate in protests? These are broad, complex questions with conceivably infinite answers. Rather than attempt to give a complete accounting for all the possible answers to these questions, I instead focus this dissertation on the goal of providing a few

novel, but specific, answers to these questions from an undertheorized and understudied

perspective. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the links between women’s protest

and repression by the state. I argue that state repressive practices both motivate protests

by women, and shape the form that those protests eventually take, in meaningful ways.

Before turning to my argument, I should note how my approach differs from

previous theories specifically explaining women’s protests. There are generally two

previous approaches to studying the causes of women’s protests. The first, best

exemplified by Murdie and Peksen (2014), is to expling women’s protests with a gender

conscious application of perspectives used to explain other protests. Murdie and Peksen

(2014) thus seek to explain women’s protests by applying general explanations for

protests, such as resource mobilization or political opportunity structures, to women’s protests, by looking at how those factors could be measured for women, specifically. For

example, Murdie and Peksen (2014) succeed in showing that women’s protests are

motivated by discrimination against women in the political and economic arena. I build

on their work by examining women’s protests in the broader context of social unrest –

theorizing that women’s protests can sometimes be a result of negative actions by the

state which are not wholly specific to women.

The second approach generally examines women’s protests (or social movements)

as uniquely gendered phenomena. Rather than treat women’s protests as similar to other

protests, these works examine women’s protest in isolation. In particular, Baldez (2002)

serves as a primary example of this approach. She builds her argument starting from the

observation that all women’s movements share something in common: the decision to

mobilize as women, on the basis of commonly held notions of women’s identity. Her

work seeks to explain why women perceive particular historical moments in gendered

terms (thus choosing to frame their mobilization as women’s movements). She argues that activist women will frame their movement as a women’s movement when gender serves as a useful unifying frame, because gender is the characteristic that all women share. Baldez (2002) further argues that the single most universal aspect women share in common, despite their unique individual experiences, is a history of political marginalization. Baldez (2002) shows that women frame their movement in gendered terms strategically, but only focuses on a single condition that might incentivize that framing strategy (i.e. partisan realignments). I build on her work by returning to her observation that all women’s protests share one commonality: they were framed as women’s protests by participants. This dissertation expands on her approach by examining other conditions, besides partisan realignment, that incentivize framing a

protest in gendered terms.

My theoretical approach thus differs from both of these past approaches but

explicitly builds from their foundations. Rather than treat women’s protests as motivated

only by woman-specific discrimination, or focus exclusively on the shared gender-

specific framing that all women’s protests exhibit, I adopt an integrated approach. I

explicitly theorize about circumstances that encourage women’s protests, specifically,

and which circumstances might affect women’s mobilization in the same way as any

other protest. This approach allows me to better situate women’s protests in a broader

understanding of social unrest. I accomplish these goals by focusing on the specific

relationships between women’s protests and state repressive practices.

In Figure 3, I outline the general process described by my theory. The process

involves 3 key actors, the state, activists, and the citizenry. At decision point 1, the state

decides whether or not to use repression. If the state uses repression, activists at point 2

decide to either organize a protest or not. Given that at least some activists seek to

organize a protest, they decide at point 3 whether or not to frame the protest as a

“women’s protest”. Finally, at point 4, other citizens that are observing the ongoing protest can decide whether to join in a protest, or not.

Figure 3: Theoretical Process of State Repression and Protest

Decision Point

State 1

Repress Not Repress

Activists 2

Protest Not Protest

Time Activists 3

Women’s Protest General Protest

Citizens

4 Participate Not Participate

So, using the illustration in Figure 3 as a guide, what causes women’s protests?

The general story goes as follows: the state first decides whether or not to engage in repression. If the state does not use repression, there may still be protests, but those protests will not be motivated by repression but by something else (e.g. adverse economic conditions). If the state does repress, citizens may decide to protest against the repression, or not. If the citizens decide not to protest, the process ends, and no protests are observed under the repressive context. If citizens decide to protest, they must then decide how to frame that protest. There are a potentially endless number of possible framings for protests, but for my purposes I am only interested in the choice between framing a protest as a women’s protest or not. As I will argue in more detail later in this chapter, the more gendered the practice of repression is, the more women’s protests are incentivized compared to general protests. Finally, given that either a women’s protest, general protest, or both, are occurring in a given context, individual women are then faced with the choice of joining or not joining the protest.

The rest of this chapter fills in the details for this general outline. In the next section, I contextualize decision points 1 and 2, showing that when the state is repressive, women are motivated to protest. In the following section, I examine decision point 3, by opening up the “black box” of repression to show that repression by the state is gendered, and thus certain repressive tactics are more likely to incentivize women’s protests compared to others. In the final section, I examine decision point 4, and argue that under specific repressive contexts, women’s gender identity is a salient political resource that encourages more women to take part in protests.

Women Protest Repression

First, let us examine decision points 1 and 2 from Figure 3. In this section, I

argue that state repression constitutes a salient grievance against the state. Thus, I will

argue, when the state is repressive, women are motivated to protest. This expectation, for

the purposes of this section, is not gendered: in this respect, I argue that women’s protests are, in this way, similar to any other protest. However, note that in the following two sections, I show that the full picture is more complex than this starting point, and that gender plays a significant role in both the practice of repression by states and the experience of, and reaction to, repression by citizens.

In arguing that repression from the state motivates women’s protests, I build on a number of previous theoretical explanations for protests. In particular, I build on the

grievance perspective (Gurr 1970) to argue that repression is a key motivation for

women’s protests, and one that has not been thoroughly examined by those studying

women’s protests. Turning first to the grievance perspective, the grievance literature

suggests that people protest when they have a salient grievance against the state. As

such, past works looking at women’s protests specifically have found that women protest

when they have a grievance. For example, women are more likely to protest when

women are not politically equal to men in a given country (Murdie and Peksen 2014).

However, protest activity within a given country generally varies a great deal over

time (see, for example, the variation I showcase within Latin American countries in

Figure # in Chapter 5), while women’s political status does not change much over time

within any given country. Thus, I argue that we should broaden our focus from relatively

static factors that constitute grievances (such as women’s legal rights which change

33 infrequently and are largely stable over time) to include more fluid negative state behaviors that might cause women to have grievances against the state that might have little to do with women’s rights specifically.

In particular, I argue that state repression is another salient grievance that motivates women to protest. When the state is repressive, I expect that women will protest more frequently. When the state targets citizens with repressive tactics, women will be affected just as men are. Thus, women will be motivated to protest much the same as men would be. Protests are costly endeavors, but the possibility of a protest stopping the state from repressing further in the future provides a benefit that some citizens and some women will find valuable enough to incentivize protesting. Consider the following accounts of contemporary repression in Mexico, historical repression in

Argentina, which show that state repression is one important cause of women’s protests.

The 2014 Disappearances in Mexico

On September 26th, 2014, 43 students in Mexico were kidnapped by police and subsequently “disappeared” (Semple 2016). The students were undergraduates at a teacher’s college, and had been en route to a protest event (BBC 2016). According to a recent report, the government of Mexico has detained 123 people, including many police officials, in relation to the kidnappings, and the government has also linked the local

Iguala police force to a powerful drug gang (Semple 2016). While some remains have been recovered and identified, the ultimate fate of “The 43” is still largely unknown, and the government of Mexico has been characteristically uncooperative with international investigations (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015). Journalists and investigators reporting on the incident have been subjected to death threats and killed in some instances

(Vulliamy 2015). In the wake of the disappearances, a wave of protests erupted in Iguala

and elsewhere in Mexico, some of which turned violent (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015,

Castillo 2014). Parents and relatives of the disappeared have been active in seeking

information about their children, advocating for justice to be done, and coordinating

protests against the government and its handling of the situation (Alfred 2015).

The mothers of the missing students, in particular, have been especially prominent in protesting against the government. In an interview with reporters, Maria de Jesus

Tlatempa, whose son is among the missing students, said that protesters would continue

to make demands to the President of Mexico: “We won’t rest, we will be a pebble in his

shoes. We won’t go home” (quoted in both Alfred 2015, and Goldman 2015). Another

mother, addressing a crowd of angry protesters, said “We’re poor, but we’re not stupid

[…] We want the truth, we don’t want any more lies […] We’ll fight until we find our

sons” (quoted in Goldman 2015). One group of mothers travelled nearly 2,000 miles to

the United States, attempting to meet with the Pope during his visit and ask him to speak

out against the government (NBC 2015). Nor were the mothers of disappeared victims the only women to turn out in protest. Maria Antonieta Lugo, a member of a group of housewives who joined in the protests without experiencing a personal loss themselves, articulated that they had joined in "because we have children of the same age" as the students who had gone missing, "This could happen to our children as well” (quoted in

Stevenson and Sherman 2014).

Even though forced disappearances first gained attention during the earlier era of military dictatorships in Latin America, the issue of forced disappearance remains gravely important in many countries, and accounts of these instances suggest that similar

dynamics still apply. While the most recent incident in Iguala, Mexico, certainly drew a

great deal of international attention and domestic ire, the disappearances of the 43

students hardly represent an unusual occurrence in Mexico or Latin America more

generally, even in the post-democratization period. During Mexico’s recent “war on

drugs” (2006-2012), upwards of 26,000 individuals are estimated to have been disappeared (CBS 2013). Note that those numbers are the government’s official estimates, and likely represent an undercount of the cases. More than 16,000 unidentified

bodies have been found, and the disappearances have continued largely unabated under

the present presidential administration, despite campaign promises to end the war on

drugs (Human Rights Watch 2014). Just as was the case in Argentina during the “dirty

war”, most of the victims have been young, working class men with families (Human

Rights Watch 2014).

Nor is Mexico alone in the region, as Colombia, Brazil, and the Dominican

Republic have all recently grappled with forced disappearances. Colombia, in part due to a long running civil conflict, is perhaps the worst case in recorded history, with disappearances occurring on an unprecedented scale. Government estimates put the number of missing persons at an upwards of 51,000 (even with known underreporting), with a large number of cases occurring from 2000 to 2003 (Haugaard 2010). As with the

43 Iguala students, parents and relatives of the disappeared have advocated for justice and desperately sought information about their children’s fates (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Women’s Protests under the Military Regimes of Latin America

The contemporary accounts above, which showed women taking to the streets to

make demands even as the government is highly repressive of opposition, is corroborated

by the history of Latin America during the period of military rule which saw similar

accounts of women’s protests. In particular, historical evidence from Argentina suggests

that repression by the state motivates women to protest. During the “dirty war” in

Argentina (1974 to 1983), an estimated 10 to 30 thousand people were “disappeared” by the military dictatorship (Wilson 1993). There were at least 300 different detention centers in operation, and many of their prisoners went undocumented. Many of those taken were tortured, those prisoners that the government never released or whose bodies have not been found are presumed dead. At a time when the military was openly repressing all civil opposition, women began to meet in the open in protest, in spite of danger to their persons.

Argentina had an unusually high amount of human rights activism, especially protests and organizations of women, relative to other military regimes and newly democratizing states in Latin America (Sikkink 2008). As I have mentioned, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo are the best-known Argentine women’s human rights organization

(Wilson 1993). Due to (and in spite of) rampant abuses by the government, Argentine women took to the streets in large numbers to demand change. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (and related women’s organizations) gathered weekly to shame the government’s actions and plead for information on their missing children2. Made up

originally of the mothers of victims of politically motivated disappearances, this

organization marched weekly near the capital wearing their distinctive white hoods to

demand information on their children’s whereabouts. From 1976 to the mid-80s, during

the military regime and the democratization period, organized human rights protest from

2 One offshoot organization still meets every Thursday at the Plaza. 37 the Mothers (and other groups) was overwhelming. Under similar conditions of civil strife, similar groups of mothers began protesting in Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and several other Latin American states. In each case, it was the disappearance of a loved one that motivated these women to form groups, take action, and protest against the government’s repressive practices.

These cases demonstrate that repression by the state can be a powerful motivation for protests. When the state engages in repression, as it did in the examples previously discussed, this inflicts harm on victims’ families, their friends, and their communities.

This harm constitutes a meaningful grievance against the state among those connected to the victims of repression. This grievance motivates some people to take action, specifically by protesting against the state. Given that women are likely represented in any large social group, and make up roughly half of any given population, women are at least as likely to be affected by repression enacted by the state, and so women should be incentivized to protest when the state uses repression, in much the same way that we expect other protests to form when the state is repressive. In this sense, I expect that women’s protests are motivated by repression in much the same way other forms of protest can be responses to repression.

H1 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government is repressive

than when the government is not repressive.

Wheras contemporary and historical evidence suggests that women react to state repression with protest, in the same way that general protests often arise from state repression (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998), the broader literature on the relationship between protest and dissent suggests further qualifications. The long line of literature on

38 the “repression-dissent nexus” has generally found a strong relationship between repression from the state and protest among citizens (Regan and Henderson 2002, Moore

2000). However, these works suggest that the relationship between repression and dissent is more complex than the historical evidence I have considered so far.

Specifically, these works find that state repression can both motivate, and be motivated by, protests (Moore 2000). Also, though repression can anger some citizens and cause them to protest, but repression might also deter citizens from protesting. In other words, repression and dissent are endogenous. This suggests caution while interpreting any observed relationship between state repression and women’s protests. Because protests and repression are codetermined, empirical analyses may overestimate the statistical significance and substantive effect of repression on women’s protests.

However, this possibility is not a huge concern for this particular research for a number of reasons. The first is that repression and dissent are interconnected, but the specific pathway from state repression to protests is multidirectional: sometimes repression motivates protests, but sometimes repression deters protests, and sometimes no effect is observed (Davenport 2007). On the opposite side, however, the relationship is unidirectional: states generally respond to protests with repression (Davenport 2007). In fact, this relationship is so consistently observed, it is known as the “Law of Coercive

Responsiveness” (Davenport 2007). This is because the state values quiescence, or peaceful obedience, by the general public. My research focuses explicitly on the first pathway, and argues that for women’s protests in particular, we should observe protests in response to repression. If repression by the state actually deters protests by women, this would only reduce the likelihood of observing the expected positive relationship

between repression and women’s protests, rather than increase the likelihood of a Type I

error.

If we are to take seriously Davenport’s (2007) suggestion to begin theorizing to

explain the imbalanced findings about repression causing dissent, then this dissertation

represents a step in that direction by examining the types of protests which arise from

dissent, focusing on women’s protests in particular. In particular, the next section

unpacks the effects of different repressive tactics on protests by different groups. I argue that women’s protests have a distinct relationship to state repression as compared to general protests.

The second reason the endogeneity problem is not particularly problematic is that

gender stereotypes influence states’ perceptions of political threats. In particular, as I

elaborate on further in the next section, states typically do not view women as a salient

political threat. Though women can and do face repressive retribution from the state, it is

far more likely that women protestors will be ignored by the state. I will leave this

observation for now, but I return to it later in the next step of my argument about why

women might protest as women.

Women Protest Forced Disappearances

Having established the general expectation that the more repressive a state is, the

more women will protest, I now turn to theorizing about why women choose to protest

“as women”, or not, at decision point 3 (Figure 3). To explain this decision in the context

of state repression, here I argue that repressive practices are gendered, that as a

consequence of this, the effects of repression are gendered, and thus protests motivated

by repression are likely to be gendered as well. Looking specifically at the state’s use of

forced disappearances, I show that women are less likely to be targeted by the state, but

are still victimized by the loss of a family member or friend, which motivates women to

protest when the state uses forced disappearances. Women consequently use their gender

identity as a shield to minimize the danger to themselves of facing backlash from the

state for protesting, and thus are able to effectively mobilize as women, while broader

protests including both men and women would likely be vulnerable to additional

repression.

Gendered Repression and Gendered Dissent

The Argentine case, along with many others, saw women taking to the streets even as the regime was very repressive. This begs the question: why do women, in particular, protest when the government is highly repressive? In this section, I argue that state repression is gendered in practice, and as a consequence of this, has gendered effects. In particular, when the state uses repression, it does so in ways that affect women and men differently. Due to the different effects that repression has on women and men, women’s reactions to repression, such as protesting, are different from the reactions of men. Certain repressive tactics are more likely to be associated with women’s protests.

Here I focus on the use of forced disappearances, in particular, as there is clear historical and contemporary evidence demonstrating gender’s role in shaping who is targeted for disappearance and how victims and survivors respond. In this section I build upon both grievance (Gurr 1968, 1970) and political opportunity structure (Tilly 1978, Costain

1992) models of protest to argue that forced disappearances can serve as a gendered grievance, directly motivating protests by survivors, but that the actual practice of forced disappearances present a gendered opportunity structure for mobilization.

While both men and women could be motivated to protest by disappearances,

women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances, and men

will not be more likely to do so, for three reasons. First, disappearances are gendered in

their targeting, namely that typically men are victims of the practice and women were not

targeted as often, thus increasing the perceived cost of protest for men and reducing the

relative cost for women. Secondarily, women have unique advantages for mobilization in

the face of political disappearances relative to men. Due to the “shield” of their roles as

wives and mothers (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), women are able to protest when men

cannot.

What is Forced Disappearance?

Forced disappearance3 is a particular type of repression that is particularly egregious compared to other types of repression. According to international law, forced disappearance refers specifically to

“… the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by

agents of the State … followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of

liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,

which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” (“International

Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance”

2006).

3 Also called “enforced disappearance” or simply “disappearance”. In this dissertation, as in other documents describing the process, “forced disappearance”, “enforced disappearance”, and “disappearance” all refer to the exact same repressive practice. 42

Forced disappearances were in many ways a repressive “innovation” of the Argentine junta (Sikkink 2008)4. While other regimes, like the Third Reich, had long practiced disappearances of political rivals, the Argentine military developed a massive and well- organized state apparatus to disappear people. It was Argentine human rights activists in the late 1970s and early 1980s that first coined the phrase “to disappear someone” to describe the clandestine political kidnappings used by the military regime (Sikkink 2011,

2008).

However, forced disappearance does not usually entail merely the violation of habeas corpus, even though that on its own is deeply troubling. Typically, those targeted by forced disappearance are actually subjected to a combination of other, concurrent violations of their physical integrity rights. In practice, forced disappearances essentially represent a combination of all three of the other types of repression. Forced disappearance is a subtype of unlawful imprisonment, often politically motivated and used against supposed “dissidents” (Navarro 1989). Once taken by the state, many victims of forced disappearance are tortured (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015). Nearly all those targeted are eventually killed. Given these patterns, it is arguably true that forced disappearance represents the worst possible physical integrity violation. Given the severity of treatment of victims, understanding the effects of forced disappearances is especially important, even as the practice has declined over time, and especially given the

4 Other repressive practices associated with forced disappearances in Argentina were also new, such as taking the babies of pregnant disappeared women, falsifying their identities, and adopting them into military families (Sikkink 2008). Out of an estimated five hundred babies taken in this way by the regime, only fifty had been found by their genetic families as of 1993 (Wilson 1993). 43

recent spread of the practice to countries like Syria (Amnesty International 2017) and the

Philippines (Bautista 2018).

Forced Disappearances as a Grievance against the State

Theories about protests and contentious mobilization often emphasize the role of grievances that motivate certain people to act against the status quo (Gurr 1968, 1970,

Davies 1962). These arguments posit that government actions, particularly repression, act as a major motivation for civil unrest (Carey 2006, Moore 1998) Disappearances, like other forms of repression, can indeed serve as a grievance that motivates survivors to act. This is because forced disappearances have particularly negative outcomes on relatives of the disappeared, and thus may motivate them to action (Navarro 1989,

Sikkink 2008).

One unique factor about disappearance tactics relative to other repressive actions are the targets of this repression (Sikkink 2008). Most of the victims of this type of repression are young: in Argentina, over 80 percent of the victims were under 35

(Sikkink 2008). Recent accounts of both Colombia (Haugaard 2011) and Mexico

(Human Rights Watch 2014) suggest that victims there have also been relatively young.

In part because of the relative youth of victims, the use of disappearance tactics can have particularly awful psychological effects on the families of victims (Sikkink 2008).

Because victims are typically young, very often the parents of the victim are still alive and are left to try to piece together what happened to their child.

Jelin (1995) characterizes the loss of a disappeared child as “uncertain harm”: the child is missing but family members do not know for certain whether they are alive or dead. This “ambiguous loss” is similar to that experienced by families of military

44 personnel who are missing in action, and is the most stressful type of grieving that people face (Boss 1999), making it difficult for family members to move on with their lives

(Sikkink 2008). In instances when the whereabouts of a family member are known (for instance, with “ordinary” political imprisonment) and/or their death is confirmed, this ambiguity is absent. By contrast, in the face of the uncertainty caused by disappearances, many family members of the disappeared in Argentina believed their children might be alive and suffering, and this possibility motivated their activism because protesting could potentially lead to the safe return of their children (Navarro 1989). Families turned to activism as a coping mechanism to help deal with their uncertainty and grief when family members went missing (Sikkink 2008).

H2 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced

disappearance as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced

disappearance.

However, it is important to note that the pain of the loss of a child through forced disappearance is universal to men and women, mothers and fathers, and so we might expect both women’s protests and broader social protests when the state uses disappearances. Historically, however, this has not been the case, and primarily women have been most active in protesting when the state uses forced disappearances (Navarro

1989, Schirmer 1989). This is due to two factors in the way in which forced disappearance has been practiced by the state, which I elaborate on in the next section.

First, the practice of disappearances is gendered, and men are more likely to be disappeared than women are. Second, women have the unique opportunity to utilize their

identity as mothers and wives as a “shield” to provide space for them to protest (Navarro

1989, Schirmer 1989), which men cannot do.

Gendered Targeting of Forced Disappearances

In addition to grievance-focused theories of protest, other works emphasize the opportunity structure within which individuals operate. These theories focus on the opportunity to protest, rather than the motivation of a protest (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978,

Kitschelt 1986, Hirsch 1990, Costain 1992, Tarrow 1994, della Porta and Tarrow 2005,

2012, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, Meyer 2004). In other words, whether or not we see protest depends, in part. on how much the state will tolerate dissent. When deciding whether to protest, individuals estimate how likely the state is to repress them for taking to the streets, based in part on how the state has reacted to dissent in the past

(Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010, Lichbach 1987).

The opportunity structure arguments are a major point of departure for my argument: While men and women alike feel the grief and motivation to protest caused directly by the disappearance of a loved one, the actual practice of disappearance alters the political opportunity structure in a gendered way, for two reasons. First, as I outline in this section, the state typically does not use disappearance against women. Second, as

I outline in the next section, women have the ability to politicize their gender identity, and protest “as women”, when the state uses disappearances than otherwise. Due to these two factors, women actually have more space to mobilize and protest when the state uses disappearances than men do.

Disappearances are gendered in their targeting: men are more likely to be disappeared than women are. Historical narratives from Argentina and other countries

(Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), recent journalistic accounts (Human Rights Watch

2014), as well as available statistics on the genders of victims of forced disappearance all support the assertion that women were less likely to be disappeared than men. The UN reports that most reported cases of forced disappearance are of men, with roughly 70% to

94% of the disappeared being male, shown in Table 1 (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015). These gender breakdowns are available primarily in the pre-democratization periods of open civil conflict in the selected countries. These countries were selected due to data availability: gender breakdowns of victims were not available in other cases (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015).

Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Victims by Gender, Selected Countries Country Women Men Argentina 30% 70% Chile 6% 94% Guatemala 12% 78% Peru 15% 85% South Africa 10% 90% Note: Table adapted from Dewhirst and Kapur (2015).

Also, consider evidence from the partial list of names of the disappeared in by the

“Proyectos Disapperacedos”, an NGO affiliated with FEDEFAM5. The full list of names

of victims in both Argentina and Brazil is included in Appendix C. These lists are

obviously only a small sample of the total number of victims of forced disappearances in

those countries, but using these lists allows us to to gather some baseline information

about who was targeted by the regime.

Their list of victims in Argentina includes 1,898 total victims. I examine only the

first names listed, as those are most informative about the person’s gender. In Spanish speaking cultures, feminine middle names are fairly common – many men have Maria as a middle name, for example. The fifteen most common first names in the list, in order of the number of appearances, were María, which appeared 81 times, followed by Carlos and Jorge, both at 74 times each respectively, Juan at 72 times, José at 63 times, Luis at

50, Eduardo at 48, Miguel at 40, Roberto at 35, Ricardo, at 31, Daniel and Julio at 30 each, and Hugo at 28 times. Indeed, if we look at the 45 most common names, which I have coded as male or female, we see that there were 928 male victims in the list but only

212 females, meaning that men were roughly 4.4 times more likely that women to appear in the list.

In addition, since many Argentine names are Spanish in origin, and Spanish is a

Romance language with gendered nouns, it is possible to capture, loosely, the gender composition of the list by checking for name endings. Names ending in “-o” are typically assigned to males, and names ending in “-a” are more frequently given to women (though

5 Acronym for Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos- Desaparecidos, an organization that works to end the practice of forced disappearances. 49

not always). Here, again, we see that male names appear more commonly in this list of

victims, with 607 names ending in “-o” but only 476 first names ending in “-a”.

The list for Brazil is much smaller, including only 125 names. However, it is still valuable information to analyze. In this list, among all the first names which appear more than once, the most common name is José, which appears 9 times, followed by Antonio at 7 times, Paulo at 6, João at 5, Maria at 3, followed by Daniel, Joel, Luis, Orlando,

Pedro, Rui, and Walter all appearing at 2 times each, respectively. This suggests that male names appear roughly 16.7 times more frequently in this list than female names.

While Portuguese naming conventions differ slightly from Spanish, generally the rule of

“-o” as masculine and “-a” as feminine still applies. I find that names in this list end in “- o” 52 times, but in “-a” only 14 times.

Taken as a whole, all the available evidence on the gender of victims of forced disappearances suggests that the state does not target women as often as men, at least with the use of forced disappearance. In part because many of the direct targets of disappearance are male, many of the political effects of disappearance are gendered as well. Men are taken more frequently, and women are thus more often left behind to piece together what has happened.

Since women know that the state is less likely to target them, they would see this context as an opportunity to protest with lower personal risks, increasing their likelihood of protest (Tilly 1978). In other words, in states where forced disappearances are common, the repressive tactics used by the state change the political opportunity structure in a gendered way, encouraging women to protest but not encouraging men. In fact, one member of the Madres articulated just this, saying “You have to leave.” to men who

wished to accompany the mothers, “If there are only women, the police will not dare to

intervene, but if you come they will not hesitate to take you away” (quoted in Bousquet

1983, Navarro 1989). This affords women’s groups, in particular, a unique opportunity

to mobilize in the face of such repressive tactics. Unlike general protests, which would

usually include both men and women, women’s protests are less likely to be met with

repression. Thus, women and women’s groups may be able to protest when men cannot.

H3 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced

disappearance, but other protests will not be more frequent..

Women’s Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts

Finally, I wish to turn to examining decision point 4 from Figure 3, wherein citizens decide whether to join a protest or not. I argue that in repressive contexts, particularly situations where the state is using forced disappearances, women’s gender identity constitutes a valuable political resource that can enable and incentivize women to join protests. This means that the gender gap in participation between women and men actually narrows under repressive contexts.

As social movement theorists often point out, political opportunities for protest do

not simply exist in the abstract. Activists must also perceive and/or construct those

opportunities for themselves (Della Porta and Tarrow 2012, 2005, Tarrow 2004,

Banaszak 1996). Here, too, there is reason to believe that forced disappearance changes

the political context in ways women, in particular, can utilize. The military regime in

Argentina used the ideal of the traditional family as a central metaphor, and the women of

the Plaza saw this as an opportunity to turn that message around against the state

(Navarro 1989). They subverted the regime’s message by exposing its hypocrisy in

51 splitting up families. The Mothers used the nuclear family and motherhood in its messages and public appeals (Jelin 2004). When the state uses forced disappearances women also have unique opportunities to emphasize their position in society as women, wives, and mothers (Mooney 2007, Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). In other words, women can organize as a group strategically.

While much prior research focuses on the negative effects of gender stereotypes, under certain circumstances, popular perceptions of women can also work to their advantage (Barnes and Beaulieu 2016, Navarro 1989). Because of the ability to “shield” themselves by politicizing their roles as wives and mothers, women were able to protest when men could not (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). Even in the context of mass repression under military regimes, women in Argentina (Sikkink 2008), Chile (Noonan

1995, Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998), and other countries still took to the streets to demand information on their children. This historical reality both challenges and qualifies the political opportunity structure argument (Sikkink 2008): women mobilized in spite of the fact that there was little to no chance for success in changing the regime’s behavior. Critically, in a repressive context, these groups organized “as women” strategically, and mobilized particularly as mothers, focused on the biological family and the bond between mother and child (Sikkink 2008).

In part due to their ability to organize “as women” (Navarro 1989), and thanks to the international attention to their cause (Mooney 2007), the state could not fully repress women and women’s groups the way it could repress more general dissent. At a time when thousands of men were disappearing, the government took only a small number from the Mothers group. While disappearances of women did indeed happen, they were

52 not nearly as frequent as one would expect given the widespread use of the practice. In the face of political disappearances then, both because of their centrality to families that the regime purported to value, and because of international attention to their cause, women had better opportunities to oppose the regime openly than men had.

Heretofore, I have primarily discussed women as a group. In other words, to borrow from rational choice terminology, I have made a “unitary actor” assumption about women. In reality women come from all different economic classes, races and ethnicities, social positions, geographies, and so on. Indeed, not all women are wives or mothers, nor are they always perceived as such. However, the assumption of women as a group is warranted by my argument for a number of reasons. While not all women are wives or mothers, only women can be wives or mothers, at least according to the traditional gender roles typically found in the region. Secondarily, when women are protesting, it would be difficult or impossible for an outside observer to distinguish which women are, in fact, wives or mothers, and which are not. Thus, while not all women are wives or mothers, even those women who do not have children or husbands can potentially join a protest of wives and mothers. Recall, for example, the reasoning of

Maria Antonieta Lugo, who was willing to join in a protest by local housewives because she herself had male relatives the same age as those who had disappeared (Stevenson and

Sherman 2014). Even those without children could be persuaded by a similar logic, and would be perceived similarly to other women in the protest by an observer even if they did not have children.

While my earlier hypotheses focus on country level dynamics, ultimately they require individual women to recognize and capitalize upon the political environment in

53 which they find themselves. When the state does not use forced disappearance, in general, women do not typically participate in politics at the same level as men (Córdova and Rangel 2016, Beauregard 2013, Kittilson 2016, Espinal and Zhao 2015, Gallego

2015, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010, Desposato and Norrander

2009, Zetterberg 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997).

Consider, for example, that women who had never been involved in politics prior to the disappearance of their children originally formed the Mothers group in Argentina

(Navarro 1989). In sum, I expect that during “politics as usual” there is a gender gap between men and women’s participation, and women are less likely to take part in protest.

H4 – During times when the government is not very repressive, women will be

less likely to participate in protests compared to men..

However, when the state makes use of forced disappearance, it is likely that women will recognize their lower risk for speaking out, their ability to organize as women, and the additional space that this tactic can afford them to protest. Consequently, individual women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances.

H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government

uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in

protests under those conditions.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have laid out my argument about the relationship between women’s protests and state practices of repression. I have argued that repression by the state is a key motivator for many protests by women, and that the practice of repression is

54 gendered in meaningful ways. Due to the influence of gender on how states target repression, I argue that society reacts in a gendered way. Forced disappearance, in particular, targets men more frequently than women. Due to this, protests under conditions where the state is disappearing citizens are more likely to be framed in gendered terms, and women’s protests are more likely, while general protest should not be more frequent in those conditions. Finally, due to women’s increased safety from outright repression when the state uses disappearance, women are more likely to participate in protests under those conditions.

Table 2 outlines my hypotheses, making clear what the comparison group expectation is for each. H1 is that women should protest repression, and in this sense, I argue that women’s protests are similar to general protests. H2 is that women’s protests should be more frequence when the state uses disappearance. H3 is that general protests should not be more likely when the state uses disappearance, because of how they are targeted in a gendered way. H4 is that under non-repressive conditions, women should be less likely to protest, and H5 is that women will be more likely to protest under repressive conditions, compared to men.

Table 2: Hypotheses

Women’s Protests Comparison H1 Women’s protests will be more frequent Women’s protests are similar to other when the state is repressive protests H2 Women’s protests will be more frequent (See H3) when the state uses disappearance H3 (See H2) General protests are not more frequent H4 Women will be less likely to participate Men are more likely to participate in in protest when the state does not use protests when the state does not use disappearance disappearance H5 Women will be more likely to Men are not more likely to participate participate in protest when the state uses in protest when the state does not use disappearance disappearance

Chapter 3 – Empirics: Women Protest Repression

In this chapter, I present empirical tests of my first major hypothesis, namely that women’s protests are frequently motivated by repressive actions undertaken by the state.

I first present a test of H1 on a global sample of states from 1990-2012. Secondarily, at the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, including an analysis of regional variations.

As a reminder, the hypothesis tested in this chapter is as follows:

H1 – Women will protest more when the government is repressive than when the

government is not repressive.

Research Design

To test my first hypothesis, I utilize a time-series cross-sectional dataset of women’s protests and covariates. These data cover the 1990 to 2012 period.

Geographically, these data cover all states recognized by the US Department of State, whose reports are used to generate human rights violations data (Cingranelli and Richards

2010). The unit of analysis is country-year (e.g. “Chile-1995” is one unit).

My primary dependent variable to test H1 is a count of women’s protests in a given year, which ranges from 0 to 205 (data from Murdie and Peksen 2014). Given the nature of the dependent variable as a “count” of discrete events, the primary modelling strategy used in this chapter (and the following chapter) is negative binomial regression

(King 1989). Negative binomial regression is a statistical modelling strategy used for modeling a dependent variable which accounts for the non-linearity typically found in

count data (King 1989). In particular, negative binomial regression accounts for the fact

that count data is bounded by a floor at zero (a discrete event cannot occur fewer than 0

times). This is preferable to a linear approach, like ordinary least squares (OLS) because

OLS becomes inefficient, inconsistent, and biased when it is applied to count data.

Additionally, negative binomial models account for two of the most common

issues with another common method for modelling count data, the Poisson regression.

The first is that unlike a Poisson model, negative binomial approaches account for over-

dispersion – a situation in which the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the mean. The second is that Poisson approaches assume independence of the dependent variable over time. Given that the dependent variable in question is over-dispersed,

negative binomial is more appropriate than Poisson. Secondarily, the dependent variable

is very likely to be dependent, rather than independent over time (one protest in a given

year probably increases the likelihood of more protests occurring within that year).

Additional testing on the dependent variable did not reveal significant zero-inflation.

Zero-inflation is a situation in which there are an unusual number of non-events in the dependent variable, which are zeroes in count data, occur and can bias estimates

(essentially similar to the problem of modeling a “rare event” in a logistic regression).

Dependent Variable

The data on women’s protest come from Murdie and Peksen (2014): prior to

2014, no comprehensive cross-national data on women’s protests existed. They utilize

data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis database (IDEA6) (Bond et al. 2003),

which is an automated coding of all events in the Reuters Global News Service,

organized into discrete “events” with information on “who did what to whom” for every

6 Note this is a distinct organization from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, also called IDEA. 58 recorded event (Murdie and Peksen 2014, King and Lowe 2003). For further discussion of coding procedures (e.g. “why Reuters?”) see Murdie and Peksen (2014), p. 6. Prior work using this dataset has focused on violent and/or nonviolent protests (Bhasin 2008,

Murdie and Bhasin 2011). In this chapter, I use a count of all women’s protests. This value ranges from zero (i.e. no protests occurred in that year) in 1,890 cases to 205 protests in one case7, with an average of about 5.2 protests in a given country-year.

Independent Variables

My theory predicts that women will protest under conditions of government repression. To measure the independent variable of interest, I use the Cingranelli and

Richards (CIRI; 2010) Human Rights Data. Using the CIRI data is appropriate because

CIRI allows me to disaggregate their index and examine the impact of particular types of repressive actions, which is not possible with other human rights data (such as PTS, see

Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010). The ability to break down repression into its component practices is important for my theory, and critical for the empirical tests I conduct in the next chapter. A descriptive breakdown of the types of repression measured is presented in Figure 4. As you can see, torture has been the the most common repressive tactic employed by states, with roughly 70% of all states still using the tactic in 2010. Political imprisonment is also a commonly used type of repression, with roughly 70% of states seeing use of this tactic in 1990. However, over time the use of this particular type of repression has declined dramatically, with only about 55% of states seeing use of the tactic in 2014. Extrajudicial killings are consistently used less frequently than imprisonment or torture across time, but

7 The United States in 1998. 59 nonetheless represent extreme disrespect for human rights when they are practiced in a given state. Finally, forced disappearance is the least utilized, but arguably most severe, form of repression. Its use has declined considerably over time, with about 58% of states using the tactic in 1990 but less than 45% of states using it in 2010.

Figure 4: Prevalence of Repression for All Countries by Repression Type

Notes: Data on repression types comes from CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). For visualization purposes, a country is coded as experiencing a type of repression in a given year if CIRI reported that a type of repression occurred “frequently” in a given country for a given year, whereas a state is coded as not experiencing a repression type if CIRI reports that type of repression only “occasionally” occurred, or did not occur, in a given year.

To test H1, I employ the additive Physical Integrity Scale. This variable is an

ordinal scale that ranges from zero to eight. I have rescaled the variable so that a score of

eight represents the “most repressive” government practices and zero represents “least

repressive”, for ease of interpretation. I do not lag this variable, as protests are generally

a rapid response to ground conditions, while all other time-varying covariates are

typically lagged by one year. This does lead to concerns for the possibility of endogeneity, but I conduct additional tests to this end shown in the Appendix, and do not find evidence of a reciprocal relationship.

Figure 5 shows the observed average number of women’s protests at varying

levels of state repression. In other words, the graph shows a simple bivariate regression

“line of best fit” between protests and repression. As you can see, the raw data suggests

that my expectation is supported. Without including any controls, we observe that

women’s protests do seem to increase in frequency as a state becomes more repressive.

However, we must account for the role of other variables that may affect this

relationship’s strength and significance. Thus I discuss the control variables employed,

and in the next section report a full model with controls.

Figure 5: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Repression

Notes: Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying observed levels of state repression. Controls are not included.

Controls

As mentioned earlier, Murdie and Peksen (2014) offer a global analysis of

women’s protest based on the three major theories of political mobilization: grievances,

resource mobilization, and political process. Grievance theories suggest that discontent

with the current political system leads to collective dissent (Davies 1962, Gurr 1968).

Thus, I want to control for whether the state respects women’s political equality (Murdie

and Peksen 2014). I control for this relationship by including the CIRI measure of

women’s political rights in my models. This scale ranges from zero (women’s political

rights are not guaranteed in law or practice) to three (women’s political rights are

guaranteed by law and are respected in practice). I expect a negative relationship: high

respect for women’s political rights should decrease the need for women to protest.

Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize

(rather than their motivation for doing so). Access to resources, such as financial and organizational support, reduces the cost of mobilization and thus increases the likelihood of protest (Tilly 1978, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Bell et al. 2013). To account for this relationship, I control for the number of women’s INGOs (from Cole, 2013), and I expect a positive relationship here: more women’s INGOs should ease the cost of collective mobilization and lead to higher levels of protest. As a secondary measure, I use women’s labor force participation. This measure is the percent of the total labor force that is female, and I again expect a positive relationship.

Political process theories focus on the opportunity to succeed in a political goal.

Mobilization depends on a favorable political environment: individuals must have some confidence they could succeed, and the government must be somewhat tolerant of dissent

(Costain 1992, see also Tilly 1978, and Lipset 1963). Historical evidence suggests this latter qualifier may not hold in the Latin American context: women could and did organize in spite of massive repression from the government in Argentina and several other countries. This is less problematic for my analysis because of the timeframe, as all

Latin American states had democratized to some degree prior to 1990. In order to capture the effects of openness of the political system, I include a control for level of democracy (Polity IV). Given there may be a “ceiling effect” (Murdie and Peksen 2014),

I test for robustness with a squared term (See Appendix A), and do not find substantively different results.

Additionally, I include a dichotomous measure that captures whether a given year contained a executive election. Elections have the potential to serve as “focal points” for the opposition (Beaulieu 2014), and represent a period of political openness in which real change is possible (Howard and Roessler 2006). Thus, I expect that high-profile elections should exhibit higher levels of protest. From 1990 to 2012, a total of 432 executive elections occurred in the world. The data for election years comes from the

Database of Political Institutions (Beck 2001).

I control for other contextual factors that might be important. The most obvious are economic controls. Wealth, development, and inequality are important for determining the level of protests we see in many contexts (Brancati 2013). Inequality may lead to economic grievances, increasing protests. Wealth and development have less clear-cut expectations: more wealth could provide more resources with which to protest, but also remove cause for doing so. I control for these with the logged GDP of a country in a given year, the logged GDP per Capita, growth in GDP from the previous year.

Gender quotas have been on the rise across the globe since Argentina became the

first to adopt such a quota in 1993 (Jones 2009, Barnes 2012). Gender quotas could

represent a signal from the government that women’s participation in politics is valued, encouraging them to mobilize. Thus, I control for the presence of a legislative gender quota with a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for every year in which a quota was in effect, and zero otherwise. This variable comes from Cole (2013).

I also control for women’s level of tertiary education. To the extent that we can

assume women are rational “unitary” actors, they would prefer to get their needs met

without having to take to the streets, because protesting is costly (see Beaulieu 2014).

One typical explanation for bargaining failure are information problems (Fearon 1995).

In low information environments, women and the state cannot send clear signals about their preferences. As information increases, women are more able to use “regular” channels to get information to the government. Following Beaulieu (2014), I proxy this

“information environment” by including a control for education. While education provides resources for political participation (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995), I expect it to encourage more “regular participation” like voting and direct women away from protesting. I use the enrollment rates of women in tertiary education from the

World Bank as my measure. As education levels increase, protest should decrease.

Given that the protest data are based on media reports, I also want to control for

potential bias from news sources. Some countries may simply have more news stories

written about them due to their geopolitical importance, news audience taste, or some

other unobserved factors. To control for this possibility, I include a measure of media

bias, which captures the number of reports (in thousands) about a given country in a

given year. This should reduce the possible bias towards more protests being reported in more news-saturated countries. Given that the data are created from Reuters’ reports, and the presence of foreign media has also been theorized to increase protest diffusion (see

Kern 2011), this control is especially necessary.

Finally, protests are likely to be auto-correlated. In other words, it is quite likely that the protests we see in a given year are related to the protests seen in the previous year. As such, I include a control for the number of women’s protests in the previous year for each country (i.e. I include a lagged version of the dependent variable as an independent variable). I expect a positive relationship here: protests in one year should positively predict protests in the following year.

Results

Table 3 reports results for testing my first hypothesis. Recall that H1 is that women will protest against state repression. I find support for this hypothesis: in both models, state repression (as measured by CIRI’s physical integrity scale, inverted) has a positive and significant impact on the number of women’s protests. To show this effect visually, in Figure 6, I graph the predicted number of women’s protests by the level of state repression (based on Model 2). As the state moves from no repression to the highest level of repression, the predicted number of protests goes from approximately 2 protests to anywhere in the range of 5-12 protests, an incredibly sizeable increase of at least double the number of protests. In sum, I find strong statistical support in favor of H1.

Table 3 shows inconsistent evidence that levels of democracy matter. As expected, the level of women’s education is negatively, significantly related to the number of protests, suggesting that high information environments reduce overall levels

67 of contention. I find that overall wealth predicts higher levels of protest, but that GDP per capita predicts lower levels of protest. In robustness checks, I find that both relationships are non-linear: increasing wealth and development both encourage participation, but past a certain point the effects reach a ceiling (see Appendix B). I find no evidence that women’s political equality, NGOs, labor participation, or gender quotas matter for predicting women’s protests. Given that most of those factors are relatively constant over time within countries, those null findings are not terribly surprising.

Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression Model 1 Model 2 Dependent Variable Women’s Protests Women’s Protests

Independent Variables Repression 0.26*** 0.27*** (0.04) (0.04) Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.04*** 0.03*** (0.01) (0.01) Women's Political Rights -0.07 0.03 (0.10) (0.11) Polity IV -0.01 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) Election Year -0.00 -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) Log GDP -0.04 -0.07 (0.67) (0.74) Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.02) Log GDP per Capita -0.06 -0.03 (0.09) (0.10) GDP Growth -0.02** -0.02** (0.01) (0.01) Media Bias 0.00 -0.00 (0.01) (0.00) Women's INGOs 0.01+ (0.00) % Labor Force Female -0.01 (0.01) Gender Quota -0.21 (0.17) Female Tertiary Education -0.00 (0.01) Observations 2725 2238 Pseudo R2 0.17 0.14 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two- tailed tests.

Figure 6: Women’s Protests by Level of Repression

Notes: Predictions based on Model 2.

Robustness Tests

I consider a number of additional checks and possible alternative explanations for my findings. The first is that perhaps my findings are an artifact of the data I use to measure repression. Though this is unlikely, I check for this possibility by using two different additional measures of repression to ensure that my findings are robust to different measurements.

In particular, I use two measures from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) data to double-check my findings. The PTS data provides two measures of repression that differ slightly because they are created from two sources: State Department country reports, and Amnest International country reports (Wood and Gibney 2010). Unlike CIRI, which uses both sources for one measure, PTS provides two separate measures, henceforth called the Amnesty Scale and the State Department Scale. For both measures, the scales range from 0 to 5. A score of 1 indicates a country “under a secure rule of law” wherein people are not imprisoned for their views and torture/political murders are rare. A score of 2 indicates that there is some imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, but that torture and political murders are rare. A score of 3 indicates extensive political imprisonment, execution and political murder may be common, and unlimited detetion is accepted. A score of 4 indicates that the practices of the previous score are expanded to large numbers, and that murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life, but primarily only for politically active citizens. Finally, a score of 5 indicates that these repressive practices are extended to the entire population.

These measures differ from the similar CIRI repression scale in a few key ways.

First, it does not disaggregate repression by type – there is only a general scale of how

71 repressive a state is, without data on specific state behaviors. Unfortunately, this means I cannot use the PTS data for testing any hypoetheses except H1. Second, the PTS data incorporates information about the scale of repression, whereas CIRI does not (Wood and

Gibney 2010). A higher score on the CIRI scale tells us that a state is practicing more types of repression, whereas a higher score in the PTS data tells us that a state is practicing repression against more people. Thus, if my theory is correct, I should expect that the observed relationship between repression and women’s protests would be even stronger using the PTS measures, as they better capture the scope of repression. Overall, however, both the CIRI and the two PTS measures of repression are highly correlated, as you can see in Table 4.

Table 4: Correlation of Repression Measures Physical Integrity Amnesty Scale State Dept. Scale Scale Physical Integrity - Scale (CIRI) Amnesty Scale (PTS) .7698 - State Dept. Scale .8085 .8137 - (PTS)

As you see in Table 5, my findings are quite robust to these measures of

repression. Whether I use the data generated from Amnesty International reports (as in

Models A and B) or US State Department reports (Models C and D), I find that we

observe far more women’s protests the more repressive the state is. In fact, the most

striking thing about my findings is that aside from autocorrelation (the lagged measure of

women’s protests) and GDP growth, repression is the only significant predictor of

women’s protests, suggesting that repression might motivate women’s protests more than

any other country level factor.

I represent these findings graphically in Figure 7. As you can see, when the state

is not very repressive, the expected number of women’s protests is around two for any

given year. However, at the highest levels of repression, the expected number of

women’s protests increases dramatically to somewhere in the range of 8 to 12, a four-fold increase at minimum. Repression remains an incredibly powerful predictor of women’s protests, regardless of which measure I use to capture it.

Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression (PTS) Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Dependent Variable Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Protests Protests Protests Protests Independent Variables Repression (Amnesty, PTS) 0.52*** 0.52*** (0.06) (0.07) Repression (State Dep., PTS) 0.47*** 0.48*** (0.06) (0.07) Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Women's Political Rights -0.11 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) Polity IV -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Polity IV2 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Election Year -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log GDP -0.17 -0.08 0.27 0.17 (0.63) (0.73) (0.68) (0.73) Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log GDP per Capita -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) GDP Growth -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Media Bias -0.00 -0.00 0.04+ 0.02+ (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) Women's INGOs 0.01 0.01+ (0.00) (0.00) % Labor Force Female -0.01 -0.01+ (0.01) (0.01) Gender Quota -0.19 -0.20 (0.16) (0.16) Female Tertiary Education -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) Observations 2395 1950 2701 2216 Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two- tailed tests.

Figure 7: Women’s Protest by Level of Repression, PTS Measures 15 10 8 10 6 4 5 Predicted Number of Women's Protests Predicted Number of Women's Protests 2 0 0

0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 Repression (Amnesty, PTS) Repression (State Dept., PTS)

Note: Predictions based on Model 4 and Model 6, respectively. The predictions on the left use the repression scale based on Amnesty International reports from the Political Terror Scale (PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010). The predictions on the right use the repression scale based on US State Department reports from the Political Terror Scale (PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010).

In addition to measurement issues, we might also worry that this global approach to analysis is missing some of the important regional variations in the relationship between protest activity and repression. As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2007) point out, regions of the world have particular dynamics and processes that are important within those regions, therefore it is dangerous to assume causal hetereogeneity across regions without taking precautions, and secondarily, political developments in one country affect developments in nearby countries, leading to meaningful regional patterns that may not be global in scale. In particular for this work, we might worry that the theoretical framework I employ only applies to one particular region (Latin America), as most of the cases I draw from are found in that region. If the relationship observed is extremely strong, but only found in one region, a global analysis may still report a significant coefficient, masking the fact that only one region fits the expected pattern.

In order to account for these possible pitfalls, I present in Table # analyses that fit my general model to specific regions. In particular, I use the regions of the world and the inclusion rules for which countries fit into which region as they are defined by the World

Bank (note that I do not run a model for the North American region, as it includes only two countries, Canada and the United States). The regional groupings imployed are:

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), and

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Given that I will use these regions again in later analyses, here I provide an inclusive list of the countries that fall within each region in Appendix

In Table 6, I present these regional analyses. As you can see, repression generally

predicts women’s protests across regions, but the size and statistical significance of

repression varies greatly from region to region. In particular, no statistically significant

relationship is observed between repression and women’s protests in South Asia. This

may indicate a meaningful regional distinction, but this might also be caused by the

relatively fewer number of countries included within that region. I return to this fact in the next chapter, dealing with repression types, in much more detail, but for now, I do not find that only a single region is completely responsible for driving my findings. In conclusion, based on these robustness tests, I do not find any empirical cause for concern

about the theoretical relationship I expected from H1: I find fairly consistent evidence that women protest when the state is highly repressive, with the exception of South Asia.

Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests by Repression (Regions) Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Dependent Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Variable Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests Region LAC EAP ECA MENA SA SSA Independent Variables Repression 0.20*** 0.09* 0.22*** 0.18** 0.18 0.28*** (CIRI) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.05) Women’s 0.05*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02* 0.03 Protests(t - 1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) Women's -0.51* -0.09 -0.32 -0.26 0.54*** 0.06 Political (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) Rights Polity IV -0.04* 0.04+ 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.11*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03** 0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Election -0.00 -0.21 -0.00** 0.12 0.95*** 0.01*** Year (0.19) (0.26) (0.00) (0.33) (0.25) (0.00) Log GDP 2.90* 3.31** -2.88** 1.94 13.50*** -0.90 (1.42) (1.09) (1.07) (3.56) (3.01) (2.64) Log GDP2 -0.05+ -0.06** 0.06** -0.03 -0.27*** 0.03 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) Log GDP -0.48** -0.26* 0.29 -0.29* -0.04 -0.35+ per Capita (0.18) (0.11) (0.24) (0.14) (0.38) (0.18) GDP Growth 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03+ 0.09+ -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) Media Bias 0.15* 0.03* 0.01 0.30** 0.01 0.28* (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13) Observations 437 300 778 298 120 740 Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.16 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two- tailed tests.

Chapter 4 – Empirics: Women Protest Disappearances

In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H2 and H3, namely that women’s protests are motivated by state use of forced disappearances in particular, but that forced disappearances will not cause more protest in general, respectively. As with the last chapter, I first present a test of my hypotheses on a global sample of states from 1990-

2012. Secondarily, at the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, including an analysis of regional variation.

As a reminder, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows.

H2 – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance

as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced disappearance.

H3 – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance,

but there will not be more protests from other groups.

Research Design

The research design employed to test my second and third hypotheses is similar to

the one described in the previous chapter. I again utilize a time-series cross-sectional

dataset of women’s protests and other country-level covariates. These data cover the

1990 to 2012 period, and are reported in Murdie and Peksen (2014). The unit of analysis

is country-year. My primary dependent variable to test H2 is the same as the data used for H1, a count of women’s protests in a given year, and so the primary modelling strategy is again negative binomial regression8. H3, however, requires a different

dependent variable – a measure of general protests. I use data on general nonviolent

protests, also collected by Murdie and Peksen (2014), to test H3. Specifically, in this

8 Additional tests did not reveal significant zero-inflation. 80

chapter I use negative binomial regression models to compare the predictors of women’s

protests to the predictors of general protests. Note that all significance tests reported are

two-tailed, and that figures show 84 percent confidence intervals (meaning that overlap

between confidence intervals should be interpreted as statistical insignificance). Here,

the main independent variable is a disaggregated measure of state use of forced

disappearance, which comes from CIRI. The disaggregated measures of repression

(including disappearance) are not lagged, due to the fact that protests are a rapid response

to current conditions, whereas all other time-varying covariates are lagged by one year to

help ease concerns about endogeneity. While this modelling decision does potentially

create concerns about endogeneity between the dependent variable and my primary

independent variables, I conduct further tests to examine this possibility and do not find

cause for concern about a reciprocal relationship.

Primary Dependent Variable

The primary dependent variable, a count of women’s protests, is the same as described in the previous chapter. For a more detailed discussion of this variable, see the section Dependent Variable, in Chapter 3. This data comes from Murdie and Peksen

(2014), who provide a global events data measure of women’s protests. The data is a count, ranging from 0 to 205, and thus the modeling strategy is again negative binomial regression.

Secondary Dependent Variable

My theory suggests that women protest “as women” rather than as part of a more

general protest strategically. The empirical implication of my argument is that there will

be more women’s protests when the government disappearances (H2), but general

protests are no more likely in those circumstances (H3). In order to test this hypothesis, I

wish to compare the predictors of women’s protests, specifically, to protests more

generally. To do this, I use the same IDEA database’s information on general nonviolent

protests. This dataset provides a count of all nonviolent protests, which were not lead by women or women’s groups, in a given year. In other words, these are broader social protests organized and carried out by both men and women. I use this data on nonviolent protests, rather than a sum of violent and nonviolent protests, due to data availability limitations. Data on violent, general protests is not available from the same source. While an imperfect comparison, because the women’s protest measure includes both violent and nonviolent protests, these measures should give me a reasonable proxy for overall levels of contention. However, comparing the two should not be problematic, especially given that women are considerably less likely to support violent action in the first place (see, for instance; Caprioli 2000, de Boer 1985, Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990,

Frankovic 1982, McGlen & Sarkees 1993, Mueller 1973, 1994, Shapiro & Mahajan

1986, Smith 1984, Togeby 1994). Using this variable, I can compare women’s protests to general, non-violent protests by mixed gender groups, which can demonstrate which circumstances lead to one type of protest vs. the other (or to both types).

Independent Variable

My theory predicts that women will protest when the state makes use of forced disappearance, and that disappearances should correlate with women’s protests but not general protests. To measure this independent variable, I use the Cingranelli and

Richards (CIRI, 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides a measure of whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year. This measure takes a

value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero represents no evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one indicates some limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use disappearances. I include the measures of the other repressive tactics (e.g. political imprisonment) as control variables.

Figure 8 shows the average observed number of women’s protests at varying levels of forced disappearance. In other words, it illustrates a “line of best fit” by performing a simple bivariate regression of protests onto disappearances. This shows graphically that the expected relationship between women’s protests and disappearance is supported by the raw data. Women’s protests do, in fact, appear to be more frequent when the state uses forced disappearance than when the state does not. Of course, this is a “naïve” model without controls, but it is nonetheless suggestive that the expected relationship is plausible.

Figure 8: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Disappearances

Notes: Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying observed levels of disappearance. Controls are not included.

Controls

In the analyses for H2 and H3, I include a number of controls thought to influence women’s protests. These controls are largely the same as those described in the previous chapter. For a detailed discussion of the measurement and expectations relevant to the other control variables which are the same as those in Chapter 3, see the section Controls in Chapter 3.

There are two new control variables to discuss for these models. First, my theory focuses on the state practice of forced disappearance. However, there are other types of repression that states employ which I wish to control for. To account for this, I include the other three disaggregated measures of repression from CIRI. In particular, these include a measure of whether a state practices torture, extrajudicial killings, and/or political imprisonment. These are measured the same way that disappearances are measure (i.e. 0 = no evidence of that repressive tactice, 1 = some use of the tactice, and 2

= widespread use of that tactice).

Second, when modeling H3, I want to account for the fact that women’s protest and general protests might be highly related phenomena. Therefore, when modeling women’s protests and general protests, I include lagged measures of both women’s and general protests as control variables. This should alleviate concerns that the two measures might be capturing the same process.

Results

Table 7 shows results for my models testing H2: that women protest more when the government uses forced disappearances. Using the CIRI index for forced disappearance, I find support for H2: the use of disappearances by the state is positively

85 and significantly associated with women’s protests. Figure 8 shows this effect graphically based on predictions from Model 14. As the level of forced disappearances increases, the predicted number of women’s protests goes from 1-2 to 4-8; at least double the number of expected protests by women. The finding that disappearances are associated with higher levels of women’s protests is robust to many alternative modelling specifications, as you can see in the Appendix.

Other types of repression besides forced disappearances are also associated with increased numbers of women’s protests. In particular, extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment are positively and significantly associated with more women’s protests, whereas torture is only significant in the full model. I had no specific theoretical expectations about these repressive tactics, but it is interesting to see them relate to women’s protests as well. However, I should note that the regional analysis which follows reveals that these relationships are inconsistent across regions.

Economic factors are also important. In particular, a growing GDP is associated with fewer protests, suggesting again that women are less likely to protest when the economy is improving. Surprisingly, and counter to my expectations, election years are associated with fewer protests by women. Perhaps this is due to the fact that major change is possible through voting, whereas protests are the only option for pressing reforms forward when there is not an election in the near future. None of the other controls I include show a significant influence.

Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Disappearance Model 13 Model 14 Dependent Variable Women’s Protests Women’s Protests Independent Variables Repression (CIRI) Disappearance 0.34*** 0.32*** (0.08) (0.09) Extrajudicial Killing 0.25*** 0.23** (0.07) (0.07) Political Imprisonment 0.28** 0.32*** (0.10) (0.10) Torture 0.15 0.21* (0.10) (0.09) Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.04*** 0.03*** (0.01) (0.01) Women's Political Rights -0.07 0.02 (0.10) (0.11) Polity IV -0.00 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) Election Year -0.20* -0.21* (0.10) (0.10) Log GDP 0.11 -0.00 (0.64) (0.72) Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) Log GDP per Capita -0.07 -0.04 (0.10) (0.10) GDP Growth -0.01** -0.02** (0.01) (0.01) Media Bias 0.00 -0.00 (0.01) (0.00) Women's INGOs 0.01+ (0.00) % Labor Force Female -0.01 (0.01) Gender Quota -0.19 (0.17) Female Tertiary Education -0.00 (0.01) Observations 2719 2235 Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two- tailed tests.

Figure 8: Predicted Number of Women’s Protests at Levels of Disappearance 5 4 3 Predicted Number of Women's Protests 2

0 1 2 Disappearance (CIRI, rescaled)

Note: Predictions based on Model 14.

Table 8 offers a test of my third hypothesis by comparing models of women’s

protest to models of general protest. In these models, I also include a control variable for

the lagged level of the other type of protest, because these processes could be highly

related. Indeed, the pairwise correlation for women’s protest and general nonviolent protests is 0.513, which leads us to expect a positive relationship between the two.

Again, disappearances are a positive and significant predictor of women’s protests, but do not show a relationship to general protests. Figure 8 depicts the substantive effects of disappearances on the two protest types. As disappearances increase, the expected number of women’s protests increases by a factor of about 1.7 times, but the number of general protests is not significantly increased or decreased. In these models, none of the other types of repression matter for predicting either type of protest.

Interestingly, neither type of protest is predicted by the other type in the full model, in spite of their high correlation. This adds further support to the idea that women’s protests are, in fact, very distinct from general protests, suggesting that the conditions that lead to high levels of women’s protest are different from those that increase general protests.

Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression of Protest Type on Disappearance Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Dependent Variable Women’s Women’s General General Protests Protests Protests Protests Independent Variables Disappearance 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.08 0.08 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) Extrajudicial Killing 0.21** 0.20** 0.00 0.00 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) Political Imprisonment 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.08 0.12+ (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) Torture 0.20* 0.23* 0.09 0.08 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00+ 0.00* (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) General Protests(t - 1) 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Women's Political Rights 0.06 0.05 0.14+ 0.03 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) Polity IV -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Election Year -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log GDP -0.19 -0.18 1.31* 1.53* (0.66) (0.72) (0.64) (0.70) Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Log GDP per Capita -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) GDP Growth -0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Media Bias -0.03+ -0.03 -0.08*** -0.07*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Women's INGOs 0.01+ 0.01* (0.00) (0.00) % Labor Force Female -0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) Gender Quota -0.12 -0.27* (0.19) (0.12) Female Tertiary Education -0.00 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) Observations 1988 1946 1842 1804 Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.

Here, again, for both types of protest, economic factors are very important. GDP exhibits a non-linear relationship with both women’s and general protests: at high and low levels of wealth, protest is lower. GDP per capita, my proxy for development, shows a depressing effect on women’s protests, and though negatively signed, GDP per capita is not significantly related to general protests. Media bias also positively predicts both types of protest, which is in line with expectations.

Interestingly, when controlling for the level of general protests, women’s labor force participation becomes negative and significant for women’s protests. This may indicate that when women have better access to the labor market they no longer organize as women, but instead as part of broad-based protests. Women’s political rights negatively predict general protests, perhaps for similar reasons: when women’s rights are already respected, there is a lower demand for change.

Women’s INGOs do not significantly predict either women’s or general protests.

This is somewhat surprising given strong theoretical reasons to expect a positive relationship. However, this null finding may simply be an artifact of two things. First, by 1990, women’s INGOs may already have proliferated to the point of saturation, and so

INGOs had reached their “ceiling” for affecting the level of protests. In addition, the level of women’s INGOs does not exhibit much change within countries over time (see

Appendix B), and thus can be thought of as close to constant. Levels of democracy, elections, gender quotas, economic growth, and female tertiary enrollment do not exhibit statistically significant relationships to either women’s or general protests. Again, these factors are likely important globally, but may lack explanatory power within the region and timeframe.

Figure 9: Predicted Number of Women’s and General Protests by Level of Disappearance 6 32 30 5 28 4 26 3 Predicted Number of General Protests Predicted Number of Women's Protests 24 2 22 0 1 2 0 1 2 Disappearance (CIRI, rescaled) Disappearance (CIRI, rescaled)

Notes: Predictions derived from Models 16 and 18, respectively.

Robustness Tests

As in the previous chapter, I now present a few selected robustness tests. In

particular, Table 9 shows the models testing H2 applied to the regional subsets described

in the previous chapter. These models reveal that the relationship between forced

disappearance and women’s protests is in the expected direction in all regions analyzed.

However, this relationship fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance in the

South Asian region. Again, this might be due to meaningful regional differences, or

could be caused by the relatively fewer observations within that regional classification.

All in all, the findings are remarkably consistent across regions.

In Table 10, I show regional tests for H3. Recall that H3 suggests a null

relationship between disappearances and general protests. As expected, none of the regional subsets demonstrate a statisticall significant relationship between disappearance and general protests. Indeed, none of the other measures of repression appear to be associated with higher levels of general protests either.

Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Disappearance (Regions) Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Region LAC EAP ECA MENA SA SSA Dependent Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Variable Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests Independent Variables Repression (CIRI) Disappearance 0.49*** 0.35** 0.37** 0.35* 0.14+ 0.23* (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11) Extrajudicial 0.03 -0.07 0.37** 0.05 -0.24 0.34** Killing (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.35) (0.12) Political 0.04 -0.13 0.31* 0.30+ 0.58*** 0.23 Imprisonment (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) Torture 0.14 0.06 -0.17 0.09 0.78* 0.33+ (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.36) (0.17) Women’s 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.03 Protests(t - 1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) Women's -0.44* -0.16 -0.42+ -0.28 0.55*** 0.07 Political Rights (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.12) (0.19) Polity IV -0.05*** 0.04+ 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.11*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.02+ 0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Election Year 0.03 -0.15 -0.00+ 0.14 1.07*** 0.00*** (0.20) (0.19) (0.00) (0.32) (0.19) (0.00) Log GDP 2.80* 4.16*** -2.75* 2.51 12.06** -0.92 (1.35) (0.96) (1.12) (3.31) (3.72) (2.61) Log GDP2 -0.05+ -0.07*** 0.06** -0.05 -0.24** 0.03 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) Log GDP -0.54** -0.35* 0.21 -0.31* -0.08 -0.35+ per Capita (0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.13) (0.35) (0.18) GDP Growth 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.04+ 0.08 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) Media Bias 0.17* 0.03* 0.01 0.28** 0.01+ 0.27* (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.12) Observations 437 300 775 300 120 740 Pseudo R2 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.16 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Table 10: Negative Binomial Regression of General Protests on Disappearance (Regions) Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Region LAC EAP ECA MENA SA SSA Dependent General General General General General General Variable Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests Independent Variables Repression (CIRI) Disappearance 0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.10 0.07 0.00 (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.14) Extrajudicial -0.04 0.16 -0.19 -0.18 -0.10 0.07 Killing (0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) Political 0.07 0.19+ 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 Imprisonment (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.07) (0.10) Torture 0.11 -0.09 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 0.23+ (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) Women’s -0.01 0.01+ 0.01* -0.01+ 0.00+ 0.01+ Protests(t - 1) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) Women's -0.43** 0.14 -0.31+ 0.05 0.14+ 0.27 Political Rights (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.08) (0.20) Polity IV -0.01 0.05** 0.03 0.01 -0.05*** -0.08** (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) Polity IV2 0.00 -0.01* -0.01** -0.01 0.00 0.01** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) Election Year -0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.19 0.31** 0.25 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) Log GDP 4.82*** 3.56** 2.00+ 3.08 8.71*** -0.57 (0.70) (1.20) (1.11) (3.97) (0.52) (2.49) Log GDP2 -0.09*** -0.06* -0.03 -0.06 -0.17*** 0.02 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.06) Log GDP -0.54** -0.07 0.16 -0.20 -0.11*** -0.12 per Capita (0.19) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.03) (0.16) GDP Growth -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) Media Bias 0.28** 0.06* 0.03** 0.40** 0.04*** 0.15 (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.16) Observations 300 204 527 198 82 500 Pseudo R2 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.26 0.11 + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Chapter 5 – Empirics: Women Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts

In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H4 and H5. H4 suggests that women will be generally less likely to participate in protests, compared to men. H5, however, suggests that this relationship between gender and protest participation is conditional on state repression, specifically that women will be more likely to protest when the state uses forced disappearances, but men will not. For this chapter, I use data from the Latin

American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to test my final two hypotheses on a sample of 18 Latin American countries in 2006 and 2008. In addition, I provide additional robustness tests and alternative model specifications at the end of the chapter.

As a reminder, the two hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows:

H4 – During times when the government is not repressive, women will be less

likely to participate in protests compared to men.

H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government

uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in

protests under those conditions.

Why Latin America?

As mentioned, in this chapter I use survey data from Latin America to test my arguments about the individual and state level factors that affect protest participation, particularly gender and repression. I choose to study this relationship within the Latin

American region for a number of reasons. The first is that meaningful country level variation is present in the timeframe. Secondarily, the substantive importance of both the dependent and independent variable in the Latin American region cannot be understated.

Finally, for case selection purposes, limiting my analyses to the Latin American region

96 allows me to control for potential unobservable confounding variables, such as the historical legacy of American foreign policy during the Cold War, and the ongoing regional conflicts surrounding the “War on Drugs”.

When looking at the Latin American region, women protest “as women” frequently. Even in the post-military regime period (1990 to 2012), there is a great deal of variation in women’s protest. Figure 10 shows trends over time in both women’s protest and state’s disrespect for physical integrity rights, which graphically shows evidence that women’s protests seem to be associated with high levels of government repression. With both measures, a higher score represents higher rates of protest and/or higher levels of repression. In terms of women’s protest, Colombia and Peru stand apart, showing massive waves of women’s protest, whereas Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have seen middling levels of women’s mobilization, and many other Latin American states saw little protest over time from women. For the most part, those states with poor physical integrity rights also had high levels of women’s protests.

Figure 10: Women’s Protests and State Repression in Latin America, 1990-2009

Note: Women’s protest is a count of all protests by women in a given country-year. The measure of repression is the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index. This comes from Cingranelli and Richards (2010), and scores range from 0-8, transformed so that a higher score means greater state repression.

In this chapter, I focus on the relationship of women’s protests and repression in

the Latin American region. There are compelling reasons to limit the scope to this

region, and these reasons broadly fall into normative and research design motives.

Turning first to normative reasons, further exploring both the dependent variable

(women’s protests) and the independent variable (repression) are critical for our

understanding of Latin America. As you can see in Figure 10, women’s protests are

fairly common in the region from 1990 to 2010. Given that protests are costly, both for

participants and for governments, understanding what causes women to protest is

critically important.

Women’s protests are especially important in the Latin American context because historically women’s participation has played a critical role in the democratization process that began in the late 1970s (Baldez, 2003, 2002, Navarro, 1989, Schirmer,

1989). Even as the government was highly repressive of opposition, women in Argentina

(Navarro, 1989), Guatemala, and Uruguay (Schirmer, 1989) took to the streets to demand information about their missing children. These women’s protests took place because of

– and in spite of – massively repressive government regimes that were “disappearing” thousands of citizens at the time. The history of the region shows that women’s political involvement can play a crucial role in creating social change.

Indeed, not only are women’s protests important in Latin America, but repression

has been a major issue for many countries there as well. During the period of military

rule, many countries in Latin America experienced a great deal of physical integrity

rights violations. Even in the post-democratization period, repression is common in Latin

American countries. For example, even from the period of 1990-2010, more countries

99 than not experienced at least one year in which there was some use of the practice of forced disappearances (see Figure 10).

In addition to the normative importance of understanding the relationship of women’s protests to repression in the region, isolating my analysis to Latin America is also advantageous from a research design perspective. In order to test my argument, I need a large number of countries over a long period of time with variation on both the dependent variable and the independent variable. Latin America provides both: women’s protests are fairly frequent but vary widely by country and over time, and repression occurs relatively often in many different countries but not in every year.

Secondarily, limiting the scope of this aspect of my study to Latin America allows me to control for many variables that might confound the relationships I seek to isolate.

For example, many countries in the region have had similar historical experiences, from a shared colonial heritage as largely Spanish colonies, to a long period of military rule, to more recent shared experiences such as the “Left Turn”. Given the similarities among countries in Latin America, differences in levels of women’s protests between countries are less likely to be a result of differences in things like culture or general acceptance of unrest.

Research Design

While the dependent variable at the country-level utilized by the preceding empirical chapters represents an excellent opportunity to analyze women’s protests at the aggregate level, and to compare women’s protests to more general protests, we may worry about relying on this measure alone for a few reasons. First, my theory suggests that there are individual level factors at play. H4 and H5 operate at the level of

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individuals deciding whether to participate in protests or not. If, at the country level,

more protests by women were recorded when the state made use of forced disappearances

but women, individually, were not more likely to protest under such circumstances, that

might suggest that only motivated activists and those most directly affected by

disappearances turned out in protest, but women generally were not more politically

outspoken in those conditions. The second concern is the possibility of an “ecological

fallacy” (c.f. Seligson 2002). Particularly, in this case we are concerned with the

“individualistic fallacy”, wherein we falsely infer patterns at the individual level from

aggregated data. Because my theory relies on both individual and country level

dynamics, it should be further strengthened by investigating individual-level variation.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, used to test H4 and H5, relies on self-reported information about individual protest participation from the Latin American Public

Opinion Project (LAPOP) for the years 2006 and 2008. While these data cover fewer years than the country level data, there is coverage of all the countries in the region.

Importantly, they also exhibit variation on the primary country-level independent variable, the use of forced disappearance. Ten countries in the region experienced at least some use of forced disappearances during at least one of those two years, and Colombia experienced a high number of disappearances in both years.

This variable is coded as follows. Respondents were asked: “[…] Thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?” The

variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent had participated in a protest in the last 12

months (at the time of the interview), and 0 if they had not. This variable allows me to

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compare both women’s and men’s reported protest activity. Given that this variable is an

individual level one, but my primary independent variable and several important controls

are country level variables, the following analysis uses multi-level logistic regression,

and again all tests are two-tailed.

Primary Individual Level Independent Variable

My theory predicts that not only will women’s groups and women activists protest

when the state uses forced disappearances, but that individual women also perceive their

relative advantages and women will thus be more apt to protest than men under these

conditions. In other words, my theory implies a cross-level interaction between gender and the state’s use of forced disappearance. When the state uses disappearances, I expect that women will be more likely to protest than when the state does not use disappearance.

Men, however, should not be more apt to protest under those conditions. In order to test this conditional hypothesis, I interact both the country level disappearance variable from

CIRI (2010) and the individual respondent’s gender.

Country Level Independent Variable

My theory predicts that women will be more likely to participate in protest when the state makes use of forced disappearance. To measure this independent variable, I use the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI; 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides a measure of whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year. This measure takes a value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero represents no evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one indicates some limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use

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disappearances. This variable is interacted with a respondent’s gender to observe

whether the effects of disappearance at the country level are conditional on gender.

Controls

Since this analysis includes individual level data, I am able to control for

additional individual level factors that might influence protest participation. I include a

control for respondent’s age, as well as a squared term for age. I control for the

respondent’s marital status. I control for the level of education that a respondent has

attained (primary, secondary, college, and post-graduate). I also control for whether the respondent lived in a rural or urban area. People living in cities likely have easier access to public spaces where protests typically occur, and consequently a larger potential audience.

Socioeconomic status has long been theorized to influence political participation broadly (e.g. Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 1995) and economic factors are known to influence protest activity (e.g. Brancati 2013). For personal socioeconomic status, I use the quintiles of wealth measure developed by Córdova (2009). This measure relies on physical household assets (e.g. the number of vehicles), and is preferable to an outright measure of income, because of a large non-response bias on standard income questions, particularly with LAPOP data (Córdova 2009). This provides a reasonable metric of how poor/wealthy a respondent is, in relation to their social context. In addition, I control for the respondent’s current employment status.

Additional controls for respondent ideology and subjective measures of economic and personal satisfaction are also included. I include controls for whether respondent feels their personal economic situation has declined in the last year, whether they

103 believed the country’s economic situation has worsened in the past year, and their current level of satisfaction with life in general. These first two would motivate more protests, whereas a generally satisfied respondent is probably less likely to protest.

Results

Individual-level analyses reveal similar dynamics to the country level. As predicted by H4, women are generally less likely to protest when the state is not repressive. The use of disappearances, however, changes the effect of respondent gender.

Under conditions of repression, women become more likely to protest than before. In fact, as seen in Figure 12, the gender gap in protest participation at the individual level disappears, and nearly reverses and becomes positive, when the state is using forced disappearances. In other words, women are at least as likely (and very nearly more likely) than men to protest when the state uses disappearance. Individual women do seem to recognize that they have a higher ability to protest in this repressive context.

As for individual control variables, age appears to matter in some models but not others. Generally, this variable suggests that the very young and very old are less likely to protest than those in the middle age group are. Married people do not show any significant difference in protest participation relative to single people. Those with more education do tend to protest more often than those with lower education levels. Right wing respondents were less likely than those on the left to protest. Subjective feelings about the country and one’s personal economic situation do not appear to relate to protest participation, but overall satisfaction with life does lower the likelihood of protesting.

At the country level, media bias towards a country is associated with a higher level of protests among respondents. The level of democracy, captured by Polity, does

104 not have significant effects, but this is not surprising given that only two years are captured and so there is not much variation. For this cross-section, overall GDP is associated with higher protests at the very high and low ends of the spectrum, with fewer protests in the middle range. Finally, GDP per capita has a depressing effect: respondents in more developed countries tend to show lower levels of protest.

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Table 11: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Covariates Independent Variables Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Cross-Level Interaction Female -0.243*** -0.218*** -0.191*** -0.203*** (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) Disappearance -0.661*** -0.407*** 0.288** 0.209 (0.146) (0.140) (0.143) (0.151) Female X Disappearance 0.181** 0.165** 0.197** 0.181** (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) Individual Level Variables Age 0.017** 0.013* 0.003 0.004 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Married 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.053 (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) Education Level 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.131*** (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) Wealth (Quintiles) 0.016 0.019 0.026* 0.028* (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) Employed -0.151*** -0.081* 0.079* 0.052 (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) Rural -0.009 -0.012 0.017 0.001 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) Right Wing -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.030*** (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) Personal Economy -0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.017 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) Country Economy 0.021 0.021 0.016 0.017 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) Life Satisfaction -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.078*** (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) Country Level Variables Media Bias 5.975*** 5.262*** 3.639*** 2.433*** (0.557) (0.531) (0.547) (0.550) Repression -0.467*** (0.083) Polity IV 7.216 (5.297) Polity IV2 -0.548* (0.313) Log GDP -127.398*** (8.578) Log GDP2 2.479*** (0.174) Log GDP per Capita -7.195*** (0.617) Constant -3.243*** -25.894 1,624.988*** 56.129*** (1.118) (21.746) (105.517) (5.267) Observations 19,299 19,299 18,102 18,102 Number of groups 18 18 17 17

Chi2 445 522 787 562 P > Chi2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.

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Figure 11: Effect of Respondent Gender on Likelihood of Protest Participation at Levels of Disappearance

Note: Predictions in this figure derived from Model 34.

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Chapter 6 – Conclusion

This dissertation is an exploration of women’s protests that seeks to both shed

light on the unique role of gender in shaping protest behavior while also recognizing the

similarities between women’s protests and other forms of contentious mobilization. In

this concluding chapter, I summarize the major and minor contributions of this project as

I see them, I provide some of my ideas for building upon this foundation in future work,

and I reiterate the importance of continuing to study women’s protests.

Contributions of this Dissertation

This dissertation presents a big picture view of women’s protests. Using the general theoreatical framework I develop in Chapter 2, I derive expectations about contexts in which women’s protests are similar to other protests, as well as uncovering contexts in which women’s protests are unique. Women protest repression just as other groups do. However, when repression is gendered, and society is especially patriarchal, women are paradoxically empowered by their previously detrimental gender roles. The ability to politicize womanhood and motherhood serves as a crucial shield that protects women and encourages them to protest “as women” rather than as part of broader protests.

This dissertation demonstrates the critical importance of state repressive practices

for understanding women’s protests, specifically. This is both a contribution to our

understanding of women’s protests, but also a contribution to the study of the effects of

repression. Previous works in this area have generally undervalued the role of gender in

dissent, but this project demonstrates that both theorizing about gender and women’s

participation are critical for understanding dissent in repressive contexts.

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To my knowledge, this is the first project to examine women’s protests at two levels – utilizing both globally comprehensive data on women’s protests at the country- year level as well as regionally exhaustive individual level data on women’s participation in protests. This is an important departure from previous works because it allows us to examine whether patterns observed at the country level really hold at the individual level

(c.f. Seligson 2002). For example, when I observed in Chapters 3 and 4 that women’s protests become more numerous in repressive states, it might have been the case that only some women were more likely to protest in those contexts. However, in Chapter 5, I find that this pattern actually holds for women in general, and that all women become more likely to protest under repressive contexts, compared to men.

Indeed, to my knowledge, this is the first large scale research endeavor that explicitly models the links between state level human rights practices to individual level behaviors and attitudes. This is a major contribution to the study of human rights, because many of the extant theories on human rights rely on assumptions about how citizens perceive and respond to state actions, but do not explicitly test those assumptions.

For example, many previous works on repression assume that citizens generally respond negatively to repression. However, preliminary analysis made possible by my data collection and multilevel modelling efforts has demonstrated that this assumption is questionable, at least within the Latin American context. Consider the following graphical representation. Using a similar model to the ones developed in Chapter 5, I model citizens’ predicted level of trust in government at varying levels of state repressiveness, interacted with citizens’ self-reported level of right-wing ideology. As

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you can see, when the state is not very repressive, there is no difference in level of trust in

government between left- and right-wing citizens. However, at middling and high levels of repression by the state, more right-wing citizens actually report much higher levels of trust in government, compareted to left-wing citizens. This analysis is obviously very preliminary and needs a great deal of elaboration, but this is the kind of question that my approach will allow us to answer more fully in the future.

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Figure 12: Trust In Government over Ideology and Repression

Predicted Level of Trust in Government 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4 Linear Prediction,Fixed Portion 3.8

1 10 Right Wing Ideology Scale

State Unrepressive State Middling Repressive State Very Repressive

Note: Predictions derived from mixed effects logit model, including all controls, as seen in previous chapter.

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Avenues for Future Researh

One clear avenue for further work is to examine is to examine the decision process of the state in choosing to repress and practicing repression. This project demonstrates that gender and attitudes about women play a role in both of these processes. However, it is still unclear what the full role of gender is in determining state

repressive behavior. Future works should take up the task of theorizing state repressive

behavior through the lense of gender.

As I mentioned in the previous section, future avenues for research linking

individual citizen attitudes and behaviors to state level repressive practices are fruitful

grounds for much future work. I have demonstrated one such area, but there are likely

hundreds more questions we could ask using this approach. How do citizens feel about

repression? Are the effects gendered in other ways, outside of protest behavior? What

citizens support the regime in spite of human rights violations, and why? These are all

incredibly interesting topics for future research to tackle.

Why Still Study Women’s Protests?

Normatively speaking, women’s protests are incredibly important. This has never been more obvious than in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Not even 24 hours after he was sworn in, a massive wave of protests, primarily organized by and for women, exploded both in Washington D.C. and cities both across the US and around the world. Women on all seven continents (including

Antarctica) marched in solidarity against the new administration. While clearly a very different situation from women protesting in a highly repressive context, the logic of my argument can still shed light on this wave of protests. In this case, the loss of an election

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and the transition to a more hostile new administration, rather than outright repression, is

the motivating grievance that drove over 4 million women to the streets in protest.

In what ways did the political climate favor women, specifically, to organize?

While I think we need to think more on this, it was probably because of the framing of

the campaigns. This campaign was different in that it was the first time a woman was

running on a major party ticket for the general election. Secondarily, much of the

campaign season was spent litigating gender issues on both sides (for Hillary, Bill’s past

infidelities and her reaction to those things, and for Trump, litigating his alleged

misogyny and many accusations of past sexual misconduct towards women). This

gender focus on the campaign trail probably helped to bring gender issues to the

foreground after the election in way that favored women organizing specifically around

their gender.

In addition, another important implication of my work is that repression is

gendered, and that both governments practicing repression do so in a way that reflects

and reinforces gender structures, and that men and women experience government

repression differently as a consequence of this. Governments typically hesitate to

disappear women because they view women as non-threatening and politically powerless.

However, this perception is false, and

My research could be very useful in studying “like cases”. In particular, the current political situation in the Philippines comes to mind. Based on my argument, I would suspect that women and women’s groups are likely to be the most active in fighting against Duterte over the disappearances and other massive human rights violations that are ongoing due to his “drug war”. Human rights groups, other nations,

113 and international actors of all kinds should anticipate that it may be women, in particular, who are the key to changing that state’s behavior. They should also do as much as they can to mitigate the danger to women’s groups and women activists on the ground and provide them with support and resources for mobilizing.

All this is to say that women’s mobilization is frequent, it is critically important for calling out human rights violations and for democratization efforts, and it is not going away any time soon. Understanding women’s protests is a supremely important endeavor for scholars of gender, of protests, of human rights practices, of democracy, to collectively undertake. This project is meant to advance our knowledge of women’s protests in some small way, but also to provide a stepping stone for future work on the subject to build, debate, and improve upon.

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Appendices

Here you can find the appendices for this dissertation. Appendix A includes both descriptive statistics and visualizations of data used in the empirical chapters, as well as supplementary information about question wordings. Appendix B includes additional robustness tests for my models of H1-H5 which are not reported within their respective empirical chapters. Finally, Appendix C includes a partial list of names of the victims of forced disappearance in Argentina and Brazil during the military regimes in those respective countries. These can be used to replicate the gender information found in

Chapter 2.

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Regional Composition Region Name Countries Included Latin America Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, and the Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Caribbean Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, (LAC) Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. East Asia and Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, South Pacific Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu. Europe and Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Central Asia Bosznia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech (ECA) Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. Middle East and Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, North Africa Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, (SA) and Sri Lanka. Sub-Saharan Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Africa (SSA) Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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Figure A1: Average Global Level of Democracy over Time 4 3 2 Average Democracyof Level 1

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year

Note: Data comes from Polity IV. Scores range from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic).

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Figure A2: Global Number of Women’s INGOs over Time 7000 6000 5000 4000 Total Number of Women's INGOs 3000 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year

Note: Data on number of women’s INGOs comes from Cole (2013).

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Figure A3: Average Global Respect for Women’s Rights over Time 2.1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 Average Level of Respect for Women's Rights 1.6

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year

Note: Data comes from CIRI (2010). Scores range from 0 (None of women’s political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process.”) up to 4 (“Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions”).

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Appendix B: Additional Robustness Tests

Table B1: Logistic Regression of Increased Repression on Covariates Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Independent Variables

Women’s Protests(t) -0.004 0.009 (0.003) (0.006) Women’s Protests(t-1) -0.009*** -0.016** (0.003) (0.006) Polity IV -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Polity2 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Presidential Election 0.116 0.103 0.107 (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) Log GDP -1.353*** -1.467*** -1.415*** (0.406) (0.424) (0.420) Log GDP2 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.028*** (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) Log GDP per Capita 0.009 0.004 0.009 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) GDP Growth -0.014 -0.011 -0.010 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)

Constant 16.621*** 17.814*** 17.229*** (4.942) (5.142) (5.099)

Observations 3,302 3,168 3,168 Psuedo-R2 0.024 0.023 0.023 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: In these models, I check for endogeneity. Here, the dependent variable is increased repression, which takes a value of 1 if the current level of repression is higher than the previous level in a given country, and 0 otherwise. Neither the current year’s number of women’s protests nor the previous years number of women’s protests predict an increase in repression, suggesting that endogeneity is not a huge concern for H1.

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Table B2: Civil Conflict Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 Independent Variables

Disappearance 0.333** 0.340** 0.275** (0.136) (0.134) (0.122) Civil Conflict 1.230*** (0.302) Polity IV -0.003 -0.025 -0.021 (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) Polity2 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) Presidential Election -0.166 (0.147) Log GDP 1.249 0.474 0.803 (0.900) (1.029) (0.911) Log GDP2 -0.020 0.002 -0.005 (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) Log GDP per Capita 0.063 -0.320*** -0.253** (0.119) (0.114) (0.100) GDP Growth 0.010 0.027 0.026 (0.010) (0.027) (0.026) -0.027 -0.247 Constant (0.141) (0.171) -17.075 -9.596 -13.574 (10.960) (12.318) (10.871)

Observations 431 2,311 2,756 Psuedo-R2 0.057 0.11 0.11 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.

One concern for H2 is that disappearances largely occur in the context of civil conflict, and so we might be capturing the effect of civil conflict with the disappearance measure. I use the PRIO measure of civil conflict here (0 if no conflict, 1 if more than 25 battle deaths occur). These two events are highly correlated, so including both in a model introduces collinearity. However, when I isolate the sample to only ongoing civil conflicts (Model 38), only non-civil conflicts (Model 39), or simply include both in one modle (Model 40), I find that disappearances still have the expected positive relationship with women’s protests.

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Appendix C: Names of the Disappeared Américo Gines Agüero

Tomás Rodolfo Agüero Ríos Ana Teresa del Valle Aguilar Names of victims of forced José Aguilar Bracesco disappearance, for data verification. Claudio Reyes Ahumada Presented here in their memory. Alejandro Fabian Aibar Angela María Aieta de Gullo

Argentina Liliana Ester Aimeta Cherif Omar Ainie Rojas Juan Carlos Abachian Carlos César Aiub Ana Catalina Abad de Perucca María Concepción Aiub Dominga Abadía Crespo Ricardo Emir Aiub Felicidad Abadía Crespo Leticia Akselman José Abdala Genaro Alarcón María Leonor Abinet Carlos Esteban Alaye Angel Luis Abraham Pablo Eduardo Albarracín Hernan Abriata Roberto Omar Albornozr José Ismael Acevedo José Antonio Alcaraz Gonzalez Dora Acosta Domingo Alconada Moreira María Eliana Acosta Velasco de Badell Jorge Eduardo Alday Lazcoz Elba Eva Acuña de Sáez Segundo Sixto Alderete Marta Graciela Acuña Fernando Antonio Alduvino Bolzan Sirena Acuña José David Aleksoski Oscar Adamoli Alberto Cayetano Alfaro Rolando Elías Adem Alicia Elena Alfonsín Claudio César Adur Carlos Alberto Almada Villalba Padre Jorge Oscar Adur Elvio Alberto Almada Nelson Roberto Agorio Ricardo Avelino Almaraz Hugo Agosti

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Guillermo Abel Almarza Carlos Alberto Andisco Alejandro Almeida José Eduardo Andrade Mónica Almirón de Lauroni Jorge Luis Andreani María Gloria Alonso Cifuentes de Juan Carlos Andreotti Sánchez Luis Alberto Angelini Mirta Alonso de Hueravilo Blanca Estela Angerosa Raúl Alonso Daniel Martín Angerosa Julio Antonio Altamirano Humberto Orlando Annone Lucio Bernardo Altamirano Héctor Alberto Antelo Dominga Alvarez de Scurta Daniel Antokoletz Federico Eduardo Alvarez Rojas Néstor Rubén Antoñanzas Gerardo Julio Alvarez Arturo Apaza Horacio José Alvarez José Luis Appel De La Cruz Jorge Alberto Álvarez Francisca Aragón José Carlos Alvarez González Lidoro Oscar Aragón Julio Rolando Alvarez García Raul Araldi Lucina Alvarez de Barros Juan de Dios Aramayo Vallejos Marcelino Alvarez Isauro Arancibia Osvaldo Angel Alvarez Alvarez Napoleón Argentino Araneda María Cristina Alvira Juan Cesáreo Arano Raquel Alvira Héctor Antonio Araujo María Elena Amadio Wenceslao Araujo Fernando Adolfo Amarilla Miguel Sergio Arcuschin Guillermo Amarilla Hugo Ardiles Nelly Ana Amato de Risso Nélida Beatriz Ardito Norberto Félix Amarturi Roberto Ardito Salvador Leonardo Amico Luis Ramon Aredez Lidia Inés Amigo Alberto Francisco Arenas Aníbal Alberto Anchepe 123

Salvador Manuel Arestín Pablo G Athanasiu Laschan Joaquín Enrique Areta Alfredo Apeleister Jorge Ignacio Areta Nicodemus Apeleister Alberto Arévalo Jorge Omar Astudillo Galizia Alfredo Arévalo María Inés del Cármen Atim Antonio Arévalo Abdala Auad Domingo Arévalo Roberto Eduardo Aued Emilio Confesor Arévalo Floreal Edgardo Avellaneda Roberto Arfa Lucrecia Mercedes Avellaneda Quintale Jorge Raúl Arfuch Jorgelina Aquilina Avalos de Gómez María de las Mercedes Argañaraz de Sara Fluvia Ayala de Morel Fresneda Vicente Ayala Carlos Enrique Arias Camila Elisabet Azar Florentino Arias Emilio Azurmendi Segundo Bonifa Arias Esteban Benito Badell Julio César Arin Delacourt Julio Aníbal Badell Joaquín Ariño Jorge Luis Badillo Carlos María Aristegui Miguel Ángel Badoff Miguel Ángel Arkatyn Adriana Bai Juana María Armelín Arturo Baibiene Raúl Aroldi César Augusto Baldini Miguel Angel Arra Angel Baldraco Jorge Omar Arreche Luis Alberto Baleano Analía Alicia Arriola Pablo Alberto Balut Juan Carlos Arroyo Guillermo Luis Ball Llatinas Horacio Antonio Arrué Adrián Ceferino Ballestero "Victor" Rómulo Artieda Esther Ballestrino de Careaga María Asunción Artigas Nilo de Moyano Daniel Agustín Baquero Juan José María Ascone 124

Luis Antonio Barassi Andrés Humberto Bellizzi Bellizzi Hector Baratti Juan Pedro Belluz Liliana Ester Barbieri Daniel Albino Benavídez Julio Elías Barcat Daniel Eduardo Bendersky Julio César Barozzi Aníbal Carlos Benítez Eduardo Barrera Ramona Benítez de Amarilla Juan Carlos Barrera Vicente José Benítez Raul Barreto Capelli Rutilio Dardo Betancour Roth Eduardo Froilan Barrios Amado Berardo Washington Javier Barrios Fernandez Remo Carlos Berardo María del Carmen Barros de Zaffora Rubén Abel Beratz Oscar Osvaldo Barros Martín Elías Bercovich Egidio Battistiol Carlos José Guillermo Berdini Raúl Augusto Bauducco Graciela Alicia Beretta Rubén Santiago Bauer Chimeno María Magdalena Beretta Pose Alberto Noé Bayarsky Azucena Ricarda Bermejo de Rondoletto Carlos Eduardo Becker Alberto Bernal Tejada Susana Beatriz Becker José Pablo Bernard Darío Oscar Bedne María Cristina Bernat María Bedoian de Ikonikoff Juan José Berninsone Guillermo José Begega Horacio Félix Bertholet Juan Francisco Belaustegui Carlos Guillermo Berti Dominguez Martín Belaustegui Herrera Juan Ricardo Bertos Rafael José Belaustegui Herrera Cristina Bettanin de Colmenares Valeria Belaustegui Herrera de Waisberg Leonardo Bettanin Fernando Alberto Belizán Ramón Oscar Bianchi Hugo Francisco Bellagamba Eduardo José Bicocca Mariana Belli Salvador Juan Bidegorry

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Patricio Biedma Scadewaldt Juan Raúl Bourg Pineau Ricardo Miguel Biegkler Almendra Eduardo Julio Bracaccini María Cristina Bienposto Robert Marcel Boudet Claudio Daniel Bignasco Susana Mercedes Boulocq Korn de Concetti Guillermo Daniel Binstock Angel Enrique Brandazza Carlos Hugo Blanco Gabriel Braunstein Viviana Avelina Blanco Claudio Braverman Luis Rodolfo Bledel Jesús María Bravo Hugo Alberto Boca Omar Fernando Bravo Nestor Boca Alfredo Oscar Brawerman Nilda Mabel Boca de Mansilla Juan José Brero Tolosa Listo Ramón Bogado Hortensia Brito Francisco Javier Bogarini Victor Mario Brizzi Victor Pablo Boichenko Julia Angélica Brocca de Herrero Adriana Silvia Boitano Fernando Ruben Brodsky Guillermo Carlos Boitano Brañas Jose Daniel Bronzel Miguel Angel Boitano Roberto Oscar Brullo Cea Liliana Beatriz Bojanich Carlos Alberto Bruni Daniel Bombara Aida Leonora Bruschtein Bonaparte Raúl Alfredo Bonafini Irene Bruschtein Bonaparte Ana Maria Bonatto Victor Bruschtein Bonaparte Jorge Alberto Bonil Arnaldo Haroldo Buffa Eduardo Bonin María Luisa Buffo Nelly Yolanda Borda Roberto Horacio Bugatti Osvald Raúl Edgardo Borelli Cattaneo Eduardo Oscar Bulacio Rodolfo Mario Borroni Tomás Angel Bulacio Carlos Borucio Alicia Raquel Burdisso Oscar Isidro Borzi Jorge Alberto Burghard 126

Julio Genaro Burgos Ponce Alfredo José Cajide Ada Margaret Burgueño Italo Américo Cali Osvaldo Enrique Busetto Jorge Donato Calvo Enrique Bustamante Daniel Eduardo Calleja Juan Carlos Bustamante Norma Estela Campano Aldo Meliton Bustos Simón Campano Cármen Santiago Bustos Horacio Domingo Campiglia Edelmiro Cruz Bustos Horacio Raúl Campione María Cristina Bustos de Coronel Julio César Campopiano Miguel Ángel Bustos Antonia Adriana Campos de Alcaraz Miguel Angel Butrón María Silvia Campos José Caamaño Uzal Jorge Candeloro Eduardo Luis Caballero José María Cane Wenceslao Eduardo Caballero Arturo Canedo del Oso Damián Cabandié Luis Canfaila Nelson Martín Cabello Pérez Ernesto Enrique Canga Gustavo Alejandro Cabezas José Antonio Cano Dardo Cabo Alberto Canovas Estape Oscar Ramón Cabral Edison Oscar Cantero Freire Ary Cabrera Prates Ana Beatriz Cantos de Caldera Hugo Cacciavillani Caligari Luis Antonio Cantos Jorge Eliseo Cáceres Jorge Antonio Capello Edgar Claudio Cadima Torrez Carlos Hugo Capitman Eduardo Alberto Cagnola Julio Cesar Carboni Ricardo Luis Cagnoni Alvaro Cardenas Claudio Caielli Daniel Hugo Carignano Rafael Caielli Eduardo Carlas Salas Liliana Beatriz Caimi de Marizcurrena Oscar Marcos Carloni

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Adrián Orlando Carlovich Haydée María Castelltort Laura Estela Carlotto Miguel Ángel Castiglioni Cornes Carlos Alberto Carpani Ana María Castillo Pablo Carpintero Lobo Liliana Graciela Castillo Barrios de Ovejero Ricardo Carpintero Lobo Norberto José Castillo Adriana María Carranza Oscar Silverio Castillo Carlos Alberto Carranza Ramón Roque Castillo Cecilia María Carranza José María Castiñeiras Gonzalo Abel Carranza Alfredo Jorge Castro Montero Cristina Carreño Araya Héctor Castro Roberto Eugenio Carri Hugo Alberto Castro Manuel Daniel Carricondo Luis Marcelo Castro Montero Maria Inés Carrieri de Velásquez María Antonia Castro Huerga de Norma Lidia Carrizo Martínez Carlos Roberto Carrozzino Jorge Antonio Catanese Ana María Caruso de Carri Gladys Hebe Caudet Gaspar Onofre Casado Hector Cavallo María Segunda Casado Elisa E. Cayul de Cugura María Adriana Casajus de Gonzales Jorge Omar Cazenave Villar Jorge Omar Cazorla Edith María Casares Santiago Alberto Cazón Juan Carlos Casariego de Bel Laura Cedola de Monteagudo Honorio Orlando Casas Edigo Jesús Cejas Arias Marta Beatriz Cascella Jorge Nestor Cena Yolanda Iris Casco Ghelpi de D'Elia María Cenador de Rondoletto Claudio Argentino Casoy Norberto Centeno Héctor Daniel Cassataro Francisco Tenório Cerqueira Júnior Anibal Ramón Castagno Luzardo Alicia Dora Cerrota de Ramos Roberto Castelli 128

Liliana Teresa Certo Diana Noemí Conde Miguel Cervantes Haroldo Pedro Conti Luis Justo Augusto Cervera Novo Roberto Julio Coria Eduardo Cespedes Juan Bautista Coronel Roberto Eduardo Cevasco Ana Cristina Corral Romano Luis Alberto Ciancio Carlos Esteban Correa Bravo David Nolver Cilleruelo María Mercedes Correa Carlos Cinqualbre Mariel Corsi Luis German Cirigliano Miguel Arcángel Cortez Ignacio Manuel Cisneros Carlos Gustavo Cortiñas Ricardo Alberto Cittadini Gabriel Fernando Costilla Roxana Teresa Claros Romero Margarita Del Carmen Costilla de Villagra Jean Ives Claudet Fernandez María Cristina Cournour Ines Adriana Cobo Mirtha Noelia Coutoune Luis Alberto Coconier Carlos Alberto Coy Manuel Enrique Cohn Ricardo Alfredo Cravello Oscar Hugo Coker Laura Noemí Creatore Juana Matilde Colayago de Battistiol Laura Lía Crespo de Moya Eduardo Alberto Colella Rodolfo Alberto Crespo Jaime José Colmenares Roberto Luis Cristina Liliana Teresa Colombetti De Bulac Celso Pedro Cruces Gerardo Coltzau Fernández Alicia Edith Cruz de Rebagliati Susana Aurora Collinet Mercedes Leonor Cuadrelli de Arin Atlántida Coma Velasco de Ardito Delacourt Luis Commatteo María Georgina Cubas de Pérez Gastón Roberto Concalvez Enrique Cuella Abel Rodolfo Concetti Aberlardo H. Cuesta Hugo Milciades Concha López Hugo Ramón Cuesta

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Jorge Anselmo Cueto Luis Tomás D'Arcángelo José Esteban Cugura Gerónimo Américo Da Costa Juan Oscar Cugura María Cristina Da Re Lucia Cullen Héctor Jorge Dadin Vesare Gloria Constanza Curia Ricardo Dakuyaku María Liliana Curra Yolanda Mabel Damora Domingo Hidelgardo Chacón Alberto Dapozo José Rafael Chamas Daniel Alberto Daroqui Francisco José Changazzo Jorge Arturo Daroqui José Adhemar Changazzo Juan Carlos Daroqui Oscar Rodolfo Changazzo Riquiflor Francoise Marie Dauthier Juan Carlos Chaparro Carlos Alberto Davit Testa Ana María Chapeta Lario Claudio de AchaRubén Mario De Angelis Gustavo Adolfo Chavarino Alicia Estela De Cicco Hector Gerardo Chaves Eugenio Osvaldo de Cristófaro José Guetas Chebala Castrillón Juan Carlos Chersanaz Luis Eduardo De Cristofaro Jacobo Chester Jorge Luis de Iriarte Carlos Alberto Chiappolini Elena de la Cuadra Ricardo Chidichimo Roberto José de la Cuadra Miguel Ricardo Chiernajowsky Carlos Enrique De La Fuente Jorge Luis Chinetti Carlos Alberto De Lorenzo Eduardo Chizzola Eduardo Antonio de Pedro Maldonado Julián Choque Cahuana Pablo Carmelo De Pino Alicia Silvia Chuburu Silvia de Raffaelli de Peralta Alicia Raquel D'ambra Victor de Raffaelli Carlos Alberto D'ambra Cristóbal Augusto Dedionigi Julio Cesar D'Elia Pallares Raul Arturo Deget

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Eduardo José Degregori Ricardo Mario Díaz María del Cármen del Bosco de Allende Santiago Augusto Díaz Julio Arnaldo Del Castillo Cristina Diez de Celesia Eduardo José Del Fabro Diana Carmen Diez de Rentani Juan Domingo Del Gesso Jorge Manuel Diez Díaz Norma Beatriz del Missier Patricia Dillon de Ciancio Néstor José del Río Luis Vicente Dimattia Carmen Angélica Delard Cabezas Ricardo Dios Eduardo Alberto Delfino Mirta Noemí Dithurbide Juan Ramón Delgado Vial Patricia Liliana Dixon Nora Mabel Delgado Valeria Dixon de Garat Carlos María Denis Raul Aurelio Dobelli Hernando Deria Graciela María Doldan Graciela Josefa Devallis de Paulín Yves Marie Alain Domergue Nestor Devincenti Eleonora Dominguez de Cristina Oscar Alfredo Dezorzi Miguel Alejandro Domínguez Miguel Angel Di Pascua Porfirio Domínguez Jorge Fernando Di Pascuale Ricardo Eulogio Dominguez Ferreyra Antonio Adolfo Díaz López María Ester Donza de Coria Enrique Gonzalo Díaz Macias Stella Maris Dorado Fernando Díaz Cárdenas Pablo Hermes Dorigo Francisco Rafael Díaz P. Carlos Dorñak Guillermo Eduardo Díaz Nieto Edmundo Sabino Dossetti Techeira José Raul Díaz Fernández Benjamín Isaac Dricas Luis Miguel Díaz Salazar Georgina Graciela Droz Estrada Manuel Julio Díaz José Alfredo Duarte Maria Beatriz Diaz Eduardo Agustín Duclos Mario Alberto Díaz Moscardo Aníbal Durand Martinez

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Rubén Sabino Dure Mario René Espinoza Barahona Rodolfo Mario Eder Carlos María Espoturno Marcelo Adolfo Eggers Alejandro Luis Estigarria Víctor Felipe Egloff Manuel Hugo Evequoz Fraga Cecilia Eguia Benavídez Luis Alberto Fabbri Alicia Eguren de Cooke Luis Mario Fachino Martha Graciela Eiroa Martiniano Pablo Antonio Faimberg Luis Enrique Eisenschlas Susana Falabella de Abdala Américo Eiza Dora Liliana Falco Luis Enrique Elgueta Carlos Agustín Falcon Nilda Elías de Silva María Claudia Falcone Rodolfo Daniel Elías Roberto Nando Falivene Claudio Epelbaum José Fernando Fanjul Lila Epelbaum Pedro Faramiñán Medina Luis Epelbaum Patricia Faraoni Guillermo Angel Ercolano Daniel Felipe Farias Marianne Erize Tisseau Omar Rodolfo Farias Margarita Erlich Jaroszewich Beatriz Fariñas de Fornies Marta Esain Carlos Guillermo Fassano Eduardo Gonzalo Escabosa Daniel Omar Favero Francisco Alfredo Escamez Laura Isabel Feldman Felix Escobar Ester Felipe Sergio Alberto Escot Anahí Silvia Fernández de Mercader Hernán Gregorio Escudero Antonia Fernández de Tellez Néstor Julio España Carlos Alfredo Fernández Bastarrica Enrique Espeche Cecilia Fernández Riquelme Eduardo T. Espinosa Lever Clara Haydee Fernández José Guillermo Espinoza Pesantes Eliseo Reynaldo Fernandez

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Ernesto Fernández Vidal Carlos Alberto Fiorito Godoberto Luis Fernández Jorge Oscar Firmenich Hector Hugo Fernández Baños Claudia Julia Fita Miller Hilda Adriana Fernandez Jorge Abelardo Flaccavento Jesús Carlos Alberto Fernández Walter Kenneth Fleury José Nicasio Fernández Alvarez Antonio Flores José Osvaldo Germán Fernández Antonio Jorge Flores Mabel Fernández de Hirschler Carlos Jacinto Flores María Cristina Fernández de Pankonin Horacio Bernardo Flores Oscar Alfredo Fernández José Francisco Flores Rita Manuela Fernández Mario Ivar Flores Claudio Arnaldo Ferraris Nelson Flores Ugarte Elena Alicia Ferreiro Pedro Ventura Flores José Miguel Ferrero Patricia Teresa Flynn Diego Ferreyra Beltrán Gustavo Adolfo Fochi María Irma Ferreira Graciela Noemí Folini de Villeres Edith Alicia Ferri Adrián Omar Follonier Juan José Ficarra Juan Carlos Follonier Alcira Gabriela Fidalgo Pizarro de Mabel Lucía Fontana de La Blunda Valenzuela Adolfo Nelson Fontanella Gloria Susana Figueroa Romero Faustino Fontenlla Miguel Ángel Figueroa Alejandro Luis Formica Ernesto Mario Filgueira Strien Hugo Enrique Fornies Marta de las Mercedes Filgueira Strien Daniel Hugo Fortunato Nélida Estela Filgueira Strien Jorge Horacio Foulkes Enrique Carlos Fimiani Humberto Luis Fraccarolli Claudio Marcelo Fink Osvaldo Enrique Fraga Orlando Finsterwald Gustavo Ernesto Fraire Armando Alberto Fioritti 133

Carlos Hugo Franano Mario Guillermo Galli Adriana María Franconetti de Calvo Stella Maris Gallicchio de Vicario Ana María Franconetti Miguel Angel Gallinari Eduardo Alvaro Franconetti Carlos Alberto Gambande Ruperti Amalia Rosa Franchelli de Dobelli Delia Elena Garaguso Generosa Fratassi Eduardo Héctor Garat Verónica Freier Esteban Francisco Garat Héctor Manuel Freijo Alejandro Horacio García Martegani Tomás Fresneda Antonio Domingo García Florencio Ramón Frias Diana Iris García Pedro Arturo Frías Ernesto García Carlos Mario Frigerio Germán Nelson García Carcagno Luis M. Frutos Hilda Magdalena García Aída Fuciños Rielo de Galizzi Horacio Oscar García Castelu Luis Alberto Fuentes Iris Nélida García Julio César Fumarola Ileana García Ramos Aníbal Eduardo Gadea María Claudia García Irureta Goyena de Gelman Emilia Susana Gaggero Pérez de Pujals Nestor Enrique García Juan Carlos Gagliano Pablo Alberto García Ana María Gago Benedetti Ricardo Bermundo García Patricia Mabel Gaitán Salvador García Robles Crescencio Galañena Hernández Victor Hugo García Tosoratto Julio Isabelino Galarza Nèlida Leonor Garde de Repetto Blanca Eva Galizzi Marzzan Luis Lorenzo Garello Juan Alberto Galizzi Machi Adelina Noemí Gargiulo de Zibaico Juan Carlos Galván Héctor Hugo Gargiulo Cristina Galzerano Arturo Martín Garín Liliana Elida Galletti María Adelia Garín De De Angelis 134

Ángel Mario Garmendia Catalina Ginder Edgardo Roberto Garnier Héctor Orlando Giordano Cortazzo José Luis Aníbal Garoni Alfredo Antonio Giorgi Adriana Gatti Casal Horacio Gerardo Girardello Amabilia Gerardo Gatti Antuna Mario Giribaldi Eduardo Alberto Garutti Osvaldo Giribaldi Teresa Garzón de Rodríguez Rómulo Carlos Giuffra Carlos Oscar Gatto Raymundo Gleyzer Padre Pablo Gazzarri Eugenio Pablo Glovatzky Klimczuk Marcelo Ariel Gelman Carmen Nelly Godoy de Reczk Julio Cesar Genoud Mario Alberto Godoy Claudio Martín Gerbilsky Marcela Cristina Goeytes Mirta Teresa Gerelli Julio Goitia Luis Román Gerez Franklin Lucio Goizueta Piccioni Eduardo Raúl Germano Mónica Liliana Goldberg Esther Gersberg de Díaz Salazar Liliana Ines Goldenberg Ángel Salomón Gertel Hugo Alberto Goldsman Fernando Mario Gertel Hugo Ernesto Gomensoro Josman Juan Carlos Gesualdo Carmen Gómez de Gargiulo Ricardo Mario Ghigliazza Daniel Osvaldo Gómez Almeida Elsa Gider de Krayem Eva del Jesús Gómez de Agüero Carlos Alberto Giglio Gladys Lucía Gómez Miguel Máximo Gil Ileana Esther Gómez Ríos Douglas Gillie María Elena Gómez de Argañaraz Nerio Deryck Gillie Ricardo Isidro Gómez Helios Gimenez Amuedo Gaston Roberto Goncalves Silvia Noemí Giménez de Guido Jorge Feliberto Gonçalves Busconi Tránsito Giménez Alfredo Gonzalez

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Américo González Villar Carlos Fernando Gregori Ana María González Granada Néstor Rubén Grill Carlos Alberto González Monica Grinspon de Logares Horacio Mario Gonzalez Daniel José Gropper Jesús Angel González Susana Flora Grynberg Jesús Manuel González Lía Mariana Guangiroli de Genoud Lidia Edith González Eusebi Enrique Gerardo Guastavino Manuel Angel Gonzalez Carlos Alberto Gudano Olga Cristina González Dante Guede Pedro Antonio Gonzalez Héctor Ricardo Guede Regino Adolfo González Sandaña Eduardo Guerci Silvia Amanda Gonzalez de Mora Alicia Margarita Guerrero Socorro Irene Gonzalez Carlos Francisco Guidet Sánchez Susana Gonzalez de Weisz Raul Alfredo Guido Susana Raquel González Florencia Guillén Víctor Hugo González Lemos Salvador Jorge Gullo Silvia Beatriz Goñi de Rossi Jorge Luis Gurrea Jorge Israel Gorfinkiel Manuel Gutiérrez Daniel Gorosito Norberto A. Habbeger Alberto Jorge Gorrini Dagmar Hagelin Francisco Eduardo Gotschlich Cordero Fernando Hallgarten María Esther Goulecdzian Celia Ester Hanono Hugo Alberto Goyenetche Alejandro Alfredo Hansen Adela Noemí Goyochea Luisa Ana Heck De Barciocco José Luis GoyocheaMiguel Ángel Hernán Jorge Henríquez Gradaschi Camano Juan Marcos Herman Sara Grande Eduardo Alberto Hernández Claudio Nicolás Grandi José Hernández Javier Gustavo Grebel Libobich 136

Juan H. Hernandez Zaspe Saturnino Vicente Ianni Reinaldo Ariel Hernández Luis Armando Ibañez Abel Herrera Luisa Ana Ibañez Claudio Daniel Herrera Nancy Norma Ibáñez Leonor Ines Herrera Roberto Aníbal Ibánez Juan Domingo Herrera Miguel Ibarbe Máximo Fernando Herrera Justo César Ibarguren Miguel Gerónimo Herrera Emilio Antonio Ibarra Nestor Ubaldo Herrera Raúl Alberto Iglesias Roberto Justo Herrera Bernardo Ignace Rosa Dalia Herrera Ignacio Ikonikoff Jose Luis Herrero Armando Imas Jairo de Jesús Herrón Fernández Daniel Alfredo Inama Amelia Higa Adolfo Luis Infante Allende Juan Carlos Higa Jorge Rosalino Infantino Andrés Ernesto Hirschler Liliana Iorio Carlos Alberto Hobert Silvia Mabel Isabella Valenzi Oscar Luis Hodola José Luis Isla Oscar Omar Hofer Ismael Alfredo Islas Ibarra Victor Hugo Hofer Martín Alfredo Islas Alberto Hojman Trainoff Teresa Israel Miguel Angel Horton Claudia Istueta Julia Natividad Huarque Alexis Jaccard Siegler Francisco Host Venturi Ricardo Ramón Jacobe Susana Noemi Huarte Martinez María Carolina Jacue Patricia Huchansky de Simó Susana Rosa Jacué Norma Susana Huder de Prado Angel Gustavo Jaeggi Díaz Oscar Lautaro Hueravilo Noemi Jansenson

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Luis Adolfo Jaramillo Carlos Cayetano La Rosa María del Carmen Jaramillo Nora Susana La Spina Máximo Eduardo Jaroslavsky Carlos Alberto Labolita Rolando Hugo Jeckel Miguel Angel Labrador Pérez Maurice Jeger Gustavo Horacio Lafleur Alejandro E. Jerez Bordeau Monica Silvia Lafuente Victor Jerez Teresita Leoni Lagger De Marenda Ramona Berta Jimenez Alberto Carlos Lago Juan Carlos Jordán Vercellone Fernando Juan Lagos Esteban Bonifacio Juarez Oscar Alejandro Lagrotta Máximo José Juárez Leonor Rosario Landaburu de Catnich Telba Juárez Mabel Landi Sergio León Kacs Martín Ramón Landin Elena Kalaidjian Ana Maria Lanzillotto de Menna Julio Kalejman Maria Cristina Lanzillotto de Santillan Cecilio Kamenetzky Guillermo Antonio Lara Elisabeth Kasemann Electra Irene Lareu Vieira de Belaustegui Marlene Katherine Kegler Krug Juan José Laso Gloria Kehoe Wilson Omar Enrique Lauria Jorge Oscar Kofman Zeigner Enzo Lauroni Carlos Antonio Koks Hugo Anibal Lavalle Alfredo Arturo Kölliker Frers Patricia Emilia Lazzeri Eduardo Sergio Korsunsky Beatriz Le Fur José Kreplak Heriberto del Carmen Leal Sanhueza Irene Krichmar de Butrón Nestor José Ledesma Yocca Jorge Arturo Kuhn Alberto Agapito Ledo Pedro La Blunda José Luis Leduc Jorge José La Cioppa Hilda Leikis de Alvarez 138

Eduardo Raúl Leguizamón Carlos López Miguel Angel Leguizamon Eduardo Néstor López Carlos Alberto Leinbock Felix Daniel López Saracco Adán Rodolfo Leiva Héctor Enrique López María Delia Leiva Héctor María López Matheu Augusto María Lenzi José Manuel Lopez Susana Leonardi de Nievas Leopoldo Omar López Roberto Omar Leonardo María Cristina López Guerra de Belaustegui Lucio Leone Mirta Graciela Lopez Pablo Armando Lepiscopo Mirtha Gladys López Ana María Lescano Néstor López Fornes Arturo Alberto Lescano Ramón Francisco López Luis Alejandro Lescano Ricardo Ernesto López María Amelia Lesgart Roberto Raúl López Rogelio Anibal Lesgart Rosa Ceferina López Jorge Claudio Lewi Urbano López Fernández Néstor Abel Leyes Carlos Alberto Lorenzo Julio Roberto Liano Clara Josefina Lorenzo Tillard Susana Libedinsky María Esther Lorusso Lammle Manuel Liberoff Alberto Isidro Losada Daniel Eduardo Linares Luque Juan Carlos Losoviz Oscar Andrés Liñeira Daniel Roberto Loto Zurita Patricio Guillermo Lobo José Teodoro Loto Zurita Claudio Logares Roberto Mario Loyola Ricardo Lois Carlos Alberto Lucantis María Cristina Lonardi de Cravello Rodolfo Guillermo Luccioni Adrián Sergio López Federico Gerardo Ludden Lehmann Celia López Alonso Cesar Lugones 139

Hugo Julián Luna Olga Yolanda Mamani Ignacio Jesús Luna Sánchez Beatriz Ofelia Mancebo Juan Manuel Luna José Manfredi Olga Luteral Juan Santiago Mangini Raúl Alfredo Llanes Alejandro Pedro Mansilla Ramón Antonio Llanivelli Rojas Liliana Mansilla Carlos Llerena Rosas Ricardo Hugo Manuele Sebastián María Llorens Daniel Aldo Manzotti Noemí Beatriz Macedo Adriana Claudia Marandet Bobes de Ruival Celia Sara Machado de Rébori Carlos Ruben Marcón Esteban Abundio Machado Américo Jorge Marchetti Modesto Humberto Machado Angel Dante Marchi Bena Luis Norberto Macor Elizabeth Patricia Marcuzzo Graciela Macrenzic Nora Beatriz Mardikiand de Cabello Jorge Angel Machuca Muñoz Juan Carlos Mardikiand Armando Madariaga Antolin Félix Oscar Marelli Patricia Rossana Maddalena de Romero Cecilia Marfortt de Trod Juan Pablo Maestre Arturo José Margaride Goyos Walter Ramón Magallanes Hector Marghetich Carlos Horacio Magariños Adolfo Margutti Horacio Domingo Maggio Daniel Enrique Mariani Miguel Ángel Magnarelli Francisco Eduardo Marín María Cecilia Magnet Ferrero de Tamburini Juan Carlos Marín Roberto Maimone Juan Marinaro Dominga Antonia Maisano de Loyola Eduardo Aníbal Marino Jorge Eduardo Malberti Risso Enrique Julio Marino Hugo Armando MalozowskiAlicia Andrés Marizcurrena Mallea Juan Patricio Maroni 140

María Beatriz Maroni Bibiana Martini de Adur Arturo Gustavo Marotta Juan Francisco Martinis Liliana Alicia Marchetti de Araujo Pedro Oscar Martucci Irma Beatriz Márquez Heraldo Juan Marucco Luis Ernesto Marquez Leonor Gertrudis Marx Pinkus Cristina Lucía Marrocco Monica Masri Susana Marrocco Alejandro Daniel Masriera Julio Antonio Martin Ricardo Alberto Massa Melita Ruth Martín Carrasco Hugo Massucco Laura Susana Martinelli de Oliva Martino Mastinu Adriana Martinez Perez Marta Zelmira Mastrogiácomo Alfredo Guillermo Martínez Alejandro Ángel Mastrogiovanni Ana María Martínez Abel Héctor Mateu Gallardo Atilio Cesar Martínez Lagrava Raúl Humberto Mattarollo Olmos César Carlos Martínez Roberto Jorge Matthews Eduardo Alberto Martínez María Cristina Mattioli de Torterau Elsa Martínez de Ramírez Orlando Maturano Héctor Luis Martínez Nora Luisa Maurer Horacio Martinez María Angélica Mayor de Rosales Jorge Alberto Martínez Abelleida Vicente Jorge Mazzitelli José Agustín Martínez Agüero Winston César Mazzuchi Frantches José Alberto Martínez César Alfredo Mecking José Mario Martínez Suárez María Graciela Médici María Luisa Martínez de González Angel Alfonso Medina Gutiérrez Rocío Ángela Martínez Gustavo Medina Ortiz Segundo Luis Martínez Oscar Alberto Medina Susana M. Martinez Wasserman Roberto Luis Medina Ubaldo Nieves Martínez Susana B. Medina de Bertholet

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Hugo Alberto Megna Asunción del Carmen Meza Delfor Manuel Meira Sabino Meza Norma Hilda Melani Alberto Daniel Miani Nebio Ariel Melo Cuesta Daniel Bernardo Micucci Graciela Mellibovsky Saidler Viviana Micucci Helvio Alcides Mellino Mónica María Candelaria Mignone Antonio Mendez Guillermo Augusto Miguel Jorge Omar Méndez Trejo Silvia Emilia Miguens José Delineo Mendez Nilda Miguez de Molina Orlando Reneé Mendez Pablo Antonio Miguez Pedro Alberto Mendez Rosa Leonor Millan de Sosa Carlos María MendozaJorge Mendoza Cecilia Laura Minervini Calderón Francisco Natalio Mirabelli Mario Eduardo Menéndez Haydee Lucía Miralles Domingo Menna Luis Ernesto Miramon Eduardo Ezequiel Merajver Bercovich Oscar Miranda Mario Miguel Mercader Raúl Miranda Adela Del Carmen Mercado Susana Elvira Miranda Gladys del Valle Mercado Paez Mirta Misetich María del Valle Mercado Amalia Clotilde Moavro Manuel Antonio Mercado Adolfo Rubén Moldavsky María Leonor Mercuri Monzó Marcela Esther Molfino Rodolfo Antonio Merediz Dardo Francisco Molina Dante Aníbal Merolla Domingo Calisto Molina Moya Fernando Salvador Merolla Jesús Juan Carlos Molina Alicia Norma Meroño Jorge Carlos Molina Diego Eugenio Merzbacher Schorr Jorge Luis Molina Rubén "Tito" Messiez José María Molina Raúl Eugenio Metz 142

Raúl Mateo Molina Jorge Horacio Moreno Guillermo Mario Molinillo Nélida Noemi Moreno de Goyochea Liliana Edith Molteni Pedro Francisco Moresi Luis Carlos Mónaco Ester Moretti José Manuel Monteagudo Roberto Morillo Mariano Carlos Montequín Luis Rodolfo Morina Jung Roald Montes Miguel Angel Morini Stella Maris Montesano de Ogando Norberto Julio Morresi Leonardo Amador Montesinos Raúl Oscar Mortola María Virginia Monzani de Andisco Jorge Teodoro Mosqueda Edy Luis Santiago Monzon Novena Antonio Juan Mosquera José Reinaldo Monzón Rubén Hugo Motta Juan Carlos Mora Toni Agatina Motta Alejandro Manuel Morales Jorge Horacio Moura José Ramon Morales Eusebio Jesús Mouriño González José Silvano Morales Miguel Ángel Moussegne Julio César Morales Ricardo Alfredo Moya Luis Alberto Morales Alfredo Moyano Santander Mercedes del Valle Morales Eduardo Horacio Moyano Mónica Morán Ana María Mrad de Medina Ariel Eduardo Morandi María Josefina Mujica Héctor Victorio Morandi Alberto José Munarriz Susana Carmen Moras Luis Munitis Orione María Rosa Moreira de Fernández Agustina Muñiz Paz Fidela Morel Diego Muñiz Barreto Pedro Crisólogo Morel María Dolores Muniz Etchemoun Carlos Alberto Moreno Santa Muratore de Lepere Graciela Moreno Eduardo Jorge Murillo Jeansen

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Rosa Angélica Murno Juan Angel Nughes Gladys Noemí Musante Felix Edgardo Núñez Julio Argentino Mussi Roque Miguel Nuñez Pablo Daniel Musso Roque Nuñez Gregorio Nachman Victor Hugo Nuñez Pedro Luis Nadal García Rosa Adela Oberti De Soriano Carmen Liliana Nahs de Bruzzone Sauro Antonio Obreque Jorge Miguel Name Claudio Melquiades Ocampo Alonso Claudio Norberto Nardini Carlos Abel Ocerin Fernández Dina Nardone Beatriz Marta Oesterheld Cristina Navajas de Santucho Diana Irene Oesterheld Eduardo Navajas Jauregui Estela Inés Oesterheld María Victoria Navajas Jáuregui Héctor Germán Oesterheld Julio Alfredo Navarro Marina Oesterheld Alicia Irene Naymark Gabe Emilio Horacio Ogando Paulo Alberto Nazaro Gustavo Ogando Gibello Raquel Negro Jorge Oscar Ogando Beatriz Haydee Neuhaus de Martinis Carlos Alberto Oliva Adriana Silvia Nieto Carlos Delfin Oliva Juan Mateo Nieto Leticia M. Oliva de Méndez Marcos Eugenio Nieva Rafael Olivera Oscar Rene Nieva Raúl Pedro Olivera Cancela Mario Alberto Nivoli Roberto Héctor Olivestre Alberto Teodoro Noailles Gloria Martha Olivieri Ramos Graciela Mirta Nogueira de Ricny Gustavo Gabriel Olmedo María de Lourdes Noia de Mezzadra José Horacio Olmedo Fernando Pablo Nolasco Gary Nelson Olmos Guzmán Rosa Eugenia Novillo Corvalan Chris Anna Olson Latta

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Inés Ollero Alberto Paira (M) Juan Carlos Ontivero José Serapio Palacio Eduardo O'Neill Rubén Amadeo Palazzesi Alicia Nora Oppenheimer Norberto Hugo Palermo Miguel Iván Orellana Castro Hugo Alberto Palmeiro Alberto Marcelo Oro Mario Oscar Paluci Daniel Franciso Orozco Osvaldo C. Paludi Rodolfo Ortega Peña Antonio Pandolfino Blanca Esther Ortiz de Murua Julio Enzo Panebianco Labbe Ramón Antonio Ortiz Enrique Pankonin Abis Rodolfo Ortiz Escobar Jorge Edgardo Papadopulos Jorge Eduardo Oshiro Jorge Emilio Papetti Oscar Oshiro Luján Susana Papic Pablo Osorio Juan Carlos Parada Susana Elena Ossola de Urrua Adolfo Paredes David Manuel Ostrowiecki José Alfredo Pareja Galviati Lidia Neptalis Otarola Hugo Alberto Parente María Cristina Otarola Alberto José Pargament Alfredo Outon Silvina Mónica Parodi de Orozco Héctor Rafael Ovejero Patricia Elida Parreira Victor Humberto Ovejero Silvana Parrile de Salinas Eduardo Oviedo Morales Otilio Julio Pascua Raúl Enrique Oxley Gustavo Pasik Mario Daniel Oyarzabal Aida Alicia Pastarini Roberto Simón Ozorio Alberto Manuel Pastor Coca Pablo Héctor Mario Patino Víctor Hugo Paciaroni Costanza Paz Vicente Padín Pillado Raúl Santiago Paz

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Enrique Carlos Pecoraro Benjamín Pérez Luis Hugo Pechien Navarro Carlos Alberto Pérez Josefina Teresa Pedemonte de Ruiz Carlos Alberto Pérez Vargas Eugenio Carlos Pérez Horacio Vital Pedraza Félix Jorge Pérez Susana Elena Pedrini Jorge Eduardo Pérez Brancatto Eugenio Roberto Pedrozo Jorge Enrique Pérez Catán Juan Pegoraro Juan Carlos Pérez Susana Beatriz Pegoraro Julio Enrique Pérez Andrade Justo José Pelozo Marcos Antonio Pérez Juan Carlos Pellegrini Druetto Ricardo Adrián Pérez Luis Roberto Pender Walter Teófilo Pérez Loza Hugo Reinaldo Penino Graciela Pernas Isidoro Peña Jorge Luis Perón Jesus Peña Guillermo Perot Juan Roger Peña Saenz Rafael Andrés Perrota Eustaquio Peralta Susana Pertierra Luis Alfredo Peralta José Carlos Perucca Piacenzi María Ester Peralta de Zalazar María Elena Peter de Fioritti Oscar Alcides Peralta Nilda Graciela Peters Silvia Peralta de Ferreyra Angel Julio Petraglia Berta Perassi Roberto Francisco Piasecki María del Carmen Percivati Franco Félix Eduardo Picardi Ana María Rita Perdighe Aurora Valentina Pico de Garbarino María Luisa Peredo María Luisa Piedra Gómez Stella Maris Pereiro de Gonzalez Ana María Piffaretti Liliana Carmen Pereyra Alejandro Víctor Pina Alicia Isabel Pérez de Astorga Miguel Angel Pincheira Ana María del Carmen Pérez 146

Ángel Mario Pinedo Segundo Oscar Porven Lucia Elena Pinto Adriana Silvia Prack José Oscar Pintos Angel Alberto Prado Mónica Susana Pinus de Binstok Sergio Guillermo Prado Cora María Pioli José Carlos Prat Jorge Luis Piotti Raúl Horacio Premat Elba Beatriz Pirola de Rivelli Armando Prieto Alonso Julio Luis Piriz Salvatore Privitera Liliana Pizá de Paira Alberto Armando Pruneda Cristina Isabel Planas Nicolás Puca Osvaldo Plaul Jorge Alberto Pucci Souza Juan Domingo Plaza Norma Lidia Puerto de Risso Julio Poce Juan Daniel Puigjané Ricardo Poce Luis Enrique Pujals Celicia Podolsky de Bronzel Jorge Gabriel Pujol Horacio Norberto Poggio Graciela Pujol de Olmedo Miguel Alfredo Poinsteau Neuman Alicia Mabel Queiro Héctor Osvaldo Polito Washington D Queiro Uzal Victor José Polti Graciela Irene Quesada Alberto Santos Ponce Carlos Quieto Ana Maria Ponce Roberto Quieto Francisco Gregorio Ponce María Ester Quignard Griselda del Huerto Ponce Silvia Mónica Quintela Mercedes Gerardo Ponce Jorge Alberto Quinterno Sabatini Sara Isabel Ponti Jorge Alberto Quinteros Gladys del Valle Porcel de Puggioni Pedro Ernesto Quiñones Ada Victoria Porta Julio César Quiroga Miguel Ángel Porta María Josefina Quiroga de Murúa

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Enrique Raab Beatriz Recchia Orlando Luis Raffo Juan Enrique Reggiardo Miguel Ragone Yolanda Dolores Reguera Brites Rodolfo Armando M. Ragucci Esteban Alfredo Reimer Jorge Daniel Raies Eduardo Lucio Renedo Jaime Abraham Ramallo Chavez Alejandra Magdalena Renou Adolfo Agustín Ramírez Luis Alberto Rentani Alicia Beatriz Ramirez Abella de Lidia Elena Renzi Cassataro Hebe Nelly Repetto Bárbara Ramírez Plante Maria del Carmen Repetto Elba Leonor Ramírez Abella de Nestor Omar Repetto Baibiene Raúl Repetto Héctor Eduardo Ramírez Eduardo Requena Hernán Ramírez Liliana Beatriz Retegui Oscar Aníbal Ramírez Mario Horacio Revoledo Rosario Victoria Ramírez de Vega Lucila Adela Révora Eduardo Ramos Mejía Eduardo Raimundo Rey José Eduardo Ramos Manuel Zoilo Reyes Juan Carlos Ramos López Hugo Javier Rezeck Noemí Concepción Ramos Ariel Ricetti Susana Beatríz Ramos de Bidegorry Guillermo Eduardo Ricny Horacio Rapaport Carlos Alberto Rincón Barber Osvaldo Raúl Ravasi Deganutti Luis Anselmo Ricciardino Ricardo Arturo Rave Miguel Angel Río Casas María Teresa Ravignani Jaime Nury Riquelme Gangas Augusto Rebagliati Daniel Jorge Risso Alfredo Mauricio Reboredo Guillermo Daniel Ritter Rosenfeld Humberto Antonio Rébori José Filemón Rivadeneira Jorge Lucio Rébori

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Miguel Angel Rivadeneira Tristán Omar Roldán Roberto Abel Rivelli Norberto Miguel Rollán Llull Carlos. A Rizzo Molina Carmen Candela Román de Iglesias Oscar Alberto Rizzo Nicolas Miguel Angel Roman Emilio Roa Espinoza Benito Vicente Romano Gaston Jose Robles Toledo Humberto Nicolas Romano Julio Secundino Robles Daniel Oscar Romanutti Rubén Francisco Roca Alfredo Romay Méndez Antonio Eulogio Rocha Graciela Alicia Romero de Metz Néstor Rodas Jorge Luis Romero Abraham Eulogio Rodríguez Laura Gladis Romero Alicia Rodriguez Saenz de Bourg Mario Osvaldo Romero Ambrosio Abraham Rodriguez Orlando Diego Romero Carlos Esteban Rodríguez Pedro Antonio Romero Eduardo José Rodríguez Roberto Julio Romero Gustavo Adrián Rodríguez Toribia Romero de Morales Hector Hugo Rodriguez Ana María Rómoli José Luis Rodríguez Diéguez Rodolfo Alberto Ron Juan Antonio Rodríguez Jorge Osvaldo Rondoletto Cenador Luis Cristobal Rodriguez Burgos Pedro Rondoletto Marcelo Mario Rodríguez Silvia Margarita Rondoletto Cenador Mario Germán Rodríguez Carlos Rafael Rosales Miguel Agustin Rodriguez Scagliotti Francisco Prospero Rosales Nora Rodríguez Jurado de Olivera Walter Claudio Rosenfeld Ruben Desiderio Rodriguez Raul Alberto Rossini Carlos Maria Roggerone Néstor Adolfo Rovegno Jorge Mario Roitman Ana Rubel de Castro Blas Mario Rojas Horacio Alberto Rubino

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Raquel Rubino Rubén Gerardo Salinas Pablo Gustavo Rueda Jorge Alberto Salite Jorge Luis Ruffa Cecilia Noemí Salomone Eduardo Edelmiro Ruival Heraldo Miliciades Salvatierra Fidelino Werter Ruiz Carlos Ángel Salles Flores Raul Ricardo Ruiz José Ricardo San Martín Ubaldo Fidel Ruiz Jorge San Vicente Prieto Daniel Lázaro Rus Alberto Esteban Sánchez Cristobal Constantino Russo Elena Sánchez de Rapetti Graciela Rutilo Artes Elizabeth Graciela Sánchez Julio César Saavedra Enrique Angel Sanchez Guido Arturo Saavedra Inostroza Fernando Sanchez Maria del Carmen Sabino Gladys Ascención Sanchez Caceres Nidia Beatriz Saens María Teresa Sánchez Hugo Alberto Sáez Mario Valerio Sánchez Ricardo Enrique Saibene Miguel Benancio Sánchez Alberto Said Santiago Sánchez Viamonte Eduardo Said Eduardo Antonio Sanjurjo Adrián Saidón Néstor Julio Sanmartino Edgardo Sajón Norberto Daniel Sant' Angelo Rene Rufino Salamanca Manuel Alberto Santamaría Ángela Alicia Salamone Juan Carlos Santamarina Diego Arturo Salas Sandro Santana Alcaraz Castillo Hector Ivan Salas Carlos Santillan Alfredo Daniel Salgado Luis Agustin Santillan Carlos Juan Salim Chalfoun Mario Luis Santini Jorge Luis Salinas Héctor Vicente Santos Ricardo Luis Salinas Iris Margarita Santos

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Francisco René Santucho Jorge Alejandro Segarra Acuña Heldy Rubén Santucho Laura Beatriz Segarra Acuña Maria del Valle Santucho Arlene Seguel Mario Roberto Santucho Andres Seguil Mercedes Elmina Santucho Daniel Armando Segura Mónica Graciela Santucho Victor Eduardo Seib Simon Angel Sapag Alberto Oscar Seindus Héctor Saraceno Alberto Semar Jorge Antonio Saravia Acuña Gregorio Marcelo Sember Beatriz Sarti Eduardo Aníbal Serrano Antonio Mario Sasso Raúl Alberto Serrano Juan Miguel Satragno Ingrid Sidaravicius de Avena Guillermo Savloff Miguel Angel Siddi José Alberto Scaccheri Enrique Sierra José Rolando ScaddingRuben Oscar Mirta Silber de Perez Scardavilla Kleber Mauricio Silva Iribarne Garay Alicia Noemi Sciutto de Duclos Luis Ismael Silva Hugo Alberto Scutari Bellizzi Néstor Eduardo Silva Daniel Marcelo Schapira Patricia Silvia Silberstein José Francisco Schiller Mury Georgina Simerman Norma Alicia Schipani de Sasso Carlos Francisco Simón Miguel Ángel Schlatter Roberto Juan Carmelo Sinigaglia Juan Alberto Schudel Alfredo Felipe Sinopoli Miguel Schwartz Norma Sintora Maglione de Solsona Diego Hernando Secaud Merlo Elena Siskopoulos Porras de Castillo Carolina Sara Segal de Rovegno Adolfo Skof Oscar Eduardo Segal Claudio Alberto Slemenson Wilber Guillermo Oscar Segalli Barsottini Salvador Sliba Alicia Estela Segarra Acuña 151

Samuel Leonardo Slutzky Rubén Alberto Stockdale Oscar Smith Daniel Alberto Strada Juan Marcelo Soler Guinard Eduardo Suárez María Cristina Solís de Marín Fidelia Nora Suárez Pedro Solís Hugo Alberto Suárez Ricardo Daniel Somaini Ignacio Antonio Suarez Ana María Sonder de Lewi José Luis Suárez Alejandro Renato Sonini Juan Carlos Suárez Roberto Ismael Sorba Julio Everto Suárez Federico Guillermo Soria Nacif Omar Gedalio Suárez Roque Angel Soriano Petrona del C. Suarez de Cordero Antonio Sosa Roberto Daniel Suárez Barrera Daniel Ernesto Sosa Virginia Adela Suarez Dora Nélida Sosa de Cruz Carlos Adolfo Surraco Britos Jose Antonio Sosa Jorge Víctor Sznaider Juan Carlos Sosa Gomez Rodolfo Eduardo Taboada Luis Alberto Sosa Victor Manuel Taboada María del Carmen Sosa de Piotti Gaby Taborga Carvajal de Leyes Delfor Santos Soto Manuel Ascencio Tajan Olga Silvia Souto Castillo Juan Takara Higa Marta Alicia Spagnoli de Vera Antonio Tamayo Carlos Osvaldo Spataro Manuel Jesus Tamayo Martinez Horacio Rodolfo Speratti Guillermo Tamburini Miguel Angel Serafin Spinella Raúl Francisco Tapia Hernández Carlos Alberto Squeri "Cali" Irma Noemí Tardivo de Ghigliazza Gustavo Eduardo Stati Lucía Rosalinda Victoria Tartaglia Ana Patricia Steimberg Manuel Antonio Tartalo Mario Alfredo Stirnemann Adriana Elsa Tasada de Megna

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Adriana Leonor Tasca Juana Torres Federico Tatter Luis Eduardo Torres José Antonio Tejero Pablo Torres Ricardo Alberto Tellez Hugo Ramon Torreta Marcelo Rodolfo Tello Fernando Alberto Torrez Pablo Daniel Tello Mario Luis Torterau Rafael Armando Tello Luis Tossi Gisela Lidia Tenembaum Pablo David Trejo Vallejos Nestor Tere Elisa Triana de Salas Carlos Enrique Tereszecuk Diana Miriam Triay de Llorens Diana Esmeralda Teruggi de Mariani Francisco Tripiana Mónica Beatriz Teszkiewicz Jorge Luis Trod Jose Antonio Teves Sergio Pedro Trod Enrique Thilman Hooguen Eduardo Héctor Trombini Alfredo Mario Thomas Molina María Teresa Trotta de Castelli Miguel Ángel Tierno Emilce Magdalena Trucco María Felisa Tirinanzi Sergio Fernando Tula Francisco Enrique Tiseira Oscar Arturo Udabe Claudio Arturo Tisminetzky Juan Ukmar Lorenzo Homero Tobar Avilés Eva Silvia Ullman de Casoy Oscar Alfredo Toledo Torres Nilsa Urquía María Rosa Tolosa de Reggiardo María Susana Ursi de Eggers Osvaldo Leopoldo Tomás Inés Magdalena Uhalde Maria Esther Tommasi Héctor Alfonso Uribe María Graciela Toncovich Felipe Arturo Urueña Alvarez Irene Laura Torrents Oscar Julian Urra Ferrarese Hilda Argentina Torres Montenegro Elena Graciela Vacas de Fortunato Juan Carlos Torres Olga Liliana Vaccarini de Rodríguez

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Marta Inés Vaccaro de Deria María Rosa Vedoya de Suárez Gustavo Alberto Vaisman Hugo Arnaldo Vega Roberto Adolfo Val Joaquín Vega Alfredo Valcarce Soto José Blas Vega Osvaldo Valdez José Vicente Vega Silvio Mario Valderrama María Luisa Vega Graciela Valdueza Miguel Francisco Velásquez Edgar Tulio Valenzuela Catalina Martha Velazco de Morini Felix Valero Ricardo Horacio Veleda Darío Miguel Valiño Alberto Jorge Vendrell María Mercedes Valiño Víctor Vicente Veneziano Graciela Vallejo Rosalba Vensentini Adriana Vera Vanella Boll Francisco A. Ventimiglia María del Carmen Vanella Boll José Pablo Ventura Pedro Varas Franco Venturi José Manuel Varela Juan Carlos Vera María Vargas Bustamante de Rueda Roberto Miguel Vera Barros David Horacio Varsavsky Leticia Andrea Veraldi Jorge Omar Vásquez Graciela Cristina Verdecanna de Carricondo Daniel Omar Vattino Luis Alberto Verdú María Marta Vásquez Edgardo Justino Vergara Graciela Beatriz Vázquez Hilda Zulma Vergara de Buffa Harry José Vázquez Mercedes Rosa Verón José Antonio Vázquez Fernández Juan Carlos Vicario María Esther Vásquez de García Miguel José Viceconte Noemí Vazquez de Moresi Eduardo Luis Vicente Néstor Guillermo Vázquez Núñez Héctor Alberto Vidal Victorio Vazquez Luis Hernan Videla Aguilera 154

Abel Luis Vigo Hanna Edla Wayrynen de Hietala Jose Salvador Vila Bustos Irene Diana Wechsler Juan de Dios Vila Mauricio Weinstein Ercilia Vilar Pallas Azize Weiss Carmen Rosa Vilte de Loker Marcelo Weisz Marina Vilte Tilo Wenner Mario Juan Villa Colombo Máximo Ricardo Wettengel Patricia Villa de Suárez Roberto Alejandro Wilson Juan Carlos Villafañe Bena Nora Irene Wolfson Alicia Romelia Villalba Silvia Haydee Wollert Maria Ines Villalobos Ventura Hugo José Yacopetti Ana María Villanueva Jorge Eugenio Yanes Fernando Villanueva Andrea Yankilevich Patricia Gabriela Villar Claudia Yankilevich Jorge Rafael Villarreal Julio Cesar Yañez Jorge Antonio Villegas Arpi Seta Yeramian Rubén Argentino Villeres Emilio Yoshimiya Nelida Cristina Viñales Carlos Alberto Yunk Cecilia Viñas Moreno de Penino María de las Mercedes Zabala Lorenzo Ismael Viñas Roberto Omar Zaffora Leopoldo Vodopovidez Haydee Noemí Zagaglia Freddi Hugo Diego Vodovosoff Jose Raul Zapata Carlos Eduardo Wagner Juan Ramón Zaragoza Felisa Violeta Wagner Néstor Omar Zaragoza Ricardo Daniel Waisberg Ramon Alfredo Zarate Enrique Walker Ricardo Héctor Zatylny Rizzo Orlando Walker Julia Elena Zavala de Reynal O'Connor Rodolfo Walsh Juan Carlos Zeballos

155

Claudio Manfredo Zieschank Cilon da Cunha Brun Irma Angela Zucchi Ciro Flávio Oliveira Salazar Lidia Alicia Zunino de Rossini Custódio Saraiva Neto Alejo Zurita Daniel José de Carvalho Claudio Zurita Daniel Ribeiro Calado Maria Rosa Zurita David Capistrano da Costa Sergio Zurita Denis Antônio Casemiro Dermeval da Silva Pereira Brazil Dinaelsa Soares Santana Coqueiro Adriano Fonseca Fernandes Filho Dinalva Oliveira Teixeira Aluizio Paihano Pedreira Ferreira Divino Ferreira de Souza Ana Rosa Kucinski Silva Durvalino de Souza André Crabois Edgar de Aquino Duarte Antônio "Alfaiate" Eduardo Collier Filho Antônio Aifredo Campos Elmo Corrêa Antônio Carlos Monteiro Teixeira Elson Costa Antônio Guilherme Ribeiro Ribas Ezequias Bezerra da Rocha Antônio Joaquim Machado Félix Escobar Sobrinho Antônio de Pádua Costa Fernando Augusto de Santa Cruz Oliveira Antônio Teodoro de Castro Gilberto Olfmpio Maria Arildo Valadão Guilherme Gomes Lund Armando Teixeira Frutuoso Heleni Pereira Teles Guariba Áurea Eliza Pereira Valadão Helenira Rezende de Souza Nazareth Ayrton Adalberto Mortati Hélio Luiz Navarro de Magalhães Bergson Gurjão de Farias Hiram de Lima Pereira Caiuby Alves de Castro Honestino Monteiro Guimarães Carlos Alberto Soares de Freitas Humberto Albuquerque Câmara Neto Celso Gilberto de Oliveira Idalfsio Soares Aranha Filho 156

leda Santos Delgado Lúcia Maria de Souza Isis Dias de Oliveira Lúcio Petit da Silva Issami Nakamura Okano Luís de Almeida Araújo Itair José Veloso Luís Inácio Maranhão Filho Ivan Mota Dias Luiz Renê Silveira e Silva Jaime Petit da Silva Luíza Augusta Garlippe Jana Moroni Barroso Lourival Paulino Jayme Amorim de Miranda Manuel José Murchis João Alfredo Márcio Beck Machado João Batista Rita Pereda Marco AntOnio Dias Batista João Carlos Haas Sobrinho Maria Augusta Thomáz João Gualberto Maria Célia Corrêa João Massena Melo Maria Lúcia Petit da Silva Joaquim Pires Cerveira Mariano Joaquim da Silva Joel José de Carvaiho Mário Alves de Souza Vieira Joel Vasconcelos dos Santos Maurfcio Crabois Jorge Leal Gonçalves Pereira Miguel Pereira dos Santos José Francisco Chaves Nélson de Lima Piauhy Dourado José Humberto Bronca Nestor Veras José Lavechia Orlando Momente José Lima Piauhy Dourado Orlando Rosa Bonfim Júnior José Maurílio Patrício Osvaldo Orlando da Costa José Montenegro de Lima Paulo César Botelho Massa José Porfirio de Souza Paulo Costa Ribeiro Bastos José Romam Paulo Mendes Rodrigues José Toledo de Oliveira Paulo Roberto Pereira Marques Kleber Lemos da Silva Paulo Stuart Wright Libero Ciancarlo Castiglia Paulo de Tarso Celestino da Silva

157

Pedro Alexandrino de Oliveira Thomas Antônio da Silva Meirelles Netto Pedro Inácio de Araujo Tobias Pereira Junior Ramires Maranhão do Valle Uirassu de Assis Batista Rodolfo de Carvalho Troiano Vandick Reidner Pereira Coqueiro Rosalindo Souza Virgílio Comes da Silva Rubens Beirodt Paiva Vitorino Alves Moitinho Rui Carlos Vieira Berbert Walquiria Afonso Costa Rui Frazão Soares Walter Ribeiro Novais Sérgio Landulfo Furtado Walter de Souza Ribeiro Stuart Edgar Angel Jones Wilson Silva Suely Yomiko Kanayama

Telma Regina Cordeiro Corrêa

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Vita

DAKOTA THOMAS

EDUCATION

The University of Kentucky Lexington, KY Graduated 2016 Degree M.A. in Political Science

The University of Virginia’s College at Wise Wise, VA Graduated 2013 Degrees B.A. in Government B.S. in Psychology

PEER REVIEWED WORKS

• “Los estudios sobre género y política en América Latina” / “Studies on Gender and Politics in Latin America” (full-text in Spanish). With Tiffany Barnes and Greg Saxton. Book chapter in La política comparada en América Latina, Simón Pachano and Santiago Basabe (editors). Forthcoming. • “Women’s Representation in Governmental Office in Latin America”. With Tiffany Barnes and Greg Saxton. In Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science. Ed. Sandy Maisel. Oxford University Press. 2018. • “Women’s Political Activism and Civic Engagement in Latin America.” With Tiffany Barnes, Greg Saxton, and Victoria Beall. In Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science. Ed. Sandy Maisel. New York: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS

• 2017 – Sidney Ulmer Graduate Student Research Paper Award - $100 • 2017 – Ken and Mary Sue Coleman Graduate Student Summer Fellowship - $1500 • 2016 – Prestage-Cook Travel Award – SPSA Travel Award - $300 • 2015 – Summer Research Grant – OPSVAW - $1500

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