NATO and Euro-Atlantic Architecture in the Second Clinton Administration

New Members, New Missions 339 Chapter 15 New Members, New Missions: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Architecture in the Second Clinton Administration Daniel S. Hamilton With the advent of President Clinton’s second term, the evolving security architecture entered a new phase. The essential premise of U.S. strategy—that the United States, as a “European power,” needed to help engineer a new interlocking architecture that could anchor a Europe that was whole, free and at peace—had become foundational to operational policies as well as public statements by the President and senior officials. Progress had been made on each element of the emerging architecture during the Administration’s first term. The prospect of walking through the doors of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions had ac- celerated aspirants’ efforts to strengthen democratic institutions; make sure soldiers served civilians, not the other way around; and resolve lingering ethnic and border disputes.1 With little fanfare, some small steps toward integration had been taken; 17 European countries had joined the Council of Europe, and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had acceded to the OECD. Nonetheless, there was no room for complacency. From Bosnia to Chechnya, more Europeans had died violently in the past five years than in the previous forty-five. Russia’s trajectory remained uncertain. The EU enlargement process seemed stalled. There was very real prospect of renewed bloodshed in the Western Balkans. President Clinton’s new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, im- mediately underscored the urgency of the task. Europe’s democratic revolution was not complete, she said. Much still needed to be done. Right after assuming office she asked me and Tom Malinowski to help her with an Economist piece in her name to set the stage for her inaugu- ral visits to European Allies as Secretary of State, and for decisions the Alliance would have to make over the next six months.2 339 340 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war In the first term, the “how” and “why” of NATO enlargement had been determined. Now the “who” and “when” had to be answered, after which the ratification struggle had to begin. At the same time, the Administration’s promise of a “new NATO” required the Alliance to complete its own internal transformation by streamlining commands, promoting European capabilities and welcoming Spain and potentially France into the integrated military command. The proposal for an At- lantic Partnership Council had to be implemented. Initiatives to inte- grate Russia, through a more robust NATO-Russia partnership and full participation in the G-8, had to move forward. A special relationship with Ukraine was still necessary. It was also clear that NATO could open its door to some, but not yet to all, of the many aspirants seeking to join the Alliance. Already in the Clinton Administration’s first term U.S. officials had been clear that enlargement must naturally begin with the strongest candidates, but that NATO’s next new members would not be its last.3 My long-time friend and colleague Ron Asmus, who had been working informally with Administration officials while outside the Administration at the RAND Corporation, now joined the State Department as Deputy As- sistant Secretary for European Affairs, with responsibility for NATO and European regional political-military affairs. He argued successfully that the Administration’s strategy should be “small is beautiful plus robust Open Door.” This meant that only the strongest candidates should be invited for membership to ensure the principle of continued enlargement would be successfully established. That would pave the way for accession by others after that. This required a proactive strategy to reassure those not in the first wave that the door did indeed remain open to them, and to work together to create the conditions that would let them walk through that door. President Clinton and his foreign policy team were now ready to advance the strategy. Significant decisions were made in a remarkable 44-day period between the May 27,1997 meeting of NATO heads of state and government at the Élysée Palace with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the July 9,1997 NATO summit in Madrid, when leaders formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. As U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter noted, the decisions all reinforced each other: “each was indispensable to the success New Members, New Missions 341 of the others and to the overall creation of a transatlantic security architecture that can succeed.”4 First, the Alliance chose the first new members because they were judged to be the most likely to gain the support of the legislatures in the 16 NATO member states. Administration officials echoed Richard Holbrooke’s mantra: NATO was not a club, it was a military alliance with high standards. Madeleine Albright drove home the point: “the enlargement of NATO must begin with the strongest candidates; oth- erwise it would not begin at all. But when we say that the first new members will not be the last, we mean it. And we expect the new members to export stability eastward, rather than viewing enlargement as a race to escape westward at the expense of their neighbors.” 5 Second, the Alliance affirmed that its door remained open to addi- tional European countries ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership. President Clinton stressed that NA- TO’s next invitations would not be the last. Secretary Perry’s fall 1996 comment set the tone: the answer to those not among the first three was not “no,” it was “not yet.” The Alliance engaged in a new phase of individual dialogues to help aspirants understand the implications of Article 5 responsibilities, work through obstacles to eventual membership, and maintain positive momentum. Third, the Alliance decided to strengthen the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which then embraced 27 countries, including countries that weren’t even part of the Warsaw Pact, including Austria, Finland, Swe- den and Switzerland. Allies agreed to the U.S. proposal for an Atlantic Partnership Council, which they renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partner- ship Council (EAPC), to replace the defunct NACC and become the political voice of the Partnership for Peace: a forum for intensified political and security consultations and decision-making among Allies and partners on common activities. Fourth, the Allies negotiated a NATO-Ukraine Charter and its op- erating arm, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, recognizing tacitly that the future of Ukraine could well be the key to many other Alliance strategic plans and objectives. Fifth, NATO and Russia signed their Founding Act creating a Per- manent Joint Council as the mechanism for Russia-NATO cooperation 342 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war on a range of issues, from peacekeeping and theatre missile defense to nuclear safety, terrorism and disaster relief, all as part of a comprehen- sive and cooperative security architecture.6 NATO reiterated that it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” in the foreseeable future to station nuclear weapons on new members’ soil, but that it may do so should the need arise. NATO further stated that military infrastruc- ture “adequate” to assure new members’ security under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would be maintained on their territory. The Alliance pledged not to place “substantial combat forces” in the “cur- rent and foreseeable security environment” on new members’ territory, but underscored an intention to increase interoperability, integration, and reinforcement capabilities with the new states. In Paris, President Clinton declared that the quest for security in Europe “is not a zero sum game, where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss and Russia’s strength is an Alliance weakness. That is old thinking, these are new times.”7 Sixth, NATO continued its internal adaptation by creating the means to build the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, rather than separate from it, slimming down NATO’s military command structure, reducing the number of headquarters from 65 to 20, preparing forces for operations under the command and control of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters and comparable ar- rangements—one of which was represented by SFOR in Bosnia—and to improve its ability to conduct operations with nonmembers.8 These and related reforms enabled the full integration of Spain into NATO’s military command. France inched closer, although Chirac in the end was not prepared to agree to full reintegration.9 Five months after the Madrid Summit, NATO foreign ministers joined their counterparts from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun- gary and signed the protocols of accession. In that same week, the Eu- ropean Council agreed to begin accession negotiations with the same three countries, as well as Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. The “Litmus Test” Major pieces of the architecture were now in place, but Secretary Albright pushed on the Baltic issue, which she called a “litmus test” of our overall strategy of integration. She said that there was perhaps no New Members, New Missions 343 part of Europe which suffered more from the old politics of the Cold War and the zero-sum philosophy of the Cold War than did the Baltic republics. That was why there could be no better example of our success and the benefits of win-win cooperation than this region—if we got it right. She looked at Ron Asmus at the time and said, “Where is the strategy?” A team of us were put together to develop one. The result was essentially the Baltic Action Plan on steroids.

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