Not Part of the Submission. Commission on the Defence Forces Submission to Commission on the Defence Forces Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission. The background references, are in some way a forceful declaration of my interest in the State, family life, public life, military life with a wide general knowledge of people, military acumen, business, community life combined with a serious leadership interest in local politics. 1. I am very pleased with the balanced membership of the Commission, consisting as it does, of a range of experiences across military, technology based security, strategic planning and government/administration backgrounds. Its composition, without strong political representation, is an acknowledgement of how the Irish State has openly developed as an educated and industrious society, benefiting from improved income levels and greater standards of living, since the State was formed in the aftermath of a terrible Civil War. It is a clear indication from Government that the Commission can be trusted to look forward in its recommendations and not be burdened by the politics of Irish national history. 2. The ravages of Covid 19 Pandemic, Brexit/Northern Ireland and the Ireland/EU political ties, have each brought a focus on what role (s) our State’s Defence Forces should contribute, to ensure a ‘flexible and quick response’, ‘best practice’ and ‘responsibility sharing’, when required. 3. There is little wrong with the brigade formation, rank structuring and locations of our PDF Defence Forces, combining, Air Corps, Navy and Army. The size and population of our State and our expected contribution to UN peace keeping missions can be adequately managed if the strength of the agreed peace-time levels are maintained. There is more than anecdotal evidence available that the Department of Defence and Defence Chiefs, have both been identified as negligent in maintaining constitutionally agreed levels of those forces. The weaknesses of Government, particularly the Department of Finance, in failing to ensure a sufficient strength of forces to substantially assist the State in its hour of need, has to be re- focussed. In such emergencies the role of the Defence Forces, both in the provision of personnel for security, logistics, medical, transport, communications and other services is just as important as are the Bank Institutions. Covid 19; Tributes are obliquely being made to the contribution by elements of the Defence Forces to help curb the rage of CV 19 in Ireland. In my opinion, the contribution has been far short of what it should and could have been. It was simple tokenism here and there, but loudly and amply promoted as if it was a ‘large scale’ contribution. This was purely a Department of Defence move to squeeze the Defence Forces into the much appreciated ‘Front Line Defenders against Covid. to justify its existence. There were role requirements everywhere in Ireland that weighed heavily on other service providers. Such essential services were being manned by other defence forces throughout the free world. Military Plan ‘B’ was nowhere in evidence. The softly referenced refusal of the Department of Justice to provide Gardai, to ensure that people incoming from countries with serious CV problems or new variants, were to be mandatory quarantined in hotel accommodations, was a clear indication that sufficient Gardai were unavailable. The result was that a major Government decision to provide a ‘wall of protection’ for Irish society, could not and was not implemented. Where was ‘Plan B’ to offer Military Police from either PDF or Reserve Forces? There was no capacity available within the Defence Forces. This is more evidence that the Irish Defence Forces are purely a token gesture to security, defence or emergency needs. In other countries the ‘National Guard’ and ‘Gendarmerie’ were evidenced in many different roles apart from ‘security operations’. The most important thing about those ‘evidences’ in other countries was that the presence of the forces, was fully realised, expected and appreciated, as a necessary answer to an emergency situation. In a changing world of political appreciations, the opportunity to present military personnel as ‘front line for the people’, was lost in Ireland. If Ireland had insufficient strength in its defence forces, at a time when even overseas commitments were also curtailed, to provide substantial services on a ‘home front’ level, then there is a ‘negligence factor’ that needs correction for the future. This was not a ‘moment in time’ lapse. The situation has been deteriorating ‘over time’ and during the governance times of several governments. The Department of Defence must realize that The Defence Forces do not belong to the senior officials of that Department or to the Defence Minister but to the State and to the People of the State to be available when emergencies arise. That essential service has not been managed well. Whilst wanting to promote ‘good standard operational procedures’ of most efficient private businesses and professions, to have a percentage coverage in surplus personnel for staff losses or emergency situations, it is of little value to highlight this, as the basic numbers of ‘Establishment’ strengths have not been maintained by the Defence Department, National Government or Military Chiefs. This is shameful and the Covid 19 pandemic of the year 2020/21, predictable Brexit-related troubles and the inability of the Defence Forces to offer worthwhile numbers to the needs for overseas contingents has exposed all three, as poor and ‘low-level’ strategists. Poor Retention Levels; There is an abundance of evidence that many officers, NCOs and other ranks have left the various elements of the DF and have gone to work, with acquired skills, in civilian posts, because of the non-attractiveness of Defence Forces pay and salaries and without the high risk of possible ‘life on the line’ assignments. This ‘life on the line’ is an element of pay & remuneration that should be re-examined, if only to find a reason to award a ‘bridging element bonus’, to lessen the attractiveness of civilian gratuities and bonuses and bring military personnel remuneration above the existing low level wages of younger members. The fact that Irish Defence Forces have never been at war or have never been used to defend the State against outside forces, has been used politically to keep remunerations low. This ignoring of the ‘life risk factor’ should be discontinued and the valuable asset of offering a human barrier to dangers should be introduced and maintained. Armies are not now a means to curbing unemployment. There is now a tolerance and acceptance in Ireland that ‘Full Employment’ has been almost reached. Our nation’s financial position is now far beyond the ‘poverty image’ of bygone years and legislations have been enacted to protect pay and remuneration for other lower paid workers. Why not treat DF personnel in a similar manner? Education Levels; The standard of education levels for school leavers in Ireland have also improved. The Departments of Defence and Finance have paid insufficient attention to the high calibre, high education levels that potential other ranks now have to offer. These, now available, education levels are much the same levels that were required by Cadets to become Officers, some years ago. Potential recruits can now go elsewhere for employment opportunities, with their new education levels Army Apprentice School Trades Education: The Commission needs to obtain validation that the closure of this very important ‘skills academy’ and provider of young professional tradesmen was a correct measure. No Defence Force can exist without these technicians and trades. Skills training on the ‘watching Nellie’ basis has long ceased to exist in favour of ‘focussed and specialist training’. Reserve Defence Forces; The overviews of The Ministers for Finance and Defence on the relative cost of fully staffed Defence Forces is politicised negatively around a public perception of ‘poor value for money’. This is because the Defence Forces are not publicly identified as State Services but as a stand-alone force. To justify the cost of the PDF, the Ministers cut back, ignore and fail to fund or develop the Reserve Forces. Instead the entire Defence Forces Group, should be judged as part of a Combined State Security Service involving Defence Forces, An Garda Siochana, Reserve Forces, and Civil Defence. The Government Ministries of Justice and Defence should be combined under a Ministership for the ‘Interior and Overseas Services’. Gendarmerie Reserve: My recommendation would be that the Reserve Defence Forces should be reformed and trained like the French Gendarmerie and be capable of switching from military to policing duties, when required. Such duties would make The Reserve a full and wholesome volunteer force and able to operate in their own local area. It is vital that State Security Force members, be knowledgeable about all local areas, in order to have a ‘centralised’ big picture. At present, studies will reveal that some volunteers must travel upwards of a two hundred mile round trip, at their own cost, to attend training with the Corps and Unit allocated or previously served. This costly participation would ‘wear out any dedication’ of a volunteer. ‘Volunteers’ in the Reserve Forces seldom join for financial gain and those who continue with a ‘desire to serve’ do so out of a ‘State dedication’, ‘developed comradeships’ and a counter-interest to the ‘day job’. Many bring skills that are not evident or available among most PDF personnel. This is also a vital supplement to PDF strengths. There are also unbelievable social benefits to the State and rarely are members challenged or charged for anti-social or anti-establishment activities. The State needs to have dedicated ‘volunteers’ and ‘pro-establishment’ people amongst the community, for many reasons. Our Reserve Forces need to mirror and portray a changing ‘community composition’ and to allow and welcome new Irish into our Defence Forces as another ‘passport facilitation’ to becoming Irish citizens.