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'Eastern Partnership' – Opening a New Chapter of Polish Eastern Policy And No. 4 THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS June 2008 INSTYTUT SPRAW PUBLICZNYCH ‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening s a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European n Neighbourhood Policy? o i by Agnieszka K. Cianciara n l i Presented jointly by the Polish and Swedish governments, the proposal for ‘Eastern Partnership’ is the first major Polish initiative at the EU forum since accession that has every p chance to become a success due to the extensive consultations that preceded its launch as well as its realistic objectives. O l ‘Eastern Partnership’ constitutes an attempt to place the traditional objectives of Poland’s Eastern policy within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As such, it is a significant policy reversal as regards the ENP, which was previously criticised in Poland for its alleged & ineffectiveness and privileging of the Southern dimension. This reversal is part of a more general attempt by Donald Tusk’s government to ‘Europeanise’ Polish foreign policy s through coalition building with both old and new EU members. e l Although ‘Eastern Partnership’ has been rather well received within the EU, a number of policy challenges remain s in the way of its implementation. These challenges include the need to secure the support of the target countries for the y initiative and to achieve concrete results in Ukraine’s progress towards greater integration with the EU. l e i Furthermore, positive results must be secured during the n i French and Czech presidencies of the EU, and the foreign a p policy opportunities provided by the upcoming Polish o i presidency in 2011 must be utilized. Finally, given the n y unyielding criticism of Tusk and Sikorski’s foreign policy by z i President Lech Kaczynski and the main opposition party, l a Law and Justice, constant efforts must be made to maintain n domestic support for these policies. A A 2 ‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy? ‘Eastern Partnership’ initiative he ‘Eastern Partnership’ proposal constitutes a brand new initiative by the Polish government aimed at counterbalancing the project of the Union for the TMediterranean advocated by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy. It is also the first major Polish initiative at the EU forum since accession that has every chance to become a success1. First of all, the project appeared to be well prepared: it took the form of a joint Polish-Swedish proposal in order to avoid the impression that the idea was coming from a single member state. Secondly, wide consultations were conducted, and the preliminary agreement of Germany, Great Britain, Denmark and Czech Republic was obtained. At the same time, France was made aware of the fact that Poland was willing to support the strengthened Mediterranean partnership only under the condition that a similar initiative could be designed for the Eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, one day before the official presentation of the project to the GAERC, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radek Sikorski, held a special conference for Brussels-based journalists to explain the details and benefits of the initiative, in order to shape the public opinion of EU member states. Finally, directly before the GAERC meeting on the 26th of May, Sikorski addressed a number of EU officials, diplomats, journalists and lobbyists gathered at a ‘breakfast briefing’ on the premises of the prestigious European Policy Centre in Brussels2. The contents of the Eastern Partnership proposal o date, the proposal for ‘Eastern Partnership’ remains fairly general, with further details to be presented and discussed at the June European Council T(concrete projects could be elaborated in Brussels by the end of this year). The principal aim is to strengthen regional cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and to a certain extent with Belarus. The project involves visa facilitation, with prospects for visa-free movement, a free trade zone for services and agricultural products (including a date to be fixed for completion of the free trade area), as well as closer cooperation in the fields of transport, the environment and border control. There will be no extra burden on the EU budget, except for what is already earmarked for these countries in the ENP financial perspective for 2007–2013. If necessary, additional funds could also be obtained 1 The first propo sal being the 'ene r gy NATO' (2006), which was not suffi cie n tly consulted with any EU member state, badly received once pro po sed and re je c ted im me dia te ly af te r wards. The se cond ini tia ti ve con ce r ned the squ a - re root syste m of vo ting in the Coun cil of Mi niste rs and was presen ted in the fram ework of the nego tiati ons on the new tre a ty (2007): it was exp li ci t ly sup po r ted only by the Czech Re pu b lic and qu i c kly wi t h drawn when the ex ten - sion of the Nice syste m was propo sed by Ger m any and France. 2 Ga ze ta Wy bo r cza, ‘Polska ofen sy wa w Bru kse li w spra wie EIT i Wschod nie go Partnerstwa’, 25.05.2008. Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 4 ‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy? 3 from the European Investment Bank and European Reconstruction and Development Bank. Furthermore, no additional institutional arrangement, such as a secretariat in the case of the Union for Mediterranean, is foreseen. Finally, as the initiative builds on the structures of the ENP, the European Commission is to play a major role, with a Commission official appointed as ‘special coordinator’3. Eastern Partnership and the prospects of further EU enlargement to the East he main question is whether ‘Eastern Partnership’ advances the issue of membership for at least some of the states concerned, notably Ukraine and TMoldova. The document to be presented at the June European Summit will not mention ‘a European perspective’ for these countries. However, Polish diplomats believe that if EU consents to the project, it may attach more importance to Eastern neighbours and as a consequence the chances for the future membership of Ukraine and Moldova will significantly increase4. The whole concept draws on the experience of the Visegrad group, enabling the countries concerned to better integrate within the grouping, while implementing internal reforms and adjusting to EU standards. This helps them to prepare for accession, once ‘enlargement fatigue’ is gone and the EU is politically prepared to make an offer5. Reactions of the countries concerned owever, the project has raised doubts, not only in some of the EU member states, but also among the partner countries concerned, most importantly in HUkraine. The political opposition in Poland also seems to be relatively sceptical. The initiative is likely to see criticism from Bulgaria and Romania, fearing that their ‘baby’ – the Black Sea Synergy – could be undermined by the new initiative. Moreover, Spain and Italy might be hesitant to endorse the proposal, due to their strong emphasis on the Southern dimension of the ENP. Finally, uneasiness was raised by the possible reaction of Russia to this reinforcement of EU policy in its region of ‘strategic interest’. As regards Ukraine, their diplomatic head, Hennadij Udovenko, reasserted that ‘any form of neighbourhood policy without membership perspective cannot be satisfying to us’. Indeed, Ukraine might not see much improvement in the proposal in comparison with the status quo. In particular, the Polish proposal implies treating the East as a uniform entity, which is obviously 3 EUo b se r ver.com, ‘Poland and Swe den to pitch Ea stern Par tne r s hip idea’, 22.05.2008. 4 Ja cek Pa w li cki, ‘Wschodnie Par t ne r stwo Tuska’, Ga ze ta Wy bo r cza, 21.05.2008. 5 EUo b se r ver.com, ‘Eastern Par tne r s hip co uld lead to en la r ge ment, Po land says’, 27.05.2008. Analyses & Opinions, 4 Institute of Public Affairs 4 ‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy? beneficial in terms of acquiring funds for major regional and trans-national projects. The idea is to balance the bilateral, EU – partner country aspect of the existing ENP. However, Ukraine does not find it beneficial to be put into one basket with countries such as Azerbaijan or Armenia, whose chances for membership are practically non-existent at the moment. Domestic reactions he initiative was also received with reservation by the domestic opposition. Pawel Kowal, deputy of the PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwoœæ – Law and Justice) Tparty and a specialist on Eastern policy, has criticized the government for taking a timid and unambitious stance at the beginning of the negotiations. According to him, the proposal is certainly not revolutionary and happens to be nothing more than a slight modification of the existing ENP. Moreover, it has not been developed with consultation of the opposition and lacks concrete details as to how and when the objectives of the partnership are to be achieved6. However, it is doubtful that these objections are fully valid. Given the realistic objectives of the initiative, the chances for its acceptance without being watered-down are quite high. The strategy of incremental steps towards strengthening EU ties with its Eastern neighbourhood is far more promising than a big-bang approach that nobody will be willing to support. Nevertheless, further details of the proposal are to be seen at the European Council meeting 19–20 of June.
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