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Poland Political Briefing: Election Campaign in Poland Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska

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Poland Political Briefing: Election Campaign in Poland Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 17, No. 1 (PL) April 2019 Poland political briefing: Election campaign in Poland Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Election campaign in Poland For more than three years the political stage in Poland has been prevailed by the dominant Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) as well as the opposition's search for a promising strategy to regain political initiative. The results of the municipal elections in 2018 confirmed the largest opposition party, the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), in a strategy of forming the European Coalition (Koalicja Europejska) for the European elections in May 2019, which should be a broad alliance of parties that represent the wide political milieu in Poland, namely the PO itself, the .Modern (.Nowoczesna), the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and Green Party (Zieloni). On the other hand, the new political star - Robert Biedroń - founded a party beyond the established left-right scheme under the name Spring (Wiosna). Interest in his party and its program is still growing, and thus this group may become the dark horse of both electoral campaigns to European and Polish Parliament (in autumn). The European Coalition was appointed specifically for the elections to the European Parliament in 2019. The initiators of its appointment were persons who in the past were Polish Prime Ministers or Foreign Minister, declaring the will to construct "one broad list in the European Parliament elections, whose aim would be to restore Poland's strong position in the European Union". Its launch was announced on February 1, 2019, but in the following weeks the quantitative composition of this group increased. At present, apart from the five main political entities, new one have associated the coalition, namely the Polish Initiative (an association and a political party in the phase of registration), and parties: Now!, Democratic Party, Union of European Democrats, Social Democracy Poland, Freedom and Equality, League of Polish Families and Feminist Initiative. These are parties that represent extremely different political approaches (liberalism, social liberalism, social democracy, Christian democracy, conservatism, agrarianism, feminism, anticlericalism). The common denominator for these entities, however, is the desire to overcome the today's power camp, enter the European Parliament and in the future also to balance the PiS's strong position on the political scene in Poland. Recently published surveys give PiS and European Coalition similar chances in the May elections to the European Parliament - the differences reach only a few percent. The PiS still 1 enjoys the greatest confidence of voters - the average support in March on the basis of 8 surveys indicates the result of 39.2% for PiS, for the European Coalition of 35.4%. The outlook for individual parties building the European Coalition looks different - the average support for the Civic Platform in the month of March was 24.5%, for the Polish Peasant Party 4.8%, for the Democratic Left Alliance 4.7%, for the .Modern 1,9% and for Green Party 0,3%. With such a distribution of forces, the just formed group of Robert Biedroń, called Spring (Wiosna) may have a decisive significance. Polls give this group almost 8% of support - that's a lot, because the movement is young, there are faces unknown in politics and the program itself is liberal and can turn the Polish worldview upside down. This completely new political party on the Polish scene was created on February 3, 2019 and its ideological character is economically and liberally social. The demands of the group are anti-clerical, feminist and pro- ecological. Active in the movement are politicians from various political streams (mainly leftist and center-leftist). Moreover several former left-wing activists and people previously politically uninvolved linked the Spring, which gives the group a loan of trust and indicates a breath of fresh air on the Polish political scene. This is important because Polish public opinion is more and more tired of the endless war between the most important parties, PiS and PO, which has been around for over a dozen years. In recent days Spring presented a lot of controversial proposals, which are extremely timely and adapted to the challenges that appeared in the public debate in 2019. The most important determinants in the Spring program include: 1. Economy: • Minimum pension amounting to PLN 1.600 (untaxed) (app. EUR 370); • Gradual increase of the minimum salary to PLN 2.700 (EUR 630) in 2020, up to PLN 3.000 (EUR 700) in 2021 and up to PLN 3.500 (EUR 815) in 2024, with 2028 to be permanently linked to the national average at 60% of the average salary; • The minimum salary for teachers - PLN 3.500 (EUR 815); • Liquidation of Social Security as well as Agricultural Social Insurance Fund, and transfer of their competences to the tax administration; • Ensuring equal pay for men and women working in the same job; • Abolition of restrictions on mothers and fathers raising children independently under the "Family 500+" program; • Moving away from a coal-based economy to 2035 by launching a program to create a renewable energy sector for 200.000 jobs with an adjustment program for miners and power plant employees; 2 • Digitalization of administration, free Internet access throughout the country, settlement of companies via the Internet, start-up incubators in each municipality, uniformed tax interpretations; • Liquidation of the Church Fund, taxation of Church; • In schools - elimination of religion lessons, increasing the number of English lessons, introduction of modern sex education and education against violence. 2. Society: • Guaranteed access to a medical specialist within 30 days; • Assistants' support, inclusive education and benefits of PLN 500 (EUR 120) for people with disabilities; • Legalization of same-sex marriages; • Introduction of a "registered partnership" (civil unions); • Guarantee of women's right to abortion on demand up to the 12th week of pregnancy, full in-vitro financing; • Free admission to all cultural institutions in Poland every Sunday; • Establishment of a Justice and Reconciliation Commission to "investigate abuse of law by public officials in 2015-2019" (period of the PiS government). 3. European Union: • Building 10 million new apartments in the European Union; • Free transport for people under 26 years of age. Robert Biedroń's party and its political program - who himself is a long-term self- government politician, journalist, political scientist and activist for LGBT people (he is a homosexual living in a relationship with another anti-discrimination activist Krzysztof Śmiszek) - is perceived as a threat to many other political groups. In particular, it is a challenge for the Civic Platform, which has recently taken a course to the left, seeing that there are voters' voices and a chance for electoral victories. Biedroń may also turn out to be a serious competitor for Grzegorz Schetyna (chairman of the PO) for the title of the opposition camp leader. For the left parties, Biedroń's initiative is also a hard nut to crack. Wiosna can take away young and middle generation, usually supporting left-wing demands. Adding to this the increasingly weaker SLD polls, which from 8-12% went down to 4-5%, it is clear that hard times has come for the Democratic Left Alliance. But Biedroń can also mean a nail to the coffin of the leftst 3 Party Together (Razem), because it is less radical - meaning much more acceptable for a wide circle of voters. This new party also hits the strongest point of the so-called "good change" policy of Law and Justice and its concern for the so-called ordinary people. Wiosna strikes with great power, although for the moment it gives only promises (in addition, these are promises without explanation, where to get the funds for their implementation, and the costs are huge, amounting to PLN 32 billion [EUR 7.4 billion]), but their momentum may arise worries among Law and Justice politicians. Although both parties are ideologically far away, Spring and its social demands cause anxious feelings in government circles. Conclusions The current landscape of the political scene in Poland is extremely diverse and contains political parties from the right to the left of the political spectrum. Although PiS and PO parties have played the key role so far, outdoing each other in political programs over the years, a new role for the upcoming elections will be played by the new party Spring. The grouping has a broad coalition capacity (although it is certainly impossible that it will create a probable government with Law and Justice) and in addition, it gave up in a joint start to the European Parliament with the European Coalition, what means that it believes in an independent success. Biedroń currently is laboriously building his party by going around the country and seeking support in the broad social masses. His popularity and social trust has developed in recent years as he served as the president of the city of Slupsk (in 2014-2018) and member of parliament (in 2011-2014), what give him interest in the media and public opinion. His party is not afraid to touch sensitive topics (eg. role of the Catholic Church in politics, liquidation of Social Security). On the other hand, Biedroń and his team must realize that their political honeymoon is coming to an end. Until now, there was nothing to account for, nothing to screen and what to ask - now it will change. The journalists and political rivals will take advantage of this opportunity.
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