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Why Does Poland Develop Different Politics in The ADVERTIMENT. Lʼaccés als continguts dʼaquesta tesi queda condicionat a lʼacceptació de les condicions dʼús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://cat.creativecommons.org/?page_id=184 ADVERTENCIA. El acceso a los contenidos de esta tesis queda condicionado a la aceptación de las condiciones de uso establecidas por la siguiente licencia Creative Commons: http://es.creativecommons.org/blog/licencias/ WARNING. The access to the contents of this doctoral thesis it is limited to the acceptance of the use conditions set by the following Creative Commons license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/?lang=en Why does Poland develop different politics in the field of the climate and energy framework of the EU? The Polish case in relation to Germany - focus on distributed generation WHY DOES POLAND DEVELOP DIFFERENT POLITICS IN THE FIELD OF THE CLIMATE AND ENERGY FRAMEWORK OF THE EU? THE POLISH CASE IN RELATION TO GERMANY - FOCUS ON DISTRIBUTED GENERATION Thesis in the fulfillment of the degree of Ph.D. in International Relations and European Integration of the Autonomous University of Barcelona Department of Public Law and Historical and Juridical Science (Doctorado en Relaciones internacionales e Integración Europea- Departamento Derecho Público y Ciencias Histórico-Jurídicas) by Aneta Ciupek 30 May 2017 Director: Prof. Esther Zapater Duque Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain Department of Public Law and Historical and Juridical Science Ph.D. Candidate: Aneta Ciupek 2 Why does Poland develop different politics in the field of the climate and energy framework of the EU? The Polish case in relation to Germany - focus on distributed generation Abstract Poland and Germany have similar resources of coal: nonetheless, theses two countries develop completely different policies in the field of the energy and climate framework of the EU. Germany is aiming, until 2080, based its country energy mix in 80% on renewables energy sources departing from the fossil fuel entirely substituting it with the low carbon energy model based on decentralized supply power system with the greater involvement of citizens. In other words, the German energy and climate strategy is in line with the EU policy in this field. Poland is on the opposite pole. Even in the long time perspective - until 2050 coal is foreseen to be the primary energy fuel in the country. The low-carbon energy model promoted by the EU is planning to be achieved through the implementation of the new Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), very expensive technology. In sum, the centralized power generation model (with the involvement of the state-controlled energy companies) is winning with the decentralized energy production model that could be built using the potential and willingness of the Polish pro-consumers and citizens. Why does Poland develop different policies than Germany in the field of the climate and energy framework of the EU? To deliver the more holistic answer to the above question the so called theory of “psychological constructivism” of Richard N.Lebow (2008) has been applied. The author claims that behind each states’ political decision stand different motives: spirit, appetite, reason. He also distinguishes fear as emotion; however many researches have been done in the field of energy security with Russian policy being, very often, the first cause of the root of this fear. Although the Russian aspect is also discussed in the below work, it is treated from the different perspective to see how the country's energy strategy can be influenced by the appearance of the different Lewbow's motives on a state level, both in Poland and Germany. These two countries develop different policies in the climate and energy field primarily because the distinctive motives drive both states. Moreover, it has been detected that very often these concepts (spirit, appetite, reason) have a different connotation for Germany and Poland what also impacts the outcome of their policies. Although the work is referring to the core three aspects of climate and energy framework (GHGs emission reduction, efficiency, renewables energy) the focus is given to the development of alternative energy sources. Hence, there are separate chapters about the Polish and the German legislation in the field of renewables energy until the current status with some background analysis. Ph.D. Candidate: Aneta Ciupek Table of Contents Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. 6 I. Introduction................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Rationale ............................................................................................................................................7 1.2 Research questions ........................................................................................................................8 1.3 Aim of the research ..................................................................................................................... 10 II. Background ............................................................................................................... 15 2.1 The Kyoto Protocol ..................................................................................................................... 17 2.2 The European 2020 strategy ................................................................................................... 18 2.2.1 The European Union Trading System (ETS) ............................................................................ 19 2.2.2 Polish reaction on the 40% GHG emission reduction target ............................................ 21 2.3 The Paris Agreement .................................................................................................................. 22 2.3.1 The Polish position during the Climate Conference in Paris ............................................ 24 2.3.2 The Germany’s and EU’s position during the Climate Conference in Paris ................ 27 2.4 European Strategy 2030 ............................................................................................................ 29 2.5 Polish progress in the realization of the targets established in the European 2020 and 2030 strategy ................................................................................................................................... 31 2.5.1 Greenhouse gas emission reduction target .............................................................................. 32 2.5.2 Renewables and energy efficiency ............................................................................................... 35 III. Polish legislation .................................................................................................... 39 3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 39 3.2 “Polish Energy Policy until 2030” from the 10th of November 2009 and “Strategy for Energy Security and Environment - perspective until 2020” from the 15th of April 2014 42 3.2.1 Renewables Energy Sources .......................................................................................................... 44 3.2.2 Increase of the security of supply of fuel and energy .......................................................... 49 3.2.3 Coal ........................................................................................................................................................... 49 3.2.4 Import of coal from Russia .............................................................................................................. 57 3.2.5 Gas and Oil ............................................................................................................................................. 60 3.2.6 Nuclear energy ..................................................................................................................................... 64 3.2.7 Reduction of GHGs .............................................................................................................................. 65 3.3 Polish energy policy until 2050 .............................................................................................. 67 3.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 71 3.5 Introduction. Transposition of 2009/28/EC Directive in Poland: long way to distributed pro-consumer generation ............................................................................................ 73 3.5.1 Introduction of the pro-consumer amendment to the law on renewable energy (February 2015) ................................................................................................................................................. 77 3.6 Examples of selected draft version of the draft Law on Renewable Energy ........... 84 3.6.1 I version of the draft law on renewable energy source: 20.12.2011 ............................. 87 3.6.2 II Version of the draft law on renewable energy – from October 2012 ....................... 91 3.6.3 IV version of the draft law on renewable energy - 12 of November 2013 .................. 94 3.6.4 Controversy around biomass, in the proposed draft law and legislations ................. 99 3.7 Conclusion and current status of law on renewable energy
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