Dreams Won and Lost: Fait Accompli and the Creation of Modern Poland, 1918-1923

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Joseph M. Zielinski

August 2013

© 2013 Joseph M. Zielinski. All Rights Reserved.

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This thesis titled

Dreams Won and Lost: Fait Accompli and the Creation of Modern Poland, 1918-1923

by

JOSEPH M. ZIELINSKI

has been approved for

the Department of History

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Timothy David Curp

Associate Professor of History

Robert Frank

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

ZIELINSKI, JOSEPH M.,, M.A., August 2013, History

Dreams Won and Lost: Fait Accompli and the Creation of Modern Poland, 1918-1923

Director of Thesis: T. David Curp

The collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires in 1918 created a power vacuum in Eastern Europe. Within this vacuum, an independent Poland emerged. The allied powers (France, Great Britain, the USA, and Italy) gathered in Paris to determine the peace settlements and the boundaries of new states. Each state arrived at the conference with their own visions, which, at times, conflicted with other nation’s concepts. Events in the East, however, interrupted allied discussions and revealed the uncertainty in allied policy toward Poland. The David Lloyd George papers, published document collections, memoirs, and secondary literature reveal the connection between allied visions for post-war Europe and the level of support provided to Poland.

Furthermore, the sources reveal the connection between allied opposition to Polish goals and Poland’s use of its military to gain contested territory.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is the result of over a year of research and writing. I know this project would not have been possible without the support from advisers, friends, and family. I would like to first thank my thesis advisor, Dr. T. David Curp. Dr. Curp guided me the past two years through the historiography of interwar Poland, directed me to primary source documents, and provided constant support for questions I developed during my research and writing. Furthermore, he generously offered copious edits that cleaned my writing and provide necessary clarity to my argument. Additionally, I would like to thank the other members of my committee – Dr. Steven Miner and Dr. John Brobst – for their guidance and introduction to the historiographies of their fields.

I would be remiss not to thank the friends and family that supported this project and me. First, I would like to thank my mother, Sue Zielinski. Her grammatical edits were invaluable to creating a clean and well-written work. Furthermore, her questions allowed me to further develop and clarify my narrative and arguments. I would also like to thank my siblings: Nick and Anna Zielinski. Their constant encouragement provided the motivation to continue through graduate school and produce this work. Finally, for reminding me of life outside of school and limiting thesis-related stress through laughter,

I would like to thank my fiancée, Kate Laissle. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents – Carl and Sue Zielinski – for their constant support and kind words of encouragement.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract ...... 3 Acknowledgments ...... 4 Introduction ...... 6 Chapter 1: Poland’s Place in European Politics ...... 14 Chapter 2: The Impossible Wish List ...... 38 Chapter 3: Stolen Victories ...... 66 Conclusion: A Victory for Whom? ...... 104 Bibliography ...... 109

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INTRODUCTION

Born out of the defeated empires of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Germany,

Poland emerged as an independent state following World War I. When the state’s borders were finalized, the new state occupied approximately 388,600 square miles and almost 30 million people. The state amalgamated portions of three empires and consequently distinct types of people with vastly different experiences. Of the 30 million people in

Poland just under seventy percent were Polish, fifteen percent were Ukrainian, and eight percent were Jewish. It was a state divided by its population; even ethnic Poles comprised vastly different backgrounds: German Poles enjoyed some measure of prosperity,

Austrian Poles possessed the most political experience, and Russian Poles were the least experienced politically.1 Many of the non-Poles in Poland resided along its eastern borderlands known as the Kresy, which incorporated territory in modern day Lithuania,

Belarus, and Ukraine. The territory’s mixed ethnic composition created significant roadblocks to Polish claims on the territory during the Peace Conference and subsequent conferences and resulted in noteworthy consternation in Polish political circles regarding their treatment. Poland, however, did not incorporate the Kresy into their territory until

1922 and until 1923, the sixth largest nation in Europe failed to achieve recognition for its borders by the broader European community, especially by Great Britain. Poland represented one of many new states created after World War I and it borders were partially subject to debate and compromise by the victorious allied powers at the Paris

Peace Conference.

1 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 260. 7

Following the collapse and defeat of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, the creation of new European states in 1918-1919 complicated the peace process. Further confounding the process, Russia was embroiled in civil war following two revolutions in one year (the February and October Revolutions of 1917).

Ultimately, these circumstances created a highly unstable situation for new states in

Eastern Europe. Within this context, the Polish state declared its independence in

November 1918. 123 years following the final partition that erased the Polish state from the map, the name Poland would exist on maps as a nation, not an idea or geographical region. For all the optimism Polish national leaders possessed, the nature of the new state was entirely undetermined and partially subject to the policies and wishes of the great powers of Europe. Polish leaders recognized this fact and lobbied Britain, France, and the

United States for favorable treatment.

Polish leaders began their efforts to create a free and independent Poland during the war. The collapse of Tsarist Russia and the creation of the Kerensky provisional government created an opportunity for Polish nationalists abroad to lobby allied governments without fear of alienating an important ally against Germany, especially since the provisional government sanctioned an independent Poland. The National

Committee, led by Roman Dmowski, managed to successfully lobby allied governments during the war. The biggest boost to their cause was President Wilson’s demand of a free, independent Poland with access to the sea in his Fourteen Points. Despite their successes, the borders of Poland remained undecided and unclear with the proclamation of independence in 1918. Allied governments endorsed Polish independence within 8 ethnographic borders; however, the ethnographic map of Eastern Europe was decidedly muddled and could not be easily determined. Polish populations predominated in cities such as Lvov and Vilna but were the minority in the countryside. Conversely in Upper

Silesia, Poles held the majority in the countryside but were the minority in urban spaces.

Drawing borders through borderlands was fraught with difficulties for the victorious powers and resulted in numerous disagreements between France, Great Britain, the

United States, and the various White Russian entities.

Victorious powers were not the only interested nations in the creation of Poland’s borders. Poland would be carved out of defeated and chaotic states and therefore Poland contended with the interests and designs of Germany, Russia, and Lithuanian and

Ukrainian national groups. The Russian Civil War began in 1917 and raged well into the peace process. The unsettled situation made creating states in Eastern Europe difficult as no one party controlled the political situation in Russia. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks and the White Russians possessed vastly different visions for Eastern Europe and the role of

Russia in it. The Bolsheviks wished to export the revolution and the White Russians desired to reconstitute a Great Russian empire. The Lithuanians and the Ukrainians attempted to create independent states according with the principle of national self- determination. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points gave hope to maligned nationalist groups and provided a base for claims on legitimacy within their ethnic boundaries.

Polish leaders, in particular Jozef Pilsudski, wished to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth and establish a federal union of Eastern European states centered on

Poland. This desire confounded Ukrainian and Lithuanian plans to create national states. 9

On Poland’s western borders, Germany attempted to mitigate their losses. Germany accepted the allied armistice on the condition the peace would be crafted on the basis of

President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Consequently, Germany knew a Polish state would emerge in the East; however, they wished to avoid ceding territory to Poland. Poland operated within this chaotic region. The retreat of the German armies from Eastern

Europe and the collapse of Russian and Austro-Hungarian authority left a power vacuum in Eastern Europe. Poland and Austro-Hungarian successor states attempted to fill this void. Poland was the largest of the new states and capable of achieving more of their territorial objectives because of the freedom to act outside the authority of the previous empires and the influence of the Great Powers, which lacked military power in the region. Thus Polish authority battled with nascent and aspiring states to occupy the void left by collapsing and withdrawing empires.

French and British policies represent an important facet in understanding Polish foreign policy and territorial gains. The great powers arrived in Paris in January 1919 with individual policy objectives. French policy towards Eastern Europe is explored in

Piotr Wandycz’s France and Her Eastern Allies. Wandycz argues that British, German, and Soviet resistance collapsed French efforts to create a counterweight against future

German aggression and to build a cordon sanitaire containing Bolshevism.2 For

Wandycz, the primary motivators of French peace conference policy were the containment of Bolshevism and the creation of an eastern alliance system that would

2 Piotr Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925; French-Czechoslovak- Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 5-6. 10 protect France against future German aggression. Poland represented one of the central states in France’s Eastern European designs. Consequently, Polish aims received French support in an effort to create a powerful state to contain Bolshevism and balance German power. Anthony Adamthwaite in Grandeur and Misery summarizes French post-war policies with Georges Clemenceau’s proclamation that France desired restitutions, reparations, and security.3 He further states that Clemenceau misplayed his hand in the face of British skepticism.4 In both monographs, French support for Poland is apparent and represents a key part of French post-war security and economic designs.

Furthermore, both books acknowledge the limitations of French policy stemming primarily from British opposition.

British opposition to Polish and French policies at the Peace Conference must be understood within British visions for post-war Europe. Jacqueline Powell in The

Battleground of High Politics argues that British policy was largely determined by its harmony with Germany at the time.5 Powell connects British policy with developments in

Germany and consequently the British supported German claims when German stability was in question. Furthermore, Brock Millman argues that the sudden and total victory on the Western Front in 1918 shocked the British and failed to change British post-war policy toward Eastern Europe, a policy that was formed when the successful outcome of

3 Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France’s Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 43. 4 Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery, 62. 5 Marie-Jacqueline Powell, The Battleground of High Politics: A Comparative study of British and French Policies Towards Poland and the Baltic States, 1917-39 (Lewes: Book Guild, 2003), 3. 11 the war was dubious.6 Britain wished to create a new balance of power in Europe following the war. French ambitions in Eastern Europe and a large Polish state diminished, in British eyes, the opportunity to create a renewed balance. Consequently,

British policy toward Poland appeared pro-German and in direct contrast to French designs. The chief architect of the British policy in Paris was David Lloyd George.

Norman Davies in “Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-1920” argues the Prime Minister was ambivalent toward Poland.7 This body of scholarship fails to accurately convey

Lloyd George’s opposition to Poland. Lloyd George did not have mixed feelings about the Poles. He opposed a multi-ethnic Poland, rejected Pilsudski’s federalism and attempted to categorize Poland as a small state. However, his opinions must be understood within the context of how he envisioned post-war Europe: a renewed balance of power, reintegrated Germany, and united, economically sound Russia. Consequently, he relegated Poland to a secondary position and consequently his opposition must be understood within that context.

Far too frequently scholarship on Polish territorial settlements after World War I fails to acknowledge Polish initiative in the finalization of the Polish Republic’s borders.

Wandycz in France and Her Eastern Allies constructed a system of dependency in which

Polish agency is pushed to the side in favor of French dominance. He acknowledged

Polish efforts to control its own destiny with the Zeligowski coup; however, relies far too heavily upon French preponderance in his examination of Polish border settlements.

6 Brock Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 283-285. 7 Norman Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-1920,” Journal of Contemporary History 6, No. 3 (1971): 133. 12

Likewise, Anna Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki in From Versailles to Locarno: Keys to

Polish Foreign Policy, argue that Polish territorial ambitions were closely tied to the will of the French and British.8 Negotiations in Western Europe without a doubt influenced

Polish borders; however, developments in Eastern Europe (particularly along the Polish-

Russian border) frequently existed outside French and British control. Within this power vacuum, Polish forces possessed greater room for maneuver; and Poland, to a degree, could act independent of its public foreign policy. In short, the primary monographs of

Polish foreign policy and territorial settlements simply do not demonstrate the degree of agency that Poland demonstrated in 1919-1922.

This thesis will argue Polish territorial demands were points of contention between their chief ally, the French, and their primary dissenter, the British, at that Paris

Peace Conference. Recognizing British reluctance to award Poland its desired territories, the Polish government and paramilitary organizations used fait accompli to achieve its territorial aspirations. By examining Eastern Galicia, Vilna, and Upper Silesia, this paper will further illuminate how Poland, in a chaotic Eastern Europe, managed to achieve the majority of its territorial demands at the cost of potential alliances with its neighbors and to the increasing frustration of its primary ally (France) and primary dissenter (Britain).

This paper will proceed conceptually in three sections. Chapter one will conceptualize visions for Poland and its place in post-war Europe. Secondary sources, memoirs, minutes and memos from the Paris Peace Conference, and the David Lloyd

George papers will demonstrate Polish leaders’ competing visions for Poland, British

8 Anna Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno: Keys to Polish Foreign Policy, 1919-25 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 7-10. 13 policy post-World War I, and France’s European designs. Chapter two will describe

Poland’s territorial objectives in Eastern Galicia, Vilna, and Upper Silesia. Secondary sources, memoirs, and reports from Eastern Europe informing and describing allied policy will demonstrate why Polish territorial demands were unrealizable without independent action because of allied opposition and inaction. Finally, Chapter three will analyze how Poland ultimately received most of their desired territory. Secondary sources and correspondence between allied governments and their representatives in Europe will demonstrate that the Poles utilized a policy of fait accompli to press for its territorial demands. Furthermore, the conclusion will demonstrate the consequences of this policy: alienation from its nearest neighbors, anger from the British, and frustration and embarrassment from the French. 14

CHAPTER 1: POLAND’S PLACE IN EUROPEAN POLITICS

The unexpected and complete collapse of Germany’s armies on the Western Front coupled with revolution in Berlin brought World War I to a sudden close. The war began as a clash of empires: Great Britain, France, and Russia battled Germany, Austria-

Hungary, and the Ottomans. By November 1918, Russia succumbed to the Bolshevik revolution, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated in the midst of national revolutions, the Ottomans crumbled, and Germany fell to a popular revolution that ousted the Hohenzollern Dynasty. After four years of unprecedented bloodshed, the victorious coalition of France, Britain, Italy, and their co-belligerent, the United States, emerged to craft a lasting peace. Each side arrived in Paris in January 1919 with their own policy objectives and ideas of how to create peace after brutal conflict. In addition to crafting a peace treaty with Germany, the Paris Peace Conference was charged with detailing the territorial boundaries of numerous new states created out of the remnants of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Geographically, Poland represented potentially the largest of the new states and one of the most problematic. Situated between Germany and a chaotic Bolshevik Russia, Poland required significant international support to gain territory or economic growth. Poland faced numerous issues in the months following

Germany and Austro-Hungary’s collapse including political unrest and the lack of a concrete plan for its borders. Additionally, the allied powers had very different ideas for an independent Poland resulting in clashes between Great Britain and France.

Within Polish politics, two primary personalities and ideologies dominated the political scene: Roman Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski. Dmowski led the National 15

Democrats. Dmowski strenuously supported an integrationist Poland, which would encompass a large area and incorporate various nationalities; the Lithuanians, Germans,

Ukrainians, and Byelorussians would become Polish rather than maintain their individual national identities. Additionally, Dmowski considered Germany to be the greatest threat to an independent Polish state. The cultural imperialism of the Kulturkampf meant that under German control, Polish language and identity was threatened. This view resulted in

Poland’s western borders being the primary concern. Pilsudski, on the other hand, considered a federal Poland incorporating Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus would secure

Poland from its neighbors. Pilsudski developed a very eastern centric view of Polish policy resulting from his estimation that Russia was the greatest threat to Poland.

Pilsudski wanted regional autonomy and governments for the federalized states; however,

Poland would be the primary partner in the relationship and the Polish Sejm would be the primary legislative body. The divisions within Polish political thought represented the complete opposite sides of the Polish opinion: an integrationist Poland, which looked west at its enemy versus a federalist Poland, which considered Russia the greatest threat to its continued existence.

Beginning in 1917 with the outcome of the war still in doubt, Roman Dmowski and other members of the Polish National Committee advocated Polish causes to allied powers. The Committee consisted primarily of Dmowski’s National Democrats and other conservatives.9 The Committee aligned the Polish cause with the Allied cause; however, did not associate themselves with the French and British until August 1917, after the fall

9 Titus Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic: A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe, 1914-1920 (London: W. Heinemann, 1957), 172. 16 of the Tsar and the establishment of the Kerensky Government. The French were the first to recognize the Committee almost a month after its foundation and the British and

Americans followed, the latter being heavily lobbied by the famed pianist-cum-politician

Ignacy Paderewski.10 Dmowski and the Committee wished to raise and control a Polish army in exile. Eventually, the French allowed the creation of such a force under the control of Jozef Haller. The army became known as the Blue Army because of their blue

French uniforms.

While the Committee was not announced until August 1917 and not recognized by all the allied powers until October, in March, Dmowski worked to lay the groundwork for allied support of Polish causes. On March 25th, Dmowski visited Lord Balfour and laid out his vision for the new Polish state. Dmowski used the recent revolution in Russia to advance Polish causes and took advantage of shifting allied views on the reliability of

Russia. In his pro-memoria, Dmowski stated that Poland should be: “(1) Big and strong enough; (2) enjoy economic independence and (3) have its own foreign policy.”11

Furthermore, Dmowski claimed that Polish territory should include only area where the masses speak Polish and are attached to the Polish nationality and cause. This statement was ambiguous, and did little to limit the scope of Polish territory. However, he did offer some specifics. Dmowski stated:

the most desirable territory … would comprise: Austrian Poland (Galicia and half of Austrian Silesia); Russian Poland (the Kingdom of Poland and the governments of Kovno, Wilno, Grodno, parts of Minsk and Volhynia; and

10 Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, 174. 11 Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, 162. 17

German Poland (…Poznania and West Prussia with Danzig … Upper Silesia and the southern area of East Prussia.12

Dmowski’s extensive territorial claims resulted from his notions of what “big and strong enough” meant. In Dmowski’s thinking, the idea of a strong, viable Polish state overruled ethnographic considerations. For example, in Wilno and Lwow (in Austrian Galicia), ethnic Lithuanians and Ukrainians in the countryside outnumbered Polish majorities in cities. Furthermore, Poles in Upper Silesia and Gdansk identified themselves as German despite Polish as a first language. Ultimately, however, Dmowski believed that an ethnically homogeneous state existed “only in the minds of philologists not politicians.”

Consequently, Dmowski’s vision for Poland relied upon the role of assimilation in his vision for Poland. Dmowski believed that Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians could become Polish through a program of assimilation. Finally, he argued that Poland could not be a small state but needed to be a great state with the means to influence international politics. 13 Clearly, Dmowski’s public statements belied his integrationist vision for a great Poland and would face opposition from its neighbors during the Peace

Conference.

Dmowski’s pro-memoria faced opposition from the British even in 1917; Lord

Balfour, who received Dmowski’s “Proclamation to the Poles,” presented his views to the

Imperial War Council the day following his meeting with Dmowski. Balfour was skeptical of the Proclamation’s resolution of the “Polish problem.” He stated that while

12 “From Roman Dmowski’s ‘Memorandum on the Territory of the Polish State,’ 26 March 1917,” in Poland, 1918-1945: An Interpretive and Documentary History of the Second Republic ed. Peter Stachura (New York: Routledge, 2004), 23. 13 Piotr Wandycz, “Poland’s Place in Europe in the Concepts of Pilsudski and Dmowski,” European Politics and Societies 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 456. 18

Dmowski stressed the danger of a German led Polish army and the necessity of making a public appeal for an independent Poland, he would prefer if Poland were merely an autonomous region under Russian control. Balfour worried that an independent Poland would cut Russia off from Europe and would prevent Russia from continuing their war effort against Germany.14 Balfour’s concerns were noted; however, allied governments issued statements of support for the Provisional Government. The fall of the Tsars and the increasingly weakening position of the Kerensky provisional government hastened allied support for the Polish cause. Titus Komarnicki, an interwar Polish diplomat and author of Rebirth of the Polish Republic, argued that the worsening position of the

Russian provisional government and the increasingly unsettled nature of Eastern

European politics provided the opportunity to make Poland a component of allied war aims.15 Similarly, Piotr Wandycz argued that the March 1917 revolution in Russia

“proved a turning point in French relations with the Poles …”16 While allied governments shifted their positions on Poland in March 1917 from an internal Russian issue to a combined war aim, Balfour’s statements on Polish independence indicate reservations about the new state’s viability and place in European politics and security arrangements.

The British did not share these reservations in their dealings with the Greeks and the Czechs. Lloyd George supported Greek ambitions in Anatolia and the Balkans because the British desired to dominate Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia and the

14 Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, 163. 15 Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, 166. 16 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 11. 19

Greeks represented a viable alternative to Ottoman power post-World War I.17

Additionally, the British distrusted the Turks and their ambitions, which made the Greeks more appealing. The Greeks were promised large swaths of Anatolia and would rule over a large Turkish minority population. This does not represent mere hypocrisy by the

British. Rather, it demonstrates their calculations that Poland was a temporary state in

Europe, as it was caught between two large, ambitious states: Germany and Poland. On the other hand, Greece emerged from the war relatively unscathed and could be a power broker and stabilizer in the region. Thus, Lloyd George supported Greek imperialism.

Similarly, Lloyd George and Great Britain supported Czechoslovakia in their demands for the Sudetenland. This territory, Benes and Masaryk argued, was essential for the economic wellbeing of Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, the Supreme Council at the Paris

Peace Conference awarded the territory to Czechoslovakia despite the large German population. The British were not averse to separating large German populations from

Germany, even though they objected to Poland governing over Germans. Again, this resulted from the calculation that Czechoslovakia would be much more secure and stable than Poland and, consequently, could receive territory with large German populations.

While Dmowski attempted to garner international support for Poland position in

France and Great Britain, Josef Pilsudski fought against the Russian Empire in Poland.

Pilsudski and Dmowski disagreed over the greater threat to Polish interests. Dmowski argued Germany represented the greatest danger to Poland and accordingly he aligned

17 John Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916-1919 (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), xii and Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 77. 20 himself with the allied powers to defeat Germany. Pilsudski, on the other hand, thought

Russia the greatest danger to Poland. He disagreed with Dmowski’s belief that a defeated

Germany and Austro-Hungary would see a reunion of Polish territory under the

Romanovs. Instead, he argued the only hope for Poland would be the defeat of all three

Empires (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia).18 However, in 1917, the simultaneous defeat of all three empires seemed unlikely; consequently, Pilsudski led troops against the

Russians because he estimated Russia represented the greatest threat to a Polish state.

Pilsudski faced opposition from some Poles because of the popularity of pro-Entente political forces such as the National Democrats and accordingly Pilsudski’s call to arms in 1914 against Russia saw meager support.19 Furthermore, Pilsudski’s actions meant he was on the opposite side of many Poles and open to political attacks on his loyalty to

Polish causes. In 1916, after victories over the Russians and increased consolidation over

Eastern European spaces, the German government attempted to create a Polish rump state under German control. Thus they created the Provisional State Council with the stated promise of a road to self-government; however, the Germans did not treat the organization seriously or put their own promises into action.20 The organization faced increasingly hostile opposition from Poles and Pilsudski’s involvement with the

Provisional Government resulted in plummeting popularity. Thus when the Germans demanded that non-Austrian-Hungarian Poles take an oath of loyalty, Pilsudski refused

18 M.K. Dziewanowski, “The Making of a Federalist,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 11, no. 4 (December 1963): 557. 19 M.K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 1918-1922 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 48-9. 20 Andrzej Garlicki, Jozef Pilsudski, 1867-1935 (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1995), 84. 21 and was imprisoned in Magdeburg. Pilsudski’s imprisonment sent his popularity soaring.

He refused to swear any loyalty to the Central Powers (although he already swore to fight for them in 1914) and distanced himself from organizations that seemingly collaborated with the Germans; thus his political capital grew.21 When the Germans released him from prison in November 1918, Pilsudski was one of the most popular Polish politicians and perhaps the most powerful and visible Pole in Poland. On November 14, political institutions in Poland transferred power to Pilsudski installing him as Head of State and

Commander in Chief of the armed forces.22

While Dmowski championed an ethnically homogeneous state, Pilsudski desired a federated state led by Poland but including Lithuania, Ukraine, Belorussia, and parts of other Baltic states.23 Pilsudski imagined a state with roughly the same borders as the 18th century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This vision for Poland was multiethnic and respectful of national traditions, though not appreciative of nationalist tendencies in other territories. This vision, M.K. Dziewanowski notes, prevailed in many areas in Eastern

Europe especially immediately following the war, because, “many ardent patriots now … instinctively tried to pick up the threads of history and return to the traditional patters of political behavior associated … with their country’s imperial past.”24 Pilsudski, born in

Wilno (modern day Vilnius) and identifying dually as Lithuanian and Pole, attempted to connect with the successes of pre-partition Poland. However, this image, while discussed in post-independence Eastern Europe, failed to address the geopolitical and social tides of

21 Garlicki, Jozef Pilsudski, 1867-1935, 87. 22 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 59. 23 Wandycz, “Poland’s Place in Europe in the Concepts of Pilsudski and Dmowski,” 453. 24 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 82. 22

1918-1919. The swelling pressure of nationalism in the 19th century coupled with

President Wilson’s belief in and proclamation of national self-determination stunted federalist ideas and made ethnic composition an important facet of national boundaries.

Pilsudski and Dmowski jockeyed for political dominance and for the privilege to create Polish foreign policy on territorial matters. The allied powers recognized

Dmowski’s Committee as the legitimate representative of Poland in 1917; however,

Pilsudski and his supporters possessed political power in most Polish spaces after the collapse of Germany in 1918. Adding to the confusion was international opinion on

Polish leadership. The British distrusted Pilsudski. He fought against the allies during the war and the British worried about his politics and long history as a member of the PPS

(the Polish Socialist Party).25 Additionally, the British thought Dmowski was too right- wing. While in London, Dmowski stated that his religion “came from Jesus Christ, who was murdered by the Jews.”26 This anti-Semitic comment fueled campaigns against

Dmowski by Lewis Namier in the Foreign Office and other prominent British Jews.27 The

French, however, were more amiable to Dmowski and very supportive of Poland after the

Russian Revolution. For the same reasons as the British, and after collaborating with

Dmowski during the final years of the war, the French distrusted Pilsudski and were more loyal to Dmowski and the Committee.28 Polish politics were split between two governments each with their own armed services: Pilsudski and his legions in Poland and

25 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003), 211. 26 Quoted in MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 212. 27 MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 212. 28 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 19. 23

Dmowski and Haller’s Blue Army in France. This split was made more complicated by the nature of politics (their disagreements over which neighbor represented the greatest threat to Poland), where they held power (France versus Poland), and who supported them (most provisional governments in various regions of Poland transferred power to

Pilsudski; Dmowski had the support, sometimes strained, of allied nations). The French attempted to force the recognition of Dmowski’s government; however, the United States and Britain deferred and recommended that Dmowski and Pilsudski reach a compromise and create a coalition government.29 Dmowski and Pilsudski’s mutual dislike and distrust prompted the involvement of the right wing but politically unaffiliated Paderewski.

Paderewski enjoyed international prestige and admiration in Poland; consequently, he was the perfect candidate to foster a political compromise. In January 1919, Pilsudski and

Paderewski reached a compromise in Warsaw. Pilsudski remained the Head of State and commander-in-chief; Paderewski became the foreign minister and Prime Minister; and

Dmowski was named the chief Polish representative for the Paris Peace Conference.30

After two months, Poland possessed a unified government with definite representation at the Paris Peace Conference.

Polish representatives at the Paris Peace Conference presented their causes to the victorious allies beginning in January 1919. The most skeptical allied power towards

Polish demands was Great Britain. Great Britain’s position toward Poland has been referred to as hostile; however, ultimately, the British viewed Poland as irresponsible and secondary to concerns over Germany and Russia. Questions about German stability and

29 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 19. 30 MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 213-124. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 20. 24 their ability to reintegrate into the European community coupled with concerns about civil war in Russia consumed British post-war policy thinking. Additionally, Polish treatment of minorities and French involvement in Eastern Europe helped explain British antipathy toward the Polish delegation and its demands. In short, Polish policy was not a primary concern and, in some instances, ran counter to British post-war desires.

During the war, Britain refused to make a solid commitment to the idea of a

Polish state. The Foreign Office considered Polish independence a “conditional war aim.”31 In other words, an independent Poland would be acceptable, but not worthy of continuing the war to achieve. Britain refused to incorporate objectives they could not achieve through force of arms into their war aims because “no ally ‘would be willing to prolong the war by a day to achieve it.’”32 Furthermore, Lord Balfour’s preference for an autonomous Poland under Russian control, rather than an independent state indicated split British opinion on even the need for an independent Poland, even if a free state was included as a conditional war aim. The Foreign Office’s planning and deliberations over war aims and peace settlements were all but rendered moot in Paris by the British Prime

Minister, David Lloyd George. Lloyd George possessed a well-known antipathy for the

Foreign Office and consequently the office occupied an ancillary position at the conference. The appointment of Maurice Hankey as the secretary of the British Peace

Delegation indicated the Foreign Office’s exclusion from the Conference. Lord Hardinge, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, was presumed the head of the Peace

31 Brock Millman, “A Council of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-1918,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 2 (April 2001): 242. 32 Millman, “A Council of Despair,” 242. 25

Delegation’s secretariat; however, despite Hardinge’s “unrivaled experience in foreign affairs,” Hankey received the appointment.33 Hankey’s position within the secretariat signifies Lloyd George’s consolidation of power over the conference delegation and the final exclusion of the Foreign Office over decision-making in Paris. Thus the opinions and views of Lloyd George are tantamount to understanding British policy toward

Poland.

Poland represented a secondary interest to Lloyd George. Beyond the Foreign

Office’s refusal to make Polish independence a primary war aim, Lloyd George himself only paid cursory attention to the matter. For example, in the six-volume War Memoirs of

David Lloyd George, the only reference to Poland is in the volume covering 1918 when

Lloyd George references the establishment of the Regency Council by Germany and

Austria-Hungary in Poland. He made no reference of Roman Dmowski’s visit to London in 1917 and did not include the Polish National Committee’s efforts to become the official representative of Polish interests in the West. The exclusion is not damning nor does it indicate any hostility, but rather, Lloyd George’s omission depicts Poland’s position in British policy especially during the war. In 1917, the war was far from won.

Years of bloody stalemate on the Western Front produced hundreds of thousands of casualties and left the warring parties no closer to resolution. In early 1917, the fall of the

Tsar sent shockwaves through the Entente. Kerensky’s provisional government continued the war effort; however, within a year, the Kerensky government collapsed under the weight of a Bolshevik revolution after the Russian Army disintegrated. As the war

33 M.L. Dockrill and Zara Steiner, “The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919,” The International History Review 2, no. 1 (January 1980): 58. 26 entered 1918, France and Great Britain worried about the prospect of German troops tipping the balance on the Western Front. Lloyd George wrote about the war effort and his primary concerns relating to the war and its successful resolution. Thus, Poland failed to gain mention; the war would not be won because Poland was independent. The sudden collapse of the Central Powers, in particular Germany, did little to push Poland forward in Lloyd George’s agenda. The Committee successfully lobbied for the recognition of

Poland as an independent state, but the nature of the nascent state was still undetermined.

Poland’s secondary or even tertiary position in British policy continued throughout the

Paris Peace Conference.

Lloyd George’s Poland policy could be characterized as hostile; however, his opposition must be understood within the greater context of his goals in Paris. Lloyd

George wished to reintegrate Germany into the broader European community, decrease

British commitments on the continent, and restore a continental balance of power. John

Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace stated that Lloyd George campaigned for a harsh German peace settlement. However, Kenneth O. Morgan argues this portrayal is ultimately inconsistent with the majority of the Prime Minister’s campaign speeches. He argues Lloyd George spoke primarily about domestic reconstruction and about the need to affirm Germany’s status as a great power and to ensure it possessed no national grievances.34 His actions in Paris worked to moderate the

Peace against punitive terms and prevent actions that would turn Germany against the

34 Kenneth O. Morgan, “Lloyd George and Germany,” The Historical Journal 39, no. 3 (Sept. 1996): 759. 27 peace. Lloyd George’s Fontainebleau Memorandum strengthens this perception. Lloyd

George argues that:

[W]e ought to endeavor to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war … First of all it must do justice to the Allies by taking into account Germany responsibility for the origin of the war … Secondly, it must be a settlement which a responsible German Government can sign in the belief that it can fulfill the obligations it incurs. Thirdly, it must be a settlement which will contain in itself no provocations for future war, and which will constitute an alternative to Bolshevism …35

This document, produced in March 1919, clearly laid out Lloyd George’s trepidation about the peace negotiations; in particular, he worried about the potential for a German casus belli in the treaty. In particular, the British Prime Minister concerned himself with the transfer of Germans to non-German rule. He wrote, “I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people … should be surrounded by a number of small States … each of them containing large masses of Germans clamoring for reunion with their native land.”36 In particular he referred to the recommendations of the Polish

Commission, whose proposal placed 2.1 million Germans in Poland. The proposals met with fierce opposition from the British Prime Minister, who managed to secure plebiscites in Upper Silesia and East Prussia.

The Prime Minister was not driven by any irrational hatred or distrust of Poland, but rather, his overwhelming concern for German stability and the acceptability of the peace motivated Lloyd George. Lloyd George’s opinions on Poland strengthen this view of his objections to Polish territorial requests. He stated on numerous occasions he

35 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939), 269. 36 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 267. 28 fostered no ill will toward Poland, including a letter to Ignacy Paderewski stating his great sympathy with all oppressed nationalities.37 Polish opinion of Lloyd George grew increasingly hostile after the peace conference prompting Philip Kerr to write to Lord

Rumbold in Poland:

I think the Poles misunderstand the Prime Minster’s attitude toward them. He is not the least anti-Polish … Everybody agrees that there is a wonderful spirit in Poland today … but there is a section of Polish opinion which has lost its perspectives … Perhaps in talking to your Polish friends you could make them realise [sic] there is no hostility at all in the Prime Minster’s mind, that he is looking at the Polish problem not merely in terms of 1919-1920 but in the light of a thousand years of European history.38

Kerr’s letter indicates Lloyd George’s perspective on the Polish question. He does not view Poland with hostility, but rather sees a section of the Polish political class as over ambitious and far too narrow-minded in their perspective. He may have liked individual

Poles and the idea of Poland, but his conception of Poland differed vastly from visions of

Poland in Polish government. He categorically rejected a supranational Poland, as

Poland “never proved its capacity for stable self-government” and should not possess an excess of non-Poles.39 The inference of Poland’s inability to govern itself effectively indicated his belief that the Polish state was temporary and would fall because of its great power neighbors, Germany or Russia. The collapse of Poland, Lloyd George thought, would be accelerated by improperly aggrandizing Poland. Furthermore, the British Prime

Minister worried about the fate of Jews in Poland. Anti-Semitic statements from

Dmowski during his wartime visit to London fueled skepticism over Poland’s ability to

37 Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland,” 134. 38 Quoted in Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland,” 133. 39 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 267. 29 fairly govern a large portion of Eastern Europe’s Jewish population. Finally, Polish demands required Lloyd George to consider German responses and an uncertain situation in Russia, where British forces were fighting Bolshevik troops. In short, Lloyd George could not consider Poland in a vacuum and his attention was drawn to issues of primary importance to British policy and the British electorate; therefore, the Prime Minister relegated Poland to a position of secondary importance with German and Russian causes occupying the primary position.

British public opinion cared little for issues in Eastern Europe and thus the British delegation had a freer hand during negotiations about the region.40 While Poland,

Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic republics failed to capture the minds and opinions of the

British electorate, Lloyd George developed a keen interest in the Polish question. In particular, the Prime Minster hoped to find the basis for future rapprochements between

Poland and its neighbors.41 Furthermore, he refused to cede territory to Poland to which, he believed, they were not entitled. He questioned Polish motives for their territorial claims and worried about the potential for a new war brought about by Polish greed.

Extensive Polish designs in Eastern Europe prompted the British to interpret Polish claims and French support as imperialism rather than security measures.42 Lloyd George postulated that Poland would support French causes in Europe and act as little more than

40 G.H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 43. 41 H.J. Elcock, “Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier,” The Historical Journal 12, no. 1 (1969): 138. 42 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 5. 30 an extension of France east of Germany.43 The British discounted Poland’s priorities and their fierce independence; Poland would be no nation’s lapdog. Furthermore, Lloyd

George believed Germany could be persuaded by ethnographic arguments and Bolshevik

Russia appeased within its borders. He failed to recognize the nature of the revolution in

Russia primarily the hope of global revolution sparked by Bolshevik forces supporting local communists. Additionally, he misunderstood Germany’s amiability to losing any territory in the East. German forces won the war in the East and the government and the public was averse to conceding territory even in Posen and especially Danzig and the corridor. Regardless of his motives, Lloyd George regarded the expansion of Poland as folly and would close diplomatic venues for Poland and endanger its very existence.

Irredentist Germany and Russia represented the greatest dangers for an independent

Poland.

Twice in a half century Germany invaded France and wrecked local industry and thousands perished on the battlefield. Consequently, after four years of war and the death of over a million French soldiers, security and the prevention of another catastrophic war dominated post-war French thought. The French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau proclaimed that the French policy for the Peace Conference would be restitutions, reparations, and security.44 This statement is simultaneously vague and indicative of

French intentions. Through reparations, Clemenceau wished to ensure that France would have the capital to rebuild its damaged industry and repay its abundant war debts.

Perhaps most importantly for Poland and the peace conference was Clemenceau’s push

43 Powell, The Battleground of High Politics, 118. 44 Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery, 43. 31 for security. The emphasis on securing France from future aggression through a policy of strength rather than reconciliation resulted in the French push for a cordon sanitaire against Russian Bolshevism and an eastern counterweight against German aggression.

Poland played prominently in post-war French designs and thus Polish officials relied on the French for political support of Poland’s territorial objectives. A 1918 study by Ernst Denis for the French Comité de’Études (a commission to prepare material for a peace conference if the allies emerged victorious) concluded French security depended on the strength of its alliances east of Germany. Denis added that France must recreate an eastern front and Poland must play a prominent role.45 Denis’ paper only represented an opinion; however, the Quai d’Orsay produced two memorandums that closely mirror

Denis’ recommendations. The Quai d’Orsay advocated for a Poland that would encompass most of German Poland (Upper Silesia, Posen, the Corridor, and Danzig), would act as a counterbalance against Germany in the absence of Russia, and would shield Europe (especially revolutionary Germany) from Bolshevik Russia.46 A strong

Poland would, in French observations, be a strong ally and act as a cordon sanitaire. A romantic element also permeated French security calculations. France remembered the

Polish attachment to Napoleon, the contributions of Frédéric Chopin, and the Poles fighting with the French against the Prussians in 1870. Clemenceau even acted as a voice for this romanticism. At the onset of the war, Clemenceau wrote “Poland will live again” and a great historical injustice (the partitions of Poland) will be undone because of the

45 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 21. 46 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 22. 32 war.47 The romantic ideal of Poland found a postwar mention with General Ferdinand

Foch’s proposal that Germany withdraw to pre-partition boundaries. British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, objected because the Allies never agreed or discussed restoring

Poland to its 1772 borders.48 The French moderated these suggestions in their post-war memorandums with concerns over misconstruing French proposals for Franco-Polish imperialism, but still advocated for a large Polish state.

The political map of Europe changed tremendously in 1918. The collapse of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire and the revolution in Germany created new states and changed how great powers interacted with the nations of Europe. One of the largest shifts was the

November 7, 1917 revolution in Russia. The victory of Lenin and the Bolsheviks over the

Kerensky government sent shockwaves through Great Britain and France. Clemenceau and Lloyd George fretted over the spread of communism to new and vulnerable states. In

French calculations, the Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent Treaty of Brest-Litovsk highlighted the importance of a stable, powerful, and large Poland and increased French distrust of the Bolsheviks.49 Marshall Foch advocated the use of Poland as a barrier against Russia and an alternative to larger allied intervention into the Russian Civil War.

Already in 1918, the allies had dispatched troops to fight with the White Russians against the Bolsheviks.50 The allies hoped to install a friendly regime and reopen the Eastern

Front. The collapse of Germany partially erased this mission and created pressure to

47 MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 212. 48 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 17. 49 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 15. 50 Paul Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 31. 33 bring allied forces home with the end of the war. The final surrender of German troops on the Western Front erased, in the public mind, the need for allied troops fighting the

Bolsheviks. Beginning with the October Revolution, allied governments associated the

Soviets as German pawns; however, in November 1918, this association partially dissolved with the collapse of the Kaiser’s government. Still, British Conservatives and the French worried about the spread of Bolshevism westward. The French were particularly anti-Bolshevik and pressed for any measure that would weaken Lenin’s government. Consequently, Polish actions on their eastern border were viewed as a part of larger anti-Bolshevik strategy.51 Despite their anti-Bolshevism, the French did not view the destruction of Russia as desirous. The French government viewed Russia as one, indivisible state; however, still supported Polish military action in Galicia in 1919.52 This resulted from Poland’s position in French security schemes and French desires to support the creation of a large Poland. Not all White Russians recognized the independence of

Poland and certainly did not support the powerful Poland of French designs. The

Russians who supported an independent Poland envisioned the Poland of Dmowski’s pre-

1917 design rather than Pilsudski’s expansive, federalist Poland. French and Russian designs for Poland differed greatly and the position France held toward Poland changed depending upon the strength of White Russian armies and the relative strength of Poland.

While France vehemently opposed the Bolsheviks, Great Britain took a more moderate approach. Lloyd George opposed continued British intervention in Northern

51 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 104. 52 Michael Carley, “the Politics of Anti-Bolshevism: The French Government and the Russo-Polish War, December 1919 to May 1920,” The Historical Journal 19, no. 1 (March 1976): 163-4. 34

Russia due to increased pressure at home; however, he did not support the Bolsheviks. In particular, Lloyd George worried about the potential for the spread of Bolshevism to a vulnerable Germany. In his Fontainebleau Memorandum, he wrote:

The greatest danger I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics… This danger is no mere chimera. The present Government in Germany is weak; it has no prestige; its authority is challenged; it lingers merely because there is no alternative but the spartacists…53

In this quote, two trends emerged illuminating Lloyd George’s thinking. First, the Prime

Minister alludes to the danger of the liberal German Government’s collapse. Second,

Lloyd George makes it clear that if Germany falls to Bolshevism the ideology will spread even further. The danger of further German collapse dominated Lloyd George’s thinking at the conference and his concerns over Bolshevism were no exception nor were they a red herring. Already in Germany in late 1918, the Spartacists gained support in Germany for their cause. The Spartacists advocated Marxism and gained influence in Germany through 1918, especially during the German Revolution of November 1918, and joined the Comintern in December 1918 becoming the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In

January 1919, the KPD launched a general strike and uprising against the Weimar

Government which required the use of the Freikorps to put down. The January 1919

Spartacist uprising confirmed fears of Germany’s vulnerability and fed into Lloyd

George’s concerns about the effects of a punitive peace on Germany. The instability of the Weimar Government coupled with civil unrest and active revolutionary circles in

Germany created a situation where Lloyd George could not be neutral to the Bolshevik

53 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 268-9. 35 threat and used the threat of Bolshevism to remind his allies of Germany’s weakness and potential for further collapse. As Lloyd George indicated in the Fontainebleau

Memorandum, Germany’s collapse into Bolshevism would endanger the other West

European nations; France teetered on the verge of collapse in 1917 and would possibly be the next nation to fall if Germany collapsed. If Germany collapsed into Bolshevism, new

Eastern European states would be sandwiched between two powerful communist powers and would be vulnerable to coercion and invasion.

Despite deep concerns about the spread of Bolshevism, Great Britain wanted a stable Eastern Europe and a stable Russia. Lloyd George did not wish to exclude Russia from the peace proceedings. He even expressed his sympathy for the Russian people stating that the Russian Army fought without arms or munitions and were betrayed by the

Government.54 While privately and in conversations between Lloyd George and

Clemenceau, Lloyd George expressed his sympathies; the Prime Minister could do little without the support of Clemenceau or his own government. Lloyd George governed though a coalition cabinet and within the cabinet, military intervention in Russia and support for the White Russians garnered significant support. For example, Winston

Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, supported allied intervention in Russia. In fact,

Churchill attempted to form a coalition in Eastern Europe, which would act without allied approval and present the allies with a fait accompli in northern Russia.55 Additionally, in

April 1919, members of Parliament signed a telegram to Lloyd George urging against the

54 MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 68. 55 Markku Ruotsila, “ The Churchill-Mannerheim Collaboration in the Russian Intervention, 1919-1920,” The Slavonic and East European Review 80, no. 1 (January 2002): 2. 36 recognition of the Bolshevik government.56 Lloyd George dominated the British

Delegation to the Peace Conference and worked to institute his vision of British policy; however, his views were not the only ones within the Lloyd George government. While

President Wilson was secure in his position until 1922 and Clemenceau had the support of the French Parliament, Lloyd George governed through a wartime coalition government. Consequently, the British Prime Minister’s position was ever vulnerable, particularly if the coalition began to falter; he could be recalled and replaced at any point during the peace negotiations. With his position ever in jeopardy, Lloyd George could not pursue his own agenda in regards to Russia.

In 1918 and 1919, Poland was caught between two great powers in transition:

Germany and Russia. Germany’s defeat in World War I and the fall of the Tsar in 1917 and the subsequent revolution in November 1917 sent Europe into chaos and helped unleash the forces of nationalism in Eastern Europe. The end of the war and the subsequent peace conference placed Poland and its territorial ambitions within the larger context of European power politics. The Polish representatives at the Peace Conference,

Dmowski and Paderewski, argued Polish causes to the French, Americans, British, and

Italians (the victorious states) and thus were forced to reconcile Polish demands with the concerns and policies of the allied powers. Therefore, the Poles recognized they competed against disparate visions for a new Europe and against the differing proposed outcomes of the defeated parties. In particular, Polish delegates lobbied the British and

French for they possessed the most power and influence in Paris. The British pursued a

56 MacMillan, Paris, 1919, 80. 37 policy of German reintegration and rehabilitation into the European community. France, on the other hand, desired to punish Germany for the war and to provide measures that would protect France against future German aggression. Faced with a supportive France and ambivalent Britain, Poland was forced to rely on its own devices to secure its ambitions. 38

CHAPTER 2: THE IMPOSSIBLE WISH LIST

The overthrow of the Tsar in February 1917 and the Bolshevik revolution in

November 1917 helped unleash Ukrainian nationalism upon East Galicia as Ukrainians saw the opportunity for success in the chaos of the collapse of two Russian governments in a year. The end of the war in November 1918 further destabilized the region with the sudden defeat of Germany and the surrender and subsequent collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy’s authority. With the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, East Galicia fell into disarray with different proto-governments all claiming legitimate control over the region. The first Russian Revolution led to the establishment of the Rada (Ukrainian

Central Council) in Kiev; however, it suffered from strained relationships with both the

Russian Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks after November 6, 1918. In March

1918, the Germans sponsored Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi to garner Ukrainian support of the German advance into central Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalists, especially the Directorate, criticized the Skoropadskyi Hetmanate for its pro-Russian sympathies and collaboration with the Germans. The Bolsheviks established their own government in

Kharkov and declared the Kiev government dissolved; however, the Kiev government remained active in governing and sent a delegation to the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.1 The Bolsheviks hoped to use their position in East Ukraine to further their ambitions to spread revolution and secure the fertile and resource rich region. The coming end of the war prompted the Kiev Rada to reconstitute themselves as a

1 Anna Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 153. 39

Directorate consisting of V. Vynnychenko, Simon Petlyura, F. Shvets, P. Adriyevs’kyi, and A. Makarenko. These men formed their government to oppose the Bolshevik government in Kharkov, eliminate the Skoropadskyi Hetmanate, and establish an independent Ukraine. Further complicating the situation in Ukraine was the West

Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR). To the surprise of the Poles living in the city, the

ZUNR declared the West Ukrainian People’s Republic in Lvov in November 1918 with

Austrian support. Ethnic Poles and the Polish Military Organization (POW) immediately opposed the Ukrainian proclamation. Other Polish paramilitary organizations had a presence in the region as well. The Poles claimed East Galicia on the basis of its significant Polish minority; however, within urban areas, the Poles were a majority.

Furthermore, the Poles referred to the history of the Polish Commonwealth to strengthen this claim. Thus three separate entities laid claim to East Galicia: Bolsheviks, ethnic

Ukrainians, and Poles.

Ethnographically, the situation in East Galicia was confused. Both the Ukrainians and the Poles could lay a claim to the region based on the principles of ethnic self- determination. The Poles claimed the region, in part, because of the majority Polish population in urban areas, in particular strong majorities in Lvov and Tarnopol.2 In addition to these major urban centers, Poles represented a majority in the other towns in the region. Consequently, Poland claimed that their majorities in the region meant they should receive the region in whole or in part. However, the region was predominately

Ukrainian as the Poles had little presence outside urban spaces. According to the

2 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 105. 40

Commission on Polish Affairs, Poles accounted for roughly 39 percent of the total population.3 The Poles recognized their weak claim to East Galicia based on ethnographic criteria. Strengthening their claims they argued the culture Poles brought to the region, the importance of Lvov and Tarnopol as cultural centers, and the integral role

Galicia played for five hundred years prior to the partitions outweighed Ukrainian claims against East Galician incorporation into Poland.4 The Jewish population further complicated the ethnography of the region. The Jews of East Galicia lived in urban spaces, especially centered in Lvov. Determining the Jewish population, as a percentage of the population, was difficult because the Austrian census of 1900 denied Yiddish speaking Jews the opportunity to claim the language as their mother tongue.5 According to religious statistics, roughly twelve percent of the total population was Jewish.6 The

Jewish population presented a challenge in determinations about the ethnic character of the region and attracted serious international attention. International Jewish populations lobbied for the careful consideration of the rights of the minority Jewish populations in

Poland. During the war, Jewish organizations reached out to Polish organizations including the Warsaw Government, which issued conciliatory statements about minority rights in an independent Poland. Dmowski’s National Committee, however, continued

3 “Report No. 3 of the Commission on Polish Affairs: Eastern Galicia,” in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (hereafter BDFA), 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 9, ed. M. Dockrill (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1991), 13-4. 4 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 105. 5 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 136. 6 “Report No. 3 of the Commission on Polish Affairs,” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 9, 13. 41 their anti-Semitic remarks.7 Jewish organizations understandably distrusted the Poles on issues of minority protection and consequently attempted to garner support for minority protection treaties to little avail. The complicated ethnographic divisions in the region and significant minority populations represented a major sticking point in decisions about the region.

The Galician question presented no easy answers for the allies in Paris. In April

1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers requested the Commission on Polish Affairs to examine the future status of East Galicia and two months later the Commission presented their report. The report did not make any recommendation rather it presented the advantages and disadvantages of a number of solutions: independence of East Galicia; provisional autonomy under either the League of Nations, a Great Power with a mandate, or a neighboring state; attachment to Poland with autonomy under a mandate; federal connection or annexation with Poland; or a plebiscite.8 The report argued that the region was not prepared for independence as it lacked internal stability. Conflicts on its borders would, no doubt, further jeopardize its weak stability and fragile economics.

Furthermore, the report placed a heavy emphasis on allied commitments to the region should either a Great Power or the League of Nations become involved in Galicia.

Understandably the report consistently stated international commitments in the region as disadvantages and further illustrated the allies’ trepidation about involving themselves in

7 Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97-98. 8 “Report No. 3 of the Commission on Polish Affairs,” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 9, 13. 42 conflicts or pledging forces for long-term deployments. Additionally, the Commission considered the frontiers of Eastern Galicia. In particular the Commission concerned itself with Lvov and the Drohobycz oilfields. The Commission recognized the tremendous value Lvov had in Polish consciousness and as a center of Polish cultural and educational life. However, they also observed that the Polish majority in Lvov was relatively slim and the Ukrainians would foster significant resentment against the Poles.9 Ultimately, the report offered no concrete recommendations; however, its rejection of Western intervention and its concerns over ethnic politics indicate allied concerns: ethnic self- determination and limiting allied commitments.

The French supported Polish designs on Eastern Galicia. The Quai d’Orsay envisioned an autonomous East Galicia within the Polish state.10 This union would form a barrier against Bolshevism. Fear over the spread of Bolshevism permeated French thinking since the revolution. Marshal Foch expressed his concern over the spread of

Bolshevism after the November 1918 armistice. German officials expressed their concern to Foch that Germany was vulnerable to Bolshevik infiltration.11 This helps explain

Foch’s preoccupation with creating a cordon sanitaire and his plan to use East Galicia as a base for an offensive against Bolshevik Russia.12 Accordingly, France supported Polish designs on East Galicia including Lvov and the Drohobycz oil fields. Foch’s interventionist policies found little support among the allies in Paris. Regardless,

9 “Report No. 3 of the Commission on Polish Affairs: Eastern Galicia,” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 9, 19-20. 10 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 107. 11 Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. Col. T. Bentley Mott (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1931), 473-4. 12 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 108. 43 interventionist policies and a genuine concern about the spread of Bolshevism motivated the French to support Polish policies in East Galicia.

While the Allies debated the ethnographic makeup of Eastern Galicia, they ultimately had little control over the events on the ground. The collapse of Russian and

Austro-Hungarian authority in Galicia created a firestorm of conflict in the region and brought the Poles and the Ukrainians into direct conflict. In October 1918, the Ukrainians launched an offensive using arms and troops deserted by and from the Austrian Army; the primary goal was to secure Lvov as the capital of an independent Ukrainian state. On

November 1, 1918, the ZUNR proclaimed the West Ukrainian Republic and raised the

Ukrainian flag over Lvov. However, in response Polish majority in Lvov drove the

Ukrainians out of the city with the help of Polish troops from Krakow, who arrived after the residents began their insurrection.13 The Ukrainians were forced to retreat but did not surrender or relent in their quest to achieve an independent state. The Polish-ZUNR conflict forestalled any effort to craft cooperation between the Ukrainians and the Poles.

In reality, the ZUNR represented the best opportunity for Pilsudski to create a Ukrainian state in federal union with Poland. The proclamation of the West Ukrainian People’s

Republic in Lvov in November 1918 and the subsequent spontaneous uprising by the

Polish population plunged the region into war and prevented meaningful negotiations between Poland and the ZUNR. Consequently, the violence in the Lvov and the Polish response to it prevented Pilsudski from even beginning his federalist program and strengthened the National Democrat position in Lvov, which strengthened calls for

13 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 154. 44 annexation. Thus, the federalist program in Ukraine was near death in 1918 and resulted in Pilsudski taking desperate measures to attempt to achieve his goals.

While the Poles and the Ukrainians fought over Lvov, the Jews were caught in the crossfire. The Ukrainian-Polish conflict divided the city and violence touched all sections of Lvov. The significant Jewish population in the city remained officially neutral in the conflict. After nearly a month of fighting, the Ukrainians departed Lvov on November

22. In the Jewish quarter, Polish paramilitary troops and Polish citizens of the city erupted into postliberation violence. For two full days uniformed Polish soldiers and civilians looted, raped, and killed the Jews of Lvov. While no written document sanctioning the violence against Lvov’s Jews has been found, there existed a belief among the Poles that such a document authorized the looting as a reward for service. The

Polish military blamed ‘bandits;’ and, on November 22, the city’s commandant, Czeslaw

Maczynski, delayed the imposition of martial law in the city and issued an inflammatory proclamation condemning the Jewish population and accusing Jews of attacking Polish soldiers.14 While there were reports of isolated Jewish attacks against Polish soldiers, there certainly existed a feeling of resentment and anger against the Jews for remaining neutral in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.15 After nearly two days of looting and murder,

Polish soldiers began to secure the city, 72 Jews were dead, 443 wounded, 38 homes burned, and 3 synagogues burned.16

14 Fink, Defending the Rights of Others, 112. 15 William Hagen, “The Moral Economy of Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwow, November 1918,” in Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland, ed. Robert Blobaum (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 206. 16 Fink, Defending the Rights of Others, 112. 45

Reports of the pogrom quickly spread throughout Europe and confirmed suspicions over Polish anti-Semitism. Paderewski condemned the violence in Lvov and worked to minimize the damage and shift blame to criminal elements. Regardless of

Polish damage control, the West and Germany blamed Poland for the pogrom.

Consequently, Poland’s image was further damaged abroad. Jewish organizations in

Germany and the German Foreign Ministry transmitted word about the “Lemberg

Pogrom” to neutral capitals and through German press wires. German Jews saw a threat to their fellow Jews in the East and connected the violence against Polish Jews to the worsening situation in Germany itself. Searching to explain the sudden German collapse in 1918, the right-wing press and anti-Semites in Germany implicated Jewish-Bolshevist conspiracies. The wartime pacifism of well-known Jewish Bolsheviks, Kurt Eisner and

Rosa Luxemburg, was cited as evidence for their outlandish claims.17 The German newspaper Im deutschen Reich wrote the Poles were an intolerant, duplicitous people and

Polish tolerance was a fairy tale.18 While German Jews and the German press criticized and publicized the Lemberg Pogrom, the British press was more reserved in their coverage. The Times and the Pall Mall Gazette stated the charges emerging out of

Germany were exaggerated and implied German telegraphic reports were unreliable.19

On the other hand The Manchester Guardian proclaimed the pogrom one of the worst in

17 Fink, Defending the Rights of Others, 112-3. 18 William Hagen, “Murder in the East: German-Jewish Liberal Reactions to Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland other East European Lands, 1918-1920,” Central European History 34, no. 1 (2001): 8. 19 Fink, Defending the Rights of Others, 117. 46

Polish history and counter to new democratic tendencies.20 Furthermore, the reports emerging from Germany prompted wealthy and powerful British Jews to lobby the

Foreign Office to act on the reports. Split media and upset British Jews resulted in Lloyd

George’s proposal that if Poland failed to cease pogroms, their prospects at the peace conference would be negatively affected.21

While the Poles attempted to control the damage, the Lvov pogrom, none-the-less, negatively affected Polish causes in Paris and played a significant role in backroom politicking. Dmowski’s Polish National Committee used its influence in the French government to prevent prominent British liberal and noted Zionist Lewis Namier from attending the conference. Similarly minded people attempted to convince Paderewski of

Lloyd George’s subservience to Jewish interests. Additionally, Jewish organizations translated and passed along anti-Semitic literature from a Polish prisoner of war organization in France.22 Consequently, the Jewish question and various intrigues developed and motivated Polish and British actions in Paris. The British urged the Poles to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the Jews and halt violence against them. The

Poles claimed they were taking all possible measures; however, the Polish government added that Jewish action sometimes justified Polish military response. None-the-less,

Polish violence against Jews confirmed, in Lloyd George’s experience, the anti-Semitism of Roman Dmowski; who considered that liberal democracy was dominated by a

20 Norman Davies, “Great Britain and the Polish Jews, 1918-1920,” Journal of Contemporary History 8, no. 2 (April 1973): 126. 21 Fink, Defending the Rights of Others, 118. 22 Davies, “Great Britain and the Polish Jews,” 128. 47

“Jewish-Masonic” conspiracy.23 The pogrom and Dmowski’s anti-Semitism reinforced each other and placed further doubts about Poland’s ability to govern a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional state.

The Lemberg Pogrom represented a violent act within the context of the

Ukrainian-Polish conflict and therefore, while it evoked the issue of minority rights, ultimately had to be considered within the broader context of the ongoing war. The

ZUNR and the Directorate joined together creating an uneasy union. The Directorate fought against the Bolsheviks in the West, while the ZUNR waged their war with Poland.

Additionally, Ukrainian forces were forced to deal with the international reaction to their own increasingly horrific pogroms. The Bolsheviks, under the guise of the Ukrainian

Soviet, attacked westward toward Kiev in the hopes of spreading revolution.

Simultaneously, the Ukrainians fought the Poles who advanced east from Lvov.24 The campaign in East Galicia formed the predominant action for the Polish army. The allies attempted to broker an armistice between the Poles and the Ukrainians by forming a commission to negotiate a peace. The British blamed the Poles for the fighting in East

Galicia; the French countered by blaming the Ukrainians. General Le Rond, a member of the French contingent, asked how, if an armistice were crafted, would the Poles defend themselves against Bolshevism.25 The French offered the most full-throated defense of

23 Antony Polansky, Politics in Independent Poland, 1921-1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 55. 24 Michael Palij, The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1995), 49. 25 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 110. 48

Polish action in East Galicia and used the specter of Bolshevism to justify the Polish offensive in Galicia.

While the Poles needed well-trained, well-supplied soldiers, the Haller Army was in France and getting the soldiers and their supplies to Poland would take transports and an open port. In January 1919, Dmowski, in his report to the Supreme Council in Paris, stated Poland was in danger from three sides: the Bolsheviks in the east, the Ukrainians in the southeast, and the Germans in the west. Consequently, Poland needed the Haller

Army to secure itself against its enemies.26 The issue, as seen by the allies, was how to secure the safe arrival of the Haller Army in Poland. The French Foreign Minister,

Stephen Pichon stated that allied intervention to secure the rail lines from Danzig might be necessary to secure the safety of the army; however, the matter remained unsettled until March 1919.27 On March 21, 1919, the Supreme Council met again to discuss the matter of the Haller Army in France. President Wilson argued that Clause 16 of the armistice permitted the free access to territory evacuated by Germany to secure order and convey supplies. Marshall Foch agreed with President Wilson’s point; however, he argued that since such time elapsed between the armistice and April 1919, he was uncertain that the clause still applied. Pichon refuted Foch’s argument and stated that the armistice was still in effect and Marshal Foch should immediately force the Germans into compliance. With no real opposition, the Council determined that to prevent the spread of

26 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, January 20, 1919, at 11 a.m.” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 2, ed. M. Dockrill, (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989): 45. 27 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, February 25, 1919, at 3 p.m.” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 2: 235. 49

Bolshevism and to maintain order in Poland the Haller Army was essential and thus must be transferred to Poland via Danzig.28 In April 1919, with negotiations in Paris regarding the future of the region still in progress, the Polish army bolstered by the arrival of

General Haller’s Blue Army launched a major offensive against the Ukrainians to secure

Lvov and the Drohobycz oilfields.29

While the allies disagreed over the status of Eastern Galicia, a similar situation unfolded in the Vilna region in modern day Lithuania. Vilna, formerly the capital of the

Duchy of Lithuania, was a great center of Polish culture and education in the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth; however, for the nearly 150 years before the independence of Poland, the city existed within the borders of the Russian Empire. The city of Vilna and the region surrounding it saw significant action during World War I and eventually the Germans placed the city in the administrative division Ober Ost. While the Germany

Army collapsed on the Western Front in autumn 1918, the situation in the East crumbled much slowly for the German Army. German forces were spread thin and plagued by plummeting morale and partisan attacks, especially along the border with Russia.30 By

November 1918, amidst the Russian Empire’s collapse, Germany’s defeat, Bolshevism’s struggles in Russia, Poland’s emergence as an independent state, and Lithuanians’ clamoring for their own state. Vilna represented a flashpoint in the Baltics: Lithuanian

28 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation hled in the Salle de l’Horloge at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, March 21, 1919, at 3 p.m,” in BDFA, 2ND part, ser. I, vol. 3: 47-55. 29 Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1972), 58. 30 James White, “National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area, 1918-1918,” Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 8 (1994): 1358. 50 nationalists claimed the city as their capital; Poles claimed the city for Poland; and

Bolsheviks saw the city as crucial for their expansionist designs, particularly as a stepping-stone to foment revolution in Berlin. The uncertain, unstable condition only confused the situation and proved a detriment to a final decision in Paris.

The situation in Vilna, in more ways than Eastern Galicia, had to be considered within the context of the Russian Civil War and related conflicts. The end of World War I prompted immediate agitation by the Soviets in the Baltic. As representatives of the new

German government arrived in Baltic cities, they discovered that not only had friendly relations developed between the Bolsheviks and German soldiers but the military administration had also ceased to function. This was not the situation in Lithuania, where the military did not crumble like military organization in Riga and Estonia.31 Allied decisions bolstered the stability of German positions in Lithuania. The British High

Command requested German formations remain in place to secure the area against advancing Bolshevik forces and preserve order. The Germans, however, feared a mutiny and announced they would withdraw from Lithuania. The Soldatenrat determined they should relinquish power to the approaching Soviets. Indicating distaste for the authority of the Soldatenrat, the German High Command armed Poles in Vilna in the hopes of keeping power from the Bolsheviks.32 The Germans abandoned Vilna on January 2, 1919 and Polish forces took control of the city. The Bolsheviks, however, had other plans and

31 White, “National Communism and World Revolution,” 1359. 32 Soldatenrat were soldier’s councils established after the abdication of the Kaiser to maintain order and govern soldier’s actions. Vejas Liulevicius, War Lands on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 229. 51 forced the Poles to withdraw on January 5.33 In an effort to bolster communist gains through the perception of national self-determination, the Soviets encouraged provisional governments in the Baltic to proclaim the creation of Soviet states. This would create the image of Soviet soldiers as supporting new states rather than conquering. Accordingly

Lithuanian communists proclaimed the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic the same day Polish forces abandoned Vilna.34

While Poles, Bolsheviks, and Lithuanians fought for control of Vilna, the Polish government debated their policy toward the city. The Polish government was divided between two primary positions: annexation or federalization.35 Beginning in January

1919, Pilsudski could not pursue his own policy. The election of a parliament (Sejm) forced Pilsudski to consider the opinion of the legislative body. The Sejm was divided but dominated by a majority of Roman Dmowski’s National Democrats and their allies.

Pilsudski, the federalist, argued Poland and Lithuania were bound by history and the commonwealth and should be reestablished in the modern world. It would be difficult to delineate just borders between the two states and thus a federal union would be the most equitable and secure for both nations. The annexation would be difficult given the advanced national character of the Lithuanians (with the caveat that the Lithuanians were unprepared for complete independence).36 The argument presented regarding Lithuania aligned with Pilsudski’s thinking on federalism since it simultaneously accepted the

33 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 119. 34 White, “National Communism and World Revolution,” 1362-3. 35 Alfred Erich Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 1920-1928 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), 13. 36 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 90-1. 52 national character of the Lithuanians and rejected an independent state. Furthermore,

Pilsudski’s scheme attempted to preserve the idea of big Poland without jeopardizing its international position. Leftist groups and large landowners in the East generally supported the federalist approach. Annexationists, whose ideological leader was

Dmowski, opposed the federalists. Dmowski argued Vilna should be a part of a centralized Polish state and Lithuania must be reduced to a small, purely ethnic state.

Dmowski, however, did not reject the idea of an autonomous Lithuania within Poland but vehemently opposed other nationalities possessing special privileges within the Polish state. 37 Dmowski’s opinion resulted from his reading of the contentious history of the

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Lithuanian national development, and its vulnerability of an independent Lithuania, which, Dmowski argued, would be subjected to significant pressure from Germany and Russia and would endanger Poland.38

These debates about the future character of Poland and its relations with neighbors developed in the newly elected Sejm in February 1919. The National

Democrats claimed 116 seats out of 340, a plurality but not majority, and were against

Pilsudski’s federalist proposals. The National Democrats and some center groups attacked the federalist program as dangerous to Polish interests and a threat to Polish economic leadership in the Baltic.39 It is unclear, however, how the right and center envisioned Polish economic leadership in Lithuania or even if an independent Lithuania would consider a Polish partnership. Augustinas Voldemaras, a Lithuanian Nationalist,

37 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 13. 38 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 120. 39 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 92. 53 presented Georges Clemenceau with Lithuanian demands in March 1919. He wrote that

Lithuania rejected any union with Poland because it had exploited Lithuania, dragged

Lithuania into anarchy leading to the partitions, and feared Polish aggressiveness.40

Lithuanian nationalists clearly distrusted Poland and desired an independent state without partnership or cooperation with Poland. On April 4, 1919, the Sejm voted to unite Vilna with the Polish Republic.41 The annexationist argument won the day in the Polish legislature; Vilna, in Polish eyes, would be incorporated into Poland and not be the capital of an autonomous state in federal union with Poland. The rapid victory of the annexationist Sejm faction demonstrated the weakness of the federalist program in Polish politics. Despite Pilsudski’s privileged position in the Polish government, the Sejm clearly worked against his vision for Poland and pressed for a single Polish state that governed over other nationalities rather than in concert with them.

While Poland, Lithuania, and the Bolsheviks fought amongst themselves for control over Vilna and Poles debated the nature of their relationship with Lithuanians, the great powers attempted to make sense of an increasingly chaotic and uncontrollable situation in the East. In April 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers addressed the

Polish-Lithuanian situation. In the wake of Bolshevik withdrawal from the region, Polish and Lithuanian forces came into closer contact with each other. The Council urged the two sides to refrain from violence and both sides should use their positions to avoid conflict in Vilna and Grodno, with the purpose of aiding the Inter-Allied Military

40 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 120. 41 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 93. 54

Commission with its work.42 The fighting, however, did not cease. On May 9, 1919,

General von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission, informed the

Allies of Germany’s intention of withdrawing the remainder of German forces from the

Baltic. In May 1919, Polish forces occupied Vilna and were fighting Lithuanian forces.

The Polish-Lithuanian conflict and the withdrawal of German forces prompted the

Council of Foreign Ministers to debate the line of demarcation, to negotiate a cease fire, and to address border settlements. The United State’s representative Robert Lansing argued that Poland should be prevented from occupying Lithuanian territory just as much as Germans. However, the French representative countered that Lithuanians had few forces to occupy any territory and the matter at hand was a military, not political, matter.43 The situation around Vilna did not lend itself to easy resolution. The various councils, committees, and commissions could not render judgment without relative peace. Moments of quiet were plagued with disagreements regarding German withdrawal or whether forming lines of demarcation were military or political matters. Regardless of the matter discussed, British and American opinion seemed against Polish occupation of territory not deemed ethnographically Polish. Interestingly, France and Great Britain encouraged German occupation. This resulted from the perception of German stability and British belief in Poland’s inability to secure itself against more powerful neighbors.

Given British skepticism regarding Polish claims on contested territory, resistance to

Vilna falling to the Poles is not surprising. However, early Polish Sejm debates and

42 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, April 26, 1919, at 3 p.m.” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 3: 157. 43 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, May 24, 1919, at 3 p.m.” in BDFA, 2nd part, ser. I, vol. 3: 252-254. 55 military action to secure the territory from the Lithuanians and Bolsheviks indicate Polish readiness to take the city with or without Allied approval. Thus Poland began to debate the policy of fait accompli as a way to achieve their territorial demands.

The French and British each had their own agendas and policies they pursued in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. France desired a quick Polish-Lithuanian settlement. If

Poland sought and received peace with the Lithuanians, the Poles could focus their attention against Germany: the primary recipient of French animus.44 Furthermore,

France evaluated Polish policy toward Lithuania within the context of its Russian strategy. France still considered Russia indivisible, but the performance of the White

Russian armies as 1919 progressed forced them to reconsider their positions vis-à-vis the

Baltic States.45 French officials feared independent Baltic States would fall under German or Bolshevik influence and consequently, Clemenceau declared that Poland should be maintained to “dam up the Russian flood and provide a check on Germany.46 The Quai d’Orsay recognized the improbability of cooperation between a reconstituted great Russia and new states in Eastern Europe; however, as the Bolsheviks solidified their position, the border nationalities improved their basis for negotiation and these states became bolder in their demands.47 The Lithuanians, in particular, alienated the French and the

British (neither of whom were hostile to the existence of an independent Lithuania) with their demands. The Lithuanians envisioned a large Lithuania and on separate occasions

44 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 120. 45 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 142. Carley, “The Politics of Anti- Bolshevism,” 164. 46 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 124 and 131. 47 Carley, “The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism,” 164-5. 56 demanded six million people to be included in a Lithuanian state.48 Lithuanian nationalists attempted to recreate a big Lithuania and in the process earned themselves the ire of the British who, in particular, argued against small, Eastern European states with oversized ambitions.

East Galicia and Vilna brought Poland into conflict with nationalist movements and Bolshevik Russia; however, Polish ambitions on their western borders brought them into conflict with Germany. The most contested territory along the German-Polish frontier was Upper Silesia. Each state claimed Upper Silesia by virtue of history and ethnography. The Poles based their claim on history and the linguistic make up of the region. Upper Silesia existed as a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the partitions in 1772. Complicating the ethnographic and linguistic map, the Germans began a program of colonization after the annexation of the territory. German industrialists and administrators provided capital and influence and consequently Upper

Silesian industry and coal production flourished.49 While German capital grew in the region, Polish laborers represented the majority of workers in the region. Consequently,

Germans and Poles both perceived the territory as their own. Germans considered Upper

Silesia their own by virtue of investment and German identity. The Polish government based their claim on Polish heritage and language. The Polish population in Upper Silesia spoke a dialect of Polish known as Wasserpolnisch. The pejoratively named dialect was different from standard Polish due to understandable borrowing from German and Czech

48 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 126. 49 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, with a collection of official documents (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1933), 1:209. 57 and therefore its linguistic unity with Polish could be questioned.50 The linguistic character of the territory mattered a great deal given the importance of national self- determination and ethnic homogeneity at the Paris Peace Conference.

The economic wealth and disputed ethnic composition of Upper Silesia meant

Polish and German interests clashed in Paris. Polish territorial ambitions ran up against

Great Britain and its interests in Germany. Consequently, Polish designs on Upper Silesia faced British skepticism about Polish stability, ethnography, and British policy to reintegrate Germany into the European community. Upper Silesia, in particular, drew the attention of Poland, Germany, and deciding powers in Paris. The region possessed significant coal reserves, which fueled industrial growth. Almost fifty-two percent of

Upper Silesian coal fueled Upper Silesian industry; however, a good percentage also went to Russian Poland and Austrian Poland. Similarly, Germany traded Upper Silesian coke with Russia and Austro-Hungary.51 Upper Silesia’s industrial and mineral wealth developed the region and, although it diminished in its importance for Germany, it remained an important center of industry and regional trade. The area’s importance in trade, especially between Russian and Austrian Poland, meant industrialists desired more local integration.52 Thus even among the German industrial classes there was support for integration with other regions of Poland, although not necessarily under the banner of a reconstituted Polish state; the German government considered the annexation of the

Dąbrowa Basin in Russian Poland after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk.

50 T. Hunt Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and the Eastern Border, 1918-1922 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 11. 51 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 44. 52 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 44. 58

While Upper Silesians possessed significant economic wealth, the actual ethnic composition of the region was uncertain. While the Poles at Paris proclaimed the Polish character of the population of Upper Silesia, significant doubts remained. Upper Silesians began to develop a Polish identity in the latter half of the 19th century. This perception began as a Catholic identity and only in the last two decades of the 19th century did Upper

Silesian intellectuals begin to develop a Polish national consciousness.53 Interestingly,

James Bjork argued that the majority of the population (i.e. working classes) still considered confessional differences, Catholicism versus Protestantism, as the primary divider of the population not ethnic dissimilarities.54 The development of Polishness in the region increased through the late 19th and early 20th centuries; however, by 1919, the question remained undecided. Social mobility and Germanization complicated the ethnic character of the region. While Poles constituted a strong majority in rural areas and in mining communities, Poles who entered into the growing middle class became increasingly German in character and identity. Furthermore, surnames became increasingly Polonized. For example, the leaders of Germany’s Upper Silesian plebiscite campaign were Ulitzka, Urbanek, and Lukaschek.55 These men possessed Polish names; however, led a German campaign. Surnames could not indicate ethnic identity and

Germans attacked the Upper Silesian dialect as distinct from Polish and thus not a metric for determining the ethnic character of the region. Consequently, the allies at the Paris

53 Harry Rosenthal, “National Self-Determination: the Example of Upper Silesia” Journal of Contemporary History 7:3/4 (1972): 232. 54 James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 17-8. 55 Richard Blanke, “Upper Silesia, 1921: the Case for Subjective Nationality,” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 2, no. 2 (1974/1975): 247. 59

Peace Conference had difficulty determining the character of the region in the face of

German and Polish claims.

Initially, the peace conference awarded Upper Silesia, in its entirety, to Poland.

Based on the strength of Polish arguments early in the conference and the support of the

French delegations, the Council of Four determined Poland should receive the entire territory. However, after the presentation of the draft treaty to the German delegation in

May 1919, David Lloyd George resurrected the Upper Silesian issue to the Council of

Four in June. The British Prime Minister argued that due to Germany’s possession of

Upper Silesia, a plebiscite was necessary to determine the ethnic character of the region and avoid a casus belli for Germany.56 This view had been previously stated by one of

Lloyd George’s advisors Herbert Fisher, the President of the Board of Education. In a letter, Fisher wrote, “an irridentist [sic] Germany will constitute a greater danger for the future peace of the World than an irridentist [sic] Poland.”57 Lloyd George’s arguments to

Clemenceau and Wilson echo the letter and help illustrate Britain’s qualms regarding the peace treaty and its potential impact on the future of Europe. Additionally, Fisher’s letter further illuminates Poland’s position in British policy. The British did not regard Poland as a primary concern in Europe; their intention was not to deprive Poland, but rather avoid antagonizing Germany. The British considered Poland a secondary power and consequently, Polish irredentism failed to concern British policy makers.

56 Paul Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919): Notes of the Official Interpreter, trans. Arthur Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 2:270. 57 H.A.L. Fisher, Board of Education, to the Prime Minister, 17 March 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/LG/16/7/37. 60

While Lloyd George believed in the danger of a revisionist Germany, he failed to convince Clemenceau and Wilson. The day after his initial plebiscite proposal, Lloyd

George revised his argument. He argued to ensure Germany’s acceptance of the peace and assuage concerns over the punitive nature of the peace, a plebiscite must be held to reaffirm the principle of national self-determination.58 Wilson accused Lloyd George of protecting German industrialists and prompted Lloyd George to retort,

No one has proclaimed more forcefully than you (President Wilson) the principle of self-determination. It means that the fate of the people must be determined by the people themselves, and not by a Dr. Lord, who thinks he knows better than they what they want.59

Lloyd George’s clever use of Wilson’s own rhetoric forced the American president to reluctantly acquiesce to the plebiscite, even though he disagreed with Lloyd George’s analysis of Upper Silesia because, in his mind, the ethnography of the region was decidedly Polish. Lloyd George’s actions easily can be portrayed as hostile; however, given the broader context of his insistence on the plebiscite those claims can be refuted.

Lloyd George insisted upon the plebiscite an entire month after the draft treaty was presented to Germany and after the German delegation voiced its objections.

Furthermore, the plebiscite was not the only objection raised by Lloyd George and represented only a part of a broader attempt to make the treaty more palatable to

Germany.

Georges Clemenceau disagreed with Lloyd George’s assessments and proposals.

He accused the British of forcing concession after concession in an effort to craft a more

58 Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four, 2:280. 59 Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four, 2:281. 61 agreeable peace; Clemenceau argued this would embolden the Germans to press for greater concessions and undermine the peace.60 Furthermore, as Lloyd George pressed for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, Clemenceau retorted that depriving Poland of Upper

Silesian coal and industry would place Poland at the mercy of Germany and open the door to German revanchism in the East.61 Additionally, the French expressed concern about the potential for German rearmament if Upper Silesia was awarded to Germany.

The French could monitor developments in the Ruhr but Upper Silesia would be beyond

French examination.62 While Clemenceau disagreed with British efforts to separate

Upper Silesia from Poland, the French needed British support for occupation plans in the

Rhineland and to continue their involvement in the continent beyond 1919.

Consequently, the French Prime Minister could not force the issue on the plebiscite and was forced to concede to British demands.

Upper Silesia, despite its diminished status, remained one of the most important industrial regions for Germany. Consequently, Poland viewed the region as an important industrial center for its future growth and economic wellbeing. However, the enormous reparation demands placed upon German in the Treaty of Versailles required economic growth and stability. Concerns over Germany’s capacity to met reparation payment deadlines prompted Mr. Thelwall, the commercial secretary in the British Embassy in

Berlin, to comment: “I consider that it would be most regrettable if Upper Silesia were turned into a Foreign State … not only would this have an exceedingly detrimental effect

60 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 44. 61 Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four, 2:270. 62 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 44. 62 on the country itself, but would create far reaching disturbances in the remainder of

Germany.”63 Mr. Thelwall’s comments echoed August Müller’s (State Secretary of the

Reich Economic Office) statement that Germany would fall apart completely without

Upper Silesian coal.64 The economic argument involving Upper Silesia was not necessarily hostile toward Poland; even though British officials did argue Poland would misuse the territory. In fact, Lloyd George thought giving Upper Silesia to Poland would be like giving a clock to a monkey. In British eyes, the complexity of the Upper Silesian economy could not be managed by the nascent Polish state. The primary argument revolved around the importance of Upper Silesian coal to Germany’s economy.

Consequently, German interests were promoted by the British delegation to ensure the success of the peace treaty and stability of Germany.

Even before the peace conference debated the future of Upper Silesia, the region seethed with tension. In late November 1918, the German state existed in a state of confusion and the Upper Silesian coal district was extremely unstable. In late November

1918, in response to poor provisions and harsh wartime measures, the Upper Silesian coal workers went on strike. The strikes were often violent and, at times, stopped coal production. The Germans recognized the strikes as ethnic in character. Ethnic Poles predominated in the mines and consequently organized unions together against predominately German mine administration. Thus, Germans believed the Polish national

63 Lord Kilmarnock to Earl Curzon, Berlin, 21 May 1920, in Documents on British Foreign Policy (hereafter referred to as DBFP), ser. 1, vol. 11, ed. Rohan Butler and J.P.T. Bury (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1961), 20. 64 “Donnerstag, 21.11.1918 nachm.: Kabinettsitzung,” in Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, ed. Erich Matthias, (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1969), 121.Upper Silesia provided about 24% of Germany’s coal. 63 movement to be behind the work stoppages.65 The unrest prompted the Council of

People’s Commissars to hold a meeting on the matter. During the meeting, Gustav Bauer proclaimed, “In Upper Silesia the majority of the population is German. Even most of the coal workers want to stay with Germany … We don’t need a plebiscite there. At all cost, we must send troops to the east.”66 Bauer spoke after the Council discussed the idea of a plebiscite in the area due to the ethnic composition of the area and the unrest. While

Germany regained control and reestablished order in late 1918, repressive government programs, poor working conditions, and food shortages led Polish workers to increasingly sympathize with the Polish national cause.

By August 1919, tension in Upper Silesia reached its breaking point. Polish workers in conjunction with labor leaders launched a general strike resulting in sixty percent of coal and industry to shut down.67 On August 16th, Polish strikers, demanding bonuses and the reopening of closed factories and mines, were fired upon by German troops. The resulting waves of violence and reprisals developed into an insurrection led by Wojciech

Korfanty and the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW).68 The POW activated military units in Upper Silesia and Posen to support their action. This was known to Germany.

Reich and Staatskommissar Otto Hörsing declared the strike illegal and remarked that the

POW imported their fighters from Posen and the Congress Kingdom and could retreat

65 T. Hunt Tooley, “German Political Violence and the Border Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1919-1921,” Central European History 21, no. 1 (1988): 58-9. 66 Donnerstag, 21.11.1918 nachm.: Kabinettsitzung,” in Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragen, 1:114-123. 67 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 77. 68 Peter Lesniewski, “Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia, 1919-21,” in Poland between the Wars, 1918-1939, ed. Peter Stachura (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 21. 64 beyond those borders as appropriate.69 By August 24th, the Germans brutally suppressed the striking and revolting Polish workers. Despite the swift, brutal repression by German paramilitary groups, the British remained aloof in their response to the violence. Philip

Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary, wrote that the Germans were “dealing with the matter with a firm hand.”70 Balfour also offered his assessment of the situation, writing that the

Poles of Upper Silesia were still under the control of the German government and should be patient (regarding their future).71 Kerr’s and Balfour’s responses indicate the British opinion that the Upper Silesian situation was merely an internal, German matter that should be treated accordingly. While the British advocated a hands-off approach, Herbert

Hoover, the head of the American Relief Administration, argued for an allied intervention and occupation.72 He stated that occupation was necessary to preserving and upholding peace prior to the plebiscite.73 Hoover’s statement echoes earlier Allied concerns about the potential plebiscite in East Galicia. The British worried that Polish control of the region prior to the vote would unfairly skew the results toward Poland due to violence, intimidation, and voter suppression. British aloofness reinforces the idea of a pro-German policy, but not necessarily anti-Polish. Lloyd George previously made his skepticism about Polish claims to the region known and the Fontainebleau Memorandum advocated for a more moderate German policy. In a March 1919 meeting of the Council of Ten,

69 Anton Golecki, ed., Akten der Reichskanzlerei: Weimarer Republik. Das Kabinett Bauer, 21 Juni bis 27 März 1920 (Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt, 1980), 219. 70 P H Kerr to the Prime Minister, 20 August 1919, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/89/4/13. 71 Mr. Balfour to Lord Curzon, 20 August 1919, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/89/4/14. 72 The American Relief Administration organized food shipments for starving and hungry people through Central and Eastern Europe. The made Hoover well informed of developments within populations. 73 Mr. Balfour to Lord Curzon, 21 August 1919, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/89/4/15. 65

Lloyd George expressed his reservations about the Polish corridor. He stated that the recommendations of the Polish Commission placed 2.1 million Germans in Poland. He further ruminated about potential problems for Poland should Germans be consigned to

Poland in such large numbers. He worried about German instability and Poland’s unproven record as administrators.74 Lloyd George’s concerns regarding the German population in Posen represented a familiar refrain in negotiations about Germany’s eastern border and certainly, given the fame of the Fontainebleau Memorandum and consistency of his arguments, could not be ignored by Polish representatives.

Consequently, for Lloyd George, criticism of Polish violence in East Galicia and support of the German crackdown in Upper Silesia does not signify hypocrisy, especially since

Upper Silesia was still officially German territory in August 1919. British policy was, however, almost entirely pro-German and consequently, in the absence of support for

Poland, he appeared against Polish causes.

74 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, March 19, 1919, at 3 p.m.” in BDFA, 2ND part, ser. I, vol. 2, 41. 66

CHAPTER 3: STOLEN VICTORIES

The Supreme Council and various commissions at the peace conference debated the future of East Galicia with each contingent pursuing its own interests. Uniting all the separate interests of the allied powers was the specter of the Bolsheviks. The ongoing conflict between Poland, Ukrainians, and Bolsheviks bordered on all out war in mid-

1919. In May 1919, the Poles continued pushing their advantage in Eastern Galicia. The

Poles wished to secure Lvov along with its sizable Polish population and the oilfields in

Drohobycz. British officials condemned the Polish offensive in Eastern Galicia as imperialism and British objections were strengthened by White Russian successes in early May 1919. Victories by Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich gave greater weight to

White Russian arguments regarding Russian economics (a desired border with

Czechoslovakia for industrial goods) and calls for self-determination in East Galicia.

Accordingly, British representatives rejected Polish claims on East Galicia and rejected calls to give Poland temporary control over the region until a plebiscite could be held.

Instead, Lewis Namier, backed by most of the British delegation, advocated for a high commissioner appointed by the League of Nations to govern the region.1 The Poles, acting contrary to the advice of the Peace Conference, continued their offensive in East

Galicia. This action infuriated Lloyd George and Wilson who called for the allies to cut off supplies to Poland if they do not heed their advice. Clemenceau joined in allied condemnation of Polish action. He stated that if Poland received East Galicia it would be

1 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 155-6. 67 a great scandal because of French and British munitions.2 Clemenceau’s statement reflected frustration on his part and his attempt to distance himself from Polish military action in East Galicia.

Despite allied condemnation, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris on

June 18, 1919 and approved Polish advance up to the Zbrucz River. The Council decided upon this because of instability in the region and the lack of a credible, stable Ukrainian government and the threat of Bolshevik advance.3 The Poles, in the Council’s decision, would control the territory they most desired: Lvov and the oilfields. Seemingly left out of the Foreign Minister’s discussion was Poland’s role in the destruction of the Ukrainian army. Dual offensives (uncoordinated) by the Poles and Bolsheviks forced the Ukrainians to fight a two front war and the arrival of General Haller’s Blue Army decisively tipped the scales in Poland’s favor. In effect, the Polish offensive in May 1919 coupled with

Bolshevik successes in May in East Ukraine forced the Allies in Paris to recognize the position of Poland in Ukraine and withdraw its strongest criticisms of Polish action.

While the allies were forced to approve of Polish advances in Ukraine, the matter was hardly settled. In May 1919, the Bolsheviks remained a threat and the successes of

Denikin endangered Polish positions in East Galicia. Furthermore, the establishment of

Bela Kun’s communist government raised concerns about the stability of East European governments and their susceptibility to communism. The rapidity of Kun’s rise to power concerned allied powers and reaffirmed the specter of the spread of communism. In

2 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 111. 3 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 18, 1919, at 3 p.m.” in BDFA, 2ND part, ser. I, vol. 2, 290-294. 68

Poland, Hungary’s spiral into communism raised fears of communist activity in East

Galicia. The Poles were forced to play their Galician cards close to their chest because of continued allied support for the various White Russian factions. Paderewski, charged with promoting Polish causes in Paris, warned Pilsudski that the Allies were counting on

Denikin and the Poles should not alienate themselves from Denikin or clash with him.4

Accordingly, the Poles strove to appear generous toward Denikin and to ingratiate themselves to the Allies; however, in reality, the Poles merely attempted to be reserved in the face of the White Russian general. The future of East Galicia came to the center of discussion once again in late 1919. In October 1919, the Red Army decisively defeated

Denikin’s forces and prompted his retreat and subsequent resignation in 1920. Even though the Allies did not abandon their support for the White Russians, the prospect of a

White Russian victory all but disappeared in late 1919. Consequently, the Poles became the most significant force in Eastern Europe and the greatest hope for Bolshevik containment. As a result of the White Russian’s apparent defeat, the Pole’s position greatly improved. The Poles recognized their position in the Allied plans and British reluctance. In a conversation between Sir Horace Rumbold and Pilsudski, Pilsudski expressed his uncertainty that Polish soldiers would fight the Bolsheviks if East Galicia would return to Russia. Furthermore, Pilsudski recognized the reluctance of the Allied powers and Great Britain to supply the Polish army. He stated, ”Poland had been left alone by the Allies to her own devices, both in dealing with Germany and in dealing with the Bolsheviks. That being the case … [Poland would] have to help herself and make her

4 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 166. 69 own arrangements.”5 Pilsudski was vague in his response about what arrangements

Poland might make; however, the threat was real; Poland could negotiate with the

Bolsheviks and declare themselves neutral. This action would deprive the Allies of an important ally against the Bolsheviks.

Polish representatives to the Supreme Council reiterated Pilsudski’s argument that a twenty-five year mandate followed by a plebiscite would diminish the Polish army’s willingness to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks in East Galicia. Stanislaw Patek,

Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued the chance of Lvov or East Galicia being removed from Poland would demoralize the Polish army and prevent resistance to the

Bolshevik army.6 This appeal attempted to further solidify Polish control over Galicia; however, met resistance from the British delegation. A combined effort from the Poles and French managed to force the British to abandon the plebiscite for East Galicia after twenty-five years and instead would merely allow the League of Nations to reconsider the issue.7 The British were reluctant to make this concession to the Poles; however, the changing political landscape in Eastern Europe forced the issue. The Pole’s relative position of power in Galicia meant they were best suited to resisting the Bolsheviks and accordingly, the French and Poles argued, should receive concessions and aid. Polish posturing about their place vis-à-vis the allies demonstrated their knowledge of their place in allied plans. Additionally, the Poles wanted to act against the Bolsheviks along their eastern border. The Poles feared Britain’s rapprochement with the Bolsheviks and

5 “Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon, Warsaw, November 7, 1919,” in BDFA, part 2, ser. I, vol. 9, 37. 6 Quoted in H.J. Elcock, “Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier,” 140. 7 H.J. Elcock, “Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier,” 140. 70 the potential for peace between France, Britain, and Russia, which would mean Poland would have no support in a future campaign against the Bolsheviks.8

The desire for a Polish campaign against the Bolsheviks came, in part, from

Pilsudski’s assessment of Poland’s enemies and threats to the new state. Pilsudski reasoned that Russia represented the greatest threat to the Polish state and accordingly focused Polish resources in the east. The spread of Bolshevism was not a specter evoked at Pilsudski’s convenience. In January 1919, the Red Army created a Lithuanian-

Byelorussian Soviet Republic, which was dismantled but not forgotten after early clashes with Polish forces.9 Then a year later, the Lithuanians turned to the Bolsheviks for help, which resulted in the further deterioration of Polish-Lithuanian relations and strengthened claims of Poland’s eastern border’s susceptibility to communist infiltration. Additionally,

Pilsudski’s federalist idea rested upon nationalities east of Poland: Lithuanians,

Byelorussians, and Ukrainians. However, the Bolsheviks and the White Russians opposed Pilsudski’s designs because it conflicted with a greater Russia or the expansion of the communist revolution.

Polish military action would be necessary to secure the expansion of its eastern borders either under Polish control or a federal union between Poland and other nationalities. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks advanced rapidly in the wake of their victory over Denikin and the collapse of his army and support mechanisms. Consequently, in early 1920, Poland and the Bolsheviks shared a common border in East Galicia. In

February 1920, Lenin wrote to Stalin inquiring what measures were being proposed to

8 Carley, “The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism,” 167. 9 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 121. 71 create a Galician strike force. Furthermore, Lenin instructed Stalin to remain quiet about

Galicia in diplomatic channels.10 Reference to a Galician strike force indicated Lenin’s early desire to launch an invasion of Poland or, at minimum, Polish held territory. One month later in March, Lenin wrote a telegram indicating his desire to march westward to aid the Sparticists in their fighting in Berlin.11 Clearly, Lenin desired to go westward and march through Poland if that would facilitate his broader goals.

The Poles however did not wish to be run over by the Soviet Army and were still dealing with remnants of the Ukrainian nationalist forces. Despite the ongoing conflict,

Pilsudski looked for allies for his federalist schemes. He was left with Semyon Petliura in

1920. The prospect of an alliance between Poland and Petliura would bring some semblance of peace and calm to Galicia, a region wracked with violence and war for the since World War I.12 Petliura and his followers were the weakest faction among the

Ukrainian nationalists, but survived the various conflicts. Thus Petliura outlived other nationalist blocs, which were damaged in the war with the Poles and the Bolsheviks.

Furthermore, the Petliura government represented the best opportunity for the creation of a Polish-Ukrainian state.

The Pilsudski-Petliura alliance strengthened Pilsudski’s drive to create a Polish-

Ukrainian federal state. Pilsudski, however, could not pursue his own policy agenda. The federalist agenda lacked support from the right and center of Polish politics. While

10 “Telgram to Stalin, 14 Februrary 1920,” in The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive ed. Richard Pipes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 78. 11 “Telegram to Stalin, 17 March 1920,” in The Unknown Lenin ed. Richard Pipes, 79. 12 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 100-1. Palij, The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 70. 72

Pilsudski stressed the economic benefit of union with Ukraine and thus a long border with Romania, which would give Poland access to the Black Sea, right-wing parliamentarians stressed the uncertain character of an independent Ukraine. It was unclear, they argued, whether Ukraine would be anti-Russian and given their insistence on East Galicia, an independent Ukrainian state would certainly be anti-Polish. The Right and the Center formed the majority in the Sejm and the two parties favored incorporation over any federal scheme.13 The fighting between the ZUNR and the POW in Lvov embittered the National Democrats and created, in the Polish population of East Galicia, resentment toward the Ukrainians and tremendous support for Endek programs. Thus the anti-federalism of the National Democrats became increasingly entrenched. The division between federalism and incorporation manifested itself in negotiations between Pilsudski and Petliura. The Poles pushed for the incorporation of East Galicia into Poland.

Pilsudski attributed this pressure to the National Democrats in the Sejm and overwhelming popular opinion.14 Pilsudski could not push his own program because of his position within the government. The Sejm designated Pilsudski the chief of state in

1919, but limited his powers by requiring the approval of his actions by parliamentary ministers and making the chief of state responsible to the Sejm. Thus Pilsudski could not pursue his own agenda without regard for the Sejm and alternative visions for Poland, especially the integrationist position. Despite efforts to mollify his political enemies, the

Pilsudski-Petliura agreement sparked harsh criticism from the political right, who considered the agreement dangerous and in direct opposition to their efforts to create a

13 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 246-7. 14 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 271. 73 national state. While the political center voted with the left to approve the agreement, all sides of the political sphere recognized the danger of provoking Russia and discouraged war.15

With alliances in place and the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, Poland launched an offensive into Soviet-held Ukraine on April 25, 1920. By early May, Polish forces occupied Kiev and tasked Petliura with organizing a Ukrainian government and army.

The goal, for Pilsudski, was the creation of a Ukrainian state that could be joined in federal union with Poland. The creation of a federal state after the Polish offensive in

Ukraine would circumvent the Sejm and allow Pilsudski to move forward with his federalist schemes. Reaction to this action in the West was mixed. Great Britain desired to end the conflict within Russia in 1919, to stabilize the region, and open it to British commerce. Consequently, as 1919 wore on, the British increasingly concerned themselves with developments in Russia and in opening channels of negotiation with the

Bolsheviks. On February 12, 1920, the British reached an agreement with the Bolsheviks for the exchange of prisoners held in Russia.16 This action demonstrated Britain’s readiness to end their involvement in the Russian Civil War and help stabilize the region, especially after the defeat of the White Russian armies. These negotiations motivated

Lloyd George’s denial of war material to Poland in January 1920; when he stated:

…the British government certainly did not advise war.

15 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 279-80. 16 Richard Debo, “Lloyd George and the Copenhagen Conference of 1919-1920: The Initiation of Anglo-Soviet Negotiations,” The Historical Journal 24, no. 2 (June 1981): 439. 74

If the Poles made a sincere attempt to make an equitable peace and the Bolsheviks … refused …Great Britain would feel bound to assist Poland to the best of its powers. If on the other hand Poland insisted on retaining within Poland areas which were indisputably Russian … and the Bolshevik government refused peace on this ground and attacked Poland to recover Russian Districts for Russia, it would be very difficult if not impossible for the British government to get public opinion to support military or financial outlay in these circumstances.17

In other words, Lloyd George informed Patek in January that should the Poles invade

Bolshevik Ukraine, the British would not send support. Despite these circumstances and claims by Lloyd George, when the Poles occupied Kiev there was no indication of British disapproval of the action. Furthermore, the French, long opponents of the Bolsheviks remained strangely silent on the issue.18

While France and Great Britain remained relatively silent on the Polish offensive, the occupation of Kiev provided the Bolsheviks a convenient excuse to launch their own attack on Poland. Lenin’s telegram about Galician shock troops and his desire to help

German communists with direct military support indicate this desire, The Soviet’s launched a propaganda offensive decrying the Polish offensive and managed to simultaneously appeal to communists and proponents of Great Russia. Consequently, the

Bolsheviks gained wide support in Russia for a counteroffensive and managed to proffer the Poles as barbaric aggressors. The Bolshevik counteroffensive was successful beyond their expectations. The arrival of the Konarmiya (First Cavalry Army) led by Semyon

Budyonny proved decisive in the counter attack. It terrorized the Polish rear and

17 “Cypher telegram to Sir H. Rumbold, Warsaw, 27 January 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/201/1/6. 18 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 112. L.J. Macfarlane, “Hands Off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920,” Past & Present no. 38 (Dec. 1967): 132. 75 continuously flanked Polish units, resulting in near continuous retreat and withdrawal.

The Polish invasion of Ukraine was rapidly rolled back and was considered a general fiasco for the Poles. Quickly the Soviets approached the Zbrucz River, which the Peace

Conference’s mandate considered the furthest boundary that the Polish Army could legitimately advance. The Soviets, however, did not merely advance in Ukraine.

The rollback of the Polish advance resulted in the British developing a more hostile policy toward the initial Polish offensive. This indicated British policy toward

Poland was tied to Polish successes and failures. Lloyd George’s view of Poland was related to his view of Poland as a saisonstaat. Consequently, as Poland demonstrated an increased ability to manage its own affairs, the British remained relatively silent and were more willing to accept Polish action. The sudden and complete reversal of the Polish armies in Ukraine, however, seemingly confirmed British opinion of Poland as a liability and a state with outsized ambitions. After the sudden and complete reversal of the Polish army, the allies pressured Poland to push for an armistice based upon Polish withdrawal behind the Curzon Line (considered to be the boundary of ethnic Poland).19 The

Bolsheviks pushed the Polish armies back all along the borderlands, eventually entering what the western allies considered ethnic Poland. However, the British and the French did not supply Poland as they previously intimated. In a conversation between Lloyd

George and Marshall Foch, Marshall Foch stated that France could not send any men or material to Poland. Furthermore, he proclaimed that Poland’s desperate situation was the fault of the Polish government and the incompetence of the Polish military. The

19 Macfarlane, “Hands Off Russia,” 133. 76 conversation, which took place on July 8, 1920, characterized the situation in Poland as desperate but not hopeless. 20

The British and the French continued demanding the Poles push for an armistice and peace treaty. In an effort to ameliorate the western powers, the Soviets claimed to be open to the idea of negotiating an armistice with the Poles. Soviet agreeability stemmed from an attempt to craft a trade agreement with the British. Despite their public face, the

Bolsheviks had no real intention to end their war with Poland. The British pressured the

Soviets on their invasion of Poland and even threatened to break off negotiations with the

Bolsheviks. Curzon wrote to Chicherin stating that the British Empire could not continue negotiations while the Bolsheviks continued their invasion.21 However, Lenin, while rejecting British pressure, mollified the British by stating that negotiations must take place between the Polish and Soviet governments. This however, represented the public face of Lenin’s schemes. He remained determined to export the revolution to other nations and encouraged his generals to advance quicker.22 The allies sent the Inter-Allied

Mission to Poland to assess the situation and to change Polish policy toward the Soviets.

Accompanying the mission was Sir Maurice Hankey, a key advisor and secretary to

Lloyd George. Hankey wrote to Lloyd George that the situation in Poland was desperate

20 “Notes of a Conversation with Marshal Foch on July 8th, 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/201/1/8. 21 “Lord Curzon of Kedleston, to M Tchitcherin, 20 July 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/58/1/24. 22 Stephen Brown, “Lenin, Stalin and the Failure of the Red Army in the Soviet-Polish War of 1920,” War & Society 14, no. 2 (Oct. 1996): 37. 77 and perhaps incapable of being set right.23 On July 26, he wrote that the Poles accused the

Soviets of stalling the negotiations but added the Poles couldn’t provide proof of this claim.24 Finally, on August 4, 1920, with the Soviet Army on the outskirts of Warsaw,

Lord D’Abernon, the future ambassador to Germany, wrote that the Soviets broke off negotiations and acted in very bad faith.25 Lloyd George, however, still claimed the war was the fault of the Poles and must fight to the end and take the advice given to them.26

British help and aid would not be forthcoming, despite British claims to the contrary both to the Poles and in ultimatums to the Soviets. British policy toward the Soviet-Polish war remained as confused and hands-off as British policy toward Poland during the Peace

Conference. Surprisingly, France made no major moves to provide support to Poland during the war. British pressure and German unwillingness to transport arms handcuffed the French, who primarily through a lack of options provided military advice through their military mission in Poland. Regardless, Polish officials recognized their isolation in facing the Bolsheviks and acknowledged British annoyance in the ill-fated invasion of

Soviet Ukraine in May 1920.

The Soviet rout at the gates of Warsaw, at the hands of the Polish Army, sent the

Soviet Army hurdling backwards. Pilsudski unknowingly launched his counterattack at a poorly defended section of the Soviet lines. This, coupled with the successful Polish

23 “MPA Hankey, ‘In the train between Prague and Warsaw’ to the Prime Minister, 24 July 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/57/6/8. 24 “MPA Hankey, Warsaw, to the Prime Minister, 26 July 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/57/6/9. 25 “From Sir H Rumbold, Warsaw, 5 August 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/57/6/15. 26 “Lloyd George to Sir H Rumbold, 9 August 1920,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/57/6/19. 78 defense against Marshal Tukhachevskii’s attempt to strike at Warsaw from the north, resulted in a complete reversal of the Soviet fortunes in the war. Soon after the Soviet reversal, the Poles and the Bolsheviks moved preliminary armistice negotiations from

Minsk to Riga. The fortunes of war favored to Poles after mid-August 1920; however,

Polish politics remained bitter. Polish political parties, especially the National Democrats and the political center, ferociously criticized Pilsudski for his ill-advised and nearly disastrous invasion of Soviet Ukraine. The successful Soviet advance resulted in efforts by Paderewski, who lobbied for the Poles in Britain and France, to frame Polish reversals as Pilsudski’s fault. The right-wing press proclaimed the successful Polish counteroffensive as a victory for Weygand, the chief of the French military mission in

Poland.27 This claim gained traction in the international community and no doubt represented an effort by the right wing to discredit Pilsudski and deprive him of any glory following his near catastrophic decision to invade Soviet held Ukraine.

Through September 1920, the Poles and the Bolsheviks negotiated an end to the war; and on October 12, 1920, a preliminary peace and armistice was signed in Riga. The

Poles recognized the independence of Soviet Ukraine and Belarus and the Soviets recognized Polish claims over East Galicia. Furthermore, the two parties vowed to respect each other’s sovereignty and not meddle in internal affairs.28 The preliminary peace represented a crucial step for Poland as it provided international legitimacy to its claims over East Galicia and removed Soviet Ukraine as a potential roadblock to the

27 M.B. Biskupski, “Paderewski, Polish Politics, and the Battle of Warsaw, 1920,” Slavic Review 46, no.3/4 (Autumn-Winter 1987): 506. 28 Jerzy Borzecki, The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 147. 79 integration of East Galicia into Poland. Finally, the armistice created a thirty kilometer wide neutral zone between the Soviet and Polish armies. Within this neutral zone,

Poland’s Ukrainian and Byelorussian allies continued to fight; however, if they entered the Polish zone, they would be disarmed. After fighting for approximately a month after the armistice, both the Ukrainian and Byelorussian forces were routed by the Soviets and forced back across the Polish boundary; the Poles disarmed and interred the men.29 Thus through November and December 1920, independent, well organized Ukrainian and

Byelorussian forces disappeared, leaving only the Poles in East Galicia with the capacity for central government.

The preliminary armistice forced Poland to abandon its hopes for federalized union with Belarus and Ukraine. While federalist agendas suffered irreparable damage through the treaty, the Treaty of Riga, signed on March 8, 1921, provided legitimacy to

Polish territorial claims and the armistice of October 1920 eliminated significant rivals to

Polish hegemony in East Galicia. Polish politicians proclaimed the treaty as an expression of independent Polish foreign policy. Furthermore, Poles praised the treaty as an expression of the mutual agreement of two nations not the will of the League of

Nations or any other power.30 Poland secured its territorial ambitions in East Galicia through its war and subsequent peace treaty with the Bolsheviks and without the approval of the allies. The French and British, however, did not immediately recognize the legitimacy of the borders drawn in Riga. The French remained reluctant to accept the

Bolsheviks and the British pressed for regional, East Galician autonomy. Yevhen

29 Borzecki, The Soviet-Polish Peace, 157-8. 30 Borzecki, The Soviet-Polish Peace, 226-7. 80

Petrushevych, the leader of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic pleaded for audiences with British and French officials to present his case against Polish annexation. The

British Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay would not hear their cause.31 Consequently, the ZUNR was isolated in Western circles. Ukrainian isolation resulted from Anglo-

French reluctance to create an independent Ukraine. This reluctance was evident from early in allied discussions at the Peace Conference; instead, Polish control for a period to time to by followed by a plebiscite seemed favorable in British circles. British opinion was not limited to Polish control followed by a plebiscite. Halford Mackinder, the British

High Commissioner to South Russia, recognized the unlikelihood of the complete collapse of the Bolshevik regime in 1920.32 Mackinder proposed the creation of new

European states to act as a shield against Bolshevism and prevent German influence from expanding into Russian spaces. Additionally, Mackinder expanded his proposal to include a series of alliances in Eastern Europe.33 This proposal bore remarkable similarity to French proposals during the Peace Conference; however, the idea gained little traction in British circles. Even pro-intervention British officials by 1920 rejected the idea. In response to the proposal, Curzon stated that British policy toward Russia was neither logical nor consistent and lacked a clear solution.34 British policy in Eastern Europe was forced to react to developments in an effort to create a more stable situation.

Developments in the East resulted in dramatic shifts in British policy. After the

31 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 173. 32 The British sent Mackinder to South Russia to assess the situation in Russia and create opportunities for British policy. 33 B.W. Blouet, “Sir Halford Mackinder as British High Commissioner to South Russia, 1919-1920,” The Geographical Journal 142, no. 2 (July 1976): 233-4. 34 Blouet, “Sir Halford Mackinder as British High Commissioner,” 235. 81 consolidation of power by the Poles in Eastern Galicia, British attention turned to creating regional autonomy under Polish control.

Polish control over East Galicia and international disputes over it came to a head during the 1922 Genoa Conference. Ostensibly called to address economic issues and the integration of Bolshevik Russia into the European community, the conference also dealt with the issue of Poland’s eastern borders. Lloyd George attacked Polish efforts in East

Galicia and the Prime Minister’s attacks and the inability of the Polish delegation to counter resulted in collapse of the Polish cabinet in 1922.35 The Genoa Conference attempted to solve the Polish border questions without success. Interestingly, Lloyd

George seemed more agreeable to a Polish East Galicia. In a conversation with

Czechoslovak Prime Minister Edvard Benes, Lloyd George stated that he did not object to the acceptance of Polish borders, since the Russians had accepted them.36 Russian agreement seemed crucial for the British and indicated the consistency of his opposition to Polish demands. He wished to avoid creating a Poland that would be subject to irredentist neighbors; the Treaty of Riga, at least on the surface, created an eastern border for Poland that was agreeable to both states. Thus theoretically securing Poland against future aggression. Lloyd George’s ultimate approval resulted from Polish action to secure itself. Polish fighting resulted in relative quiet and created a stable situation allowing for tentative British approval of Polish military action. Although, he remained

35 Carole Fink, “Beyond Revisionism: The Genoa Conference of 1922,” in Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922, ed. Carole Fink, Axel Frohn, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 22. 36 “Notes of a Conversation between Mr. Lloyd George and Dr. Benes at the Villa d’Albertis, Genoa, on Wednesday, April 26, 1922, at 11.15 a.m.” DBFP vol. 19, 565-570. 82 concerned that the German-Soviet rapprochement at Rapallo signified danger for the

Polish state as the Soviet’s proclaimed the Treaty of Riga an imperialist peace. While

Lloyd George remained hopeful for an autonomous East Galicia within Poland, Polish borders eventually received allied endorsement and recognition in March 1923.

The Polish fait accompli in East Galicia was accomplished through an ill-advised offensive in May 1920, a near miraculous counteroffensive in August 1920, a treaty with the Bolsheviks in March 1921, and the disarmament of Ukrainian armed forces in

Ukraine. The Poles achieved this almost completely without the approval of the West, though the French may have encouraged independent action. While the French supported the Poles at every opportunity, independent Polish action repeatedly forced Clemenceau and subsequent French leaders to repudiate the Poles. Despite French disavowals, the

British viewed Polish action as in agreement with French post-war policies, which further strained their relations. Contrasting with French designs, Ukrainian communist and nationalist leaders abroad condemned the Polish annexation of the territory as an act of violence.37 Consequently, Polish-Ukrainian relations were stained by the Polish annexation of the territory and Polish designs on the territory (incorporation not federalism) precluded the establishment of an autonomous Ukraine. France and Great

Britain clashed over German borders, reparations, Middle Eastern mandates, the Greco-

Turkish conflict, and the Bolshevik role in post-war Europe. Disagreements over Poland only added to this burden.

37 Fink, “Beyond Revisionism,” 23. 83

While the Poles fought in Ukraine, Lithuania became a major point of contention between the Poles, Lithuanians, and the Bolsheviks. In March 1920, the Conference of

Ambassadors chastised Pilsudski for Poland’s continued action in Lithuania and warned against further advancement against Lithuania. Polish and Lithuanian forces fought in and around Vilna since early 1919 and by late March, early April, the Lithuanians had managed to secure some backing from Britain through loans and political cover.

Simultaneous with British support of Lithuania against Poland, Voldemaras, the

Lithuanian Prime Minister, reached out to the Bolsheviks for recognition. Voldemaras requested the Soviets recognize Lithuania including their claim to Vilna. The Soviets would not provide their immediate recognition; however, offered negotiations and their willingness to recognize Lithuania based on ethnic principles. 38 These negotiations began on May 7, the same day Polish troops occupied Kiev during their ill-fated invasion of Ukraine.

Polish-Lithuanian relations suffered during the Soviet-Polish war. During the war, despite Western pressure, the Lithuanians refused to declare their neutrality and continued negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Consequently, Poland felt threatened by the

Soviets and perceived the Lithuanians as aiding the Bolsheviks in the war against Poland.

In late July 1920, allied leaders gathered at Spa in Belgium to discuss reparations with

German representatives. The Poles appealed to the allies for support; however, Polish reversals in Ukraine left a negative impression and resulted in Lloyd George decrying

38 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 130. 84

Polish imperialism and incompetence.39 Early indicators demonstrated allied frustrations with Polish action and its rapid reversal.

Polish Premier Wladyslaw Grabski appealed to the allies to send aid to Poland to help slow the Bolshevik advance into Poland. The allies, however, made aid contingent upon several conditions. First the Poles were required to seek an armistice based on the borders agreed upon by the Peace Conference. Second, plenipotentiaries were to be sent by Poland to attend a conference in London to settle disagreements between Poland,

Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Russia, and East Galicia. Finally, the Poles were required to accept the decision of the Supreme Council on Vilna, Eastern Galicia, Teschen, and

Danzig.40 After the allied powers proposed the measures, Grabski questioned the allies on the merits of the December line proposed by the Peace Conference. Lloyd George rebuked him by arguing that Vilna lay far beyond the ethnographic boundaries of Poland and the city’s Polish majority was offset by the overwhelming Lithuanian character of the countryside. The allied powers pressed Poland on their continued wartime occupation of

Vilna and argued that should Poland continue to hold it; the Bolsheviks would take the city and hold it. On the other hand, if the Lithuanians possessed the city, the Bolsheviks might be less inclined to occupy Vilna. In the face of allied arguments and steadfastness,

Grabski had little choice but to accept these conditions especially when the rapidity of the

Bolshevik advance was considered.41 This agreement legally placed the future of Vilna in

39 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 153-4. 40 “British Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held at the Villa Fraineuse, Spa, on Saturday, July 10, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.” DBFP, vol. 8, 513-8. 41 “British Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held at the Villa Fraineuse, Spa, on Saturday, July 10, 1920, at 3 p.m.” DBFP, vol. 8, 524-30. 85 the hands of the allied powers with input from the feuding parties. Given Lloyd George’s stances on Lithuanian issues in the past and his enmity towards anything but a purely ethnically homogeneous Polish state, it seemed unlikely Poland would receive Vilna. The ethnic map tilted heavily toward the Lithuanians because of the overwhelming Lithuanian character of the countryside surrounding Vilna. Grabski’s plea for support against the

Bolsheviks resulted in an agreement that heavily favored Lithuania in their quest to claim the historic capital.

Lloyd George’s position of influence and prominence in Polish matters at Spa resulted from Italian and French inability to press the British on Eastern European matters. France remained largely silent on the Polish military action on Kiev and French

Prime Minister Millerand insisted on continued abjurement of the Bolsheviks.

Consequently he could not mediate the Polish-Soviet conflict. Millerand warned the

Poles against outsized territorial demands and consequently the Kiev offensive contrasted with stated French desires.42 Furthermore, the allies convened the Spa Conference to determine German reparations and payments, which affected Millerand’s willingness to press for Polish causes. Piotr Wandycz noted that because of French-British disputes over reparations, disarmament, and mandates in the Middle East, Millerand did not wish to antagonize Lloyd George.43 Unfortunately for Poland, France could not support the Poles at Spa and Lloyd George’s objections to Polish military action and “outsized” ambitions ruled the debates.

42 Carley, “The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism,” 175. 43 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 155. 86

The situation in Vilna became untenable on July 11, 1920. Despite Grabski’s optimism that the Poles could hold Vilna against the Bolshevik advance, the British

Commissioner for the Balitc, Stephen Tallents, reported that by July 11 the Poles must retreat from Vilna. However, it wasn’t until July 14 that Warsaw informed Lithuanian forces to occupy Vilna. The allies hoped that Lithuanian possession of Vilna would prevent a Bolshevik advance into the city; however, the Bolsheviks occupied the city before the Lithuanians could arrive in the city on July 15.44 Allied hopes to block the

Soviet advance through Vilna failed to account for Lithuanian diplomacy. The

Bolsheviks and Lithuanians signed the Treaty of Moscow on July 12. The treaty allowed for the Bolshevik forces to pass through Vilna to the Polish front. This provision, included in a secret protocol, undermined Lithuanian assertions of their neutrality. The

Lithuanians agreed to Soviet demands in return for Bolshevik recognition of Lithuania, including Vilna, Grodno, and Lida. The Lithuanians used the treaty as the basis of all negotiations with the Poles, who countered that since neither the Lithuanians nor the

Soviets possessed Vilna when the treaty was signed it could not be considered binding.45

Differences over possession of Vilna prevented Polish-Lithuanian relations to develop during July and August 1920 and negotiations over the city amounted to non-starters.

As Bolshevik forces streamed eastward following the Battle of Warsaw, they were forced to abandon occupied areas; one such city was Vilna. After the Bolsheviks occupied Vilna on July 15, they did not revert control to Lithuanians. Rather they began

44 “British Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held at the Villa Fraineuse, Spa, on Saturday, July 10, 1920, at 3 p.m,” in DBFP, vol. 8, 524-30. and Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 31. 45 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 32-33. 87 to lay the groundwork for a communist revolution in Lithuania itself.46 The Soviet

Army’s reversal at the gates of Warsaw prompted the Bolsheviks to give control of Vilna to the Lithuanians on August 24.47 The occupation of Vilna by Lithuanian forces prompted strenuous objections by the Poles and the beginnings of further negotiations, which collapsed with Polish advances into claimed Lithuanian territory and Lithuanian demands over the recognition their possession of Vilna. The Poles, however, announced grievances against the Lithuanians and desired to retake Vilna. The Polish High

Command accused the Lithuanians of allowing safe passage to retreating Bolshevik troops trapped against the border by the Polish counteroffensive in order to rejoin the

Soviet Army.48 Furthermore, Lithuanian use of the Treaty of Moscow to legitimize their territorial claims frustrated the Poles who viewed Lithuanian actions and agreement with the Bolsheviks as an alliance.

The Polish advance and the Lithuanian occupation of Vilna began a series of back and forth conversations between the two states. These disagreements required the mediation of the League of Nations, which ultimately did little to solve the deep issues between the states. Polish complaints about Lithuanian sympathy with the Bolsheviks and aid for retreating and regrouping soldiers prompted renewed Polish advances. These advances resulted in louder calls by the Lithuanians of Polish violations of borders and armistice agreements. Clashes between Lithuanian and Polish forces intensified as the

Poles pressed into Lithuanian claimed territory and the two government’s lack of trust

46 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 34. 47 “Colonel Ward (Kovno) to Earl Curzon,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 520. 48 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 35. 88 resulted in a slow moving process to halt the violence. The Lithuanians claimed, with good reason, that the Polish military were planning a military action to retake Vilna.

Indeed, the National Democrats advocated for a complete occupation of not only Vilna but also all of Lithuania. General Rozwadowski, a National Democrat, proposed the

Polish army continue their advance into Lithuania to prevent the Bolsheviks from using in the territory as a jumping off point for future invasions.49 This aligned with Dmowski’s proposals for Lithuania. The National Democrats proposed the complete annexation of

Lithuania on the basis of Polish cultural influence and the assimilation of non-Poles into

Great Poland.50 Complete annexation and assimilation was the National Democrats ideal; however, this policy was impractical given the national character of the Lithuanians and the measures necessary to accomplish it. The Polish military high command noted that flooding Lithuania with Polish soldiers would earn Poland the eternal enmity of the

Lithuanian people.51 Additionally, Lithuanian supporters (primarily the British) would protest such an action and prevent a key National Democrat platform: integration with

Western Europe.

British intelligence supported Lithuanian claims of Polish duplicity in their negotiations. Curzon wrote that Pilsudski and the Polish military were planning a military action to retake Vilna despite reassurances by the Polish Foreign Minister to the contrary.52 These concerns were momentarily laid to rest on October 7 with the signing of an armistice at Suwalki between Poland and Lithuania, which included a demarcation

49 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 316. 50 Polansky, Politics in Independent Poland, 98. 51 Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 316. 52 “Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 583. 89 line.53 The agreement made no mention of Vilna, though tacitly left the city in Lithuanian hands. The Lithuanians referred to the agreement as a treaty and the Poles deemed it a military agreement. However, the presence of political representatives on both sides indicated something more than a military agreement. Ultimately, the document signed on

October 7 was not quite a treaty. Regardless, events of the same day, October 7, would render the agreement moot.

On October 7, General Zeligowski with troops consisting of men from Vilna and

Grodno appeared to mutiny, ignore orders to cease advancing, and launched an offensive toward Vilna. Pilsudski orchestrated this plan in an attempt to force the Lithuanians to either create a federal union with Poland or accept Vilna’s incorporation into Poland proper.54 Zeligowski’s troops rapidly advanced; and by October 8, the Lithuanians could not defend Vilna and left it for the Poles. The British furiously protested the Polish advance. Curzon accused the Poles of a gross breach of faith, an utter disregard for allied advice, and failing to properly advise their military. Furthermore, Curzon condemned

Polish duplicity in appealing to the League of Nations, signing an agreement with

Lithuania, and then launching an offensive.55 Zeligowski entered Vilna to cheers from the city’s Polish population and proclaimed the formation of the state of “Central Lithuania.”

He claimed to be representing the will of the people and protecting their right to decide

53 “Sir P. Loraine (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 586. 54 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 136-7. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 317-8. 55 “Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris),” DBFP, vol. 11, 592. 90 their own fate, based on the principle of self-determination. Furthermore, the disavowed

Treaty of Moscow placed the city under Lithuanian jurisdiction.56

The British laid the blame for Zeligowski’s mutiny and subsequent occupation of

Vilna on the Polish government despite, Polish Charge d’Affaires in London, Jan

Ciechanowski’s assurances that Zeligowski’s mutiny was unanticipated and completely without the approval of the Poles. The British, quite rightly, asked that if the ethnic character of Zeligowski’s men was known why his command was positioned at a sensitive place on the front.57 These questions underlined British skepticism about the affair and underscored their belief in Pilsudski’s compliance in the scheme. The French were highly displeased by the Zeligowski affair. The French premier, Georges Leygues, disavowed the action and stated that it made the worst impression. Furthermore, the mutiny provided Lloyd George with further complaints about the Poles. French efforts to lobby the British on behalf of Poland were damaged after the apparent fait accompli.58

The British and the French, however, could do very little in actuality. Curzon recognized

British inability to press Poland in any significant manner. He stated that that Britain was

“beating the air and attempting to hide [their] impotence.”59 This indicates a central problem with British policy in Eastern Europe. British policy was highly reactive. Polish action in East Galicia and Vilna caught the British off guard and they failed to present a compelling solution in Eastern Europe. The British desired to reintegrate Germany and

56 “Sir P. Loraine (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 596. 57 “Record by Mr. Gregory of a conversation with M. Ciechanowski, in DBFP, vol. 11, 593-5. 58 Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 183. 59 Note to Gregory’s conversation with M. Ciechanowski’s, in DBFP, vol. 11, 595. 91

Russia; however, they lacked a plan to achieve that goal. Consequently, as Curzon noted, the British could only “beat the air” and react to events on the ground rather than shape and implement policy.

Beyond official condemnation and bellicose rhetoric, the British could do very little in October 1920. Much of British impotence resulted from developments in

Anatolia. In October 1920, Greek forces in Anatolia attacked into Anatolia hoping to defeat Mustafa Kemal sustaining Greek military pressure, which had begun in the summer. Further complicating this action, King Alexander of Greece died after a monkey bite in October resulting in Greek political chaos including the fall of Britain’s primary

Greek political ally, Prime Minister Venizelos and his controlling parliamentary coalition. This resulted in the return of the exiled king Constantine and Anglo-French condemnations of the return of the pro-German Greek monarch.60 Consequently, developments in the Mediterranean captured British attention, as security in the

Mediterranean directly related to British economic and imperial interests. With developments in the Mediterranean and lacking military credibility in the Baltic, even through association, the British and the French were forced to accept official Polish condemnation and warned the Poles against future fait accompli.

With the British and French unwilling and unable to provide significant support for the Lithuanians and concerns over the viability of the Lithuanian state in the wake of a renewed Soviet offensive, the allies viewed a federation with Poland more favorably.

60 Erik Goldstein, “Great Britain and Greater Greece, 1917-1920” The Historical Journal 32, no. 2 (June 1989): 356. 92

However, by October 1920, support for federation dwindled significantly in Poland.61

Furthermore, Lithuanian officials uncompromisingly demanded the return of Vilna and the complete withdrawal of Zeligowski’s soldiers as a condition for renewed negotiations. These demands annoyed allied officials and resulted in decreased patience and willingness to work with the Lithuanians. Even the Soviets, perhaps the Lithuanians greatest backer, could not support Lithuanian demands for an international force to govern Vilna. The Poles effectively portrayed the Lithuanians as the roadblock to a Baltic settlement because of the Lithuanians rejection of federation and rejection of allied plans for mediation.62Additionally, while the League of Nations had condemned the Zeligowski fait accompli, they failed to effectively reprimand him or Poland and accepted the fiction of a complete independent action.63 The Poles used effective diplomacy in the wake of their fait accompli to legitimize their action and secure Vilna for Poland. In January 1922, people in Vilna elected an incorporationist majority for the Vilna Sejm. The vote was roundly criticized because of the abstention of large numbers of Lithuanians,

Belorussians, and Jews; however, the election of an incorporationist Sejm paved the way for legal incorporation with Poland. On February 20, the Sejm voted for incorporation with Poland as the Wilno Voivodeship and the Polish Sejm ratified the proposal a month later. Zeligowski’s fait accompli and subsequent diplomatic maneuvers by the Poles created the opportunity for the incorporation of the city into Poland.

61 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 140. 62 Cienciala, From Versailles to Locarno, 142-4. 63 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 58. 93

The Zeligowski mutiny functionally ended Polish-Lithuanian relations for almost the entirety of the interwar period. The Lithuanian state never reconciled itself to losing

Vilna and the city remained Lithuania’s official capital. The Lithuanians went so far in their objections they refused to attend conference in which the Poles were present.64 This increased Lithuanian diplomatic isolation and closed venues for discussions with the

Poles. Additionally, Lithuanian intransigence provided the final death sentence to efforts to create a Polish-Lithuanian federation. French efforts to craft a series of alliances failed in the post-war period. Furthermore, opposition within Poland created, in Poland, little opportunity to create any federalized state.

Polish actions in Eastern Galicia and Lithuania illustrate Polish actions along an unstable border with Russia. Simultaneous with crises in Vilna and East Galicia, Poland faced a dangerous situation in Upper Silesia. The Supreme Council of the Paris Peace

Conference decided upon a plebiscite for Upper Silesia. This altered the original decision to give the region to Poland based upon perceived ethnic composition. In early February

1920, the Inter-allied Administrative and Plebiscite Commission of Upper Silesia assumed power in the region from local German authorities. The Commission arrived supplemented by allied occupation troops. These troops were expected to ensure the peace during the occupation and separate the Germans and Poles, especially in the wake of the August 1919 insurrection. The Commission was comprised of French General

Henri Le Rond, English Colonel Henry Percival, and Italian General Alberto de Marinis.

Contrasting with allied action in East Galicia and Vilna, the allied powers possessed

64 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 93. 94 significant power on the ground in Upper Silesia. Furthermore, in contrast with Galicia and Vilna, the French position enabled them to more closely influence pro-Polish policy in the East. This position stemmed from Le Rond’s presidency over the commission and control over the military. Le Rond was known as an advocate of French designs, which would empower Eastern European states to balance Germany and would create a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism.65 Acting as a counterweight to Le Rond, Col. Percival represented British desires to mitigate the worst of the Peace to reintegrate Germany into the European community. Accordingly, after only a couple months on the ground, he wrote to Curzon expressing his concerns regarding Le Rond’s open favoritism toward the

Poles and bias against Germans.66 His complaints indicate British fears over the

Commission becoming an extension of Quai d’Orsay policy regarding Germany.

Tensions in Upper Silesia increased through 1920 and the Plebiscite Commission took limited action to defuse these tensions. One of the first matters the Commission addressed was the prevalence of firearms in the large rural areas of Upper Silesia. The

Commission issued a decree requiring the registration of firearms and mandating fines and jail time for illegally held weapons.67 Furthermore in June 1920, the Plebiscite

Commission dissolved the German dominated police force and the secret police

(Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo). The Germans pressed the Commission to delay the dissolution of the Sipo because of concerns over “Polish hooliganism.”68 The British and

Germans forced the issue to the Commission and indicated their mutual distrust of Polish

65 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 141. 66 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, 2 May 1920,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 12-14. 67 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites, 2:170-1. 68 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 183. 95 elements in Upper Silesia; a feeling that was not unfounded. French troops balked when disarming Poles and retained a casual attitude at stopping arms shipped from Poland

(specifically Posen). This resulted in the Poles retaining large weapons caches in the region. The Germans also did not completely comply with Commission issued directives.

While German Freikorps units were documented in Upper Silesia after August 1920, there is evidence that implies their presence before the second Polish uprising. A German plebiscite official stated that German shock units had been formed but their inability to hinder the Polish action indicated their poor supply and leadership.69 The quote indicates

German action to counteract Polish elements in the region and attempt to balance the

Polish Military Organization (POW).

Tensions boiled over during the Soviet-Polish War. In August 1920 as the Soviets were at the gates of Warsaw, German rail workers, at the behest of union leadership, stopped all independent shipments of munitions to Poland and staged a massive demonstrations in Kattowitz, Rybnik, and Gleiwitz. The demonstration turned violent when French troops and Sipo arrived and surrounded the main square and drew sabers. In violent confusion, German demonstrators killed an outspoken Polish activist and burned the headquarters of the local Polish Plebiscite Commissariat, killing several inside.

Eventually, the French, acting upon German advice, withdrew and the riot burned itself out and Italian troops restored order the following day. The riot’s violence against Poles convinced the POW of the Plebiscite Commission’s inability to protect Poles.

Consequently, the POW, led by Wojciech Korfanty, armed bands of the Polish

69 Quoted in Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 186. 96 population and organized strikes among Polish miners. These units rapidly gained control in the industrial triangle, occupying Lublinitz, Tarnowitz, Beuthen, Königshütte,

Kattowitz, Pless, and Rybnik. The Poles expelled the Sipo in these regions and concentrated on eliminating the primary German plebiscite leaders.70 Korfanty reached an agreement with the German plebiscite leaders on August 27 in which he renounced violence in exchange for immediate disbanding of the Sipo, the expulsion of everyone brought into Upper Silesia to influence the plebiscite, and discrimination in the workplace. The Poles used their position of power in Upper Silesia following the uprising to secure important concessions deemed important for a favorably Polish outcome to the vote. This strategy concerned the British who considered it an abuse of power and indicative of French inactivity or unwillingness to rein in the Poles. Specifically, the

Germans complained, “French troops were not showing impartiality.”71 German and

British complaints about French partiality toward the Poles were well founded.

Furthermore, Korfanty did use his position of relative power after the second uprising to secure important concessions from local plebiscite officials. Importantly, the uprising and agreements between local authorities and the Poles forced Berlin to reassess Upper

Silesia’s creation as an autonomous state to shore up local support before the plebiscite.72

The second uprising left the region on edge and put greater pressure on the

Commission and its quest to secure a peaceful vote in Upper Silesia. Violence and the

70 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, August 22, 1920,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 37-44. 71 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, August 28, 1920,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 45. “Lord Kilmarnock to Earl Curzon, Berlin, August 31, 1920,” in DBFP, vol. 11, 45. 72 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 196-8. 97 problem of outvoters73 resulted in suggestions for a divided plebiscite. Concerns over ballot safety resulted in the British negotiating a one-day plebiscite with outvoters, in exchange for British troops on the ground in Upper Silesia.74 The compromise satisfied several key points. First, it elated the Germans and British as they received the one-day, one-region plebiscite. Second, the French and Italian troops finally received help from

British troops who were promised to the Commission but were never delivered.

On March 20, 1921, an entire year following the Plebiscite Commission’s assumption of power in the region, Upper Silesians voted. Colonel Percival reported that the vote took place quietly and peacefully, in contrast with the year leading up to the plebiscite.75 The vote returned 1,186,342 valid votes: 59.6 percent favored Germany and

40.4 percent favored Poland. Of 1,474 commune areas, 792 voted for German and 682 voted for Poland. Furthermore, in the industrial triangle (Gleiwitz, Beuthen, and

Kattowitz), five of eight districts voted for Germany, albeit by slim margins in some areas.76 Percival, in his report to Curzon, noted that the north, northwestern, and southwestern portions of Upper Silesia went strongly for Germany; the south and the east voted for Poland; and the middle saw a small majority for Germany.77 Curzon accepted the plebiscite results as proof of Germany’s claim to all of Upper Silesia. He wrote, “I think … in view of the overwhelming German majority in the plebiscite area, the only

73 Outvoters included individuals born in Upper Silesia but had moved out of the region. They were permitted to vote in the plebiscite and German subsidization of outvoter travel benefited Germany. 74 Gisela Bertram-Libal, “Die britische Politik in der Oberschlesienfrage, 1919-1922,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 20, No. 2 (1972): 111-2. 75 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, March 21, 1921,” DBFP, vol. 11, 196. 76 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 236. Wambaugh, Plebiscites, 1:250. 77 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, March 23, 1921,” DBFP, vol. 11, 196-7. 98 really efficacious solution appears to us to be the recognition of German claims to the whole.”78 The Commission did not release the results of the vote until May 7; however,

German and Polish representatives closely estimated the results producing German jubilation and Polish dejection. Furthermore, the results of the plebiscite were not so overwhelming as to ensure the totality of the region for Germany. The Italians directed their representative, de Marinis, “to exercise discretion by making some concessions to

Poles in districts where the latter had decisive majorities whilst allotting the greater part of Upper Silesia to Germany.”79 Through April 1921, the Commission debated the division of the area. Le Rond supported Korfanty’s suggestion that gave Poland two- thirds of the population of the industrial triangle. The British and Italians, however, argued Poland should receive only the cities of Pless, Rybnik, Tarnowitz, and a small sliver of territory on the eastern border of Upper Silesia. This proposal allocated Poland

25 percent of the communes and 23 percent of the population, well under the percentage who voted for Poland.80 The divisions within the Commission were so entrenched they presented the League of Nations with two proposals for the division of the area.

British and Italian insistence over a positive outcome for Germany in the plebiscite was tied, in part, to concerns over German stability. British ambassador to

Berlin, Lord D’Abernon, expressed the concern of German businessmen, who in January

1921, voiced their collective fear of the impact of Upper Silesia’s separation would have

78 “Earl Curzon to Colonel Percival, Foreign Office, March 22, 1921,” in DBFP, vol. 16, 1. 79 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, March 30, 1921,” in DBFP, vol. 16, 4-5. 80 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 254. Wambaugh, Plebiscites, 1:253. 99 on the German economy and reparation payments.81 These fears echoed earlier German statements, which tied reparation payments to favorable territorial settlements for

Germany. 82 The German Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference had successfully, in some minds, connected territory (especially in the East) with the success and timeliness of German reparation payments. The German political establishment was not alone in putting pressure on the allies. German trade unions wrote to David Lloyd George. They argued that the loss of Upper Silesia would represent a significant hardship for the

German people and would force German labor to renounce all obligations placed on

Germany.83 While German complaints and threats were an effort to exert pressure on the allies, the language effectively managed to stir British and Italians fears about German stability and ability to honor their treaty obligations.

While the British and Italians pushed their partition line against French proposals,

Wojciech Korfanty wrote and published an editorial in his newspaper, Grenzzeitung. The piece, entitled “The Diplomats have Spoken,” claimed the British-Italian plan represented the opinion of the entire Commission and would likely be accepted by the Supreme

Council.84 The editorial served as the spark for the third Upper Silesian insurrection beginning on May 7, 1921. The insurrection quickly gained control of Pless, Rybnik, and

Tarnowitz. Furthermore, the rebels destroyed bridges connecting Upper Silesia to

81 “D’Abernon, Paris, to Earl Curzon, 19 January 1921,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/54/1/6. 82 Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, “German Note of May 13, 1919, on Territorial Questions,” in The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. Alma Luckau (New York:Columbia University Press, 1941), 245-6). 83 “Representatives of German Trade Unions, Berlin, to the Prime Minister, London, 12 October 1921,” Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/53/3/11. 84 Wambaugh, Plebiscites, 1:253. 100

Germany. Colonel Percival wrote to London that he believed the insurrection to be an attempt to seize the region through force.85 In addition to the POW’s military action,

Upper Silesian coal, iron, and zinc workers declared a general strike. The Poles were well organized and possessed approximately 60,00 men at arms, which were reinforced by defectors from the Polish contingent of the plebiscite police.86 The Poles enjoyed early success and forced General le Rond to request additional troops because the Commission was overrun and could no longer keep order. Further complicating the situation, Pilsudski refused to disavow the insurrection and forbid officers and soldiers from siding with insurgents.87 Pilsudski’s statements about national sentiment combined with excited public opinion must have seemed similar to assertions by the Polish premier during the

Vilna crisis six months before. Pilsudski’s indifference did not belie any sinister motive; rather it resulted from Pilsudski’s eastern focus. The National Democrats, however, cared deeply for Upper Silesia. Endeks led the Posen Insurrection in 1918, which resulted in

Posen’s separation from Germany. The party of Dmowski focused their attention on

Germany; consequently, the fate of Upper Silesia garnered much more interest. Finally,

Pilsudski’s indifference to the insurrection in Upper Silesia represents a tacit acceptance of the action and the actions of National Democrats along the border with Germany.

Lloyd George railed against the insurrection. He questioned the Polish character of the population; he accused the Poles of attempting to create a fait accompli; and

85 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, May 3, 1921,” in DBFP, vol. 16, 49. 86 Lesniewski, “Three Insurrections,” 33. 87 “Mr. Max Muller to Earl Curzon, Warsaw, May 6, 1921,” in DBFP, vol. 16, 55-56. 101 reverted to the idea that Germany should defend itself.88 The British, Germans, and

Italians blamed the French for the uprising because Le Rond departed for Paris the day before the uprising. However, in reality, French opinion vacillated between support and condemnation. The French considered the action embarrassing, they supported the Poles and the Poles launched the uprising without consultation with Paris. Furthermore, French soldiers on the ground could not be depended upon to use excessive force against their

Polish allies. While generally soft in their criticism, Polish threats to flood coal mines elicited sharp condemnations from the French government. The French would not tolerate provoking the British and Germans and threatening the economic well being of the region. Additionally, the French pressured the Poles to end the uprising as they had already proved an important point: the local insistence on a Polish Upper Silesia. The

French saw potential to use the uprising as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the

Italians and British.89 The French, however, did not approve of the uprising as a fait accompli or overly antagonistic threats against industry.

Korfanty responded to British criticism in a lengthy telegram to Lloyd George.

Korfanty argued that the Polish population was laborers and the Germans were the immigrants to the region. Additionally, he made reference to Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, in which the Polish population had been “germanised [sic] by an unscrupulous oppresive

[sic] and brutal system of government.” He further addressed Lloyd George’s claim that the insurrection was an attempted fait accompli; Korfanty rejected this claim and argued the uprising was a spontaneous expression of despair after learning of the British-Italian

88 Tooley, National Identity in Weimar Germany, 257. 89 Wandycz, France and Its Eastern Allies, 232. 102 partition proposal.90 Korfanty’s letter attempted to sway Lloyd George and portray the uprising as an expression of the people. The uprising however was far too organized and well supplied to be spontaneous. Furthermore, the extent of their advance was far too specific. The Polish insurgents pressed the German and Italian forces. On May 11, under pressure from the Polish government, Korfanty agreed to halt attacks if the insurgents could administer the area approximating the Korfanty line, which he proposed to Le

Rond immediately following the plebiscite. Colonel Percival rejected this proposal because, “it is difficult to see how we (the British) can agree to any concessions in view of our promise that Poles are not to be allowed to benefit by insurrection.”91 Given the amount of territory occupied and the outcome of the previous two insurrections, it seems the POW wished to either present a fait accompli or to strengthen their position in negotiations. The Poles received stiff resistance and were pushed back by German

Freikorps and Grenzschutz units beginning on May 18 and, by July 7, the Allies managed to halt military action by both the Poles and Germans; however, the Poles retained their hold on the eastern third of the plebiscite area.

Bickering about the boundaries of the partition of Upper Silesia dominated the six weeks following the end of the insurrection. No compromise could be reached between the French, British, and Italians and the matter was referred to the League of Nations.

Representatives from China, Belgium, Brazil, and Spain solicited expert opinion and developed their recommendation for the division of the territory. The Commission

90 “Korfanty to Lloyd George, London, 16 May 1921,” David Lloyd George Papers, LG/G/57/5/8. 91 “Colonel Percival to Earl Curzon, Oppeln, May 11, 1921,” in DBFP, vol. 16, 72-3. 103 recommended that Poland receive most of Rybnik and all of Pless. This was not surprising since even the British-Italian plan allotted that territory of Poland. The

Commission also allotted the land surrounding Beuthen and the city and land of

Kattowitz. Germany retained Gleiwitz, Hindenberg, and the city of Beuthen. Ultimately,

Germany received approximately seventy percent of the land and fifty-seven percent of the population. Importantly, however, Poland received 76 percent of the coal mines, 90 percent of the coal reserves, 97 percent of the iron ore, 82 percent of the zinc ore, 71 percent of the lead ore, all of the iron works, over half of the zinc factories, half of the steel works, and the largest power plants.92 Poland received the lion’s share of the industrial production and a portion of the population roughly consistent with their share of the vote. Furthermore, territory integrated to Poland amounted to approximately a third of the plebiscite area, the same amount held by the insurgents following the third uprising. Korfanty’s three uprisings showcased the strength of the POW and forced concessions from the Germans, British, and French. While Korfanty publically denied his attempt to present a fait accompli, the actions of the POW and the specific nature of their offensives accomplished just that.

92 Wambaugh, Plebiscites, 1:259. 104

CONCLUSION: A VICTORY FOR WHOM?

Great Britain and France accepted Poland’s borders and its political agreements with the Bolsheviks, which ratified the Polish-Soviet border, in 1923. Additionally, the

League of Nations settled the Polish-German border in Upper Silesia and the Polish and

German governments ratified the agreement. Poland included Vilna, East Galicia, the

Kresy, and a portion of Upper Silesia. The state included ethnic Poles, Germans,

Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and Jews. The Polish Government governed the minorities through a system of regional autonomy granted to some regions and through international agreements, which bound the Polish state to protect ethnic minorities. The bulk of the minority population in Poland during the interwar period was in territories annexed by Poland during the formative years between 1918-1923, although a significant

Jewish population lived in the territory of the former Congress Kingdom.

The boundaries of the Polish state included most of the territory envisioned by

Roman Dmowski and the National Democrats. In 1917, Dmowski claimed East Galicia,

Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, Volhynia, Poznania, West Prussia, Danzig, and Upper

Silesia.1 Six years following Dmowski’s initial statement, Poland successfully annexed

East Galicia, Vilna, Poznania, Volhynia, Grodno, and some of Upper Silesia. Germany retained West Prussia and the allies created Danzig as a free city under control of the

League of Nations and Soviet Russia controlled Minsk. The Poland of 1923 resembled the Poland of Dmowski far more than the Poland of Pilsudski’s planning. Each of the regions annexed by Poland possessed significant minority populations: Germans,

1 Stachura, Poland, 1918-1945, 23. 105

Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and Jews. While the minority population in

Upper Silesia received regional autonomy, the minority populations in the borderlands were subject to the policies of the Sejm in Warsaw. The German and Jewish populations were subject to what Rogers Brubaker characterizes as “dissimilation;” meaning there was no effort to assimilate these populations, rather they were relegated and relegated themselves to the periphery of Polish political life.2 The National Democrats believed, however, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians should be subjected to assimilationist programs.3 The Sejm repeatedly reaffirmed National Democrat and Peasant Party designs by passing measures to annex Vilna and then accepting the request from Zeligowski’s government in Vilna for annexation. Additionally, the lack of support in 1919 for a federal union with Lithuania and hostility toward the Pilsudski-Petliura agreement in

1920 further illustrated the indifference of Polish politics to the federal scheme. The annexation of East Galicia and the strength of right-wing parties in the region indicated the reluctance of Poland to accept regional autonomy for the region. Although the Polish government promised regional autonomy for East Galicia, those promises were quickly forgotten and East Galicia became a entirely subject to the Polish government.

1922 represented the complete destruction of Pilsudski’s desire to create a large, federal Polish state in Eastern Europe. Poland stabilized its borders as a single, national entity in Eastern Europe. The borders dreamed by Pilsudski would have been extensive and create three autonomous states within Poland. Additionally, the scheme would have

2 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1996), 88 and 93. 3 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 100. 106 limited the spread of Bolshevism into Eastern Europe as Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine would have limited further Soviet expansion. Polish military action in Ukraine and

Lithuania eliminated the remaining possibilities to create independent states in federal union with Poland. It is clear, however, the Polish Sejm did not support these designs and thus Pilsudski’s advance into Ukraine to install Petliura’s government demonstrated efforts within Polish government to present a fait accompli. Lithuanians refused to open relations with the Poles after Zeligowski’s fait accompli and the Ukrainian supporters of the Pilsudski-Petliura agreement were eliminated as a credible force following the Treaty of Riga in 1922. Thus the eastern borders of the Second Polish republic were a compromise between the Soviets and the Poles.

The borders of the Polish state successfully established Poland, which closely resembled the territory desired by Dmowski. Interestingly, however, Dmowski was least successful with his goals along the German-Polish border. Dmowski did, however, get as much territory as he could: Posen, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia. Given Germany’s reluctance to give up any territory and British opposition to Polish demands, Poland managed to gain a remarkable amount of territory. Polish territorial ambitions were most successful in the East because Germany had the support of Britain. Lloyd George’s efforts managed to limit German territorial losses. Poland did not receive Danzig and

Germany retained East Prussia and most of Upper Silesia. The Germans, however, would not accept any territorial losses and any settlement that took territory from Germany was sure to be rejected. Poland possessed the most initiative in the east because of the unsettled and undetermined nature of the borderlands. The POW, however, managed to 107 successfully exert pressure through a series of insurrections in Upper Silesia and a successful coup in Posen.

Freedom to act and successes in the east juxtaposed with National Democrat’s concerns over German aggression. The National Democrats considered Germany

Poland’s greatest threat; however, they could not exert extensive pressure on Germany because of allied and political restraints on their party program. Furthermore, Pilsudski remained a significant force in Polish politics in the 1920, even after elections swept the right and the center into political power. The influence of Pilsudski and pressing military situation forced Polish attention to turn east, which is where Polish territorial gains were most extensive and successful. Consequently, Poland received more of their territorial objectives in the east than west. Pilsudski managed to achieve most of his territorial goals: Vilna, Lvov, Ukrainians oilfields, and the Kresy. This achievement, however, was attained through annexation rather than a federal Great Poland. Dmowski’s vision for

Poland was the concept that ultimately won in 1923. Poland constituted one, national state and assimilation proved the more acceptable ideology to the political right and center. The expansive, assimilationist Poland of Dmowski’s 1917 thinking proved the closest approximation to Poland six years later.

Dmowski’s victory ultimately was a hollow one. Given the methods Polish government and organizations utilized to achieve territorial goals (fait accompli), a hollow victory was the only way Poland could win. Lithuania never reconciled itself to losing Vilna. After the exile of ZUNR leadership and the destruction of Petliurite forces,

Ukrainians developed underground insurgent forces in Ukraine to terrorize the Poles and 108

Bolsheviks. The Germans never reconciled themselves to losing territory and irredentism swelled in Germany during the interwar period. The loss of regional alliances alienated the Poles and placed them in a vulnerable position between a bellicose Germany and a revisionist Soviet Union. While Pilsudski’s brash action managed to take territory and

Dmowski’s supporters annexed it through Sejm resolutions, these actions resulted in internal discord within Poland (ZUNR terrorism in East Galicia) and created a common enemy for Germany and the Soviet Union. 109

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