Civil Conflict in South Vemen Mark N

- /~/6 Civil Conflict in South Vemen Mark N. Katz In January 1986, fighting erupted in This article will examine the background South Yemen (also known as the People's of the crisis; the crisis itself; and its impli Democratic Republic ofYemen- PDRY) cations for the future. between two factions of the ruling Marxist leadership. Both of the factions were Background of the Crisis strongly pro-Soviet, and the group that won said it would pursue the same policies as Since the November 1967 victory in the group it ousted. What the issues were in which Marxist guerillas led South ¥emen the struggle appeared quite confusing, and to independence. they have undergone sev during the ten or so days when the fighting eralleadership struggles. In the 1969 coup, was at its heaviest, it was unclear what was 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il became head of the happening. Reports that the leaders ofeach party, Salim'Rubayi'Ali chief of state, and side had been killed alternated in quick 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hassani the de succession with reports that the leaders of fense minister; in 1971 al-Hassani also be each were alive and were victorious. By the came prime minister. This group of "radi time the fighting ended, the top leaders of cals" actively supported the Marxist rebel one faction had all been killed, but that lion to the east in neighboring Oman. The faction prevailed nevertheless. rebels, who eventually became known as At first glance, what happened in Aden, the Popular Front for the Liberation of South Yemen's capital, might not seem Oman (PFLO). won some early victories. especially interesting: no matter which But at the end of 1975, the rebellion was pro-Soviet faction defeated the other, the defeated by the forces ofSultan Qabus with USSR would retain its influence in South the help ofBritain. Jordan and Iran. Yemen. But skepticism greets the protesta Soon after, the South Yemen leadership tions of the new leaders that they will fol was wracked by a new power struggle. The low the same policies as their predecessors, president, Salim Rubayi 'Ali, who was since the new leaders are associated with a oriented more toward China, wanted to fol policy that the ousted leader, 'Ali Nasir low Peking's lead in normalizing relations Muhammad al-Hassani, had ended with America and the West (the radicals namely, the exportation of revolution to had severed diplomatic relations with South Yemen's neighbors. Hence, predic Washington shortly after they came to tions as to the probable behavior ofthe new power in 1969). However, the party chief, leadership and their Soviet allies toward the Isma'il. who was strongly pro-Soviet, rest of the region are fraught with consider wanted to hew closely to Moscow's able uncertainty. policies. At fIrSt, 'Ali appeared to have the upper hand when, in the summer of 1977• he succeeded not only in normalizing rela Mark N. Katz is a research associate at the Kennan InstilUte for Advanced Russian Studies of Ihc Smith· tions with Saudi Arabia but also in sonian Institution's Woodrow Wilson International negotiating a generous aid package from Center for Scholars. He is Ihc author or Th~ Third Riyadh. However, when the Ogaden crisis World In SOl'i~t Military Thought (Baltimore: Johns broke out in the fall, 'Ali was powerless to Hopkins University Press, 1982). and Russia and Arabia: Sovld Fo~ign PoliC)' toward ,h~ Arabian prevent party chief Isma'U (and the Ptnlnsula (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univenily Soviets) from using Aden as a trans-ship Press, 1986), ment point for arms and Cuban troops sent 7 8 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW-FALL 1986 KATZ:S to help Ethiopia. The Saudis, who sup the border with South Yemen). In February The ported Somalia in the dispute, were so 1979, fighting broke out between the two pleased angered by this move that they cancelled countries, but a cease-fue was instituted the overtlu their aid, thus effectively weakening Presi following month. However, this did not Hassan dent'Ali further. He appealed to Washing end the NDF insurgency nor its support by party 81 ton for aid in order to extricate South South Yemen. prime n Yemen from total reliance on the Soviets. three te Even as a U.S. State Department mission ously I was enroute to Aden in June 1978, fighting moved broke out in Aden between the forces of • ofatten ,Ali andlsma'il. After two days offighting, the new 'Ali was defeated and executed; the State Ironically, Isma'U's efforts to promote have ge Department mission was aborted. revolution in Oman and North Yemen did neighbCl Exactly what role the Soviet Union not meet with Soviet approval. Although USSR. played in the June 1978 fighting is still the Kremlin was not averse to Marxists This I disputed. What is certain, however, is that coming to power in these countries, it ma'U's Moscow gained considerably from the up found that unsuccessful Marxists were an mained heaval. Having recently lost access to mili embarrassment. The Soviet Union has tra them, 'J tary facilities, fust in Egypt and then in ditionally had a dual policy toward Third ter, but i Somalia, the Soviets managed to retain and World countries: support Marxist revolu by pIOn even to expand their presence in South tion in those countries where revolution chief of Yemen, thanks to Isma'i}'s ouster of'Ali. seems feasible; otherwise, work for good replaced After the June 1978 coup, Prime Minis relations with the government in power lih Qash ter al-Hassani ascended to the post of chief (even if it is conservative) in hopes of to suppo of state, but by the end of the year he was loosening its ties with the United States. sions c~ displaced by party leader Isma'jJ. Isma'U, Thus, SouthYemen's backing ofunsuccess Hassani now clearly the preeminent leader, signed a Cui Marxists in Oman, not only did little to Yemeni treaty of friendship and cooperation with advance the cause of revolution in that very 101 Brezhnev in October 1979. country, but also eroded the Soviet Union's Qasim ~ Isma'jJ was very keen on seeing Marxist diplomatic efforts to improve its relations support t revolution spread to the neighboring states with the oil-rich Arab monarchies. 1982, C( of the Arabian Peninsula. When the Shah The prognosis for the NDF in North that succ of Iran fell from power in early 1979, the Yemen was much more promising in 1979 remainin; last Iranian troops were withdrawn from and 1980 than for the PLO in Oman. This crossed 0 Oman. Believing that it was mainly foreign was not particularly pleasing to the Soviets, AI-Ha intervention that had previously defeated for they knew that the NDF's appeal was close rei the PFLO Isma'U backed this organiza limited mainly to the Sunni Shafi'is of emment. tion's renewed efforts to incite revolution southern North Yemen, who resented al-Hass81 in Oman. PFLO forces made several raids the rule of the Shia Zaidis to the north. The Sultan of into Oman, but the PFLO failed com ongoing insurgency was also hampering even fror pletely to revive the rebellion there. Soviet efforts to establish diplomatic rela South YI In North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Re tions with the Saudis (Soviet hopes in this ties with public), Isma'jJ had greater success. Him regard had been spurred by Saudi displeas richer on self a Northerner, Isma'U wanted to bring ure over America's arranging the Camp tance to ~ about the union of the two Yemens, prefer David agreement between Egypt and Is South Ye ably under his rule. Several coups had al rael). Further, the Soviets were so fearful also furtb ready taken place in the North, and the of driving North Yemen (with its popula with theSl regime ofColonel'Ali •Abadallah Salih ap tion about four times that of the South) into In Oct< peared ripe for overthrow. Isma'U backed closer relations with the West that Moscow treaty of the National Democratic Front (NDF), a actually sold Salih's government the Moscow Marxist group that rapidly gained influence weapons it used to combat the Marxist (Which hi in the southern part of North Yemen (near NDF. communi FALL 1986 KATZ: SOUTH YEMEN 9 I February The Soviets were therefore not dis Saudis) agreed for the fust time to establish :n the two pleased when in April 1980 Isma'il was diplomatic relations with the USSR; the ,tituted the overthrown in a bloodless coup by al United Arab, Emirates followed suit in is did not Hassani. AJ-Hassani became head of the November 1985. Soviet contacts with ;upportby party and chief of state whiJe keeping the Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar (none of prime ministership - the fust time that the which has yet established diplomatic rela three top posts were occupied simultane tions with the USSR or any other com ously by one person. AI-Hassani also munist country) also increased. I moved quic~y to reverse Isma'iJ's policy ofattempting to export revolution. Instead, The January 1986 Crisis the new leader embarked on a campaign to o promote have good relations with South Yemen's AJ-Hassani's foreign policies furthered ~emen did neighbors while remaining close to the Moscow's aims in the region, but his Although USSR. domestic policies caused the Soviets some ) Marxists This policy, however, did not please Is alarm. Although extremely pro-Soviet, untries, it ma'iPs close associates, who still re a1-Hassani was also interested in promoting ts were an mained in powerful positions.

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