- /~/6 Civil Conflict in South Vemen Mark N. Katz

In January 1986, fighting erupted in This article will examine the background South Yemen (also known as the People's of the crisis; the crisis itself; and its impli­ Democratic Republic ofYemen- PDRY) cations for the future. between two factions of the ruling Marxist leadership. Both of the factions were Background of the Crisis strongly pro-Soviet, and the group that won said it would pursue the same policies as Since the November 1967 victory in the group it ousted. What the issues were in which Marxist guerillas led South ¥emen the struggle appeared quite confusing, and to independence. they have undergone sev­ during the ten or so days when the fighting eralleadership struggles. In the 1969 coup, was at its heaviest, it was unclear what was 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il became head of the happening. Reports that the leaders ofeach party, Salim'Rubayi'Ali chief of state, and side had been killed alternated in quick 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hassani the de­ succession with reports that the leaders of fense minister; in 1971 al-Hassani also be­ each were alive and were victorious. By the came prime minister. This group of "radi­ time the fighting ended, the top leaders of cals" actively supported the Marxist rebel­ one faction had all been killed, but that lion to the east in neighboring Oman. The faction prevailed nevertheless. rebels, who eventually became known as At first glance, what happened in Aden, the Popular Front for the Liberation of South Yemen's capital, might not seem Oman (PFLO). won some early victories. especially interesting: no matter which But at the end of 1975, the rebellion was pro-Soviet faction defeated the other, the defeated by the forces ofSultan Qabus with USSR would retain its influence in South the help ofBritain. Jordan and Iran. Yemen. But skepticism greets the protesta­ Soon after, the South Yemen leadership tions of the new leaders that they will fol­ was wracked by a new power struggle. The low the same policies as their predecessors, president, Salim Rubayi 'Ali, who was since the new leaders are associated with a oriented more toward China, wanted to fol­ policy that the ousted leader, 'Ali Nasir low Peking's lead in normalizing relations Muhammad al-Hassani, had ended ­ with America and the West (the radicals namely, the exportation of revolution to had severed diplomatic relations with South Yemen's neighbors. Hence, predic­ Washington shortly after they came to tions as to the probable behavior ofthe new power in 1969). However, the party chief, leadership and their Soviet allies toward the Isma'il. who was strongly pro-Soviet, rest of the region are fraught with consider­ wanted to hew closely to Moscow's able uncertainty. policies. At fIrSt, 'Ali appeared to have the upper hand when, in the summer of 1977• he succeeded not only in normalizing rela­ Mark N. Katz is a research associate at the Kennan InstilUte for Advanced Russian Studies of Ihc Smith· tions with Saudi Arabia but also in sonian Institution's Woodrow Wilson International negotiating a generous aid package from Center for Scholars. He is Ihc author or Th~ Third Riyadh. However, when the Ogaden crisis World In SOl'i~t Military Thought (Baltimore: Johns broke out in the fall, 'Ali was powerless to Hopkins University Press, 1982). and Russia and Arabia: Sovld Fo~ign PoliC)' toward ,h~ Arabian prevent party chief Isma'U (and the Ptnlnsula (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univenily Soviets) from using Aden as a trans-ship­ Press, 1986), ment point for arms and Cuban troops sent

7 8 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW-FALL 1986 KATZ:S

to help Ethiopia. The Saudis, who sup­ the border with South Yemen). In February The ported Somalia in the dispute, were so 1979, fighting broke out between the two pleased angered by this move that they cancelled countries, but a cease-fue was instituted the overtlu their aid, thus effectively weakening Presi­ following month. However, this did not Hassan dent'Ali further. He appealed to Washing­ end the NDF insurgency nor its support by party 81 ton for aid in order to extricate South South Yemen. prime n Yemen from total reliance on the Soviets. three te Even as a U.S. State Department mission ously I was enroute to Aden in June 1978, fighting moved broke out in Aden between the forces of • ofatten ,Ali andlsma'il. After two days offighting, the new 'Ali was defeated and executed; the State Ironically, Isma'U's efforts to promote have ge Department mission was aborted. revolution in Oman and North Yemen did neighbCl Exactly what role the Soviet Union not meet with Soviet approval. Although USSR. played in the June 1978 fighting is still the Kremlin was not averse to Marxists This I disputed. What is certain, however, is that coming to power in these countries, it ma'U's Moscow gained considerably from the up­ found that unsuccessful Marxists were an mained heaval. Having recently lost access to mili­ embarrassment. The Soviet Union has tra­ them, 'J tary facilities, fust in Egypt and then in ditionally had a dual policy toward Third ter, but i Somalia, the Soviets managed to retain and World countries: support Marxist revolu­ by pIOn even to expand their presence in South tion in those countries where revolution chief of Yemen, thanks to Isma'i}'s ouster of'Ali. seems feasible; otherwise, work for good replaced After the June 1978 coup, Prime Minis­ relations with the government in power lih Qash ter al-Hassani ascended to the post of chief (even if it is conservative) in hopes of to suppo of state, but by the end of the year he was loosening its ties with the United States. sions c~ displaced by party leader Isma'jJ. Isma'U, Thus, SouthYemen's backing ofunsuccess­ Hassani now clearly the preeminent leader, signed a Cui Marxists in Oman, not only did little to Yemeni treaty of friendship and cooperation with advance the cause of revolution in that very 101 Brezhnev in October 1979. country, but also eroded the Soviet Union's Qasim ~ Isma'jJ was very keen on seeing Marxist diplomatic efforts to improve its relations support t revolution spread to the neighboring states with the oil-rich Arab monarchies. 1982, C( of the Arabian Peninsula. When the Shah The prognosis for the NDF in North that succ of Iran fell from power in early 1979, the Yemen was much more promising in 1979 remainin; last Iranian troops were withdrawn from and 1980 than for the PLO in Oman. This crossed 0 Oman. Believing that it was mainly foreign was not particularly pleasing to the Soviets, AI-Ha intervention that had previously defeated for they knew that the NDF's appeal was close rei the PFLO Isma'U backed this organiza­ limited mainly to the Sunni Shafi'is of emment. tion's renewed efforts to incite revolution southern North Yemen, who resented al-Hass81 in Oman. PFLO forces made several raids the rule of the Shia Zaidis to the north. The Sultan of into Oman, but the PFLO failed com­ ongoing insurgency was also hampering even fror pletely to revive the rebellion there. Soviet efforts to establish diplomatic rela­ South YI In North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Re­ tions with the Saudis (Soviet hopes in this ties with public), Isma'jJ had greater success. Him­ regard had been spurred by Saudi displeas­ richer on self a Northerner, Isma'U wanted to bring ure over America's arranging the Camp tance to ~ about the union of the two Yemens, prefer­ David agreement between Egypt and Is­ South Ye ably under his rule. Several coups had al­ rael). Further, the Soviets were so fearful also furtb ready taken place in the North, and the of driving North Yemen (with its popula­ with theSl regime ofColonel'Ali •Abadallah Salih ap­ tion about four times that of the South) into In Oct< peared ripe for overthrow. Isma'U backed closer relations with the West that Moscow treaty of the National Democratic Front (NDF), a actually sold Salih's government the Moscow Marxist group that rapidly gained influence weapons it used to combat the Marxist (Which hi in the southern part of North Yemen (near NDF. communi FALL 1986 KATZ: SOUTH YEMEN 9

I February The Soviets were therefore not dis­ Saudis) agreed for the fust time to establish :n the two pleased when in April 1980 Isma'il was diplomatic relations with the USSR; the ,tituted the overthrown in a bloodless coup by al­ United Arab, Emirates followed suit in is did not Hassani. AJ-Hassani became head of the November 1985. Soviet contacts with ;upportby party and chief of state whiJe keeping the Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar (none of prime ministership - the fust time that the which has yet established diplomatic rela­ three top posts were occupied simultane­ tions with the USSR or any other com­ ously by one person. AI-Hassani also munist country) also increased. I moved quic~y to reverse Isma'iJ's policy ofattempting to export revolution. Instead, The January 1986 Crisis the new leader embarked on a campaign to o promote have good relations with South Yemen's AJ-Hassani's foreign policies furthered ~emen did neighbors while remaining close to the Moscow's aims in the region, but his Although USSR. domestic policies caused the Soviets some ) Marxists This policy, however, did not please Is­ alarm. Although extremely pro-Soviet, untries, it ma'iPs close associates, who still re­ a1-Hassani was also interested in promoting ts were an mained in powerful positions. One of economic development in his poverty­ on has tra­ them, 'Ali 'Antar, was the defense minis­ stricken country. Having been prime minis­ "'ard Third ter, but al-Hassani was able to remove him ter since 1971 and having dealt since then ist revolu­ by promoting him to the post of deputy with the Soviets regarding their economic revolution chief ofstate in 1981. •Ali ' Antar was then assistance to Aden, he realized just how k for good replaced as,defense minister by Salih Mus­ little the Soviets either could or would help . in power lih Qasim, who also wanted South Yemen him. Indeed, part ofa1-Hassani's reason for I hopes of to support the NDF. On a number ofocca­ improving relations with Oman and North ited States. sions cease-fires were arranged by ai­ Yemen was to encourage the Saudis, .unsuccess- Hassani between the NDF and the North Kuwaitis, and other wealthy Gulf states to did little to Yemeni government. None of these lasted give him the economic assistance that ·Ion in that very long, partly because 'Antar and Moscow would not. Further, a1-Has~ani iet Union's Qasim were able to continue providing began to open the country to investment by .ts relations support to the NDF. But in the spring of Western companies. He particularly en­ .es. 1982, Colonel Salih launched an offensive couraged Western oil companies to come F' in North that succeeded in crushing the NDF; the and explore for oil; the Soviets had been ing in 1979 remaining rebels either defected to him or trying to find it since the early 1970s, but )man. This crossed over into the South. had failed. the Soviets, AI-Hassani quickly moved to established The hardliners remaining in Aden who appeal was close relations with Colonel Salih's gov­ had been associated with Isma'il were not Shafi'is of ernment. Furthermore, in the fall of 1982, pleased with this economic opening to the o resented al-Hassani normalized relations with the West. They were concerned that this would ~north.Tbe Sultan of Oman and prohibited the PFLO lure young people away from Marxist prin­ hampering even from making radio broadcasts out of ciples, especially if foreign corporations omatic rela­ South Yemen. AI-Hassani improved his operated more effectively than the usually ,opes in this ties with all the neighboring states, and the unsuccessful Soviet-sponsored enterprises. Idi displeas­ richer ones renewed their economic assis­ The Soviets appeared to share their concern : the Camp tance to South Yemen. This new, friendly that Marxist rule would somehow be :)'pt and Is­ South Yemeni policy toward its neighbors jeopardized by the influence of Western :e so fearful also furthered Soviet efforts to improve ties and conservative Arab money. I its popula­ with these countries. ' In May 1984, it became evident that the ~ South) into In October 1984, North Yemen signed a hardliners were gaining strength when the hatMoscow treaty of friendship and cooperation with defense minister Qasim and other hardlin­ roment the Moscow. In September 1985, Oman ers joined 'Ali 'Antar on the ruling Polit­ the Marxist (which has traditionally been more anti­ buro. Isma'H's former internal security communist than even the conservative chief - who was reported to have been

: -~.- 10 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW-FALL 1986 KATZ

executed or imprisoned in September 1982 After every coup in South Yemen, the level - also became a minister at this time. In new leadership's account of events has said January 1985, al-Hassani relinquished the usually been greeted with skepticism. medi prime ministership, though this post did not Western journalists visiting Aden shortly 10,OC go to a hardliner but a technocrat - al­ after the fighting died down, however, ,Attas - who was believed to be a suppor­ concluded that the new leaders' story was ter of al-Hassani. Still, it was unusual that essentially accurate. Al-Hassani had called al-Hassani would want to give up this posi­ a Politburo meeting for January 13 to tion considering that he had been able to which only his rivals had been invited. As seize full power from it in 1980.2 they were waiting for al-Hassani, men with WI machine guns opened fue on them. Many this ( were killed, including 'Ali 'Antar and conf~ Salih Muslih Qasim. Others, who had Radic brought their own weapons to the meeting, Aden escaped and made contact with their sup­ porter • porters. When the rebels finally took Aden, coup they announced the names of their memo aloHa bers who had been killed, making no men­ Sovie What role, if any, the Soviets had in tion of Isma'U. Several days later they re­ warri. these developments is not certain. But vealed that he had escaped from the meet­ this, 0 they must have been involved in the early ing room, but had died later. 4 took 2 1985 return to Aden of the former leader, After arranging for this massacre, ale aided Isma'il, from Moscow (where he had been Hassani did not remain in Aden but went to sued I living in exile since 1980). Upon his re­ his home province of Abyan to await de­ come turn, Isma'i1 was named head of one of the velopments. This may have been one of model departments in the ruling party's Central several foolish errors for this enabled to the Committee Secretariat. In October 1985, hardliners to rally their forces and seize hardlil the third congress of the Yemeni Socialist many important positions in the capital. feet \l Party was held; Isma'il was "elected" to AI- Hassani made another error the Hassa both the Politburo and the Secretariat, as weekend after the fighting began when he ceased were several other of his hardline allies. left the country to visit Ethiopia and North sign t~ With these developments, al-Hassani's po­ Yemen. He may have gone to gain their stay ill sition had definitely been weakened. 3 support, or at least to persuade them not to they hi What happened at the party congress set aid his opponents. But when it was first ing So the stage for the final showdown between announced that he had left the country, troops the two opposing factions. With al-Hassani speculation instantly arose that he had fled; More

level of fighting, especially in Aden, was Although the new leaders are closely as­ ~men; the said to have been intense; the Western sociated with Isma'it and the hardliners ~ents bas media frequently cited estimates that who earlier had made strenuous efforts to epticism. 10,000 people had been killed.s export revolution, both they and the Soviets m shortly went to great lengths to reassure Oman, however" North Yemen, and Saudi Arabia that they story was intended to continue aI-Hassani's policy of luld called maintaining friendly relations with those try 13 to countries.8 The Soviets, then, did not lVited. As What was the role ofthe Soviet Union in abandon al-Hassani because they disap­ men with this conflict? At first, Moscow seemed proved of his policy of befriending the :m. Many confused about what was transpiring. neighboring countries. Indeed, this is a pol­ 'ntar and Radio Moscow repeated the initial Radio icy they wanted South Yemen to continue who had Aden broadcast made by aI-Hassani's sup­ since if the new leadership in Aden tried to ~ meeting, porters that his opponents had attempted a promote revolution in Oman and North their sup­ coup but had failed. 8 Soon, realizing that Yemen, they would probably not succeed ook Aden, aI-Hassani was not in complete control, the at this time but would only undermine heir mem­ Soviets attempted to mediate between the Moscow's recent success in improving re­ Ig no men­ warring factions, but they failed. After lations with some of the conservative Gulf er they re­ this, observers noted that the Soviets under­ states. l the meet- took a series of measures that increasingly aided the hardliners. The Soviet Union is­ ssacre, al­ sued a warning to other states not to be­ but went to come involved in the fighting. Since the I await de­ moderate aI-Hassani was more acceptable :en one of to the neighboring states than were his • is enabled hardline opponents, the Soviets were in ef­ and seize fect warning other states not to aid ai­ he capital. Hassani. In addition, the Soviet media Conclusion error the ceased all mention of al-Hassani - a sure m when he sign that they had lost faith in his ability to Had the Soviets really sought the ouster l and North stay in power if not an outright signal that of aI-Hassani? Jeane Kirkpatrick concluded , gain their they had turned against him. Refugees flee­ in The Washington Post that they had and, them not to ing South Yemen also claimed that Soviet moreover, that they had orchestrated the it was first troops were aiding the opposition forces. change in regime in order to install some­ le country, Moreover, it was reported that the Soviets one of less independent mind. to As has he had fled; were amplifying the opposition's radio already been seen, however, aI-Hassani's It have sup­ signal. 7 policy of seeking good relations with his rside out of Prime Minister al-'Attas had the good neighbors was yielding benefits for I. Although fortune to be on an official visit to New Moscow; the Soviets had no interest in risk­ province, it Delhi when the fighting broke out. He had ing their gains by seeing those restored to d his oppo­ been scheduled to travel from there to Pe­ power in Aden who wanted to export revo­ of Aden and king, but he went to Moscow instead. lution at a time when exporting revolution ..en reported When the rebels gained the upper hand, he was not likely to be successful. The Soviets ) march on was named the new chief of state, and he could have desired the ouster of aI-Hassani never mate- returned to Moscow shortly thereafter. 'Ali because they feared that his policy ofallow­ fell to the Salim aI-Bayd, one of the few who sur­ ing Western businesses into the country mi has been vived the January 13 Politburo massacre, would subvert socialist rule there. The ng followers became the head of the party. AI-Bayd, Soviets, after all, did permit Isma'iJ to re­ lrth Yemen, however, had been wounded; his newly ap­ turn to Aden from Moscow and may well I1f the border pointed deputy, Salim Salih Muhammad, have been instrumental in effecting his re­ Arabia. AI­ appears to be running the party. 8 turn to the Politburo. ort time, the 12 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW-FALL 1988 KATZ:

But had the Soviets really sought the the Soviets may have decided to support ouster of a1-Hassani, they probably could al-Hassani's opponents because they from have brought about a quick, quiet change of seemed more likely to win and because it rival regime at any time, either before or after was more important to Moscow to see one specti Isma'i1 returned. Instead, it appears that the side come to power quickly and restore the coural Marxist order. The unacceptable alterna­ pend ( Soviets were basically satisfied with al­ ~ Hassani, but that they were worried about tive was to remain loyal to a1-Hassani, Ihe some of his internal policies. Therefore, thereby risking prolonged fighting that strong again; they sent Isma'il home to join the Politburo could have led to the destruction of Marxist the ch not in order to overthrow al-Hassani, but rule in the country. leader: merely to warn him that he could be over­ South Yemen is now relatively calm, and is the thrown if he went too far in allowing West­ the new pro-Soviet leadership seems to be Yemel ern corporations into South Yemen. From firmly in power. The fighting in Aden in­ ideolol the Soviet point of view. this must have terrupted the USSR's progress in improv­ will 101 seemed an eminently sensible maneuver: ing ties with the oil-rich monarchies of the chief ( there existed two factions (at least) among Gulf Cooperation Council. But because sociale the South Yemeni leadership. both of South Yemen is now quiet, and because eroplc< which were pro-Soviet. By pitting them both Moscow and Aden have made great against one another, the Soviets could best efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia, Oman, ensure that the policies they backed were and North Yemen that South Yemen will carried out by Aden. This was much more not be a threat to them again, the setback in effective than relying on one leader who. the Soviet diplomatic campaign to win I. FOI and eX1e1 although pro-Soviet, could pursue his own friends in the region may prove only Arabia: policy preferences more easily (which is temporary. Peninsuj what Isma'iI had been doing before ai­ Some may conclude that though the up­ Press,I5 Hassani overthrew him in 1980). And ul­ heaval in South Yemen was tragic for the 2. SCI timately. a strong Marxist ruler could con­ people of that country if the casualties suf­ USSR: f EaslJOUl ceivable break with Moscow completely, fered were indeed as high as was reported, 3. On while a divided leadership would be un­ the Soviet position in the country or in the Polilburo likely to do this. Even if some wanted to region will suffer little negative impact. in Arabic expel the Soviets. the rivalry among the But the Soviets themselves may not be so InformaJi, Report [h leadership would virtually prevent them sanguine. Until this year, South Yemen 17,1985, from uniting on such a move, and the was something of a showcase-example C6. Soviets could support the rival leaders in among the new Marxist-Leninist Third 4. John ousting the potential apostates. World stales. Virtually all the others (Af­ the Fury l 1986, p. If this indeed was the Soviet reasoning ghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozam­ Soulhern behind returning Isma'H to Aden, then they bique, Angola. and Nicaragua) are struggl­ FcbNlU}' I badly miscalculated not only the sheer ing against armed internal opposition that ports Ex· viciousness of the rivalry among the South the local Marxist government has been un­ Times, Fe Yemeni leadership but also their own abil­ able to defeat - even with the help oflarge 5. John South Yer ity to keep the situation under control. numbers of troops from Cuba (in Angola), 1986, pp. Once the fighting broke out, Moscow be­ Vietnam (in Cambodia). or the Soviet Subside," came alarmed that each faction was turning Union itself (in Afghanistan). In South A3. to its own tribe for support, and that the Yemen. though, this was not the case. No 6. MOSQ FBIS:SOVl tribes were becoming heavily involved in significant domestic opposition existed, p. HI. the conflict. 11 What must have worried and the Marxist regime seemed fmnly in 7. "U.S Moscow was that if conflict among the power. Wor," Thl Marxist forces persisted, non-Marxist What happened in January 1986 shat­ A3. forces, such as the tribes supported by tered this assumption. The Soviets. certain 8. AI·DI Commincc some of the neighboring countries, could that their control ofSouth Yemen was fmn, Bohlen, "! overthrow the Marxist regime altogether were surprised to find that it was obviously Leader by and expel the Soviets completely. Thus, not firm enough to prevent intense conflict 25, 1986, I in Arabic, 7,1986, p. · .

-FALL 1986 KATZ: SOUTH YEMEN 13 to support from erupting. Further. the fact that the The Soviets. then, may face similar ause they rival Marxist factions turned to their re­ crises in South Yemen if the South Yemeni I because it spective tribes for support was not an en­ leaders. following their usual pattern. once ,to see one couraging sign: the Soviets can hardly de­ more become locked in struggle. If fighting Irestore the pend on tribal forces for the best defense of becomes chronic. the Soviets may find they ~le alterna­ the Marxist order. Finally. there is the need to exert greater efforts and incur al-Hassani. strong possibility that fighting will erupt greater costs to maintain their position in ghting that again; wherever the head of the party and the country. Yet. if a strong leader arises 10fMarxist the chief of state have been two different who can unite all these disparate elements leaders. they have inevitably clashed. This under his own rule. the Soviets will become ycalm. and is the situation that exists now in South fearful of being expelled by him. There leems to be Yemen. It is not at all clear whether party are. after all. only some 1.000 Soviet mili­ in Aden in- ideologues such as Salim Salih Muhammad tary advisers in South YemenI! - far in improv­ wiD long tolerate the technocrat al-'Attas as fewer than the 20.000 that Sadat expelled chies of the chief of state; al·· Attas. after all. was as­ from Egypt. In light of these consi(Jera­ lut because sociated with al-Hassani before the fighting tions. the Soviets cannot be confident of md beCause erupted. easily retaining their influence in the South made great Yemen of the future. • bia. Oman. Yemen wiD NOTES Ie setback in 1. For a fuller account of South Yemen's internal 9. John Kifner, "Southern Yemen Offers a 'Good !ign to win and external politics. see Mark N. Katz. Russia and Neighbor Policy.· .. The NelV York Times, FeblUDI)' prove only Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian I. 1986, p. 3. (In recent conversations, however. Peninsula (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University American and NOlth Yemeni officials indicated that Press, 1986), ch. 2. the National Democratic Front has renewed its activ­ lUgh the up­ 2. See Nonnan Cigar. "South Yemen and the ity in southern North Yemen; moreover. the new ragic for the USSR: Prospects for the Relationship," The Middle South Yemeni leadership has supported it in retalia­ lSuaities suf­ East Journal 39:4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 775·795. tion for North Yemen's allowing AI-Hassani and his las reported. 3. On the elections to the YSP Central Committee followers to remain there. But the level or NDF activ­ Politburo and Secretariat. see Aden Domestic Service ity does not appear to be as intense as it was in Itry or in the in Arabic, October 16, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast 1979-82.) live impact. Information Service: Middle East and Africa Daily 10. Jeane Kirkpatrick. "Hazardous Duty in South ay not be so Repon [hereinafter referred to as FBIS MEl. October Yemen," The Washington Post, Febtuary4, 1986. p. ~uth Yemen 17,1985, p. CI; and FBIS ME, Oetober21, 1985, p. A16. (Ms. Kirkpatrick's views are cited here because lse-example C6. they reneeted the thinking of many high·level poli· 4. John Kifner, "Battle for Southern Yemen: How cy-makers as to what was transpiring in South Ilinist Third the Ful)' Began," The Nell' York Times, Janu8l)' 30, Yemen.) See also, Mark N. Katz. "South Yemen: ~ others (Af­ 1986, p. A4. John Kifner, "Massacre Over Tea: The Kirkpatrick Version," The Washington Post, lia. Mozam­ Southern Yemen ConOict," The Nell' York Times. FeblU8I)' 8. 1986, p. A19. ) are struggl­ FeblU8'Y 9, 1986, pp. AI, A16. "South Yemen Re­ II. On the role ofthe tribes in the fighting, see lohn ports Ex-Chief Died in Baltle." The New York Kifner, "Soviet Said to TI)' to Calm South Yemen." ,position that Times, FeblUary 11,1986, p. AS. The Nell' York Times. Janu8l)' 17. 1986, p. A3; and has been un­ 5. John Kifner, "Rebel Fighters Declue Victol)' in Kifner. "Battle for Southern Yemen: How the FUI)' help of large South Yemen," The New York Times, lanuary 20. Began." loc. cit. The role of the tribes. however, (in Angola). 1986, pp. AI. A4. and "Southern Yemen Battles must not be overemphasized, as is the case in an r the Soviet Subside," The New York Times, JanuDl)' 27, 1986, p. article by John Cooley, "S. Yemen Connict Boils A3. Down to Tribal War." The Christian Scienu 1). In South 6. Moscow TASS in English. JanuDl)' 13, 1986, in Monitor. FebIUDI)' II, 1986. the case. No FBIS: Soviet Union Daily Repon, Janulll)' 14. 1986, 12. As of July 1985, there were also only 500 tion existed. p. HI. Cuban and 75 East Gennan mililal)' advisers in South led ftrmly in 7. "U.S. Urges Soviet to SlaY Out ofSouth Yemen Yemen. See International Institute for Strategic War," The New York Times, Janu8l)' 24, 1986, p. Studies. The Military Balance 1985-1986 (London: A3. IISS, 1985), pp. 30, 33,147. V 1986 shat­ 8. AI-Bayd had been elected to the YSP Central Iviets. certain Committee Secretariat in October 1985. Celestine Ilen was ftrm. Bohlen, "S. Yemeni Official in Moscow Proclaimed vas obviously Leader by Rebels," The Washington Post. JanuDl)' 25. 1986, pp. AI, A17. and Aden Domestic Service tense conflict in Arabic, FeblU8I)' 6. 1986. in FBIS ME. FeblU&ry 7.1986. p.O.