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YEMEN's WATER CRISIS » October -November 2011 PROTEST INOMAN Volume 8-Number 1 £4 | €5 | US$6.5 » Volume 8 - Number 1 October - November 2011 £4 | €5 | US$6.5 THIS ISSUE » YEMEN AND OMAN » YEMEN'S WATER CRISIS » EFFECTS OF THE HUTHI CONFLICT IN NORTH YEMEN » THE SOUTHERN SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTH YEMEN » SOUTH ARABIAN LANGUAGES » PROTEST IN OMAN » VEILING IN OMAN » PLUS » REVIEWS AND EVENTS IN LONDON Volume 8 - Number 1 October - November 2011 £4 | €5 | US$6.5 THIS ISSUE » YEMEN AND OMAN » YEMEN'S WATER CRISIS » EFFECTS OF THE HUTHI CONFLICT IN NORTH YEMEN » THE SOUTHERN SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTH YEMEN » SOUTH ARABIAN LANGUAGES » PROTEST IN OMAN » VEILING IN OMAN » PLUS » REVIEWS AND EVENTS IN LONDON View from al-Nadhir, southern Razih, Yemen. 1977 © Shelagh Weir About the London Middle East Institute (LMEI) Volume 8 - Number 1 October-November 2011 Th e London Middle East Institute (LMEI) draws upon the resources of London and SOAS to provide teaching, training, research, publication, consultancy, outreach and other services related to the Middle Editorial Board East. It serves as a neutral forum for Middle East studies broadly defi ned and helps to create links between Nadje Al-Ali individuals and institutions with academic, commercial, diplomatic, media or other specialisations. SOAS With its own professional staff of Middle East experts, the LMEI is further strengthened by its academic Narguess Farzad SOAS membership – the largest concentration of Middle East expertise in any institution in Europe. Th e LMEI also Nevsal Hughes has access to the SOAS Library, which houses over 150,000 volumes dealing with all aspects of the Middle Association of European Journalists East. LMEI’s Advisory Council is the driving force behind the Institute’s fundraising programme, for which Najm Jarrah it takes primary responsibility. It seeks support for the LMEI generally and for specifi c components of its George Joff é programme of activities. Cambridge University Max Scott Gilgamesh Publishing Sarah Searight Mission Statement: British Foundation for the Study of Arabia Th e aim of the LMEI, through education and research, is to promote knowledge of all aspects of the Middle Kathryn Spellman Poots AKU and LMEI East including its complexities, problems, achievements and assets, both among the general public and with Sarah Stewart those who have a special interest in the region. In this task it builds on two essential assets. First, it is based LMEI in London, a city which has unrivalled contemporary and historical connections and communications with Ionis Th ompson the Middle East including political, social, cultural, commercial and educational aspects. Secondly, the LMEI British Foundation for the Study of Arabia is closely linked to SOAS, the only tertiary educational institution in the world whose explicit purpose is to Shelagh Weir provide education and scholarship on the whole Middle East from prehistory until today. SOAS Co-ordinating Editor LMEI Staff: Rhiannon Edwards Editorial Assistant Director Dr Hassan Hakimian Alice Piller Roner Deputy Director and Company Secretary Dr Sarah Stewart Listings Executive Offi cer Louise Hosking Vincenzo Paci-Delton Events and Magazine Coordinator Vincenzo Paci-Delton Designer Shahla Geramipour Th e Middle East in London is published Disclaimer: Letters to the Editor: six times a year by the London Middle East Institute at SOAS Opinions and views expressed in the Middle East Please send your letters to the editor at Publisher and in London are, unless otherwise stated, personal the LMEI address provided (see left panel) Editorial Offi ce views of authors and do not refl ect the views of their or email [email protected] Th e London Middle East Institute organisations nor those of the LMEI or the Editorial School of Oriental and African Studies Board. Although all advertising in the magazine is University of London Th ornaugh Street, Russell Square carefully vetted prior to publication, the LMEI does London WC1H 0XG not accept responsibility for the accuracy of claims United Kingdom made by advertisers. T: +44 (0)20 7898 4490 F: +44 (0)20 7898 4329 E: [email protected] SSubscriptions:ubscriptions: www.lmei.soas.ac.uk ISSN 1743-7598 To subscribe to Th e Middle East in London, please email [email protected] to request subscription information and a form. Contents LMEI Board of Trustees 4 18 28 Professor Paul Webley (Chairman) EDITORIAL Valued Friends OBITUARY Director, SOAS Th e UK friendly societies devoted Ernst J Grube Dr John Curtis to Oman and Yemen British Museum Sarah Searight H E Sir Vincent Fean KCVO Consul General to Jerusalem 5 YEMEN AND OMAN Professor Ben Fortna, SOAS 29 INSIGHT LISTINGS: Professor Graham Furniss, SOAS Yemen’s water and the Arab 20 OCTOBER – NOVEMBER Dr Karima Laachir, SOAS Spring Th e timeless art of Tribal Poetry EVENTS Professor Annabelle Sreberny, SOAS Gerhard Lichtenthaeler Steve Caton LMEI Advisory Council Lady Barbara Judge (Chair) Professor Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem Near and Middle East Department, SOAS 7 22 Th e End of Bayt Zayd during the POETRY H E Khalid Al-Duwaisan GVCO Ambassador, Embassy of the State of Kuwait Huthi Wars in north Yemen Selected and translated by Flagg Mrs Haifa Al Kaylani Shelagh Weir Miller Arab International Women’s Forum Dr Khalid Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa President, University College of Bahrain Professor Tony Allan King’s College and SOAS 10 24 Dr Alanoud Alsharekh Veiling in Oman Th e non-Arabic languages of LMEI and Fellow, St Antony’s College Dawn Chatty southern Arabia Mr Farad Azima Janet Watson Iran Heritage Foundation Professor Doris Behrens-Abouseif Art and Archaeology Department, SOAS Dr Noel Brehony 12 MENAS Associates Ltd. A tale of two countries 25 Mr Charles L. O. Buderi Th e history of relations between REVIEWS Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP North and South Yemen Exhibition: Adornment and Dr Elham Danish Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Noel Brehony Identity: Jewellery and Costume Mr Kasim Kutay of Oman Moelis & Company Clara Semple Ms Heidi Minshall Middle East & North Africa Research Group, Foreign & Commonwealth Offi ce 14 Mr Rod Sampson ‘Th e future will be ours, our Barclays Wealth, Dubai country, South Arabia!’ 26 Dr Mai Yamani Th e southern movement in BOOKS IN BRIEF Correction Carnegie Middle East Centre Yemen Susanne Dahlgren Founding Sponsor and In the last issue on page 18, Member of the the caption read: 'Th e PSC Advisory Council 27 took part in a TUC vote in PROFILE Sheikh Mohamed bin Issa al Jaber 2009'. Th e caption should MBI Al Jaber Foundation 16 Taher Qassim have read: 'A TUC vote in Th e year of Oman’s discontents 2009'. John Peterson October-November 2011 » The Middle East in London » 3 EEDITORIALDITORIAL © Gerhard Lichtenthaeler DDearear RReadereader Meeting to resolve a water dispute, Amran region, Yemen, 2011. Gerhard Lichtenthaeler (see page 5) is seated with a government offi cial at the head of the room Shelagh Weir, MEL Editorial Board s the Arab Spring reaches autumn, population, is woefully underdeveloped, cities, despite attempts to crush them by and most eyes are trained in hope and (as Lichtenthaeler describes) faces imprisonments and military force. Th ese Aand horror on Libya and Syria, our imminent, catastrophic water shortages. protests, which demand Salih go, have focus shift s to two of the lesser-known Two distinct protest movements in gathered people from all parts of society, countries of the Middle East - Oman and the north and south of Yemen have been including businessmen, intellectuals, Yemen - which are experiencing their challenging Salih’s regime for several years, students, rural tribesmen and women. own unique disturbances. Each of these and (as Dahlgren and Weir describe) During these turbulent events, the southern Arabian countries has been ruled these have escalated into increasingly stereotypes of all women being secluded by the same man for an extraordinarily violent confl icts which seriously threaten at home and politically inactive, and long period: Sultan Qabus of Oman for the stability and unity of this fragile state tribesmen being inherently conservative, 41 years; President Ali Abdullah Salih – far more than the presence in Yemen disorderly and violent, have taken a of Yemen for 33 years. Both rulers have of `al-Qa`idah in the Arabian Peninsula well-deserved battering. Women have maintained power with the help of (now (AQAP)’. Since early this year Salih has played active and vociferous roles in the diminishing) oil resources and foreign aid – additionally suff ered from Yemen’s version Yemeni uprising, including as leaders administrative, fi nancial and military. And of the Arab Spring - in his case physically and spokespeople. And tribesmen have both now face unprecedented opposition as well as politically. An explosion in his left their guns behind, and marched and to their authoritarian regimes or manner of palace compound in June severely injured danced chanting verses of protest and ruling - especially from disenfranchised and him, and he has since been in Saudi Arabia longing - adapting (as Caton shows) an age unemployed shabab (youth) who have little receiving medical treatment. He recently old tradition to contemporary conditions. to lose, and dream of better, freer lives. appeared on TV repeating his intention to One can only hope that the intensely Th ese internal political pressures are return to Yemen, where his sons and allies communicative Yemenis, with their recent and as yet `relatively mild’ in still hold key positions, but as I write (in penchant for using words creatively and Oman, according to Peterson, where its early September) he is still abroad leaving persuasively, can resolve their diff erences, paternalistic ruler has presided over major Yemen in a limbo of uncertainty. Meanwhile settle their grievances and decide their economic and infrastructural development. major military, tribal and political fi gures political future by discussion and popular But they are older and graver in Yemen, have defected to the opposition.
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