Military-Age Males in Us Counterinsurgency and Drone Warfare

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Military-Age Males in Us Counterinsurgency and Drone Warfare MILITARY-AGE MALES IN U.S COUNTERINSURGENCY AND DRONE WARFARE Sarah Shoker MILITARY-AGE MALES IN U.S COUNTERINSURGENCY AND DRONE WARFARE By SARAH SHOKER, B.A., M.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy McMaster University © Copyright by Sarah Shoker, April 2018 Ph.D. Thesis-S. Shoker; McMaster University-Political Science McMaster University Hamilton, Ontario DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY(2018) Department of Political Science TITLE: Military-Age Males in U.S Counterinsurgency and Drone Warfare AUTHOR: Sarah Shoker, B.A., M.A (University of Saskatchewan) SUPERVISOR: Dr. J. Marshall Beier NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 146 i Ph.D. Thesis-S. Shoker; McMaster University-Political Science Abstract In 2012, The New York Times reported that the Obama Administration excluded all Military-Age Males from the collateral damage count in areas where the U.S engaged in drone warfare/ Though the Military-Age Male (MAM) category references the draft, the term is applied to all boys and men, including civilians, who are aged sixteen years and older. The Military-Aged Male category is not synonymous with 'combatant,' but marks boys and men for differentiated treatment in conflict zones, to the point where male bodies are used as a shorthand for 'combatant' when assessing the collateral damage count. This dissertation seeks to answer an empirical puzzle. The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counter- Insurgency Field Manual (2006), a document which emerged from the American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, emphasizes that militants vie for the civilian population's support as a way to win the war against a stronger and better-resourced military force. These documents state that the United States cannot rely on military prowess alone and that, in fact, “non-military means are the most effective” way to win an irregular war against militant groups. Both the Bush Jr. and Obama Administrations used the Military-Age Male category to structure military strategy, meaning that civilian protection was applied asymmetrically and that military violence was legitimized when directed against male civilians. These security practices would seemingly cause resentment from a large segment of the population and undermine the success of U.S foreign policy. This dissertation documents the political ecosystem that legitimized violent military action against the 'Military-Age Male.' Specifically, I examine Military-Age Males under the Bush and Obama Administrations and illustrate how counterinsurgency and drone warfare became practices that were sustained by an elaborate bureaucracy that interpreted the battlespace—and combatant from civilian— by using assumptions about gender. ii Ph.D. Thesis-S. Shoker; McMaster University-Political Science Acknowledgments Academics are supported by a large group of people who are often rendered invisible by the lone author credited for the dissertation. I want to highlight the support of those who helped me on my PhD journey. Specifically, I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Marshall Beier and my committee members, Dr. Lana Wylie and Dr. Peter Nyers. Your support and knowledge made it clear that academia had room for one more—I felt welcomed by the Political Science department at McMaster University. That is not always the case for scholars pursuing research projects that focus on gender. So, thank you, for viewing International Relations as an expansive and inclusive discipline. I hope that I can one day emulate the support you gave me. There are many others who helped me along my journey—many of you were not involved in Political Science at all, but you always had time to ask me questions about my research. You made me recognize that I could write in a way that appealed to different audiences. You looked over my papers for typos. You consoled me when I felt stressed. You were compassionate. To all those who witnessed me on the high of a research finding, or on the low of a burnout: thank you. iii Ph.D. Thesis-S. Shoker; McMaster University-Political Science This dissertation is dedicated to the civilian dead. iv Ph.D. Thesis-S. Shoker; McMaster University-Political Science TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................................................ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................................iii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION:WHO COUNTS..................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2: METHODS, METHODOLOGY, AND LITERATURE REVIEW Who Speaks for IR......................................................................................................................................9 Methods: Notes on Interrogating Problems ............................................................................................12 The Public and Private Spheres in Crisis: A Literature Review..............................................................21 CHAPTER 3: PRODUCING THE NOT-CIVILIAN: MILITARY-AGE MALES AS TECHNOCRATIC CATEGORY Introduction..............................................................................................................................................35 The History of Civilian Protection ..........................................................................................................37 Lawfare: Bureaucratic Procedure and the Making of War......................................................................42 At the Center is Gender............................................................................................................................49 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................53 CHAPTER 4: RISK-MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN WAR Introduction..............................................................................................................................................55 What War are We Fighting?.....................................................................................................................57 International Relations Comes Home: Expanding the Liberal Project...................................................64 Civilian Death in the Human Terrain......................................................................................................73 CHAPTER 5: LEARNING TO SEE DATA: MILITARY-AGE MALES AND DRONE WARFARE Introduction..............................................................................................................................................89 A Brief History of Signature Strikes ........................................................................................................90 Drowning in Data: How Drone Crews Use Data to Issue Strikes ........................................................104 The Future of Intelligence......................................................................................................................112 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................119 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF WARFARE..........................................................121 REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................................128 v Ph.D. Thesis-S. Shoker; McMaster University-Political Science Chapter 1 Introduction: Who Counts? In 2012, The New York Times reported that the Obama Administration excluded all Military-Age Males from the collateral damage count in areas where the U.S engaged in drone warfare (Becker and Shane 2012). Though the Military-Age Male (MAM) category references the draft, the term is applied to all boys and men, including civilians, who are aged sixteen years and older. The Military-Aged Male category is not synonymous with 'combatant,' but marks boys and men for differentiated treatment in conflict zones, to the point where male bodies are used as a shorthand for 'combatant' when assessing the collateral damage count. Though this revelation in The New York Times attracted much short-lived attention, less notice was paid to the Military-Age Male's origins and that this category had also been used extensively during the Bush Administration. The United States often highlights its own superior conduct during wartime, juxtaposing the behavior of norm-violating actors against U.S attempts to protect civilians. The U.S has institutionalized criticism against norm-violating actors through, for example, congressional resolutions condemning militant organizations for their use of civilians as human shields (H.Con. Res 107, 113th Cong. 2014). Pentagon officials have criticized ISIS for forcing civilians to act as human shields (BBC News 2016). Similarly, U.S Central Command (CENTCOM) has criticized Taliban fighters for forcing civilians to remain in villages that were at risk of being bombed by Coalition Forces. While U.S and Afghan military forces were “committed to [protecting the lives of Afghan citizens” the Taliban was “deliberately [placing] civilians in harm's way” (Garamone 2009). Considering these foreign policy stances, the decision made by both the Bush and Obama Administrations to direct military action against civilian boys and men during counterinsurgency operations and then to
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