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Journal of Critical Reviews ISSN- 2394-5125 Vol 7, Issue 11, 2020 ACTIVITIES OF TATARSTAN OFFICES IN TURKESTAN Sotiboldiev Gayrat Otamirzayevich1 1Senior Teacher, Department of “Social Sciences” Namangan Engineering-Construction Institute. Received: 15.04.2020 Revised: 22.05.2020 Accepted: 15.06.2020 Abstract In this article highlights of activities of the authority subjects of Russia and the socio-economic situation of the peoples, problems of socio-economic and political development, factors of Russian representation in Turkestan in the Soviet era, so strengthening the sovereignty of the Soviet power in Turkistan. So, based on the abovementioned reasons, we can conclude that the establishment of representative offices of the Russian Federation in Turkestan covers political, economic, spiritual and cultural spheres, while at the same time strengthening the sovereignty of the Soviet power in Turkistan. Keywords: Turkestan, Tatarstan, Socio-economic Situation, Consulate, Government. © 2020 by Advance Scientific Research. This is an open-access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31838/jcr.07.11.181 INTRODUCTION practical assistance of America to the hungry, also touched upon In the 20-ies of the XX century, within the representative offices the assistance of the peoples of Turkestan. For example, the of the Russian Federation operating in Turkestan, the Tatarstan imam of Mullah Akmasjid Sodiq Imomquliy, one of the well- office is of particular importance. The reason for the known tatar clergyman, came to Turkistan asking for the help of establishment of the office was the mobilization of the Tatars, a faithful believer. The opinions of the tataristanist Zuhra whose language, religion, customs were common in order to Baimbetova about the fact that she was sent to Bukhara “to carry strengthen Soviet power in Turkestan, proceeding from the out activities in the direction of helping the hungry” are also interests of the Center, on the other hand, the drought in the described. But at the same time, although he gives this Volga region was due to the fact that the tatar people came to the information, he does not say nothing about the fact that the country to massively save lives. assistance in such a procedure was also carried out by the peoples of Turkestan. MATERIAL AND METHODS When it comes to the relations of Turkistan and Tatarstan in RESULT AND ANALYSIS 1917-1924 years, it is possible to study the migration of the However, on September 27, 1922, in the resolution №511 of the Tatars to the country in connection with two issues: Tatarstan hunger strike Commission, the representative of the Tatarstan press society(Tatsoyuz)in Turkestan. Under the The first is the mobilization of the Tatars from Tatarstan to leadership of M.Akhmerov it was mentioned that 12 September Turkistan as a “necessary personnel” in strengthening the this year from Turkistan was sent to 2,934.5 wagon grain boiler bolshevik power, it is considered to be associated with the with a weight of 4 pounds.[4] implementation of socialist changes in the socio-political life of Turkistan. Most of them were considered military, party It can be noted that M.Akhmerov worked as a representative of representatives, representatives of the educational sphere. Most the Tatarstan national economy and Tatsoyuz in Turkistan in of the "personnel" who came to the country were attracted by 1921-1923 years.[5] It can be seen from this that in the process their own wishes. On June 1, 1921, N.Y.Sindyukov appealed to the of helping the hungry, not only in the BPCR, but also in Tashkent, Kazan Office of the regional party, asking that he knew the the Tatarstan office in Turkistan carried out active work. On language, customs and psychology of the population of the September 26, 1922, Zaitsev, one of the servants of the Republic of Turkestan well and therefore sent himself to Andijan commission to help the hungry, listed the following monthly uyezd for work in Revolution. July 4 1921, N.Sindyukov will be need products for cantons in Tatarstan: 5.083 pud flour, 1.214 mobilized from Tatarstan to Turkey. P.A.Fyodorov and S.I. pud grain products, 2,048 pud meat and fish products, 363 pud Sorokins came to Turkistan in July 1921 year from the Tatarstan fat products, 123 pud sweets, 387 pud Salt, 20 pud tobacco.[6] Buguruslan uyezd. P.A.Fyodorov and S.I.Sorokin 1921-1922 On September 29, 1922, under the chairmanship of Sobirov, a years at Hospital of Jizzakh uyezd, respectively, worked as head meeting of the Central Commission was held to combat the of department and as a secretary of health department.[1] In consequences of famine in Tatarstan. In it, 10 issues were such mobilization, the activities of the offices are clearly visible. considered, and the 8th issue was devoted to the distribution of 2.934.5 pounds of 4 wagon grain, which was sent from Turkistan The second, one of the humanitarian disasters in the history of to Kazan.[7] Tatarstan in 1921 year, was famine. According to information, in Tatarstan itself, from 400 thousand to 1 million people died. The The famine in the Volga peoples also worried the all Russian Tatarstan Army experienced more famine than the regions. Central Executive Branch(RCEB). In November 1922, he During this period, as a result of famine, crimes such as proposed to publish and subscribe to the publication of the cannibalism[2], theft and murder were regularly committed “Russian Industry Review” and the issue of settlement of the among the population. A cruel policy was pursued by the central central bank's funds in the all Russian Central Executive Branch authority. Public figure of Tatarstan Tamina Biktimerova gave an of assistance to the hungry and the end of the consequences of interview on this issue in the publication “Tatar-Inform”, in starvation was put forward. This news came to Tatarstan 26 which she widely touched on these issues.[3] November.[8] It is noted that the famine that occurred in Tatarstan in 1921- One of the ways to eliminate famine is to bring food reserves 1923 years and its solutions are described. The migration of the from these other countries as well as to establish competent population of Central gubernia to other regions, along with the bodies in other regions. Such a situation paved the way for the Journal of critical reviews 1009 ACTIVITIES OF TATARSTAN OFFICES IN TURKESTAN establishment of representative offices of the Russian Federation Thirdly, the famine, which occurred as a result of the drought in in the Turkic country. For example, the authority of the Turkistan the central governorates of the Russian Federation, was ASSR to cooperate with all organizations was given to the Saleh necessary for the resettlement of the population of this country Ramzi, from September 10, 1921 to October 30, 1921 Tatarstan to Turkistan. transferred to Turkistan, the information about the status of the 50,000 population was entrusted to the chairman of the central Fourthly, the problems that have arisen as a result of the policy executive branch of Tatarstan Sobirov.[9] In connection with the of the bolshevik’s blindly led to were to be solved. famine, the Tatarstan Republic's representative offices at various Fifthly, the economy of ylka was to ensure the need for qualified levels operating in Turkestan, matlubot societies have been personnel in the recovery of the nation's economy. active in this regard. The authorities of the Russian Federation in Turkistan, matlubot societies, carried out various charitable Sixthly, in order to ensure the need for qualified personnel, the activities to transfer their compatriots to Turkistan, to provide establishment of higher educational institutions in the country for the hunger in their homeland, and also engaged in the work of and, at the same time, the integration of the Bolshevik ideology sending food from the region, the uezds. The goal was to get rid into the population of the country. of starvation. In particular, the canton of Bugulma of the Republic For the above reasons, we can conclude that the establishment of of Tatarstan Safar Galiev allowed himself to return to Kazan, the representative offices of the subjects of the Russian placing his family of 12 people in Andijan on July 1, 1921.[10] Federation in Turkistan covers political, economic, spiritual and In the fight against famine in the Volga region and in the Urals, cultural spheres. the Turkistan region showed the muslims a sample of agreeable. On mutual assistance, the Muslim community of the Central REFERENCES Commission for the support of the hungry under the central 1. Rasulov A.N. The relationship between the peoples of executive branch of Turkestan (TurkCCC) for the collection of Turkistan and the Volga, the Ural Mountains. -Tashkent, food for the Muslims of Tatarstan (HFCC) played an important "University". 2005. – P. 62. role.[11] Relations between Muslims in Tatarstan and the 2. Ergashev I., Farxodjonova N. INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL Muslims of Central Asia were further strengthened due to CULTURE IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION //Journal famine. But this “closeness” did not please the officials of the of Critical Reviews. – 2020. – Т. 7. – №. 2. – P. 477-479. bolshevik government. In particular, the authorities were very 3. Latipov. R “1.2 million of our people survived thanks to the careful about the constant contact of the Turkic Muslims of the help of the United States”: Why during the famine in the Volga and the Urals with muslim believers in Central Asia.[12] Volga region, a third of the residents of TASSR died and how the rest were saved.sntat.ru. 5.10.2019.
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