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Turnout of Reciprocal Altruism 'Club of Economics in Miskolc' TMP Vol.16., Nr. 2., pp. 103-113. 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18096/TMP.2020.02.11 How Did Reciprocity Evolve in Online Communication? Turnout of Reciprocal Altruism CYNTIA VALOCIKOVÁ JOLÁN VELENCEI, PH.D. PHD STUDENT ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ÓBUDA UNIVERSITY ÓBUDA UNIVERSITY e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] SUMMARY Why do we help strangers on the Internet? Sharing our experience, knowledge, or information does not involve a large investment of energy, yet users often expect to be rewarded for sharing their personal resources. Economics and other disciplines call this type of exchange reciprocal altruism. The present research introduces different types of altruism and then deals with reciprocal altruism. It describes how this form of selflessness can appear in social media. The aim of the research is to create an overview of Hungarian and international research, which is the first step of a long-term, comprehensive research project. Keywords: Altruism; Reciprocity; Knowledge Sharing; Social Community Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: D64, O35 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18096/TMP.2020.02.11 INTRODUCTION THE CONCEPT OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM Online social networks are communication channels that allow information and knowledge to be shared and exchanged between people around the world. They have Altruism is a dominant form of behaviour. Many remodelled the traditional “face-to-face” form of social researchers, sociologists and economists – contact and contributed to cross-border networking. (Piliavin & Charng 1990; Samuelson, 1993, Michalski Although users have access to vast amounts of 2003), etc. – have studied altruism; however there is no information and knowledge with the spread of online unified definition on it. The creation of the concept is social networks, it is doubtful that they will expect attributed to the 19th century French philosopher reciprocity for sharing their own knowledge (Chang & Auguste Comte. In his view, altruism is an instinct that Chuang 2011). This form of mutuality is the so-called is the opposite of egoism and is related to selflessness. reciprocal altruism, which is not a familiar concept in From time to time, researchers have raised several various disciplines. Most people have limited time, questions. Does any pure, selfless help actually exist? energy, or other resources, so they often expect a reward Are there different types of altruism? Sociologists seek in return. Reciprocity is a very effective incentive for social behaviour, so they base their thoughts on Comte’s knowledge sharing and self-image building, especially conception. Psychologists, however, regard altruism as in online communities (Davenport & Prusak 1998). a hidden egoism, because according to their view In our study, we use the academic literature to selfless behaviour is connected with additional reward. explore the concept of reciprocal altruism and illustrate Proponents of the theory of evolution link altruism to its presence on online social media through various behavioural genetics. According to Richard Dawkins: cases. We are examining, how reciprocity, as a type of “An apparently altruistic act is one that looks, altruistic behaviour can affect online knowledge and superficially, as if it must tend to make the altruist more resource sharing, and how altruism can evolve on online likely (however slightly) to die and the recipient more social media sites. likely to survive. It often turns out on closer inspection that acts of apparent altruism are really selfishness in 103 Cyntia Valociková - Jolán Velencei disguise” (Dawkins 1989, pp. 80-81). In his work The The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior (1963), Hamilton Selfish Gene (1989) Dawkins submitted many ideas and revealed the terms of theory: “It follows that altruistic cases of a gene-centred view of evolution. To explain behaviour which benefits neighbours irrespective of altruism, he also presents some cases from the world of relationship (such as the warning cries of birds) will only animals. ‘An entity, such as a baboon, is said to be arise when (a) the risk or disadvantage involved is very altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to increase slight, and (b) the average neighbour is not too distantly another such entity's welfare at the expense of its own. related” (Hamilton 1963, p. 355). Selfish behaviour has exactly the opposite effect. According to Hamilton, the reason for the 'Welfare' defined as 'chances of survival', even if the evolutionary spread of altruistic behaviour is the effect on actual life and death prospects is so small as to mechanism of kin selection. According to one of the seem negligible. One of the surprising consequences of basic tenets of the theory, the evolutional suitability of the modem version of the Darwinian Theory is that an individual depends on the extent of genes that the apparently trivial tiny influences on survival probability individual is able to pass on to the next generation. Each can have a major impact on evolution. This is because descendant inherits 50% of each parent’s genes, which of the enormous time available for such influences to means that half of both paternal and maternal genes make themselves felt” (Dawkins 1989, p. 13). In the passed on to the next generation. Thus, in the case of economic approach, according to Hámori, altruism can four descendants, both parents double their genetic be defined as the application of others' prosperity into representation. However, copies of an individual’s the individual's welfare function (Hámori 2003, p. 59). genes are not only carried by descendants, but also by In another study, Hámori points out that other relatives, depending on the extent of kinship. The measure of common genes between relatives is shown “[…] according to the development of by the so-called Coefficient of Relationship (r), first economics over the last two to three decades, it defined by American geneticist Sewall Wright in 1922. examines the motivations of beyond self-interest According to this coefficient, siblings share 50% of their and cases of propitiousness and viciousness. common genes (r = 0.5), while first cousins share 25% Onto the characters of the economy particularly (r = 0.25) (Hamilton 1964) . the underdeveloped one, the envy and wicked joy There are examples of Hamilton’s rule seen not only changes individual utility functions and creates a among humans but also among animals. One of the most connection between individual utilities. In the frequently mentioned examples is observed for same way, altruistic and compassionate squirrels. In case of danger, ground squirrels signal each economic actors, whose survival has been other with whistles, but in same time, they also draw the questioned for a long time, not only exist, but attention of the predators. However, the study showed with their manner »magnetize« the behaviour of that the purpose of the signalling is to warn those living selfish actors who contact them. As a result of in nearby hollows, although endangering their own this cooperation, they act »as if« they are safety. The study also showed that females in the nearby selfless.” (Hámori 1994, p. 510) hollows usually mate with related individuals. Males wander at a young age, while females settle in a nearby These concepts do not fully cover altruism, as hollow (Bereczkei 2009). Hamilton provided a scheme definitions may differ even within disciplines, of four social behaviours with their effect on actor and depending on which type of altruism is appearing. Here recipient (Table 1). If a behaviour is beneficial for both and now, we assume that in pure altruism the individual actor and recipient it is a mutual benefit, if a behaviour does not expect any reward in return for his selfless act. is beneficial for only one party is selfishness or altruism, In selfish altruism, the individual is driven by his or her if a behaviour is disadvantageous for both it is labelled own interests and is only seemingly selfless. spite (West et al. 2006). In kin altruism, the closer is kinship; the more common is altruistic behaviour (Karajz 2018). In 1964, the American evolutionary biologist William D. Table 1. Hamilton found a connection between altruistic A Hamiltonian classification scheme for social behaviour and evolutionary selection, also referred to as behaviours Hamilton’s rule. Hamilton relied on relative selection, according to which a person’s genes are present not only in direct posterity but also in relatives. If altruists help Effect on recipient their relatives to survive or reproduce, these relatives + - also develop a gene which is disposed to selflessness, Effect on + Mutual Benefit Selfishness that they can pass on to descendants. The more common actor - Altruism Spite genes are shared by relatives, the more certain they are Source: (West et al. 2006) to pass altruistic genes on (Hamilton 1963). In his work 104 How Did Reciprocity Evolve in Online Communication? Turnout of Reciprocal Altruism A non-related type of altruism is reciprocal altruism, In order to guaranteed the benefits of mutual favours, a type of “exchange of gifts” where the individual in most cases we need to belong to a well-defined expects a return in exchange for selflessness in the network. The bigger and tighter the net, the safer it is future. This differs from selfish altruism in that the (Hámori 2003). Such networks can be formed not only altruist does not expect reciprocity from the recipient among the players presented in the market, but can also and in a specific situation, but trusts that another be a circle of friends or a university group. Trust can also individual will later act in an altruistic manner. reduce the costs for actors, as cooperation in the other Henceforth, reciprocal altruism will be the focus of the party awakens respect and propitiousness, and those study. who are respected can acquire financial benefits (Pinker Reciprocal altruism is one of the most common 2009; Golovics 2015).
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