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The Evolution of Cooperation Robert Axelrod; William D. Hamilton Science, New Series, Vol The Evolution of Cooperation Robert Axelrod; William D. Hamilton Science, New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4489. (Mar. 27, 1981), pp. 1390-1396. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-8075%2819810327%293%3A211%3A4489%3C1390%3ATEOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 Science is currently published by American Association for the Advancement of Science. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/aaas.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Fri Jan 4 15:02:00 2008 The latest data for 1978 suggests that the situa- ary 1975) the Committee on Science and Tech- budget appropriations." In other words, it tion may, in fact, be deteriorating. we may nology received jurisdiction over envlron- seems that work on highly relevant matters be losing the war on air pollution." mental research" as a result of several changes might be funded even if of poor quality. [See 3. For examples see House Subcommittee on the in the rules of the House of Representatives. EPA and the Academic Community (EPA-60018- Environment and the Atmosphere, The Erzviron- The Subcommittee on the Environment and the 80-010, Environmental Protection Agency, Cin- mentcrl Protection Agerzcy's Resecrrch Progrcrm Atmosphere was formed to handle this juris- cinnati, Ohio, 19801, p. 2.1 with Prirnury F,'rnphusis on the Community diction and for 4 years (two Congresses), with 19. National Academy of Sciences, Materials Advi- lfecrlth und Environmenrul Surveillance Syatem Congressman Brown as chairman, had respon- sory Board, Repor1 of the Ad Hoc Committ~eon (CHESS):An lnveatigative Report (Government sibility for ORD. In January 1979, as a re- Principles i?fReseurch-Engineerinx Interuc'tion Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976). espe- sult of reorganization within the Committee on (National Academy of Sciences, Washington, cially chapters 4 to 6. Science and Technology, Congressman Brown D.C., 1966), p. 16. 4. Without trying to be entirely rigorous, we will moved to the chair of the Subcommittee on 20. W. 0. Baker, in House Committee on Science use an NSF definition: "Basic research is that Science, Research, and Technology. The Sub- and Technology, Serninur on Reaeurch, Produc- type of research which is directed toward in- committee on the Environment and Atmosphere tivity, und the Natiorzul Economy, 18Jrrne I980 crease of knowledge in science. It is research was renamed Subcommittee on Natural Re- (Government Printing Office, Washington, where the primary aim of the investigator is a sources and Environment and given some addi- D.C., 1980). fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject tional jurisdiction. 21. Testimony of J. N. Pitts, in 1980 Aulhorizcltion under study, rather than a practical application 13. Eni~ironmrnterlProtection Agency Reseurch und ,for the Office of Resecrrch und Developnzenl, thereof." This was given by A. T. Waterman, Development laarres: 1978, hearings before the Eni~ironmrntulProtection Ayency, hearings be- then director of NSF, in Symposium on Ruaic House Subcommittee on the Environment and fore the House Subcommittee on Science and Reaeurch, D. Wolfle, Ed. (American Associ- the Atmosphere, 19 July and 13 and 14 Septem- Technology, 13 and 15 February 1979 (Govern- ation for the Advancement of Science, Washing- ber 1978 (Government Printing Office, Washing- ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979). ton, D.C., 1959). p. 20. ton, D.C., 1979). 22. H. W. Bode, in nusic Resecrrch und Nrrtioncrl 5. For example, the EPA administrator, D. Costle, 14. In making funding decisions, the agency uses a Gorrls, a report to the House Committee on in a letter dated 12 June 1978 to Senator William zero-base budgeting (ZBB) process in which Science and Astronautics (National Academy of Proxmire, chairman of the HUD-lndependent programs are approved by a~consensusof the Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 74. Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropri- administrator and the six assistant administra- 23. At present the program offices guide EPA's atrons Committee, said concerning enviionmen- tors. In the ZBB process, the ORD has only research not only through the ZBB process but tal research, "I've had to make too many billion about one of six votes, and thus research pro- also through the mechanism of 13 research com- dollar decisions over the last year without the grams are vulnerable to a great deal of influence mittees. These committees translate program critical information this sort of investment, from the program offices. Because they play ofice needs into "research strategy docu- made five years ago, would have provided." such a substantial role in defining the program of ments" which guide all EPA research (10). 6. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess- research ultimately conducted by ORD, the 24. This provision is contained in section 6 of Public ment, A Review if the U.S. F,'nvironmrntul administrator and all assistant administrators Law 95-155, the FY 1978 authorization act for Protection Agency Environmentcrl Resecrrch were asked to testify on what they expect from ORD. For explanation of congressional intent Outlook FY I976 through 1980 (Government that office. see Conference Report to Accompcrny H.R. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976). 15. Speciul Urban Air Pollution Problema: Denver 5101, 95th Congress, Report No. 95-722 (Gov- 7. National Academy of Sciences, Commission on und Houaton, hearings before the House Sub- ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Natural Resources, Ar~ul),ticcrlStudies for the committee on the Environment and the Atmo- 1977).. ,. U.S. Environmentul Protection Agency, vol. 3, sphere, 19 and 21 November 1977 (Government 25. This provision is contained in section 11 of Research and Development in the Environmen- Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978). Public Law 95-155. For explanation see the tul Protection Agency (National Academy of 16. Long-Term Environmental Research in the En- report cited in (10), and also Report lo Acc'om- Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1977). i~ironmenterlProtection Agency, hearings before puny H.R. 5101, 95th Congress, Report No. 95- 8. National Advisory Committee on Oceans and the House Subcommittee on the Environment 157 (Government Printing Office, Washington, Atmosphere, A Report lo the President crnd the and the Atmosphere, 30 June 1977 (Government D.C.. 1977). Congress, fifth annual report (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978). See 26. This was cbntained in section 4(a) of H.R. 7099, Printing Ofice, Washington, D.C., 1976). the testimony of R. L. Sansom, especially his the House version of the FY 1981 authorization 9. ORD Progrcrm Guide (EPA-60019-79-038, Envi- supplemental statement, p. 52. bill. The provision was deleted from the final ronmental Protection Agency, Washington, 17. H. Kissinger, The Reporter, 5 March 1959, p. version of the bill at least in part because the D.C.. 1979). 10.- ~ agency strenuously (if informally) opposed it 10. Kesecrrch ~rrtlook,1980 (EPA-60019-80-006, En- 18. For example, the agency has instituted a new and succeeded in having it removed from the vironmental Protection Agency, Washington, system of research grants putatively aimed at Senate-passed version of the bill. For cxplana- D.C., 1980). This presents the agency's 5-year bringing new work of high quality into its pro- tion of intent, see Report to Accompan)~H.K. environmental research plan in response to stat- gram. Despite this aim the published solicitation 7099, 96th Congress, Report No. 96-959 (Gov- utory requirement. The plan is updated and a for grant proposals does not explicitly and ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., new report issued annually. unambiguously state that funding decisions will 1980). 11. Many examples of the environmental problems be based on scientific quality. Instead the fol- 27. J. Bronowski, The Common Senae of Science EPA faces are reported in Environmentcrl Oul- lowing appears: "Scientific merit and relevance (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 19781, look 1980 (EPA 60018-80-003, Environmental of proposals will be significant and balanced p. 143. Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., 1980). factors in the evaluation procedures since all 28. We thank A. V. Applegate for substantial assist- 12. At the beginning of the 94th Congress (Janu- projects must be in concert with the Agency's ance in the preparation of this paper. To account for the manifest existence of cooperation and related group behav- ior, such as altruism and restraint in competition, evolutionary theory has re- cently acquired two kinds of extension. The Evolution of Cooperation These extensions are, broadly, genetical kinship theory (3) and reciprocation the- ory (4, 5). Most of the recent activity, Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton both in field work and in further develop- ments of theory, has been on the side of kinship.
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