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Summer 2012 ▲ Vol. 2 Issue 2 ▲ Produced and distributed quarterly by the Wildland Lessons Learned Center

F I R I N G O P E R A T I O N S

What does a good firing show look like? And, what could go wrong ?

Once you By Paul Keller

t’s an age-old truth. put fire down— Once you put fire down—you can’t take it back. I We all know how this act of lighting the — you can’t when everything goes as planned—can help you accomplish your objectives. But, unfortunately, once you’ve put that fire on take it back. the ground, you-know-what can also happen. Last season, on seven firing operations—including prescribed and wildfires (let’s face it, your drip doesn’t know the difference)—things did not go as planned. Firefighters scrambled for safety zones. Firefighters were entrapped. Firefighters got burned. It might serve us well to listen to the firing operation lessons that our fellow firefighters learned in 2011. As we already know, these firing show mishaps—plans gone awry—aren’t choosey about type or geographic area. Last year, these incidents occurred from Arizona to Georgia to South Dakota—basically, all over the map. In Arkansas, on the mid-September Rock Creek Prescribed Fire, that universal theme about your drip torch never distinguishing between a wildfire or prescribed fire is truly hammered home. Here’s what happened: A change in wind speed dramatically increases fire activity. Jackpots of fuel exhibit extreme fire behavior and torching of individual trees. One crew member, conducting interior firing, is entrapped. He has Inset Photo: by Arrowhead Interagency difficulty deploying his shelter. Hotshot Crew

[Continued on Page 3] Background Photo: by Kari Greer

In this Issue

You ever heard: “Hustle up, the window is closing”? Page 2 More firing operation incident reviews. Page 5

Firing tips and Tactical Decision Game scenario. Page 6 Firing operation insights from a veteran burner. Page 17

Ground By Travis Dotson

Fire Management Specialist Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Truths [email protected]

Breaking Windows

ave you ever heard this during a firing operation: Had a clearly defined trigger point? Known ahead of time what “Hustle up, the window is closing.” all of the terrain looked like? Had a briefing?

H What does that mean? I think I get it. We are trying to Get That Stuff Ironed Out get through the window. Right? We are on this side and we You have to get that stuff ironed out before the operation want to be on that side. (Why are we trying to squeeze through begins, however you can, or you’re right back in chaos mode. a “window”? Apparently, “door of opportunity” just doesn’t And chaos mode is dangerous. The answer is Leading Up. sound as good.) This year, eleven wildland firefighters have already died. We “A window of opportunity is a brief period of time where it is have lost folks flying on a fire, driving on a fire, and PT’ing in particularly advantageous to do something. Often a window of preparation for a fire. We have already had multiple people get opportunity closes quickly, meaning someone must take a hit by trees resulting in fractured bones and other injuries. We decisive action at the time…” have had multiple narrow informs WiseGeek.com. escapes where equipment is

abandoned and burned up. Yes, we know the term “window.” We use it all the “A window of opportunity is a brief period of time where Who knows how many time. We also know about unreported close calls have making sound and timely it is particularly advantageous to do something. Often a occurred. The window for us decisions and having a bias for window of opportunity closes quickly, meaning someone getting hurt seems to be action. How are we able to constantly open. So, what recognize windows of must take a decisive action at the time . . .” do we do about that opportunity? We use Situation window? Awareness. So we have all the WiseGeek.com tools to recognize and take Adapt this Question advantage of the right windows. to Other Risky Operations

So why do we end up in It seems like sometimes we situations where the window is get so excited about an open open and there is no action window, we get all geared- going on, and then—as it closes—we scramble around and do up and jump through—without looking out of it first. It’s why something? we ask: “Is this flight necessary?” Meaning, just because we have a chance to fly, doesn’t mean we should. Maybe we That is the Window Closing should adapt that question to some of our other risky Have you ever been stuck waiting for someone to give the OK operations: Is this drive necessary? Is this tree felling to put some fire down? And during the waiting there is not a lot necessary? Is this firing operation necessary? of discussion about what exactly the plan is and how it will be carried out. And then when they finally pull the trigger, it’s an I’m not trying to create a bias for inaction. I’m all about gettin’ emergency and chaotic and you take more chances because after it when it’s time to get after it. I just don’t think we need you have fewer options? That is the window closing, and us to be getting smashed doing things that don’t need to be done. breaking the glass to force our way through. And we get Just know why you are being asked to carry out an operation, bruised, scraped, cut, and even killed doing it. how it fits with the strategy, and look for the windows. The

How do we avoid that, even if you are just a lowly holder or ones for getting it done—and the ones for getting smashed! torch dragger? Well, when you look back on situations where Dig on Tool Swingers. you lost the window, how do you finish the sentence: “We should have…” We should have what? Been on the same page?

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Firing Going as Planned Burn Boss on the Rock Creek Prescribed Fire: ‘There is not a wildfire and a prescribed fire—Fire is Fire’

Once inside his deployed shelter, he realizes fire is burning in the leaf litter

inside his shelter. He abandons the shelter and escapes to a nearby road. His

injuries include burns on his face, one of his hands, both knees, and back. He is

also treated for heat stress.

In the FLA, the Burn Boss explains that, in hindsight, he now realizes: “On a wildfire you show up respecting it. On a prescribed fire, something’s got to happen before you respect it.” His key lesson: This mindset has to change. Because prescribed burning is a “common” work activity, all burn crew members explained that they had become complacent. One crew member pointed out how their thinking before this shelter deployment incident was: “We weren’t on a fire, we were burning.” http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Rock_Creek_RX_Entrapment_FLA.pdf

Firing Ops – Vale Interagency Hotshot with Fusee chucks a Firequick Flare on the 2011 Las Conchas Fire.

“I wasn’t thinking LCES, I was thinking get the fuel out there and burn,” explains a burn Sling-Shot – Vale Interagency Hotshots launch crew member on the Rock Creek Prescribed Fire that entrapped a fellow burn crew a FireQuick Flare on the Las Conchas Fire. member, who was forced to deploy his fire shelter (above). As pointed out in the FLA, all crew members said that they had become more complacent because their mindset was that this operation was a “prescribed” fire—not a “wild” fire.

Firing Operation Entrapment Avoidance Last August on the Coal Canyon Fire in South Dakota’s Black Hills—just one day after firefighter Trampus Haskvitz dies during initial attack operations on this same incident when fire overruns his position and entraps him in his engine (http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Coal_Canyon_Fire_SAI_Report_REDACTED.pdf)— firefighters are forced to implement entrapment avoidance procedures during a firing operation. While no one is injured, a crew vehicle catches fire and sustains significant damage.

http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/320_Road_Entrapment_Avoidance.pdf

To prevent events like this from happening again, this incident’s FLA focuses on

the importance of your ability to successfully identify changed—or changing— Drip Torch Time – Gila Interagency Hotshot on the conditions and modify your actions. FLA participants discuss the following tools Las Conchas Fire. to be used for interrupting your immediate operation to gain a better appreciation for the bigger, more complete picture of what’s happening around Photos by Kari Greer you:

Evaluation Triggers – Changed conditions that might prompt a reevaluation of your operations. These include: change in RH or probability of ignition; frequent

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[Continued from Page 3] spotting; unanticipated fire behavior; changes in tactics; increased operational tempo or communication overload on radio frequencies.

Tactical Pause – What you initiate when an “Evaluation Trigger” is identified. This pause—leading to dialogues to identify changed conditions—can simply be a deliberate communication about what people are seeing. This can be accomplished by radio, or face-to- face check-ins with adjacent resources, or your own crewmembers, to discuss what others are observing.

Check-In with a New Firefighter – Feedback from a first- or second-year firefighter can prompt a reevaluation of expectations. Engaging your newer firefighters—or others who think differently—can help “daylight” missed cues or biased assumptions.

Plan for Worst Case – While several methods are available for identifying and planning for “worst case” scenarios, this FLA’s participants discussed the “PACE” (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) model for emergency planning.

Importance of Briefings During firing operations in Division Zulu on the Coal Canyon Fire, firefighters Underscored After Spotting Forces experience a sudden increase in fire behavior that forces them to Firefighters to Seek Safety Zones implement entrapment avoidance.

The June 1, 2011 Fiddlers Island Road Burn Out FLA shares the story of what occurred and lessons from this burn out operation in Georgia: http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Fiddlers_Island_Burn_Out_FLA.pdf.

Firefighters who participated in this operation shared the following insights in the FLA about briefings: Ask more questions (Trigger Points, Safety Zones, Escape Route, Operations); Verify chain-of-command; Do not leave briefing until all of your questions are answered; If you are unsure of the operation, ask more questions; As assignments change, regroup and brief crews.

“Trust your feelings. I knew we needed to get out long before we left and I didn’t say anything.”

Engine Operator (1) Fiddlers Island Road Burnout FLA

“It’s hard to speak up until you are put into the position of not speaking up—until you have been through it once. The next time I am in that situation . . . I will speak up!”

Engine Operator (4) Fiddlers Island Road Burnout FLA

Finger #2 of the main lightning-caused Honey Prairie Fire hits Fiddlers Ice Canyon RX Burn Injury http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Ice_Canyon_RX_Burn_Injury.pdf Island Road. The Fiddlers Island Road Burn Out FLA discusses and shares the lessons from the strategic firing operation that was In August 2011, a firefighter operating a Terra Torch is injured, designed to keep this fire inside the Okefenokee Wildlife Refuge. receiving 2nd degree burns to his leg. How did this happen?

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Las Conchas Burn Out Operation Results in Vehicle Damage and Burn Injuries

The June/July 2011 Las Conchas Fire in New Mexico includes an incident in which firing operations on Division India result in burn injuries to firefighters and burn damage to vehicles and equipment. http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Las_Conchas_Near_Miss_AAR_Notes.pdf

Here’s a summary of what happened:

While holding the line at approximately 1400 hours, gusty, erratic downdraft winds from a thunderstorm intensify fire activity. Heavy smoke occurs on both sides of the line.

During their escape, two engines heading east come head-to-head with an engine heading west. Due to the smoke, the engine operators have difficulty seeing each other—but are able to stop without a vehicle collision. The fire around them is increasing in intensity. Radiant heat damage to this cooler is among the burn effects to engines and The westbound engine is forced to back up to a point where the two equipment received during firing operations. Engine crew members other engines can safely pass by. The westbound engine then turns also received burn injuries. around and follows the other engines out.

Exposure to intense radiant heat on one engine crew member’s face and ear—as well as inhaling heated air—requires evaluation at a hospital. A second engine crew member also experiences smoke inhalation and is treated and released by line medics. Two engines receive minor burn damage to side mirrors, decal delaminating, damage to

instrument panel, and heat damage to an ice chest (cooler).

The firefighters involved in this incident share several insightful

lessons learned in their “Near Miss AAR Notes”, including:

“There were too many bosses.” One person should be in charge “In a matter of seconds we started getting heavy smoke of holding forces; and one person should be in charge of and a lot of fire and heat on both sides.” burning.

Crew Member on “Engine 1” A clear line of supervision needs to be established. If an engine

is called in to deal with a spot fire, who are they working for? The Task Force Leader? The crew doing the burn out? The Burn

Boss or the Holding Boss? “Within ten minutes, the fire ahead became too intense and Engine 1 pulled out and headed straight toward our Safety versus mission focus. Everyone had their head down, engine—head on.” focused on controlling spot fires. Take the time for a safety briefing to discuss escape routes with all resources involved in Crew Member on “Engine 2” the operation.

More Firing Operation Incident Reviews

2011

Bull Fire Entrapment FLA

http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/BullFireEntrapmentFLAFinal.pdf

So, What Makes a Successful Firing Operation? Lessons Learned Review Firefighter Entrapment Horseshoe 2 Fire

http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Horshoe_2_Entrapment_Review.pdf Significant components for ensuring successful firing operations include these universal themes: 2009 Dry Creek Complex Fire Near Miss  Have thorough briefings; http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Dry_Creek_Complex_Fire.pdf  Maintain good commo with all resources; 2008  Know your trigger points—reevaluate and use them; and Pole Creek Prescribed Fire FLA

http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Pole_Creek_Rx_Escape_FLA.pdf  Be familiar as possible with the area’s wind and terrain characteristics and their potential influences on fire behavior. Indians Fire Accident Prevention Analysis Report http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Indians_Fire_APA_021209.pdf

OK. You light the match. You’ve put fire on the ground. 2007 Alabaugh Canyon Fire Entrapment and Shelter Deployment You can’t take it back. http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Alabaugh_Canyon_Fire_Final_SAI_Report_

102407.pdf

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Firing Operations

Firing Operations—whether under prescribed or wildfire conditions—are some of the highest-tempo operations in which firefighters engage. Here are

a few things to keep in mind if you’re involved in a firing operation.

Shop Talk

Photo by Kari Greer Here’s a few firing tips, followed by a scenario.

Scout the Burn Area

“Firing Tips” photos by Kari Greer

Communicate the Plan Never underestimate the importance of scouting the area you’ll be burning. Some If you’re on the firing team, make sure you understand the plan. Ask things to look for: values to be protected, questions if you have them. Update your leader and your fellow firing team hazards, control features, access points members. and changes in —including “non- Communicate your firing plan to adjacent forces, incident overhead, target” fuels. dispatch centers, or others who need to know what you’re up to.

Scenario Time! Find other Tactical Decision Games like this at: http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/TDG_Library/thelibrary.htm

You are a Crew Boss assigned to night shift on Division C of the Williams Fire on the Bitterroot National Forest. Your assignment is to complete Span = ½ Mile firing operations on Division C. Your crew and another crew are at the C/D break on the eastern edge of the Division. Both crews are fully prepared with standard firing equipment, including drip and fuel—both at the same location. Fire Perimeter

Division Supervisor says: “I’m concerned about the a hard push with the expected winds tomorrow morning that would threaten the Complete Dozer Line historical cabins to the south. I have to go and check on a broken down dozer. Keep me informed. Give me a call when you start your operation and what your firing sequence will be.” Cabins

Fire Status Size: 5000 Acres Containment: 65% Contained Fuels: Ponderosa Pine [see right] Weather: 65°F, 35% RH, Winds 3-5 Develop a course of action and prepare any communication downslope/ down-canyon contacts you think are necessary.  Line was constructed by dozers and improved by handcrews; safety zones are every ¼ mile.

If you have a subject idea for “Shop Talk,” please send it to us: [email protected] 6

One of Our Own

Photo by Eli Lehmann

Alex Viktora

Firing Operation Insights from a Veteran Burner

By Travis Dotson

lex Viktora works at the National Advanced Fire and Resource Institute (NAFRI) as the Fuels Field Operations A Specialist. Before taking this position in 2011, he spent ten years on the Zion Fire Use Module. Alex has a wealth of experience in firing operations. I recently sat down with him to pick his brain on this topic.

Alex’s experience with firing operations goes all the way back to his first fire.

“The very first wildland fire operation I was ever on was a small scale Rx fire in some cheat grass in 1999 and I got to run a torch.” From there, Alex became a crewmember on the Zion Fire Use Module and started traveling around the country learning about burning. “I got to do a couple years solid of just dragging a torch and watching firing bosses.”

He eventually opened up an Ignitions Specialist task book (as it was known then). “It was a qual that I didn’t want to get signed-off on because being a trainee was a great way to guarantee opportunities! Eventually, my task book was taken away from me and I was made to become qualified. One of the last trainee assignments had three simultaneous firing operations, so I couldn’t be right next to the firing teams. I got to a high point and just coordinated the teams, which was a great way to finish off that task book.”

In 2008, Alex moved into a position to become a frequent trainer for firing boss trainees on the module.

As federal wildland fire moves into the era of only two kinds of Alex Viktora on a prescribed fire in 2006. fire (planned and unplanned), I asked Alex how firing operations may differ in each instance.

All Fire Requires the Same Tactics “Well, just like we say: ‘fire is fire’, ‘firing is firing’, regardless of whether it’s a planned or unplanned event. LCES, knowing where you’re going, knowing what you’re going to be lighting on fire, scouting, communication. It all requires all the same tactics. On Rx, we pay a little more attention to the ecological fire effects, although we are definitely getting more folks paying attention to that in wildfire situations now. Another big difference with prescribed fire is you may have one opportunity to get it right—while on wildfires, you may have road after road or ridge after ridge. The consequences in the wildfire situation are not lower, but they are different, for sure. With prescribed fire, you have one day, one operation, one window to get it right. In some cases, that leads to a little bit more pressure.”

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We all know that if you lose it on a wildfire, you’re still a hero for trying. But if you lose it on a prescribed fire, you are nowhere near a hero—even though, tactically, you’re firing it so you can hold it in both situations.

Alex shares some finer points on this wildfire versus prescribed fire subject.

“Often, in the prescribed fire setting, it can be a pretty slim organization. Maybe three torches and twice as many holders. You could find yourself in that situation on a wildfire, too. It’s not always an entire hotshot crew to do the firing and three Type 2 crews to do the holding. But in prescribed fire, it’s essentially never that way. Prescribed fire can be tough because of its very unique tight little windows. On wildfire assignments, you might have the flexibility to work longer shifts, work a swing shift, or do that overnight firing show. In prescribed fire, unfortunately, this luxury of time is frequently not the case. I wish it was. My favorite is a slim nighttime organization taking advantage of good diurnal winds and lower probability of ignition.”

Common Denominators in Firing Operations Gone Bad We have all seen a firing operation go bad. Alex has certainly been around enough firing operations to see his share. When asked about “common denominators” in these situations, this veteran burner answered immediately.

“Timing. Delays are small failures. When we get a little behind schedule, things pile up. All of a sudden you are at the worst part of your firing operation at the hottest part of the day. The plan might have been to be through that heavy patch of fuel or critical holding point prior to a predicted wind shift. Delays are

a killer.” Alex (left) on the North Rim of Grand Canyon in 2010 with Brian Wilson.

Alex also shared insights on the pitfalls of being rigid, or unwilling to adapt to what is actually happening.

“You’ll start getting signals. Maybe you need to check it up and wait for the right wind, or for the probability of ignition to come down. The fire is going to tell you these things. But we often don’t recognize or adjust to what the fire is telling us. People tend to get in the mode of ‘we need to get from point A to point B by this time’. It’s good to have a plan and a sense of when things need to be done. But it’s also good to know when to let go. Know the plan; don’t fall in love with the plan.”

‘Signals’: Don’t Let Complacency Dull Your Senses to Them Alex also has good insights on “signals” and what they mean.

“Some are real simple. Like, if you’re getting spot fires that are taking early in the day, that’s a pretty obvious signal that more spots will take later in the day—real basic stuff and we don’t need to overcomplicate it.

“When you have thunder cells move into the area, that one is huge. If you are trying to take aggressive action on a wildfire, it’s really easy to get comfortable operating with thunderstorms in the area. But when it moves in and starts messing with your firing operation—don’t take that too lightly! I’ve seen thunderstorms all around and the firing operation is going great, everything pulling off the line, but be wary of success. It often leads to complacency. And complacency dulls your senses to those signals.”

As Alex discussed how this concept of success can be dangerous, it certainly hit home with me. I’ve seen situations in which you get something fired way quicker than you had expected because everything went perfect. And even though you already accomplished the “Delays are a killer,” veteran firing boss goal you set for the entire operational shift, you start thinking: ‘Well, let’s go ahead and Alex Viktora confirms.

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keep going into the next division—or to the next unit’.” Alex has seen this phenomenon, too.

“The closest call I ever had in a firing operation was exactly that scenario. You get at it early in the morning, you build some successes, get a couple pieces of work done, and all you need is that one last piece and then you are really done. But now you don’t always have the same conditions that made you successful. Whether it’s the time of day, the weather—or, maybe its 12 hours into a shift and the crew is not the same as they were in the morning. Something slowly changes and it’s easy to look beyond those things. It’s easy to say we’ve done these three units and there is only one more—let’s just knock it out. Those last little ‘cherry on top’ operations can be really problematic because our success blinds us to the changes. We all like getting more done than the boss thought we could.”

What Makes This Seasoned Firing Boss Nervous? We all have things that make us nervous and firing operations can definitely do that. Check out what makes this seasoned firing boss nervous.

“Lighting in situations with bad or no prep really makes me nervous,” Alex confides. “Too much focus on getting something done makes me nervous. I know we perform well as an organization in stressful situations and firing, by nature, can be a high-tempo operation. But I feel like there are times where too much pressure can be counterproductive.

“I guess the common ingredient is incomplete planning. That makes me nervous. Although you could sit and plan something Alex completing fuels work on the Range Unit, North Rim Grand forever—and never take action. Just getting everyone talking and Canyon National Park, in 2009. coming up with what makes sense is the key to balancing that

out. Like it or not, windows exist, and sometimes they really force you to get things done in a very succinct manner. The logistics of any mission are crucial. It’s one of my pet peeves when torch fuel is not out in front, or some other logistical piece forces a delay.”

A Real Watch-Out Situation Have you ever had a long shift of dragging a torch and your arms start to ache and your SA starts to break down? Alex explains how, for him, this scenario is a real watch out situation.

“One of the things that scares me more than anything is the thought that someone in the middle of a firing operation—torch 4 out of 7—is going to fall and hurt themself and be surrounded by fire. You have to make sure folks’ blood sugar is managed! I’ve been that guy whose blood sugar is going through the floor and haven’t had time to take a swig of water, let alone jam 100 calories down my throat. That’s scary because you start tripping and stumbling. You’re one step away from rolling an ankle or busting a knee and creating a seriously bad situation.”

What about the Ingredients to a Successful Firing Operation? We always tend to focus on how things go bad. But what are the ingredients to a successful firing operation?

“It’s simple. Have a good plan. I know we don’t always have all the time we want, but you can still get someone out in front getting a sense of where it is you’re going to go and what your options are. Once you figure that out, just let folks know what the plan is and what to expect. Have logistics figured out. What are you going to need to get this done? Have more than one option in your plan.

“Another key ingredient is clear intent. Everyone up and down the organization, including those who are holding, need to understand what is going on. Do we just need to get black between us and the fire because this is our chance to stop it? Or, are we going to be really patient because understory effects are critical and it’s going to take a lot of time and patience.

“And then there is team. Team can emerge fairly quickly if you’ve got folks who are willing to communicate and work with one another and develop the ability to make their own adjustments as necessary.”

What Makes a Good Torch Dragger? Everyone knows that person who always gets put on the torch. But what makes that individual the one you want? What makes a good torch dragger?

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“The best igniter is not somebody who is going to tip the torch, put their head down and walk. It’s someone who is going to pay attention, look around, look at what their fire is doing behind them and make their own adjustments. This person might also see opportunities and suggest an organizational change, notice and communicate observations like: ‘We’re putting a lot of heat on the ground, we could probably get away with one less torch’. Often, when you are in charge, you can’t see everything. That’s why I really appreciate it when folks bring things to my attention. I like it when people are thinking and have the courtesy to let me know what they are seeing. Often times, folks with less experience see things that more experienced folks don’t—or can’t—see.”

What Makes a ‘Bad’ Igniter? On the flipside, what are some things that will assure you a spot in the line of holders? What makes a bad igniter?

“Folks who don’t pay attention to where they are going, don’t pay attention to what their fire is doing, how it’s interacting with Alex scouts for an anchor point on the Aspen Fire, North Rim, other peoples’ fire, not making those micro adjustments. Anyone who drags fuel across rock, bare ground, or decomposed granite. People Grand Canyon National Park, in 2009. who don’t pass messages along. Folks who wait until their torches are empty before they say anything. Those things mess with the flow, or prevent you from getting in the flow.”

What Makes the Torch Slinger to Firing Boss Transition Successful? Most of us will progress from torch slinger to firing boss. During that growth and transition, how do our perspectives change? What do we need to learn to help make that transition successful?

“Understand the logistical challenges involved with firing. I use to get annoyed with having to go back out to get filled-up because one person was empty. As an igniter, I may not have a grasp on the whole situation, or when that next logistical trigger point is. That’s not my job. My job is to see the person on my left and right, stay in commo, make sure I’m not putting too much down or dripping fuel in the dirt.

“Early on, I didn’t understand the team management side of things. I just wanted to stay plugged in. But there is a time where you run it just like a hockey team: two in/two out—for good reasons. I get that now.

“As a beginning firing boss, I would say things like: ‘It’s not hot enough unless holding is nervous.’ After a few close calls, I think I’ve tempered that. After all, you can’t put fire back in the can. And that’s real important to remember. I now really appreciate when folks on my firing team point things out. At first, I didn’t feel this way. Initially, I felt like they were pointing things out I should have seen and felt it was a weakness on my part. But now I see they are engaged in the process, investing in it and want to contribute. I’m still not the best with that, but I do really appreciate the input.”

Firing from an Airboat We all have great jobs, we get sent all over the place to carry out all kinds of cool missions. Alex shared one of his more unforgettable ones.

“We were doing this prescribed fire in far northwest Minnesota. I get to do some firing from an airboat— you know, the ones with the giant fan on the back.” Alex doing project work near Manning Camp, Rincon Mountains, [See photo on next page.] “I’m one of two people on Saguaro National Park, in 2010. this boat and I’ve got this drip torch with a three-foot wand.

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“We were in this canal at the south end of the unit. There was a place where the canal was dry. If the airboat could maintain enough speed, it could just skim over this mud area. At one point, the boat operator said: ‘Hey, I’ll drop you off and you go light that stuff and I’ll come around and pick you up’.

“So I jumped off the boat. The first indicator that this might be problematic should have been the fact that I had to push the boat back into the water to get him going after dropping me off. As I’m getting into position to start lighting, he had to go down to some open water, turn around, and come back into position to get me.

“So I go do my thing, light all the cattails and they get going! Then all the matted down cattails start to burn, just steadily burning and backing. When he comes back to get me, he beaches the boat just a little too much. I jump in, put my PFD on and we try to go—but we’re stuck. Airboat firing operations in Agassiz National Wildlife Refuge, Minnesota, in 2005. “There is steady fire in the matted down stuff all That’s Mr. Viktora in the chair. around us. I jump out to push, but we are really stuck. Meanwhile, the fire is all over the place. We did have a hand tool on the boat. I grabbed it and started knocking fire out here and there to keep it from scorching the boat. We didn’t want to scorch it any more than we had earlier in the day. (That’s a different story!)

“As a beginning firing boss, I would say things like: ‘It’s not hot enough unless holding is nervous.’ After a few close calls, I think I’ve tempered that. After all, you can’t put fire back in the can. And that’s real important to remember. I now really appreciate when folks on my firing team point things out.”

“We eventually got the surface fire contained so it wasn’t going to get up under the boat. Both of us ended up having to jump out and push the boat out to a place where we could get moving again. Good times!”

Alex has one more piece of advice for all of us.

“Some people think: ‘I don’t want that qualification until I feel like I know everything.’ That’s ridiculous! But we often get that tendency, especially with high-responsibility positions, like FIRB. Just because you get qualified does not mean you quit gaining experience or stop learning. You should remain a perpetual trainee (in your mind). The problems begin when you quit thinking that way. It’s being a student of fire, just like Gleason said.”

Take all these lessons and insights from someone who has put a lot of fire on the ground with you to your next firing operation. You could be the difference between a success no one hears about—or the bad deal on the six o’clock news!

Got a potential “One of Our Own” candidate?

Please let us know. Contact: Paul Keller 503-622-4861 [email protected]

For past issues of Two More Chains: If you would like us to include you on our e-mail subscription list, please click here. http://wildfirelessons.net/Additional.aspx?Page=TwoMoreChains

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Initial Attack Operations Suggestion

The Spring 2012 issue of Two More Chains provided sobering This would be a counterbalance to potential errors in judgment: statistics: “71 percent of wildland firefighter entrapment ignorance, casualness, and distraction. incidents—including four fatalities—occurred [in 2011] during My closing thoughts: Be prepared. Go direct. Think and evaluate Initial Attack.” Why does this story continue to unfold year after constantly. Look out for yourself and all those around you. year—and how can we prevent it? I would hope you are already familiar with the wisdom of Carl Wilson, Dick Mangan, and Paul Tim Swedberg Gleason: ▫ ▫ ▫ ▫ http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2003_n_before/carl-wilson(1977).pdf Appeal to ‘Ground Pounders’ http://www.blackbull-wildfire.com/Pubs/WildLandFireFatalitiesBW.pdf http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/gleason/lces.htm I want to thank you for Two More Chains. I have been using it during our (several) Fire Refresher and Basic 32-hour training this Each of these documents should be read and discussed by year. The articles are well written, informative and really appeal to everyone in wildland firefighting. Perhaps current emphasis leans us “ground pounders”. I hope you guys continue to publish and too much toward the large fire organization and not the command keep up the good work. Thanks! and safety of everyday incidents. A tremendous workload is on Initial Attack commanders: size-up, communications, Maeve Juarez, Captain, Casitas Fire Station accountability, safety, setting objectives and tactics, coordinating Los Padres National Forest and directing ground and air attack, and much more. [Editor’s Note: Thank You, Maeve, for your kind words and support. And

Do these demands lead to “distraction” as noted by Gleason? He thanks to everyone who has taken the time over the past year to send us words of encouragement and appreciation for Two More Chains. We are went on to say: “Establishing a Lookout position in the truly grateful for your positive input. It helps reinforce our original—and Operations function has its merits. The Lookout(s) would be ongoing—intent and commitment to provide wildland firefighters with a assigned directly to the Division Supervisor. They would have only relevant and useful communication tool. And, if we should make a misstep one responsibility, albeit an important one. Lookouts keep one along the way, please let us know about that, too!]

eye on the fire and the other on the Division’s firefighters.”

My suggestion stems from Gleason’s views about safety. On Two More Chains, published quarterly by the Wildland initial attack, I believe it is critical that wildland departments Fire Lessons Learned Center, is dedicated to sharing formally designate and announce an Accountability Officer information with wildland firefighters. For story tips, (Lookout) with the responsibility to account for personnel and questions, or comments, please contact: Paul Keller, safety, invoking the LCES system. [email protected], 503-622-4861.

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