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ISSUE BRIEF 08.07.18 The Evolution of the Kuwaiti ‘Opposition’: Electoral Politics after the Arab Spring

Daniel L. Tavana, Princeton University

Analyses of Kuwaiti politics are replete by the prerogatives of the ruling Al-Sabah with references to “the opposition.” family.2 In the realm of electoral politics, Impressionistic accounts—from journalists, these groups include blocks of Sunni and think tanks, and social scientists—often Shia, Liberal and Islamist, and hadhar refer to the opposition as a coherent, (settled or sedentary) and bedu (bedouin publicly known group of elites known for or nomadic) voters. Despite the relative their politicking in the pluralism that has characterized political (Majles al-Umma) or for their activism competition between these groups outside formal institutions. During over time, the government’s top-down campaigns, this tendency to label dominance of state institutions has led candidates as members of “the opposition” different constellations of these segments intensifies as candidates criticize the to claim ownership of an opposition government in an effort to signal their identity throughout Kuwait’s history. In independence and mobilize voters. The turn, the absence of a well-institutionalized reality of Kuwaiti politics, however, belies opposition—and public frustration with this these distortions. Since 2012, the presence opposition’s ability to deliver—has stunted of opposition in the Majles al-Umma has electoral competition in Kuwait. diminished, largely due to an emiri decree Since parliamentary were first that amended Kuwait’s election . This held in 1963, Kuwait has used four different The intensity of the brief analyzes how the new law has limited non-proportional, plurality (block vote) Majority Bloc’s criticism the opposition’s ability to succeed in light electoral systems. In plurality electoral of the government of changes to the dynamics of electoral systems, electors vote for candidates in contestation after the Arab Spring. multimember electoral . Candidates prompted the emir to Since independence, political life in need not obtain a majority of votes in order dissolve the National Kuwait has resembled the “segmented to win a seat. In 2006, Kuwaiti activists and Assembly in June 2012. pluralism” of many small European elements of the then opposition succeeded The dissolution plunged . Segmented pluralism in reducing the number of electoral districts Kuwait into the most reconciles “religious and ideological from 25 two-member districts to 5 ten- diversity with civic cohesion,” whereby member districts with partial block (limited) significant political “social movements, educational and . Previously, each elector was given crisis since 1992. communication systems, voluntary two votes in districts that each elected two associations, and political parties” are candidates. Under the partial block (limited) organized “along the lines of religious voting system, each elector was granted and ideological cleavages.”1 In Kuwait, four votes. With larger districts and more competition between these familles votes at their disposal, electors were free spirituelles, or segments, has created a to distribute their votes to family members, delicate consociational balance checked tribal representatives, representatives RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.07.18

from different political factions, and other limit the ability of different “groups”—tribes, candidates. Elections were held under proto-parties, and other ideologically this system in 2006, 2008, 2009, and connected factions—to form electoral February 2012, producing largely short-lived coalitions (lists) and mobilize voters. Under assemblies with sizable oppositions. the four-vote system, it was not uncommon After elections were held in for Kuwaitis to split their votes among February 2012, during the events of the candidates they supported on the basis of ‘Arab Spring,’ a group of over 30 MPs various ascriptive, social, or political ties. announced the formation of the Majority Not only did the old system encourage Bloc (Al-Aghlabiyya). The Majority Bloc candidates to form coalitions and campaign was arguably Kuwait’s most vocal anti- for votes they might not otherwise receive, government in the National but it also gave the competition for votes a Assembly’s history. The intensity of the distinct strategic flavor as candidates and The atomization of Majority Bloc’s criticism of the government factions negotiated with each other before prompted the emir to dissolve the National each election. candidates has led Assembly in June 2012 after only four In contrast, candidate strategy changed them to view elections months in session. The dissolution plunged under the new SNTV system, eliminating the as “every person for Kuwait into the most significant political value of electoral coalitions, or lists. In 2016, themselves” contests. crisis seen since the post-liberation for example, there was considerable internal restoration of the National Assembly in debate within the Islamic Constitutional 1992. In an attempt to resolve the crisis in Movement (ICM, or Hadas) over whether or the government’s favor, the emir issued an not to support a second candidate in the emiri decree amending the electoral law in Second . Both Jama’an Al-Herbesh October 2012. The new law left Kuwait’s five and Hamad Al-Matar were elected in electoral districts intact but controversially February 2012, but neither had participated switched to a single non-transferable vote in an election since the electoral law was (SNTV) . Each elector would changed. The ICM reluctantly agreed to now have only one vote, instead of four. support both candidates in 2016. Al-Herbesh Since this change, Kuwait has held came in fourth place with over 2,400 votes; three parliamentary elections in December Al-Matar came in eleventh place with 1,710 2012, 2013, and 2016. These elections were votes, narrowly (and controversially) losing Candidate strategy boycotted by different elements of the the district’s final seat by less than 50 votes. changed under the opposition in protest of the emiri decree. A similar trend can be seen among larger Since 2016, however, many opposition- tribes in the Fourth and Fifth Districts. For new SNTV system, affiliated tribal and Islamist candidates have example, candidates from the Al-Mutair eliminating the value returned, arguing that the Constitutional tribe, one of the largest tribes in Kuwait, of electoral coalitions, Court’s 2013 decision to uphold the emiri were able to win four seats in February 2012. or lists. decree has largely settled the issue of the They won only one seat in 2016. law’s legality. The atomization of candidates has led In what follows, I examine how the them to view elections as “every person new electoral law has undermined the for themselves” contests. In turn, this consociational balance that has defined has encouraged candidates to focus their electoral contestation since the National mobilization efforts on precincts within Assembly’s inception in 1963. This their districts where they are most likely to analysis comes from interviews I recently capture a voter’s single vote, rather than conducted with current and former attempting to garner the support of different parliamentary candidates in Kuwait and groups across the district. In the Second precinct-level results from the 2016 Majles District, for example, a candidate needs al-Umma elections. roughly 1,500 to 1,800 votes to secure a The new one-vote system has changed seat in the Majles al-Umma, a three-fold how both candidates and citizens approach decrease from elections held under the elections. From the beginning, it was clear four-vote system. Candidates now know that the switch to SNTV was designed to they have fewer opportunities to mobilize 2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE KUWAITI ‘OPPOSITION’: ELECTORAL POLITICS AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

voters in parts of the district where they do not reside or have other social, familial, or TABLE 1 — POLLING STATION-LEVEL RESULTS, MAJLES AL-UMMA ascriptive tribal or sectarian ties. ELECTION (2016) In practice, this change has limited electoral competition to individual precincts Candidate votes from Total number within each of Kuwait’s five electoral top two precincts (mean) of precincts districts. Precincts typically consist of one or more areas (mintaqa). Areas in First 0.535 8 Kuwait are small, geographically confined Second 0.635 8 neighborhoods ranging from a few hundred Third 0.427 10 registered voters (e.g., Fahad al-Ahmad Suburb) to nearly 20,000 registered voters Fourth 0.538 11 (e.g., Sabahiya). There are 50 precincts, Fifth 0.394 13 and the mean precinct contains nearly 10,000 voters. This competition within individual precincts has been particularly SOURCE Author’s Analysis disadvantageous to those opposition candidates with broader, district-wide appeal, because these candidates are now it has engendered—has intensified unable to secure an elector’s second, third, competition between those candidates or fourth votes from precincts outside their most likely to cooperate once inside the own. The new system is disadvantageous Majles al-Umma. Candidate rivalries are in this way because tribal and Islamist now forged within these precincts—not opposition candidates were better able to across them—among individuals with similar secure more voters across precincts when social, political, and business networks. This voters were able to distribute their votes has fragmented cooperative tendencies to family members, tribal representatives, among MPs who hail from similar precincts and representatives from different political with overlapping electoral bases. In other factions. Now, with only one vote, efforts words, it has encouraged competition to mobilize voters across several precincts within previously cohesive groups. In By prohibiting have become more difficult. 2016, candidates popular in the areas of candidates from In the 2016 Majles al-Umma election, Abdullah Al-Salim Suburb, Shamiya, and forming coalitions the average candidate received a narrow Shuwaikh, for example, described their majority (50.6%) of votes from their top rivals as those who were also most popular and appealing to two precincts.3 Table 1 breaks this figure in the same areas. In the Fourth and Fifth voters’ second, third, down in greater detail by electoral district. Districts, candidates affiliated with certain and fourth votes, For example, in the Second District, the tribes are now having to compete with the shift to SNTV has average candidate received 63.5% of votes each other to win support from members incentivized candidates from the top two precincts in which they of their tribes. Tribal candidates described performed best. It is difficult to explore this uncomfortable reality to me in detail: to focus on the these relationships over time, as the Ministry the new law has pitted tribal leaders against precincts they are of Interior has not made comprehensive, each other and depressed turnout in areas most familiar with. historical, precinct-level results available. with large numbers of tribal voters. Candidates have always had strongholds, These new dynamics have further or precincts where they performed better encouraged citizens to look to their comparatively. But by prohibiting candidates representatives for services. The types of from forming coalitions and appealing to services MPs offer vary across districts, but swing voters’ second, third, and fourth they include, for example, the provision of votes, the shift to SNTV has incentivized support for business interests and access candidates to focus on the precincts they to health care and employment. “Service are most familiar with. MPs” are certainly not new to Kuwait, but As a result, the new law—and the the gradual reemergence of clientelistic attendant localization of electoral appeals politics has led candidates to emphasize 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 08.07.18

their ability to deliver services through their campaign-related coalitions. While the connections to state institutions. This trend diversity of political life in Kuwait will likely has deepened even in parts of the endure, the mechanisms through which where it was previously less common. A candidates and citizens approach elections former who has struggled to win will have lasting, generational effects. Left This issue brief is part a seat under the new law describes this unchecked, these effects may gradually development in Mishref: undermine the pluralism that has been of a two-year research a feature of electoral life in Kuwait since project on pluralism in In Mishref—there are very rich people, they have lots of resources. When I independence. the Middle East after was running, they said: “You are very the Arab uprisings. nice, you were a good MP, and you ENDNOTES The project is generously are honest. But you didn’t provide any supported by a grant services [khadamat]. When you became 1. Val R. Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism: a minister, you did not appoint any of our Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion from the Carnegie family members.” You see how things in the Smaller European Democracies,” Corporation of New York. have changed? Usually in Mishref—they Comparative Politics 3, no. 2 (January 1971): never asked about this. The new system 141, https://www.jstor.org/stable/421297. prevents people from voting for the future. 2. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational ,” World Politics 21, no. 2 This renewed focus on services, clientelistic (January 1969): 207-225, https://www. transactions, and favoritism has strengthened jstor.org/stable/2009820; Arend Lijphart, the government’s hand, privileging those “Consociational Theory: Problems and candidates with access to state institutions. Prospects. A Reply,” Comparative Politics 13, See more issue briefs at: If the previous electoral law encouraged no. 3 (April 1981): 355-360, https://www. www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs candidates to build bridges with different jstor.org/stable/421902. types of voters, the new law has done the 3. This figure is calculated only from This publication was written by a opposite. Previously, candidates took great those candidates who finished among the researcher (or researchers) who pride in their ability to win support from participated in a Baker Institute project. top 30 candidates in each of Kuwait’s five Wherever feasible, this research is all different voters: Sunni or Shia, Liberal districts, for a total of 150 candidates. reviewed by outside experts before it is or Islamist, hadhar or bedu, and so on. released. However, the views expressed Obtaining such diverse support was not herein are those of the individual always a necessary condition of electoral AUTHOR author(s), and do not necessarily success, but it was often an important one. represent the views of Rice University’s Daniel L. Tavana is a doctoral candidate Where candidates were once incentivized to Baker Institute for Public Policy. in the Department of Politics at Princeton coordinate with those outside their family, University, where he researches elections, © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute tribe, or sect, many now resort to polarizing comparative political behavior, and public for Public Policy group-based appeals in an attempt to attract opinion in the Middle East and North Africa. support from those voters already most likely This material may be quoted or He holds master’s degrees from Cambridge to vote for them. Seen in this light, it is not reproduced without prior permission, University and the Kennedy School of difficult to understand how these changes provided appropriate credit is given to Government at Harvard University, as well as have exacerbated societal divisions and the author and Rice University’s Baker a bachelor’s degree from the University Institute for Public Policy. heightened consociational tension. of Pennsylvania. By moving electoral competition into Cover image credit: precincts, limiting cross-cutting and political flickr.com/xiquinho (CC BY-SA 2.0) appeals, and increasing citizen demands for Cite as: services, the new electoral law may erode Tavana, Daniel L. 2018. The Evolution the “segmented pluralism” vital to the of the Kuwaiti ‘Opposition’: Electoral National Assembly’s status as the Gulf’s lone Politics after the Arab Spring. Issue competitively elected legislative institution. brief no. 08.07.18. Rice University’s These changes have limited the ability of Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. opposition-minded elites to win elections and form parliamentary blocs forged from 4