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Maaser, Nicola; Stratmann, Thomas
Conference Paper Distributional Consequences of Political Representation
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Collective Decision Making I, No. A06-V3
Provided in Cooperation with: Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Suggested Citation: Maaser, Nicola; Stratmann, Thomas (2014) : Distributional Consequences of Political Representation, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Collective Decision Making I, No. A06-V3, ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100565
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OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
Nicola Maaser a,*, Thomas Stratmann b
a Department of Economics and ZeS, University of Bremen, Mary-Somerville-Str. 5, 28359 Bremen, Germany b Department of Economics, George Mason University, 1D3 Carow Hall, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
ABSTRACT
We investigate the geographical concentration of representatives and the distribution of fiscal transfers both theoretically and empirically. We develop a model which predicts that funds to an area are positively correlated with the number of representatives residing in that area. Our empirical analysis uses the fact that due to the electoral rules for German state elections the number of representatives varies quasi-randomly across electoral districts. Controlling for various socio-economic and demographic variables and using a variety of estimation techniques, we find that areas with greater number of representatives receive more government funds.
KEYWORDS : representation, redistribution, vote-buying, transfers, comparative political economy
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 421 218-58555; Fax: + 49 421 218-58624. E-mail address : [email protected].
I. Introduction
Does asymmetric legislative representation of citizens translate into an asymmetric allocation of government funds? The concern not to get their “fair share” of public funds motivates many struggles for greater representation, e.g., by minority groups, groups challenging legislatures’ apportionment, or EU’s heads of governments in their negotiations on voting rules for the Council. The consequences of asymmetric representation also feature prominently in recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy (e.g. Gibson et al. 2004; Knight 2008; Rodden and Dragu 2011). An interesting question is whether only the groups whose interests a legislator is supposed to represent benefit from fiscal redistribution, or whether the individuals in the geographic area where the legislator resides can expect additional funds. In the latter case distribution of federal funds is divorced from representation suggesting that legislators have more discretion in allocating funds than traditionally modeled in voting models, where legislators might allocate funds to voters based on whether they are swing voters or supporters, but not based on where the legislator resides. This paper studies the link between representation and redistribution in the context of a – basically proportional – electoral system used in German states where variation in the geographical concentration of representatives is quasi-random rather than institutional. Our results demonstrate that geographic areas in which a greater number of legislators reside, receive larger fiscal transfers. These effects are more pronounced for discretionary funds as opposed to formula funds. We also examine the importance of the governing party in distributive politics. Here, we find some evidence that areas with more government party representatives receive larger state transfers. The paper thus challenges the widespread assumption that proportional rule in unitary states is inherently exclusive to geographically concentrated spending (Carey and Shugart 1995; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Crisp et al. 2004; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006). We develop a simple theoretical model of a central government that uses its discretion over the geographical distribution of local public goods to build legislative coalitions to get its proposals passed. One of the model’s contributions is that it demonstrates a link between the number of representatives from an area and the amount of funds that the area receives. It does so with a view to how many legislatures operate, first by assuming that legislative leaders introduce legislative proposals and second by assuming that votes in the legislature are cast predominantly on ideological issues rather than on the geographical allocation of benefits.
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We create a unique dataset of fiscal transfers to geographic areas for electoral districts in three large German states (Laender ) between 1990 and 2009, and analyze the effect of the geographical distribution of representatives on the geographic allocation of government transfer spending. The reason for studying German states is that their electoral system provides an especially useful opportunity to identify the impact of differential geographical representation. While the eventual strength of the parties in a state legislature is determined at-large according to the principle of party-list proportional representation, electoral districts serve to personalize the vote by allowing voters in each district to elect one candidate directly by plurality rule. 1 State electoral laws stipulate that electoral districts be of roughly equal population size, 2 and limit deviations from equal population size. For example, in Bavaria, a district’s population shall not deviate by more than 15 percent from the average district. 3 However, a district’s presence in parliament is often not limited to its directly elected representative, but reinforced by party-list representatives who live in the electoral district and have an office there at which citizens can contact them. We expect these representatives to have ties to the district where they reside for several reasons: Some are losers of the direct race in that district, but have entered the legislature via the party list; others have long records in local politics or action groups; probably all have better information on conditions and problems in their own neighborhood. 4 District representation in this sense is considerably more variable than district representation by the directly elected members of the legislature. Our empirical identification strategy rests on these quasi-random variations in the number of representatives affiliated with some district. To address the concern that some common unobserved factor might lead to both more representatives living in a district and to the district receiving larger state transfers, we take advantage of the fact that persons ranked very low on a party list sometimes become members of parliament in order to restore proportionality. For legislators who hold such ‘proportionality seats’ ( Ausgleichmandate ), obtaining a seat is not endogenous to some unobserved district characteristic, but to an
1 More details on electoral systems in German states are provided in Section IV. 2 Districting is conducted on the basis of total population, including persons not entitled to vote such as minors. Recent jurisdiction (2 BvC 3/11, January 31, 2012), however, requires that close attention be paid to the number of eligible individuals across districts. 3 In fact, population differences across electoral districts in our sample states are very similar to those of US congressional districts both in terms of the coefficient of variation – 0.09 in the US, and 0.11 on average in our sample – and the ratio between the smallest and the largest district – 2.22 in the US, and 1.68 on average in our sample (own calculations comparing American Community Survey data (5-Year averages 2006-2010) obtained from the National Historical Geographic Information System, see www.nhgis.org , with the most recent electoral period in our dataset). 4 Indeed, anecdotal evidence from newspapers and representatives’ websites indicates that credit claiming for funds and activities in the district is common and pertains to all sorts and political colors of representatives. 2 electoral rule in combination with the vote totals. The allocation of these seats could have hardly been anticipated and thus district representation by ‘surprise’ representatives provides a plausible instrument for district representation. To date, evidence for the relevance of formal political representation for distributional outcomes has come exclusively from two types of political environments: First, legislative bodies which represent member states in federations or unions (e.g., U.S. Senate, German Bundesrat, Council of the European Union), focusing on the overrepresentation of the smaller units (Rodden 2002; Pitlik, Schneider, Strotmann 2006; and Fink and Stratmann 2011). Second, legislatures whose members are elected under plurality rule from single-member districts, for example, as in most U.S. state legislatures. This electoral system is associated with targeted spending because representatives have incentives to build a personal base of support within their geographic district (Cain et al. 1984; Cox and McCubbins 2001, p. 37; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006). Differences in district populations – as existed for example between state legislative districts in the U.S. prior to the Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186, 1962 ) and Reynolds v. Sims (377 U.S. 533, 1964 ) decisions – could lead to an unequal per-capita distribution of government funds (Ansolabehere et al. 2002). The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the relevant literature. Section III introduces our theoretical model. Section IV contains information about the electoral system in German states. We describe the data and our empirical model in Section V. Our empirical findings are presented in Section VI. A final section concludes the paper.
II. Related literature
From a theoretical perspective, a link between representation and redistribution is shown in various legislative bargaining models (for example, Baron and Ferejohn 1987, 1989; Snyder et al. 2005; Knight 2008). These models show that larger legislative representation increases a region’s proposal power, and that more representation makes a region a more attractive coalitional partner for other regions. Another approach that we follow in this paper is to model the distribution of discretionary government expenditures across districts as “legislative targeting”. In these models the leaders in the legislature or party allocate funds to legislators to optimize legislative outcomes. Examples for such studies can be divided into those that emphasize pivotal legislators as the primary determinants of legislative outcomes (e.g., Krehbiel 1998;
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King and Zeckhauser 2003), and those that emphasize the importance of senior majority-party legislators (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005). Empirical work on representation and redistribution has mostly focused on democracies that are structured as federal unions. All federal unions are characterized by asymmetries in the population, size, and economic power of their constituent parts, and their political institutions interact with these asymmetries. For example, smaller units are typically overrepresented by a federation’s foundational bargain to accommodate their fears of domination by larger units. In contrast to these studies which explore the effects of deliberate over-representation of some regions, our work investigates the effects of the geographic concentration of legislators. Examining a diverse set of federations around the world, Rodden and Dragu (2011) show that overrepresented states or provinces tend to get a larger share of federal funds. Gibson et al. (2004) report large overrepresentation effects for expenditures in Brazil and Argentina. Ansolabehere et al. (2002) analyze the allocation of money by U.S. states to counties. They use variations in representation over time due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr decision and subsequent cases. These decisions mandated a shift from highly unequal representation of citizens across state legislative districts to ‘one person, one vote’. The authors find that state transfers to counties favored overrepresented counties prior to redistricting, and that the allocation of transfers became more balanced after the implementation of the court decision. Considerable attention has been paid to the distributional effects of unequal representation of the states in the U.S. Senate. Single-country studies that focus on the U.S. include Atlas et al. (1995) and Lee (1998). They find that federal expenditures and net transfers per capita are significantly greater in smaller, overrepresented states. Knight (2008) points out that the U.S. Senate does not allow to disentangle the effects of representation from the independent effects of population size; as the number of senators is uniform all variation comes from variation in population across states. 5 To overcome this shortcoming, Knight (2008) makes use of the fact that the same state is represented differently in the House and in the Senate. He finds that states with greater representation receive more funding from appropriations bills that originate in the U.S. Senate relative to appropriations bills that originate in the House. Single-country studies that focus on Germany include Pitlik, Schmid, and Strotmann (2001), Pitlik, Schneider, and Strotmann (2006) and Fink and Stratmann
5 Disentangling the effect of legislative representation from the effects of population size is nontrivial in empirical analysis (see Acemoglu 2005). 4
(2011) who find that states with high per-capita representation in the German Bundesrat receive more net funds per capita from the German intergovernmental transfer system. Similarly, Rodden (2002) reports a positive and linear relationship between per-capita redistribution and the unequal per-capita representation of citizens in the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Our work also relates to the growing empirical political economy literature on legislative organization and government expenditures. For example, Baqir (2002) finds that public spending increases in the size of U.S. city councils. Further, Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) find a positive effect of council size on government spending using municipality-level data from the German state of Bavaria.
III. Theoretical framework
Here we present a theoretical model building on work by Young (1978a, 1978b) in which he characterizes the equilibrium in a game where two players exchange political favors. In our model, players are legislative leaders and representatives in the legislature. Our model predicts that government funds are concentrated in highly represented areas.
3.1 Economic environment
Consider a partition of citizens into geographically distinct electoral districts indexed by . Each of the citizens in < is assumed to have the following quasilinear preference over consumption of a local public good and consumption of the private good : , (1) ( , ) = ℎ / + where is strictly increasing and normalized so that . The congestion parameter ℎ captures the degree of rivalry in consumption: ℎ(0) both =private 0 goods ( ) and pure public ∈ [0,1] goods ( ) are special cases. Finally, each citizen in is endowed with = 1 units of the private good =which 0 can be converted into public goods at a dollar-for-dollar rate. The allocation of local public goods is determined by a centralized legislature. We normalize total expenditure to and assume that public good provision is financed by a uniform head tax on ∑ all citizens.1 Private consumption is determined residually and equals 1/ . = − 1/
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3.2 Political environment
The legislative assembly is composed of ( ) representatives who decide by simple majority rule on a succession of proposals made by ≤ an external player whom we refer to as the legislative leaders. The set of representatives affiliated with district is denoted by . We assume that and for all . We begin⋃ with= the assumption ∩ = that ∅ the legislative ≠ leaders value the passage of their proposals sufficiently high that they offer local public goods to some set of legislators in exchange for their votes in favor of the proposal in order to have a measure pass with certainty, rather than merely with some high probability, and that they have the requisite funds to do so. For any given issue there exists some subset of representatives who strictly prefer the leaders’ proposal to the status quo and hence vote in favor, whereas a subset of representatives is opposed. Any representative in the remainder is indifferent between voting for or against the proposal by his ideological ≡ preferences. ∖ ( ∪ Yet,) legislative leaders can increase the representative’s payoff from voting in favor by allocating a local public good, or project, to the district with which that representative is affiliated, and thus sway him to support the measure. Formally, if a proposal is made, each representative chooses an action from the action set indicating whether is in favor, against, or neutral towards the proposal. We take= { , these , } choices to be the consequences of rational and strategic reasoning based on ideology, reputation concerns, etc. Assuming that the outspoken opponents are in the minority ( ), legislative leaders can always build a coalition of and at least