Volume 6 | Issue 6 | Article ID 2776 | Jun 01, 2008 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus

The Denationalized Have No Class: The Banishment of Japan's Korean Minority-- A POLEMIC

Sonia Ryang

The Denationalized Have No Class: The compounded. Banishment of Japan’s Korean Minority-- A POLEMIC

Sonia Ryang

1.

In a recent article by Bumsoo Kim entitled “Bringing class back in: the changing basis of inequality and the Korean minority in Japan,” I read:

“[…] this study shows that the Young Koreans in Japan celebrate legal/institutional and socioeconomic wedding in traditional Korean style. structural changes in Japan for the past few decades, by decreasing Nevertheless, what the above passage made me ethnic inequality between Koreans wonder—and what I found to be odd in it—was and Japanese while increasing class this: Koreans in Japan have always had inequality among Koreans, have made incorporated class stratification: throughout class more significant than ethnicity the colonial period, during the US occupation in understanding the inequalityand the entire post-war period, and to this day. problematic of zainichi Koreans [i.e. The question is why, then, do some researchers Koreans in Japan].”[1] think that class (and here, I take that they mean, through conflation, class consciousness Perhaps it is logical that an oppressed and and class differentiation) was not previously marginalized ethnic minority, once it begins to relevant to Koreans in Japan or, more precisely, receive the benefits of the affluence of the host when we think about Koreans in Japan. When society, albeit belatedly, would shed itsdid class disappear from the rhetoric and markings of ethnicity and begin to take on the understanding of and about Koreans in Japan to markings of class. Perhaps it is also logical to the extent that now someone has to “bring think that in such a situation class, rather than class back in”? ethnicity, would become more relevant to forging identity. Unequivocally, however, I These questions led me to think not so much remain unconvinced by the argument that a about class as about being human—notably, particular category becomes “more significant” about when a human is not a human in Japan. I than certain others, since the marking of the find that focusing on class (including class oppressed is always necessarily multiply consciousness and class differentiation) or,

1 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF more precisely, the absence thereof, can for Japanese and Koreans? In other words, is provide a useful perspective when thinking the mode of attrition of this concept from about Japan as a nation-state in which non- public consciousness the same for Japanese nationals are not deemed human. and Koreans in Japan, the former being members of the Japanese national polity, and the latter being outsiders in relation to it? In 2. line with this, my further proposition is that class stratification, including membership of a It is no news to Japan scholars that the concept certain class, should be understood as being of class does not always serve as a useful premised upon national membership. More guide. Having said this, class is not a unified category. Following the Neo-Marxistcrudely put, if one is not a member of a intervention in academe, especially in the work national polity, one is not a class member: that of Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu, no is to say, the denationalized have no class. To a serious social scientist has been content with a great extent, this is a truism, as many cases, definition of class limited to economicglobally speaking, confirm this position. But the relationships. Rather, cultural capital and case of Koreans in Japan presents a particularly ideological mechanisms as we understand them clear instance of the phenomenon, as I shall today carry as much importance as socio- show below. economic relations and income or wages.[2] I shall argue that there is an important But there is also the problem of cross-cultural mechanism at work here, involving legal, and cross-national compatibility of categories. philosophical, and cultural elements, such that For example, the category of middle class Koreans do not qualify to be included when one captures a much broader population in the US talks about class formation in Japan. Such than in Britain. While in the latter, at least in exclusion of Koreans is not new. Throughout popular and lay discourses of the everyday, the the postwar era, Korean residents in Japan middle class stands in clear distinction from the have not been recognized as a sociological working class (the histories of which have been category, either in the context of censuses and written; for example[3]), in the former, the surveys in Japan or from within the middle class seems to encompasspositionality of Koreans themselves. heterogeneous income groups with vague nomenclatures, often including professionals, The systematic exclusion of Koreans from blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, small Japan’s quantitative data, such as the national business owners, and so on. Furthermore, in census, however, has not been matched by a both the US and Britain, poverty lines have similar practice in the area of qualitative often followed racial (in addition to ethnic and studies, particularly in the case of the literary colonial) lines of division. While racialized print market. Koreans in Japan have been economic borders have long divided the Korean studied from multiple angles, and their cases minority from the Japanese majority, the vast have been used to test many concepts that majority of Koreans and Japanese would today populate the margins of Japanese society, classify themselves as middle class—if asked, including poverty and domestic violence. that is. In other words, terms such as class are Strangely, however, these studies have failed to passé in popular discourse in Japan, just as touch upon the concept of class. poverty deceptively appears to have vanished in the eyes of many.[4] I do not attempt to fill this gap in the study of class among Koreans in Japan, but use this But did class disappear equally and identically omission to highlight an intellectual challenge.

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I do so by paying close attention to the limbo- not propose to conceptualize Koreans as like ontology of Koreans in Japan in relation to holding a transnational or supranational Japan and Korea. This concept has been existence or, worse still, “cultural explored by other writers, generally carrying citizenship”— labels that in no way capture the the implication of a moral inferiority, or more fundamental reality of Koreans in Japan.[5] I precisely, an inferior or lesser belonging in one shall show that the reason why Koreans in terrain, presumably, Japan’s national entity. Japan continue to be viewed as irrelevant to, or Instead, I shall take banishment, or exile, as an not conforming with, class divisions within important conceptual pillar in this exercise. Japanese society is that they are merely and This position separates me from existing nakedly human and not members of a national studies of Koreans in Japan that presuppose an polity. As I shall demonstrate below, this is an inferior, incomplete form of belonging of example of what Giorgio Agamben calls bare Koreans in relation to Japanese society: what I life, a form of existence that Hannah Arendt am saying is that there is no such form of claims as the most perilous and precarious in belonging—complete exclusion or banishment the modern world.[6] is all that exists for Koreans in Japan. The banishment of Koreans from Japanese society is 3. as much a reality as a useful conceptual tool in clarifying why Koreans have not been studied It should not take too much to persuade the from the perspective of class stratification in reader that, for a long time in postwar Japan, Japan. This, I shall argue, is a result of both Korean residents were poor—poorer than their internal and external perceptions; by the Japanese contemporaries, and poorer than Japanese government and researchers on the Koreans in Japan are today. With a certain one hand, and by Koreans themselves on the audacity, I might even claim that, for a other. substantial period, Koreans in Japan had only two cultural assets—a culture of nationalism It will be necessary to start from the postwar and a culture of poverty. Koreans were poor, process according to which emerging Korean known to be poor, and expected to behave like expatriate movements effectively segregated poor people. This meant that, in the scheme of Koreans from the Japanese mainstream,Japanese stereotyping of Koreans, they were rendering them invisible in the context of associated with an array of damnable, beastly, Japan’s domestic statistics. This needs to be and barbaric characteristics including a understood in tandem with the legal exclusion benighted querulousness, lack of education and of Koreans from the Japanese nation by a intelligence, crude and slow wits, an easily concerted effort of the US Occupationexcitable nature, opportunism, dishonesty, and authorities in the immediate postwar years and deceptiveness. These were distinctly colonial the Japanese authorities thereafter. I shall then characterizations of Koreans in Japan by the introduce a survey, possibly the only existing Japanese media and authorities.[7] But sociological survey available in English, carried ironically, in the postcolonial self- out using quantitatively appropriate methods understanding of Koreans in Japan, poverty and among Korean males in Japan by Kimviolence loomed large, as these formed part of Myungsoo in 1995, and shall further interpret the unmistakable heritage that Korean its results. expatriate decolonization in Japan had to deal with. My final goal is to address the question of what it is to be human rather than “Korean” or And that violence, that ethnic Korean brand of “Japanese.” The reader will recognize that I do violence, the intensity of which Japanese

3 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF sectioned off in urban ghettos such as Sanya or Indeed, as long as Koreans did not try to take Kamagasaki, readily found its way into Korean advantage of the limited forms of welfare homes, fiercely inflicted upon weaker members offered by local municipalities, there was of the family by the patriarch. The oft-quoted hardly anything the Japanese government owed figure of the areru chichi or violent father, them—that is, speaking from the perspective of however, was also seen as burning with the Japan’s domestic law. This is because, following flames of patriotism—there was always a good their 1952 forfeiture of Japanese nationality, justification for his actions, as he had been Koreans became officially and completely extra- destroyed, abused, exploited, and mentally territorials in the eyes of the Japanese injured by Japanese imperialism and colonial government. That is, with the signing of the rule. Note that this portrayal was not found in San Francisco Treaty between the US and the writings of Japanese commentators, let Japan in 1952, Koreans lost all the legal alone state-commissioned researchers, but in properties associated with national belonging the writings of ethnic Korean writers in in Japan. Instead, thereafter, they became Japan.[8] extra-national temporary residents, or sojourners, many of them stateless persons, to Strangely, however, the poverty of Koreans was be precise. Thus they came to be excluded from not represented or perceived (by Koreans veterans’ benefits, atomic bomb victims’ themselves) as a class phenomenon. It was, benefits, disability benefits, the national rather, an ethnic property. Just as Japan’s so- pension plan, national government welfare, and called “untouchables,” the burakumin, were all other nationalized forms of social security. associated with poverty, Korean neighborhoods To be sure—and this is important—many were referred to as chōsenburaku or Korean Koreans were the recipients ofseikatsuhogo, hamlets (or ghettos, in more contemporary “livelihood protection,” a rescue measure language). These consisted of persons engaged implemented by local municipalities (not the in a range of activities (and lack of activity) national government). But no access was associated with poverty—raising pigs,provided to national-level benefits and welfare. collecting cardboard boxes and glass bottles, As such, the poverty of this group did not gathering old nails and melting them in constitute a domestic class problem for the backyards, the ubiquitous day laboring, and Japanese nation-state. The year 1952 therefore chronic unemployment. Families lived in shacks constituted an important juncture in the history that sometimes had no running water, often of Koreans in Japan. I shall return to this point using shared outhouses. Men were often later. heavily dependent on alcohol, which consumed the meager earnings from their daily labors. Women tried to cling to these paltry funds in 4. order to provide for the children. Women also worked, often illegally and with a sense of Historically speaking, Koreans played an humiliation, at times brewing rice wine or important role in the formation of the modern collecting scrap metal on the streets, all the Japanese working class, Japanese trade while nursing and raising children. I have unionism, and the Communist movement, both perhaps made the wrong emphasisduring the colonial and postcolonial periods. At here—humiliation was not foremost in their the height of the Comintern’s intervention in thoughts, rather they were preoccupied with the Korean and Japanese Communist the desperate struggle for survival. movements during the 1920s, Korean communists in Japan, following the Comintern All of this, however, remained in the ghetto. policy of one party per nation, joined their

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Japanese comrades in the name of trans-ethnic working class solidarity. The Korean comrades were famed for their level of commitment and fearless determination, and their activities often led to injury or imprisonment.[9]

When the war ended, there were 2.4 million Koreans in Japan, most of whom were repatriated during the years immediately following Japan’s defeat. Repatriation took place in a chaotic atmosphere, with virtually no administrative assistance provided by the Japanese or Occupation authorities. By 1948, only about 590,000 Koreans remained in The headquarter of Choryeon (top) and Japan.[10] During the early years of the US Mindan (bottom) in Tokyo Occupation (1945-47), leftist movements in Japan regained momentum. Koreans joined this The above belief in itself had not prevented wave by maintaining strong connections with leftist Koreans from forming their own working-class, progressive, and communist organization. Within two months of the war’s forces. Throughout East Asia, activists worked ending, in October 1945, the League of Koreans in Japan (zainichi chōsenjin renmei in under the assumption that socialist revolutions Japanese and chaeilbon choseonin ryeonmaeng would spread, domino-like, following the in Korean), commonly referred to as Choryeon, establishment of North Korea (1948) and the was founded. This body was soon to be People’s Republic of China (1949). On this confronted with a rival nationalist organization, premise, it was argued that if the Korean left the Association of Koreans Remaining in Japan wanted to support Korea’s socialist revolution (zainichi kankoku kyoryÅ« mindan in Japanese and the goal of national unification under North and chaeil hanguk keoryu mindan), commonly Korea’s leadership, it had to first join forces known as Mindan. While it is conventionally with Japanese communists in their efforts to (and not completely erroneously) understood bring down the current reactionary Japanese that Choryeon supported north Korea while government.[11] Mindan backed south Korea (reflecting Korea’s partition as of 1945 into a Sovietized north and an American Military Government-run south), the operational mechanisms of expatriate politics reflected boundaries that were far more complex, ambiguous, and unstable. For example, Choryeon had a Seoul office in South Korea. Moreover, the majority of Koreans remaining in Japan originated from the southern provinces of Kyeongsang, Cheolla, and Cheju, thereby rendering it somewhat unnatural that Choryeon enjoyed support among this population, unless one remembered that Koreans (and others also) in those days regarded the country’s partition as a temporary

5 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF state-of-affairs soon to be resolved. Koreans of end unexpectedly by communiqués issued by both left- and right-wing persuasions shared the North Korean Foreign Minister in 1952, fiercely anti-Japanese and nationalisticwhich expressed North Korea’s willingness to sentiments and a strong desire to gainenter into normal diplomatic relations with the complete independence through a unified Japanese government currently in power.[13] Korea. What divided them were differing views on how best to achieve the common goal of Following this development, Koreans withdrew national reunification and independence from en masse from the Japanese Communist Party foreign occupation: one camp wanted to unify and, after a few years of internal purges and Korea under North Korean-style socialism, fierce debates, re-organized as the General while the other wanted to free the peninsula Association of Korean Residents in Japan, or from revolutionary influences associated with Chongryun in its abbreviated Korean form. In the Soviet Union and China. retrospect, the emergence of Chongryun in 1955 completed the process of banishment of Koreans in Japan from the Japanese national 5. polity first initiated through the 1952 forfeiture of Japanese nationality. The classification of The left sought to build a supra-national class exiled Koreans as sojourners, rather than as coalition. Ironically, such possibilities were members of the society of the host nation, augmented by the suppression of the left by amounted to a postcolonial settlement in dual Japanese and Occupation authorities. In 1949, terms—for the Japanese government, which Occupation authorities and Japanese military police responded to Choryeon’s support for could now completely banish Koreans from any North Korea, by closing down Choryeon’s form of national planning, and also for Koreans headquarters, outlawing it and confiscating its in Japan themselves, who thus freed themselves properties, assets, and savings. This was the from the legacy of Japanese colonial first application of the Prevention ofsubjugation while remaining in Japan. Indeed, Destruction Law or hakai bōshihō. Earlier, in in the latter case, it was precisely because they 1948, Korean schools operated by Choryeon continued to stay on in Japan that they had to had been forcibly shut down under theself-exile themselves from the Japanese nation- provisions of Martial Law, resulting in deaths state. and injuries.[12] Chongryun, in contrast to Choryeon, renounced In the wake of these developments, Korean left- all forms of intervention in Japan’s domestic nationalists had no choice but to join the politics. Instead, it declared itself to be the Japanese Communist Party, which had not been organization representing North Korea suppressed by the authorities. However, this overseas. This meant that Chongryun would not marriage of convenience soon showed signs of wage campaigns demanding civil rights, strain. The frustrations of Korean members economic and social benefits, provision of intensified following the outbreak of the Korean medical care, or other civic entitlements War in 1950, compounded by disillusionment provided by the Japanese government. It when the promised East Asian revolution failed recognized these as rights reserved exclusively to materialize. Fierce debate took place among for Japanese citizens. Furthermore, it Korean members, some stressing solidarity renounced the use of unlawful violence in all with the international working class movement, aspects of its activities, and declared itself to and others calling for prioritization of national be a law-abiding organization in Japan. This goals and efforts to end the bloody conflict on marked the virtual disappearance of Koreans the peninsula. This debate was brought to an from Japanese left-wing movements. In

6 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF exchange, Chongryun secured relative elementary school in Tokyo. 2007. autonomy to operate its own schools with its own academic curricula. As long as its schools In short, by 1955, within three years of being were not accredited as Level 1 schools, or deprived of Japanese citizenship, Koreans in ichijōkō, those classified by the Ministry of Japan (or at least Chongryun and its affiliates, Education as capable of issuing academic which accounted for the majority of Koreans at certificates and degrees, the pedagogical the time) had banished or exiled themselves contents of programs offered at thesefrom the Japanese civic terrain. During the institutions would be left untouched by the period when their status had been ambiguous, ministry. At the same time, however,that is to say, in 1949, when they were not Chongryun schools would not be entitled to legally excluded from Japanese citizenship public subsidies, thereby freeing the ministry status under the Occupation, they were from the burden of having to finance the “outlawed”; in 1952, they were excluded from education of Korean students enrolled in Japanese civic entitlements; in 1955, Koreans Chongryun schools. Chongryun enjoyedthemselves embraced this marginalization by substantial support among Koreans in Japan. At effectively declaring that they had no wish to the time of its founding, Japanese intelligence be counted within Japan’s civic life. estimated that as many as 90 percent of Koreans in Japan sympathized with andFrom then on, Koreans were erased from supported North Korea.[14] Japan’s national census, national surveys, GDP calculations, and income charts. They were also denied veterans’ pensions, payments for medical expenses for victims of the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and welfare and social security payments. Further, they were denied access to national healthcare, the right to hold civil and public service jobs, and the right to vote, while they remained obligated to pay taxes in a classical form of “taxation without representation.” Fundamentally speaking, their exclusion (and self-exclusion) occluded them from class categorizations—there was, in other words, no way to include them in discussions and conceptualizations of socio-economic class formation and transformation in postwar Japan, since they had been stripped of civil status and privileges. More figuratively speaking, being a member of a certain class stands on the prerequisite of being a member of a national state polity: if one is not a national, one does not belong to any class, either.

But that is not all. Up until 1965, Japan recognized neither the governments of South Ethnic Korean students study at a Korea nor North Korea. Alien registration Chongryun-funded certificates carried by Koreans in Japan would

7 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF include the terms chōsen (a general term for also, that regardless of what Koreans thought Korea; often used to refer to North Korea) or they were, they had no citizenship or kankoku (South Korea). However, the Japanese nationality. Their idea of being “overseas government’s immigration bureau is on record citizens of North Korea” was a baseless illusion as stating that neither term refers to arecognized neither by North Korea nor by nationality.[15] It may not be intuitivelyJapan, nor for that matter by any state or obvious to the reader today, but up until 1965, international organization. Koreans in Japan had no official nationality available for them, since neitherkankoku or North Korea does not issue passports to chōsen written on the Japanese alienpersons living overseas, and there is no registration certificate meant a nation. Since documentation or paperwork inside North 1965, following normalization of diplomatic Korea that registers Koreans in Japan as relations between Japan and South Korea, citizens of the nation residing abroad. The only kankoku came to be deemed as a nationality. time North Korea has officially acknowledged But even today, a minority of Koreans in Japan that Koreans in Japan could potentially be continues to have chōsen (Korea) entered in North Korean nationals was when it entered the space for “nationality” on their alien into a formal agreement with the Japanese Red registration documents. This term does not Cross so that Koreans could be repatriated denote a nationality, since there is no nation from Japan to North Korea in 1959. It is simply called Korea in the world. To this day, extremely interesting to note that, as discussed Japan does not recognize North Korea, which is in recent research by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, the often associated with the alien registration Japanese government anticipated that the status under the name chōsen; no precedent number of Korean would-be returnees to North exists to the effect that the North Korean Korea would total around 60,000. This just government grants Koreans residing in Japan happened to be the number of Koreans North Korean nationality. The oft-displayed receiving seikatsuhogo or “livelihood understanding that those whose alienprotection” (similar to, but not identical with, registration bears the label chōsen are the social security) through the minimal benefits citizens of North Korea or the Democratic program offered by Japanese local governments People’s Republic of Korea living in Japan, in the 1950s, and Morris-Suzuki suspects that therefore, is preposterous. Nevertheless, I the numerical equivalence here is not totally emphasize, just as in the case of the 1955 self- coincidental. As such, for the Japanese banishment of (Chongryun) Koreans from government, the issue of the Koreans and their Japan’s national polity, the self-declaration of poverty was to be resolved by physically these individuals as being North Koreans in eliminating them from Japanese soil.[16] Japan was a solid reality, if only on a rhetorical The repatriation of these individuals to North level, during the years immediately following Korea, it should also be noted, became possible Chongryun’s emergence. through the active assistance of the International Red Cross. It is ironical to 6. observe that an internationalhuman rights organization assumed that the final, best The newly acquired name for the Korean left, solution was to move people from a country in “overseas nationals of the Democratic People’s which they had no claim to national citizenship Republic of Korea,” ethnicized their identity. to another where they were thought to belong. For them, the bedrock of their consciousness Here again, the human rights of Koreans in was patriotism, not class-consciousness. Note Japan were activated only when they were

8 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF deemed as belonging to a certainthis status made Koreans eligible for public country—even though there was no way of housing, public medical care, and other securing their return trip due to the lack of benefits. It is clearly apparent from such an diplomatic relations between Japan and North example that it is only when a person acquires Korea. The ensuing tragedy was that Koreans a nationality that human rights begin to be who thought that they were returning “home” accorded to that person. to North Korea found themselves marginalized, bereft of rights, and living under materially and Morally speaking, this measure was, of course, politically harsh conditions. unjustifiable: why should the Japanese government only provide benefits to those From 1959 to 1976, 92,749 individuals were Koreans in Japan who applied for South Korean “repatriated” from Japan to North Korea. nationality, while its colonial rule had Considering that most Koreans in Japan subjugated the entire Korean peninsula? This originally came from the southern provinces, it remains an enigma until one considers the was an inherently anomalous repatriation. historical background of Cold War politics. As Interestingly, no such mass repatriation of the dominant force in the postwar East Asian Koreans from Japan to South Korea took place geopolitical environment, the US following the normalization of diplomatic wholeheartedly connived in the above strategy. relations between Japan and South Korea in More fundamentally, the post-WWII global 1965, despite the fact that the majority of order presupposed a person’s belonging to a Koreans came originally from southernnational polity as the most important condition provinces. It is important to register that, due for that person to be considered human—not to pronatalist population policies that traced the other way around. And this meant that the their origins back to the National Eugenics Law 1965 treaty left those Koreans who did not opt of 1940, Japan’s population continued to grow to identify themselves with South Korea until the late 1960s, thereby obviating the need stateless and hence, non-human in terms of for migrant workers. It should also behuman rights. Here is another instance of what remembered that postwar Japan was the Arendt describes: “Man, it turns out, can lose destination for hundreds and thousands of all so-called Rights of Man without losing his Japanese returnees from overseas colonies, essential quality as man, his human dignity. including Sakhalin, Mongolia, China, southeast Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from Asia, and of course, Korea. As the defeated humanity.”[17] As long as the globe remains party in World War II and a nation in ruins, the sliced up into national sovereign states, non- former colonial master of Asia, Japan did not nationals or the de-nationalized will remain face an influx of (illegal) labor immigrants from stateless, homeless, and rightless. They are outside. This meant that former colonial rightless not because they are legally subjects, the majority of whom were Korean, discriminated against, but because they are were the only stateless persons in Japan. outside of the law. In a way, a convicted murderer has more normal human rights than As stated, it was not until 1965 that Koreans in the denationalized. And the denationalized is Japan became eligible to adopt a nationality. disenfranchised from domestic national class Following diplomatic normalization between stratification: he has no class. Japan and the Republic of Korea, Koreans in Japan could apply for South Korean nationality. In this light, it should be clear how erroneous it What is extremely interesting is that permanent is for many of those conducting research on residence status in Japan was grantedKoreans in Japan, and especially those with a alongside South Korean nationality, and that political conscience and a passion for justice, to

9 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF argue that Koreans in Japan are treated as sub- It is more than interesting to remember that humans, second-class citizens, andpersons who are naturalized in Japan are discriminated against inside Japanese society. referred to as shinnihonjin or “new Japanese,” For, they are not discriminated against inside as if to indicate re-birth or a new life or, even Japanese society, since they are actually more controversially, as kikajin, kika meaning a outside Japanese society, this arising from the “return” to the correct state, implying that fact that they are merely and nakedly human, being Japanese or becoming Japanese is and not sub-human. Furthermore, to argue that fundamentally right (and good) for humanity. they are treated like second-class citizens This is all too deceptive, considering that a would be to miss the central point that they are person who used to be only a naked human was in no sense citizens in any class whatsoever. not treated as human, while a person who had become a national was now treated as human for the first time.[20] 7. The enthusiasm and sense of profound Arendt once wrote: commitment with which former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (in power from Not only did loss of national rights in all 2001 to 2006) talked about the possible instances entail the loss of human rights; the amendment of Article Nine of the Constitution restoration of human rights, as the recent need to be understood in this context, since this example of the State of Israel proves, has amendment would enable Japan to declare war been achieved so far only through the against other nations: the possibility of war is restoration or the establishment of national the possibility of emergency, and further, a rights. The conception of human rights, state of emergency is a state in which non- based upon the assumed existence of a nationals can be exterminated more easily than human being as such, broke down at the very at other times. Controversial behavior by the moment when those who professed to believe governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, should in it were for the first time confronted with also be seen in this light, that is, as evidence of people who had indeed lost all other qualities a craving to declare a legal civil war in order to and specific relationships—except that they eliminate undesirable elements. Of particular were still human. The world found nothing note is his 2000 reference to foreigners and sacred in the abstract nakedness of being immigrants as daisangokujin, or “third country human.[18] nationals,” a term used to denote non-Japanese, non-Allied nationals (i.e. former colonial But in Japan’s case and also, therefore, in the subjects) in occupied Japan, branding them as case of non-Japanese in Japan, there was responsible for social unrest. (During the same another peculiar twist, aptly depicted in the period, public school teachers that were words of Zygmunt Bauman: sympathetic to the Koreans and/or resistant to the singing ofKimigayo, Japan’s national If birth and nation are one, then all the anthem that reveres the Emperor, were others who enter or wish to enter the criticized and punished).[21] national family must mimic, or are compelled to emulate, the nakedness of the newborn. The state—the guardian and prison guard, the spokesman and the censor-in-chief of the nation—would see to it that this condition was met.[19]

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accept deportees from Japan, they became wandering stateless persons and were placed in semi-permanent protective custody.

ÅŒmura Immigration Control Center today in Nagasaki

This case points to an important factor in thinking about the bare life of stateless persons: in situations such as national emergencies or where certain decisions have been made at the national level, a person can easily become stateless, even if deemed to be in possession of a proper nationality. This was the case for Japanese Americans in the US after Pearl Harbor, when even those who were US Ishihara Shintarō, the governor of Tokyo citizens were sent to camps.[25] Not only that—inside the camps, they were studied as For, the exception here derives from ex capere, some kind of naked species whose reactions meaning “outside,” and a state of exception is a were meant to be used to inform the US state in which the law makes itself known by government about the Japanese national suspending itself. This is an effective way to character. Prominent anthropologists such as control a population that exists outsideJohn Embree participated in this endeavor.[26] ordinary national law.[22] Of course,In other words, as stated above, states of undesirable elements can include bothemergency such as wars make anything nationals and non-nationals. The unknowable possible—the elimination of humans, detention number of victims in concentration camps in of undesirable elements, and deprivation of North Korea and the testimonials of those who some citizens of their civil rights as the have escaped attest to this. Yet here, also, the sovereign state sees fit. degree of belonging to the nation became manifest in an unmistakable way: returnees to The fact that the ÅŒmura camp has been North Korea from Japan were often sent to relieved of its special duty as a place of camps that had been specially reserved for detention for Koreans does not mean that the them, marking them out as a distinctlypossibility of being incarcerated in a similar superfluous population, for example.[23] institution in future has been permanently removed. In the case of a national emergency, Japan used to have a camp that was designated such as a war of the kind that Japan’s recent for the detention of illegal border crossers and prime ministers were eager to have the option offenders of the Alien Registration Law (i.e. of participating in, it is non-nationals that non-nationals) awaiting deportation. ÅŒmura would be the first to face detention in the name shÅ«yōjo, or the ÅŒmura camp, used to of national security.[27] detain offenders for years without trial and no clear plans for their placement—reminiscent of US Guantanamo Bay facility today.[24] The 8. majority of Korean detainees at the ÅŒmura camp originated from the southern provinces In 1981, simultaneous with Japan’s ratification that belong to today’s South Korea. But, since of the International Covenants for Human the South Korean government refused to Rights and joining the United Nations Refugee

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Convention, Koreans in Japan who did not have deportation stipulations for those found guilty South Korean nationality were givenin felony cases. But, it should be emphasized permanent residence in Japan. Their status was that, unlike US permanent residence, which termed tokurei eijÅ«ken, or special exceptional can be seen as a transient status which permanent residence, and the Japanesenaturally bridges the gap between the status of Immigration Bureau subsequently issued such foreign national and that of US citizen, special persons re-entry permits for Japan, allowing permanent residence status in Japan is no them to travel abroad. Many Koreans whose guarantee of eventual citizenship. Japanese family members had been repatriated to North citizenship which may only be obtained through Korea after 1959 were now able to travel to naturalization, an arduous process with no North Korea to be reunited temporarily with guarantee of success. their families. However, due to Cold War tensions between the two halves of the Korean In the meantime, ambiguity remains the peninsula, it remained impossible to visit both constant for Koreans in Japan in terms of their North and South—it was an either/or decision national affiliations. Those with South Korean at that time. nationality differ from those living in the Republic of Korea in that they do not have It was during the 1980s that many situational resident registration numbers, 13-digit IDs (not structural) changes were made in the initiated about four decades ago that combine topography of Koreans in Japanese society. birth date, gender, a code for the region in First, there was an influx of Koreans from which the holder was first registered and their South Korea after the 1988 liberalization of order of registration.[28] This ID number is overseas travel by the South Koreancomputerized and is required for the government. Secondly, inside the Korean completion of basic tasks such as internet expatriate movement, there was a considerable registration. Unless one has a number that can easing in the hitherto confrontational positions be identified in the Korean Information and held by pro-South Korea and pro-North Korea Security Agency database, one is, for practical camps in light of moves toward ending the purposes, not a national. Koreans in Japan who global Cold War. Thirdly, and in connection have South Korean nationality do not bear such with the above, it became accepted inside the a number and do not appear in the database. Korean community in Japan that the first For this reason, if the South Korean passport generation’s myth of an eventual return to the carried by a Korean traveler from Japan expires homeland was not going to be achieved. The while he or she is abroad, a South Korean generations born in Japan came to realize that embassy or consulate in the given country they and their children would spend the rest of cannot renew or reissue it. Current conditions their lives in Japan. under which Koreans in Japan retain South Korean nationality also exempt them from In 1992, all Korean permanent residents, military service and taxation. In exchange, they including those who had acquired permanent are not eligible to vote or stand for election. In residence following the 1965 treaty and those other words, their South Korean “nationality” is who had acquired it in the years following of a dubious sort. 1981, found themselves under a common classification as special permanent residents, On the other hand, those Koreans in Japan who or tokubetsu eijÅ«sha. This change was do not have South Korean nationality, accompanied by a diverse range ofnumerically in the minority today, remain improvements in the residential status of stateless. But, paradoxically, rather than being Koreans in Japan, including a softening in recognized as stateless persons, often in

12 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF popular consciousness, they are regarded as consciousness, or the lack thereof, among “North Koreans.” There is no form of North Koreans in Japan, reference to Chongryun will Korean nationality recognized at any level of illuminate the situation. Chongryun actively Japan’s legal and juridical system, since North promoted the view that the poverty of Koreans Korea is not recognized by the Japanese state. in Japan was an ethnic problem, firstly caused Yet, the Cold War ideology of non-South Korean by colonial oppression, and later through equaling North Korean lingers on, triggering continuing discrimination by the Japanese abuse and violence by Japanese perpetrators state. Rather than placing Koreans inside toward those not holding South KoreanJapanese society, and subsequently demanding nationality and/or those affiliated with the that the Japanese government grant Koreans North Korea-supporting expatriatethe appropriate economic, political, and basic organization, Chongryun, whenever there is civil rights, Chongryun focused on raising the any sign of hostility between the Japanese and profile of North Korea among Japanese North Korean governments. After thesympathizers on one hand, while organizing September 17, 2002, revelation that North Korean affiliates as loyal followers of the North Korean agents had kidnapped a total of thirteen Korean regime and of Chongryun itself on the innocent Japanese from Japan’s shores during other. Strategically, it thus formed a broad the 1970s and 1980s, Koreans in this category ethnic front, soliciting mass support for itself. became the most vulnerable. It should also be Backgrounding its success was the image of a emphasized that the North Korean government, South Korean regime tainted by support from in the face of the persecution of the so-called the US and ruled by a military regime known “North Koreans” in Japan, made next to no for violently suppressing student and worker effort to protect them. protests.

It would be this group of stateless Koreans, In Chongryun’s official rhetoric, all Koreans in whose form of existence is nakedly human Japan were destined to “be embraced in the without the official recognition of any nation- warm bosom of our glorious socialist state, that would be the first to be loaded onto fatherland,” their sojourn in Japan only the trucks, possibly after being given one temporary in nature. As such, internal hour’s notice to pack one item of luggage, and differences among Koreans in Japan—be they sent away to the camps. The erasure of related to level of education or size of Koreans from Japan’s domestic socio-economic wealth—had to be disregarded. For, according surveys has to be understood in this context. In to Chongryun, Koreans in Japan formed one other words, it should be clear that, far from united people dedicated to the eventual enjoying the privilege of belonging to the reunification of their fatherland and the lowest strata in Japan’s class structure, “liberation of their brothers and sisters in Koreans have been, and continue to be, South Korea from the US imperialist wolves fundamentally and unequivocally excluded from and their puppet clique.” this structure. This is why their historical poverty must be considered ethnic poverty and Chongryun was able to sustain this notion for vulnerability, and not a class phenomenon, in two decades or so due to the ethnic the context of Japan’s national order.[29] marginalization of Koreans as a whole in Japan, and occasionally explicit and blatant acts of discrimination specifically targeted at 9. Chongryun and its affiliates. Chongryun’s political deprivation and impotence in Japan Turning our attention to internal class-actually strengthened its internal unity, the

13 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF unity of an ethnic community that wason the margins of Japanese society, albeit discriminated against due to its political disenfranchised, as he or she had done until allegiance. This further delayed recognition of then in any case. By the 1980s, the Cold War the fact that affiliates of the organization were, mentality of “either with us or against us” had in fact, divided from each other in multiple subsided, and unhappy individuals inside ways as a result of the uneven distribution of Chongryun were prepared to leave the economic, political, and social capital. organization. Although this did not mean that they would immediately support South Korea Class divisions evidently existed amongfrom that point on, the iron curtain, it was Chongryun followers from the very beginning. understood, had been lifted, and elements of But this reality was made part of the larger the Korean population in Japan, especially the expatriate cause for the reunification of Korea younger generations, looked to the middle under North Korean initiative. Wealthy donors ground. were decorated and highly praised by both Chongryun and the North Korean government, We must remember that, whereas the called aegukjeok sanggongin or patriotic transition from a labor-intensive to a capital- industrialists and entrepreneurs. Their children intensive economy occurred during the 1960s received special treatment in schools, along for the Japanese mainstream, it only reached with the children of highly ranked cadres. They Koreans in Japan in the early 1980s. were given offices in Sanggonghoe or the Nevertheless, such a transition did take place: Korean Association of Industrialists andthe decades of hard work and hardship (and I Entrepreneurs, an auxiliary organization within mean, literally, twelve hours or more a day of Chongryun. Indeed, they played a key role in labor for starvation-level wages, virtually no enhancing the morale as well as the economic savings, and other aspects of the culture of foundation of Chongryun’s endeavors. Here, poverty) that older generations endured began class division was occluded and deemed to pay off, enabling them to leave Korean secondary—patriotic commitment and loyalty ghettos for decent residential areas, provide toward North Korea’s leadership formed the their children with a higher education, and utmost priority in Chongryun’s rhetoric and enjoy some real leisure. In short, the problem practice. of Korean poverty was mainly resolved due to the endurance of the Koreans themselves, It was from the early 1980s that inequalities outside the planning frameworks and concerns and the uneven distribution of power inside of the Japanese government. Chongryun, and within North Korea itself for that matter, became the subject of attention for Post-poverty younger generations were Chongryun affiliates on a number of levels. altogether different. First off, they were However, again, this was not done with employable in Japanese sectors, unlike their reference to class differentiation withinuneducated parents. In a cultural sense, too, Chongryun, but through criticism of itsthey were no longer brought up simply with bureaucratization by disgruntled voices within nationalism, but were also well versed in the organization. Such criticisms, however, Japanese contemporary popular culture and ultimately proved to be ineffective. This was socially accepted standards. Politically, in due to the fact that if any Chongryun member comparison with their parents and wished to leave the organization, there was grandparents, they no longer had such a fierce virtually no sanction that the organization interest, nor such a deep personal and could actually place upon him or her: all he or professional investment, in homeland-oriented she had to do was to leave and continue to live politics.

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As stated above, by becoming permanent monitored and pedantically corrected. For residents of Japan, Chongryun Koreans gained many, following a wave of emotional upheaval documentation allowing them to travel abroad. during their initial visit, repeat visits only Although the application procedures were confirmed their disillusionment. Chongryun maddeningly cumbersome, this re-entry permit Koreans, even including cadres, who had been enabled Chongryun Koreans to leave Japan and born and grew up in Japan, found harassment return. The first destination many Chongryun by the party in relation to such miniscule and Koreans chose to visit was, predictably, North insignificant areas of their personal lives not Korea, partly to be united with their repatriated only irritating, but deeply insulting. They failed family members, and partly to be educated “in to understand the way North Korean socialism the bosom of the fatherland.” Various tours worked—through heavy ideologico-cultural were offered—family reunion tours (long-term policing and incessant intervention by the state and short-term), cadre re-education courses into the personal realm. This is because (two-week trips up to one-year stays),Chongryun Koreans, and especially those of delegation visits (either based on political merit younger generations, are individuals that have or monetary payment), professional training cultivated a remarkable level of competence in visits (for artists, performing artists, musicians, distinguishing between organizational and non- Korean language teachers, and so on), and organizational spheres, having spent all of their high-school tours (as prizes for best Youth lives in Japan while remaining devoted to the League unit or winner of nation-wide athletic success of North Korea.[31] In a way, the meets, for example), to cite only a fewnewly-granted right of overseas travel acted as categories. an opening for the development of a new, critical vision of both North Korea and Chongryun visitors to North Korea quickly Chongryun itself. discovered that the glorious socialist fatherland that they had adored and admired was very far Such looming skepticism coincided with from the “paradise on earth” they had expected changes in the economic status of Koreans in to find. Previously repatriated members of their Japan. Not everyone, of course, achieved the families were not given the opportunity to fully dizzying success of Son Masayoshi, a participate in nation building, suspected as naturalized ethnic Korean entrepreneur, but it they were of lacking in loyalty and seen as is true that many second and third-generation having been contaminated by reactionary Koreans succeeded in a competitive market ideologies. Party supervisors assigned to environment. Although many failed in the Chongryun visitors treated them in an arrogant 1990s recession, for a good part of the 1980s, and often sexist manner (in the case of male younger Koreans acquired valuable experience supervisors with respect to female visitors). as part of Japan’s economy, albeit from the Chongryun visitors were not accorded freedom margins and in a more precarious position than of movement; even journalists had to be their Japanese contemporaries. No longer were accompanied by supervisors and were often they confined to running pachinko pinball halls denied access to fieldtrips for no clearand yakiniku (BBQ) restaurants, and when they reason.[30] did engage in such types of enterprise, young owners introduced fresh and innovative On a more personal level, Chongryun visitors commercial strategies that no longer bore the were harassed, ridiculed, and simply treated marks of a culture of poverty. Trendy, odor-free with very little respect: flaws in their Japanese- BBQ restaurants became popular date spots for accented Korean were met with contempt, and young couples in Tokyo, while pachinko halls even their clothing, hairstyles and posture were began catering to women players, featuring

15 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF annexes with soft interiors and a children’s recruitment. Thus, earlier generations of corner. Koreans and their descendants (the “old- comers”) became the major employers of the newcomer Koreans. This inevitably re-arranged the self-perceptions of long-term Korean residents in Japan. Although confined within the ethnic sector, “old-comers” now faced the somewhat bewildering realization that they were the preferred employers of newly-arrived Korean workers.[32] The arrival of these new Korean immigrants, whose Japanese proficiency was poor, customs and mannerisms obviously different, capital insignificant and appearance foreign, led to the noticeable gentrification of “old-comer” Koreans in Japan. This, of course, paradoxically also meant that Son Masayoshi, Chief Executive Officer the latter became less easily distinguishable (CEO) of Softbank Mobile from the Japanese mainstream in terms of class as well as Softbank group. Son is one of and ethnicity. Is this the case, though? Let us Japan's richest entrepreneurs. see.

The trajectories of such individuals can be contrasted with those of Koreans newly10. arriving in Japan in their hundreds and thousands at the beginning of the 1990s. The I have dwelt so far on the topology of Koreans South Korean government started to issue in Japan’s national landscape. In this final short passports to ordinary citizens around the time segment, I shall look at the class morphology of of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, and many Koreans in Japan—if there is any, that is. Given visitors on various types of visa began pouring the dearth of survey data pertaining to Koreans into Japanese cities, coming close to replicating in Japan, Kim Myungsoo’s 1995 survey shines the Korean ghettos of earlier periods; that is, with significance. While its sample is confined creating their own enclaves for socialto a very narrow category of Korean men in gatherings. These typically included small Japan who have South Korean nationality and restaurants or bars with non-generic, Japanized are aged twenty and above, and a comparable names (of the kind often seen in business set of Japanese men, the survey results shed premises owned by earlier generations of light on correlations between economic status, Koreans in Japan). However, such names might education, and social status. The responses of refer to a small country town or street, easily 889 Korean male permanent residents in Japan recognized as an “insider” location by Korean were obtained in ten interviews conducted natives. Such eateries and bars might also between February 1995 and October 1996. often have Korean signage—an unmistakable These were compared with the responses of sign of the newcomers. 1248 Japanese men aged between twenty and sixty-nine, obtained through interviews More importantly, at least during the initial conducted in October and November 1995. Kim stage following their migration to Japan, finds surprisingly that as the average Korean kinship ties and the circle of family friends mean income slightly surpassed that of the served as the most effective sources ofJapanese. Very little disparity was also noted in

16 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF terms of years of education, with a mean of among Korean minority members [in Japan] are 12.01 years for the Koreans and 12.35 for the in fact far from being fully equal in comparison Japanese.[33] with the Japanese as the data analyzed in this article indicates, even though the outcome of Where the Korean data deviates from the Korean minority status attainment here Japanese pattern is in the patterns forappears to have reached levels similar to those advancement in society. Whereas for Japanese of the Japanese.”[38] Compare this with respondents, length of education correlated Bumsoo Kim, whose words are quoted in the with social status, education did not secure opening of this article, arguing that class is comparable upward mobility for the Koreans. becoming a more important factor than At the same time, as many as 70 percent of ethnicity when thinking about Koreans in Korean respondents primarily depended on Japan. Both Kims hold that the livelihood and family and friends, that is, ethnic connections career achievement of Koreans in Japan today in order to secure employment, and they are improving and becoming comparable to predominantly ended up among the ranks of their Japanese contemporaries. Yet, in contrast the urban self-employed.[34] In Kim’s sample, to B. Kim, who regards ethnicity as no longer 42.3 percent of Japanese respondents are being as relevant as class, M. Kim shows that white-collar workers as opposed to 26.6 large disparities remain between Japanese and percent of their Korean counterparts, while Koreans within the Japanese nation state. How 23.2 percent of Japanese respondents are self- should one understand this? employed as opposed to 52.1 percent of their Korean counterparts.[35] Of particularWe are dealing here with a parallel significance is the fact that the educational phenomenon: the job attainment, living level of Korean fathers was not reflected in the standard, income level and other quantitative degree of social advancement of their sons, indicators documented for Koreans in Japan demonstrating that cultural capital does not stand on fundamentally different mathematical have the same value for Koreans and Japanese (figuratively speaking, that is) footing than that once they are placed in the Japanese (national) of Japanese nationals. Consider the fact that job market.[36] A key difference lies in the fact the government retirement plan is unavailable that Koreans are unable to turn to formal to many first-generation Koreans in Japan. This Japanese government agencies in order to makes the family savings of Koreans something secure employment given their non-national other than simply money saved, since it will status (I have already discussed what it means have to finance elder care single-handedly with not to have national status). no government subsidies. Consider also the fact that large numbers of Koreans continue to The breakdown of occupations for Koreans is work in ethnic enclaves. This makes for also indicative: 11.57 percent working in situations in which family income remains restaurants, 16.07 percent in construction, 12 vulnerable, work hours are much longer, and percent in simple manufacturing, and 8.3 labor, much more intense and arduous for percent unemployed; hardly any are found in Koreans. Consider further the fact that the the professional or executive sub-class. Not Korean children grow up fully understanding surprisingly, Kim finds that the older the that public service careers such as those of a Korean male, the more disadvantaged he is in government official, diplomat or public school the job market.[37] teacher are not an option. This renders their ethics of socialization, aspirations for job Myungsoo Kim concludes “that employment attainment, and economic goals altogether opportunities and status attainment processes different than those of Japanese children.[38]

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Why these differences? It is because the it is no wonder that their class position has situation of nationals and non-nationals are not been ignored (even by themselves). Similarly, it comparable since non-nationals not only are is not surprising that factors such as poverty, denied access to many career avenues but are which could otherwise lead to class formation, also excluded from many of the benefits are constantly ethnicized. provided to citizens in ways that differentiate class stratification. In sum, as long as Koreans In the US, poverty is racialized with the result in Japan have no national membership (not just that unemployment, high crime rates, lack of in Japan, but also in Korea, North or South), education, drug abuse, and other paraphernalia they will be unable to fully enter the system of that fill the closet of poverty are associated class stratification in Japan or Korea. with non-whiteness and other ethnic markers. Nevertheless, poverty which disproportionately It is true that many local governments have confronts people of color and other minorities, opened the door to Koreans and non-Japanese, is a national problem, one requiring the allowing them to obtain low-ranking civil attention of Congress, national and local service jobs—perhaps a first step in altering the government budgets, and the object of legal excluded status of Koreans in Japan.[39] But, a and institutional reforms. Such is not the case high hurdle remains in the quest for civil for Koreans in Japan who remain outside all of status, as Japan is not a federation or a union of these categories and largely invisible. As such, states: as long as the central government their exclusion from Japan’s system of class strenuously excludes Koreans in Japan, there is stratification is not because they are little that local municipalities can do. It came as discriminated against as an ethnic minority or no surprise, for example, that the Japanese as second-class citizens inside Japan, but Supreme Court upheld the decision by the because they are not there, inside: they exist Tokyo Metropolitan Government to bar a civil outside Japanese society, that is, they are servant from taking an exam for promotion to a banished from it. Without bearing this point in managerial position due to her South Korean mind, any discussion of ethnicity or class nationality; that is, her not being Japanese.[40] factors, or the shifting weight of importance In other words, Koreans can be civil servants so between these with regard to Koreans in Japan, long as they stick to sweeping the floors and will prove to be one-dimensional. cleaning the bathrooms; if they wish to be supervisors or managers, they will need to be reminded of the fact that they are merely human and not citizens. Acknowledgements: As long as the system of nation-states governs This paper was originally prepared for a our world, refugees, immigrants, and other workshop in Ann Arbor, Michigan, organized stateless persons have no place in the domestic by David Slater and Hiroshi Ishida, on social class stratification within individual nation- states. This does not mean that it is not classes in Japan. I’d like to thank them for possible (for scholars) to classify them or their astute comments, and other measure them according to national socio- participants in the Michigan workshop for economic classifications and surveys. Neither their constructive suggestions. I am indebted does this mean that they do not have class to Youngmi Lim, who provided me with consciousness. But in the case of Koreans in valuable information and materials, including Japan, who in effect have no citizenship, or Kim Myungsoo’s article. Comments and (South Korean) citizenship of a precarious kind, suggestions by Tessa Morris-Suzuki and John

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Lie were immensely helpful for the revision in order to earn the trust of their Japanese of this paper. As usual, Mark Selden’s critical comrades within the party, while it was reading enhanced this article. And Don almost unheard of for a Korean to rise to Cameron’s skillful copyediting benefited this high-ranking office within the trade unions or paper beyond measure. the party in Japan. See Iwamura (1972) for example.

Endnotes: [10] Wagner (1951: 95).

[1] Kim (2008: 871). [11] Kim (1946).

[2] Perhaps the best-known Althusserian [12] Martial Law was proclaimed in Kobe, class theorists would be Poulantzas (1973), which witnessed the fiercest resistance. Therborn (1986), and of course, Althusser Three Koreans died—one teenager shot by (1984, 1990) himself. For Bourdieu, see the US military, one child dying from a head (1977, 1984). injury inflicted by the police, and one teacher murdered while in prison. See Inokuchi [3] Thompson (1964) and, more classically, (2000) and Koshiro (1999) for some details. Engels (1993). [13] The North Korean initiative failed. The [4] Of course, the increasing numbers of Japan-ROK treaty was not signed until 1965. homeless in Japan’s cities are outside the Until then, North Korea tried to preempt domain of popular perception. South Korea by making various gestures including the 1952 communiqués and the [5] I regard the view that facilely sees opening of repatriation in 1959. See text Koreans in Japan as “Korean Japanese” as below and Ryang (2000a) with regard to unrealistic. See, for example, Tai (2004). repatriation. Similarly, I include in this category authors who suggest that Koreans should simply [14] Hiroyama (1955: 10). acquire Japanese nationality. These include Tei (2001) and Lee (1997). [15] Ryang (1997: 122).

[6] See Agamben (1995) and Arendt (2000). [16] Morris-Suzuki (2007). Morris-Suzuki See below in the text. discovered, by investigating newly de- classified papers, that the role played by the [7] See Weiner (1989). Japanese Red Cross was much more significant and decisive than had been [8] An array of historical and recent literary previously thought. representations can testify to this effect, starting from writers such as Kin Kakuei [17] Arendt (2000: 38). (1970) and Ri Kaisei (1972), and later including Yang Seog-il (1998), and Kaneshiro [18] Arendt (2000: 41). (2000). [19] Bauman (2003: 130). [9] History testifies, however, that the Korean members had to work extra hard, [20] An average of about 10,000 Koreans are risking their lives and proving their bravery, naturalized each year as Japanese citizens.

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See Ministry of Justice statistics. [29] It needs to be added that there has been a huge increase in the number of Koreans in [21] Ishihara made the reference to Koreans Japan being naturalized. In 1969, 1,889 and other non-nationals in Japan today as Koreans became naturalized; by 1995, the daisangokujin in front of the Ground Self- figure had jumped to 10,000. In 2001, the Defense Force. See“Mr. Ishihara’s total number of naturalized persons (not only Insensitivity,” The Japan Times April 15, Koreans) exceeded 15,000 (Seean article 2000. (Accessed May 29, 2008). from Japan & Politics, March 11, 2002. Accessed May 8, 2008). These individuals [22] Agamben (2005). Much of Agamben’s would be absorbed within Japanese census ideas are derived from Schmitt’s notion of figures, but it must be emphasized that deep- sovereignty (Schmitt 1922). seated prejudices in Japanese society would lead many to feel ambiguous and ambivalent [23] See, for example, Kang (2001). For a about being considered part of the Japanese totalitarian society, see Arendt (2000:national polity. 119-145). [30] My two visits in 1985 as a reporter for [24] Pak (1969), Yoshitome (1979), and Pak the Chongryun media organ, Choseon Sinbo (1983). Due to the South Korean(Korea Daily), attest to this. I was routinely government’s reluctance to accept any tricked in relation to where I should meet my deportees from Japan, the camp was already supervisor, where to go, and whom to talk to, overcrowded by the 1950s, and the Japanese while my hotel rooms were randomly government virtually gave up on thechanged every one or two days. I think this deportation of detainees (Tatsumi 1966). This was done simply to confuse, exhaust, and intensified the nature of their limbo status. harass me, so that I would not be able to properly complete my assignment covering [25] See for example, Kurashige (2002). the family reunions.

[26] Ryang (2004: Ch.1) for a discussion. [31] Ryang (1997) discusses this issue.

[27] Today ÅŒmura Detention Center is one [32] Ethnographic studies and other forms of of three detention centers under the Ministry research on Korean newcomers in Japan have of Justice, Immigration Office, of Japan. Still been actively carried out in Japan. See Ko based in Nagasaki, southwestern Japan, it (1995), for example. See also Ryang (2000b, functions as a confinement and examination 2002b). facility for illegal immigrants in Japan. Detainees usually end up being deported. [33] Kim (2003: 8). According to recent Ministry of Justice statistics, during the year 2006, 7,807 [34] Kim (2003: 14). persons of Korean nationality, 2,987 Thai [35] Kim (2003: 9). citizens, 850 Malaysian citizens, 658 Indonesian citizens, and 480 Sri Lankan [36] Kim (2003: 14-15, 12). citizens were deported. (Accessed May 9, 2008). [37] Kim (2003: 12, 11).

[28] Kim (2005). [38] I discuss this matter pertaining to ethnic

20 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF ethics of care and justice in Chapter 4 Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. “Diaspora and the Ethic of Care: A Note on Disability, Aging, and Vulnerability of the De- Engels, Friedrich (1993) The Condition of the nationalized” of myWriting Selves in Working Class in England,Oxford: Oxford Diaspora: Ethnography of Autobiographics of University Press. Korean Women in Japan and the US (2008). Hiroyama, Shibaaki (1955) “Minsen no [39] Ahn (2000). kaisan to chōsen sōren no keisei ni tsuite” (On the dissolution of Minjeon and the [40] Rusling (2005). emergence of Chongryun), Kōanjōhō 22: 5-11.

References: Inokuchi, Hiromitsu (2000) “Korean Ethnic Schools in Occupied Japan, 1945-52,” in Agamben, Giorgio (1995)Homo Sacer: Sonia Ryang (ed.) Koreans in Japan: Critical Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Voices from the Margin, London: Routledge. Stanford University Press. Iwamura, Toshio (1972) Zainichi chōsenjin Agamben, Giorgio (2005) State of Exception, to nihon rōdōsha kaikyÅ« (Koreans in Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Japan and the Japanese working class), Tokyo: Azekurashobō. Ahn, Doek Keun Matthew (2000) “Reflections on Voting, Identity, and Self-Affirmation in Kaneshiro, Kazuki (2000)Go, Tokyo: Japan,” Harvard Asia Quarterly Autumn 2000 Kōdansha.

Althusser, Louis (1986) “Ideology andKang, Chol-hwan (2001) The Aquariums of Ideological State Apparatuses (NotesPyongyang: Ten Years in a North Korean Towards an Investigation),”Essays on Gulag, New York: Basic Books. Ideology, London: Verso. Kim, Bumsoo (2008) “Bringing Class Back in: Althusser, Louis (1990) For Marx, London: The Changing Basis of inequality and the Verso. Korean Minority in Japan,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31 (5): 871-898. Arendt, Hannah (2000) “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man,” The Portable Hannah Kim, Myungsoo (2003) “Ethnic Stratification Arendt, London: Penguin. and Inter-Generational Differences in Japan: A Comparative Study of Korean and Japanese Bauman, Zygmunt (2003) Liquid Love: On Status Attainment,” International Journal of the Frailty of Human Bonds, Cambridge: Japanese Sociology 12: 6-16. Polity. Kim, Tae-gyu (2005) “New individual Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory identification system sought,”The Korea of Practice, Cambridge: CambridgeTimes Feb. 24, 2005. University Press. Kim, Tu-yong (1946) “Nihon ni okeru Bourdieu, Pierre (1984) Distinction : A Social chōsenjin mondai” (The Korean question in Critique of the Judgement of Taste,Japan), Zenei 1: 14-19.

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Kin, Kakuei (1970) Kogoeru kuchi [Frozen http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GB08Dh mouth], Tokyo: Kawadeshobō. 01.html

Ko, Seonhui (1995) “’Shinkankokujin’ no Ryang, Sonia (1997) North Koreans in Japan: teijÅ«ka—enerugisshuna gunzō” [TheLanguage, Ideology, and Identity, Boulder: settlement of “new Koreans”—their energetic Westview Press. image], in H. Komai (ed.)TeijÅ«ka suru gaikokujin [Settling foreigners], Tokyo: Ryang, Sonia (2000a) “The North Korean Akashishoten. Homeland of Koreans in Japan,” in Sonia Ryang (ed.) Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices Koshiro, Yukiko (1999) Transpacific Racisms from the Margin, London: Routledge. and the US Occupation of Japan, New York: Columbia University Press. Ryang, Sonia (2000b) “Osaka’s Transnational Town: An Ethnography,” Korean and Korean Kurashige, Lon (2002) Japanese American American Studies Bulletin 11 (1): 71-93. Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934-1990, Berkeley: Ryang, Sonia (2002a) “A Dead-end in a University of California Press. Korean Ghetto: Multiple Readings of a Complex Identity in Gen Getsu’s Akutagawa- winning Novel Where the Shadows Reside,” Lee, Seijaku (1997)Zainnichi kankokujin Japanese Studies 22 (1): 5-18. sanseino muneno uchi [Inner thoughts of a third-generation Korean in Japan), Tokyo: Ryang, Sonia (2002b) "A Long Loop: Sōshisha. Transmigration of Korean Women in Japan,” International Migration Review 36 (3): 894-911. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2007) Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War, Ryang, Sonia (2004)Japan and National Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Anthropology: A Critique, London: Routledge.

Pak, Cheong-gong (1969)ÅŒmura Ryang, Sonia (2008) Writing Selves in Diaspora: shÅ«yōjo (The ÅŒmura camp), Tokyo: Ethnography of Autobiographics of Korean Nigatsusha. Women in Japan and the US, Lanham: Lexington Books. Pak, Sun-jo (1983) Kankoku, Nihon, ÅŒmura shÅ«yōjo (Korea, Japan, the ÅŒmura Schmitt, Carl (1922) Political Theology: Four camp), Osaka: JDC. Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Poulantzas, Nicos (1973) Political Power and Social Class, London: New Left Books and Tai, Eika (2004) “‘Korean Japanese’: A New Sheed and Ward. Identity Option for Resident Koreans in Japan,” Critical Asian Studies 36 (3): Ri, Kaisei (1972) Kinuta o utsu onna (The 355-382. woman who fulled clothes), Tokyo: Bungeishunjusha. Tatsumi, Nobuo (1966) “Nikkan hōteki chii kyōtei to shutsunyÅ«koku kanri Rusling, Matthew (2005) “High Courttokubetsuhō” (The Japan-ROK legal status Bolsters Japan’s Anti-Immigrant Image,” Asia agreement and the special provision for the Times Online Feb. 8, 2005immigration control act), Hōritsujihō 38

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(4): 59-67. Humanities Press.

Tei, Daikin (2001) Zainichi kankokujin no Yang, Seog-il (1998) Chi to hone (Blood and shūen (The end of Koreans in Japan), Tokyo: bone), Tokyo: Gentōsha. Bungeishunju. Yoshitome, Roju (1977) Ōmura chōsenjin Therborn, Goran (1986)What Does the shūyōjo (The Ōmura Korean camp), Ruling Class Do When It Rules?: State Tokyo: Nigatsusha. Apparatuses and State Power under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism,Sonia Ryang teaches anthropology at the London: New Left Books. University of Iowa. Her forthcoming book will be entitled Writing Selves in Diaspora: Thompson, Edward P. (1964) The Making of Ethnography of Autobiographics of Korean the English Working Class, New York: Women in Japan and the US, will be Pantheon Books. published by Lexington Books in 2008. She is currently conducting a year-long, multi-sited Wagner, Edward (1951) The Korean Minority research project on healthcare disparity in Japan: 1904-1950, New York: Institute of among Iowans of Asian heritage. Pacific Relations.

Weiner, Michael (1989) Origins of the Korean She wrote this article forJapan Focus. Community in Japan, 1910-1923, New York: Published June 8, 2008.

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