THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF INSITUTIONAL FAILURE A comparative study of audits, rulers, and voters in Swedish municipalities RASMUS BROMS WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018:11 QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG December 2018 ISSN 1653-8919 © 2018 by Rasmus Broms. All rights reserved. The electoral consequences of institutional failure: A comparative study of audits, rulers, and voters in Swedish municipalities Rasmus Broms QoG Working Paper Series 2018:11 December 2018 ISSN 1653-8919 ABSTRACT Electoral accountability is widely considered an essential element for ascertaining institutional quali- ty. Nevertheless, and contrary to this notion, a growing body of empirical research finds weak or limited support for the notion that voters actually punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. Instead, I introduce the concept of institutional performance voting, capturing institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel dataset on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities, I find that voters punish mayoral parties responsible for institutional dys- function. Rasmus Broms The Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg
[email protected] Introduction Do voters punish politicians responsible for bad institutions? Considering a plethora of findings indicating that incumbents serve at the mercy of a number of factors partially or wholly out of their control, from the state of the market to the weather, and contingent on the performance of sports teams as well as shark attacks (Achen and Bartels 2003 [but cf. Fowler and Hall, 2018]; Healy, Mal- hotra, and Mo 2010; Gasper and Reeves 2011; Miller 2013), it stands to reason that they should also be evaluated on the actual performance of the governments they run, and the institutions they are tasked with upholding.