Protests Usher in Transitions but No Light at End of Tunnel

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Protests Usher in Transitions but No Light at End of Tunnel UK £2 Issue 236, Year 5 EU €2.50 December 22, 2019 www.thearabweekly.com US policies Looking German on Syria back at 2019 MPs call for Hezbollah ban Page 11 Pages 6-7, 13 Page 4 Iranian Protests usher in transitions protesters adopt anthem but no light at end of tunnel of their own The Arab Weekly staff Tunis Ali Alfoneh he past week was a period of transitions and celebrations of change in parts of the very protest movement T Arab region. and revolution has an Algerians swore in a new elected anthem and poetry of president after months of street its own. Think of “La demonstrations, the Sudanese cel- Marseillaise” of the ebrated one year of regime-changing French Revolution, the protests, the Tunisians marked the E“Internationale” of socialist upris- ninth anniversary of the 2010 upris- ings and revolutions across Europe ing, which ousted former President and Russia and leftist, nationalist Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali from power, and Islamist anthems of Iran’s 1979 while the Iraqis and Lebanese strug- revolution. gled to agree on a new prime minis- Iran’s November 2019 protest is no ter after more than two months of exception. Released December 10, protests. Soroush Lashkari’s “With Clenched Socio-political dynamics have Fists” has become the anthem of the thrown stones into the region’s still latest protests but what is the mes- waters. Transitional authorities in sage of Lashkari’s poetry? Sudan abolished a repressive “moral Lashkari, 34, also known by his code” imposed for decades by Omar artistic name “Hichkas” (“No One”), al-Bashir’s Islamist regime. left Iran for Britain after the 2009 New Algerian President Abdelm- protests against the fraudulent adjid Tebboune promised to heed election that secured Mahmoud the lessons of the largely peaceful Ahmadinejad’s second term in office Hirak but protesters were divided on as Iran’s president. his proposed reforms. No fear. A woman protester confronts security forces during a demonstration in Algiers. (AP) At the time, Lashkari’s “A Better The sectarian systems of Lebanon Day Will Come” was widely inter- and Iraq, along with the shadow of preted as a commentary on the Iran and its proxies, have been under The protesters attacked Iranian con- In Lebanon, Washington wields not apply the law nor is the political Islamic Republic’s harsh repression assault. However, the old systems do sulates in Najaf and Sulaymaniyah the sanctions card. US measures establishment subject to oversight of the protests. not seem ready for retreat quite yet. but there were still reports of Iranian against Hezbollah-connected banks mechanisms which give rise to cor- From his self-chosen exile in Lebanese President Michel Aoun Major-General Qassem Soleimani and businesses, which were among ruption and unaccountability that London, Lashkari, in cooperation said December 19 that he named as meddling in Iraq’s government for- the causes of Lebanon’s economic creates frustration,” said Salamey. with other Iranian musicians and prime minister the academic and mation talks. crisis, could be followed by sanc- It is not clear what kind of compro- songwriters, not only innovated former minister Hassan Diab, de- In Iran and Iraq, the tug of war tions against Hezbollah’s Christian mises will be accepted, if at all, by Persian-language rap music but also spite opposition from protesters. between protesters and the rul- allies. the largely leaderless protests. followed developments in Iran as his Hezbollah was said to be the main ing elite has been intertwined with Protests in Iraq, Lebanon and to The other key question is whether primary source of inspiration. political force behind the nomina- the US-Iran showdown but, while a large extent those in Algeria and the protests will improve or worsen He is the sole singer and song- tion of Diab. it was encouraged by Washington Sudan are in a way a “revolution of the economic situations, which had writer to translate the desperation, Imad Salamey, a political science pundits to seize the opportunity of rising expectations” with protesters sparked the unrest in the first place. rage and hopes of the protesters into professor at the Lebanese American the mounting resentment of Iraqis wanting to do away with the ruling “Transitions can be very costly, rhyme: University, said Diab’s appointment against Iran’s encroachment, the elites in order to “get their country especially if there is resistance to “With clenched fists, bereaved of will deepen Lebanon’s crisis because Trump administration dramatically back.” change by political elites,” Salamey all possessions and left in a desert it means “the coming government reduced the size of its diplomatic Much has to do with outdated sys- said. with thirsty lips, with all hopes will be dominated by Hezbollah and staff in Baghdad, casting doubt tems of government and obsolete “Resistance to change can be very killed without even receiving the its allies” without Sunni support. about its willingness to push for an social contracts. “The problem is not costly both economically and hu- corpse,” the song begins with refer- In Iraq, demonstrators chanted Iraqi government that stands up to in the text of social contracts but it manely,” he added. ence to families who did not even “Iran out” in massive street protests. Iran. is in weak state institutions that can- P 2-3, 5-6, 8-9, 13 receive the bodies of their killed loved ones. “Even absent the sanctions, hap- piness is not possible as if the home- land is a colony where not a cent is Turkey’s militarised foreign policy puts spent on the nation,” continues the song reflecting the widespread belief that Iran’s ruling elites are enriching Ankara on collision course with Russia themselves rather than caring about the welfare of the Iranian public. Thomas Seibert military support. activism in the Eastern Mediterra- has changed. Eruptions of violence, Iranians, Lashkari sings, “work Citing military sources, the inter- nean against Greece over Cyprus.” such as the Syrian war on Turkey’s day and night but have to ask for a net publication Haberturk reported Military power has always played southern border, demonstrated the loan at the end of the month, are Istanbul that Turkey may build a mili- a role in Turkey but, in recent years, limits of soft power for Turkish lead- now streaming into the streets to tary base in Libya like those unilateral military action has be- ers. Ankara’s bond with the Muslim somehow get what is rightfully urkey is increasingly relying in Qatar if the Libyan gov- come a much more regular feature Brotherhood and its neo-Ottoman theirs.” on military capabilities in its ernment asks for a Turk- of Turkish foreign policy, sparking rhetoric alienated governments in Even more directly, the song at- foreign policy, triggering re- ish troop deployment. friction with neighbours, regional the Middle East while Ankara’s rela- tacks the regime: “They don’t want T gional and international ten- Ankara said it is try- powers and other NATO members. tions with the European Union and citizens but slaves, from the cells sions, the latest being with Russia ing to make its voice Since 2016, Turkey has staged the United States soured. one hears cries and shrieks.” about a potential troop deployment heard in a region three military interventions in Turkey’s latest Syria intervention The song goes on and on but not in Libya. where conflicts on Syria. In November, Erdogan triggered a crisis of confidence with with an optimistic end: “It’s world- Ankara seems to be on a collision Turkey’s doorstep announced the construction the United States. At the same time, weary, who are screaming.” But at course with Moscow over Turkey’s pose threats and of a second military base in Turkey threatened military action to least the protesters of the song are plans to deploy troops in support of where other players Qatar. Turkish soldiers are stop gas exploration by other coun- screaming: “We are all in it together.” the Islamist-backed Tripoli govern- ignore Turkish inter- deployed in Somalia. tries off Cyprus, driving up tensions For now, Iran’s ruling elites are ment. ests. However, the ap- A decade ago, in the Eastern Mediterranean. turning a deaf ear to the poetry of Turkish President Recep Tayyip proach is not winning soft power and the Some observers said it is doubtful the protests but, by ignoring the Erdogan assailed the presence of the Turkey any friends. “Turkish model” that the abrasive approach will turn critical voices, they may be losing a Russian private military company Mustafa Gurbuz, a of a “Muslim de- out to be to Turkey’s advantage, precious opportunity to the society Wagner in Libya and Russia said it non-resident fellow at mocracy” were breeding only confrontations. they are increasingly alienating. was “very concerned” by the possi- Arab Centre in Wash- at the centre ble Turkish troop deployment. ington, said: “Erdogan’s of Turkey’s Thomas Seibert is an Arab Weekly Ali Alfoneh is a senior fellow at the Erdogan recently stated Turkey nationalist allies are foreign policy. correspondent. Arab Gulf States Institute in Wash- was ready to send troops to Libya pushing for military The picture ington. to back the internationally recog- Full version of this article appears on nised government in Tripoli, which Making no friends. Turkish soldier patrols the northern Syrian www.thearabweekly.com Full version of this article appears on is already a recipient of Turkish town of Tal Abyad, on the border with Turkey, in October . (AFP) P 5, 7 14,16 www.thearabweekly.com 2 December 22, 2019 Top news Iraq at ‘crossroads’ as protesters push for overhaul of ruling elite Nabil Ahmed Iraqi authorities outsourced their dirty work against protesters, leav- ing just as the killings commenced Baghdad and returning to assist with ar- rests.” raqi protesters seem headed “If they stood by and allowed towards another victory over these armed men to attack pro- the ruling parties resisting de- testers or carried out the murders I mands for an overhaul of the themselves, the Iraqi government political system protesters see as forces will be responsible,” she profoundly corrupt and flagrantly said.
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