Risk Management and Use of Risk-Based Approaches in Inspection, Maintenance and HSE Analyses of NIS A.D

STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH

Risk management and use of risk-based approaches in inspection, maintenance and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. plants Final Report for Package B

(selected Annexes only)

Stuttgart, Belgrade, July 7, 2010

Report title: Final report for Package B

Costumer: NIS Petroleum Industry of Serbia

Customer order Nr.: 45/609 Risk management and use of risk- Internal project Nr.: 10027 based approaches in inspection, Project title: maintenance and HSE analyses of Project start: October 1, 2006 NIS a.d. plants Project end: December 31, 2010

Subproject: Package B Applicable codes/standards:

Workpackage: WP2.11 Date of order acceptance:

Task: Date of completion:

Additional contract info:

Participants in the activity: Distribution (list):

Participants / A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, P. Stanojevic, Distribution: B. Orlic, S. Eremic, O. Tot, M. Ilic, Z. 1 x NIS a.d. Pavlovic, D. Subotin, D. Jasin, R. 1 x Steinbeis R-Tech Guntrum, B. Stojanovic

Author(s): A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, R. Guntrum

Doc. Nr.: Version: 06 Date: July 7, 2010

Document Pages: 193 Annexes: 29 data: Status: Confidentiality:

NIS, petroleum industry, risk management, API 581, risk based inspection, Keywords: reliability centered maintenance, Seveso, Safety report

© Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies GmbH, Willi-Bleicher-Str. 19, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH

Table of Contents

List of Figures ...... vi List of Tables ...... viii 1 Management Summary Report ...... 1 2 Detail Technical Report ...... 2 2.1 General part ...... 2 2.1.1 Introduction ...... 2 2.1.2 General about NIS a.d...... 3 2.1.2.1 Activities ...... 3 2.1.2.2 History of the company ...... 4 2.1.2.3 NIS in numbers ...... 4 2.1.3 Pancevo Oil Refinery ...... 5 2.1.3.1 General data ...... 5 2.1.3.2 Location of Pancevo Refinery ...... 6 2.1.3.3 Description of the plant ...... 17 2.1.3.4 Safety of the plant ...... 23 2.1.4 Novi Sad refinery ...... 27 2.1.4.1 General data ...... 27 2.1.4.2 Location description ...... 27 2.1.4.3 Description of the plant ...... 33 2.1.4.4 Safety of the plant ...... 35 2.1.4.5 Description of processes ...... 37 2.1.5 Elemir Gas refinery ...... 40 2.1.5.1 General data ...... 40 2.1.5.2 Location description ...... 40 2.1.5.3 Description of the plant ...... 46 2.1.5.4 Description of processes ...... 49 2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology ...... 50 2.2.1 General ...... 50 2.2.2 Preparation of data base ...... 50 2.2.3 Identifying the Damage Mechanisms ...... 52 2.2.4 Calculating the Likelihood of Failure52 2.2.5 Calculating the Consequence of Failure ...... 53 2.2.6 Determine the Financial Consequences ...... 54 2.2.7 Calculating the Risk ...... 54

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2.2.8 Remaining life assessment ...... 55 2.2.9 Developing an inspection plan ...... 56 2.2.10 Software used ...... 60 2.3 General about HSE (HAZOP, Seveso II) methodology ...... 60 2.3.1 HAZOP ...... 60 2.3.2 Seveso II Directive ...... 62 2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo Refinery ...... 63 2.4.1 The scope of analysis ...... 63 2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad Refinery ...... 64 2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir Refinery ...... 64 2.6.1 Executive summary ...... 64 2.6.2 Introduction ...... 66 2.6.2.1 Objective ...... 66 2.6.2.2 Scope ...... 66 2.6.2.3 Deliverables ...... 67 2.6.3 Methodology ...... 67 2.6.4 Performed activities ...... 67 2.6.5 Unit and process description ...... 68 2.6.6 Results of analysis ...... 71 2.6.6.1 HAZOP Analysis Results ...... 71 2.6.6.2 Technical discussions ...... 71 2.6.6.3 Management Systems Evaluation ...... 77 2.6.6.4 API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based) analysis results ...... 79 2.6.6.5 API 581 qualitative analysis (component based) ...... 79 2.6.6.6 RBI Detailed quantitative analysis ...... 81 2.6.7 Conclusions and recommendations 81 2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo, Unit FCC ...... 83 2.7.1 Introduction ...... 83 2.7.1.1 General ...... 83 2.7.1.2 Implementation of Seveso requirements ...... 83 2.7.2 Information on site, plant and unit 84 2.7.2.1 General data ...... 84 2.7.2.2 Location of Establishment ...... 84 2.7.2.3 Policy the company is pursuing ...... 86 2.7.2.4 Safety management system ...... 86 2.7.2.5 Hazardous materials ...... 86 2.7.2.6 Meteorological data ...... 86 2.7.2.7 External activities ...... 86 2.7.3 Detail description ...... 86

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2.7.3.1 FCC unit S-2300 ...... 86 2.7.3.2 Gas concentration unit S-2500 ...... 91 2.7.3.3 Flow charts ...... 95 2.7.3.4 Condition of the processes ...... 95 2.7.3.5 Hazardous material ...... 95 2.7.3.6 Utilities and effects ...... 97 2.7.4 Safety of the plant ...... 99 2.7.4.1 History of accident ...... 99 2.7.4.2 Hazards identified ...... 99 2.7.4.3 Frequency of occurrence of hazards .. 105 2.7.4.4 Consequences of hazards ...... 106 2.7.4.5 Domino effect from Event TOP1 ...... 115 2.7.4.6 Summary of Hazard Analysis ...... 116 2.7.4.7 Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards ...... 116 2.7.4.8 Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident ...... 116 2.7.5 Risk assessment ...... 117 2.7.5.1 Frequency ranking ...... 117 2.7.5.2 Damage severity ...... 117 2.7.6 Conclusions ...... 118 3 RBI / RCM User’s manual ...... 119 4 References ...... 120 5 Annexes ...... 121 Annex 1 Geographical position of Pancevo ...... 122 Annex 2 Industrial zone of Pancevo ...... 123 Annex 3 General plan of Pancevo refinery ...... 124 Annex 4 Organization of Pancevo refinery ...... 125 Annex 5 General plan of Novi Sad refinery ...... 126 Annex 6 Substances in Novi Sad refinery ...... 127 Annex 7 Organization of Novi Sad refinery ...... 129 Annex 8 Responsibilities’ within management system in Novi Sad refinery ...... 130 A.8.1 According to the requests of the standard ISO 9001:2000 (SRPS ISO 9001:2001) ...... 130 A.8.2 According to the requests of the standard ISO 14001:2004 (SRPS ISO 14001:2005) ...... 133 Annex 9 Novi Sad refinery – flow diagram of U 100 136 Annex 10 Refinery Novi Sad – flow diagram of U 200 137 Annex 11 Elemir Gas refinery in NIS Naftagas ...... 138 Annex 12 Integrated management system policy of NIS Naftagas ...... 139 Annex 13 Flow diagram of Elemir Gas Refinery ...... 140 Annex 14 Position of unit FCC in Pancevo refinery .... 141

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A.14.1 Blocks in Pancevo refinery ...... 141 A.14.2 General plan of refinery – position of FCC in Block 6 ...... 142 Annex 15 QMS/EMS documents of RNP ...... 143 Annex 16 List of available drawings of FCC ...... 146 Annex 17 Main hazards in FCC ...... 150 Annex 18 Block diagram of Pancevo refinery ...... 154 Annex 19 List of substances in Pancevo Refinery ..... 156 Annex 20 Flow diagrams ...... 160 A.20.1 FCC complex, Gas concentration unit - Propylene splitter section ...... 160 Annex 21 Safety data sheets for substances in FCC . 161 Annex 22 Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from CPS 2000) ...... 163 Annex 23 Summary of hazard analysis ...... 165 Annex 24 FCC: Bow-tie analysis result ...... 168 A.24.1 TOP1: Release from FA-2514 ...... 168 A.24.2 TOP2: Release from DA-2503 ...... 168 A.24.3 TOP3: Release from DA-2509 ...... 168 A.24.4 TOP4: Release from FA-2953 ...... 168 A.24.5 TOP5: Release from FA-2455 ...... 168 RGE: API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009 ...... 174 Annex 25 RGE: API 581 Qualitative, component based - Inspection planning ...... 177

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List of Figures

Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work ...... 2 Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D...... 3 Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d...... 5 Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia ...... 6 Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia ...... 7 Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo ...... 10 Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of Refinery ...... 10 Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo ...... 16 Figure 9: Years of construction ...... 20 Figure 10: Second phase of expansion ...... 21 Figure 11: Bombing 1999 ...... 22 Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad ...... 27 Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad ...... 28 Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery ...... 28 Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia ...... 41 Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir ...... 41 Figure 17: Map of roads ...... 42 Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per year (%) ...... 45 Figure 19: Seismic activities ...... 46 Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery ...... 46 Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall management system ...... 51 Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI . 52 Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix ...... 55 Figure 24: NIS risk matrix ...... 55 Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process ...... 62 Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component based applied on RGE equipment ...... 65 Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on selected RGE equipment ...... 65 Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir Refinery ...... 66 Figure 29: Project web site – Tools and analysis ...... 68 Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3 ...... 72 Figure 31: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 2 of 3 ...... 73

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Figure 32: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 3 of 3 ...... 75 Figure 33: HAZOP Loop 1 ...... 75 Figure 34: Results of management system evaluation for RGE ...... 78 Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative unit analysis matrix ...... 79 Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for year 2009 ...... 80 Figure 37 Preliminary results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on selected RGE equipment ...... 81 Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies 82 Figure 39: Financial Risk Prioritization ...... 82 Figure 33: Position of FCC in Pancevo Refinery ...... 85 Figure 34: Access to the FCC complex ...... 85 Figure 35: Flow chart of FCC ...... 88 Figure 36: HAZOP tool – Main page ...... 100 Figure 37: HAZOP tool - Loop description ...... 100 Figure 38: HAZOP tool – Nodes ...... 101 Figure 39: HAZOP tool – Drawing ...... 101 Figure 40: Loop1 - TOP1 Event, FA-2514 ...... 102 Figure 41: Column D 2503 – debutanizer section of S 2500 ...... 103 Figure 42: Column DA-2509 – splitter section of S-2500104 Figure 43: General scenario ...... 107

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List of Tables

Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery ...... 8 Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the precipitation quantity ( mm) in Pančevo ...... 14 Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in Pančevo reduced recording to the data for Belgrade ...... 14 Table 4: Medium monthly and annual values of the air humidity in Pančevo, reduced according to data for Belgrade ...... 16 Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery 17 Table 6: Storage capacities of Refinery ...... 19 Table 7: Qualification structure of employees in Pancevo Refinery ...... 25 Table 8: Number of employees in Pancevo Refinery by type of work ...... 25 Table 9: Maximum concentration of employees, first shift26 Table 10: List of units in Novi Sad Refinery ...... 29 Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia) ...... 31 Table 12: Novi Sad region - Frequency of the winds ...... 32 Table 13: Average value of cloudiness in sky/10 ...... 32 Table 14: Key units in Novi Sad Refinery - characteristics34 Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of Novi Sad refinery ...... 36 Table 16: Firefighting equipment ...... 36 Table 17: Available fire extinguishing means ...... 37 Table 18: Dangerous substances in U 100 ...... 38 Table 19: Dangerous substances in U 200 ...... 40 Table 20: Statistical data on monthly weather parameters for Zrenjanin region ...... 43 Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather parameters for Zrenjanin region ...... 43 Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July .. 45 Table 23: Temperature distribution in the region - December ...... 45 Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind ...... 45 Table 25: RGE supplies ...... 47 Table 26: Employees structure in Elemir Refinery ...... 47 Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of certification ...... 47

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Table 28: Fire fighting equipment ...... 49 Table 29: Substances in Elemir Gas refinery ...... 49 Table 30: Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor ...... 53 Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning ...... 57 Table 32: Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning ...... 57 Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories ...... 58 Table 34: CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories 59 Table 35: Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage 59 Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace Tube ...... 60 Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study .. 62 Table 38: HAZOP analysis for Loop 1 ...... 74 Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments ...... 77 Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements .... 83 Table 41: Vacuum Gas Oil ...... 96 Table 42: C3/C4 Recycle From Alkylation Unit ...... 96 Table 43: Naphtha From LCGO Hydrotreating Unit ...... 96 Table 44: Quality of wet gas ...... 96 Table 45: Quality of raw FCC gasoline ...... 97 Table 46: FCC supplies ...... 98 Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity ...... 98 Table 48: Frequency of occurrence of accidental events 105 Table 49: Definition of Frequency Classes ...... 106 Table 50: Typical damages caused by overpressure .... 107 Table 51: Details on damage caused by pressure wave 108 Table 52: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, main characteristics ...... 109 Table 53: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, scenario ...... 110 Table 54: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, main characteristics ...... 110 Table 55: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, scenario ...... 111 Table 56: TOP3 – Release from DA-2509, main characteristics ...... 112 Table 57: TOP3 – Release from DA 2509, scenario ...... 112 Table 58: EVENT 4 – Release from FA-2953, main characteristics ...... 113 Table 59: Event 4 – Release from FA-2953, scenario ... 114 Table 60: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, main characteristics ...... 114 Table 61: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, scenario .. 114 Table 62: Level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures ...... 115 Table 63: Selected TOP events and scenario ...... 117

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Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes ...... 118 Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes ... 118 Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios ...... 118

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1 Management Summary Report

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2 Detail Technical Report

2.1 General part 2.1.1 Introduction Package B within the project RiskNIS Risk management and use of risk-based approaches in inspection, maintenance and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. pl ants was ordered by the end of August 2008. The aim of Package B is to additionally provide the guided / supported implementation of the technology and tools already provided in the basic Package A to approximately 20% of all equipment in NIS a.d. production units (the assumed most critical equipment) – ca. 5100 equipment. The scope of work in Package B is presented on the Figure 1

Aopt. Optional CMMS Full CMMS System containing: • Asset management • Maintenance Personnel planning • Preventive maintenance • Master plans • Reports

Aopt – Optional CMMS

A Basic package B Extended C Full coverage package package

A. Basic package: C. * Full coverage • Feasibility study (all identified equipment) • Basic implementation for RBI, RCM and Basic package INCLUDED RCFA: Software Licensing and first • 12871 pieces of equipment for Level 1 year maintenance cost B. Suggested package: analysis Basic package INCLUDED Travel and subsistence • 5148 pieces of equipment for Level 2 Project Management FULL training INCLUDED analysis • 1287 pieces of equipment for Level 3 • 200 Equip. RBI level 1 • 2529 pieces of equipment for Level 1 analysis analysis • 80 Equip. RBI level 2 • 1012 pieces of equipment • 12058 pieces of equipment for RCM • 20 Equip. RBI level l3 analysis for Level 2 analysis analysis • 20 components analyzed by • 253 pieces of equipment • 250 pieces of equipment / systems for RCM for Level 3 analysis RCFA analysis • 1268 pieces of equipment Introduction of the full scale CMMS (Aopt) is a • 10 components analyzed by for RCM analysis necessary precondition for this Package. RCFA • 38 pieces of equipment / • Implementation of HSE, HAZOP and systems for RCFA analysis Seveso II Directive Basic training for RBI, RCM/RCFA and HSE/HAZOP/Seveso II, first instance of the training/certification

330 pieces of equipment

5.100 pieces of equipment

31,500 pieces of equipment

Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work

Kick of meeting for Package B was held on September 28, 2008 in Elemir Refinery and preparation for data collection started immediately. Templates for data collection for RBI, RCM / RCFA analysis have been developed and agreed with experts from three refineries.

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Order of refineries to be treated with analysis has been agreed as RGE, RNS, RNP, according to availability of experts to collected / verify data. Data collection started by the end of December 2008 with Refinery Elemir and for other two refineries in the first quarter of 2009. First preliminary RBI report prepared for RGE and delivered in March 2009. Several meetings were held in order to review the work progress (May 4, June 12, December 12, 2009) and to present plan for the further work. Two workshops were held as well in Stuttgart (April 2010) with the aim to verify input data and to agree the type and contents of the reports expected by NIS management. Analysis have been done as required by the contract for Package B; based on their results recommendation for improvement / optimization of inspection, maintenance and HSE practice have been given. Training, education and certification of NIS a.d. employees started in November 2008 and finished in January 2010. Training has included both, theoretical courses in the field of risk management and on-the job training in German companies. 2.1.2 General about NIS a.d. 2.1.2.1 Activities NIS is the largest oil company in Southeast Europe. It is joint stock company and fifty one percent of NIS shares is held by the Russian company Gazprom Neft. Corporate headquarters are located in Novi Sad and Belgrade and production facilities are located across the whole territory of Serbia. NIS is the only Serbian company which possesses an integrated and well balanced system of production, refining and trade of crude oil and petroleum products, as well as natural gas exploitation and which plays a significant role in stability and security of energy supply. The company deals with crude refining, sales of petroleum products, and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Serbia and Angola. Annual NIS crude oil production totals ca. 1 million tons. NIS owns two oil refineries (Figure 2), Pančevo Oil Refinery and Novi Sad Oil Refinery, with total refining capacity of ca. 7.3 million tons per year. There is an LPG production facility, so called Elemir LPG refinery. Oilfield services business deals with geophysical exploration, drilling and well testing , hydro probing, transportation, workover and civil construction services. In addition to its retail network (480 petrol stations), NIS also owns oil depots all over Serbia.

Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D. The company's main business is the exploration of gas and oil in Serbia (mainly in Vojvodina) for and the production, importing, processing, transportation and marketing of hydrocarbons (oil and gas). It will hold hold monopoly on all oil imports except the high quality diesel fuel, called "eurodizel" in Serbia, until 2011. The company is a leading supplier of petroleum products in the Serbian market. It exports as well motor fuels, benzene, toluene), road and industrial bitumens to the EU countries, Ukraine, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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2.1.2.2 History of the company The development of the oil economy of Serbia began after World War II, when the research, and a few years later, production of oil and natural gas, as well as distribution and sales of petroleum products, began in this region. Soon after refineries have been constructed, companies for transport and trade of natural gas were set up as well. NIS predecessor company was the Company for Crude Oil Exploration and Production, incorporated in 1949 by the Resolution of the Government of the Federative National Republic of Yugoslavia, and which in 1953 was named Naftagas. In 1949 the first gas fields discovered, in 1951 - started natural gas production and development of the gas transmission system and first crude oil fields discovered. In 1968 Novi Sad and Pančevo Oil refineries started up and the largest oil field in the country, discovered (Velebit). NIS-Oil Refinery Pancevo, a company for production of petroleum, power fluids and electricity began to work in December 14, 1968 with capacity of 1.32 million tons of crude oil per year. In the first phase of expansion, December 14, 1979 atmospheric distillation II was put into operation, which has increased the primary processing capacity 4.82 million tons of crude oil per year. By commissioning of secondary refinery plants Refinery has been aligned with a modern European refineries with a modern structure of production facilities. During the NATO bombing refinery was badly damaged. Direct damage is estimated upwards of 360 million dollars but production capacity is restored soon. NIS-Oil Refinery Novi Sad for production of all types of motor gasoline, diesel fuel, road and industrial bitumen, lubricants, and solvent began to work December 13, 1968. During the bombing in 1999 heavily damaged. Material damage is estimated 320 million dollars. After reconstruction atmospheric distillation reached the capacity of 500,000 tons per year of crude oil processing, and platforming, bitumen plant and atmospheric distillation capacity of 2 million tons per year of processing. NIS was established as a public company for the exploration, production, refining and trade in crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas in 1991. It has integrated the following companies: Naftagas, Gas, Energogas, Pančevo Oil Refinery, Novi Said Oil Refinery, Belgrade Oil Refinery and Kruševac Lubricant Factory (FAM). Since 1st October 2005 NIS started to operate as a joint stock company dealing with production of crude oil and gas, crude oil refining and trade in petroleum products, production and marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. The privatization of NIS started in 2007. Several companies, including Gazprom Neft, MOL, OMV, Hellenic Petroleum, Rompetrol and Lukoil expressed interest to acquire the company. However, on 25 January 2008, Serbia and Russia signed an agreement giving 51% of NIS's shares to Gazprom Neft for €400 million and €550 million in investments until 2012. Adjoining contracts signed with Gazprom are the contact about inclusion of Serbia in the South Stream project and the construction of a gas reserve facility in Banatski Dvor. On 24 December 2008 final contract between the Government of Serbia and Gazprom were signed. 2.1.2.3 NIS in numbers In 2009, JSC Gazprom Neft completed the acquisition of 51% of NIS shares, while the Government of the Republic of Serbia remains the owner of 49% of shares. Instead of previous business strategy mostly oriented to the market of Serbia and internal resources, a new strategy has been defined for NIS as achievement of long term stable leadership at the market of petroleum products in South East Europe. NIS a.d. Novi Sad share capital is 81, 530, 200.000.00 RSD and owns the total of 163 060 400 of 500.00 RSD in nominal value. The structure of the shareholder capital of NIS a.d. Novi Sad on January 2, 2010 is shown on Figure 3.

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Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d. Key task of the company is to increase the competitiveness and efficiency of the company and improving the business management. Organizing of its business operation according to international standards will enable NIS to feel secure both in times of globalization in general as well as in the times when Serbia is entering the EU. It has 11000 employees, 500 gas stations across Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. 1600 internally serviced gas stations, 8 large terminals, 44 warehouses and air fuel pumping facility at Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport. Pančevo Oil Refinery (yearly refines of 4.8m tones of crude oil) and Novi Sad Oil Refinery (yearly refines of 2.6m tones of crude oil) are owned by NIS and gas Refinery in Elemir, near Novi Sad. NIS a.d. in basic figures for the year 2005: • contributing 20% to the state budget • 719.560 t of crude oil production • 295.430.633 m³ of natural gas production • 7,3 mill. t - refining capacity • 3,927 mill. t crude processed In 2007 NIS had a profit of approximately 9 billion RSD (US$ 170 million) and 262 billion RSD (US$ 5 billion) of revenues. In 2008 total revenues was USD 4.7 billion. 2.1.3 Pancevo Oil Refinery 2.1.3.1 General data Pančevo Oil Refinery is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffin and aromatic solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur and feedstock for petrochemical industry. Primary and secondary units for crude oil processing were constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of various types of crude. Today it is mostly imported crude oil that is being processed (70-80%). It is supplied by way of a pipeline through Croatia or by barges on the river Danube from Romania and Hungary. The rest of processed crude oil is of the domestic origin (oil fields located in the province of Vojvodina). Refinery's available processing capacity is 4,820 x 106 tons per year of crude oil, i.e. 14,660 tons per day. With this production capacity and with storage capacity of approximately 700,000 cubic meters of crude oil and derivates, it is the biggest factory of this type in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of exporting 20% of its production. The assortment of derivates manufactured is extremely wide. Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge, and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge. Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) has financed the construction of a pipeline from the island Krk (Croatia) to Petroleum refinery Pancevo, by way of which 6 x 106 tpy of crude oil can be transported. Reloading facility at the river Danube enables a simple way of supplying

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the crude oil and dispatching the derivatives by barges. Crude oil and its derivatives can also be loaded and unloaded at the Refinery's own railway transport facilities. There are also tank-truck loading & unloading facilities. Head office of the refinery is in Pancevo, Spoljnostarcevacka b.b and legally it is a part of the joint-stock company NIS - Petroleum industry of Serbia owned Serbia and JSC Gazprom Neft. Total number of employees is 2300. Some of planned development projects are: • meeting EU standards on product quality • reconstruction of the units and infrastructure in order to improve the process efficiency and crude oil valorization • reduction of energy costs • improvement of environmental protection • joint projects with neighboring petrochemical company HIP-Petrohemija on better valorization of by-streams.

2.1.3.2 Location of Pancevo Refinery Macro location Pancevo Refinery is situated at exceptionally favorable location - 14 kilometers from Belgrade, the biggest consumer center in Serbia and about 4 km away from the town Pančevo on the left bank of the Danube River at its confluence with the Tamiš River. The Pančevo territory covers an area of approximately 760 square kilometers around the confluence of the two rivers, between coordinates 20°30’ – 21° East geographic longitude and (44°40’ – 45°) North geographic latitude. Geographical location of town Pancevo in Serbia is shown on Figure 4 and Error! Reference source not found..

Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia

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Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia

Map of Serbia, scale 1:2000000, with position of Pancevo is given in Annex 1.

Pančevo is an industrial town with a population of about 130,000 people; 86,000 live in the city, the remainder in outlying settlements and villages. The largest companies on the territory of the town Pančevo is represented by an industrial complex (Figure 5a) which includes the petrochemical plant HIP Petrohemija, Pancevo Refinery of NIS and the chemical fertilizer plant HIP Azotara. The industrial complex lays on the city’s southern edge, southeast of Vojlovica (Figure 5b), a major residential area. The three factories, which cover about 290 hectares, employ about 6,600 people and represent the major employer for the entire Pančevo area. The map of industrial zone is given in Annex 2 (scale 1:25000).

Micro location Pancevo Refinery is located in the southeastern and eastern part of the southern industrial zone, located about 4 km from the town of Pancevo, between settlements Vojlovica and Starcevo. To the West of the refinery, at a distance of 2.5 km, runs Danube river, with docks owned by the refinery. Channel Nadel flows to the East of the Refinery. Residential area of Starčevo is located to the Southeast at a distance of 1 km of Refinery while residential area of Vojlovica located northwest at a distance of 350m. Several small villages lie directly to the south of the industrial complex. Sensitive public buildings like schools are in a distance of about 3 km. Furthermore no traffic routes or major transport centers are nearby the establishment yet. The refinery is surrounded by agricultural land. The nearest industrial facilities are located on the northwestern edge of the refinery and plant Messer-Tehnogas and Petrochemical Complex Petrochemical HIP-Pancevo. Pancevo refinery covers an area of 145 hectares. Port on the Danube, area of 3.5 hectares, and pipeline bridge connecting the port and the refinery, about 2.5 hectares, are located outside of the refinery. Refinery itself consists of 24 blocks where production and power units are settled, as well as necessary infrastructure. Schema of blocks in Refinery is given in Annex 3 and list of blocks in Table 1.

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Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery

No Description

Headquarter Mashing workshop Storage and garage Block I Technical security center Trafo F Entrance gate 2

Central wardrobe Restaurant Block II Laboratory Sample house Trafo C

FCC Complex control building Fire brigade house Block III Monastery Vojlovica and church Development and Investment

Flare I and II Storage tanks for slop and oil water Block IV API separator Pumpe house PK-4 with annex Vessels with hydrogen and nitrogen

Atmospheric distillation I, S-100 Visbreaking, S-200 Platforming S-200 HDS I, S-400 Gas treatment and fractionation, S-500, S-570 Merox TNG, S-500 Gasoline redistillation, S-600 Block V Special gasoline merox, S-650 Udex, S-620 Souer water treatment, S-900 Flare gases recuperation, S-1000 Command room of Block |V Air compresor room, S-1500 Auxiliary systems, Vapor condensate (S-1300), Fuel gas (S-1500), Alylation system (S-1800)

Atmospheric distillation II, S-2100 Vacuum distillation, S-2200 FCC with gas treatment, sour water treatment and amine washing (S-2300, S- 2500, S-2900 and S-2950) HDS II, S-2400 TNG refination, S-2450 Block VI Alkylation, S-2600 Light gasoline merox, S-2650 Light cracked gasonile merox, S-2750 Heavy cracked gasoline merox, S-2850 Claus, S-2450 Control room for S-2200 and S-2100

Block VII Storage area (15 tanks)

Storage area (9 tanks) Block VIII Pump house PK-8 with annex and control room

Thermal power unit Chemical treatment of water Block IX Tanks for own fuel (2 tanks) Raw water pool and cooling towers

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No Description

Pumps for fire fighting water

Block X Storage area, (24 tanks)

Block XI Storage area (24 tanks)

Block XII Storage area (4 tanks)

Block XIII Storage area (15 tanks)

Block XIV Storage area (6 tanks)

Block XV Storage area (24 tanks)

Bitumen production, S-250 Air compressors Tanks for feed and bitumen products (11 tanks) Trafo Bitumen Block XVI Auto and rail loading of bitumen Auto and rail loading of LPG Filling station for liquid derivates Control building for loading station Scale for trailers

Tanks for fuel oil (2 tanks) Warehouse for investment equipment Sowage Block XVII Parking Trailers washing building Trailer equipment building Gate 3

Block XVIII Crude oil tanks (4 tanks)

Block XIX Storage area (6 tanks)

Block XX Storage area (12 tanks)

Sulfolane unit, S-3600 Block XXI Control building for Sulfoline unit Trafo Sulfoline

Block XXII Storage tanks for Sulfoline

Trafo ST-35/6 Block XXIII Gate 1

Railway building Garage for locomotives Loading installation for derivate Block XXIV Unloading installation for crude oil and semi-products Oil terminal with the building Wagon Sludge sediment

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Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo

Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of Refinery

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Access to the Refinery is provided by the following roads: • Entrance 1 o K-1 for the delivery of equipment investment o K-1A for the workers and the fire exit and entrance • Entrance 2, K-2 entry for workers and materials for technical good stores • Entrance 3, K-3 input trailers for shipping products manufacturing • Industrial rail for transport of raw materials and shipping of products to the production station Suburb • Docks on the River Danube on the right side of the road Pancevo - Starcevo.

Natural and protected areas The territory of Pančevo municipality encompassed the protected area “Ponjavica” Nature Park, proclamated in 1995 which is located southeast of Pančevo city. This area is significant because of its connection with surface and underground water from the SZIC, on one side, and because its importance for protection of natural wetland flora and fauna on the other side (V level of IUCN protection and III level of national protection). The park, instituted in 1994, and managed by the public Enterprise "Omoljica", located in the homonymous village of Omoljica3 has an area of 133,54 ha,, which include part of the Ponjavica watercourse and adjoined areas. The park lies between two villages, Omoljica and Banatski Brestovac. “Ponjavica” also includes two special nature reservations established in 1961 – “Ivanovo” and Danube River island “Omoljicka Ada”. In the northeast part of Pančevo municipality, near the village of Dolovo is located the Monument of Nature “Tri stabla jasena”. This protected area, instituted in 1999, has three white ash trees estimated to be 200 to 250 years old. The following natural areas are present in the municipal territory of Pančevo: • Natural area named “Pancevacki rit”, between old and new road to Pančevo • is very interesting wetland area. It is old type of environment, such used to exist around all big lowland rivers in the past. This area is important for bird nesting. These locations are in procedure for protection within international project Important Bird Areas. This bog-land are also very interesting and important as place where could be found different animal species which life circle and activities are closely connected with nearness of water and bog-lends. It is important to notice that flora of this area has not yet been investigated. Hence, there is a possibility to find there endangered water plants. • Danube River islands (Forkontumac, Stefanac, Cakljanac, Brestovacka Ada, Ivankovacka Ada) and natural, wooded area on the river banks of Danube and Tamis river are natural areas important in many aspects of environmental point of view, but without any level of protection. Like “Pancevacki rit”, this sites suppose to be under protection as natural heritage and sites of potentially high biodiversity. These locations are important for nesting a great number of birds; for example, one of them is Haliaeetus albicilla, species considered as vulnerable according to IUCN ategorization. It is important to notice that some fish species spawn on riversides and island sides. River islands flora and fauna of the river banks, similarly to “Pancevacki rit”, have not yet been investigated, so it can be expected to find there some endangered and protected species. Jabucki rit and Glogonjski rit are remaining parts of marshes in the lower reaches of the Tamis River, located northeastern of Pančevo. These natural areas are out of PTA of SZIC, but they are also important for protection of flora and fauna biodiversity of this region. The importance of the residual wetland areas of Pančevo is also recognised at international level. According to the “National Report prepared for the 7th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) - 1995“ marshlands around Pančevo are designated for inclusion in the Ramsar List in 2010. Flora and Fauna In the territory of Pančevo natural vegetation survives only in small areas along river banks and canals and in marshes. The most of the area is agricultural nowadays. Autochthonous vegetation exists only in the few, above mentioned, places. For this reason and for the lack of information on plant species living in the area, natural areas with autochthonous vegetation should be protected in this municipality. More than 430 species of plants are present in the area, including some treathened species that can be found in the natural areas. No punctual data on the flora and vegetation of Pančevo are available at the moment.

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Fauna of Fauna of the area comprises more than 280 species approximately. Some of these species are threatened, according to IUCN categorization. Population According to the census in 2002. in the municipality of Pancevo lived 127,162 people and 23 different nationality, which speaks of a turbulent history and demographic situation of the people in this region. About 8,000 reside in the Vojlovica and Topola quarters in the close vicinity of Pancevo Refinery.

Geological and other characteristics Geomorphology Pančevo is located in a flat area of fluvial deposits along the eastern banks of the Danube River. The municipal territory is part of the Pannonian Basin. In a morphological sense, the Danube river divides the region into 2 different units: • mountainous region, south to the river • plain region, north to the river. The region located in the north of the Danube river is part of the Pannonian Plate, with altitude increasing from southwest (around 68 masl) to northeast. The city of Pančevo belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45 masl (2). Pančevo is placed on the edge of Banat loess terrace, on the ontact of two big morphological units – Banat loess terrace and alluvial plains of Danube and Tamis rivers. Alluvial plains extend along Danube and Tamis rivers, in the direction of their flows, with an average elevation of 70-71 masl. The Banat loess terrace is mainly flat with relics of Tamis old flow in the form of local depressions and an average altitude of 70 to 85 masl. Both, terrace and plains, are protected from Tamis and Danube high waters by embankments along the rivers banks. The city of Pančevo belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45 masl. Hydrology of the Pančevo area The region is characterized by a well developed hydrographic network by two typical lowland rivers, Danube and Tamis, with numerous branches, meanders, old flow streams and channels. The hydro graphic and hydrological characteristics of this region are of special significance for determining the general water balance as well as the quantity of water lost to Danube. The largest and by far the most important surface water body is the Danube River, flowing west-southwest of the investigated area. The area from the left river bank to the river terrace on the east is flat and it’s called alluvial plain. In the recent past it was an area regularly flooded by high waters of the Danube. In the last century the flood plain of the Danube was protected from floods to become agricultural land. Amelioration of the area included digging of a dense canal network, construction of an embankment along the whole riverbank, drilling a few groups of abstraction wells and installation of many pump-stations for (ground) water pumping from canals to the river. In addition, Danube water level rised around 2-3 m by construction of “Djerdap” dam in 1980’s. The result of all the above-mentioned works is that the Danube water level often surpasses the ground level of its alluvial plain around Pančevo, and almost constantly surpasses the water level in drainage network. Another important factor of flow regime is also the regime of “Djerdap” dam exploitation, making it very hard to determine flow regime in more detail. On the Pančevo monitoring station the mean water level of the Danube river for year 2002 was 70,84mas, with minimal 70.06 masl and maximum 71.94 masl. As for hydrological characteristics, maximal flows of Danube occur beginning of spring, usually in April when it is around 7400 m3/s, minimal is in September with 3200 m3/s. Based on hydrological data for the period 1997 - 2000 on water measuring profile-Pančevo, mean Danube flow in this region is 5.326 m3/s (3) . Maximal flow is a consequence of spring time rainfalls and snow melting throughout the Danube watershed. Strong rains combined with soil saturated by water from snow melting enable fast water run off that affect river flow. Upstream of Pančevo, Tamis and Sibnica Rivers flows into the Danube. Tamis River flows from northwest to southeast. It is regulated in its lower part, near its mouth, and therefore it is much deeper here than upstream. Its regime is directly dependent on the Danube regime. During the Danube maximal water levels, Danube

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can not receive all the water from Tamis, thus creating backwater at Tamis that floods the surrounding area. At minimal water level in its upstream parts at some points it almost dries completely. West of the Tamis river there is the Sibnica River and a network of natural and artificial canals, which are all directly dependent on the Danube regime. The narrow area of Pančevo, South Industrial Zone of Pancevo, next to the flood plain, and the SZIC were built on backfilled material, by which the ground level was raised to an altitude of around 75 masl. This had to be done because of the high groundwater level especially during the maximum water level in Danube and the influence of “Djerdap” dam. This caused the creation of an artificial aquifer under the zone (Azotara and Petrohemija) in its inner parts practically independent from the Danube River, which was the purpose of these amelioration works. Between the city of Pančevo and the South Zone Industrial Complex two parallel open canals have been constructed for industrial purposes. The northern wider canal connects the fertilizer plant to the Danube. This is a navigable canal, used by ships to carry bulk of raw materials and products, and is itself used as a raw water source by the fertilizer and the petrochemical industries. The southern canal is a wastewater canal that is used for discharging industrial effluent. Both canals are approximately 2 km long. They are divided and surrounded by embankments all the way from the plants to the Danube. The two canals both originate from the fertilizer plant HIP Azotara. Those two canals are of great importance for the hydrology and hydrogeology of SZIC. One the main purposes of canals is to drain the backfilled area, the shallow aquifer, of the Industrial Complex making a local underground (hydro geological) sub watershed. At the same time, the canal waters infiltrate the lower alluvial deposits of the Danube, which means that those canals connect the artificial shallow aquifer with the main alluvial aquifer. Geology and Hydrogeology The wider region around Pančevo is composed entirely of significantly thick quaternary deposits settled on older Neocene sediments, which are found only in deep research boreholes. Geology of South Zone Industrial Complex area can be divided into: • Oil Refinery region, and • Region of Petrohemija and Azotara. The Oil Refinery region belongs to the Banat loess terrace, southeast from Petrohemija. The altitude of this first terrace from loessoide silt is higher then alluvial plain so there was no need for backfilling as in case of Petrohemija and Azotara. There was just backfilling with the purpose of levelling of original ground, which was slightly uneven. Oil refinery was constructed on backfill heterogeneous material. Regarding the grain size analyses of this heterogeneous material it is similar with sediments found beneath. The thickness of backfilled material vary from 0 to 3,5 m. The altitude of Oil Refinery after backfilling is around 74,21-76,93 masl, with slope from north to south. Sediments found beneath are mostly presented by loessoide silt, since Refinery was built on Banat loess terrace made of loess and loessoide silt. Thickness of this sediments, together with backfilled material, goes from 4,5-12,5m, usually around 7-9m. Under this sediments starts the main aquifer made of alluvial sands. Altitude of main aquifer overlying is on 61,72-70,94 m.a.s.l Hydrogeology of Oil Refinery region do not have any specific characteristics comparing with data given in chapter Hydrogeology of Pančevo area. As it is mention before, backfilling of this terrain has been done only to level the previous surface of the ground. There is two underground waters with different hydrodynamic characteristics: aquifer with free water level (formed in loessial loam) and confined aquifer formed in Quaternary and Neocene sediments. Hydraulic conductivity of loessial loam is around 2x10-6 cm/s, and for main aquifer around 1,5x10-2 cm/s [RADUS doo, 2004]. Underground water level, for the period September 2001-August 2002, vary from 70,1-72,1 m.a.s.l. General direction of groundwater flow is from north to south. Terrain Tectonics From geotectonic aspect, the investigation area of Pančevo belongs to the south part of Banat depression on the very border (Danube river) with the Zone of Uncover Neocene. The oldest sedimentary rocks of Cretaceous age are folded and faulted during the Laramian stage, between Senonian and Paleogene. During this period the basic tectonic framework was formed. The tectonic movements in Neocene are weaker.

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In the zone of bare (uncovered) Neocene, it is manifested by re-appearance of existing fault. The most intensive products of neotectonics in this region according to B.Siric are faults that divide the terrain on blocks, whose activity began before Neocene. He states as well, that during Quaternary smaller fault-like structures formed that represent potential zones of contemporary movements. In investigation area of Pančevo Neocene sediments have maximal thickness of 500m. Tectonics of the Quaternary was relatively quiet.

Meteorological data Pančevo is characterized by a continental to a moderate continental climate. The local climatic conditions in this area are mostly affected by the presence of rivers Danube and Tamiš, geographic latitude, distance from Mediterranean and Atlantic seas, as well as by its isolated position in the Pannonian Basin surrounded by high-altitude mountains (Alps, Dinaric Alps, Carpathian Mountains and Rodhopes). Moreover, significant forest belt located along the two rivers could also influence on a local scale the municipal climate. Rainfall Precipitation distribution in Pančevo area is characterized by an alternation of rather humid and rather dry periods. Generally, years with lower precipitation show two rainfall seasons during spring and autumn, characteristic for the continental climate. During years with high precipitation the spring rainy season extends through the summer period, showing the influence of the Mediterranean climate regime. Table 2 shows data on rainfall for the period 1961 do 2003. Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the precipitation quantity ( mm) in Pančevo

J F M A M J J A S O N D Ann.

Mean 38.2 35 42.2 53.1 62.2 84.6 60 50.7 54.7 41.2 48.8 51.8 662.5 value

Maximum 103 100.1 128.8 132.9 171.5 195 227.7 259.7 189 164.4 89.8 146.4 927.8

Year of max. 1987 1978 1981 2001 1987 1969 1999 1975 2001 1974 1980 1969 1999 value

Minimum 2.2 3.4 2.2 14.4 12.9 7.6 0 0 0 0 4.2 0.3 334.5

Year of 1990 1987 1972 1968 1988 2000 1989 1992 1986 1965 1986 1972 2000 min. value

Lightning is high frequency event in summer. The level of underground water is about one meter deep. The surface is brick earth covered with concrete. Air Temperature Data on medium monthly and annual air temperatures for the period 1961 - 2002 is shown in Table 3. Mean long-term air temperature value for the period 1962-2002 is 11.3 °C. Analysis of the average monthly air temperature shows that January is the coldest month with an average of –0.4 °C while July is the hottest month with an average of +21.8 °C. Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in Pančevo reduced recording to the data for Belgrade

J F M A M J J A S O N D Ann.

Mean -0.4 2.0 6.3 11.7 17.1 20.2 21.8 21.5 17.2 11.7 6.0 1.2 11.3 value

16.31 Maximum 3.7 7.3 10.7 15.5 171.5 19.7 22.8 24.8 26.4 21.2 5.0 13.4 1.3 Year of max. 1983 2002 2001 2000 2002 2000 1988 1992 1994 1966 1963 1985 2000 value

Minimum -6.7 -4.0 0.6 0.6 7.5 18.1 19.3 17.7 13.6 8.5 0.8 -3.0 10.2

Year of 1964 1985 1987 1997 1991 1974 1979 1976 1996 1974 1988 2001 1978 min. value

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High temperatures during the hot period of the year cause turbulences in the atmosphere and strong vertical circulation that can favourably effect the dilution of emitted pollutants. It is known that at a relative humidity higher that 55% and a temperature higher than 25°C, photochemical smog is formed. In Pančevo, these conditions are met on a couple of days of July and August. During the winter period low temperatures and poor turbulences in the atmosphere enable temperature inversions in Pančevo. Under these conditions dispersion of polluting substances is poor and concentration of polluting substances in the lower part of the atmosphere occurs. During this period, therefore immission measurements can detect pollutants concentrations higher than the law limit values. Wind Wind has an important and significant influence on Pančevo climatic characteristcs and air quality condition, since it could effect the transport and dilution of polluting substance. Moreover, in specific climatic conditions, it could affect also the city of Belgrade. Wind profile in the lowest layers of the atmosphere is greatly influenced by local topography, distribution of water bodies and land ect.

The wind profile in the non-urbane part of Pančevo is under the influence of relatively smooth terrain. In case of break-through of large atmospheric systems – cyclones, the movement above Pančevo is in accordance with the circulation in the system of synoptic scales. At such times a medium to strong wind usually blows. In the urbane part of Pančevo we have increased ruggedness of urbane units that lead to modifications in wind speed and wind direction. Meteorological station in Pančevo doesn’t have anemograph, so all the data about wind are given from the Belgrade observatory. Frequency of winds from various directions for Pančevo – wind rose - is given in

Figure 8.

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Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo

The dominant wind is the south-eastern wind, called Kosava. It is most frequent during autumn, winter and early spring. The least frequent are north-eastern, easterly and south- westerly winds. Southeastern winds are the fastest – higher than 3.5 m/s. Predominant wind mean speed is 2,9 m/sec and annual average wind speed is 2,3 m/sec. Wind speed influences the degree of smoke rise from the chimneys. Higher speeds are favourable for dilution of pollutants from lower sources, but cause smoke rinsing from chimneys in case of high-point sources2. The less frequent winds in Pančevo have the lowest speeds. These winds have a detrimental effect on dispersion of polluting substances from ground sources but enable rising of smoke from high sources to higher altitudes enabling significant dispersion, that is high degree of dilution of emitted polluting substances from higher sources. Air Humidity The mean annual value of relative humidity for the Pančevo region is around 78%, as shown in Table 4. The highest monthly average values are recorded during winter season, in December (88%) and January (88.1%), while the lowest average values are recorded during summer period, in July and August (around 72%). Table 4: Medium monthly and annual values of the air humidity in Pančevo, reduced according to data for Belgrade

J F M A M J J A S O N D Ann.

Mean value 88.1 84.3 76.1 72.0 71.4 73.0 72.7 72.7 75.6 78.1 84.3 88.0 78.0

Maximum 98 94 93 81 83 86 84 86 85 91 94 97 85.5

Year of max. value 1971 1971 1962 1966 1961 2002 2002 1975 1975 1975 1975 1970 1970

Minimum 81 75 62 65 61 56 61 56 63 66 71 79 71.2

Year of min. value 1985 1998 1972 1968 1992 2000 2000 2000 1986 1961 1963 1989 2000

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2.1.3.3 Description of the plant

Activities

Head office of Pancevo Refinery: Address: 26000 PANCEVO, Spoljnostarcevacka b.b. Telephone: + 381 13 310 004 + 381 13 310 Fax: + 381 13 345 255 WWW: http://www.rnp.co.yu Legal status of the company: part of the joint-stock company NIS-Petroleum industry of Serbia Main downstream markets: petrochemical & chemical industry, trading companies within Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) Main export products: liquefied petroleum gases (propane, butane, propylene)

Pancevo Refinery performs the following activities: • Production of petroleum products, thermoelectric power, chemicals and basic chemical products • Storage of crude oil, intermediate products and products • Transportation of crude oil and transport through pipeline • Laboratory analysis and processing • Maintenance of process and other equipment • Development and research services. With the processing capacity of 4.8 million tons per year, it is the biggest factory of this type in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of exporting 20% of its production. Pancevo Refinery has several development projects (to be realized in next three years) in order to reach the level of modern European refineries t three years to complete the following development program: • MHC / HDT - Hydro treatment of FCC batch and diesel which allows reaching the European specifications for gasoline and diesel fuel, increasing diesel production at the expense of motor gasoline and increasing utilization by reducing fuel oil • Sour water stripper, Amine washing and Claus - supporting plants where extracted sulfur is hydro treated and sent to be sale as elementary sulphur • On Line blending - which allows optimal mixing and shortens the time needed for mixing and lower the number of tank • Modernization of facilities for receiving and shipping oil from tanks which includes installation of modern measuring and control equipment and application of technical solutions that enable the reduction of losses and the strict European emission standards. List of commercial products of Pancevo Refinery is given in Table 5 and storage capacities in Table 6. Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery

Commercial Product Standard Code

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Commercial Product Standard Code Gases Propane PN SRPS B.H2.130 Butane BN SRPS B.H2.132 Isobutene IBN PS RNP 36/99 Propane - Butane mixture PBS SRPS B.H2.134 Propylene PLN PS RNP 26/99 Motor gasoline Premium MB 95 SRPS B.H2.220 Unleaded gasoline Premium BMB 95 PS RNP 2/99 Special gasoline Special gasoline 35/105 SB 35/105 SRPS B.H2.267 Special gasoline 60/80 SB 60/80 PS RNP 35/99 Special gasoline 65/95 SB 65/95 SRPS B.H2.267 Special gasoline 65/105 SB 65/105 SRPS B.H2.262 Special gasoline medical SBM Ph.Jug.III Special gasoline 75/130 SB 75/130 SRPS B.H2.268 Special gasoline 80/120 SB 80/120 SRPS B.H2.268 Special gasoline 140/200 SB 140/200 SRPS B.H2.271 Special gasoline - pan 140/200 PAN 140/200 PS RNP 13/99 Aromatics Benzene BZ SRPS B.H2.001 Toluene TL SRPS B.H2.002 Gasoline components Primary gasoline for petrochemical plant PB-PHK PS RNP 37/99 Petroleum Lighting petroleum PO GM SRPS B.H2.310 Jet fuel GM SRPS B.H2.331 EKO EL

Diesel Diesel fuel D1 D1 SRPS B.H2.410/1

Diesel fuel D2 D2 SRPS B.H2.410/1 Euro diesel NSD SRPS B.H2.410/1 EKO 3 diesel

Fuel oil Fuel oil extra light EL PS RNP 3/99 Fuel oil middle S PS RNP 7/99 Bitumen Bitumen for road BIT 200 BIT 200 SRPS U.M3.010 Bitumen for road BIT 60 BIT 60 SRPS U.M3.010 Polymer bitumen PMB 50/90 Other products

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Commercial Product Standard Code Liquid sulfur TS PS RNP 29/99

Table 6: Storage capacities of Refinery

Product m3 Crude oil 200000 YUNA terminal 40000 LPG 5000 Naphtha 100000 Middle distillates 220000 Fuel oil 240000

Organization and responsibilities Organization of the refinery is shown given in Annex 3.

History of the plant Construction years Pančevo Refinery was founded based on the Decision of Executive Board of the National Republic of Serbia on 18 December 1959, under the name – Pančevo Oil Refinery – a company under construction, with the seat in Pančevo, Spoljnostarčevačka bb. The contracts for engineering with the French company “Lummus“ from Paris and for “UOP“- USA license were concluded in March 1964, and the first tank foundation was completed in November 1965In August 1966, equipment worth 7 million pounds started being delivered. This equipment was imported from England, and the first foundation for Atmospheric Distillation AD-1 was laid on 1 March 1967. Installation lasted for 18 months, and the unit was commissioned in September 1968. The first derivatives were dispatched from the Refinery in October, and official commissioning of the Refinery was performed on 14 December 1968. In December, Platforming Unit was commissioned as well, and in 1969, the other units were successively commissioned: two- stage thermal cracking, gas concentration, gasoline redistillation, Merox Unit for LPG, special gasoline and kerosene, aromatics extraction – Udex and HDS of middle distillates.

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Figure 9: Years of construction Commissioning of the first Refinery in this region was successfully conducted with the Refinery's own human resources that had previously been trained according to the program compiled and organized by the Refinery experts. In parallel with the construction of the process units, auxiliary systems and associated facilities were constructed as well: Power Plant, storage tanks, facilities, jetty at the Danube... First Years of Operation Primary processing installed capacity was 1.32 million tons of crude oil per year. The oil for processing mostly arrived by barge – the Danube, and in the first year of operation, 1969, 1.055 million tons was processed. Already in 1970, the jetty was expanded, which made it one of the biggest jetties of that type in the country. In the following 1971, the Refinery processed 1.3 million tons of crude oil – therefore, it operated with full capacity. In that year, based on the increased market demand for the derivatives, the Refinery prepared development and investment program for the Refinery expansion.“Naftagas“ Novi Sad that Refinery was a part of at the time, in 1973 adopted the concept of Refinery development in phases. The Refinery was recognized as a fuel-type refinery for the production of fuels, solvents, bitumen and feed for olefin and paraffin chemistry. This concept covers the supply of fuel to the regional market, supply of the required feed to Petrochemical Complex, construction of Yugoslav pipeline, gasification of the eastern part of Yugoslavia, etc. Capacity was increased immediately, as an inter-phase expansion, until the implementation of the planned phases of development. In 1972, RNP used its own resources to reconstruct the two-stage thermal cracking into atmospheric distillation, thereby increasing the primary processing capacity to approximately 2 million tons per year. First Phase of Expansion For the purpose of developing oil and gas energy sector in SFRY, and for the purpose of developing chemical and petrochemical industry in the eastern part of the country, the first phase of Refinery expansion commenced by constructing a new primary unit of atmospheric distillation 2. This phase of expansion was implemented in accordance with the Contract with Petrochemical Complex in 1972, as a part of joint investment in which Petrochemical Complex provided foreign loans from the east and west, and the Refinery provided the funds in dinars for the customs and other financing within the country. Installation of this unit was started in August 1976. The unit was designed by ICPRP from Ploesti (Romania), and the equipment was also supplied from Romania, and from the west as well. This unit, with the capacity of 3.5 million tons of crude per year, was officially commissioned on 14 December 1979. This increased the Refinery's total installed primary processing capacity to 4.820.000 tons per year. In 1976, Platforming Unit was reconstructed, which increased its capacity by about 65%. Oil Pipeline At the end of 1979, on 22 December, Yugoslav oil pipeline from Omišalj to Pančevo was put into operation. The first quantities of oil were delivered by pipeline to Pančevo in March 1980. The pipeline, with the capacity of 34 million tons per year, connected all Yugoslav refineries at the time, with a branch for the refinery in Lendava (Slovenia) and transit for Hungary and Czechoslovakia. “Naftagas“ Novi Sad, i.e. Pančevo Refinery that was a part of it, was one of the founders and investors of the pipeline construction, and it had its reserved transport capacity of 6 million tons per year. Until the closing of the pipeline, which took place by unilateral decision of Croatian authorities on 6 September 1991, almost all of the crude for Pančevo Oil Refinery's processing needs arrived by that pipeline. From the beginning of its operation, the pipeline transported 34.088.000 tons of crude oil for Pančevo Oil Refinery's requirements. Cessation of crude oil transport by pipeline has not led to Refinery units shut-down. Soon afterwards, a month later, delivery of crude oil was organized by rail and barge on the Danube, as well as by pipeline in the part from Elemir via Novi Sad to Pančevo. The Refinery started using the pipeline once again, after signing the Contract with Croatia, on 18 June 1996. Second Phase of Expansion

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Upon completion of the first phase of expansion and increase in primary processing in the Refinery, it became necessary to build secondary units that provide “deeper“ crude oil processing, i.e. better crude oil yield. Construction of the secondary units was implemented as the second phase of Refinery expansion. However, before that, in 1982, Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen Units were completed and commissioned. Design and equipment for both units were made in USSR. Equipment and material for Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen were financed bythe guarantees of banks from the loan of ex USSR to the Government of SFRY, and the funds in dinars were provided by the Refinery.

Figure 10: Second phase of expansion License and basic engineering for the main unit from the secondary unit complex, Fluid Catalytic Cracking (FCC), were bought from US company TEXACO in 1978. Designs, equipment and materials were bought in the west, by way of loans that the Refinery, with the guarantees from our banks, secured in Great Britain. Construction of secondary units with auxiliary and associated facilities, and adjustments to the existing Refinery system lasted until November 1985, when the main unit was commissioned. The other units from FCC Complex – II phase of expansion (Alkylation, HDS, Merox, etc.) were commissioned in the period from 1985 to 1988. Financing of II phase of expansion, excluding Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen, was carried out by way of western loans for those components that had to be imported. Payments in dinars (customs, transport, insurance, civil works, installation and the like) were effected from the Refinery funds, from the joint investment funds which mostly consisted of extra profit from the production of oil and gas, and with considerable assistance and guarantees from “Privredna banka Pančevo“, “Vojvođanska udružena banka Novi Sad“, “Jugoslovenska investiciona banka Beograd“, “Genex Beograd“, insurance corporations “Insurance company Dunav“ and “Insurance company Novi Sad“, and others. Keeping Pace In the period up to 1990, two-stage thermal cracking was reconstructed into vacuum residue visbreaking, aromatics extraction unit (Sulfolane) was constructed, liquid sulphur production unit (Claus) was commissioned, storage space was expanded, construction of the new water chemical treatment unit, flare gas recovery unit and a new cooling water system was completed. Several facilities were built and reconstructed in the Handling Department (new tank truck loading facility, reconstruction and expansion of API-Separator, in-line blending of refinery products). In Petrochemical Complex battery limits, a joint unit for secondary waste water biological treatment was built.

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By the end of nineties, it was already possible to compare the Refinery with the modern world refineries. The built Refinery units enabled production structure in the ration 80% of white, highly valuable products, to 20 % of black products. Sanctions Security Council introduced at the end of May 1992 sanctions to FR Yugoslavia. Embargo had very serious consequences for the entire Petroleum Industry of Serbia, and thereby for the Refinery as well. Direct damages from embargo are estimated to several billion dollars, and indirect damages, in the form of delayed development, lost profit, and the like, can only be assumed. The last barges with the imported crude oil arrived in Refinery on 18 June 1992, and from that moment on, Refinery was only processing domestic crude oil. Only about one sixth of the available primary processing units were in operation, under the conditions of dinar and foreign currency insolvency, multiple limitations in terms of procurement of spare parts and chemicals, and the like. At the time of embargo, S-100 was in operation, a small primary processing unit, and the average processing capacity was 2.400 tons per day. This unit, before the sanctions, was almost discarded – it was used for occasional processing of slop as well as a spare unit. In 1991, this unit was revitalized and put on stand-by. It proved that the Refinery would not have been able to operate without it during the sanctions. Namely, there was not enough crude oil for the operation of big Atmospheric Distillation Unit. All through the sanctions, S- 100 operated without major shut-downs. During embargo, Platforming, Gas Concentration and Udex with auxiliary units were in function, in addition to S-100. Even in these conditions, continuity of crude oil processing was preserved, while the development was not entirely neglected either. This time was used for reparation of process equipment that had not been in operation, for the preparation of investment and development projects, professional training and education of personnel, development of information system. Because of that, Refinery was ready when the sanctions were lifted: Primary processing units were ready as early as November 1995. Immediately upon the arrival of greater quantities of crude oil, the processing capacity was increased to 8.000 tons per day. In 1996 and 1997, revitalization of all the Refinery units was carried out, and these were successively being put into operation. This is without precedent that a refinery was successfully restarted, after most of its units have been out of operation for almost 4 years. Bombing and reconstruction In the course of seventy-seven days of NATO bombing of Serbia, the Refinery was bombed seven times. The first time it was bombed on 4 April 1999, when the Refinery Power Plant was hit with two missiles. The following attacks took place on 12 April (twice), 13 April, 16 April, 18 April and 7 June. About 60 percent of Refinery units was destroyed, and almost all of the units and facilities were damaged, to a greater or smaller extent. Direct damages from the bombing were estimated to more than 400 million dollars, but considerable indirect damages should be added to the final sum.

Figure 11: Bombing 1999

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Refinery, with its own resources and means, with the employment of domestic contracting companies, started reconstructing the damaged parts right away. In the first phase of reconstruction, in less than three months, overhaul and reparation of the damaged equipment on the major primary processing unit (AD-1) and on some of the units in Block 5 were completed. In Handling Department and Power Plant, units and facilities necessary for the operation of process units, acceptance of crude oil and dispatch of finished products were made operational again. Derivative production was restarted as early as 26 September 1999. The second phase, which implied a future modernization, was commenced right away. Bitumen Production and Vacuum Distillation Units were reconstructed and commissioned. By commissioning Boiler 1 in the Power Plant, Refinery repaired the unit that had been almost completely destroyed. This resulted in the renewal of the Refinery's own generation of steam. The most complex and significant unit for a better crude oil yield in the Refinery, Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCC), started operation on 1 September 2000. In parallel with the reparation, reconstruction and modernization of many units also took place. Some of the most important are as follows: replacement of the old control systems on almost all units with the new ones that are used in EU countries, reconstruction of Vacuum Distillation Unit in accordance with the design by Greek company Asprofos, for the purpose of increasing the yield, improving the bitumen feed quality, more reliable operation and easier unit management. FCC was modernized for the purpose of improving yield, and more reliable and longer operation. Refinery today Pančevo Oil Refinery is significant organizational part of and the biggest oil processing company in NIS-Petrol, which is the biggest branch of shareholding company - Petroleum Industry of Serbia. That is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffinic and aromatic solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur. Primary and secondary units for crude oil processing were constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of various types of crude. With the processing capacity of 4,8 million tons per year, it is the biggest factory of this type in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of exporting 20% of its production. Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge, and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge. Refinery is situated at exceptionally favourable location - 14 kilometers from Belgrade, the biggest consumer center in Serbia. It has its own Jetty on the Danube and pipeline that connects them, also truck loading facilities and railway station with the facilities for derivative dispatch and crude oil acceptance. Top priority for all employees in Pančevo Oil Refinery is crude oil processing and production of sufficient quantities of oil derivatives according to the European standards for domestic requirements and creation of conditions for export, at the same time meeting all environmental standards. That is achieved by constant upgrading of operation process quality, better crude oil yield, power optimization and reduction in production costs, and for that purpose, it has been planned to implement development projects defined in cooperation with the foreign engineering companies (JGC, SHELL, ABB). Particular attention is paid to environmental protection. During units reconstruction from 1999 to 2001, by investing into modernization and overhaul of the existing units, reconstruction and construction of storage tanks and facilities, as well as the preparation of basic designs for the future modernization, environmental component was integrated into the entire production cycle: starting from crude oil storing, derivative production, to derivative dispatch into transport means. Implementation of the planned development technological projects is of common interest both for industrial zone and for Pančevo town as a whole. These projects aim at reaching European standards by restricting and controlling detrimental substance emission into the air, soil and water. 2.1.3.4 Safety of the plant Management system Pancevo Refinery has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO 9001:2000 standard, for all its operations. The system is certified by Lloyd’s Registrar

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Quality Assurance. Internal audits and management reviews are conducted once in a year in accordance with written procedures. Top management has establish policy of improving the quality of products, services and environmental protection, which is achieved in the following manner: • by permanent development of the company, by introducing state-of-the-art technologies and processes in oil processing areas • by delivery of products and services to meet buyers' needs with minimum costs • by delivery of products and services in accordance with the requirements defined by standards and regulations for petroleum industry • by consistent implementation and continuous improvement of designed quality management system, in all operations, by employees • by continuous and planned specialized education of all employees and in accordance with the requirements of modern business activities • by cooperation with scientific research and project organizations, regarding product and process development projects • by motivation of employees and improvement of working conditions • by establishing and maintaining the documented environmental management system, in accordance with the requirements of ISO 14000:2004 standard. Environmental Protection Policy consists of the following: Pančevo Oil Refinery, being the biggest oil processing company in the Republic of Serbia, for the purpose of its long-term successful business activities and assurance of sustainable development, within its business policy, places considerable emphasis on systematic approach to the environmental protection improvement activities. For that purpose Pančevo Oil Refinery performs the following: • introduces the environmental protection policy, programs and practice into every activity, as an important element of managing all business operations. • Identifies all environmental aspects and puts under control the important ones. • Operates in accordance with the environmental protection laws and regulations. • Pursues permanent improvement in environmental protection. • Systematically reduces detrimental substance emission into the surroundings (air, water, soil), saves resources and energy, minimizes use of detrimental substances and the quantity of dangerous waste. • Minimizes the possibility of detrimental effect on the environment by preventive measures and the measures to be taken in case of an accident. • Increases employees’ awareness of environmental protection significance, by constant education and professional training, as well as by providing information in a timely and proper manner. • Develops cooperation with the institutions of local and communal self-government, responsible for environmental protection, as well as with all other interested parties. • Procures products not having or having minimum effect on the environment, and induces suppliers to actively apply all the environmental protection measures, including application of ISO 14001 in their business activities. Safety Management System is a part of quality and environment management system and includes some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for Health, Safety and Environment issues is Risk Management division. Critical situations, preparation for emergency situations The Pancevo Refinery has for many years a fire protection plan, made according to the requirements of fire protection regulation in Serbia. Existing plan prescribes in details the behavior of workers in the event of fire and have been made for the following cases: • protection plan for unplanned production stop • fire protection plan o technological preventive plan o fire distinguishing tactical plan In 2009 Pancevo Refinery has developed a risk assessment of chemical accidents separately for all relevant production and technological units. Based on this, protection plan in the case

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of chemical accidents was developed on the level of production units as well as for the whole plant. Elements of the plan are: • Forces and assets of the Plan • Scheme for response to accident • Training and education program • Control program • Other instructions and information. Total number of employees in the refinery is 1625. Qualification structure of employees is given in Table 7 and number of employees in different section in

Table 8. Maximum concentration of employees in first shift during working days is given in Table 9. General Plan of Refinery Pancevo is given in Annex 1, map in scale of 1:2000, within which are listed and identified the process unit and storage. The specific plans for individual facilities are included in the vChapter V of the report. Table 7: Qualification structure of employees in Pancevo Refinery

Number of Qualification employees PhD 1 MSc 1 BSc 202 College 68 Highly skilled 201 High-school 953 Skilled 137 Elementary school 3 Semiskilled 3 Unskilled 56

Table 8: Number of employees in Pancevo Refinery by type of work

Number of Occasional Permanent Office work Unit / Section employees work in work in field field Production 404 254 50 100 Power plant 108 88 10 10 Manipulation 218 Maintenance 286 286 Laboratory 124 10 114 Research and 65 65 investment HSE 114 ICT 33 Other (headquarter, 237 273 finance, commercial affairs)

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Total: 1625

Table 9: Maximum concentration of employees, first shift

Number of Location employees

Headquarter 441

Mashing workshop 227

Block V building 69

S-2100 and S-2200 building 29

FCC building 82

S-3600 building 17

S-0250 building 18

Power plant and HPV 57

Laboratory 126

HSE building 35

Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards Preventive, organizational measures Fire will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed in 2007. An internal professional fire brigade is located in Block VI. 73 people are working there and 68 are fire fighters. The available equipment is described in Annex 5. The advantage is a very short alarm period for rescue operation. Nevertheless in the case of a major accident the fire brigade will also be addressed by the accident and will not be able to perform the rescue operations. Rescue and emergency plans are under construction and do not exist at the moment. This will be done by Risk Management division. Preventive, constructional measures The surface is brick earth covered with concrete. The level of underground water is about one meter deep and will probably be affected by an accident. Therefore all tanks are build in basins. A drainage system exists for fire extinguishing water. A new project is running at the moment with the objective to separate normal water and waste water in different drainage systems. The maintaining department has developed a plan of fire water retention. Technical measures Due to the requirements of the national laws every three years the safety valves will be maintained and controlled. The electrical department has developed an electrical emergency supply system. A monitoring system has been build up in 2006 and it is managed by the HSE department and is just in the testing phase. The waste management and classification will be done by Risk Management department. The waste will be handled by a contractor. Measures to mitigate an accident The intended major maintenance period is every three years. In reality at the moment there is a major maintenance shut down per year as the process has been modified to increase the efficiency of the process. The modification can partly lead to erosion and corrosion. This has to be controlled at the moment by a yearly inspection.

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The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU regulations. It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented. The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department. No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are underground. Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About 10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has been addressed by lightning. The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an external party. Internal communication will be done by phone, radio and mobile phone. 2.1.4 Novi Sad refinery 2.1.4.1 General data Novi Sadl Refinery (Figure 12) belongs to NIS Petrol which is, further, an organizational part of the joint stock company - Petroleum Industry of Serbia, NIS a.d. It is a refinery with mostly western manufacture and origin technology and equipment dating from '70s and '80s. In 1980s it was upgraded to 3.000.000 t/year hydro skimming refinery with two distillation trains, one for domestic naphthenic, low suphur, crude and other for imported paraffinic crudes. Storage capacity was 677.000 m3. Products were LPG, gasoline, diesel, heating oil, fuel oils, lube oils and other special products. On December 31, 1991 RNS became a part of the public company with certain rights and liabilities in terms of legal transactions and continued business activities within NIS – Petroleum Industry of Serbia, as Novi Sad Oil Refinery, a part of the company for production of petroleum products. It produces nowadays different types of fuels as well as raw materials for basic lubes and bitumen.

The refinery itself and its headquarter is located on the following address: NIS-Petrol Novi Sad Refinery Put Sajkaskog odreda 1 21000 Novi Sad

Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad

2.1.4.2 Location description

Macro location Novi Sad Refinery is situated about 1 km away from the town Novi Sad and about 80 km from Belgrade, on the left bank of the Danube River. Novi Sad is located in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina (Figure 13 and Figure 14), with land area of 699 km², while on the city's official site, land area is 702 km²; and the urban area is 129.7 km². The city lies on the river Danube and one small section of the Danube-Tisa-Danube Chanel.

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Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad The territory of Novi Sad covers an area of 21506 km 2 and its coordinates are 45º 19’ North geographic latitude and 19º 51’ East geographic longitude. Novi Sad's landscape is divided into two parts; one is situated in the Bačka region and another in the Syrmia region. The river Danube is a natural border between them. Bačka's side of the city lies on one of the southern lowest parts of Pannonia Plain, while Fruška Gora's side (Syrmia) is a horst mountain.

Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery Alluvial plains along Danube are well formed, especially on the left bank, in some parts 10 km from the river. A large part of Novi Sad lies on terrace deposit with an elevation of 80-83 m. The northern part of Fruška Gora is composed of massive landslide zones, but they are

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not active, except in the Ribnjak neighborhood (between Sremska Kamenica and Petrovaradin. Refinery Novi Sad (NIS-RNS) is located in the economic zone of the city of Novi Sad - North 4. This zone is foreseen for building large commercial facilities and covers area of 1735 hectares. Refinery itself covers about 256 hectares of industrial space. The site is in north- eastern part of the city of Novi Sad, south the site flows channel Danube-Tisa-Danube, while on the north side is the street Put Šajkaškog odreda, the road for settlement Shanghai (distance about 2 km). On the west side of the refinery are main storage are of NIS NAFTAGAS-TRAFFIC with installations for filling oil and petroleum products. On the south side are the production plants and warehouses, factories for the production of artificial fertilizers "AGROHEM. On the north-west side is located filling stations with storage tanks for liquid petroleum gas. Distance from the bottling and storage space is about 250 meters. Along the east side lie the pipeline installation. This site has convenient traffic conditions. On the north side of the refinery site is a highway E-7 (Belgrade - Novi Sad - Subotica) while on the west side is the main road M-7 (Backa Palanka - Novi Sad - Zrenjanin). On the south side are lying waterways, the river Danube and Novi Sad channel Savino Selo.

Micro location Novi Sad Refinery is a complex of process and auxiliary facilities for processing crude oil, storage facilities, transportation and manipulation utilities, research and laboratory space and other supporting facilities. In the north part of the refinery there are pipeline installations. Refinery is fenced and secured, and the only access is possible from the street Put Šajkaškog odreda where entrance gates are locating enabling access to the refinery from the road. Inside the area of Novi Sad Refinery are located 13 production, manipulation and storage units, including necessary infrastructure. General plan of the refinery is given on Annex and list of units in Table 10. There are two main production lines in RNS:

• lube oil and bitumen line and • fuel production line.

Table 10: List of units in Novi Sad Refinery

Unit Unit ID Specification Storage and manipulation Storage area with related equipment

Manipulation piping-product lines-crude oil piping with related equipment Pump station in storage area and manipulation Additives Systems

Blow down System with piping

Transport and delivery Ponton 1 and Ponton

Oil Rail Ramp

Wagon Filling Station - Section 69

Ramp for refine products loading

Auto Filling Station

Wagon Filling Station - LPG

Half-industrial unit 1000 Half-industrial unit

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Unit Unit ID Specification Water preparation 02-0100 Water surge and related equipment

0200 HPV

Cooling towers 65 Fire water preparation system

Steam production and distribution of steam and gas Technological water production Boiler 0300 Section Steam and condensate unit – reduction 30 station Waste water treatment Stream, natural gas, refine gas, fuel oil 53 distribution Flare Flare system with related piping and KRB-400 equipment U-2100 Atmospheric distillation with stabilization U-2200 Vacuum distillation Fuel - secondary U-2300> Hydro treating with related tank T-1 U-2400 Plat forming unit with related tank T-2 U-2500 LPG production with tanks U-2600 Unibon unit-Desulphurization U-2700 Supporting systems U-5800 Sulphide water treatment units U-4500 Instrumental air production unit Lube oil 1 U-100 Atmospheric distillation U-200 Vacuum distillation

Lube oil 2 HF-400 Hydro finishing

HFH-400 Hydrogen production unit

KR-500 Sour refining with Gurdon>

U-550 Percolation with re-distillation of gasoline

Bitumene production Bitumen production with raw materials U-300 storage tanks (G10 i V1 do V6) Re-treatment and delivery with products tanks (VT1 do VT9) U-900 Supporting systems (hot oil system)

Novolin Oil blending with piping and pump stations Tanks area of profit centre Novolin

Meteorological, geological and other data Climate

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Novi Sad has a moderate continental climate, with four seasons. Autumn is longer than spring, with long sunny and warm periods. Winter is not so severe, with an average of 22 days of sub-zero temperature. January is the coldest month, with an average temperature of -1.9 °C. Spring is usually short and rainy, while summer arrives abruptly. The coldest temperature ever recorded in Novi Sad was -30.7°C (-19.3°F) on January 24, 1963; and the hottest temperature ever recorded was 41.5°C (110.7°F) on July 6, 1950. Average temperatures are given inTable 11. The southeast-east wind Košava, which blows from the Carpathians and brings clear and dry weather, is characteristic of the local climate. It mostly blows in autumn and winter, in 2-3 days intervals. The average speed of Košava is 25-43 km per hour but certain strokes can reach up to 130 km/h. In winter time, followed by a snow storm, it can cause snowdrifts. Also it can cause temperatures to drop to around -30°C. Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia)

Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year

Avg. 2.5 5.7 11.5 17.2 22.5 25.2 27.2 27.2 23.7 18 10.3 4.5 16.3 high °C (36) (46) (57) (67) (76) (81) (85) (85) (77) (68) (54) (44) (65) (°F)

Avg low -4.4 -2.3 1.2 5.8 10.6 13.6 14.7 14.2 11.2 6.3 2.2 -1.9 5.9 °C (°F) (29) (32) (38) (46) (55) (60) (62) (62) (56) (47) (40) (33) (47) Rainfall 38 35 41 47 57 82 61 55 36 35 46 44 577 mm (1.5) (1.4) (1.6) (1.8) (2.2) (3.2) (2.4) (2.2) (1.4) (1.4) (1.8) (1.7) (22.7 (in.) )

Winds The presence of winds opposites directions is characteristic of this region (Figure 14). Most dominant winds are from two different directions; south-east (18.2%) and north-west direction (17%). The third kind of wind is western and the least one which can be seen on this area is Sothern wind. These winds are characterizing the whole Pannonia Basin. The dominant south-east wind KOSAVA is blowing from December to March, in winter part of the year. North-west wind is dominating from June to September, in summer part of the year. The calm weather without the wind is mostly presented in June, July, August and September. Strength of the wind is between 0,81 – 1,31 m/s.

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Table 12: Novi Sad region - Frequency of the winds Air humidity Relative humidity of the air in the Novi Sad region is about 70 to 80 %. During a year it decreases with temperature increase. The lowest humidity is in summers and the highest in winters. Average yearly humidity is 76% and it is identical to relative air humidity in the whole Vojvodina. Cloudiness and sun Cloudiness mostly follows the movement of the relative air humidity. The most cloudy, 7.8/10 of the sky, is in February, and the smallest in August, 3.9 (Table 13). The average value in a year is 5.7/10 of the sky. The sun shins 2080.2 hours in a year. The sunniest month is July, with average 279.5 hours; the shortest is in December with only 51 hours of sun. Data for seasons are: springtime 413.3 hours, summer 837.7, autumn 479.7 and in winters only 247.8 hours. The average number of days with fog in a year is 31.5, and average monthly maximum is 19.8 days (mostly December, less in January). The average maximum number of days with fog in a year is 56.8 and the minimum is 13 days. Table 13: Average value of cloudiness in sky/10

J F M A M J J A S O N D Ann.

Novi Sad 7.1 7.8 6.2 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.4 3.9 4.2 4.7 7.1 7.7 5.7

Bodies of water and flooding In the region of Novi Sad underground waters, deep on up to 300 m and not so deep one, are of big importance. In the alluvial water regime is directly depending on Danube river. High underground water show important amplitudes, while the deep underground waters show higher stability. On the lower parts of the alluvial valley the underground waters come the surface and flood it.

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On the loess terrace the level of the underground water rises from October to April. Oscillations are within 1 to 1.5 m, while the deepness is mostly more then 4 m. Freatske water are high polluted. Not treated waste water go to the open sewage line, cricks from the mountain Fruska Gora and drain to the underground, to the not deep water layers which are use for individual or public water supply. All human facilities in Backa and partly Novi Sad are drained using open channels. Areas of seismic activities In the region seismic activities are possible with intensity 6 - 8 MCS. On location of Novi Sad Refinery possible earthquake with intensity of 7 MCS. Geological and hydrological characteristiques Environment of Novi Sad is characterized by presence of two different morphological units: Fruska Gora mountain and the Pannonian basin. Their genesis is related to strong orogenic movements with the participation of deflection. Fruska Gora is an area of erosion, and the Pannonian plain area reservoirs (lake sediments, les, sand) and erosion (alluvial plain). Novi Sad Refinery lies on the oldest alluvial carbonate coat that is sandy clay and to some extent consolidated. In the area of Novi Sad shallow groundwater and deeper ones, up to 300m are of the great importance. The water level in alluvial area is directly related to the water level of the Danube. High groundwater show significant amplitude, in contrast to the deep groundwater, which show greater stability. Wastewater is directly discharged in an open canal network, creeks of Fruska Gora and further drained in underground, in the shallow water-bearing layers, which are used for individual and public water supply. The entire area is Refinery fill-reflux sand thickness from 1:50-2.00m. Flora, fauna and protected natural and cultural properties Natural advantages for plant species in the area of Novi Sad and surrounding are not the same. They are primarily caused by differences in relief, the differences in the amount of underground water, in geological and pedological soil composition, anthropogenic influence and other factors. Biographical characteristics of the area corresponding to the rim of the Pannonia regions. Observing the physical and geographical distribution of fauna, flora observed the following characteristic areas: • region of Bačka with complex agro eco systems • region of Fruška gora with complex forest • Fruska Gora Prigorje with cultural landscape and • Danubian region under the jack forests and flood meadows. Distinctive forest vegetation of Fruska gora, plant communities loessial.plateau, vegetation of the Danube alluvial plains, wetlands and meadow vegetation and anthropogenic forest are developed. On the location of Novi Sad Refinery there are no rare or endangered plant and animal species, nor particularly valuable plant communities. Within the refinery, among certain sections of reservoirs, installation, related facilities and internal roads, there is no other vegetation except grass cover and low trees around the administration building. According to the Office for Protection of no registered archaeological sites in the observed area.

Population Novi Sad iis Serbia's second-largest city, after Belgrade. In its most recent official census from 2002, the city had an urban population of 216,583, while its municipal population was 299,294. But according to the data from April 2010, the city had an urban population of 286,157, while its municipal population was 372,999. Shanghai, nearby village, occupies an area of 13 ha, and lives about 1,600 inhabitants. 2.1.4.3 Description of the plant

Activities The main activities in Novi Sad refinery are:

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• production of derivates, thermalpower energy, chemicals and basic chamical products • public transportation by rail, road and river • laboratory analysis and services • research - development services • public storage. Characteristics of key units in the refinery are given Table 14. Novi Sad Refinery produces up to 2.5 million tons of crude per year. There are two main production lines in the refinery: • lube oil and bitumen line and • fuel production line. Table 14: Key units in Novi Sad Refinery - characteristics

Capacity Constructe Unit License (t/year) d Atmospheric Distillation AT-500 Pritchard 500.000 1968 Atmospheric distillation I Naphtha Stabilization USSR 2.000.000 1985 U-2100 Vacuum Distillation U-2200 USSR 1.200.000 1985 Naphtha Hydro treating U-2300 UOP (TPL) 560.000 1985 Platforming U-2400 UOP (TPL) 430.000 1985 Gas treatment (LPG) U-2500 UOP (TPL) 60.000 1985 HDS Unibon (Kerosine /VGO) U-2600 UOP (TPL) 240.000 1985 Atmospheric Distillation U-100 Badger 500.000 1974 Vacuum Distillation U-200 Badger 550.000 1974 Bitumen Badger 200.000 1974 Hydro finishing U-400 Texaco 240.000 1981 Acid Treatment U-500 Texaco 89.000 1985 Lube Oil Blending, Filling and Packaging Texaco 56.000 1981

Substances present in the refinery are listed in Annex 6.

Organization and management system Organization of Novi Sad Refinery is presented in Annex 7. Quality management and environmental management systems are certified. Specification of responsibilities based on certified management systems is given in

History of the plant Novi Sad Refinery was established in 1968 as an Operating unit within a bigger company named: Petroleum industry ''Naftagas''. The planned capacity was 500,000 t/ year. Nowadays available capacity of the refinery is 2.500.000 t/year and the storage capacity is 410.000 m3 m. In 1972 it is adopted Development Basis for Novi Sad Refinery for the period of 10 years. The following courses of further development were adopted: • development of production of all types of lube oils and bitumen (program ''Lube Oil Plant'' which was effectuated through phases Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II) and • fuel production development (''Fuel Plants'' program). Lube oil and bitumen production was effectuated through phases (Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II).

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First phase of Lube Oil Plant I program in 1973 involved construction of the following production units: • Atmospheric Distillation Unit (500.000 t/y) • Vacuum Distillation Unit (550.000 t/y) • Bitumen Production Unit (160.000 t/y). In 1975 realization of the most elaborate RNS program, called Fuel II Plant was started parallel with the commencement of Yugoslav pipeline construction, the founder of which, amongst others, was RNS. Fuel II Plant Process Units involved construction of following production units: 1. Primary Process Units with • Atmospheric Distillation unit, capacity 2.000.000 t/y • Gasoline Stabilization Unit, capacity 580.000 t/y • Vacuum Distillation Unit, capacity 1.200.000 t/y 2. Secondary Process Units with • Hydro Treating Unit, capacity 500.000 t/y • Platforming Unit, capacity 430.000 t/y • HDC Unibon, capacity 230.000 t/y • LPG Processing Unit, capacity 66.000 t/y In 1976 Atmospheric Distillation Unit, Vacuum Distillation Unit and Bitumen Production Unit (Lube Oil Plant I program) were commissioned. Second phase of Lube Oil Plant II program involved construction of the following production units: • Hydro Finishing Unit (240.000 t/y) • Acid Treatment Unit (80.000 t/y) • Lube Oil Blending Unit (56.000 t/y). 1979 Fuel II Plant process units construction was started and 1980 Lube Oil Blending Plant was constructed and started up. 1981 Start-up of Hydrofinishing Unit and other accompanying units. 1984 Fuel II Plant program Primary Process Units were started up with the delivery of the first quantity of imported crude oil via Yugoslav pipeline 1986 Fuel II Plant program Secondary Process Units were started up. 2.1.4.4 Safety of the plant Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards Preventive measures There is no major maintenance period as the different establishment is only running between 20% and 50% or their normal capacity (missing feed). The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU regulations. Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year. Gas installations will also be inspected if the duration of the shut down period is more than one month. Preventive constructional measures No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are underground. Preventive technical measures Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to some initial fires (each time fire on the top of a column). This part is also protected by earthing. In general the normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection measure earthing is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and continuity will be done. Additional measures Internal communication will be done by radio, phone and mobile phone. Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident

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The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. Evacuation training has been only done for parts of the establishment. Rescue and emergency plans has been establishment now. Sub contractors have to pass training (fire protection and workplace safety) and to do an exam. There is only one drainage system for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The fire water retention (shown in Error! Reference source not found.) will be done by hydrants connected to basins. Fire extinguishing by foam can be down by fire brigade. An automatic gas detection system does not exist. A fire detection will be done by optical control. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not exist. A system for automatic cooling of the tanks. Fires will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed last year. An alarm plan in the establishment exist. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will be informed by radio to leave the establishment. Operating Fire fighting unit within the Fire protection Service is located on two locations on refinery territory. Staffing of the unit, 82 persons, is designed by the Plan of Fire protection of OD RNS, and approved by MUP of Serbia. Actually there are 69 persons working in this unit, as shown in Table 1. Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of Novi Sad refinery

Position taken Working position Planned Workers of Workers of Total the refinery subcontractors number Manager of operating 1 - - - unit of fire brigade Chief of operating unit 1 - - - of fire brigade Shift leader of operating unit of fire 10 9 - 9 brigade Fireman, department 16 13 - 13 leader Driver, fireman 16 10 10 20 Fireman, operator 25 7 9 16 UKUPNO 69 39 19 58

Equipment and utilities of Firefighting unit are shown in Table 16. Table 16: Firefighting equipment

Mobile equipment Type Capacity Mercedes VP 33/43 6000/6000 Mercedes VPS 26/36 4000/5000/1000 Vehicles Mercedes VPS 26/32 4000/5000/1000 FAP S 2x2000 4000 TAM – Technical vehicle - Rosenbauer 3 pcs Ziegler 1pc Motor pumps Honda 5 pcs Flight – floating pump 2 pcs

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Mobile equipment Type Capacity Turbine vacuum pump 2 pcs stabile 14 pcs Fire extinguish monitors Mobile 4 pcs

Beside the above mentioned mobile equipment, operating firefighting brigade has the following multipurpose equipment: - fire extinguishers ( type S-6A, S-9A, S-25A, S-50A, CO2-5, CO2-10 ) - suction and discharge pipes (Ø52 mm, Ø75 mm, Ø110 mm ) - water/foam nozzles - manifolds / collectors - mixers for foam - vatrogasne armature - insulation facilities - personal protection equipment (suits for fire approaching, suits for entering into fire, fire helmets Systems for storage area extinguishing and cooling The refinery is provided with ring hydrant net with over 500 hydrants, as well as hydrant facility for continual maintenance of water pressure in hydrant net. Firefighting system is separated in 5 stations with suitable capacity of firefighting substances and utilities (motor and electrical pumps, regulating equipment…). The reason for this separation is the size of refinery. There are following stations: • Stara vatrogasnica • MIX-stanica • Mešaona Blending benzina • Terminal JP „Transnafta“ • Mešaona Goriva II Table 17 shows means for fire extinguishing and capacities. Table 17: Available fire extinguishing means

Means Capacity Available 73.000 liters + 92.700 liters Storage tanks for “Polifilm” 75.000 liters (reserve) Powder “Monex” 15.125 kg Firefighting water tanks 10.000 liters 10.000 liters

Almost all tanks are provided with stabile firefighting and cooling systems. Fire protection of Lube oil I and Lube oil II units These units are provided with ring hydrant net, stable and mobile monitors, as well as with numerous fire fighting devices of different types. A fire on process units segments is extinguished from station „MIX-stanica“, with additional water pressure provision from station „Stara vatrogasnica“ (and if necessary from Mešaone - Goriva II). Station „MIX- stanica“ is equipped with two tanks with extracte for fire extinguish, each with capacity of 16 m3, pumps and devices for extracted mixture, as well as with the piping for emulsion distribution for fire extinguish on of process unit segments and related storage area. The whole refinery is connected with Fire alarms system, with 24 hours service on both locations. 2.1.4.5 Description of processes Main units in Lube oil part of Novi Sad refinery are:

• Gasoline Stabilization Unit, with capacity of 580.000 t/y

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• Vacuum Distillation Unit (U 200), with capacity of 1.200.000 t/y • Hydro finishing Unit, with capacity of 240.000 t/y • Acid Treatment Unit, with capacity of 80.000 t/y • Lube Oil Blending Unit, with capacity of 56.000 t/y

For the analysis within the project, units U 100 and U 200 are considered.

Atmospheric distillation unit, U 100 U-100 processes domestic crude oil Velebit and Kelebija, with capacity of 1500 t/day. Both crude oil are naphtha origin. Atmospheric distillation unit consists of following connected section: • desalter section • heating section • atmospheric distillation section. The main products are: • Gasolin • Kerosene • Atmospheric gas oi • Light residue. Simplified diagram showing process parameters is given in Annex 9. Operation of U 100 is described in Process and operation book Job No BN-5010, 1975 Badger B.V. and in the project for reconstruction of the unit Industroprojekt Zagreb. There are specific operation instruction for heater HF 101, desalter and process pumps. Available related drawings are:

• PI diagrams: DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107A, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107B, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107C, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107D, rev.8, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107E, rev.7< • Process flow diagrams: S-3941-100-04D-01, rev. • Mechanical scheme: B-3941-100-06D-01, rev.

A detailed description of U 100 is given in the documentation of Quality management system, in Q6P.U1.01 – Postupak rada atmosferskog postrojenja U 100 (Operational procedure of Atmospheric unit U 100). Table 18 lists materials used in process and their basic characteristics in relation to the toxicity, health and environment. More details about each substance may be found in safety data sheet. Table 18: Dangerous substances in U 100

Effect to the Environment Physical Name Name Quantity (t) health effect properties Raw Crude oil Cancerous Water organism 200.000 material

Product Flammable Crude gasoline Cancerous Water organism 2.200 liquid

Flammable Kerosene Cancerous Water organism 16.000 liquid

Flammable Gas oil Cancerous Water organism 41.200 liquid Flammable Atmospheric residue Cancerous Water organism 140.600 liquid

By-product -

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Effect to the Environment Physical Name Name Quantity (t) health effect properties Chemicals No data Sodium hydroxide Irritant corrosive available Irritant, Risky for water Deemulgator Potential stable organism cancerous Irritant, Anticorrosion Harmful for Dangerous to corrosive inhibitor water organism drink Ammonium Very toxic for Toxic, Irritant Toxic hydroxide water organism

From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present: H2S in waste gas, SO2 – in flue gas

Vacuum distillation unit, U 200 Vacuum distillation unit U 200 treats atmospheric residue of crude oil Velebit, Kelebija and imported crude oil. Products are: • vacuum gas oil • VD-1 • VD-2 • VD-3 • VD-4 • paraffin’s slop, • heavy residue. Vacuum section consists of the following connected units: • Heating section, • Distillation section, • Vacuum group, • Tempered water section, • Fuel oil section. The unit is connected with the following organizational units: • Production: o Atmospheric distillation U 100 o Bitumen Blowing section – unit 300 (compression station), • Other organizational sections o Technological preparation section o Power plant o Laboratory o Storage area and re-treatment and o Maintenance. Simplified diagram showing process parameters is given in Annex 10 .Detail description of the unit is given in the documentation of quality management system, Q6P.U2.01 – Postupak rada vacuum postrojenja U 200 (Operational procedure of the unit U 200). Table 19 lists materials used in process and their basic characteristics in relation to the toxicity, health and environment. More details may be found in safety data sheet.

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Table 19: Dangerous substances in U 200

Effect to the Environment Physical Quantity Category Name health effect properties (t) Flammable Raw material Atmospheric residue Cancerous Water organism 160.000 liquid

Flammable Vacuum gas oil Cancerous Water organism 12.000 liquid Flammable VD1 Cancerous Water organism 13.000 liquid

Flammable VD2 Cancerous Water organism 20.000 liquid Flammable Product VD3 Cancerous Water organism 20.000 liquid Flammable VD4 Cancerous Water organism 20.000 liquid Flammable Paraffin’s slop Cancerous Water organism 15.000 liquid Flammable Vacuum residue Cancerous Water organism 60.000 liquid

By-product

Irritant, Anticorrosion Harmful for dangerous to corrosive inhibitor water organism Chemical drink

Neutralizer

From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present H2S in waste gas and SO2 given in U 100 while they have the common chimney. 2.1.5 Elemir Gas refinery 2.1.5.1 General data Elemir Refinery is a gas-type refinery which produces natural gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and gasoline. It is designed by J.F. PRICHAR & COMPANY, 4625 ROANOKE PARKWAU, CANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, USA and delivered by EDWIN & COMPANY (OLDBURY) LIMITED BIRMINGHAM ENGLAND Desing-Engineering Job No IN-1776. The refinery is located in Elemir and was commissioned in 1963. The natural gas from fields Mokrin, Srpska Crnja and Rusanda is a main feed for Refinery and the main products are: • Propane, 45 t/day • n-Butane, 34 t/day • isobutene, 38 t/day • Debutanizer gasoline, 60 t/day • Process oil, 5 t/day and • Gasoline, Gt 4,2 t/day. 2.1.5.2 Location description

Micro location of the refinery Elemir Refinery is located 3 km north-east from small town Elemir and 10 km from the town Zrenjanin in Vojvodina and belongs to Srednje-banatski province (see Figure 15 and Figure 16 for location of Zrenjanin in Serbia and location of Elemir). Zrenjanin Municipality covers 1.324 km2, out of which 112.340 ha is agricultural area and 1.392 ha are under forest. The Zrenjanin region has 22 inhabited locations with total approximately 132.051 inhabitants.

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Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia Elemir Refinery lays down on 42ha, it is the flat area and the wider surrounding is basin. The closest houses are in the area of 1km. The closes industrial facilities are: NIS Petrol storage area, HIP Petrohemija – Factory of syntactic cauchuck, filling station and distribution unit of LPG of NIS TNG a.d, and main regulating node for natural gas transportation GRČ Elemir JP Srbijagas. Map of roads is shown on Figure 17. In the close environment it could be between 100 to 500 people. There are no public buildings, schools or hospitals in the surrounding.

Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir

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Figure 17: Map of roads

Micro location of Elemir Gas refinery General plan of the refinery is given on including position of each unit or building within the refinery.

Legend:

1. Process unit 4. Separator 7. Control room 2. Process furnace 5. Workshop 8. Boiler 3. Compressor unit 6. Generator building 9. Storage area

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10. Main building 17. Low flare 24. Washing area 11. Tanks for process oil 18. Water preparation unit 25. Cooling towers 12. Trafo station 19 Earth laguna 26. Spare parts storage 13. Production tanks 20. Separator of oil water 27. Firefighting water retention 14. Filling station for tracks 21. Workshop 28. Main gate 15. Firefighting center 22. Storage of auxiliary fluids 16. Laboratory 23. Technical gases storage

Geological, meteorological and other data Air temperature In the winter period the cold air from north causes significant decrease of temperature, while the cold air from Carpathian brings dry, windy and cold weather. In springs southwest flows are dominant causing temperature increase. On east, northeast and southeast cold air appears mostly in the cold part of the year. Table 3 and Table 4 show statistical data on metro parameters in Zrenjanin region in the period 1991 to 2004. In summers cold air from the north causes bad weather and storms. Cold air is getting fast worm from the earth and transforms in continental warm air. In June, when southwest winds blow in high region, the cold air spread in Pannonia, the weather development ends up with storms. Table 20: Statistical data on monthly weather parameters for Zrenjanin region

JAN FEB MAR APR MAJ JUN JUL AVG SEP OKT NOV DEC

Tsr(°С) 0.3 2.0 6.5 11.7 17.5 20.8 22.3 22.3 16.8 11.9 6.3 0.8 Tx(°С) 3.3 6.6 12.2 17.3 23.4 26.7 28.3 28.9 23.1 17.7 10.3 3.8 Tn(°С) -2.5 -2.0 1.7 6.4 11.4 14.7 16.0 16.1 11.6 7.3 3.0 -1.9 ApsTx(°С) 17.7 20.2 27.7 30.1 33.5 38.0 38.7 38.7 34.2 30.0 23.6 14.9 ApsTn(°С) -24.6 -17.9 -12.6 -6.7 -0.2 6.0 6.5 7.2 2.2 -8.6 -10.5 -23.1 b.d.mraz 20.9 17.6 11.2 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 8.2 19.1 b.d.trops. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 7.4 11.8 12.6 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 U(%) 84 76 67 66 63 65 65 64 71 75 80 85 SS(h) 65.9 120.6 164.3 187.4 251.4 285.4 287.3 284.4 204.0 158.1 89.1 58.6 b.d.vedrih 2.9 5.9 5.4 4.2 5.6 6.5 9.1 11.9 6.0 6.2 4.1 2.8 b.d.tmurnih 14.7 8.4 7.6 8.9 6.4 4.3 4.1 3.8 5.6 6.9 12.0 16.0 RR(mm) 34.3 24.1 26.1 45.9 51.0 81.9 66.5 39.3 62.2 51.5 52.8 50.4 maxRR(mm) 30.7 20.4 22.9 30.4 52.5 62.5 72.3 49.1 60.0 45.9 47.5 44.2 rr>0.1(mm) 10.9 8.7 8.8 11.4 11.4 11.7 10.2 7.7 11.0 8.9 10.8 11.8 rr>10(mm) 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.0 2.5 1.7 1.2 2.0 1.1 1.8 1.3 b.d.sneg 5.0 5.3 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 5.1 b.d.s.p. 11.3 7.6 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 8.4 b.d.grad 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather parameters for Zrenjanin region

GOD PRO LET JES ZIM VEG

Tsr(°С) 11.6 11.9 21.8 11.7 1.0 17.6 Tx(°С) 16.8 17.6 28.0 17.0 4.6 23.6 Tn(°С) 6.8 6.5 15.6 7.3 -2.1 11.9 ApsTx(°С) 38.7 ApsTn(°С) -24.6

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b.d.mraz 82.0 13.5 0.0 10.9 57.6 5.0 b.d.trops. 35.7 2.0 31.8 1.9 0.0 35.7 U(%) 72 65 65 75 82 67 SS(h) 2156.5 603.1 857.1 451.2 245.1 1658.0 b.d.vedrih 70.6 15.2 27.5 16.3 11.6 49.5 b.d.tmurnih 98.7 22.9 12.2 24.5 39.1 40.0 RR(mm) 586.0 123.0 187.7 166.5 108.8 398.3 maxRR(mm) 72.3 rr>0.1(mm) 123.3 31.6 29.6 30.7 31.4 72.3 rr>10(mm) 16.0 3.0 5.4 4.9 2.7 10.8 b.d.sneg 19.9 2.5 0.0 2.0 15.4 0.5 b.d.s.p. 31.8 1.6 0.0 2.9 27.3 0.1 b.d.grad 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.9

Legend:

Tsr (°С) air average temperature (°С) Tx (°С) average max. air temperature (°С) Tn (°С) average minimal air temperature (°С) ApsTx (°С) absolute max air temperature (°С) ApsTn (°С) absolute minimal air temperature (°С) b.d.mraz number of ice days Tn< 0°C b.d.trops. number of tropical days Tx≥30°C U (%) relative air humidity u % SS (h) sunshine in hours b.d. vedrih number of clear days b.d. tmurnih number of sunshade days RR (mm) precipitation (mm) maxRR(mm) daily max. precipitation (mm) rr>0.1(mm) number of days with precipitation ≥ 0.1 mm rr>10(mm) number of days with precipitation ≥10.0 mm b.d.sneg number of days with snow b.d.s.p. number of days with show ? b.d.grad broj dana sa gradom

Cloudiness and sun Analysis of weather seasons has shown that the smallest cloudiness is in August (3.5/10 of the sky, 35%). December has the most clouds (77%). The average yearly cloudiness. e.g. average daily cloudiness is 4.4/10, e.g 55%. Comparing with the length of the sunshine in individual seasons it may be concluded that sunshine in summers is 850.6 hours e.g 63.1% of potential, in winters only 226.7 hours e.g. 26.7 of potential. In vegetation period average sunshine isi1506.1 hours or 58.4 of potential.

Fog The average number of fogy days in a year in Zrenjanin region is 22.4 days or 6.1%. Fog appears in every month but the most often it appears in December, average 5.6 days (probability is 18%). Ice days, days with average daily temperature is under 0 o C, most often appear in January. The average number of icy days in January is 14. t

Relative air humidity Air temperature distribution based on values of dry and wet thermostat for two months in a year (July and December) are given in Table 22 and Table 23.

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The average yearly air humidity value in the Zrenjanin region is 78.5%; the lowest monthly value of daily relative air humidity in July is 69% and the highest in December 85%. Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July

o TSv ( C) Tmv (°C) R (%) 7 14> 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver. 18,1 25,4 19,1 20,5 16,0 18,1 16,4 16,7 80 50 77 69

Table 23: Temperature distribution in the region - December

o TSv ( C) Tmv (°C) R (%) 7 14 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver. -2,5 1,0 -1,4 -3,0 -3,0 0,0 -1,9 -1,8 85 90 76 85

Air pressure In Zrenjanin and wider surroundings the air pressure decreases in the period January – April, and increases. The average value of the air pressure in a year is about 1006 mbar, the highest is in January, 1010 mbar and lowest in April, 1003 mbar. In October this value is about 1008 mbar (81 m of see-height). Precipitation Average frequency of days with strong precipitation (9.5 mm) is 16,4 days per year, e.g. 13,1% of total number of days with precipitation, what is very law value. The most of those days appear in May, average 2.2 days, with probability of 7%, and the lowest number of those days is in October. The highest value was recorded in July. In summers it happens that one day precipitation is higher then in winter period or in transition seasons. Wind Frequency (%o) and velocity of wind (m/s) are given in Table 24. Weather with no wind appears mostly in July (91%o), and the lowest freqancy is in February (63%o). The Figure 18 shows “wind rose” for Zrenjanin and this applies for Elemir as well. Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind

N NE E SE S SW W NW Frequency 97 57 80 205 125 77 157 138 Velocity 2.4 1.4 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.6 2.8

Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per year (%)

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Bodies of water and flooding The level of underground water is 2 – 4 meters. The surface is loam. There was one flooding in 1998/99. The surrounding area of the establishment has been flooded but not the establishment. The underground water has been polluted by gasoline because of leaks in the gasoline pipeline. The relevant pipe has been changed. Seismic and geological activities In the area of the establishment there is no specific seismic (Figure 19) or geological risks.

Figure 19: Seismic activities 2.1.5.3 Description of the plant

Activities

Head office of Elemir Refinery Address: 23208 Elemir Proleterska bb Telephone: + 381 23 758 101 + 381 23 758 Fax: + 381 23 738 702 Legal status of the company: part of the joint-stock company NIS- Petroleum industry of Serbia

Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery

Elemir Refinery (Figure 20) is a gas-type refinery which produces natural gas, LPG and gasoline. It is designed by J.F. PRICHAR COMPANY, 4625 ROANOKE PARKWAU, CANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, USA and delivered by EDWIN COMPANY (OLDBURY) LIMITED BIRMINGHAM ENGLAND Desing-Engineering Job No IN-1776. The refinery was commissioned in 1963. It was the first unit of the kind built in the country, thus the design standards were the standard of the country that has designed the unit. The delivery has included: Know-how, license, patents, base engineering and other services. In the year 1988 reconstruction took place (equipment replacement) with no changes in technological process. The major outside supplies for RGE and the connected safety problems are shown in Table 25.

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Table 25: RGE supplies

Type of Safety problem supply There are no safety problems if no electricity will be delivered. Within less than 5 minutes the internal Electricity generator system will take over the supply of electricity. Fuel gas No safety problems as the production will stop if no

gas will be delivered Nitrogen It will only be used for maintenance

Organization and management system Elemir Gas Refinery is a part of production division of NIS-Naftagas as shown on NIS- Naftagas organizational scheme in Annex 11. Total number of employees in RGE is 123. Qualification structure of employees is given in Table 26. Table 26: Employees structure in Elemir Refinery

Number of employees Qualification RGE Naftagas PhD / M.Sc. / B.Sc. 10 1 College 3 Highly skilled High-school 43 Skilled 14 45 Elementary school / Semiskilled / Unskilled 7 Total 77 46

Responsible for safety aspects in the whole NIS a.d. is the central HSE department of NIS a.d. and NIS Naftagas Safety department (Department for systematic support - EMS, Safety, QMS, IMS) and this department is delegating one person to the RGE for HSE duties. Nevertheless safety is one of the major points of the philosophy of the company. Management systems are certified and scope of certification is shown in Table 27. Policy established by top management withing integrated management system is presented in Annex 12. Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of certification

Evrocert certificates IQ Net certificates Organizational part Issue date Number Issue date Number Research and production 04.12.2003 1081/00 22.12.2003 AT-2808/0 Geophysical Institute 07.12.2003 1052/01 22.12.2003

Drilling 04.12.2003 1055/01 22.12.2003 AT-2840/0 Special works 06.12.2003 1047/01 22.12.2003 AT-3338/0 Maintenance 10.12.2003 1049/01 22.12.2003 AT-2448/0 Transport and building 12.12.2003 1058/01 22.12.2003 AT-3120/0

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Evrocert certificates IQ Net certificates Organizational part Issue date Number Issue date Number Hidrosonda 05.12.2003 1059/01 22.12.2003 AT-3121/0 Drinking water factory “Jazak“ 18.08.2006 1226/00 28.09.2006 AT-00085/0 18.08.2006 1023/00 28.09.2006 AT-05400/0

History of the plant NIS-NAFTAGAS is founded by the decision of FNRJ Government on 10.02.1949. as a company for research and crude oil and gas production. Since 31.12.1991. It works within Petroleum Industry of Serbia. In 28.09.2005. the Company for research, production, treatment, distribution and trade of crude oil and its derivates and research and production of gas is founded (Društvo za istraživanje, proizvodnju, preradu, distribuciju i promet nafte i naftnih derivata i istraživanje i proizvodnju prirodnog gasa) "NIS" a.d. NIS-NAFTAGAS is it part dealing with research and production of crude oil, natural gas, underground water and geothermal energy, engineering in the field of oil industry and design and construction of facilities. As for accidents, there was a jet fire in a compressor for fluidisation of Propane (Incoming pressure 1.6 to 2.8 bar, outgoing pressure 13 to 15 bar). There was a leakage in the compressor which leads to a jet which was ignited. The fire has been extinguished by closing the incoming line.

Measures to prevent or mitigate an accident (general) Organizational measures There is a major maintenance period once/year. The pressure vessels and columns will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU regulations. Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year. Equipment for use in explosive atmosphere has a visual inspection twice a year and an inspection by external authorized persons every three years. Constructional measures No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are underground. Technical measures In general the normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and continuity will be done. Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to one accident in the past. At a top of a small chimney for steam the lightning ignited the steam. The flow has been stopped and the fire has been extinguished hereby. As a result the instrumentation and control system has been damaged. This part was not protected by earthing. Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident (General) The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. The evacuation training will only be done for a rescue brigade. Rescue and emergency plans exist partly for the buildings. Fire fighting equipment in RGE is specified in Table 28. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will be informed by sirens to leave the establishment. The surface is loam. The level of underground water is about 2-4 meters deep. All tanks are built in basins. A drainage system exists for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The fire water retention will be done by hydrants connected to two basins (900 and 250 m3). Fire extinguishing by foam is also possible. A gas detection system has been installed. A fire detection system is under construction. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not exist. A system for automatic cooling of the tanks is existing.

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Table 28: Fire fighting equipment

Type Description 1. Stable hydrant system 1100 m3 2. Stable system for foam 2 m3 of foam 3. Portable systems with S-9 30 4. Portable systems with S-50, 250 10 5. Portable systems with S250 5

6. Portable systems with CO2 10 7. Water guns with foam 3

2.1.5.4 Description of processes RGE is designed for maximal processing and preparation as follows: • 1200000 m3/day of natural gas, • 21.6 t/day of gas condensate and • 10 t raw gasoline Main products of the refinery are: • Propane 45 t/day • n-Butan 34 t/day • izo-Butan 38 t/day • Debutanized gazoline 60 t/day • Process oil 5 t/day and • Gazoline Gt 4,2 t/day. Process may be separated in six main technological operations: separation, dehydration, absorption, desorption, distillation and rectification. Natural gas and gas condensate, after separation, go to the dehydration column for drying with three-ethylene glycol. Dry gas goes for deep cooling and further to the absorption column where propane, butane, pentene and hexane are absorbed from the natural gas. For absorption oil is used (150 g/mol). The processed natural gas is taken from the top of the column. The used absorption oil, with above mentioned products, goes for stabilization to the de-ethanizer where methane and ethane are separated from the absorption oil. Further oil goes to distillation where C3 and C8 are distillated and from the column bottom process oil is going out and further heated in the furnace. This oil is used as a heating fluid in the process unit. Distillates are condensed and led to the rectification columns where clean components are derived. In the first rectification column (depropanizer) propane is separated as the pure component, and the mixture of hydrocarbons from the bottom of the column is led to the debutanizer. In the second column (debutanizer) the mixture of butane is derived from debutanizer gasoline on the column bottom. Butane mixture from the debutanizer column goes to the de-isobutanizer where isobutene is separated from n-butane. Flow diagram of the refinery is given in Annex 13. Substances present in the refinery are given in Table 29 and complete description Table 29: Substances in Elemir Gas refinery

R.br. Substances or group of substances Quantity (t) 30. Verry toxic 1) 5 31. Toxic 2) 10 32. Oxidizing 3) 10 33. Explosive 4) 10 34. Eco toxic 5) 10

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35. Flamable gases 6) 10 36. Slef flamable 7) 50 37. Solid flamable 8) 50 38. Materije koje u dodiru sa vazduhom i vodom 50 39. Verry flamable liquids 9) 1000 40. Flamable liquids 10) 5000

2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology 2.2.1 General It is commonly accepted that some inspection on the equipment and piping is necessary to validate the expected condition of the items as well as to assure the integrity of the plant. However it is difficult to determine exactly how much inspection effort is required. An RBI analysis assists to determine the required effort by providing three key parameters, the likelihood of failure of the item, the consequence of failure of the item and the risk from the combination of likelihood and consequence of failure. The purpose of a RBI analysis is to focus inspection activities on those pieces of equipment where failure risks associated with an active damage mechanism are highest. It should be noted that releases have two main causes, one is failure due to material degradation, which can be inspected for and the other is a system error, e.g. an operator error where inspection cannot assist. Risk based inspection planning is a methodology which prioritizes inspection activities on the basis of the actual risk reduction associated with each specific activity. It does this through the following steps: • Prepare a suitable database • identify the main active damage mechanisms and possible scenaria – HAZOP analysis • Perform qualitative Risk-based assessment according to the CEN CWA 15740 • Performed detailed analysis based on API RP 581:2008 - Risk Risk-Based Inspection Technology • Calculate the likelihood of failure for each piece of equipment as function of the different damage mechanisms, the rate of degradation and time in service • Calculate the consequence of failure associated with each piece of equipment • Combine the likelihood and the consequence numbers to calculate the risk associated with each piece of equipment and rank the equipment according to the risk results • Calculate the reductions achievable in the likelihood of failure through a suitable inspection program (This is achieved by removing the uncertainty in the actual rate of degradation or condition of the item and thus reducing the chance of failure) • Develop the inspection program based on the inspection costs versus the inspection benefits. 2.2.2 Preparation of data base The summaries of process description and PFDs for each plant were first reviewed to obtain a preliminary understanding of the process and the equipment functions. The equipment and piping items were identified from the PFDs. Each item was entered in the master workspace in process order. This database was supported by piping specifications, equipment data sheets, process stream compositions, operating conditions and other relevant documents. The preparation of this database was an extensive process. The datasheets in Excel format were used to gather the data. The key data are also marked on the PFDs for easy reference.

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Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall management system

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Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI 2.2.3 Identifying the Damage Mechanisms The damage mechanisms of interest are those which develop over a period of time, gradually weakening the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure is predicted. These damage mechanisms include internal corrosion and external damage under insulation. Damage mechanisms for the process units were identified based on supplied data, interviews with the staff, standard industry process knowledge and using the API documents, together with R-Tech material and corrosion expertise. The following “inspectable” active or potentially active damage mechanisms have been identified and the corrosion circuits are also developed. The potential damage mechanisms include:

• External Damage (Corrosion under insulation) – CUI • Internal thinning (generalized / Localized thinning) • Fatigue damage on the piping systems • Creep and other elevated temperature related damage mechanisms • Potential of brittle fracture in the process parts operating under temperatures below the ambient temperatures

2.2.4 Calculating the Likelihood of Failure The likelihood of failure of a piece of equipment or pipe is a direct function of the nature and rate of the degradation mechanisms to which it is subjected. The essential steps are to:

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• Identify the damage mechanism(s) • Predict the rate of degradation • Assess the inspection history Consider the age (Note - in this study a (5) years look ahead was made to give a risk profile for June 2012), this is to identify equipment with risk that could exceed the inspection targets between the upcoming and the following plant shut down. When the likelihood of failure is being assessed, the calculation routine is based on the simple premise that unexpected catastrophic failures occur when degradation happens faster than expected. The routine therefore looks at the “what if” scenarios of the corrosion rate being either twice or even four times the predicted rate and calculates the likelihood of failure compared with the operational conditions. It also takes into account the current confidence in the condition based on the nature of the inspections previously performed and their ability to characterize the extent and rate of the different damage mechanisms. These factors are combined by the software to produce a value for the likelihood of failure for each damage mechanism. This is expressed as a Likelihood Factor, which is a number to be applied to the generic failure frequency of the particular item. If no damage mechanisms have been identified, the Likelihood Factor may be 0.5 indicating that the component is 50% less likely to fail than the industry average for such components. If a severe damage mechanism is found and the item has not been thoroughly inspected for some time the Likelihood Factor may be in the thousands indicating that the component may be much more likely to fail than the industry average and that an inspection is needed urgently. The general approach is to address those items in the order of the decreasing Likelihood Factor, as indicated in Table 30. Table 30: Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor Likelihood Factor Action Value Immediate action should be taken, prioritised by risk. Select the highest risk item with a value in this range and perform Likelihood Factor appropriate action. A first step should always be careful >1000 checking of the input data for errors. If this does not resolve the problem, a highly effective inspection appropriate to the damage mechanism should be performed. 100

2.2.5 Calculating the Consequence of Failure Based on the process flow diagrams (PFDs) and discussion with the risk & process engineers, each item of equipment was assigned to an inventory group. This group represents the fluid that could escape in the event of a leak at any one of the items in the group. Each equipment item is then associated with two inventories, it’s own and the group inventory. The consequences are calculated taking into account the nature and amount of the fluid released. The amount and rate of fluid released depends upon factors such as the size of the hole, the fluid viscosity and density and the operating pressure. The rupture of a large diameter high-pressure pipe or vessel obviously has a different consequence than a pinhole leak at a small diameter low-pressure pipe and this method quantifies that difference. Each piece of equipment or piping has a certain generic (industry average) probability of failing either by a pinhole type leak, a medium size hole, a large hole or a rupture. The

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consequence of each type of failure is calculated and combined with the probability for that failure; to calculate the overall risk associated with each piece of equipment. 2.2.6 Determine the Financial Consequences There are many costs associated with any failure of equipment in a process plant. These include, but are not limited to: • Cost of equipment repair and replacement • Cost of damage to surrounding equipment in affected areas • Costs associated with production losses and business interruption as a result of downtime to repair or replace damaged equipment • Costs due to potential injuries associated with a failure • Environmental cleanup costs The approach used in API RBI is to consider all of these costs on both an equipment specific basis and an affected area basis. Thus, any failure (loss of containment) has costs associated with it, even when the release of the hazardous material does not result in damage to other equipment in the unit or serious injury to personnel. Recognizing and using this fact presents a more realistic value of the consequences associated with a failure. Since the costs include more than just business interruption, the approach used for quantitative API RBI analysis is called the financial consequence approach. The financial consequence of a loss of containment and subsequent release of hazardous materials can be determined by adding up the individual costs discussed above:

FC=FC cmd+FC affa+FC prod+FCinj+FCenviron The basic method of risk analysis as presented in API RBI is not changed for the financial risk analysis. The risk is still calculated as the consequence of failure (now expressed as cost in dollars) times the probability of failure. For a rigorous and flexible analysis, the consequences (costs) are evaluated at the hole size level. Risk is also evaluated at the release hole size level by using the probability of failure associated with each release hole size. The total risk is calculated as the sum of the risks of each release hole size. 2.2.7 Calculating the Risk This is now a very simple step, where the risk associated with each piece of equipment is essentially given by the formula: RISK = Likelihood of Failure x Consequence of Failure The risk is the combination of two key terms: • Likelihood of failure and • Consequence of failure Understanding the two-dimensional aspect of risk allows new insight into the use of risk as an inspection prioritization tool. The consequences are calculated based on fluid properties, temperatures, pressures and inventory. The likelihood is based on “generic” or “average” failure frequency data. An analysis is then performed considering important failure mechanisms for each piece of equipment to determine if it is more, or less likely to fail than average. The result is then used to modify the likelihood of failure in this study. The consequence and the likelihood are then combined to give a risk value for each piece of equipment. A high-risk item may be high risk due to either a high likelihood of failure or a low consequence of failure or conversely a high consequence of failure and a low likelihood of failure. An inspection program can only influence the value of the likelihood of failure, not the consequence. No matter how much inspection is performed the consequence is unchanged. Therefore, where a high-risk item is driven by the consequence value, other actions such as more precise analysis such as Quantitative Risk Assessment and upgrading of mitigation system may be considered.

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The overall ranking is then done according to the RIMAP risk matrix, shown in the Figure 23. Alternatively, the risk can be represented in the NIS risk matrix, as shown in Figure 24.

Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix

Figure 24: NIS risk matrix 2.2.8 Remaining life assessment The remaining life for the equipment and piping items based on the hoop stress was performed according to the recommendations given in the API 581 BRD, and Steinbes R-

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Tech Software iRIS-Petrol has been used for the analysis. It accounts for both internal thinning and external corrosion rates. The remaining life is calculated as follows:

1. First, determine the Minimum Wall Thickness (tmin) to be used. There are 3 options available for specifying this tmin: • using the Design Corrosion Allowance taken from design documents (which is a default option) • using User-defined Minimum Thickness taken from local codes or other considerations such as structural stability. • using Calculated Minimum Thickness which is based on ASME code formula:

2. Determine the Remaining Corrosion Allowance where:

in which, Initial Corrosion Allowance is determined from step (1) and Total Wall Loss = Internal Wall Loss + External Wall Loss 3. The Nominal Remaining Life is then calculated as follows: NomRemLife = (RemCorrAllow) / (Total Corrosion Rate) in which, Total Corrosion Rate = Internal Thinning Rate + External Corrosion Rate Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petro also provides an alternative calculation for remaining life known as the probabilistic remaining life. It is based on a weighted average of the nominal remaining life for all possible thinning scenarios. For internal thinning, 3 states are assumed and the probabilistic remaining life equation is as follows:

Whereby State i = 1, is when the thinning rate is as given by the user State i = 2, is when the thinning rate is 2 times the given rate State i = 3, is when the thinning rate is 4 times the given rate Pi is the probability of state i. (Nominal Remaining Life)i is the remaining life calculated for state i. A more complex equation is used when external thinning is included or where liner is involved. 2.2.9 Developing an inspection plan The key piece of data for the development of an inspection plan is the Likelihood Factor. The Likelihood Factor for each piece of equipment is a composite i.e.

Likelihood Factor (LF) = LFThinning + LFCUI(ClSCC) +……

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Since an inspection needs to be tailored to fit the particular type of damage expected at a particular piece of equipment, the key considerations are: • High total Likelihood Factors • High overall risks • The Likelihood Factor per damage type. • Short or zero probabilistic remaining life. As agreed with NIS, inspection planning targets are adopted for this inspection planning. For each equipment item, the driving damage mechanism is identified for inspection. Based on the inspection planning targets the Likelihood Factor for the relevant driving damage mechanism is then reduced by assigning appropriate number and effectiveness of inspection. This is generated by software as inspection. The actual inspection scope to satisfy the assigned effectiveness is then developed based on API inspection guideline for each relevant damage mechanisms, as given in the tables below. Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning

Inspection Effectiveness Intrusive Inspection Non-intrusive Inspection Category 50-100% examination of the 50-100% ultrasonic scanning A surface (partial) internals coverage (automated or manual) Highly Effective removed) and accompanied by or profile radiography thickness measurements Normally 20% ultrasonic scanning Normally 20% examination (no coverage (automated or manual), B internals removed), and spot or profile radiography, or external Usually Effective external ultrasonic thickness spot thickness (statistically measurements validated) 2-3% examination, spot external C Visual examination without ultrasonic thickness Fairly Effective thickness measurements measurements, and little or no internal visual examination Several thickness measurements, D External spot thickness readings and a documented inspection Poorly Effective only planning system Several thickness measurements E taken only externally, and a No inspection Ineffective poorly documented inspection planning system

Table 32: Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning

Inspection Effectiveness Intrusive Inspection Non-intrusive Inspection Category 50-100% coverage using 100% visual examination (with automated ultrasonic scanning, or A removal of internal packing, profile radiography in areas Highly Effective trays, etc.) and thickness specified by a corrosion engineer measurements or other knowledgeable specialist 20% coverage using automated 100% visual examination (with ultrasonic scanning, or 50% B partial removal of the internals) manual ultrasonic scanning, or Usually Effective including manways, nozzles, etc. 50% profile radiography in areas and thickness measurements specified by a corrosion engineer or other knowledgeable specialist

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Inspection Effectiveness Intrusive Inspection Non-intrusive Inspection Category Nominally 20% coverage using automated or manual ultrasonic Nominally 20% visual scanning, or profile radiography, C examination and spot ultrasonic and spot thickness measurements Fairly Effective thickness measurements at areas specified by a corrosion engineer or other knowledgeable specialist Spot ultrasonic thickness measurements or profile D No inspection radiography without areas being Poorly Effective specified by a corrosion engineer or other knowledgeable specialist Spot ultrasonic thickness measurements without areas E No inspection being specified by a corrosion Ineffective engineer or other knowledgeable specialist

Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories

Inspection Insulation Insulation Not Effectiveness Removed Removed Category Remove >95% of the insulation AND For the total surface area: A >95% profile or real-time Highly Effective visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by radiography UT, RT or pit gauge is required For the total surface area: > 95% external visual inspection prior to removal For the total surface area: of insulation > 95% external visual inspection AND AND B remove >60% of total surface Usually Effective area of insulation including follow-up with profile or real time suspect areas radiography of >60% of total surface area of insulation AND including suspect areas visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required For the total surface area: > 95% external visual inspection prior to removal For the total surface area: of insulation >95% external visual inspection AND AND C remove >30% of total surface Fairly Effective area of insulation including follow-up with profile or real time suspect areas radiography of >30% of total surface area of insulation AND including suspect areas visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required D >95% external visual inspection For the total surface area:

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Inspection Insulation Insulation Not Effectiveness Removed Removed Category Poorly Effective prior to removal of >95% external visual inspection insulation AND AND follow-up with profile or real time remove >5% of total surface radiography of >5% of total area of insulation including surface area of insulation suspect areas including suspect areas AND visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required <5% insulation removal and inspection No inspection or ineffective E OR inspection technique or <95% Ineffective no inspection or ineffective visual inspection inspection technique

Table 34: CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories

Inspection Intrusive Non-intrusive Effectiveness Inspection Inspection Category For the total surface area: No inspection techniques yet A 95% dye penetrant or eddy available meet requirements of Highly Effective current test with UT follow-up of "A". relevant indications. For the total surface area: For the total surface area: > 95% automated or manual B 60% dye penetrant or eddy ultrasonic scanning Usually Effective current testing with UT follow-up OR of all relevant indications. AE testing with 100% follow-up of relevant indications. For the total surface area: For the total surface area: C > 30% dye penetrant or eddy Fairly Effective current testing with UT >67% automated or manual follow-up of all relevant ultrasonic scanning indications. For the total surface area: For the total surface area: >5% dye penetrant or eddy >30% automated or manual D current testing with UT ultrasonic scanning Poorly Effective follow-up of all relevant OR indications >60% radiographic testing Less than “D” effectiveness or Less than “D” effectiveness or no E no inspection or ineffective inspection or ineffective inspection Ineffective inspection technique used technique used

Table 35: Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage

Inspection Effectiveness Inspection Category A Visual inspection of >95% of the exposed surface area with Highly Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required

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B Visual inspection of >60% of the exposed surface area with Usually Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required C Visual inspection of >30% of the exposed surface area with Fairly Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required D Visual inspection of >5% of the exposed surface area with Poorly Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required E Visual inspection of <5% of the exposed surface area with Ineffective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required

Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace Tube

Inspection Effectiveness Inspection Category Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes and A strapping at UT measurement locations. FMR at various Highly Effective locations B Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes Usually Effective C Visual inspection with UT thickness measurements of 75% of the Fairly Effective tubes D Visual inspection with spot UT measurements Poorly Effective E Visual Ineffective

2.2.10 Software used Software used for analysis, R-Tech iRIS-Petro RBI, is fully based on API methodology and recommendadtion contained in the document API RP 581 Risk Based Inspection Technology, Second edition (see references [1]). The software is used for assessment of the risk on equipment/subequipment level and for developing and evaluating inspection plan and strategies. Software is described in Chapter 3, together with instructions for the users.

2.3 General about HSE (HAZOP, Seveso II) methodology 2.3.1 HAZOP The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) technique provides a means of systematically reviewing the design and operation of a system to identify the potential occurrence of hazardous events (impacts on people, property, or the environment), or operability problems (impacts on process efficiency or productivity). It is based on the premise that a hazard is not realized if the process is always operated within its design intent. The HAZOP technique involves structured brainstorming to look for deviations from the design intent. Structure is provided by the use of a set of guidewords. The guidewords are applied to various aspects of the design intent, i.e. process parameters, to develop deviations. The team determines if the deviation could realistically occur and, if there are realistic causes, evaluates whether the consequences are significant, as defined by the scope of the study. The team may then evaluate whether existing safeguards are adequate considering the causes and consequences of the deviation. The safeguards may be either in the form of hardware or procedures. In some cases, the team may make recommendations for corrective action, for study to determine an optimal solution, or for additional investigation to determine whether a problem exists that warrants action. The primary objective of the classical form of HAZOP study is the identification of problems or possible accident scenarios. This information alone is not sufficient to make decisions on

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what should be done. It is useful if a simple risk estimate can be provided for each problem in order to provide a basis for deciding on the best allocation of resources to address key problems. Consequently HAZOP-PC provides a means for qualitatively estimating the likelihood and severity of each problem identified in order to develop a risk estimate. HAZOP studies can be performed for new plants where the design is nearly firm and documented, or for existing plants where a significant redesign is planned, or where no previous study has been performed. HAZOP studies can be conducted not just for processes but also for storage, transportation, and other systems. While the HAZOP technique is the most comprehensive hazard analysis method of those available, it cannot provide complete assurance that all hazards have been identified. HAZOP Team HAZOP team members need to be knowledgeable of the process and its operation, at least some of the team should come from the operating facility. A typical team may consist of the following members: • Team Leader • Process Engineer • Operations Supervisor • Safety Engineer • Maintenance/Inspection Supervisor • Facilities/Mechanical Engineer HAZOP Process Typical HAZOP process is illustrated on the Figure 25.

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Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process

2.3.2 Seveso II Directive The Seveso II Directive is based on Article 174 (ex-Article 130s) of the EC Treaty. It is important to mention that, according to Article 176 (ex-Article 130t) of the EC Treaty, Member States can maintain or adopt stricter measures than those contained in the Seveso II Directive. The aim of the Seveso II Directive is two-fold. Firstly, the Directive aims at the prevention of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances. Secondly, as accidents do continue to occur, the Directive aims at the limitation of the consequences of such accidents not only for man (safety and health aspects) but also for the environment (environmental aspect). Both aims should be followed with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the Community in a consistent and effective manner. The scope of the Seveso II Directive is solely to the presence of dangerous substances in establishments. It covers both, industrial "activities" as well as the storage of dangerous chemicals. The Directive can be viewed as inherently providing for three levels of proportionate controls in practice, where larger quantities mean more controls. A company who holds a quantity of dangerous substance less than the lower threshold levels given in the Directive is not covered by this legislation but will be proportionately controlled by general provisions on health, safety and the environment provided by other legislation which is not specific to major-accident hazards. Companies who hold a larger quantity of dangerous substance, above the lower threshold contained in the Directive, will be covered by the lower tier requirements. Companies who hold even larger quantities of dangerous substance (upper tier establishments), above the upper threshold contained in the Directive, will be covered by all the requirements contained within the Directive. The Directive was amended again in December 2003. The key elements of preparation of a Seveso assessment are described in the Table 37. Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study

Item Section heading Summary Comments No. Summary of findings and Executive 1 intended methods of control of summary accidents and hazards Must cover the plant features, process and layout, and if Description of plant, special Introduction and nearby to populated areas 2 features and any limits to the overview must describe issues in local scope of the Seveso assessment. communities that may impact hazard management. Methodology – the Outline of the approach taken by hazards and This section describes the the assessment team to 3 effects assessment methodology illustrate a rigorous approach management undertaken. and use of appropriate data. process A listing of the hazards that apply to the plant under assessment. In addition to the identification A key first step to describe Hazard of the major accident hazards, what accidents and hazards 4 identification study the safety-critical elements and apply to the plant being performance standards (i.e. the assessed. manner in which the “safety critical” elements perform in the context of the major hazard).

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Item Section heading Summary Comments No. Many HAZID exercises are A supporting list of typical carried out using a hazards to assist the 5 Hazard checklist “brainstorming” team review, comprehensive review of the checklist is a very useful applicable hazards. element to support this review. A term used in the UK as a short-hand description but the A further description of the step to identify the “safety safety critical elements (those Safety-critical critical elements” (SCEs) is a 6 items that help to protect the elements key identification of the plant and adjacent valuable systems used to communities). prevent, detect, control or mitigate the incidents. A collation exercise of the Setting of Formal statement of the performance measures 7 performance performance required for the required to be in place to standards “safety systems” for this plant. enable the SCEs to do their job effectively. Usually making use of a generic Qualitative risk risk matrix, a risk ranking table Assigning risk levels against 8 assessment of the identified risk associated each identified hazard. with the plant. Often based on corporate A section stating the grouped standards adopted by the plant acceptance criteria, covering not operators. just safety issues but also, May be already completed, 9 Risk tolerability ecological and amenity otherwise will require a consequences criteria plus “search” of standards accepted environmental performance and by the plant operator and manageability criteria. collating values. The means by which the plant A section describing the manner operators demonstrate to their in which the plant’s regulators and corporate Demonstration of management intend to manage management that the hazards 10 major hazards the identified major hazards and foreseen on the plant will be management identifying a range of HSE able to be controlled in some critical tasks, (in order to manner by the HSE prioritise effort and budgets). management systems in place. Noting that the management approaches will require effort to Escape, be assigned to manage escape, 11 evacuation and evacuation and rescue of

rescue affected personnel on the plant and adjacent affected communities.

2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo Refinery 2.4.1 The scope of analysis According to the plan for Package B, a

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List of components

2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad Refinery

2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir Refinery 2.6.1 Executive summary The overall proposed inspection plan for the equipment based on screening results (Table 10 API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009), shows overall reduction of almost 50% of equipment to be inspected pro year in next 3 years. On the other hand, about 10% of equipment has to be inspected more intensively with more adequate methods and scope than it was practiced so far.

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Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component based applied on RGE equipment

5 0 - 0%

D-4 D-6 D-7 E- D-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T- 4 18 - 72% 110 T-5 E-1A/B E-2 T-4 9 L T-6 T-8 I K E L 3 D-27A T-1 2 - 8% I H O O D 2 D-300 T-101 T-2 D-102 T-3 5 - 20%

1 0 - 0%

A B C D E

0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25

C O N S E Q U E N C E S

Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on selected RGE equipment

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2.6.2 Introduction 2.6.2.1 Objective The objective of the study was to assess the risk profile of the RGE equipment through the application of the Risk based inspection methodology and to prioritize equipment for inspection. Moreover, the goal was to demonstrate the applicability of the overall approach to the NIS units. 2.6.2.2 Scope The scope of the RBI study covered all the equipment items and related piping as originally agreed prior to the project.

Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir Refinery

Number of Component type items Pressure vessel 41 Condenser, Shell 17 Heat Exchanger, Shell 13 Column Top 10 Filter 7 Furnace Tubes (general) 6 Other Equipment 5 Heat Exchanger, Tube Side 4

The scope of work covered the following activities: 1. Understanding the system This includes activities like HAZOP analysis, review of design assumptions, process flow diagrams, P& IDs, survey of all maintenance, inspection documents (location, nature and criticality of flaws, thickness measurements, corrosion rates etc.), repair and modification records, operating conditions, PSV settings, stream data, materials of fabrication, vessel coating and insulation details. Review of financial data including cost of plant shut down and averages cost of process plant. 2. Preparation of Simplified Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with all data essential to the RBI analysis of the equipment items. 3. Development of corrosion circuits and determination of expert corrosion rates. 4. Data entry and analysis using Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petrol software. 5. Preparation of documentation of corrosion rates and assessment of damage mechanisms and mode of failure. 6. Review of inspection records.

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7. RBI analysis and results checking. 8. Preparation of RBI analysis report. 2.6.2.3 Deliverables The deliverables of the RBI project include: 1) Database of equipment for the process units studied. 2) RBI analysis report for the units include the followings: a) Six (6) sets of process flow diagrams showing the basic information used in the analysis. b) Inspection plan guidelines for selected ‘high risk items’ based on a plan period agreed with RGE. This consist of tables and reports indicating the overall risk, likelihood and consequence factors, the recommended inspection methods and coverage for each equipment item and the active or potential damage mechanisms identified per equipment item. c) The assumptions and conclusions of the RBI analysis. 2.6.3 Methodology General details on applied RBI / RCM methodology and HAZOP are presented in Chapter 2.2 of this report. A HAZOP study is performed by a HAZOP team, consisting of experienced engineers and operating personnel from appropriate disciplines, facilitated by an independent chairman experienced in the use of the HAZOP methodology. The team may include representation from both the design contractor and from their client who is to operate and maintain the facility. Typically the team may include process engineers, project engineers, electrical & instrument engineers, maintenance engineers and senior operating personnel. Other specialists may be drafted in to the meeting when appropriate. The HAZOP review is normally based on P&IDs of the planned facility, while PFDs, Cause and Effect Diagrams, Hazardous Area Classification drawings and Layout Drawings may also be used to provide additional information. During a HAZOP, the P&IDs will be broken down in to logical sub-systems (nodes), which may be a vessel, a line interconnecting equipments, or some other logical sub-system. The HAZOP technique involves the following steps: 1. Identify the node to be studied. 2. Define the design intent of the node and the normal operating parameters. 3. Apply a HAZOP deviation (e.g. NO/LESS FLOW) to the node. 4. Identify all possible causes for the deviation. 5. Identify for each cause all possible consequences, without regard for the safeguards in place. 6. Identify all available safeguards to prevent the cause or to limit the consequences. 7. Recommend any new safeguards where judged necessary. 8. Repeat steps 4 to 7, using the next HAZOP deviation. 9. Repeat steps 3 to 8 until all HAZOP deviations have been applied to the node. 10. Select the next node to be studied, repeating steps 1 to 9. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until all the guide-words have been applied and discussed and the team is satisfied that all meaningful deviations have been considered. The team then goes back to Step 1 and repeats the process for the next section or node. Figure 3illustrates the normal workflow of a HAZOP study. When a recommendation was proposed, the risk was ranked based on consequences and frequency, using the COMPANY Risk Ranking Matrix. 2.6.4 Performed activities In order to be able to perform the given analysis, the following activities have taken place: 1. Training in RBI methodology and presentation of qualitative methods during the Training RBI from October 30 to November 3 2006 2. First Certification RBI on November 27, 2006

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3. Complete implementation of the qualitative assessment tool in a form of Web-based software tool (see Figure 8) a) Integration of the software tool in the project web site (Figure 29) http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com 4. Export facility in the software in order to allow offline completion of the questionnaire (example of offline questionnaire is given in Error! Reference source not found.) 5. Basic demonstration of the methodology and training in Stuttgart, December 2007, O. Tot, D. Subotin 6. Data collection and assessment performed by NIS RGE team, extended with the representatives of NIS, RNP and RNS in two sessions: a. October 2008 b. December 2008

Figure 29: Project web site – Tools and analysis List of inputs 1. Input PFD diagrams from RGE 2. Description of the process and systems as discussed during the Workshop Dec. 2007 3. Detailed process analysis – December 2008 4. Detailed data collection for the selected equipment types – October and December 2008 5. Answers to the NIS BRD questionnaire – June 2007 – March 2008 6. Management system evaluation, last performed in June 2008 7. Overview of inspection results for the given equipment – December 2008 2.6.5 Unit and process description General description of Elemir Gas refinery is given in Chapter 2.1.5. Here are repeated and grouped main data. Purpose of the unit/plant – natural gas refining – separation of the higher fractions of the carbon hydrates from the lighter ones. Feed: natural gas

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Outputs: refined gas, Propane 45 t/day, n-Butane 34 t/day, iso-Butane 38 t/day, Debutanised gasoline 60 t/day, process oil 5 t/day and Gasoline Gt 4,2 t/day Year of construction: 1963 Re-engineered and re-constructed for operations up to -23°C in 1969. Design life time- not given in the project documentation, most of the equipment has been designed according to the ASME Section VIII, edition valid at the time of construction. This is equivalent to approx. ASME Section VIII, Division 1 according to the current standard edition. Re-qualification of the equipment to the latest code of construction (ASME) has not been performed. Analysis of the design and qualification to the current regulation of pressure vessels in Serbia has been performed on several occasions, mostly by the local Universities. Elevation above see level: 80 m Seismic zone: 7 (Mercalli), zone 3 according to API 581 classification. Typical wind direction: NE-SW Maximum soil load: 16 N/m2 Expected soil deformation: 6-10cm for 1,85 m depth of foundations Underground water level: 4m below Depth of soil freezing: 60 cm Temperature range: 36 in summer to -30°C in winter, corresponding to the -30 to -5 class in API 581 Wind loads (to be considered in strength calculations for equipment): • structures lower than 10 m: 687 N/m2 • structures from 10-30 m: 803 N/m2 • structures from 30-60m: 1003 N/m2 • structures higher than 60m: 1177 N/m2 Snow weight: 740N/m2 Maximal rainfall in 24 hours: 120mm Temperature zone: Temperate (rainfall between 500-1000 l/(m2 year) Process stability: from 0-1 unplanned shutdowns per year, from 0-1 planned shutdowns per year. Process is very stable Detection systems: Process instrumentation – i.e. high level of liquid propane detector, regulation and automation system for operating parameter maintenance, security system AMOT for automatic shutdown of compressors, high concentration of hydrocarbon detectors, 24 hour human supervision of the process parameters with hand logging and hourly walk-around, local detectors, visual detection. Insulation systems: Most of the insulation systems are manually activated, on the spot. The only exception is the AMOT system for automatic shutdown of the compressors, AMOT, that can automatically shut down the compressor in cases of high number of rotation, high level registered in D-1, increased vibrations, low pressure of the fluid (oil), high temperature of cooling water. Fire-fighting equipment: Portable fire-fighting equipment S-9, S-250,CO2-10,CO2-30, water cannons with foam Temporary repairs and signs of deterioration: some signs of deterioration are present, however, they are logical consequence of the overall equipment age. Temporary repairs and repairs with inappropriate materials have been made during the 1990s, mainly due to the fact that it was not possible to obtain better equipment Modification of the original design: • Re-design of the input part of the system – T1, T101.... • Change of the working fluid – instead of the proprietary oil, refining-generated oil is used History of incidents:

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• Propane leakage on the compressor, and auto-ignition of the fluid. Apart from material damage, there was no other damage to the people or environment mainly due to an early detection of the incident and fast fire extinguishing • Leakage of propane, butane and gasoline from the underground lines due to the corrosion of the underground lines. Consequences – propane and butane was easily spotted, and quickly fixed. Gasoline leakage was discovered at a relatively late stage, due to the fact that it did not evaporate. Soil remediation has been done by pumping up the gasoline from the soil, the whole operation lasted 2,5 months • Problems at the furnace firing – the firing process is manual and can in some cases lead to the explosive concentrations inside the furnace and consequent injury of the person performing firing. So far no serious injuries have happened. Safety and relief valves: the process is inherently clean, there is a potential for some corrosion mainly from the outside. No significant fouling of the RV has been registered, however, in the general process of control, some of the valves have been found not to be functioning. Fluid information: Present fluid in the system are: • Natural and refined gas - 3,8-17,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 640-645°C, gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39 Approx. fluid composition: methane ~ 93%, ethane ~ 2,50%, propane ~ 0,30%, butane ~0,03%, other carbon and nitrogen maximum 3,50%,mostly containing fractions C1-C4, daily throughput of 1200000 m3 per day (or 500t) • Propane - 2,1-9,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 465°C, gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39 Present quantities on site: o Process 12m3 as liquid, 8m3 as gas o Storage: maximal 926 m3(as liquid) and 232 m3(as gas) • Butane - 1,5-8,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 365°C, gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39 Present quantities on site: o Storage: maximal 892 m3(as liquid) and 224 m3(as gas) • Debutanized gasoline - 1,3-7,6% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 257°C, liquid with no color, flammable and polluting for soil and water. Danger mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks S36/39,S45,S61,S62 Present quantities on site: o Storage: maximal 355 m3(as liquid) and 89 m3(as gas) • Heavy gasoline - 1,3-8,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 205-220°C, liquid with no color, flammable and polluting for soil and water. Danger mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks S36/39,S45,S61,S62 Present quantities on site: o Storage: maximal 36 m3(as liquid) • Methyl-alcohol – 7,3-36% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 455°C, liquid with no color, flammable and poisonous. Danger mark T,F, Risk marks R11 R11,R23/24,25, information marks S-2,7,16,24 Present quantities on site: o Process: 50l (as liquid) • Water and steam

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The overall view of RGE is shown on Figure 20. Figure in Annex 13 shows the overall PFD diagram for RGE, whereas Error! Reference source not found. show the same diagram in more readable form. 2.6.6 Results of analysis 2.6.6.1 HAZOP Analysis Results During the first HAZOP Session, several technical issues have been discussed, one of those being analyzed with the HAZOP methodology (Figure 33 and shows loop analyzed and The results are available on-line using the link: http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com in the member-area section of the project web site. 2.6.6.2 Technical discussions

Technical problem 1 On the top of column T-5 sometimes a valve has to be opened. In some cases the gas (Decane) ignites and a flame appears on the top of the valve. In this case the valve will be closed again. Discussion: The temperature of the gas is 260 0C. There are two possible ignition sources. The first possibility is electrostatic ignition. The second possibility is an ignition by hot surfaces. More probable is the ignition by a hot surface. The gas will heat up the surface of the gas. Autoignition temperature of Decane is about 210 0C. By turbulence at the end of the valve an explosive air/Decane mixture will be formed which ignites at the hot surface and lead to the flame. Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possibility to mitigate the formation of an explosive air/Decane mixture is to use a three way valve instead of the existing one. The third line will be connected to a steam line. Both lines have to be opened instead of only the Decane line. This will have two effects. The surface will be cooled down under the autoignition temperature and the explosive atmosphere will be inerted. Therefore an ignition on the surface will not took place.

Technical problem 2 In combination with a pressure drop it may be that there is no liquid phase of Decane at the bottom of T4 (distillation unit). This will lead to a gas flow to the connected pumps instead of a liquid flow. The gas will be ignited in the pumps. Same problem will arise if no cooling is available for the pumps (will be cooled by water and cold oil). Normally two pumps are in operation and one is stand by. A flow indicator for Decane is responsible for the flow of the cooling liquids to the pumps. Discussion: The reason for the ignition is the hot surface of the pumps where an air/Decane mixture will be ignited. Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possible solution is as first a temperature measurement at the pumps. In the line between distillation T4 and pump a valve can be integrated. This has to be opened if the flow indicator for Decane and the temperature indicator at the pump indicate that there is no flow of liquid Decane. The open line can be connected to the flare. The valve can be closed again if the flow indicator gives a signal for liquid Decane flow.

Technical problem 3 Once per year the gas pipelines outside the establishment will be cleaned. Different kind of liquids and dusts has been accumulated over the period of one year. The Naftagas plant is responsible for the collecting of these wastes. The waste is delivered by a pressure wave through the incoming line for gas and is collected in the separator D-300. The technical problem is twofold. In the loop1 discussed during the Hazop analysis a pressure surges occur (e.g. water hammer, cavitational hammer). These pressure surges can lead to damages of plant's equipment (valves, pumps, pipe bends) up to leakage of the pipe system. After the cleaning the gaseous line will be opened again. Again pressure surges occur and parts of the equipment can be obstructed completely or partly by remaining particles. This is actual the case for the heat exchanger E-110.

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Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3

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Figure 31: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 2 of 3

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Table 38: HAZOP analysis for Loop 1

Guide Safe Guard ID Node Parameter Cause Consequence Description Safe Guards Word Independent

Feed No safety problem, shut down or Two Safety valves 1 entrance to Flow Less Less Gas Supply FALSE continuation depending on flow on D-300 D-300

Feed No Supply Cleaning gas Two Safety valves 2 entrance to Flow No No safety problem TRUE line on D- 300 D-300

Feed No safety problem, shut down or Two Safety valves 3 entrance to Pressure Lower Less Supply TRUE continuation depending on flow on D-300 D-300

Feed Supply changes, More Valve (LCV 301) to F301 will be partly or Two Safety valves 4 entrance to Composition Higher TRUE C1-C2 Gas completely closed on D- 300 D-300

Feed Supply changes, Less PV 401 is an overflow valve and will mitigate Two Safety valves 5 entrance to Composition Less TRUE C1-C2 Gas increase of level. Storage tank D-27A. on D- 300 D-300

Feed Filter has to be cleaned. Indication: Pressure Two Safety valves 6 entrance to Pressure Higher Filter in F-301 dirty. . TRUE increase continuously on D- 300 D-300

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Figure 32: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 3 of 3

Figure 33: HAZOP Loop 1

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Discussion: There was only a general discussion on the hammer effect on the lines where the liquid phase is in. A more detailed discussion was about the pressure wave which took place when the gaseous line will be reopened. As the heat exchanger is not really working at the moment based on pollution with dust particles the questions raised up what can happen furthermore in other parts of the plant. It has been proposed not to concentrate on the possible damages and instead to concentrate of a mitigation of the pressure wave. At the moment a valve in a 12 inch line with a 3 inch pipepass will be opened, It has been proposed to include another valve in a 6 inch line with a 2 inch bypass to reduce the pressure wave. The following proposals have not been discussed in this meeting. The typical scenarios for the origin of pressure surges are fast closing valves triggered by the breakdown of auxiliary power and fast acting control devices. The fast deceleration of the liquid results in high pressure surges upstream the valve, because kinetic energy is transformed into potential energy. This effect is called water hammer that is explained by the following example. In a horizontally installed 500 m long pipeline of the size DN 200 which transports water with a velocity of 3 m/s at ambient temperature, the pressure increases by a fast closing valve from a stationary pressure of 6 bar up to 40 bar. Hereby the forces induced to pipe supports exceed the design criteria from 1-5 kN to 125 kN. Due to liquid inertia, the transported liquid continues to flow downstream the valve with the initial speed, the pressure decreases and a large expanding vapour bubble is formed directly downstream the valve. The pressure falls up to saturation pressure of the liquid and is thus lower than the pressure in the system. Thereby the liquid stream is decelerated and finally accelerated towards the closed valve (back flow). As a result of fast re-condensation of the vapour bubble, the liquid flows against the closed valve and is stopped rapidly. The resulting pressure surge is referred to as cavitational hammer. The amplitude of the first cavitational hammer downstream the valve is nearly as high as the amplitude of the first water hammer upstream the valve. Well-known methods for the prevention of water hammer in pipeline systems are e.g. the application of air vessels, surge shafts, bladder accumulators, as well as the prolongation of closing and opening times of valves. The latter is the easiest and the most favourable method. Due to technical and legal requirements for pipeline operation within the chemical industries and power plants it is not always possible to decelerate the closing process undefined. Air vessels, surge shafts or bladder accumulators are used if the pipeline system is not designed on the same level. These applications are installed upstream the closing valve in its immediate proximity. When shutting off the medium flows in to the loft and is braked by this. Another possibility is the expansion of valve gears with facilities which decelerate the closure as soon as the last third of the flow cross section is nearly reached. These can be dampers (often used with swing check valves) or programmable positioners..

Technical problem 4 There is a leakage in the product lines C3 and C4 to the tanks. As the lines are underground the leakage and the size of the leakage can not be detected. There is no leak detection system installed. Discussion: Leakage is visible by bubbles on the ground if it is raining and by parts of non growing grass. Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. As the amount of gas is unknown there is the hazard of an explosion. The only possible solution is to repair or to exchange the lines or to build new lines on the ground and to close the old ones.

Technical problem 5 There is a compressor in use where gaseous Propane will be compressed from 1.7 to 13-15 bars. There are two problems. The first problem is in the case of a leakage in the compressor (Jet fire, explosion). Hot surfaces near by have a temperature of 500 0C. The volume of the compressor is about 0.5 cbm. The second problem may occur if liquid propane flows into the

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compressor. This will normally be mitigated by a measurement of gaseous and liquid phase in the separator before. If this is not working an explosion is possible. Discussion: This has not been discussed during the meeting. Technical solution: There will be possibilities by using quick closing valves. This will mitigate the flow of liquid Propane to the compressor. Further technical specification possible but not done. 2.6.6.3 Management Systems Evaluation According to the API 581, Management system evaluation (self-assessment) has been performed. After this, an audit of the results has been performed in order to revise the scores achieved. The results are given in the table below and shown on Figure 34. Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments

Maximal Actual Audit Audit comments Id Section Title Points Score results

Leadership and The self assessment evaluation is 1. 70 43 40 Administration confirmed

The self assessment evaluation is confirmed, however, it seems Process Safety 2. 80 72 65 that not everyone has instant Information access to needed safety information needed (ie MSDS)

Process Hazard The self assessment evaluation is 3. 100 49 45 Analysis confirmed

Version control of the documents and agreed procedure of the Management of 4. 80 58 40 “where the latest version of the Change i.e. PFD” seems not to be known to everyone

Operating procedures are not visibly enough available to everyone. However, due to the size of the team, this is 5. Operating Procedures 80 57 50 compensated in quick direct consultations. Problems only in cases when one of the responsible is not reachable (i.e. illness, holidays etc.)

The self assessment evaluation is 6. Safe Work Practices 85 72 70 confirmed

In the last couple of years a lot has been done to improve the 7. Training 100 82 75 knowledge, however the lack of training in the previous periods has left some traces.

The team is capable of maintaining the integrity of the equipment as it is. However, re- 8. Mechanical Integrity 120 111 90 engineering or process improvement initiatives are not always considered as possible solutions

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Maximal Actual Audit Audit comments Id Section Title Points Score results

Due to the danger of the current startup procedure, more has to Pre-Startup Safety 9. 60 58 45 be done to make sure that the Review startup is not considered as “routine” task

Not all elements needed for safety report and emergency 10. Emergency Response 65 51 40 response are available on demand

The incident investigation practice is normally performed, however, the damage 11. Incident Investigation 75 65 40 mechanisms are often not investigated, instead of root causes often only symptomatic reactions.

Contractors 45 42 25 Contractors are usually good managed, however, there are QA problems in the procurement 12. process for the “small equipment” (i.e. valves, safety valves, etc.)

Assessments 40 20 20 The self assessment evaluation is 13. confirmed

The RGE has obtained the above average score even after the auditing process. The overall Total 1000 780 645 impression is that the overall team of process, maintenance engineers and management is functioning very well

Figure 34: Results of management system evaluation for RGE

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2.6.6.4 API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based) analysis results The evaluation according to the API 581 qualitative method has been performed, and the overall risk of the RGE has been determined to be MEDIUM (or C3). This has several reasons: 1. Size of the refinery – it is rather small compared with other refineries or other units that are supposed to be benchmarked by the same methodology 2. The process is fairly simple and stable 3. On the other hand, the process fluids (natural gas, propane, butane, gasoline) are both explosive and flammable, therefore giving the C consequence class 4. The age of the equipment and the history of damage mechanisms result in the likelihood ranking of 3.

5

4 L I K E L RGE-1 Procesno 3 I postrojenje H O O D 2

1

A B C D E

C O N S E Q U E N C E S

Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative unit analysis matrix

2.6.6.5 API 581 qualitative analysis (component based) According to API 581, edition 1998, the qualitative analysis has been performed for 99 components, without connecting piping and rotating machinery. The work for this equipment is still in progress. Risk matrix for qualitative analysis is shown on Figure 36. The risk assessment results are shown in Annex 24. According to the ranking in the risk matrix, the inspection plan can be constructed, for next two years. According to the risk assessment, the equipment having high and medium high risk should be inspected at least once a year. Furthermore, for items with high risk, it is recommended to increase the inspection efficiency from class D (spot testing) to class C, in order to have better risk control. For the equipment that has annual maintenance tasks (heat exchangers – cleaning, filters, condensers), the same inspection interval has been maintained (i.e. each year), although according to the risk ranking this interval might be increased. This is in line of maximization of the effort invested, i.e. to use the opportunity to inspect the equipment when normal maintenance tasks are done.

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The corresponding inspection plan (Annex 25) results in increase of inspection on equipment identified as critical (6 pieces of equipment), while decreasing the number of equipment to be inspected each year (i.e. in 2009 from 99 to 51).

5 0 - 0%

4 D-101 D-102 2 - 2%

L C1A/B (potis) C1A/B D-1 T-3 T-4 T-6 T- T-1 T-101 T-2 I 3 (usis) C2A/B (potis) 14 - 14% 8 T-5 T-7 K C2A/B (usis) E L I D-27B D-27C D-27E D-103 D-104 D-11 H E-10 E-102 E-103 D-111 D-112 D-12 O E-104 E-11 E-110 D-120 D-121 D- E-101/A E-101/B O E-113 E-116 E-12 122 D-16 D-2 D- E-1A/B E-20A FT- D E-120 E-13 E-14 E- 27A D-27D D-27F 103A FT-103B FT- 2 15 E-16 E-17 E-18 D-28A D-28B D- D-300 T-9 83 - 84% 104 FT-302 HP-1 E-19 E-2 E-20B E- 28C D-28D D-28E HP-2 JI-1 JI-2 PF- 21 E-22 E-23 E- D-28F D-28G D- 1 PF-2 SP-1 24/A E-24/B E-25 E- 29A D-29B D-29C 3 E-4 E-5 E-6A/B E- D-4 D-5 D-6 D-7 7 E-8 E-9 D-8 D-9 FT-301

1 0 - 0%

A B C D E

0 - 0% 15 - 15% 40 - 40% 36 - 36% 8 - 8% 99

C O N S E Q U E N C E S

Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for year 2009

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2.6.6.6 RBI Detailed quantitative analysis

5 0 - 0%

D-4 D-6 D-7 E- D-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T- 4 18 - 72% 110 T-5 E-1A/B E-2 T-4 9 L T-6 T-8 I K E L 3 D-27A T-1 2 - 8% I H O O D 2 D-300 T-101 T-2 D-102 T-3 5 - 20%

1 0 - 0%

A B C D E

0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25

C O N S E Q U E N C E S

Figure 37 Preliminary results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on selected RGE equipment

2.6.7 Conclusions and recommendations Presented results so far have DRAFT status; further refinement is planned for the level of detailed analysis in order to obtain results that are acceptable for plant personnel. The proper identification of damage mechanisms and inclusion of rotating equipment and piping is planned for the next cycle of data update. The preliminary analysis of potential savings in inspection costs is given in Figure 38. The overview of financial risk for the whole unit is given in Figure 39. THIS Chapter will be elaborated in the next version.

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Comparison of costs per inspection strategy 6,000,000 Din.

5,000,000 Din.

4,000,000 Din. RSD 3,000,000 Din.

Costs 2,000,000 Din. Current practice

1,000,000 Din. RBI optimized 0 Din. 2009 2010 2011 Inspection year

Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies

3,500,000 € 100% 90% 3,000,000 € 80% 2,500,000 € 70% 2,000,000 € 60% 50% 1,500,000 € 40% 1,000,000 € 30% 20% 500,000 € 10% 0 € 0% 1 1 2 2 3 2 5 7 2 9 4 4 8 7 6 6 5 1 1 1 2 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ T T T T T T T T T E JI JI D D D D D D 28F 27F 28E 27E 300 102 101 102 110 28C 27C 29C 28B 27B 29B 29A 28A 27A 28D 27D ‐ ‐ SP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ HP HP 1A/B (usis) (usis) T E E ‐

D D D D D D 101/B D D D D D D 101/A D D D D D (potis) (potis) ‐ ‐ E

E E C2A/B C1A/B C2A/B C1A/B

Figure 39: Financial Risk Prioritization

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2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo, Unit FCC 2.7.1 Introduction 2.7.1.1 General Law on changes of the Law on Environmental Protection adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia May 2009 contains some of the requirements of Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC). Between other, Seveso plant is defined as a facility in which activities are carried out and in which one or more dangerous substances are present in quantities equal or greater than prescribed. Further obligations of Seveso plants operators are defined, who must submit information, or to develop a policy to prevent accidents and report safety and accident protection plan. Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning of Republic of Serbia has identified facilities that are subjected to Seveso II Directive and published a preliminary list (14 May 2009). Refinery Pancevo has been preliminary identified as upper-tier "Seveso" plant. Corresponding sub-lows which will allow full implementation of the Directive are currently in preparation. Full implementation of this regulation will provide prevention, preparedness and rapid response to a chemical accident. This chapter of Detailed Technical report presents Safety report for a part of Pancevo refinery, FCC complex (Fluidized Catalytic Cracking) following the requirements of the Directive and on the base of Safety report for Pancevo Refinery done within the Package A. Some of general data needed for the report are contained in Volume I of the Detailed Technical report. For easier understanding and reading, Cross-reference table is prepared (Table 1) showing relation between part of reports and requirements from Article 9 of the report. 2.7.1.2 Implementation of Seveso requirements Table 40 shows relation between requirements of Seveso II directive and individual parts of Detailed Technical report. Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements

Corresponding Minimum data and information to be included in paragraph of the the safety report referred to in Article 9 Safety report Information about management system and organization of the establishment in relation to the prevention of I major accidents, this information must consider the items listed in Annex III II Surrounding of the establishment

Description of site and its surrounding, including the geographical location, meteorological, geological, A hydrographic conditions and, where appropriate, its history. Identification of installations and other activities of the B establishment which could present a risk of a major accident. Description of areas that may experience a major C accident. III Description of the establishment

Description of main activities and products of major parts of the plant in terms of safety, sources of major A accident hazards and the conditions under which such a major accident could occur including a description of proposed preventive measures. Description of processes, in particular the operating B methods. C Description of hazardous substances:

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1. the inventory of dangerous substances, including: - identification of hazardous substances (chemical name, CAS number, name according to IUPAC nomenclature), the maximum quantity of dangerous substances present or possible; 2. physical, chemical, toxicological characteristics and indication of hazards, both immediate and delayed for man or the environment; 3. the physical or chemical in normal use or under foreseeable accidental conditions.

This Safety Report is updating the Safety report prepared in May 2008. It therefore incorporates the organizational changes and technological changes occurring in plant and refinery from that date. 2.7.2 Information on site, plant and unit 2.7.2.1 General data Name and Address of Operator: Fluid Catalytic Cracking complex (FCC) is a part of Refinery Pancevo and further of NIS Petroleum Industry of Serbia which is owned by Government of Republic Serbia (41%) and JSC Gazprom Neft (51%), The address of the headquarter and refinery itself is: NIS Petrol Pancevo Refinery Spoljnostarcevacka 199 26000 Pancevo Name and Location of Activities Data about location and activities of the Refinery are given in Chaper 2.1.5Volume I of Detailed Technical Report. Basic design of the plant License and engineering: TEXACO Development Corporation Detailed engineering: Foster Wheeler Responsible for preparation of the Safety Report This report is prepared by Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies, Haus der Wirtschaft, Willi-Bleicher-Straße 19, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany 2.7.2.2 Location of Establishment Geographical map of Pancevo Municipality and location of Pancevo Refinery are given in Annex 1 and Annex 2. The FCC complex covers 41860 m2 in Block 6 of Refinery Pancevo (see A.14.1 and A.14.2). Position of FCC is shown on Figure 40. Complex is located between other blocks of refinery, 3 of them are with production units: • North - Block 5 with units for oil production built in the first phase of Refinery construction, • South - Block 21 with Sulfolan unit, • Est - Block 9 with power production units. Block 3 is located on the West side of FCC complex with following buildings: control room for FCC complex, buildings of fire protection brigade and investment and development unit. Monastery Volovica with a church is also located west of the Block 6. Access to the FCC complex (Figure 41) is possible by internal roads - from the East, Street No. 3, from the West Street No. 2, from North Avenue C and from the South Avenue D.

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Figure 40: Position of FCC in Pancevo Refinery

Figure 41: Access to the FCC complex

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Some accidents took place in the past. 1986 there was a fire in a pressure vessel and a separator of fuel gas. In 1989 an accident caused by abrasion occurred. The result has been a small steam leak in a reactor. In 2003 a slide valve was closed caused by a cut cable. The pressure inside the regenerator increased and cyclones were damaged. 2.7.2.3 Policy the company is pursuing RNP has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO 9001:2000 standard, for all RNP's operations. Details are given in chapter 2.1.4.. List of RNP QMS and EMS documentation is given in Annex 15. 2.7.2.4 Safety management system Safety Management System is a part of RNP quality and environment management system including some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for HSE issues is Risk Management division. 2.7.2.5 Hazardous materials FCC ensures deep conversion of vacuum gas oils into gases, gasoline components, diesel components and fuel oil. Catalytic cracking process breaks or cracks long chain hydrocarbons into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to increase gasoline and diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30% distillate and 30% butanes and lighter. Accordingly, hazardous materials in RNP FCC are: • Propane • Butane • Gasoline • light cracked gas oil • H2S and • for internal use fuel gas. The complete list of hazardous materials is given inError! Reference source not found.. 2.7.2.6 Meteorological data Chapter 2.1.3.2 of this report contains data related to • Meteorology • Hydrology • Geology • Seismology. 2.7.2.7 External activities Industrial activities external to the establishment of Refinery Pancevo are described in Volume I of Detailed Technical Report. FCC complex is located in Block VI of Refinery Pancevo and it includes following units: • S-2300: Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit (hereafter FCC) • S-2500: Gas concentration unit • S-2550: Merox unit LPG extraction • S-2600: Alkylation • S-2750: Merox, Light naphtha sweetening Unit • S-2850: Merox, Heavy naphtha sweetening • S-2900: Sour water stripper • S-2450: Sulphur recovery unit (Klaus) 2.7.3 Detail description 2.7.3.1 FCC unit S-2300 General about process Catalytic cracking is a key process used to increase the quality and quantity of gasoline fractions. The most commonly used process is the fluid bed type, which uses a finely

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powdered zeolite catalyst that is kept in suspension in the reactor by the incoming oil feed from the bottom of the reactor. Upon contact with the hot catalyst, the oil vaporizes and is cracked into smaller molecules. Vapors from the reactor are separated from the entrained catalyst and fed into a fractionator, where the desired products are removed and heavier fractions are returned to the reactor. The catalyst is deactivated by thermal degradation and through contact with heavy metals in the feed, necessitating regeneration or replacement. FCC is used in processing of vacuum heavy gas oil which is pumped into the pipe reactor “RISER” where the actual reaction of cracking is taking place. Unit area is 90 x 100=9000 m2, construction is open and mainly made of concrete. It incorporates also a concrete chimney with 150m in height and 13m diameter base. This process breaks or cracks long chain hydrocarbons into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to increase gasoline and diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30% distillate and 30% butanes and lighter. If you do the math you will see that the volume of products is greater than the volume of the feed. Capacity of the unit FCC unit is designed to manufacture 3000t/dan (1.000.000t/year) of heavy vacuum gas oil that is derived from crude oil Kirkuk. The Pancevo Refinery is mostly processing crude oil of "REB" and "Kikinda" and processing capacity depends on the availability of supplies and the market requirements for final products. Flow chart is shown in Figure 42. Description Process flow Diagrams Flow through the Unit is shown schematically on the following Process flow Diagrams:

Drawing No. Title 2231-0-50-2331 Reactor - Regenerator Section 2231-0-50-2332 Catalyst Storage &Air Surge Drum Section 2231-0-50-2333 Feed Preheat and Main fractionator 2231-0-50-2334 Main fractionator Strippers and Overhead System 2231 -0-50-2531 Compression Section 2231-0-50-2532 Absorption/Deethaniser Section 2231-0-50-2533 Debutanizer Section 2231-0-50-2534 Naphtha Splitter Section 2231-0-50-2535 H2S Scrubber Section 2231-0-50-2536 Depropanizer Section 2231-0-50-2537 C3 Drier Section 2231-0-50-2538 Propylene Splitter Section

Flow charts are given in 0. The unit is designed for two regimes: • Winter - maximum production of diesel • Summer - maximum production of gasoline. Feed for the unit is heavy vacuum gas oil from the unit S-2200, Vacuum distillation. Block diagram of Pancevo refinery is given in

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Figure 42: Flow chart of FCC

Reactor / Regenerator section Fresh feed to the Unit is normally supplied as hot vacuum gas oil from the Vacuum Distillation Unit. Unit 2200. Cold gas oil from storage can also be used to supplement the hot feed or as the major source of fresh feed. up to 60% of design throughput. if desired. Excess hot feed is cooled in the VGO Cooler. EC-2307, and returned to storage. Both feeds are fed independently into the Feed Surge Drum, FA-2303. Fresh feed is pumped from the feed Surge Drum by the Fresh Feed Pumps, GA- 302/S, under flow control through the feed preheat train to the Feed Heater,BA-230l. The preheat train consists of the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-230l A/B, the Feed/ICGO Reflux Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B, and th~ Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers)EA-2303 A/B. The feed is then heated in the Feed Heater and routed to the FF Riser. Provision is made for the Feed Heater to be bypassed. The additional capability of routing fresh feed to the RF Riser is provided. As eparate riser is provided for cracking recycle feed. Recycle feed is pumped to the RF Riser from the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302,by the lCGO Recycle Pump,GA-2306/S. Fresh feed and recycle feed enter the Reactor-Stripper, DC-2301, at the base of the FF Riser and RF Riser respectively, where each feed is vaporized and raised to the reactor temperature by mixing with hot regenerated catalyst returned from the Regenerator, OC- 2302. Each feed begins to crack immediately on contacting the hot catalyst. The cracking reaction takes place in the Risers of the Reactor after which most of the catalyst is separated from the Reactor vapours and falls down to the Reactor stripping section. The catalyst fines still entrained with the Reactor vapours are disengaged in two two-stage Reactor Cyclones, FC-230l A/D. Catalyst separated in the Cyclones is returned to the Reactor bed section by the Cyclone diplegs. The Reactor vapour product passes to the Main Fractionator, DA-2301, where it is fractionated. During the cracking reaction carbon is deposited on the surface of the catalyst in the form of coke. After passing through the Reactor stripping section where stripping steam removes entrained hydrocarbon vapours, spent catalyst passes from the Reactor through a slide va1ve to the lower section of the Regenerator, DC-2302, for coke removal. Coke is removed from the catalyst by combustion to carbon dioxide in the Regenerator using air supplied by the Air Blower, GB-230l. Mixing of the spent catalyst with hot regenerated catalyst supplies the heat to start burning." The burning of the catalyst occurs in two stages. The "primary combustion" stage produces CO and CO2 and releases heat which almost

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instantaneously raises the burning temperature. The "secondary combustion" stage occurs simultaneously as the CO burns with oxygen to form C02. Combustion of the coke to carbon dioxide is almost complete at the temperature in the Regenerator. Duri ng start-up the Ai r Preheater, BC-2301, is used to heat up the Regenerator. The Air Blower is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2510. Condensate from the condenser is collected in the Condensate Drum, FA-2520,and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the Turbine Condensate Pump,GA-2520/S,via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2520. The Inter/After Condenser condenses the'vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is vaporised in the Re- evaporatbr, EA-2522. Hot gases produced by the combustion of coke leave the dense phase of the Regenerator and enter the dilute phase where entrained catalyst is removed in three twostage Regenerator Cyclones, FC-2302 A/F and returned to the Regenerator catalyst dense phase via the cyclone diplegs. The hot regenerated catalyst leaves the Regenerator via the Fresh Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe and the Recycle Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe and passes through the slide valves to the FF and RF Risers. The hot gases leaving the Regenerator Cyclones pass through the Flue Gas Pressure Control Valve, PA-2305, the Ori fi ce Chamber, PA-2307,and the Fl ue Gas Diverter Valve, PA- 2306,to the CO Boiler, BF-2301,before exhausting to atmosphere via the Stack. CA-230l. The CO Boiler produces HP steam (44.1 bar g) by recovering sensible heat, and the heat of combustion of CO when operating with non promoted catalyst, from the Regenerator flue gas. The CO Boiler is supplementary fired with fuel oil or fuel gas to provide sufficient steam to meed the demand of the FCC complex. Boi1er feed water enters the CO Boiler under flow control and passes through a preheater and economiser to improve the overall efficiency of steam generation. The steam and water mixture produced in the convection bank is separated in the steam drum and the steam is then passed through a two-stage superheater. The steam temperature is controlled by taking a slip stream of steam from the fi rst stage of the superheater and passing it through an attemperator. The attemperator and preheater are located inside the steam drum. Fresh catalyst is fed to the Regenerator from the Fresh Catalyst Hopper, FE-230Z, using the Continuous Catalyst Addition Device, GB-2302. Equilibrium catalyst for start-up is stored in the Equilibrium Catalyst Hopper, FE-2301.

Main Fractionator Section Superheated Reactor vapours from the Reactor, OC-230l, enter the bottom section of the Main Fractionator, DA-230l. The Reactor vapours are desuperheated by contact with a large circulating stream of cooled fractionator bottoms over six disc and donut trays. The fractionator bottoms is circulated by the Fractionator Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, and cooled in the following four parallel heat exchanger circuits: A. The Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers,EA-2303 A/B B. The LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304. C. The Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505, in the Gas Concentration Unit. D. The Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B. Controlling the rate and return temperature of this coolant affects the rate of reflux required higher in the tower. The down flowing coolant for desuperheating the vapour feed also serves as a scrubbing medium which collects catalyst entrained in the vapours. Catalyst concentration is reduced to a satisfactory amount by withdrawal of a fractionator bottoms product at the appropriate rate. The fractionator bottoms product is drawn off downstream of the Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators and cooled in the Fractionator Bottoms Product Cooler, EC-230l, before being pumped to tankage by the Fractionator Bottoms Product Pump, GA-2304/S. Facilities exist for the return of fractionator bottoms to the RF Riser should this operation be dictated by mechanical problems or special product requirements. lntermedi ate Cycle Gas Oi 1, 1CGO, is withdrawn from a total draw-off tray in the Main Fractionator. Part is circulated by the lCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S,under flow control, and

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is cooled in the following four parallel heat exchanger ci rcuits before returning to the colurnn: A. Feed/ICGO Refl ux Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B. B. Deethaniser Reboiler,EA-2502,in the Gas Concentration Unit. C. Naphtha Splitter Reboiler,EA-2507,in the Gas Concentration Unit. D. 1CGO Reflux Steam Generator,EA-2307. The main part of this ICGO Reflux Stream is returned to the Fractionator above the draw off tray. The remainder is returned to the bubble cap trays below the draw off pan in order to scrub out any entrained catalyst remaining in the vapour from the baffled section, and also to provide additional cooling of the vapour. The balance of the ICGO from the total draw off tray passes to the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302. The ICGO Stripper is reboiled by circulating ICGO Recycle through the ICGO Recycle Reboiler Pump, GA-2j07/S, to the ICGO Recycle Stripper Reboiler, BA-2302, under flow control. The fi red heated serves the dual purpose of stripping and preheating the Recycle Feed. Recycle feed is pumped from the ICGO Stripper by the ICGO Recycle Pump, GA-2306/S, under flow control to the RF Riser. The ICGO stripper vapour is returned to the Main Fractionator. Light Cycle Gas Oil, LCGO, is removed from a partial draw off tray in the Main Fractionator. Part is circulated by the LCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2308/S, under flow control and is cooled initially by preheating boiler feed water in the LCGO/BFW Exchanger, EA-230S, and preheating the Debutani ser Feed in the Debutaniser Feed Preheater, EA-2S03. These combined streams are then cooled by passing some of the LCGO Reflux through the Lean Sponge Oil Cooler. EC-2305, before returninq to the Main Fractionator. Some of the LCGO Reflux from the outlet of the Lean Sponge Oil Cooler is pumped by the Lean Sponge Oil Pump, GA-2309/S, to the Sponge Oil Absorber, DA-2501, in the Gas Concentration Unit before returning to the Main Fractionator, and some ;s passed to the Gland and Flushing Oil Surge Drum, FA-2307, to be used as gland and flushing oil. The remaining LCGO from the Main Fractionator passes to the LCGO Stripper, DA-2303t where light ends are stripped from the light cycle gas oil with heat supplied by fractionator bottoms in the LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304. The stripped vapours are returned to the Main Fractionator. The LCGO product is pumped by the LCGO Product Pum~ GA-2310/S, through the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-2301 A/~ to the LCGO Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) or to storage via the LCGO Product Cooler, EC-2303. A naphtha sidestream is withdrawn from the Main Fractionator between the LCGO draw-off and the column overheads. Thi s stream is ci rcul ated under f1 ow control by the Top Pumparound Reflux Pump, GA-23l1/S,to the Propylene Splitter Reboi1er, EA-2515,in the Gas Concentration Unit before being returned to the Main Fractionator. Fractionator overheads are cooled and partially condensed in the Fractionator Overhead Condenser, EC-2306. Water soluble corrosion inhibitor is injected upstream of the Fractionator Overhead Condenser using the Fractionator Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2514, to prevent hydrogen blistering. Unstabilised gasoline and vapours are separated in the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304, with the vapours flowing to the GCU Gas Compressor, GB-2501. Unstabilised gasoline is pumped under level control by the Fractionator Overhead Pump,GA-2312/S,to the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-2501, in the Gas Concentration Unit and is also used as pumpback ref1 ux to the Main Fractionator to control overhead temperature. The condensed water phase and sour water passed into the boot of the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator from other Units is pumped by the Sour Water Pump, GA-2313/S,to the Sour Water Stripper Unit (Unit 2900).

Process Steam Generation and Blowdown Boiler feed water from offsite is preheated in the LCGOI BFW Exchanger, EA-2305,and passed to Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B,and the ICGO Steam Generator, EA-2307,for generation of medium pressure steam. Steam generated in these exchangers is superheated in the superheat coil of the ICGO Stripper Reboi1er, BA-2302, and passed to the M.P. Steam Header. Continuous and intermittent b10wdown from the Steam Generators and the CO Boiler, BF- 2301,are passed to the M.P. B1owdown Drum, FA-2521,where L.P. steam generated passes to the L.P. Steam Header. The b1owdown passes under level control to the Atmospheric

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B1owdown Drum, FA-2522, where it is quenched with raw water before passing to the oily water sewer.

Slide Valve Air System

Dry plant air, with a water dew point of -40 °C, is provided to supply the power to actuate the automatic slide valves. The air supplied to each valve passes to an air motor operated power unit which directs the air supply to drive the valve in either direction, depending on the signal being received from the automatic controller. Alternatively, the slide valve can be moved by the manual operation of a local 4-way valve which performs a similar function. The Slide Valve Air Surge Drum, FA-230l, is provided to operate the valves during an emergency. The drum is sized to hold sufficient air to close each operating valve once from the wide open position without the reservoir pressure dropping below 4.1 bar g.

Spry Water System

In· the event that any portion of the Regenerator exceeds 730 °c for short periods, spray water from the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302, should be injected into the Regenerator by the Spray Water Pump, GA-2301 IS. Spry water should be removed from the Regenerator at the first opportunity to prevent catalyst deactivation and .to regain optimum combustion air control.

Gland and Flushing Oil System

Light Cycle Gas Oil is normally used as pump gland flush oil and flushing oil for instruments, the supply being taken from downstream of the Lean Oil Cooler, EC-2305. An alternate diesel supply is provided at start-up from offsite storage. The LCGO passes into the Gland and Flushing Oil Surge Drum FA-230~and is continuously circulated around a ring header system using the Gland and Flushing Oil Pump GA-23l4/S. This system is also used for flushing equipment which can be taken out of service while the rest of the unit is in operation. 2.7.3.2 Gas concentration unit S-2500 Gas Compression Section Vapours from the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-230~ are compressed in the two stage, turbi ne dri ven GCU Gas Compressor, GB-2501, after passing through the First Stage Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2501. Liquid removed in the Compressor Suction Drum, flows under gravity back to the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator. Off gas from the LCGO Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) is also fed to the First Stage Compressor Suction Drum. Flashed condensate is injected into the first stage discharge to protect the lines from hydrogen blistering together with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the First Stage Compressar Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-25l5. This stream is then cao1ed and partial1y condensed by the First Stage Compressor Condenser, EC-2501, befare enteri ng the Second Stage Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2502. The interstage liquid from this drum is pumped by the Second Stage Compressor Suction Drum Pump, GA-250l/S to the Deethaniser Feed Coalescer, FA-2505. Sour water, separated from the hydrocarbon phase in FA-2502,is sent under level control to the Fractionator FA-2502 are compressed in the second stage of the GCU Gas Compressor and then injected with steam condensate together with corrosion inhibitor from the Second Stage Compressor Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2S16, and routed to the HP Separator Condenser, EC-2502. The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is vaporised in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521. Absorption/Deethaniser Section The vapours from the compressor second stage are combined w;th liquid from the Raw Gasoline Absorber,DA-2501 ,and overhead vapours from the Deethaniser ,DA-2502, the C3 Drier Overhead Accumulator,FA-2513,and the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA- 2514,and passed to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,EC-2502. Flashed condensate

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is injected into the inlet of the airfin to protect the exchanger from hydrogen blistering together The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is vaporized in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521, with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2516. The combined stream is cooled and passed to the High Pressure Separator,FA-2504,where hydrocarbon vapour, hydrocarbon liquid and water are separated. Water i s continuous 1y removed from the boot and transferred to the Main Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,before pass ing to the Sour Wate r Stripper. The vapour stream from the Hi gh Pressure Separator, FA-2504,is introduced at the base of the Sponge Oi1 Absorber/Raw Gaso1 i ne Absorber, DA-250l ,where i t i s scrubbed with raw gasoline and then with 1ean sponge oil to remove C3's and heavier. The raw gasoline is fed from the Maln Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,by the Fractionator Overhead Pump,GA-23l2/S, via the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,to the Raw Gasoline Coalescer, FA- 2503. Water removed i s returned to FA-2304. The raw gasoline enters DA-2501 where it contacts the vapours from the High Pressure Separator over slotted ring packing. Ouring winter operation, debutaniser bottoms recycle from the Debutani Sf'r Bottoms Recyc1e Pump,GA-2504/S, is pumped with the raw gasoline into the Raw Gasoline Absorber. This is done to provide suffieient liquid loading both in the Raw Gas01ine Absorber and in the Deethaniser to effect the desired C3 recovery. The raw gasoline leaves the bottom of the ABsorber and is pumped by the Raw Gasoline Absorber Bottoms Pump,GA-2502/S,into the inlet of the High Press ure Separator Ai rfan Cool er, EC-2502. The vapours emerging from the Raw Gasoline Absorber pass up the co1umn through a chimney tray and are contaeted with 1ean sponge oil aver slotted ring packing. The lean sponge oil whieh is unstripped LCGO is pumped fram the FCCU by the Lean Sponge Oi1 Pump,GA-2309/S~and enters the top of the Sponge Oil Absorber,DA-2501, where it removes a major part of the C315 and C4's from the vapour. The rieh spange oi1 1eaving the Absorber passes to the Rich Sponge Oi1 Surge Drum, FA-2516. Any vapours whi eh di sengage are returned to the Absorber be10w the top packed bed. Rieh sponge oil is returned to the coo1ed LCGO reflux stream which passes to the Main Fractionator, DA-2301. Water removed from the boot of FA-25l6 is returned to FA-2304. The overhead gases from the Spange Oi1 Absorber,DA-2501, consisting mainly of hydrogen. Cl's, C2'5 and hydrogen sulphide flow to the Fuel Gas Scrubber KO Drum,FA-2509, and on to the base of the Fuel Gas Scrubber, DA-2505. where lean amine is used in the countercurrent extraction of hydrogen sulphide. Liquid hydrocarbons from the High Pressure Separator, FA-2504,are pumped by the Deethaniser Feed Pump, GA-2503/S. together with interstage liquid from the Second Stage Compressor Suction Drum Pump. GA-250l/S. to the Deethaniser Feed Coalescer, FA- 2505.before passing to the top tray, tray 21, of the Deethaniser.DA-2502. Water from the coalescer boot is passed to FA-2304. Light ends are stripped out in the Deethaniser, DA-2502, in order to control the C2 content in the resulting C3 streams. The overheads from the column are returned to the High Pressure Separator Airfin Cooler,EC-2502. The column is reboiled by circulating hot intermedi ate cycle gas oil (ICGO) pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S, through the Deethani ser Reboi1er. EA-2502. Reboiled vapours return to the column and the liquid product is fed to the Debutaniser.DA-2503. The flow from the bottom of the Deethaniser represents the total liquids recovery of the sys tem. Any free water trapped in the Deethani ser i s removed in the Deethaniser Water Draw Off Pot, FA-2506, which takes liquid from tray 15 of the co1umn. Debutaniser Section The Debutaniser DA-2503, is designed to separate C4'5 and 1ighter from C51S and heavier, with the overhead having less than 0.3 wt.% pentanes and heavier and bottoms containing less than 0.5 wt.% butanes and lighter. The feed to this tower is the Deethaniser bottoms stream. This stream is preheated by circulating hot LCGO. pumped by the LCGO Re fl ux Pump, GA-2303jS. through the Debutaniser Feed Preheater. EA-2503, and by Debutaniser

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bottoms in the Debutanizer Feed/Effluent Exchanger. EA-2504. Partial1y vaporized feed enters the Debutanizer. which has 42 trays, on tray 18. The Debutaniser overheads are totally condensed in the Debutaniser Overhead Condenser, EC-2504, and passed to the Debutaniser Overhead Accumu1 ator, FA-2507. Water soluble corrosion inhibitor is injected into the in1et of the condenser by Debutaniser Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2517~ to prevent hydrogen blistering. Water removed in the boot of the Overhead Accumu1ator is returned to the Main Fractionator Overhead Accumu1ator, FA-2304 Reflux is returned to the column via the Debutaniser Overhead Ref1 ux Pump, GA-2505/S, and the C3/ C4 product is pumped by the Debutaniser Overhead Product Pump, GA-2506/S, via the Debutaniser Overhead Trim Cooler, EA-2506, to the C3- C4 H2S Scrubber, DA-2506,where H2S is removed by contacting with amine. The column is reboiled by circu1ating hot fractionator bottoms pumped by the Fractionator Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, through the Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505. The bottoms s tream i s used to preheat the tower feed in the Debutaniser Feed/Eff1uent Exchanger,EA- 2504,and then to reboi 1 the Depropani ser, DA-2507, in the Depropani ser Reboi1er, EA- 2509, before passing to the Naphtha Splitter, DA-2504. Provision is made to cool and recycle a portion of the Debutani ser bottoms to the Raw Gasol ine Absorber, DA-250l, in order to improve C3 recovery when operating at other than maximum gasoline operations. The Debutaniser bottoms stream is taken off downstream of the Depropaniser Reboiler and is cooled in the Debutaniser Bottoms Recycle Cooler, EC-2503, before being pumped by the Debutaniser Bottoms Recycle Pump,GA-2504/S, to the Raw Gasoline Absorber DA-2501. Naphtha Splitter Section Debutaniser bottoms 1S charged to tray 10 of the 20 tray Naphtha Spl itter, DA-2505. The Sp1 itter i s operated to produce light and heavy naphtha streams, with the light naphtha having an ASTM end point of 700C and there being a 5.6 0C minimum gap between the light naphtha 95% ASTM point and the heavy naphtha 5% ASTM point. The tower overhead is tota11y condensed by the Naphtha Splitter Overhead Condenser,EC- 2505,and passed to the Naphtha Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA-2508. Part of this liquid is pumped by the Naphtha Splitter Reflux/ Product Pump,GA-2508/S,as reflux to the Naphtha Splitter. The remainder is sent to the Light Naphtha Merox Unit (Unit 2750) before passing to storage. The tower is reboiled by circulating hot ICGO pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump, GA-2305/S, through the Naphtha Sp 1i tter Reboi 1er. EA-2507. The hea vy naphtha bottom product stream is pumped by the Heavy Naphtha Product Pump, GA-2507/S, via the C Drier Reboiler, EA-2512, to the Heavy Naphtha Product ~ooler) EC-2507, before passing to the Heavy Naphtha Merox Unit (Unit 2850) and storage. Fuel Gas H2S Scrubber Section Overhead gas from the Absorber, DA-2501, together with off gas from the LCGO Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) and sour gas from several sources offsite are fed to the Fuel Gas Scrubber KO Drum, FA-2509, and passed to the Fuel Gas H2S Scrubber, DA-2505. Lean DEA (Diethanolamine) from theAmine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950) is fed into the Scrubber near the top and contacting with the gas takes place in two 3 metre beds of 38mm ceramic saddles. The sweet gas leaves the tower at the top and passes to the Refinery Fuel Gas System. The Rich DEA, containing the absorbed H2S and CO2, passes to the bottom of the tower and is mixed wlth rich amine streams from the C3-(4 Scrubber, DA-2506, and the Hydrotreating Unit. This combined stream is then routed to the Amine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950). C3-C4 Scrubber Section Cooled LPG from the Debutaniser Overhead Trim Cooler, EA-2506, is introduced into the bottom of the C3-C4 Scrubber, DA-2506. Lean DEA (Diethanolamine) is fed into the top of the tower and contacted with the LPG in two 3 metre beds of 38mm slotted rings where transfer of the H2S and C02 from the hydrocarbon to the amine takes place. The rich amine is taken from the bottom of the Scrubber and routed to the bottom of the Fuel Gas Scrubber, DA-2505, where 1t is flashed to remove soluble and entrained hydrocarbons before passing to the Amine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950). At the top of the C3-C4 Scrubber, the amine and hydrocarbon are allowed to separate by gravity. The separated hydrocarbon is then passed through a 1 meter coalescing section to remove any traces of the aqueous amine before passing out of the tower. The C3-C4 stream

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is then routed to the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) to remove mercaptans before being pumped by the Depropaniser Charge Pump, GA-2552/S to the Depropaniser, DA-2508. Depropaniser Section C3-C4’s from the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) together with C3-C4 recycle from the Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) are fed, through the Oepropani ser Feed/Effl uent Exchanger, EA- 25G8, to the Depropani ser, DA-2507. The feed enters on tray 27 of this 53 tray column. Reboil heat is suplied to the Depropaniser by the Debutaniser bottoms stream in the Depropaniser Reboiler, EA-2509. The butane/butylene praduct from the bottom of the Depropaniser is first cooled in the Depropaniser Feed/Effluent Exchanger, EA-2508) and then by cooling water in the C4 Product Cooler, EA-25l0 , before being routed to the Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) or to offsite storage. The overheads from the column are tota11y condensed in the Depropaniser Overhead Condenser, EC-2504, and passed to the Depropaniser Overhead Accumulator, FA-25l0. Water, separated_ out in the boot of this drum,is passed to the Main Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304. Part of the condensed hydrocarbon stream is pumped by the Depropani ser Refl ux/Product Pump, GA-2509 IS, as refl ux to the Depropani sero The rema inder i s routed to the (3 Drier, DA-2508. C3 Drier Section Water contained in the overhead product of the Depropaniser is separated fram the C315 in the C3 Drier, DA-2508, in order to produce a propane cut with a dew pOlnt less than -30 °c. The feed to the C3 Orier t DA-2508 ,is cooled in the C3 Orier Feed Cool er, EA-2511, and passed through the C3 Drier Feed Coa1escer t FA-2511 t to remove free water. The feed enters the 30 tray column on tray 18. The tower overheads are partially condensed by the C3 Drier Overhead Condenser t EA-2513 and fed to the C3 Drier Overhead Accumulator t FA- 2513. The liquid hydracarbon from the Accumu1ator i5 pumped back to the tower as reflux by the C3 Drier Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2511/S, via the C3 Drier Reflux Coalescer, FA- 2512. Vapour from the Accumulator i5 recycled to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, in the Absorption/Deethaniser Section. Propylene Splitter Section Dried C3’s enter the Propylene Splitter t DA-2509 ton tray 41 of tne 101 tray column. The co1umn overheads are partia11y condensed in the Propylene Splitter Overhead Condenser, EC-2508 t and pass to the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator, FA-2514. The liquid hydrocarbon from this drum is pumped back to the tower as reflux by Propylene Splitter Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2513/S, while the vapour is recycled to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, in the Absorption/ Deethaniser Section. Propylene product is withdrawn from tray 91 as a side draw and routed to storage offsite via the Propylene Product Cooler, EA-2516. Reboil heat to the co1umn is provided from two separate sources. The majority of the heat is supplied by a top pump around reflux stream from the FCCU Main Fractionator t DA-2301, and is circlated by the Top Pump around Reflux Pump,GA-2311/S through the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Top Pump around Refl ux Exchanger, EA-2515. The remaining heat is supplied by the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA~25l4, which uses high temperature steam condensate from the High Temperature Condensate Drum,FA- 2517, as the heating medium. The propane product is taken from the bottom of the tower and is pumped by the Propane Product Pump, GA-25l2/S, through the Propane Product Cooler, EA-2517, to offsite storage. Condensate Collection System Steam condensate from the Sour Water Stripper Reboiler, EA-2902, and the Amine Regenerator Reboiler, EA-2952, together with condensate from the M.P. condensate header is passed into the High Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2517. Flashed steam is fed into the LP steam main. The hot condensate is primari1y used as a heat source and is passed to the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA- 25l4, before entering the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518. Excess condensate passes directly to the Low Temperature Condensate Drum. If insufficient condensate is available for reboiling the'Propylene Splitter, boiler feed water is fed into the High Temperature Condensate Drum.

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Condensate from the LP condensate header is also fed into the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-25l 7. Flashed steam is exhausted to atmosphere. Flashed condensate is fed by the Compressor Condensate Booster Pump, GA-25l8/S, to the First Stage Compressor Condenser, EC-250l, to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, and to the Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) to be used as water wash in the DP Water Wash Settler, FA-2509, and the DIS Water Wash Settler, FA-26ll. Additional condensate is supplied by the Process Condensate Pump, GA-2521/S, vi a the flashed condensate header to theCondensate Surge Drum, FA-2404, in the Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400), to the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302, in the FCCU, and to other intermittent users. The excess condensate fram this pump is routed to the offsite deaeration facilities. If insufficient condensate is available, boiler feed water is fed into the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518. Corrasion Inhibitor System In order to protect certain items of equipment fram corrosion and hydrogen blistering a water soluble based corrosion inhibitor system has been provided. The corrosion inhibitor i5 mixed with turbine condensate in the Corrosion Inhibitor Drum, FA-2515. The solution is mixed using fuel gas which is vented to the flare system. The following items of equipment and its downstream piping are protected by injecting the material using the following pumps:

Main Injection Pump Equipment GA-2514 Main Fractionator OH Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2304 GA-2515 First Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2501 GA-2516 Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2502 GA-2517 Debutaniser Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2504 GA-2524 Sour Water Stripper Reflux Corrosion Inhibitor Pump DA-290l

Fuel Gas System Fuel gas from the Refi nery Fuel Gas Sys tem i s fed i nto the Fuel Gas Mixing Drum FA-23l0 before passing to the fuel gas header. At start-up or when insufficient fuel gas is available fram the Refinery system, fuel gas is provided by vaporising LPG, taken from offsite or from the feed to the Depropaniser, DA-2507, in the LPG Vaporiser, EA-2310. This is mixed with the fuel gas from the Refinery in the Fuel Gas Mixing Drum. The fuel gas header feeds fuel gas to the FCCU heaters via the Fuel Gas KO DrUm,FA-2305, to the HTU heaters via the Fuel Gas KO Drum, FA-2425, to the Sulphur Recovery Unit via Fuel Gas KO Pot, FA-2318, and to all other users. Flare Header System All safety reliefs resulting fram the lifting of pressure safety relief valves are fed to the Refinery Flare System via the FCCU/GCU Flane KO Drum,FA-2523. This drum handles reliefs from the FCCU, GCU, Amine Regeneration L1nit and Sour Water Stripper. Any hydrocarbon liquid knocked out in the Flare KO Drum is pumped by the Fl are KO Drum Pumps t GA-2525 A/B,to the light slops header. This drum also serves as an atmospheric flash drum at start-up when raw gasoline from the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,is run down, via this drum.to the light slops system. 2.7.3.3 Flow charts Complete list of available drawings of FCC complex is given in Annex 16. 2.7.3.4 Condition of the processes The use of electricity of FCC is 35.4 Mega Watt per day. Steam is needed as well: • High pressure steam (45 bar, 4129 C) 620 tons per day. • Medium pressure steam (16 bar, 3200 C) 410 tons per day • Low pressure steam (4.5 bar 2000 C) 60 tons per day.

2.7.3.5 Hazardous material

Feed Characteristics

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Following tables give characteristics of main feed for FCC. Table 41: Vacuum Gas Oil

Crude Source KIRKUK REB TBP Cut Range (°C) 340 - 380 - 500 590 Gravi ty (oAPI) 25.4 Specific Gravity at 15.6oC (kg/m3 ) 0.9315 Pour Point (oC) 32 31 Sulphur (Wt%) 2.2 2.35 Basic Nitrogen Wt (ppm) 150 Conradson Carbon Residue (Wt%) 0.3 0.5 Characterization Factor 11. 85 Molecular Weight 360

Table 42: C3/C4 Recycle From Alkylation Unit

Crude Source KIRKUK REB

C3 (Mol%) 1.99 1.5

IC4 (Mol%) 93.37 93.33

NC4 (Mol%) 4.59 5.11

IC5 (Mol%) 0.05 0.06 Molecular Weight 57.9 57.9 Specific Gravity at 15.6oC (kg/m3 ) 119.9 119.7

Table 43: Naphtha From LCGO Hydrotreating Unit

Crude Source KIRKUK REB H2S (Mol%) 1.1 0,8

C2 (Mol%) 1.1 1.7

C3 (Mol%) 2.2 2.5

IC4 (Mol%) 1.1 0.8

NC4 (Mol%) 2.2 2.5

IC5 (Mol%) 3.4 2.5

NC5 (Mol%) 5.6 4.1 Naphtha (Mol%) 40.5 23.1 LCGO (Mol%) 42.8 62.0

Products of FCC Products from FCC unit are: • Wet gas • Raw FCC gasoline • Light cycle gas oil • Products from the bottom of fractionators • Intermediate cycle gas oil for production process in FCC Characteristics of some products are given in next tables. Table 44: Quality of wet gas

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Regime 1 Regime 2 Component (%mas) (% mas) H2S 5.84 7,68

H 2 0.15 0.38

CH 4 2.24 5.63

C2 H6 2.17 6.66

C2 H4 1.72 2.76

C3 H8 4.86 10.61 Propylene 22.38 16.56 i-butane 24.78 22.23 n-butane 6.67 6.82 Butilene 29.19 20.67

Table 45: Quality of raw FCC gasoline

Regime 1 Regime 2 Component (%mas) (% mas) Molecular weight 9.41 100.8 Specific Gravity at 15.6oC 65.9 58.7 IBP 2.24 5.63 10% 2.17 6.66 30% 1.72 2.76 Distillation ASTM o C 50% 4.86 10.61 70% 90% EP Octane number RON 22.38 16.56 MON 24.78 22.23 paraffin 6.67 6.82 olefins PONA (%vol) naphthens aromats

Total sulfur 0.160 0.169

Safety data sheet Safety data sheets for dangerous substances in FCC are given in Annex 21.

Main hazardous materials in FCC Quantity of substances contained in FCC is given in Annex 19. Refinery is reporting to the state authority on type and quantities of substances each year using defined form. The list of potential explosion hazards is given in Annex 17 as determined in the document Explosion hazardous zones in Block VI of NIS - Refinery Pancevo (Elaborat o zonama opasnosti od eksplozije za Blok VI, u NIS – Rafinerija nafte, Pančevo, April – Juni 2003.)

2.7.3.6 Utilities and effects

Major supplies

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The major outside supplies for FCC and the connected safety problems are shown in Table 46. The internal electrical distribution system is working now without any problems. In the year 2006. the transformer unit has been completely rebuilt. Table 46: FCC supplies

Type of supply Safety problem

Electricity Possible problem could cause that no electricity will be delivered and this, further, could cause a safety problem. A hazard analysis does not exist.

Fuel gas No problems

Steam Sometimes problems but no safety problems

Instrumental air Only problems if electricity is not available

Nitrogen No problems

Cooling water Smaller problems. Up to now cooling water delivery was reduced in two cases caused by leaks in the system.

Loss of electricity One of the most important outside supplies for FCC is electricity. Hazard analysis has never been done for this case. Loss of electricity could cause safety problem, even may lead to a Domino effect if something else goes wrong simultaneously. Loss of electricity could affect differently some types of equipment as shown in the following table. Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity

Equipment/ installation Possible safety problem affected Reactor Slide valves will close and reaction will stop. Some valves will opes due to their basic function and the steam will be released. Result will be steam in the reactor and the process will stop. (less than 10 seconds). Temperature will increase as no cooling exists. Regenerator Regenerator will be a separate unit as all slide valves are closed. The remaining coke and catalyst will still react. There are about 90 tons of catalysts in the regenerator. A balance of the remaining coke and air is difficult regarding the high reaction speed. Nevertheless as the concentration of Oxygen is reduced the concentration of CO may increase and may cause explosion problems. Column Temperature and pressure will increase as the ventilator used for the air coolers are not longer working. The safety valve at the top of the column will open. Air coolers No problem as the temperature will go done very fast if the feed will not be continued. Pressure vessel No problem as functioning is not depending on electrical equipment. Sensor/ Are still working as using a 24 V line. Instrumentation

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Computers Still working as supplied by an internal electricity line.

2.7.4 Safety of the plant 2.7.4.1 History of accident The establishment has been build up from 1981 up to 1984. The production started in 1985. From 1985 to 1992 there was a period of normal operation. From 1992 to 1996 there was no operation. From 1996 to 1999 was again a period of normal operation. The establishment has been bombed in 1999 and rebuild in 2000. From 2000 up to now there is again a period of normal operation. The average production is about 80% of the total capacity. 2.7.4.2 Hazards identified The Hazards related to the operation of the FCC Unit are associated to uncontrolled release of hazardous materials, mainly due to failure of components due to causes not directly related to process deviations (Loss of Containment events). The cases of possible loss of containment identified and analyzed in the report are chosen to represent the possible range of hazardous materials that can be released and the process conditions of the release. Possible accidental scenarios caused by process deviations are controlled and protected by the Process Control System and by the Shut Down System, so that their probability of occurrence can be considered to be negligible. They are therefore not further analyzed in this report. The Release cases (Top Events) identified for the analysis are: 1. TOP1 - Release of propylene from the bottom of Vessel FA-2514 2. TOP2 - Release of gasoline from the bottom of column DA-2503 3. TOP3 - Release of propane from bottom of propane splitter DA-2509 4. TOP4 - Release of toxic gas (H2S) from FA-2953 5. TOP5 - Release of mixture of toxic gases from FA-2455. The above cases allow to represent hazards related to the presence of both, flammable materials and toxic materials, from vessels, columns and furnaces. For the Propylene splitter section, including FA-2514, an HAZOP analysis has been done. This section contains the largest inventory of hazardous material in the Unit, therefore an assessment of the process deviations for this unit was conducted, to assess if there is any specific process deviation that can contribute to leaks in this Section. HAZOP analysis has been done using web based tool designed by R-Tech (Figure 43 - Figure 46) and following .

TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514 In the loop, shown in Figure 47, a pressure vessel (FA 2514) and a condenser (EC 2508) have been considered. The vessel is a part of the propanizer section; short description of this section is given in subsection 3.1, simplified flow diagram is given in Annex 1. The pressure vessel has a volume of 21 m3. The operational pressure is 19.9 bar and the operational temperature 44 0 C. The pressure vessel contains propylene. The vessel is filled by max. 10 – 12 m3. The stream is coming from the top of the column with 140 m/hour. The intention is to recycle the condensed phase to increase the purity of the product. The stream will be re-circulated in the column. Sensors are measuring the level and the pressure and are responsible for the regulation. External sensors are measuring the gas concentration outside the vessel. The pressure vessel is protected by two safety valves acting by 22 bar. The vessel is design for 22.5 bar and 52 0 C. The safety valves are designed as a redundant system as one valve is able to protect the vessel. The design of the valves for one phase dispersion or two phase dispersion is unknown. (Probably done for one phase dispersion which will not consider the real situation.) Additional a sprinkler system is installed for cooling the vessel in the case of a fire. The whole flow is based on the pressure difference between column and vessel which is 400 mbar.

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No flow to the vessel is possible if a valve is closed but will cause no safety problem.

Figure 43: HAZOP tool – Main page

Figure 44: HAZOP tool - Loop description

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Figure 45: HAZOP tool – Nodes

Figure 46: HAZOP tool – Drawing More flow is not possible as the pressure in the vessel will increase which will decrease the pressure difference between column and vessel and will reduce automatically the flow. Furthermore the heater of the column will be stopped automatically. The deviation flow is directly connected with the deviation pressure. Therefore pressure is not further considered. Temperature can not increase or decrease in this loop.

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For a shut down all lines will be cleaned with steam and for a start up all lines will be cleaned with nitrogen,

Figure 47: Loop1 - TOP1 Event, FA-2514 The Hazop analysis has confirmed that a leak in the pressure vessel is a scenario to be quantitatively assessed, while no specific process deviations able to cause a more significant scenario have been identified. Scenario identification Following a mechanical failure due e.g. to corrosion, material defects etc, it is postulated that a complete rupture of a 6” pipe connected to the pressure vessel FA-2514 will occur. This scenario is chosen to represent a credible worst case of release from the FCC Unit, giving the process characteristics and the full-bore rupture considered. In case the resulting pool is not ignited, the accidental scenarios develops as a flammable gas dispersion with possible Flash Fire or UVCE. In case of immediate ignition, a Pool Fire will occur. The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in following Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

TOP2: Release of gasoline from bottom of Column DA 2503 Column DA-2503 is a part of debutanizer section of Gas concentration unit; description given in chapter 2.7.3.2 and flow diagram in Annex 20. Simplified flow diagram showing position of the column is given on Figure 48. The column has pressure of approx 13 bar and a temperature of 190 C. This event represents the release of a flammable material at high temperature and pressure, giving possibly rise to a two-phase jet.

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Figure 48: Column D 2503 – debutanizer section of S 2500 Scenario identification Two possible release scenarios are postulated, one corresponding to a significant leak (diameter approx 1”) and one corresponding to a major leak (diameter approx 4”). The release will be in form of a two-phase jet causing, if ignited, a jet fire. In case of late ignition of the dispersing cloud, Flash Fire or Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE) will occur. The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.

TOP3: Release of propane from the bottom of column DA-2509 Propylene splitter DA-2509 is a part of Gas concentration unit, Propylene splitter section; description of the unit given in chapter 2.7.3.2 and flow diagram in Annex 20/ Column DA-2509 has pressure of approx 21 bar and a temperature of 62 C. Simplified flow diagram showing position of the column is given on Figure 48. This event represents the release of propane at relatively high temperature and high pressure, giving rise to a two-phase jet. Scenario identification Two possible release scenarios are postulated, one corresponding to a significant leak (diameter approx 1”) and one corresponding to a major leak (diameter 3”, pipe diameter). The release will be in form of a two-phase jet causing, if ignited, a jet fire. In case of late ignition of the dispersing cloud, Flash Fire or UVCE will occur.

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The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.

Figure 49: Column DA-2509 – splitter section of S-2500

TOP4: Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953 Vessel FA-2953 is a part of section for amine regeneration; description of unit given in 4..., simplified technological scheme in Annex 3. In case of failure of vessel FA-2953, a mixture rich in H2S (approx 90%) will be released. This case is chosen to represent a possible leak of a toxic material within the Plant. Scenario identification The release scenario postulated is a leak of diameter of approx 2”, chosen considering the actual conditions and characteristics of the vessel. The release will be in form of a gas jet dispersing in atmosphere causing a toxic cloud. The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in following Sections 5.3 and 5.4 The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in following Sections 5.3 and 5.4

TOP5: Release of toxic mixture from the vessel FA-2455 Vessel FA-2455 is a part of of Claus unit; description given in ...; flow diagram given in Annex 4. In case of failure of vessel FA-2455, a mixture of H2S (approx 70%), SO2 and CO2 will be released. This case is chosen to represent a possible leak of a toxic mixture within the plant. Scenario identification The release scenario postulated is a leak of diameter of approx 4”, chosen considering the actual conditions and characteristics of the vessel. The release will be in form of a gas jet dispersing in atmosphere causing a toxic cloud. The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in following Sections 5.3 and 5.4

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2.7.4.3 Frequency of occurrence of hazards The frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios is assessed on the basis of historical data on leaks and ruptures from typical process components. Statistical data available are summarized in Table 48. Table 48: Frequency of occurrence of accidental events

Frequency Event Fonte (events/ year) Leak from Flange seal 4,0 × 10-4 Cremer & Warner, “A report to the Rijnmond Public Autority” Leak from pump mechanical seals 6,0 × 10-2 Tab. A 9-2 Lees Leak from piping diameter Frequency in /meter (mm) of pipe/year) < 50 9,0 × 10-6 Cremer & Warner, “A report to the Rijnmond Public Autority” 50 – 200 5,0 × 10-6 >200 3,0 × 10-6 Piping rupture diameter Frequency in /meter (mm) of pipe/year) < 50 9,0 × 10-7 Cremer & Warner, “A report to the Rijnmond Public Autority” 50 – 200 3,0 × 10-7 >200 9,0 × 10-8 Catatrophic tank rupture 1, × 10-5 Cremer & Warner, “A report to Leak from tanks 1,× 10-4 the Rijnmond Public Autority

The data above are derived from experience up to the eighties; to date the availability of tools and procedures specifically dedicated to the improving of safety like Safety Management Systems, RBI etc makes it realistic to consider that the frequency of failure should be lower than those experienced up to 20 years ago or more. To take this into account, a factor of reduction of 0.1 is applied to the all the values given in the Table 2. The frequency of occurrence of the final scenario depends on the probability of ignition (immediate or delayed). From technical literature, the following values for the probability of ignition are considered: • Immediate ignition of gas/flashing leaks: 0.3 – 0.01 • Immediate ignition of a liquid pool fire: 0.05 – 0.01 • Delayed ignition of flammable cloud: 0.15 – 0.01 • Probability that the delayed ignition will cause an UVCE: the possibility that an UVCE occurs depend on the amount of flammable material in the cloud. It is considered that for a quantity of gas within the flammable limits lower than 1000 kg, the UVCE can not occur, and only a flash fire is considered. For quantity of gas within the flammable limits higher than 1000 kg, the probability of having UVCE following ignition is considered to be 0.3. The frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios is calculated by Event Tree analysis, on the basis of estimation of the above values. The frequency of occurrence of the scenarios can then be classified according e.g. to the classification given in Table 49. On the basis of the above classification, events having a frequency of occurrence lower than 10-7 per year are considered to be practically not credible and are therefore not further analyzed. The frequency of occurrence of the Hazards identified is assessed as described in the following sections.

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Table 49: Definition of Frequency Classes

Frequency Classification (events/year) Probable > 10-2 Unlikely 10-4 ÷ 10-2 Very unlikely 10-6 ÷ 10-4

Extremely unlikely < 10-6

TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514 The frequency of occurrence of the release (full rupture of a 6” pipe) is estimated considering 20 m of piping. The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 5E-7 events/year. The frequency of occurrence of a pool fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of ignition) 5E-8 events /year. The frequency of occurrence of a VCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 2E-9 and 4E-9 events /year. Notwithstanding the low frequency of occurrence of the scenarios, the consequence analysis will be done to assess the consequences of a worst case scenario (even if the frequency assessment makes it to be considered not credible).

TOP2: Release of gasoline from the bottom of Column DA 2503 The frequency of occurrence of the release (significant and major leaks of a 6” pipe) is estimated considering 20 m of piping. The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 1E-5 and 5E-7 events/year. The frequency of occurrence of a jet/pool fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of ignition) 3E-6 and 1E-7 /year respectively. The frequency of occurrence of a UVCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 1E-7 and 5E- 9 events/year.

TOP3: Release of Propane from the bottom of Splitter DA-2509 The frequency of occurrence of the release (significant and major leaks of a 3” pipe) is estimated considering 20 m of piping. The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 1E-5 and 5E-7 events/year. The frequency of occurrence of a jet fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of ignition) 3E-6 and 1E-7 /year respectively. The frequency of occurrence of a UVCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 1E-7 and 5E- 9 events/year.

TOP4: Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953 The frequency of occurrence of the release is assessed considering the leak from the outlet section piping of FA-2455. Considering the leak from a tank wall, the frequency is estimated in the order of 1E-5 events/year.

TOP5: Release of toxic mixture from the vessel FA-2455 The frequency of occurrence of the release is assessed considering the leak from the outlet section piping of FA-2455. Considering the leak from a tank wall, the frequency is estimated in the order of 1E-5 events/year. 2.7.4.4 Consequences of hazards

General model The scenarios that can derive in general from a release, leading to a given outcome, are represented in the Figure 50. This path was followed while deriving scenarios for FCC analysis.

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Hazardous substance

Pressuried Unpressurised leak Other leak incident

Discharge Liquid Explosion: pool Gas 2-phase Liquid Condensed phase Runaway reaction Dust Physical Flash and rainout Evaporation

Dispersion External fire Jet Dense Neutral

Fireball Jet fire Flash fire VCE Pool fire Bleve

Toxic effect Thermal effect Explosion effect blast and fragment

Outcome

Figure 50: General scenario The consequence analysis assess the type of release (hazardous substance, type of leak) and calculate the expected outcome by application of suitable analytical models.

Criteria for damage assessment Damage caused by accidental scenarios are related to the level of overpressure, heat radiation and toxic gas concentration reached at given distance from the release source. The following tables give the criteria, from International technical literature, adopted to define the damage to equipment or people associated to physical effects of accidents. Table 50: Typical damages caused by overpressure

Overpressure Observed Effect 1kPa Glass breakage.

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Overpressure Observed Effect 3kPa 90% glass breakage, gauges break 7 kPa Repairable damage to internal partitions and joinery. Cone roof storage tank collapse 14 kPa House uninhabitable and badly cracked. Fired heater bricks crack. 21 kPa Wagons and plant items overturned. Half filled cone roof storage tank uplifts. Unreinforced masonry bearing wall building destroyed 35 kPa Regenerator bracing fails and frame collapses. Unreinforced steel or concrete frame building destroyed. 70 kPa Many types of process vessels overturned or destroyed.

Table 51: Details on damage caused by pressure wave

Peak side on overpressure (psi) (kPaa) Annoying noise (137dB), if low frequency (1-15 0.02 0.2 Hz) Occasional breaking of large glass windows 0.03 already under strain Loud noise (143 dB), Sonic boom glass failure 0.04 Breakage of windows, small under strain 0.1 0.7 Typical pressure for glass failure 0.15 1.0 "Safe distance" (probably 0.95 no serious damage 0.3 2.0 beyond this value) Missile limit Some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass structure Limited minor structural damage 0.4 2.8 Large and small windows usually shattered; 0.5 - 1.0 3.5 - 6.9 occasional damage to window frames Minor damage to house structure 0.7 4.8 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable 1.0 6.9 Corrugated asbestos shattered 1 - 2 6.9 - 13.8 Corrugated steel or aluminum panels, fastening fail, followed by buckling Wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted 1.3 9.0 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses 2 13.8 Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, 2 - 3 13.8 - 20.7 shattered Lower limit of serious structural damage 2.3 15.9 50 % destruction of brickwork of house 2.5 17.3 Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building 3 20.7 suffer little damage

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Peak side on overpressure (psi) (kPaa) Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundation Frameless, self-framing steel panel building 3 - 4 20.7 - 27.6 demolished Rupture of oil storage tanks Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured 4 27.6 Wooden utilities poles (telegraph, etc.) snapped 5 34.5 Tail hydraulic press (40 000 lb) in building slightly damaged Nearly complete destruction of houses 5 - 7 34.5 - 48.3 Loaded train wagons overturned 7 48.3 Brick panels, 8 - 12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail 7 - 8 48.3 - 55.2 by shearing or flexure Loaded train boxcars completely demolished 9 62.1 Probable total destruction of buildings 10 69.0 Heavy (7000 lb) machine tools moved and badly damaged Very heavy (12 000 lb) machine tool survived Limit of crater lip 300 2000

Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from CPS 2000) are given in Table 51.

Consequence analysis modeling The analysis of the consequences of the accidental scenarios has been done using computer codes, with the process data and assumptions discussed in the preceding chapters. The analysis has been done considering two meteorological conditions: low wind velocity associated with stability class F (stable atmosphere) and medium wind velocity associated with stability class D (neutral atmosphere). In the following sections, the main results of the consequence analysis are given. TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of pressure vessel FA-2514 The analysis considers the full bore rupture of the 6” pipe at the outlet of the FA-2514 vessel. The following tables summarizes the main characteristics of the scenarios associated to the event. Table 52: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, main characteristics

LEAK FULL BORE RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT Bottom line of F-2514 SUBSTANCE Propylene DIAMETER OF Not analyzed 152 mm OUTFLOW SECTION TEMPERATURE Not analyzed 43.3°C PRESSURE Not analyzed 19.9 barg OUTFLOW RATE Not analyzed 509 kg/s

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LEAK FULL BORE RUPTURE

The Propylene leak is considered to be directed downward, forming a pool of liquid that, in case of ignition, will cause a Pool Fire. If the pool is not ignited, it will start evaporating and the SCENARIO resulting cloud will disperse. If the cloud is ignited at DEVELOPMENT distance from the source, where the gas concentration is still within the flammable limits, it can give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending on the congestion conditions. If no ignition is found, the cloud will disperse without any further consequences. RELEASE < 1 minute (considering shutdown activation) DURATION

The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following Table. The analysis is done also if all scenarios have frequency of occurrence lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible, to obtain an assessment of the damage distances associated to a major release case. Table 53: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, scenario

WEATHER DAMAGE DISTANCE SCENARIO LEVEL CONDITIONS (m) Flame height 29 37.5 kW/m2 20

2 Pool Fire (1) 12.5 kW/m 42 1.5F/ 5D S1 7 kW/m2 55 5 kW/m2 63 3 kW/m2 80 Flammable mass 7000 0.3 bar 150 UVCE(1) 1.5F/5D 0.14 bar 260 S2 0.07 bar 570 0.03 bar 1000 LFL 562 1.5F Flash Fire(1) LFL/2 758 S3 LFL 400 5D LFL/2 538 ((1) The scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible. Distances calculated to give assessment of a worst case scenario

TOP2: Release of gasoline from bottom of Column DA-2503 The analysis considers the release from the 6” pipe at the bottom outlet of the DA-2503 column. The following Table 54 summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event. Table 54: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, main characteristics

LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE EQUIPMENT Bottom line of DA-2503

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LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE SUBSTANCE Gasoline (Modeled as Octane) DIAMETER OF OUTFLOW 1” 4” SECTION TEMPERATURE 191 C 191 C PRESSURE 12.7 barg 12.7 barg OUTFLOW RATE 13 kg/s 208 kg/s The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a two-phase jet that, in case of ignition, will cause a Jet Fire and a Pool fire of the rain-out quantity. If the jet is not ignited, it will disperse. If the cloud is SCENARIO ignited at distance from the source, where the gas DEVELOPMENT concentration is still within the flammable limits, it can give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending on the congestion conditions. If no ignition is found, the cloud will disperse without any further consequences. 10 minutes < 1 minute (considering RELEASE DURATION shutdown activation)

The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following Table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7 events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible. Table 55: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, scenario

Release Size 1” Release Size 4” WEATHER SCENARIO DAMAGE DAMAGE CONDITIONS LEVEL DISTANCE LEVEL DISTANCE (m) (m) 1.5F/5D Flame Flame 14 20 length length 37.5 37.5 5 7 kW/m2 kW/m2 Jet /Pool Fire 12.5 12.5 2 15 2 16 S4 kW/m kW/m 7 kW/m2 20 7 kW/m2 25 5 kW/m2 25 5 kW/m2 28 3 kW/m2 31 3 kW/m2 37 1.5F Flammable Flammable 660 3000 mass mass 0.3 bar - (2) 0.3 bar - (1) 0.14 bar - (2) 0.14 bar - (1) 0.07 bar - (2) 0.07 bar - (1) UVCE 0.03 bar - (2) 0.03 bar - (1) S5 5D Flammable Flammable 250 2600 mass mass 0.3 bar - (2) 0.3 bar - (1) 0.14 bar - (2) 0.14 bar - (1) 0.07 bar - (2) 0.07 bar - (1)

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Release Size 1” Release Size 4” WEATHER SCENARIO DAMAGE DAMAGE CONDITIONS LEVEL DISTANCE LEVEL DISTANCE (m) (m) 0.03 bar - (2) 0.03 bar - (1) 1.5F LFL 85 LFL - (1)

(1) Flash Fire LFL/2 112 LFL/2 - S6 5D LFL 83 LFL - (1) LFL/2 112 LFL/2 - (1) (1) Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible. (2) Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg and the explosion is to be considered not credible. TOP3: Release of propane from bottom of Splitter DA-2509 The analysis considers the release from the 3” pipe at the bottom outlet of the DA-2509 column. The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event. Table 56: TOP3 – Release from DA-2509, main characteristics

LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT Bottom line of DA-2509 SUBSTANCE Propane DIAMETER OF 1” 3” OUTFLOW SECTION TEMPERATURE 62 C 62 C PRESSURE 21 barg 21 barg OUTFLOW RATE 2.8 kg/s 25 kg/s The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a two-phase jet that, in case of ignition, will cause a Jet Fire. SCENARIO If the jet is not ignited, it will disperse. If the cloud is DEVELOPMENT ignited at distance from the source, where the gas concentration is still within the flammable limits, it can give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending on the congestion conditions. > 1 hour 10 minutes (considering RELEASE DURATION shutdown activation)

The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7 events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible. Table 57: TOP3 – Release from DA 2509, scenario

Release Size 1” Release Size 3” WEATHER SCENARIO DAMAGE DAMAGE CONDITIONS LEVEL DISTANCE LEVEL DISTANCE (m) (m) Jet Fire Flame 1.5F/5D Flame length 19 46 S7 length

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Release Size 1” Release Size 3” WEATHER SCENARIO DAMAGE DAMAGE CONDITIONS LEVEL DISTANCE LEVEL DISTANCE (m) (m) 37.5 37.5 kW/m2 5 14 kW/m2 12.5 12.5 kW/m2 8 30 kW/m2 7 kW/m2 11 7 kW/m2 42 5 kW/m2 14 5 kW/m2 50 3 kW/m2 20 3 kW/m2 60 Flammable Flammable 100 3400 mass mass 0.3 bar - (2) 0.3 bar - (1) 1.5F 0.14 bar - (2) 0.14 bar - (1) 0.07 bar - (2) 0.07 bar - (1)

(2) (1) UVCE 0.03 bar - 0.03 bar - S8 Flammable Flammable 10 260 mass mass 0.3 bar - (2) 0.3 bar - (1), (2) 5D 0.14 bar - (2) 0.14 bar - (1), (2) 0.07 bar - (2) 0.07 bar - (1), (2) 0.03 bar - (2) 0.03 bar - (1), (2) LFL 85 LFL - (1) 1.5F (1) Flash Fire LFL/2 112 LFL/2 - S9 LFL 83 LFL - (1) 5D LFL/2 112 LFL/2 - (1) (1) Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible. (2) Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg and the explosion is to be considered not credible.

Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953 The analysis considers a release from FA-2953. The following Table summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event. Table 58: EVENT 4 – Release from FA-2953, main characteristics

LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT FA-2953 SUBSTANCE H2S (90%) DIAMETER OF OUTFLOW 50 mm Not considered SECTION TEMPERATURE 77 C PRESSURE 5 barg OUTFLOW RATE 2.2 kg/s SCENARIO The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a

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DEVELOPMENT dispersing jet. RELEASE 15 minutes (considering shutdown activation) DURATION

The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following Table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7 events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible. Table 59: Event 4 – Release from FA-2953, scenario

Release size 100 mm Scenario WEATHER DAMAGE DISTANCE LEVEL CONDITION (m) LC50 420 1.5F Toxic Dispersion IDLH 1300 S10 LC50 230 5D IDLH 720

Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2455 The analysis considers a release from FA-2455. The following Table summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event. Table 60: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, main characteristics

LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT FA-2455 SUBSTANCE H2S (70%), SO2 (30%) DIAMETER OF 100 mm Not considered OUTFLOW SECTION TEMPERATURE 102 C PRESSURE 1 barg OUTFLOW RATE 2.9 kg/s SCENARIO The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a DEVELOPMENT dispersing jet. RELEASE Approx 45 minutes DURATION

The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following Table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7 events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible. The distances given in the table refer to the concentration of H2S, that is the main component of the mixture. Table 61: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, scenario

Release size 100 mm Scenario WEATHER DAMAGE DISTANCE LEVEL CONDITION (m) LC50 360 Toxic Dispersion 1.5F IDLH 1100 S11 5D LC50 255

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IDLH 670

2.7.4.5 Domino effect from Event TOP1 Domino effects from Event TOP1 can be mainly due to overpressure effects. The criteria for the definition of damage levels associated to overpressure are given in Table 50. Table 62 shows the level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures. Table 62: Level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures

1 Scenario Scenario Nr. 1 (EML ) Structure parts, probability (p) 0.0000015 equipment (example only!) Value % Damage Description (milion €) Damage (k€)

• Overpressure of 0.05bar • Damage of 90% glass Atmospheric 500 5 - 10 1200 • Instrumentation distillation damage • In worst case scenario, about 10% damage Command center 10 0.0

• Overpressure of 10kPa (0.1bar). • Damage of structures of 60%, process equipment 10% Vacuum 1100 10 2400 • Metal frames slightly distillation moved • Small amount of damage inside; can be repaired • Damage of light roof constructions • Overpressure of 15 kPa (0.15 bar) • Damage, but not destruction of structures • Glass and FCC 11000 30 9000 instrumentation damaged • Electrical cabling and control equipment damaged • The inner part of the cooling tower damaged • Overpressure of 10kPa (0.1bar). • Structural damage of 60%, process equipment of 10% Sulphurisation 700 10 70 • Metal frames slightly moved • Small amount of damage inside; can be repaired • Damage of light roof constructions Alkylation 1000 100 1000 total damage Total 14310 13670

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VAR (k €) 20.505

2.7.4.6 Summary of Hazard Analysis

The results of the hazard analysis are summarized in Annex 23. The following information are given: • initiating event • accidental scenarios deriving from initiating event • frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios • damage distances.

2.7.4.7 Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards Measures to avoid the occurrence of leaks and ruptures, to avoid ignition of leaking substances, to limit effects of fires/explosion, to avoid or control process deviations are Organizational and/or Technical and are described in Chapter 2.1.3.4.

Organizational measures The intended major maintenance period is every three years. In reality at the moment there is a major maintenance shut down per year as the process has been modified to increase the efficiency of the process. The modification can partly lead to erosion and corrosion. This has to be controlled at the moment by a yearly inspection. The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU regulations. It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented. The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department.

Lighting protection Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About 10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has been addressed by lightning. The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an external party.

2.7.4.8 Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident Constructional and technical measures are presented in Chapter 2.1.3.4. Further, bow-tie analysis has been done for selected top events described in Chapter 2.7.4.2 and summarized in Table 63. The bow-tie is a structured method to assess risk where a qualitative approach may not be possible or desirable. The success of the diagram is that it is simple and easy for the non- specialist to understand. The idea is a simple one of combining the cause (fault tree) and the consequence (event tree). When the fault tree is drawn on the left hand side and the event tree is drawn on the right hand side with the hazard drawn as a "knot" in the middle the diagram looks a bit like a bowtie.

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The exact starting point of the Bowtie Methodology has been lost in time but it is believed that they were originally called “Butterfly diagrams” and evolved from the Cause Consequence Diagram of the 1970s. It is then thought that David Gill of ICI plc developed the methodology and called them bowties in the late 70’s. It is generally accepted that the earliest mention of the bowtie methodology appears in the ICI Hazan Course Notes 1979, presented by The University of Queensland, Australia. Bowtie diagrams for FCC have been created for selected top events which are to be prevented by • analyzing threats that could cause the event to occur • analyzing consequences of the event occurring • using available controls to prevent the event occurring and • using available controls to mitigate against the consequences Table 63: Selected TOP events and scenario

No Description Content Phase Component Vessel, Leak, inside S1: pool fire TOP1 S2: delayed VCE propylene liquid FA-2514 S3: BLEVE S4: Flash fire Column, Leak, bottom S5: jet fire TOP2 gasoline liquid DA-2503 S6: UVCE S7: Flash fire Splitter, Leak, bottom S8: jet fire TOP3 propane liquid DA-2509 S9: VCE S10: flash fire Vessel, leak of toxic gas TOP4 90% H2S, gas FA-2953 S11: Dispersion Vessel, Leak of toxic (mixture) gas from the H2S, SO2, gas FA-2455 TOP5 combustion chambers Co2 S12:

Corresponding bow-ties are given in Annex 24.

2.7.5 Risk assessment The risk associated to the FCC operation is assessed through a Risk Matrix.

2.7.5.1 Frequency ranking

The frequency of occurrence of scenarios is assessed according to the classes given in table :

2.7.5.2 Damage severity The severity of damages associated to each scenario is assessed according to the following classes, where the severity is related to the maximum distance at which the damage levels

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are experienced. It shall be noted that the definition of severity considers major hazards having a potential impact on the population, as required by the Seveso II directive. Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes

Frequency Classification Scenario (events/year) PROBABLE > 10-2 UNLIKELY 10-4 ÷ 10-2 VERY UNLIKELY 10-6 ÷ 10-4 S10, S11 EXTREMELY UNLIKELY < 10-6 S1 – S9

Effects limited to the plant personnel are therefore in this context considered as not defining a major hazards. These are assessed and controlled by Occupational Health procedures and analyzes. Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes

Classification Damage

No significant effects if not in the vicinity of the Neligible involved equipment Effect dangerous for life (12.5 kW/m2, 0.14 bar, Significant IDLH) reached within the FCC Unit. Effect dangerous for life (12.5 kW/m2, 0.14 bar, Serious IDLH) reached outside the FCC Unit, limited within the Refinery fences. Effect dangerous for life (12.5 kW/m2, 0.14 bar, Major IDLH) reached outside the refinery fences.

On the basis of the above definition, the risk associated to each scenario can be assessed as in the following Risk Matrix, where three levels of risk are sown: an High risk area (in red) where prevention and protection measures shall be considered to reduce the risk, a Medium Risk area (in yellow) where prevention and protection measures should be considered to reduce the risk, a Low risk area (in green) where the risk can be considered to be tolerable and no further measures are necessary.

Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios S3, S5, S6, Negligible S8, S9 Significant S1, S4, S7

Serious S2 S11, S10

Major Extremely unlikely Very unlikely unlikely Probable

2.7.6 Conclusions

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3 RBI / RCM User’s manual

Due to size and for easier use of the manual it is given as a separate book.

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4 References

[1] Contract No: 45/609 of September 8, 2006 [2] API RP 581, Risk-Based Inspection Technology, Second edition, September 2008 [3] CEN CWA 15740 RIMAP, 2008 [4] HSE RNP, Implementation of HSE in NIS a.d. Plants NIS RNP Safety report, May 2008 [5] Understanding explosions (2003) By Daniel A. Crowl. Center for Chemical Process Safety of the AIChE, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 16, Issue 5, Page 449 [6]

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5 Annexes

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Annex 1 Geographical position of Pancevo

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Annex 2 Industrial zone of Pancevo

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Annex 3 General plan of Pancevo refinery

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Annex 4 Organization of Pancevo refinery

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Annex 5 General plan of Novi Sad refinery

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Annex 6 Substances in Novi Sad refinery

Nr Generic, chemical or other Place in process Mas (t) name or chemical formula Raw Intermedi By- Final Max. Av. Av. Waste Transport Transfer Storage material ate product product daily monthly yearly 1. Crude oil x R 558527 2. LPG x R 847 3. Primary gasoline x R 27042 4. Motor gasoline MB-95 x R 6957 5. Motor gasoline BMB-95 x R 20527 6. Dizel x R 157221 7. Fuel oil x R 11591 8. Mazut x R 154034 9. Bitumene x R 31320 10. Oil distillate x x R 55796 11. HCl x R 2530 12. NaOH x R 1791

13. NH4OH x B 2 14. Na OCl x R 6

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Nr Generic, chemical or other Place in process Mas (t) name or chemical formula 15. NALCO 71221 (Coagulant for x R 5,2 raw water) 16. NALCO 71601 x R 1,1 t

17. Na3PO4 x R 0,3 t

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Annex 7 Organization of Novi Sad refinery

RNS Director

Director’s Office

Secretariat

Business Coord. Technical-Technological Department Department

Information and Production PR Service

Center for MS Manipulation

Maintenance Laboratory Development and Risk Management Legal, personnel and Investment General Affairs

Power Plant

ICTI Economics Goods Management Finance and Commercial Counting Business

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Annex 8 Responsibilities’ within management system in Novi Sad refinery

A.8.1 According to the requests of the standard ISO 9001:2000 (SRPS ISO 9001:2001)

ISO 9001 Requirement Function/job position Comment 4 Quality management system General requests - determinig, documenting, RNS director, implementation, management representative management representative is 4.1 maintenance and constant improvement of QMS main responsible effectiveness top management, - QMS implementation management representative 4.2 Requests refering to documentation Overall management system for top management, 4.2.1 General requests all QMS documentation and management representative records

Quality manual Development, management and 4.2.2 management representative management maintenance top management, Official management with all Documentation 4.2.3 management representative documentation, records and management MSC manager computer media used in QMS

Records management and 4.2.4 Records management top management removal 5 MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES Management Development, implementation top management, 5.1 responsibilities and and improvement of QMS management representative activities effectiveness

Ensurance that users top management, 5.2 Focus on user requirements are determined and management representative met Quality policy RNS director - declaring quality policy

- implementation and Communication and top management, 5.3 maintenance of quality interpretation of quality policy to management representative policy all people in the organization top management, - quality policy review management representative 5.4 Planning Setting quality objectives at certain functions and levels top management, within the organization, 5.4.1 Quality objectives management representative measuring quality objectives, compliance with quality policy and constant improvement

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ISO 9001 Requirement Function/job position Comment obligation In order to accomplish quality top management, 5.4.2 QMS planning objectives, QMS has to be management representative planned

5.5 Responsibilities, authorizations and communication Defining and communicating Responsibilities and top management, 5.5.1 responsibilities and authorizations management representative authorizations in the organization Management Appointing management 5.5.2 Direktor RNS representative representative Establishing appropriate 5.5.3 Internal communications top management communication processes in the organization top management, 5.6 Review by management QMS review in planned intervals management representative 6. RESOURSE MANAGEMENT Provision of resources organizational parts - defining required managers Defining and providing required 6.1 resources resources - provision of required RNS director resources 6.2 Human resources - general provisions, (staff 6.2.1 RNS director allocation) Ensuring staff is competent based on adequate qualifications, top management - qualification, awareness training, knowledge and 6.2.2 head of the Personnel and training experience Section Infrastructure - defining required top management infrastructure and its Operations director Defining, establishing and 6.3 maintenance maintaining infrastructure - establishment of the RNS director required infrastructure Defining and managing human 6.4 Working environment top management and physical factors of working environment

7. PRODUCTS REALIZATION Planning and development of Planning of products 7.1 top management processes required for products realization realization

7.2 Processes applying to customers Director of Department for Ensuring that agreement related Determining requests Materials Flow Management to customers requests, changes 7.2.1 related to products (MFM), and amendments has been (services) Director of techncial and achieved technological operations Revision of requests Functions of participants in Ensuring the organization has an 7.2.2 related to products the revision process ability to meet requirements (services) Director of Department for Materials Flow Management Communication with Ensuring potential additional 7.2.3 (MFM), customers requests are fullfiled Director of techncial and technological operations 7.3 Design and development

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ISO 9001 Requirement Function/job position Comment Managing and coordinating From planning design and top management, design and development by 7.3.1 development to managing director of Department for planning, input elements, output do changes of design and development and elements, revisions, verifications, 7.3.7 development investments validation and changes management 7.4 Supply 7.4.1 Supply process Selection and rating of suppliers 7.4.2 Supply information Director of Department for and receipt of supplied commercial operations Verification of supplied products/services 7.4.3 products

7.5 Production and servicing Production and servicing Planning, producing and servicing 7.5.1 management in conditions of management Validation of processes whose Validation of production resulting output elements can 7.5.2 and servicing processes not be verified by follow-up monitoring and measurements Director of technical and technological operations, Identification of products and Identification and 7.5.3 Director of Operations management with unique reproducibility Director of Handling Dept identification of products Director of Energy Plant Identification, verification, safety 7.5.4 Users assets and provision of customers assets Maintaining compliance of 7.5.5 Products perservation products during the realization of internal processes Determining management Managing tracking and Director of technical and 7.6 method by monitoring and measuring devices technological operations measuring devices 8. MEASUREMENTS, ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENTS Planning and conducting processes of monitoring, 8.1 General provisions top management measuring, analysis and improvements 8.2 Monitoring and measurements Director of Department for Tracking information about Meeting customers 8.2.1 Materials Flow Management customers observations related requirements (MFM) to meeting requirements

management Contrinuous rating of QMS 8.2.2 Internal audit representative, compliance and effectiveness MSC manager Monitoring and measuring Showing processes abilities to 8.2.3 top management processes performances achieve planned results Director of technical and technological operations, Director of Operations Verification of requests for Monitoring and measuring Director of Handling Dept 8.2.4 products (controlling, products characteristics Director of Laboratory examination, monitoring) Director of Department for Materials Flow Management (MFM) Director of technical and technological operations, Managing inconsistencies Analysis and treating 8.3 Director of Operations in a product inconsistencies in a product Director of Handling Dept

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ISO 9001 Requirement Function/job position Comment Determining, collecting and analyzing data about a process 8.4 Data analysis top management and product and taking measures based on the obtained data 8.5 Improvements Improving QMS effectiveness by using quality policy, quality 8.5.1 - Constant improvements top management, objectives, results of revisions, do - Corrective actions management representative data analysis, corrective actions, 8.5.3 - Preventive actions preventive actions and assesment by the management

A.8.2 According to the requests of the standard ISO 14001:2004 (SRPS ISO 14001:2005)

ISO Requirement Function/job position Comment 14001 General requests

determining,documenting, top management, MS management representative 4.1 implemetation, MS management is main responsible maintenance and representative continuous EMS improvement Announcement, development, top management, MS maintenance, communication to 4.2 Environmental policy management representative all employees; revision and audit. 4.3 Planning top management, Identification of important 4.3.1 Environmental aspects MS management environmental aspects,revision representative and constant updating.

top management, Determining identification MS management procedures and approaches to Legal and other representative, legal and other reqests that 4.3.2 requirements EMS coordinator relate to environmental aspects (Environmental Dept and RNS’ activities, products or manager) services. Determining application and maintenance of documented general and specific envionmental objectives in compliance with adopted policy top management, and obligation to prevent General and specific 4.3.3 MS management environemntal pollution. objectives and programs representative Development and maintaining of a program for accomplishing defined general and specific objectives that specifies responsibilities, assets and deadlines for their realization. 4.4 Application and implementation Providing resources availability. Setting, documenting and communicating objectives, Resources, objectives, responsibilities and 4.4.1 responsibilities and Director of RNS authorizations authorizations Appointing one or more management representatives for environment. Qualifications, training top management, Identification of needs for 4.4.2 and awareness MS management professional improvements.

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ISO Requirement Function/job position Comment 14001 representative, Education, professional Head of the Personnel improvements and gaining Section experience for competency purpose. Presenting EMS to staff and creating awareness about environment, motivation of people. top management, Implementing and maintaining 4.4.3 Communication MS management internal and external representative communication. Determining different types of documentation that are being managed, application and top management, maintenance of efficient working MS management 4.4.4 Documentation procedures and controls related representative, to EMS. MSC manager Documentation (information) can be on paper and/or in an electronic form.

Establishing, applying and top management, maintaining documented MS management procedures for documentation 4.4.5 Documentation control representative, control that is required by EMS MSC manager and standard SRPS ISO 14001:2005. Establishing, applying and maintaining documented procedures for the control of operations and activities related Managers directly to determined important responsible for performance 4.4.6 Operations controls environmental aspects. of a specific operation, Determining working criteria in direct operations executors. procedures. Introducing suppliers and contractors with specific procedures and requests. Identification of potential accidents and hazardous events, response and prevention and top management, mitigation of their environmental Alertness to response in other employees within the impact. 4.4.7 emergency situations defined competencies and Periodic assessment, if required, responsibilities. revision of responsiveness in emergency situations as well as examination of response procedures.

4.5 Revision Establishing, application and maintenance of regular monitoring and measuring procedures of crucial operations EMS coordinator characteristics that may have an (Environmental Dept important influence on 4.5.1 Montoring and measuring manager) environment and information MS management documentation. representative, Ensuring that calibrated and verified equipment is used ofr monitoring and measuring, keeping records of related documentation. EMS coordinator Establishing, application and 4.5.2 Compliance evaluation (Environmental Dept maintenance of procedures of

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ISO Requirement Function/job position Comment 14001 manager) periodic evaluation of compliance MS management with applicable legal and other representative, requests which RNS approved. Establishing, applying and maintaining procedures for MS management determining inconsistencies, representative, identifying the cause of Inconsistencies, corrective MSC manager, 4.5.3 inconsistencies, taking corrective and preventive actions other employees within the and preventive actions in defined competencies and proportion to the difficulty of a responsibilities. problem and its influence on the environment. Establishing, applying and top management, maintaining procedures for MS management records management required by 4.5.4 Records control representative, the standard JUS ISO MSC manager 14001:2004 and by standards used in EMS.

Establishing and maintaining one or more programs and procedures for performing planned controls to determine MS management whether EMS is in compliance 4.5.5 Internal audits representative, with planned EMS solution, is it MSC manager properly introduced and maintained and communication of process results to the management. top management, Management has a responsibility MS management to do EMS revision in planned 4.6 Revision by management representative, intervals to enable its suitability, MSC manager adequacy and effectiveness.

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Annex 9 Novi Sad refinery – flow diagram of U 100

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Annex 10 Refinery Novi Sad – flow diagram of U 200

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Annex 11 Elemir Gas refinery in NIS Naftagas

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Annex 12 Integrated management system policy of NIS Naftagas

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Annex 13 Flow diagram of Elemir Gas Refinery

D - 4 C-1,2 A/B C-102 D-8 F-302 D-300 F-301 D-101 T-1 E-110 T-101 T-9 D-16 E-102 E-101 A/B E-2 E-1 A/B E-120 D-120 D-102 T-2 E-104 E-3 D-1 E-5 D-104 E-103 E-6 A/B E-7 D-5 D-103 E-15 SC-1 D-121 E-116 E-4 D-122 F-1; F-201 E-24 A/B T-3 E-9 E-11 E-10 T-4 D-2 E-12 E-16 E-17 D-6 E-18 T-7 E-19 D-7 E-20 A/B T-8 E-21 E-22 E-23 PRIHVATNI PRIHVATNA KOMPRESORI KOMPRESOR PRIHVATNA FILTER ZA TROFAZNI FILTER ZA SEPARATOR DEHIDRATACIONA DEHIDRATACIONA KOLONA ZA SEPARATOR PROPANSKI IZMENJIVAC PROPANSKI IZMENJIVAC PROPANSKI SEPARATOR SEPARATOR APSORBER IZMENJIVAC PROPANSKI PRIHVATNI IZMENJIVAC SEPARATOR PROPANSKI IZMENJIVAC PROPANSKI PRIHVATNI VODENI CENTRIFUGALNI SEPARATOR ZA VODENI VODENI KOALESCER PEC PROPANSKI DEETANIZER IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC RIBOJLER DESTILATOR PRIHVATNA KONDENZATOR IZMENJIVAC RIBOJLER PRIHVATNA IZMENJIVAC DEBUTANIZER RIBOJLER PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA KONDENZATOR DEIZOBUTANIZER RIBOJLER VODENI KONDENZATOR IZMENJIVAC POSUDA ZA WEIR KLARK COOPER-BESSEMER POSUDA ZA SIROVI SEPARATOR GASNI POSUDA KOLONA KOLONA SUŠENJE POSUDA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK TOPLOTE HLADNJAK POSUDA POSUDA TOPLOTE HLADNJAK SUD TOPLOTE POSUDA HLADNJAK TOPLOTE HLADNJAK SUD ZA SUD ZA PARE HLADNJAK SEPARATOR RABLJENO ULJE HLADNJAK HLADNJAK HLADNJAK TOPLOTE TOPLOTE POSUDA TOPLOTE POSUDA ZA TOPLOTE SMEŠU N-BUTANA I HLADNJAK TOPLOTE TOPLOTE IZO-BUTAN KONDENZAT KONDENZATA PROPAN PROPANA PROPAN PROPAN IZO-BUTANA GAZOLIN

1 E-103 PRC PRC 151 3 LC 131 E-20A E-20B HCV 150 E-12 E-18 HO HO E-1A E-120 IIIC-102 1 1 PREMA PREMA E-24A E-8 D-5 TIC T-5 D-9 LCV 4A FI 7 2 PIC 200.1 E-23 210 13 LC 8 1 1 LCV TRC FI 9 T-9 200.2 PRC TRC 152A 152 PRC LC E-1B 9 151 4 TIC 19 204 T-3 FRC PRC 9 TRC 1 1 1 E-104 E-6A FRC PC 6 9 4 T-6 10 KA T -3 15 E-110 5 E-24B E-9 HIC TS 150 PRC PREMA T-7 8 PC 1 PRC T-101 E-2 TIC 18 TS FRC 7 301 PC 16 13 E-3 4B E-110 TIC 150 10 T-1 E-2 6 25 PCV E-7 6 FRC 301B E-6B E-11 FRC 13 19 11 29 10 LC od C-2A C-1A C-2B C-1B F-201 LC 23 T-8 D-120 151 E-2 19 PCV 6 D-104 208 C3 E-3 24 301A CW FRC C3 C3 E-7 7 LC LC 26 E-102 35 D-8 1 154 FIQ E-116 T-4 102 E-3 E-7 C-2A C-1A C-2B C-1B D-2 F-1 35 D-7 E-22 PCV T-2 LC D-6 E-4 29 10 24 OD/PREMA 30 PRC CW CW PREMA E-5 TRC 152 TRC 9 C-1A/B 8 UV 154 E-5 E-101A C3 C3 D-101 TRC LC LC C3 od E-4 5 E-19 E-21 35 2 152 TRC CW 3 E-10 LC LI LC D-103 E-15 8 LC D-16 19 19 101 LC LC 13 LG SC-1 3 153 E-101B LG LC 11 LC LC CW CW D-121 155 156 D - 4 7 20 5 LC LI TRC SV TRCAH 129 7 7 160 LCV D-1 6 101 D-102 LC 114 TSH

GS ELEMIR 163 FRC E-102 FS SV PRCA 14 FRC 8 6 160 5 LS 157 FRC PREMA E-2 PREMA E-3 PREMA E-7 8 TRC PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA RABLJENO ULJE 128 C3 KA D -9 LOŽIVI GAS

ULAZNA ŠAHTA FIQ 103 GAS PRERAÐENI

KA T-4; T-6; FIQ FIQ 106 T-8 PCV FIQ FIQ FIQ FIQ 201 100 03-01 107 104

AS 150 FIQ ULAZ GASAULAZ GASA D-122 IZOBUTAN NORMALNI BUTAN LCV OD 101 F-302 PS-4 GAZOLIN PROPAN D-9 SMEŠA SMEŠA U PRELIVNI PREMA PENTANA P-9A/B BUTANA OD E-25 P-11 P-7A/B P-8A/B ŠAHT GR-1/GR-102 P-120A/B P-1A/B/C P-2A/B P-4A/B/C P-5A/B D-300 LAH LAL LIC 301 301 301 P- 30

F-301

SIROVI GAZOLIN IZ PROIZVODNIH REZERVOARA Legenda: 24.08. 2006 Propan U PRELIVNI D-27A N-butan ŠAHT Jašin/Subotin Izobutan Gazolin S.Josipovic Prirodni gas Preradeni gas A.Ilic Apsorpciono ulje Projektni zadatak za izr. URP Kondezat ugljovodonika Toplo ulje rekonstr. sist. za prikupljanje i spaljivanje Rashladni propan Bogato ulje fluida u pogonu za proizv. NTG El. Rashladna voda NIS Naftagas TEHNOLOŠKA ŠEMA POGONA TNG TEG 1 Loživi gas Pogon za proizv. NTG ELEMIR

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Annex 14 Position of unit FCC in Pancevo refinery

A.14.1 Blocks in Pancevo refinery

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A.14.2 General plan of refinery – position of FCC in Block 6

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Annex 15 QMS/EMS documents of RNP

No Document full name, English File name 1. Environment Management Manual EMS_Poslovnik.doc 2. Identification of environmental aspects EP01.doc 3. Validation of environment impact EP02.doc 4. Legal and other requirements EP03.doc 5. Environment goals and objective EP04.doc Programs for environment 6. EP05.doc management 7. Communication in EMS EP06.doc 8. Waste management EP07.doc 9. Dangerous materials management EP08.doc 10. Oil management EP09.doc 11. Readiness for emergency situation EPO10.dok 12. Monitoring and measuring EPO11.dok 13. Nonconformities resolution in EMS EPO12.dok 14. Quality plan PQ000.doc Plan for implementation and 15. PQ002.doc certification of EMS 16. Start up and shut down of the unit QG45-01.doc Instruction for operation and 17. QG46-09.doc maintenance of swimming roofs 18. Work order QG55-01.doc Conduction of maintenance works in 19. QG55-02.doc RNP 20. Equipment control, QG55-03.doc 21. Quality Manual QMS_Poslovnik.doc Formatting of quality management 22. QP01.doc system documents Control of management systems 23. QP02.doc documents 24. Standards and QP03.doc 25. Control of records QP04.doc 26. Strategic studies – development plans QP05.doc 27. Business analysis and planning QP06.doc 28. Job descriptions QP08.doc

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No Document full name, English File name 29. Management review QP10.doc 30. Education and training QP11.doc Knowladge of management systems in 31. QP12.doc RNP 32. Personnel evidence QP13.doc 33. Maintenance QP16.doc 34. Maintenance planning QP17.doc Preventive, corrective and investments 35. QP18.doc maintenance 36. Unit and equipment overhaul QP19.doc 37. Hardware QP20.doc 38. Security QP21.doc 39. Sales QP23.doc Contracting, contract elements and 40. QP24.doc contract review 41. Business communication and protocol QP25.doc 42. Product development QP26.doc 43. Development and investments QP27.doc 44. Facilities construction QP29.doc 45. Development of information system QP33.doc 46. Software QP35.doc 47. Design and construction in QP36.doc maintenance 48. Purchasing QP38.doc 49. Suppliers validation and selection QP39.doc 50. Production QP44.doc 51. Control of production process QP45.doc 52. Manipulation QP46.doc 53. Finalization QP47.doc 54. Crude oil and derivates reception QP48.doc 55. Power plant QP50.doc 56. Technological steam production and QP51.doc distribution 57. Chemical and technological preparation QP52.doc of water 58. Electricity production and distribution QP53.doc 59. Work order for works in refinery QP55.doc 60. Product servicing QP56.doc 61. Material balance counting QP58.doc 62. Legal, general and personnel affairs QP59.doc 63. Library of RNP QP60.doc 64. Product identification and traceability QP61.doc

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No Document full name, English File name 65. Customer supplied product control QP63.doc 66. 67. Delivery of oil products QP65.doc 68. Measuring, control and monitoring QP66.doc equipment 69. Customer satisfaction measuring and QP67.doc monitoring 70. Internal audits QP68.doc 71. Technical surveillance over the equipment and conduction of QP69.doc maintenance works in RNP 72. Control plans QP70.doc 73. Sampling and samples marking QP71.doc 74. Customers complains QP72.doc 75. Corrective and preventive measures QP74.doc

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Annex 16 List of available drawings of FCC

Oznaka NIS- Drawing Title Design Drawing designation RNP Foster Standard symbols Wheeler 2231-0-50-2300.B LO 03A18A (FW)

FCC process. Reactor stripper. FW 2231-0-50-2301.F LO 03A18A

FCC process. Regenerator. FW 2231-0-50-2302.G LO 03A18A FCC process. Air blowers and air FW 2231-0-50-2303.F LO 03A18A heaters. FCC process. Catalytic transport FW 2231-0-50-2304.F LO 03A18A and storage FCC process. Air surge & Spray FW 2231-0-50-2305.F LO 03A18A water drums

FCC process. Engineering details FW 2231-0-50-2306.F LO 03A18A

FCC process. Feed preheat system. FW 2231-0-50-2307.G LO 03A18A

FCC process. Main fractionators. FW 2231-0-50-2308.F LO 03A18A

FCC process. ICGO&LCGO strippers FW 2231-0-50-2309.G LO 03A18A

FCC process. Fractionator OH FW 2231-0-50-2310.F LO 03A18A System. FCC process. Gland & flushing oil FW 2231-0-50-2311.E LO 03A18A system.

FCC process. CO Boiler FW 2231-0-50-2312.E LO 03A18A

FCC process. Fired heaters burner FW 2231-0-50-2313.D LO 03A18A and decoking detail FCC process. Evaporization system FW 2231-0-50-2314.E LO 03A18A for of LPG and gas fuel FCC process. Battery limit pipelines FW 2231-0-50-2321.B LO 03A18A FCC process. Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating unit (2400). Feed FW 2231-0-50-2401.F LO 03A18A exchangers section. Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating unit (2400). Feed exchangers and FW 2231-0-50-2402.F LO 03A18A reactor section. FCC complex. Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating unit (2400). Effluent separators & FW 2231-0-50-2403.F LO 03A18A recycle gas scrubber section. FCC complex. Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating FW 2231-0-50-2404.G LO 03A18A unit (2400). Compress section. FCC

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Oznaka NIS- Drawing Title Design Drawing designation RNP complex

Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating unit (2400). Stripper section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2405.F LO 03A18A complex. Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating unit (2400). Product exchangers FW 2231-0-50-2406.E LO 03A18A section. FCC complex Flare header system. Hydrotreating unit 2400, SRU 2450 LPG Merox unit 2550, light naphtha sweetening FW 2231-0-50-2407.E LO 03A18A unit 2750 Heavy naphtha sweetening unit 2850. KO drum FA- 2420. FCC complex LCGO hydrotreating unit. Compressor GB-2401A/B & GB- FW 2231-0-50-2408.A LO 03A18A 2420 A/B Auxiliaries. FCC complex Sulphur production & storage unit. Sulphur recovery unit, sheet 1. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2451.F LO 03A18A complex Sulphur production & storage unit. Sulphur recovery unit, sheet 2. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2452.B LO 03A18A complex Gas concentration unit (2500). FW 2231-0-50-2501.F LO 03A18A Compression section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). Gas FW 2231-0-50-2502.G LO 03A18A absorption section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). De- FW 2231-0-50-2503.F LO 03A18A ethanizer section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). FW 2231-0-50-2504.F LO 03A18A Debutanizer section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). Naphtha splitter section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2505.F LO 03A18A complex Gas concentration unit (2500). H2S FW 2231-0-50-2506.F LO 03A18A scrubber section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). FW 2231-0-50-2507.G LO 03A18A Depropanizer section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). C3 FW 2231-0-50-2508.H LO 03A18A drier section. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). Propylene splitter section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2509.G LO 03A18A complex Gas concentration unit (2500). Corrosion inhibitor section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2510.F LO 03A18A complex Gas concentration unit (2500). Condensate recovery system. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2511.F LO 03A18A complex

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Oznaka NIS- Drawing Title Design Drawing designation RNP Condensate collection and FW 2231-0-50-2512.F LO 03A18A blowdown systems. FCC complex Steam distribution. HP steam. MP FW 2231-0-50-2513.E LO 03A18A steam. FCC complex FCC Process. LP steam system. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2514.D LO 03A18A complex FCC Process. Cooling water supply. FW 2231-0-50-2515.D LO 03A18A FCC complex Plant air. Instrument air. Flashed condensate. Boiler feed water. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2516.E LO 03A18A complex

Fire protection system FW 2231-0-50-2517.D LO 03A18A

Flare header systems. FCC (2300), GCU (2500) SWS (2900) Amine FW 2231-0-50-2518.E LO 03A18A regeneration. FCC complex Nitrogen. Closed amine drain. Light FW 2231-0-50-2519.E LO 03A18A slops. OffSpec LPG. FCC complex Utility and potable water. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2520.E LO 03A18A complex Cooling water balance. Summer FW 2231-0-50-2521.B LO 03A18A and winter cases. FCC complex Cooling water balance. Summer FW 2231-0-50-2522.B LO 03A18A and winter cases. FCC complex Gas concentration unit (2500). Compressors auxiliaries. GB-2301 FW 2231-0-50-2523.C LO 03A18A and GB-2501.FCC complex

Cooling water return. FCC complex FW 2231-0-50-2524.C LO 03A18A

LP condensate. MP condensate. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2525.D LO 03A18A complex. Merox unit (2550). LPG extraction. FW 2231-0-50-2551.E LO 03A18A Sheet1. FCC complex Merox unit (2550). LPG extraction. FW 2231-0-50-2552.E LO 03A18A Sheet 2. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation process (2600). Coalescer section. FW 2231-0-50-2601.D LO 03A18A Sheet 1 of 11. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation process (2600). Reactor section. FW 2231-0-50-2602.E LO 03A18A Sheet 2 of 11. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation process (2600). Refrigeration FW 2231-0-50-2603.E LO 03A18A section. Sheet 3 of 11. FCC complex Alkylation unit (2600). Refrigerant compression. Sheet 4 of 11FCC FW 2231-0-50-2604.F LO 03A18A complex.. EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s process Unit (2600). Sheet 6 of FW 2231-0-50-2605.D LO 03A18A 11FCC complex. OP feed caustic &

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Oznaka NIS- Drawing Title Design Drawing designation RNP water wash. FCC complex

EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s process Unit (2600). Sheet 6 of FW 2231-0-50-2606.E LO 03A18A 11FCC complex. DB feed caustic and water wash. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s process Unit (2600). Sheet 7 of FW 2231-0-50-2607.E LO 03A18A 11FCC complex. De-isobutanizer section. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s process Unit (2600). Sheet 8 of 11. FW 2231-0-50-2608.E LO 03A18A Re-run section. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation process Unit (2600). Sheet 9 of 11. FW 2231-0-50-2609.E LO 03A18A Acid neutralization. FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s process Unit (2600). Sheet 10 of FW 2231-0-50-2610.E LO 03A18A 11. Flare and acid blowdown section.FCC complex EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s process Unit (2600). Sheet 11 of FW 2231-0-50-2611.E LO 03A18A 11. Acid and caustic tankage. FCC complex Distribution systems. Flare, acid blowdown, fresh caustic. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2612.C LO 03A18A complex Light naphtha sweetening Unit FW 2231-0-50-2751.E LO 03A18A 2750. FCC complex Heavy naphtha sweetening. Unit FW 2231-0-50-2851.E LO 03A18A 2850. Sheet 1 of 3. FCC complex Heavy naphtha sweetening. Unit FW 2231-0-50-2852.E LO 03A18A 2850. Sheet 2 of 3. FCC complex Heavy naphtha sweetening. Unit FW 2231-0-50-2853.E LO 03A18A 2850. Sheet 3 of 3. FCC complex Sour water stripper (Unit 2900). FW 2231-0-50-2901.E LO 03A18A FCC complex Amine regeneration unit. Sheet 1 of FW 2231-0-50-2951.F LO 03A18A 2. Diagram 1. FCC complex Amine regeneration unit. Sheet 2 of FW 2231-0-50-2952.F LO 03A18A 2. Diagram 2. FCC complex

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Annex 17 Main hazards in FCC

Temperature Pressure Flow Sign Name of the source Medium Phase Class (oC) (bar) (t/h)

Columns in FCC Sirovi benzin DA-2301 Vrh V=600 Lako ciklično plinsko ulje; 350oC 3,2/ 89,5 Fractionation column G/F H=42 Međuciklično plinsko ulje; Dno 3,5 m3/h D= 4,5 560oC Produkt dna kolone DA-2302 Vrh V=60m3 Striper ICGO Međuciklično plinsko ulje 390oC 61 F 3,5 H=10 Međuciklično plinsko ulje ICGO Dno m3/h D=2,2m 430oC P Vrh DA-2303 Striper LCGO LCGO (lako ciklično plinsko 270oC 123,8 V=35m3, F 3,5 (lako ciklično plinsko ulje) ulje) Dno m3/h H/D=8m/1,5m 300oC DC-2301 138,8 Reaktor - striper Vakuum plinsko ulje F 512 2,52 V=350m3, m3/h DC-2302 Reaktor – regenerator 590- Katalizator, koks, CO,CO2 S/G 1,7 - V=700m3, katalizatora 730

FE-2301, Ciklon posude regeneratora i FE-2302 Katalizator vazduh 400 4 - reaktora za katalizator V=250m3,

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Temperature Pressure Flow Sign Name of the source Medium Phase Class (oC) (bar) (t/h)

Heat exchangers

EA- plinsko ulje Plašt izmenjivača Vakuum EA- plinsko ulje 300/240 300/240 20/24 2301A/B Cevni snop izmenjivača LCGO (Lako cik. plin. ulje) 20/24 Vakuum EA- Plašt izmenjivača 340/290 plinsko ulje 340/290 12/24 138,8 2302A/B F 12/24 P Cevni snop izmenjivača Refluks m3/h Plašt izmenjivača Vakuum plinsko ulje EA- 330/380 Produkti dann frakcionatora 330/380 24/11 2303A/B Cevni snop izmenjivača 24/11 (Uglj.+360oC) Plašt izmenjivača 300 EA-2304 LCGO (striper rebojler) 5/11 330 Cevni snop izmenjivača 380

Plašt izmenjivača LCGO (Lako ciklično EA-2305 250 16 330 Cevni snop izmenjivača plinskulje) F

Produkt dann frakcionatora Plašt izmenjivača 235 P EA-2306 (Uglj.+360oC) 20/11 340 Cevni snop izmenjivača Para 380

Refluks – Međucik. plin.ulje Cevni snop izmenjivača 235 EA-2307 (ICGO) F 20/12 340 Plašt izmenjivača Para 340 Pumps GA–2301/S Pumpa za vodu Voda F 100 11 18m3/h - Napojna pumpa za vakuum Vakuum plinsko GA–2302/S F 190 15 168m3/h plinsko ulje ulje

GA–2303/S Pumpa dna 355 7 50 P Ugljovodonici frakcionatora gotov F GA–2304 /S +360oC 90 13 DA-2301 proizvod

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Temperature Pressure Flow Sign Name of the source Medium Phase Class (oC) (bar) (t/h)

GA–2 305/S Refluks pumpa ICGO 310 7 370 ICGO GA–2 306/S ICGO recirkulaciona pumpa (Međuciklično F 400 5 170 plinsko ulje) GA–2 307/S ICGO rebojler pumpa. 390 9 450

LCGO (Lako GA–2308/S LCGO refluks pumpa ciklično plinsko F 210 10 320 ulje) GA–2309/S Uljna pumpa apsorbera Benzin F 45 20 70 Pumpa za LCGO gotov LSGO (Lako GA-2310/S F 250 13 80 proizvod ciklično plinsko ulje) Pumpa za refluks GA–2311/S benzin F 140 8 165 frakcionatora DA-2301 Pumpa za vršne produkte F GA–2312/S frakcionatora (iz posude FA- benzin 50 20 150 2304)

Pumpa za vodu frakcionatora F GA–2313/S Voda+ugljovodonici 45 3 12 S FA-2304 LCGO (Lako F GA–2314/S Pumpe za ulje za ispiranje 15 25 P cikl. plins. ulje)

Pumpa za kiselu vodu od FA- GA–2315/S Kisela voda f - - - P 2304 do S-2900 Vessels and tanks Rezervoar za vakuum plin. FA – 2303 vakuum plin. ulje f 217 3,87 50m3/h ulje Akumulator za vršni produkt Benzin, loživi FA – 2304 G/f 74 3,52 40 frakcionatora gas P FA –2307 Posuda za ulje za LCGO (Lako cikl. FA –2307 F 74 5,3 10 ispiranje plins. ulje)

Rezervoar za smešu FA – 2305 Loživi gas G 72 7,03 8 gasovaloživi

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Temperature Pressure Flow Sign Name of the source Medium Phase Class (oC) (bar) (t/h)

gas FA - 2308 Posuda za dekoksovano VPO vakuum pl. ulje F T 345 8,5 4 FA - 2310 Posuda za TNG TNG G 72 8,8 50 Furnaces Vakuum plinsko 138 BA– 2301 Peć postrojenja S-2300 F 420 20 ulje m3/h

BA-2302 Rebojler ICGO Loživi gas, ICGO f 420 24 340 - BF-2301 CO bojler CO, CO2 G 450 14 - BC-2301 Peć za grejanje vazduha Lož ulje G/F 420 420 10 -

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Annex 18 Block diagram of Pancevo refinery

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Annex 19 List of substances in Pancevo Refinery

Limit Maximum present quantity according Total (t) for the application of to Seveso Substance Quantity Article 9 II (t) directive In process Stored (t)

Annex I, Part 1 Ammonium nitrate 1 2500 / / / / / / Ammonium nitrate2 5000 / / / / / / Arsenic pentoxide, arsenic (V) 2 / / / acid and/or salts

/ / / Arsenic trioxide, arsenious (III) 0,1 / / / acid and/or salts / / / Bromine 100

Chlorine 25

Nickel compounds in inhalable powder form (nickel monoxide, nickel dioxide, nickel sulphide, 1 trinickel disulphide, dinickel trioxide)

Ethyleneimine 20

Fluorine 20

Formaldehyde (concentration 50 90 %)

1 1 This applies to ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate compounds in which the nitrogen content as a result of the ammonium nitrate is more than 28 % by weight (compounds other than those referred to in Note 2) and to aqueous ammonium nitrate solutions in which the concentration of ammonium nitrate is more than 90 % by weight.

2 This applies to simple ammonium-nitrate based fertilizers which comply with Directive 80/876/EEC and to composite fertilizers in which the nitrogen content as a result of the ammonium nitrate is more than 28% in weight (a composite fertilizer contains ammonium nitrate with phosphate and/or potash).

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Limit Maximum present quantity according Total (t) for the application of to Seveso Substance Quantity Article 9 II (t) directive In process Stored (t)

Hydrogen 50 5.72 All units 33.3 Hydrogen chloride (liquefied 250 gas)

Lead alkyls 50

Liquefied extremely flammable gases (including LPG) and 200 natural gas 2109.1 Acetylene 50

Ethylene oxide 50

Propylene oxide 50

Methanol 5000

4, 4-Methylenebis (2- chloraniline) and/or salts, in 0.01 powder form

Methylisocyanate 0.15

Oxygen 2000 / Gaseous oxygen / Toluene diisocyanate 100 64.8

Toluen 64.8 Carbonyl dichloride (phosgene) 0.75

Arsenic trihydride (arsine) 1

Phosphorus trihydride 1 (phosphine)

Sulphur dichloride 1

Sulphur trioxide 75

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Limit Maximum present quantity according Total (t) for the application of to Seveso Substance Quantity Article 9 II (t) directive In process Stored (t)

Polychlorodibenzofurans and polychlorodibenzodioxins 0.001 (including TCDD), calculated in TCDD equivalent

The following CARCINOGENS: 4-Aminobiphenyl and/or its salts, Benzidine and/or salts, Bis (chloromethyl) ether, Chloromethyl methyl ether, Dimethylcarbamoyl 0.001 chloride, Dimethylnitrosomine, Hexamethylphosphoric triamide, 2- Naphtylamine and/or salts, and 1,3 Propanesultone 4-nitrodiphenyl Benzen 84.9

Automotive petrol and other 50000 petroleum spirits Heavy, light and special 1232.2 Gasoline (UN 1993)

Crude oil (UN 1267) 7955.9 Virgin Naphtha Gazoline 99.6 Other gasoline 9597.31

Annex I Part 2 1. Very toxic 20 0.62 2. Toxic 200 422.2 3. Oxidizing 200

OXIGEN (Refrigerating Liquid) 4. Explosive (where the substance or preparation falls within the 200 definition given in Note 2 (a)) ---

5. Explosive (where the substance or preparation falls within the 50 definition given in Note 2 (b)) ---

6. Flamable (where the substance or preparation falls within the 50000 definition given in Note 3 (a)) 17.1

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Limit Maximum present quantity according Total (t) for the application of to Seveso Substance Quantity Article 9 II (t) directive In process Stored (t)

7a. Highly flamable (where the substance or preparation falls within 200 the definition given in Note 3 (b) (1))

7b. Highly flamable (where the substance or preparation falls within 50000 the definition given in Note 3 (b) (2)) 137.5 8. Extremly flammable (where the substance or preparation falls 50 within the definition given in Note 3 (c)) 147.8 9a- DANGEROUS FOR THE 500 ENVIRONMENT (R50)

7121.41 9b.- DANGEROUS FOR THE 2000 ENVIRONMENT (R51/53)

1.08 10. OTHER CATEGORIES not covered by those given above in 500 combination with risk phrases: (i) R14/15)

10. OTHER CATEGORIES not covered by those given above in combination with risk phrases: 200 (ii) R29: ‘in contact with water, liberates toxic gas’ (R29)

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Annex 20 Flow diagrams

A.20.1 FCC complex, Gas concentration unit - Propylene splitter section

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Annex 21 Safety data sheets for substances in FCC

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Annex 22 Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from CPS 2000)

Overpressure

Equipment psi 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 bar 34 69 03 38 72 07 41 76 10 45 79 14 48 83 17 52 86 21 55 90 28 66 03 41 79 Control House Steel A C D N Roof Control House A E P D N Concrete Roof Cooling Tower B F O Tank: Cone Roof D K U Instrument Cubicle A LM T Fire heater G I T Reactor: chemical A I P T Filter – Filter H F V T Regenerator I IP T Tank: Floating Roof K U D Reactor: cracking I I Pine supports P SO Utilities: gas meter Q

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Overpressure

Equipment psi 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 bar 34 69 03 38 72 07 41 76 10 45 79 14 48 83 17 52 86 21 55 90 28 66 03 41 79 Utilities: electronic H I transformer Electric motor H I V Blower – Duvaljke Q T Fractionation colum R T Pressure vessel: PI T horizontal Utilities: gas regulato I MQ Extraction column I V T Steam Turbine I M S V Heat exchanger I T Tank sphere I I T Pressure vessel: I T vertical Pump I V

Legend: A - Windows and gauges broken G - Brick cracks M - Controls are damaged S - Piping breaks B - Louvers fall at 0.2 - 0.5 psi H - Debris-missile damage occurs N - Block walls fall T - Unit overturns or is destroyed C - switch gear is damaged from roof collapse I - Unit moves and pipes breaks O - Frame collapses U - Unit uplifts (0.9 tilted) D - Roof collapses J - Bracing falls P - Frame deforms V - Unit moves on foundation E - Instruments are damaged K - Unit uplifts (half tilted) R - Frame cracks F - Inner parts are damaged L - Power lines are severed Q - Case is damaged

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Annex 23 Summary of hazard analysis

Consequences Frequency Damage distance Occurrence Explosion Dispersion Toxic/ Nr. Event of the Data Accident Scenario (m) frequency overpressure Flammable event Fire heat radiation (bar) threshold (kW/m2) 37.5 20 0.3 - LC50 -

1. Pool fire 12.5 42 0.14 - IDLH - 5E-8 (immediate ignition) 7 55 0.07 - LFL - 5 63 0.03 - 1/2 LFL - 37.5 - 0.3 150 LC50 - Leak from bottom of Substance: 2. VCE 12.5 - 0.14 260 IDLH - TOP1 the vessel FA-2514 5E-7 Propylene 2E-9 (delayed ignition) Ø leak: 6" 7 - 0.07 570 LFL 562 5 - 0.03 1000 1/2 LFL 758 37.5 0.3 - LC50 -

3. Flash fire 12.5 0.14 - IDLH - 4E-9 (delayed ignition) 7 0.07 - LFL -

5 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -

37.5 5 0.3 - LC50 - Substance: Leak from the bottom gasoline 4. Jet fire 12.5 15 0.14 - IDLH - TOP2 1E-5 3E-8 of the column DA-2503 Ø leak: 1" (immediate ignition) 7 20 0.07 - LFL -

5 25 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -

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Consequences Frequency Damage distance Occurrence Explosion Dispersion Toxic/ Nr. Event of the Data Accident Scenario (m) frequency overpressure Flammable event Fire heat radiation (bar) threshold (kW/m2) 37.5 - LC50 - Mass in flammable 5. VCE 12.5 - condition IDLH - - (delayed ignition) 7 - < 1000 kg. LFL - VCE is not credible. 5 - 1/2 LFL - 37.5 - 0.3 - LC50 -

6. Flash fire 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH - 1E-7 (delayed ignition) 7 - 0.07 - LFL 85 5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL 112 37.5 7 0.3 - LC50 -

7. Jet fire 12.5 16 0.14 - IDLH - 1E-7 (immediate ignition) Substance: 7 25 0.07 - LFL - Major leak from the Gasoline TOP3 bottom of the column 5E-7 5 28 0.03 - 1/2 LFL - Ø leak: 4" DA-2503 8. VCE - Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible. (delayed ignition) 9. Flash fire 5E-9 Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible. (delayed ignition) 37.5 5 0.3 - LC50 -

10. Jet fire 12.5 8 0.14 - IDLH - 3E-6 (immediate ignition) 7 11 0.07 - LFL - 5 14 0.03 - 1/2 LFL - Substance: Leak from the bottom Propane 37.5 - LC50 - TOP4 1E-5 Mass in flammable of Splitter DA-2509 Ø leak: 1" 11. VCE 12.5 - condition IDLH - - (delayed ignition) 7 - < 1000 kg. LFL - VCE is not credible. 5 - 1/2 LFL -

12. Flash fire 37.5 - 0.3 - LC50 - 1E-7 (delayed ignition) 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH -

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Consequences Frequency Damage distance Occurrence Explosion Dispersion Toxic/ Nr. Event of the Data Accident Scenario (m) frequency overpressure Flammable event Fire heat radiation (bar) threshold (kW/m2) 7 - 0.07 - LFL 85 5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL 112 37.5 7 0.3 - LC50 -

13. Jet fire 12.5 16 0.14 - IDLH - 1E-7 (immediate ignition) Substance: 7 25 0.07 - LFL - Major leak from the Gasoline TOP5 bottom of the splitter 5E-7 5 28 0.03 - 1/2 LFL - Ø leak: 3" DA-2509 14. VCE - Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible. (delayed ignition) 15. Flash fire 5E-9 Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible. (delayed ignition) 1300 37.5 - 0.3 - LC50 Substance: (1.5F) H2S (90%) Leak of toxic gas from Ø leak: 50 420 TOP6 1E-7 16. Toxic dispersion 1E-5 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH FA-2953 mm (1.5F) Release 7 - 0.07 - LFL - height: 3 m 5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL - 1100 Substance: 37.5 - 0.3 - LC50 H2S + CO2 + (1.5F) Leak of toxic gas from SO2 360 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH TOP7 combustion chamber 1E-5 Ø leak: 100 17. Toxic dispersion 1E-5 (1.5F) FA-2455 mm Release 7 - 0.07 - LFL - height: 1 m 5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -

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Annex 24 FCC: Bow-tie analysis result

A.24.1 TOP1: Release from FA-2514

A.24.2 TOP2: Release from DA-2503

A.24.3 TOP3: Release from DA-2509

A.24.4 TOP4: Release from FA-2953

A.24.5 TOP5: Release from FA-2455

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RGE: API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009

ID Name Likelihood Consequence Risk 2903 C1A/B (potis) 3 C Medium 2902 C1A/B (usis) 3 C Medium 2905 C2A/B (potis) 3 C Medium 2904 C2A/B (usis) 3 C Medium 2845 D-1 3 D Medium High 2855 D-101 4 C Medium High 2856 D-102 4 E High 2857 D-103 2 D Medium 2858 D-104 2 D Medium 2853 D-11 2 D Medium 2859 D-111 2 D Medium 2860 D-112 2 D Medium 2861 D-12 2 D Medium 2862 D-120 2 D Medium 2863 D-121 2 D Medium 2864 D-122 2 D Medium 2854 D-16 2 D Medium 2846 D-2 2 D Medium 2906 D-27A 2 D Medium 2907 D-27B 2 C Medium 2908 D-27C 2 C Medium 2917 D-27D 2 D Medium 2918 D-27E 2 C Medium 2919 D-27F 2 D Medium 2909 D-28A 2 D Medium 2910 D-28B 2 D Medium 2911 D-28C 2 D Medium 2912 D-28D 2 D Medium 2913 D-28E 2 D Medium 2920 D-28F 2 D Medium 2921 D-28G 2 D Medium 2914 D-29A 2 D Medium

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ID Name Likelihood Consequence Risk 2915 D-29B 2 D Medium 2916 D-29C 2 D Medium 2865 D-300 2 E Medium High 2847 D-4 2 D Medium 2848 D-5 2 D Medium 2849 D-6 2 D Medium 2850 D-7 2 D Medium 2851 D-8 2 D Medium 2852 D-9 2 D Medium 2875 E-10 2 C Medium 2893 E-101/A 2 B Low 2894 E-101/B 2 B Low 2895 E-102 2 C Medium 2896 E-103 2 C Medium 2897 E-104 2 C Medium 2876 E-11 2 C Medium 2898 E-110 2 C Medium 2899 E-113 2 C Medium 2900 E-116 2 C Medium 2877 E-12 2 C Medium 2901 E-120 2 C Medium 2878 E-13 2 C Medium 2879 E-14 2 C Medium 2880 E-15 2 C Medium 2881 E-16 2 C Medium 2882 E-17 2 C Medium 2883 E-18 2 C Medium 2884 E-19 2 C Medium 2866 E-1A/B 2 B Low 2867 E-2 2 C Medium 2885 E-20A 2 B Low 2886 E-20B 2 C Medium 2887 E-21 2 C Medium 2888 E-22 2 C Medium 2889 E-23 2 C Medium 2890 E-24/A 2 C Medium 2891 E-24/B 2 C Medium 2892 E-25 2 C Medium 2868 E-3 2 C Medium 2869 E-4 2 C Medium

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ID Name Likelihood Consequence Risk 2870 E-5 2 C Medium 2871 E-6A/B 2 C Medium 2872 E-7 2 C Medium 2873 E-8 2 C Medium 2874 E-9 2 C Medium 2931 FT-103A 2 B Low 2932 FT-103B 2 B Low 2933 FT-104 2 B Low 2923 FT-301 2 D Medium 2922 FT-302 2 B Low 2925 HP-1 2 B Low 2926 HP-2 2 B Low 2927 JI-1 2 B Low 2928 JI-2 2 B Low 2929 PF-1 2 B Low 2930 PF-2 2 B Low 2924 SP-1 2 B Low 2835 T-1 3 E High 2844 T-101 3 E High 2836 T-2 3 E High 2837 T-3 3 D Medium High 2838 T-4 3 D Medium High 2839 T-5 3 E High 2840 T-6 3 D Medium High 2841 T-7 3 E High 2842 T-8 3 D Medium High 2843 T-9 2 E Medium High

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Annex 25 RGE: API 581 Qualitative, component based - Inspection planning

Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

Pressure D-102 trofazni separator 1969 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1 vessel

T-1 ulazni separator Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1

kolona za sušenje T-101 Column 1988 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1 gasa

T-2 apsorpciona kolona Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1

prečistač posnog T-5 Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1 ulja

T-7 deetanizer Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1

Pressure D-101 separator 1962 2009 Medium High 4 1 1 1 1 vessel

Pressure D-1 prihvatni sud 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1 vessel

Pressure D-300 trofazni separator 2000 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1 vessel

T-3 deetanizer Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1

T-4 Column 1963 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1

T-6 depropanizer Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1

T-8 deizobutanizer Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1

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Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

T-9 Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1

C1A/B KOMPRESORSKE Pressure 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 (potis) BOCE vessel

C1A/B KOMPRESORSKE Pressure 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 (usis) BOCE vessel

C2A/B KOMPRESORSKE Pressure 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 (potis) BOCE vessel

C2A/B KOMPRESORSKE Pressure 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 (usis) BOCE vessel

Pressure D-103 međusakupljač 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-104 trofazni separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-11 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-111 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-112 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-12 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-120 separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-121 separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-122 separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-16 trofazni separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-2 sakupljač refluksa 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

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Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

Pressure D-27A rezervoar 1963 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-27D rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-27F rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28A rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28B rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28C rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28D rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28E rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28F rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-28G rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-29A rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-29B rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-29C rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-4 prihvatni sud 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-5 isparivač 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

D-6 sakupljač refluksa Pressure 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1

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Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

vessel

Pressure D-7 sakupljač refluksa 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-8 sakupljač refluksa 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-9 prihvatni sud 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1 vessel

FT-301 Filter Filter 1962 2009 Medium 7 1 1 1 1

Pressure D-27B rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-27C rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 vessel

Pressure D-27E rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 vessel

Boiler - Furnace Tubes E-10 rebojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 for Fired Heater

E-102 propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-103 propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Heat E-104 izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

Boiler - Furnace Tubes E-11 predgrejač 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 for Fired Heater

Heat E-110 izmenjivač 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

Heat E-113 izmenjivač 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

E-116 izmenjivač Heat 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

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Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

Exchanger

E-12 kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Heat E-120 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

E-13 vodeni hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Heat E-14 izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

kondenzator E-15 Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 propana

Heat E-16 predgrejač 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

Boiler - Furnace Tubes E-17 rebojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 for Fired Heater

E-18 kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Boiler - Furnace Tubes E-19 rebojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 for Fired Heater

E-2 propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-20B kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Boiler - Furnace Tubes E-21 rebojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 for Fired Heater

E-22 vodeni hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-23 kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-24/A propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-24/B propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

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Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

Heat E-25 izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

E-3 propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-4 vodeni hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Heat E-5 izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

Heat E-6A/B izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

E-7 propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

E-8 vodeni hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Boiler - Furnace Tubes E-9 međubojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1 for Fired Heater

Heat E-101/A izmenjivač lote 1963 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

Heat E-101/B izmenjivač lote 1963 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

Heat E-1A/B izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1 Exchanger

E-20A kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1

FT-103A Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1

FT-103B Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1

Filter sa aktivnim FT-104 Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1 ugljem

FT-302 Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1

Other HP-1 Hidroforska posuda 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1 Equipment

HP-2 Hidroforska posuda Other 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1

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Recommended Recommended Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011 Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D type) inspection type)

Equipment

Other JI-1 Jono izmenjivač 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1 Equipment

Other JI-2 Jono izmenjivač 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1 Equipment

PF-1 Peščani filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1

Peščani filter-bočna PF-2 Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1 filtrac.

Other SP-1 Posuda za so 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1 Equipment

Total to be inspected: 51 94 56

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